Text

Svc Water Sys Operational Performance Insp (Swsopi) Self- Assessment Rept
	ML17332A761
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	05/05/1995
From:	Stanley R; INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:	;
Shared Package
ML17332A760	List: ML17332A759; ML17332A761;
References
	NUDOCS 9505180505
	Download: ML17332A761 (116)
	v • d • e

SERVICE MATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION (SWSOPI)

COOK NUCLEARPLANT SELF-ASSESSMENT REPORT MAY5, 1995 DATE:

mme Bv: (6'~~ ~i~~<

@P ~rg~

Dwvs:

APPROVED BY:

9505i80505'9505i'2 eas

aaacv ~asooaaxs

'PDR 8

TABLEOF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

i

1.0 INTRODUCTION

~...

~.. ~..... ~.....,

1 2.0 GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION............................

3 3.0 MECHANICAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN REVIEW.. ~.....

5 4.0 OPERATIONS.................................,...........

14 5.0 MAINTENANCE

~

22 6.0 SURVEILLANCE AND TESTING

~

~ I

~

~ \\

~

41 7.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS...........

49 8.0 ELECTRICAL AND I&C....................................

54 9.0 PERSONS CONTACTED

~

58 ATTACHMENTS:

A -

Self-Assessment Plan B -

Condition Reports C -

ESW Job Order Summary - Generic Letter 89-13 Corrosion Monitoring D -

Generic Letter 89-13 Actions Summary E -

Recommendations F -

Requests for Information American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization (AEPNO) conducted a Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI) at the Cook Nuclear Plant from February 27, 1995 to March 31, 1995.

This self-assessment was an AEPNO initiative led by the Nuclear Engineering Department and consisted of a team of ten reviewers from AEPNO's corporate office, Cook Nuclear Plant, and General Physics/Cygna Energy Services (GP/Cygna).

A full scale SWSOPI methodology was utilized for the self-assessment using NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/118, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)," as a guideline, The self-assessment was also conducted under the "Licensee Self-Assessment Related to Area-of-Emphasis Inspection," which is promoted by the NRC in Administrative Letter 94-03. In order to perform a self-assessment of this type NRC approval is required.

The NRC performs an oversight of the self-assessment

process, and then conducts a short inspection after the self-assessment report is issued.

This review and oversight was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 40501.

The NRC's SWSOPI requirements and objectives were incorporated into the self-assessment plan and the inspection was conducted accordingly.

The objective was to assess the operational readiness of the Essential Service Water (ESW) System, placing emphasis on actions in response to Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."

The ESW system was determined to be capable of fulfillingits thermal and hydraulic performance requirements and found to be operated consistent with its design basis.

Operational controls, maintenance, surveillance, testing,'and personnel training were found satisfactory, thus ensuring the ESW system willperform its safety related functions.

There were several programmatic strengths identified during the self-assessment.

These were; overall operations, the zebra mussel program, the forebay inspection and cleaning

program, and the self-betterment program in the Nuclear Engineering Department I&C Section.

However, there is need for improvement in some areas; specifically issues relating to Generic Letter 89-13. As a result of the inspection, fifteen condition reports (CRs) were issued for processing in accordance with GP 16.1/PMI-7030.

No operability or reportability concerns were identified.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System

'perational Performance Inspection 1

The primary findings of this inspection are the following:

~ Small margins exist in the fiows to the containment spray (CTS) heat exchangers during the flow balancing operation.

(CR 95-0510)

~ Few pipe inspections are being conducted on the ESW system for microbiological induced corrosion (MIC) or fouling. (CR 95-0509)

~ Acceptance criteria for inspecting safety-related heat exchangers are insufficient.

(CR 95-0511)

~ The heat transfer analyses of the component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger tests do not meet Generic Letter 89-13 requirements to calculate the heat transfer at the design conditions after obtaining the fouling factors from the test data.

Flow and temperature measurements need to be improved.

(CR 95-0512)

~ At times, a vacuum exists on the shell side (ESW side) of the CTS heat exchanger.

During the post-LOCA recirculation mode, steam formation and reduced fiow through the heat exchanger could result.

(CR 95-0513) 4 A partial summary report was not issued for RFC-3076 which would have assured that OP drawings and procedures were revised in a timely manner, It does not appear that there was adequate configurationloperational control for these valves.

(CR 95-0421)

~ Emergency diesel AB south combustion air aftercooler temperature indicator 2-XTI-301 is in disrepair and was reattached to its mounting with masking tape.

(CR 95-0475)

~ 12-RFC-2935 and 12-MM-227 upgraded the ESW pump's parts from bronze to stainless steel.

Both design changes were closed out after all engineering work was completed, but prior to implementation at Cook Nuclear Plant.

(CR 95-0476)

Insufficient training has been conducted on Generic Letter 89-13 issues.

Interviews with maintenance personnel indicate that understanding of MIC, silt accumulation, and corrosion is weak.

(CR 95-0507)

Attachment B lists all CRs associated with this inspection.

Attachment D lists the summary of the implementation of the five actions of Generic Letter 89-13.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection ll

RECOMMENDATIONS To maintain the ESW system and to retain its capability to perform its safety related functions, the following actions are recommended:

Ri Evaluate the CCW heat exchanger supply piping for silt accumulation and reconfirm the flow instrumentation.

Ifsilt accumulations show potential impact on indicated flow, reperform the flow balance, i.e.,if the actual flows in the line are found to be higher than previously thought.

This extra flow to the CCW heat exchanger takes flow away from the CTS heat exchanger.

(Ref: Plan Item 1.8)

R2 Continue development of the computer model for hydraulic analysis of the ESW system.

Evaluate the flow balance for LOCA conditions when two pumps per train (one in Unit 1 and one in Unit 2) are expected to be running.

Confirm that the flow balance valve lineup is valid under the operating case of the open train cross-tie valves (between units) with the other unit in each of its possible configurations.

(Ref: Plan Item 1.1)

R3 Develop a heat exchanger heat transfer test program for testing and analyzing CCW heat exchangers which includes a basis for test requirements for the following:

type of instrumentation number of each type sensor location Test data analysis methodology should also include; source references for the equations used, sample calculations, and a calculation which supports the design data sheet.

Verification should be completed for the analysis methodology.

(Ref: Plan Items 1.19 and 4.13)

R4 Establish the flow rates in the flow balance at values close to the required flow rates.

Currently, excess flow rates are established to the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and CCW heat exchangers which contribute to low flow to the CTS heat exchangers.

(Ref: Plan Item 1.8)

RS Develop a pipe inspection program.

The program should focus on the key Generic Letter 89-13 issues of silt accumulation, mussels, MIC, and corrosion and should include a timeline for completion.

Inspection of the embedded piping in the turbine building foundation should be included. (Ref: Plan Item 3.7)

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection iii

R6 Change the test flow rate for the IST pump test.

The ESW pump is tested at a flow rate of 7,000gpm.

The accident flow rates in the flow balance are 9,126gpm plus up to 80 gpm for the control room air conditioning (CRAC).

Therefore, the test flow rate should be on the order of 9,200gpm. (Ref: Plan Item 1.8)

R7 Since silt accumulation has been a historical condition at Cook Nuclear Plant, the ESW System piping should be radiographed at key locations to determine the extent of silt accumulation.

These locations should include the following:

the low points in the line to the CTS heat exchanger, the upstream and downstream piping adjacent to the flow orifices monitoring the CTS and CCW heat exchanger

flows, and the 12" piping upstream of the 3" takeoff to the CRAC.

Cook Nuclear Plant has been in operation for over twenty years; therefore, silt accumulation could be significant at these low point and low flow condition locations in the ESW Sytem piping. (Ref: Plan Item 3.4)

RS Develop inspection criteria for components in the ESW system which include quantifiable parameters.

(Ref: Plan Item 3.4)

R9 Implement additional training for the maintenance supervisors and mechanics including topics such as silt accumulation, MIC, mussels, and corrosion (pipe wall loss). (Ref: Plan Item 3.13)

RIO Review implementation of significantly delayed modification packages to ensure the information is current from a technical and administrative

aspect, (Ref: Plan Items 4.7 and 6.5)

Attachment E lists all the recommendations associated with this inspection.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection lv

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A SWSOPI self-assessment was conducted at the Cook Nuclear Plant and corporate offices by the American Electric Power Nuclear Organization (AEPNO) and General Physics/Cygna Energy Services (GP/Cygna).

The self-assessment was conducted between February 27, 1995 and March 31,1995,and was conducted by a team comprised of ten reviewers from AEPNO corporate office, Cook Nuclear Plant, and GP/Cygna.

The self-assessment team was comprised of the following members:

Team Leader:

David Powell, AEPSC - NED Mechanical:

Robert Stanley, GP/Cygna Gregory Hines, AEPSC - NED Operations:

Alan Tattersall, GP/Cygna Pat O'eil, ISLAM - Operations Maintenance:

Jeffrey Haverly, GP/Cygna Curtis Hehl, I&M-Maintenance Surveillance and Testing:

James Olson, GP/Cygna Walter McCrory, ISLAM - Plant Engineering Electrical and ILC:

Donald Kosack, GP/Cygna The self-assessment methodology utilized for this effort was a full scale SWSOPI using NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/11S titled, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)," as a guideline.

The self-assessment was also conducted as a "Licensee Self-Assessment Related to Area-of-Emphasis Inspections" promoted by the NRC in Administrative Letter 94-03.

In order to perform a self-assessment of this type, NRC approval is required and the NRC performs an oversight of the self assessment

process, This review and oversight is conducted by the NRC through Inspection Procedure 40501.

The NRC's SWSOPI requirements and objectives were incorporated into the SWSOPI Self-Assessment Plan.

The self-assessment was then conducted in accordance with the plan.

The plan covered the following areas; Mechanical Design, Operations, Maintenance, Surveillance and Testing, Quality Assurance American Electric Power

~

Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page 1 of 60

and Corrective Actions, and Electrical and INC. The plan is'ncluded in Attachment A.

The objective of the SWSOPI was to assess the operational readiness of the ESW system, with emphasis on AEP's actions in response to Generic Letter 89-13 (GL 89-13), "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."

Assessment Ob ec ives The objectives of the SWSOPI procedure are:

~ assess the licensee's planned or completed actions in response to GL 89-13, verify that the service water system is capable of fulfillingits thermal and hydraulic performance requirements and is operated consistently with its design basis, and

~ assess the operational controls, maintenance, surveillance and other testing, and personnel training to ensure that the service water system is operated and maintained such that it can perform its safety related functions.

The scope of GL 89-13 requests licensees to perform the following tasks:

1. Implement and maintain an ongoing program of surveillance and control techniques to significantly reduce the incidence of flow blockage problems as a result of biofouling in open-cycle service water systems.

2. Conduct a test program to verify the heat exchanger capability of all safety-related heat exchangers cooled by service water.

The total test program should consist of an initial and periodic test programs and should include heat exchangers connected to or cooled by one or more open-cycle systems.

3. Establish a routine inspection and maintenance program for open-cycle service water system piping and components to ensure that corrosion, erosion, protective coating failure, silting, and biofouling cannot degrade performance of the safety-related systems supplied by service water.

4. Confirm that the service water system willperform its intended function in accordance with the licensing basis.

5. Confirm that maintenance practices, normal and emergency operating procedures, and training are adequate to ensure that safety-related equipment American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page 2 of 60

cooled by the service water system willfunction as intended and that operators of this equipment willperform effectively. Confirmation should include review of practices, procedures, and training modules.

The Self-Assessmerit Plan contained topics which were evaluated by team members.

Starting with Section 3.0 in this report, the individual topics from the plan are stated, and the inspection assessment is provided for the topic.

During the self-assessment, Requests for Information (RFI) were generated.

The RFIs are listed in Attachment F.

Assessment records were also used by each team member to record findings and observations for each assessment plan item.

These assessment records are not included in this report, but are available in NED files for review.

2.0 GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION The Essential Service Water (ESW) System at Cook Nuclear Plant is comprised of two supply headers (east and west) in each unit.

Each header is cross-tied to a header in the other unit (i.e., 1E header is cross-tied to 2W header).

Two isolation valves, which are normally open and do not automatically

close, separate the headers between the units.

The east header in one unit, together with the west header in the other unit, (1E and 2W, 2E and 1W) is considered a train.

Two ESW pumps (1E and 2W, 2E and 1W) supply water to each train.

Each ESW header in a unit supplies the following components:

~ component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger,

~ containment spray (CTS) heat exchanger,

~ control room air conditioning (CRAC) system,

~ a primary supply to one of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) on the

unit, an alternate supply to the other EDG on the unit, and

~ emergency supply to auxiliary feedwater '(AFW) pump(s)

(one or two depending on the header)

A duplex strainer is located on the discharge of each pump, which will automatically backwash once a day from a timer signal. It also automatically backwashes on high differential pressure.

The strainer is a duplex basket (when one basket is, in service the other can be backwashed).

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page 3 of 60

ESW pumps are located in the intake structure, which is a seismically designed structure and are located between each unit's circulating water (CW) pumps and behind the CW traveling screens.

Water is drawn into the intake structure via pipelines which are 2,285'into Lake Michigan, A crib is provided at the entrance to each pipeline.

The ESW discharge line returns water to the lake just downstream from the CW discharge tunnels and upstream of the CW discharge pipes, which extend 1,150'into the lake.

The ESW discharge location is just downstream from the roller gate, which is closed to permit CW recirculation during winter operation.

During normal operation, water is supplied only to the CCW heat exchanger and the CRAC.

Cook Nuclear Plant operators provide flow to the EDGs during winter, when ESW system flows are low due to low lake temperatures, to maintain minimum flow requirements.

Ifloss of power occurs, the EDG starts and the associated ESW pump is sequenced on.

The EDG's ESW supply water valves are environmentally qualified and are located in a tunnel along with the steam line to the AFW turbine.

In the event of a steam line break, the motor operators and controls can withstand harsh environmental conditions.

There are two safeguard actuation trains in each unit (A and B). In the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), the solid state protection system (SSPS) will provide a start signal to all four ESW pumps (i.e., the Train A signal starts two Train A pumps (1E and 2W), and the Train B signal starts two Train B pumps (1W and 2E)).

The safety injection (SI) signal willalso position the outlet valve on the CCW heat exchanger to provide 5,500 gpm. After the refueling water storage tank is depleted in the injection phase and ifthere is a permissive from the containment sump outlet valves, the SSPS automatically opens the outlet valves on the CTS heat exchanger to permit a minimum flow of 2,400gpm.

Radiation monitors are provided on the ESW outlet of the CTS heat exchanger to detect a leak between CTS and ESW; otherwise, a leak would result in an unmonitored radioactive discharge to the environment during an accident.

The CRAC unit is non-seismic and non-safety related.

An ESW cross-tie to the control room air handler is provided to supply ESW directly to the air handling cooling coil in the event that the CRAC is unavailable for service and cooling is required.

Cross-tie valving must be performed manually.

In an SI event, flow to the CRAC system remains aligned.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page 4 of 60

ESW provides a back-up supply to the AFW pumps in the event normal AFW system supplies are not available.

Manual operation is required to initiate back-up flow to AFW.

3.0 MECHANICALSYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN REVIEW Plan Item 1.1-Review the design-bases, and other design documents such as calculations and analyses for the SWS, and determine the functional requirements for the SWS and each active component during accident or abnormal conditions.

The design basis is clearly stated in the Design Basis Document (DBD).

Supporting information is identified in the System Description, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and Westinghouse analyses (WCAPS).

FSAR Table 9.8-5 identifies the ESW system flow requirements.

The functional requirement for ESW system is to provide sufficient fiow to the various components to remove the design heat loads.

The component should be designed to operate in the expected environment, able to operate in the event of a single active failure, and designed to operate following an earthquake.

Functional requirements for specific active components are:

~ establish 5,500 gpm to the CCW heat exchanger in the event of a LOCA by positioning its outlet valve,

~ establish 2,400 gpm to the CTS heat exchanger during the recirculation

mode,

~ establish flow to the diesel generators when they are started, and

~ start the ESW pumps on either a loss of power condition or an SI signal.

The pump head requirement was determined in several calculations.

Calculation HXP841106 began the series and was supplemented by HXP900626AF and others.

A new computerized flow model, which is almost complete, is in development and provides a good evaluation of the hydraulic conditions.

It is not yet modeled for all the design basis scenarios.

Various operating procedures were reviewed for correlation to calculations or other engineering output.

Seven operating procedures were reviewed, and none contained requirements for ESW fiow excluding minimum pump fiow requirements.

Comparison between PMSO.111 and the system operating procedure revealed different values (87.5'F versus 90'F) for maximum allowable American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page 5 of 60

lake temperature.

Procedure change request (PCR) 95-0259 was issued to rectify this discrepancy.

Plan Item 1.2-Review the SKS configuration drawings for consistency with applicable design documents, NRC requirements, and licensing commitments.

The configuration drawings, test procedures, and vendor manuals were found to be consistent with design documents, NRC requirements, and licensing commitments.

A flow balance test was performed to confirm valve positioning for an SI signal.

The CCW heat exchanger is heat transfer tested for GL 89-13 requirements.

ESW pumps are in-service tested (IST) in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements.

With the exception of a line size discrepancy on the CTS heat exchanger vent found during a walkdown, the flow diagrams matched Cook Nuclear Plant configuration.

Plan Item 1.3-Review the SWS operation as compared to design documents.

Based on discussions with the system engineer and members of the inspection team and a review of plant documents, operation of the ESW system was found to be in accordance with design documents.

The system is flow balanced, as required; ESW strainer

operates, as required; pump flows are within both minimum and maximum limits; and diesel generator heat exchangers are placed in operation when lake temperatures are low to assure that minimum pump flow requirements are met.

Surveillance tests for Train A and Train 3 SI signals are performed to start the associated ESW pumps.

During normal configuration, one pump is operated on a combined pipe header to keep each train pressurized.

The procedures and observed operation of the ESW system conform to the design basis.

Plan Item 1.4-Evaluate single active failure vulnerabilities of the system and the resulting impact on interfacing system components.

Also, examine potential common mode failures from fouling of common intakes or traveling screens.

The single active failure review, which was performed for GL 89-13, was limited to a review of UFSAR Table 9.8-6, "Essential Service Water System Malfunction Analysis." Each unit is provided with two trains or headers throughout Cook Nuclear Plant, which is acceptable from a mechanical perspective.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page 6 of 60

The control system was reviewed, in particular the configuration for a train SI signal.

Both Train A and Train B SI signals start two pumps on one header, which is acceptable since two pumps on a common pipe header provide the flows required for two unit operation.

The ESW pumps are located downstream from the CW traveling screens.

The common ESW structure is downstream from the screens.

While this provides a

potential common mode failure (clogging of all screens),

the remaining open area of the screens and the associated low flow rates as circulating water pumps are shut down would not prevent the ESW pumps from receiving lake water and thus being able to perform their safety function.

The flow rate for the ESW pumps is very small compared to total circulating water flow.

Plan Item 1.5-Review the effectiveness of design features installed to minimize silting and biofouling of the piping and components.

The general arrangement of the intake minimizes massive silt intrusions to Cook Nuclear Plant.

Intake pipes take suction from a crib 2,285'into the lake.

The water then flows to the intake structure.

The bottom elevation of the intake structure is lower than the lake bottom and the west wall of the intake structure precludes silt movement into the intake.

However, some silt does enter the system at the crib. Most of this is silt which is in suspension in the lake.

Additionally, the ESW pumps are set back in the intake, which has low velocity areas where silt settles to the bottom, with a wall in front of the pump cells.

Intermittent chlorination has been less than completely effective in preventing veliger settlement and colonization in the service water system.

Continuous chlorination is scheduled to begin May 1, 1995, pending expected approval by the Michigan Department of Natural Resources.

A draft chlorination study is in the approval stages.

Clamtrol treatment has been effective in killing mussels that colonize in the systems.

Plan Item 1.6-Verifyiffeatures are provided for the timely detection of flow degradation and ifflowbalancing has been conducted during various system operating modes.

A flow balance is performed to verify that, for the valves which position automatically, the fiows which are achieved exceed those fiows required during the LOCA recirculation phase.

System fiow balances and component inspections provide timely detection of fiow degradation.

Additionally, the CTS loop is tested monthly at high flow rates to fiush out silt accumulation.

These are based on Recurring Tasks 18086 through 18089.

American Electric Power

~

Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page Z of 60

The Operations Department performs surveillances on the ESW system to determine whether the pumps and valves are operable per ASME Section XI valve Ec pump program requirements, which provide an assessment of pump and valve condition.

During the respective unit outages performance testing of heat exchangers and EDG coolers provides a satisfactory indication of potential flow degradation.

These performance tests and associated results are discussed in more detail under Plan Items 1.11 and 4.12.

Plan Item 1.7-Verifythat pump run-out conditions are not present with minimum number of pumps operating with worst case alignment of non-safety related loads.

Computer flow analyses results were reviewed and indicated that the pump run-out condition is acceptable.

The CRAC system is the only non-safety related load in the system and it is not automatically isolated for loss of power or LOCA scenarios.

In the event it cannot perform its air conditioning function, there is a safety related capability provided.

The ESW system can also provide water directly to the control room air handler cooling coil. Procedures are in place to manually start ESW flow to the coil and to isolate the flow to the non-safety related CRAC unit. Flow requirements for the CRAC or air handler coil are approximately the same.

Plan Item 1.8-Verifythat system flowbalance data is consistent with key design assumptions.

Flow balance procedures for Units 1 and 2 were reviewed.

Requirements in the flow balance test procedures and in test data were found to be consistent with the design assumptions which are listed in the DBD and UFSAR.

The results associated with these procedures, which were performed during the last three

outages, were also reviewed.

The flow balance satisfactorily demonstrated that the required flow during a design basis event would be delivered to the respective heat exchangers and coolers.

However, the procedure does not verify design flow to the CRAC units.

The flow to the CRAC is recorded.

However, this data is taken with the temperature control valves (1, 2-WRV-711, 712) regulating flow to the chiller package condensers so that the maximum required flow cannot be achieved.

Commitments relating to flow balancing were more associated with confirming the valve positioning, which automatically

changes, than with confirming the actual system flow balance.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page S of 60

The flow balance results also show that the outlet valve on Unit 2 west CTS heat exchanger has to be fullyopen to deliver the required flow. Flow rates achieved for the three different tests reviewed were marginally above the required minimum flow. Additionally, the outlet valves for the other CTS heat exchangers were also found to be open more than 80% with achieved fiows only marginally above requirements.

While design flows are achieved, there is minimal flow margin to the CTS heat exchanger.

The individual flows achieved for each of the other components is appreciably higher than the values required in the flow balance procedure.

Additionally, silt accumulation in the ESW supply lines to the CCW heat exchanger, upstream of the flow orifice, could cause false low flow readings.

The ESW portion of the thermal balance in the heat transfer test has shown consistent low values, which may be due to errant flow readings.

In addition, the results of the IST on the ESW pumps show the pumps are operating below their curves.

This results in the operating point on the pump curve being significantly past the desired operating point.

As a result the pump pressure is lower than expected.

The total effect of the three conditions (higher actual flows to the CCW heat exchanger due to silt accumulation flow errors, use of higher flow rates in the flow balance (resulting in the flow rate being past the pump design point), and degraded pump performance) could be the root cause of the reduced

pressure, and thus fiow, to the CTS heat exchanger.

The above conditions were modeled into both a computer simulation of the system and the computer fiow analysis for the ESW system, The results showed that with higher flows to the CCW heat exchanger, lower pump total developed

head, and higher flows to the EDGs the pressure at the CTS heat exchanger was reduced and the outlet valve in the model needed to be full open to achieve the required flows.

Item 1.9-Check whether design features are provided to mitigate the effects of flooding caused by SWS leaks.

Review NUREG 1275, Volume 3, Section 3.3, for information on SWS events involving actual or potential flooding.

Mitigation of flooding events appears to have been adequately addressed.

Two additional manually-actuated flood protection pumps (approximately 200 gpm each) were added to the heater drain room sump pits in the early 1990s under PM 12-1187.

Provisions were made for draining the ESW pipe tunnel by adding a 4" connection through the pipe tunnel wall, which drains water from the tunnel to the heater drain pump room, where it would be removed by the flood protection pumps.

Combined capacity of the two pumps (400 gpm) is exceeded American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page 9 of 60

by the flow rate from the postulated crack in the pipe (706 gpm).

However, the ~

time to flood-up to the ESW cross-tie valves (89 minutes) is sufflicient to allow operator action to isolate the leak.

Annunciator response procedures 1/2 OHP4024.118/218, Drop 84, indicate that the operator is to check the level of water in the ESW pipe tunnel, by attaching a tygon hose to the tell-tale valve upstream of the tunnel drain valve, prior to opening the door.

As part of the seismic review, the consequences of failure of the non-seismic CRAC chiller was determined.

Floor drains would direct the expected flow (75 gpm) to the turbine room sump.

Sealing of floor penetrations, which was performed for fire protection

reasons, would prevent water intrusion into the control room.

This issue has been adequately addressed.

Plan Item 1.10- Review the safety-related portion of the system for seismic qualification and verifythat non-safety related portions can be isolated in accordance with the provisions specified in the system design bases.

Flow diagrams 1-5113 and 2-5113 were reviewed to identify interfaces with non-safety related equipment or piping.

Consequences of failure of the non-safety related CRAC, which is located above the control room, is addressed under Plan Item 1.9.

Seismic aspects of the non-safety related CRAC system have been reviewed.

The CRAC system and components were evaluated under the SQUG program and were found acceptable.

Automatic vent valves on top of the CTS heat exchanger are outside the in-service inspection (ISI) code class boundary and are thus non-safety related.

This is confirmed by the classification in the facility data base (FDB).

The design was reviewed and the vent valve and upstream piping were found to be mounted and supported seismically.

The CW system intake pipes are non-safety related, and Cook Nuclear Plant probablistic risk assessment (PRA) considers their failure as non-credible.

In the remote possibility that the intake pipes do fail, sluice gates WMO-17 and WMO-27, between the forebay and the discharge pipe, allow recirculation of the ESW system, thus maintaining the heat sink.

The annunciator response procedure for extreme low forebay level directs the sluice gates to be opened and then to "continue efforts to restore circulating water."

Other actions, such as temporary makeup from the lake with portable pumps, could maintain heat sink requirements and should be listed in the response procedure.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Page 10 of 60

Plan Item 1.11-Review the program for monitoring system degradation.

No formal system exists to monitor system degradation other than ASME Section XI IST pump and valve testing.

The system flow balance and heat transfer test results from,sequential tests can be compared as a form of system degradation monitoring.

The as-found fiow balance data has shown that changes between tests and corrections to throttle valve positions have been made as a result of the findings.

Existing heat transfer test results appear to be inadequate to assess degradation because discrepancies exist in the test data.

The test can demonstrate that the heat exchanger is adequate, but good trend data has not been developed.

Plan Item 1.12-Review the setpoints for alarms and actuations to ensure they are consistent with the design bases and assumptions.

Actual versus required submergence of ESW pumps was reviewed.

Required net positive suction head (NPSH) at 13,600 gpm is 38.5'(5.5'ubmergence).

The setpoint for forebay extreme low alarm (XPS-813, -823) is 565'elevation, The pump is located at elevation 547', so a worst case submergence is 18', at runout flow, which is acceptable.

There are no formal documented calculations for non-safety related process setpoints or instrument setpoints.

A review of the various process instruments indicated that calculations which would otherwise be performed under the engineering control procedure are not prepared for non-safety related instruments.

There are no uncertainty setpoint

'analyses expected to be prepared for the ESW system.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This procedure is to perform a Service Water System Operational Performance

~ Inspection (SWSOPI) at the Cook Nuclear Plant.

The inspection methodology to be utilized for this work will be that for a full scale SWSOPI using NRC Temporary Instruction Tl 2515/118 titled, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)",

as a guideline.

The Inspection requirements and objectives have been incorporated into the Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI) Self Assessment Plan.

2.0 SCOPE OF WORK The scope of work is as follows:

Assessment Ob'ectives The objective of the Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection is to assess the operational readiness of the Essential Service Water System by determining whether.

1.

The system is capable of performing the safety functions required by the design basis.

Testing is adequate to demonstrate that the system would perform all of the safety functions required.

3.

System maintenance (with emphasis on pumps and valves) is adequate to ensure system operability under postulated accident conditions.

4.

Operator and maintenance technician training is adequate to ensure proper operation and maintenance of the system.

Human factors considerations relating to the selected system (e.g., accessibility and labeling of valves) and the supporting systems for those systems are adequate to ensure proper system operation under normal and accident conditions.

Assessment Guidelines Assessment guidelines consist of:

1.

Review of design-basis requirements and determination of operating conditions under which each active component functions under accident or normal conditions.

2.

Review of the design of the system as installed in the plant.

This shall include

assessing the cumulative effects of design changes.

3.

Review of the maintenance and test records.

4.

A walkdown of the system.

5.

Review ofabnormal, emergency, and normal operating procedures, maintenance procedures and surveillance procedures.

6.

Review of the operational experience of the system.

To accomplish the inspection objectives, the SWSOPI will be conducted using USNRC Inspection Procedure

93801, "Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI)",

and

. Temporary Instruction 2515, Rev. 1, "Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection (SWSOPI)", as a basis for the review. The objectives ofthe USNRC SWSOPI Procedure are to:

1.

Assess the licensee's planned or completed actions in response to Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" 2.

Verify the Service Water System is capable of fulfillingits thermal and hydraulic performance requirements and is operated consistent with its design basis.

3.

Assess the operational controls, maintenance, surveillance, and other testing and personnel training to ensure the Service Water System is operated and maintained so as to perform its safety related functions.

The scope of Generic Letter 89-13 "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment", requires the licensees to perform the following tasks:

1.

Implement and maintain an ongoing program of surveillance and control techniques to significantly reduce the incidence of flow blockage problems as a result of biofouling in open-cycle service water systems.

Conduct a test program to verifythe heat exchanger capability ofall safety-related heat exchangers cooled by service water. The total test program should consist ofan initialtest program and a periodic test program. Both the initialtest program and the periodic retest program should include heat exchangers connected to or cooled by one or more open-cycle systems.

Ensure, by establishing a routine inspection and maintenance program for open-cycle service water system piping and components, that corrosion,

erosion, protective coating failure, silting, and biofouling.cannot degrade the performance of the safety-related systems supplied by service water.

Confirm that the service water system will perform its intended function in accordance with the licensing basis for the plant:

Confirm that maintenance practices, normal and emergency operating procedures, and training that involve the service water system are adequate to ensure that safety-related equipment cooled by the service water system will function as intended and that operators of this equipment will perform effectively.

This confirmation should include reviews of practices, procedures, and training modules.

3.0 SCHEDULE v

The project schedule and major milestones for the project are:

Training and Data Gather Entrance Meeting Complete initial review Columbus Office Review Start Final Review Week Exit Meeting Issue Final Report 4.0 PROJECT APPROACH February 27, 1995 March 3, 1995 March 17, 1995 March 20, 1995 March 27, 1995 March 31, 1995 May 1, 1995 The Inspection will be conducted in several tasks as follows:

Task 1:

Task 2:

Task 3:

Task 4:

Task 5:

Project Initiation Data/Design Bases Acquisition Execution of the Review Plan Preparation of Draft Report Preparation of Final Report Task 1:

Pro'ect Initiation Team orientation and site access training to the extent required, willbe conducted during the first week of the SWSOPI.

During this week, a formal entrance meeting with plant personnel will be held.

During this project initiation,task, the Self-Assessment Plan will be finalized to address the pertinent elements of the Cook Nuclear Plant Essential Service Water System.

The particular elements of the Self-Assessment Plan will be finalized with consideration of:

particular system components industry experience, lessons learned and NRC identified problems on the particular system (l8 E notices, NRC initiated SWSOPls, etc.)

points of focus (i.e., GL 89-13 issues, EPRI identified issues, MOV issues, etc.)

The organizational composition of the review team is as follows:

o Team Leader o

Functional Reviewers Design Inspectors (electrical, mechanical, IBC, civil/structural)

Plant Activities Reviewers (operations, maintenance, and surveillance and test)

The responsibilities associated with each position are as follows:

o Team Leader Responsible for the overall direction of the technical, administrative, and schedule aspects of the project to ensure that all project criteria are met.

He will provide daily summaries of SWSOPI progress, daily activities, plan-of-the-day/week summaries, and will identify interface requirements.

He willcoordinate site interviews and walkdowns and conduct daily exit meetings.

He will also direct the preparation of the draft and final report.

Functional Reviewers - Responsible for refinement and the implementation ofthe Self-Assessment Plan in their specific area of expertise (i.e., design, operations, and maintenance, etc.).

They will ensure that all owner specific design details, past NRC and SWSOPI system and process related issues as well as all industry identified system related points of focus are identified within the Self-Assessment Plan. They are responsible for implementation ofthe plan and forthe observation documentation completion on the Assessment Record and draft document development input in each area of responsibility. They are also responsible for identifying any specific issues requiring technical expert support and the bringing in of such experts.

Task 2:

Data/Desi n Bases Ac uisition A data list willbe developed of the available design related and design basis information inventory for the Essential Service Water System.

Input will be solicited from Cook Nuclear Plant site and home office personnel in the data identification phase.

The objective will be to obtain and assess all documents supporting implementation of the

'elf-Assessment Plan. These would include, but would not be limited to, the following:

Design Basis Documents (as available)

Original Equipment Purchase Specifications Flow Diagrams Logic Diagrams Loop Schematics Elementary Wiring Diagrams Original Pre-Operational Test Procedures and Reports Licensing Letters Operating and System Procedures Abnormal, Emergency, and Alarm Response Procedures Surveillance and Test Procedures and Reports Corrective and Preventive Maintenance Procedures

Training Lesson Plans Instrument and Control Setpoint Calculations Calibration Procedures and Reports Maintenance Job Orders Non-Conformance Reports SALP and INPO Evaluations Condition Reports Task 3:

Execution of the Self-Assessment Plan The SWSOPI is implemented by the review team utilizing the attached Self-Assessment Plan.

The plan will be customized to incorporate system specific areas of attention, including trouble spots and problem areas that are identified during the initial discussions with Cook Nuclear Plant personnel.

This will aid in focusing the reviews from the start.

The data gathering and design bases review tasks provide the review team with the necessary baseline operational and functional information to evaluate during the execution ofthe plan. The plan is designed to be a guide for the detailed system review and provide a means to standardize the fundamental review process and ensure thoroughness.

The plan provides the minimum set of items to be reviewed for each major area based on the overall objectives of the NRC SWSOPI program and previous experience.

It is stressed that the review team members are expected to add to and refine the inspection plans based on the direction and findings of the assessment.

The plan addresses the following inspection areas:

o Design (including system design bases and design changes and modifications) o Operations (including procedures, human factors, training, surveillance and testing in electrical, mechanical and ILC) o Maintenance (vendor manuals, maintenance procedures, work prioritization, planning, procurement, inspections, completed Job Orders, maintenance training)

Review meetings will be conducted at the conclusion of each day's activities while on site.

The meetings allow for cross-discipline review and discussion of potential trouble areas.

The meetings, conducted by the team leader, allow for complete "system" basis conclusions and findings.

The execution of the plan will be accomplished per the schedule in Section 3.

The SWSOPI review willfollowthe requirements of the NRC Temporary Instruction.

Interviews with appropriate Cook Nuclear Plant personnel (operations, maintenance, training, etc.) will be conducted along with general research into potential problems or trouble spots.

General questioning is directed toward system improvement.

'What can go wrong'" and "How do we make it work better7"

The project team will utilize the strategy described below:

1.

Each Functional Reviewer willbe responsible to execute their respective part of the Self-Assessment Plan. The Team Leader willoversee and guide the team to ensure a thorough and focused effort.

Interviews with appropriate utility personnel (design, operations, maintenance, training, etc.) will be conducted along with general research into potential problems or trouble spots.

Interviews aid in identifying potential problem areas very early in the SWSOPI process, thus allowing in-depth system investigation.

3.

Three (3) assessment mechanisms will be utilized in the project performance:

a) plant data assessment, b) personnel interviews, and c) field inspections.

Each assessment performed willbe documented on the Assessment Record (AR) form.

AR forms are included as Attachment A:

When there is a need for additional information or identification of a potential problem is made, then the SWSOPI Request for Information Form (RFI) willbe used.

RFI forms are included as Attachment B. The request will be evaluated whether a concern exists.

All RFls identified as a Concern shall be initialed by the Team Leader or a designee.

Each RFI will be numbered to track the status of the RFIs.

The Plant Response Team willobtain the requested information or evaluate the identified potential problem.

The response team willevaluate all RFls categorized as a concern.

The response team will document the evaluation on the SWSOPI Concern Form.

Concern Forms are included as Attachment C. These will be categorized as follows:

Category A - Condition Report Number generated Category B - Further investigation required Category C - Response obtained and submitted to Inspection Team Through usage of these forms, every stage of SWSOPI assessment can be recorded.

The primary objectives of using these forms are listed below:

A clear path of observation development can be maintained.

Controls are in place to document implementation of each Self-Assessment criterion.

Flags are implemented for Team Leader review approvals as well as to focus related inspection areas by other reviewers.

Potential safety implications receive automatic and immediate attention and t prioritization with regard to operability and reportability determinations.

These Assessment Records and Request for information Forms willform the basis of the SWSOPI report development. Allobservations and issues can therefore be tracked from identification to closeout.

Upon completion of the final on-site inspection week, an exit meeting will be conducted with utility management.

During this meeting, the overall performance of the SWSOPI will be summarized along with the identification of observations and findings.

Task 4:

Pre aration of the Draft Re ort A draft report will be prepared and reviewed by the assessment team.

Task 5:

Pre aration of the Final Re ort The final SWSOPI report willthen be developed and submitted to the NRC. Documents which are used during the course of the project will be comprehensively logged. Those that are used to directly support the findings and conclusions of the SWSOPI willalso be referenced in the final report.

SELF-ASSESSMENT PLAN, 1.0 Mechanical S stems En ineerin Desi n Review and Confi uration Control Review the design-bases, and other design documents such as calculations and analyses for the SWS, and determine the functional requirements for the SWS and each active component during accident or abnormal conditions.

1.2 Review the SWS configuration drawings for consistency with applicable design documents, NRC requirements, and licensing commitments.

1.3 Review the SWS operation as compared to design documents.

1.4 Evaluate single active failure vulnerabilities of the system and the resulting impact on interfacing system components.

Also, examine potential common mode failures from fouling of common intakes or traveling screens.

1.5 Review the effectiveness of design features installed to minimize silting and biofouling of

'the piping and components.

.O 16 Verify if features are provided for the timely detection of flow degradation and if flow balancing has been conducted during various system operating modes.

1.7 1.8 Verify that pump run out conditions are not present with minimum number of pumps operating with worst case alignment of non-safety related loads.

Verify that system flow balance data is consistent with key design assumptions.

1.9 Check whether design features are provided to mitigate the effects offlooding caused by SWS leaks. Review NUREG 1275, Volume 3, Section 3.3 forinformation on SWS events involving actual or potential flooding.

Review the safety-related portion of the system for seismic qualiTication and verify that non-safety related portions can be isolated in accordance with the provisions specified in the system design bases.

Review the program for monitoring system degradation.

Review the setpoints for alarms and actuations to ensure they are consistent with the design bases and assumptions.

Review the system design bases to ensure that the functions required are met.

o D

NALD NU EAR P ANT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION SELF-ASSESSMENT PLAN

1.14 Evaluate the adequacy and consistency of the existing system/component with respect to the design bases.

1.15 Assure availability of power circuits under all operating and design bases conditions.

1.16 Review instrumentation for range and accessibility.

1.17 Verify the adequacy of system/component controls and protection logic.

1.18 Review all modification to the SWS and select at least three significant modifications for a detailed review.

1.19 Evaluate the Gook Nuclear Plant assessment to Action IV of Generic Letter 89-13.

2.0 0 erations 2.1 Perform an in-depth system walkdown.

Review the SWS configuration for consistency with design drawings.

2.2 Review the SWS alarm response procedures and operating procedures for normal, abnormal, and emergency system operations.

2.3 Review operating logs to determine the adequacy of temperature and flow monitoring.

2.4 Review operator training for the SWS, ensuring that the lesson plans reflect the system modifications and that the licensed operators have been trained on these modifications.

2.5 Review the proper implementation of procedures for verifying periodic and post-maintenance alignments of valves in the SWS, especially those valves that isolate flow to safety-related components.

2.6 Verify that required accident condition flow is not degraded during normal system operation valve alignments.

2.7 Review control of SWS heat exchanger flow variations due to changing climate (temperature) conditions.

2.8 Walk through the system operating procedures and the system piping and instrument diagrams with engineering and operations staff, as appropriate.

Verify that the procedures can be performed and that components and equipment are accessible for normal and emergency operation.

2.9 Verify that the operators'nowledge of equipment location and operation is adequate.

0 A 0 LEAR PLANT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION SELF-ASSESSMENT PLAN

2.10 Interview the operators to determine the adequacy of their technical knowledge of such items as the operation ofthe system, its role in accident mitigation, technical specification surveillance requirements, and determination of operability.

2.11 Review the local operation of equipment.

Determine ifthe indication available to operate the equipment is in accordance with applicable operating procedures and instructions.

Verifythat the environmental conditions, such as expected room temperature, emergency lighting, and steam, assumed under accident conditions are adequate for remote operation of equipment.

2.12 Assess operational controls fortraveling screens and circulating water pumps to preclude excessive drawdown of the intake bay, with associated loss of SWS pump suction head, as a result of clogging the traveling screens.

Assess operational requirements for the

'liding sluice gates.

2.13 Assess the effectiveness of the OE Program.

3.0 Maintenance 3.1 Conduct an in-depth system walkdown to review the as-configured system for material condition.

3.2 If possible, witness maintenance performed on the selected system.

Review maintenance package preparation and observe quality control involvement.

3.3 Review maintenance procedures for technical adequacy.

3.4 Determine ifmaintenance procedures are sufficient to perform the maintenance tasks and provide for identification of equipment deficiencies..

3.5 Compare maintenance procedures to vendor manuals to identify any vendor recommendations not incorporated into the procedures.

3.6 Determine ifvendor manuals are available and maintained current.

3.7 Review the periodic inspection program used to detect corrosion, erosion, protective coating failure, silting, and biofouling.

3.8 Review the maintenance program for removal and repair of SWS piping and interface system components due to silting, biofouling, corrosion, erosion, and failure of protective coatings.

3.9 Determine if the SWS components are being adequately maintained to ensure their operability under all accident conditions.

O D NAD EARP T

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION SELF-ASSESSMENT PLAN

3.10 Review the maintenance history forthe selected components ofthe SWS forthe past two operating cycles (minimum of two years) or longer if necessary.

Look for recurring equipment problems and determine ifany trends exist.

3.11 Review several completed maintenance activities for technical adequacy, performance of appropriate post-maintenance testing and satisfactory demonstration of equipment operability.

3.12 Determine the adequacy of the maintenance program from an overview perspective.

Qf importance here is a determination that the maintenance work order system ensures that the plant, system and component design bases are adequately maintained.

3.13 'etermine ifmaintenance personnel receive adequate training pertaining to the SWS and ifthe degree of training provided is consistent with the amount of technical detail in the procedures.

3.14 Conduct detailed interviews with the maintenance personnel to determine their technical knowledge of how components are maintained.

3.15

.Assess the degree ofassessment ofindustry-component/system specific failures and/or maintenance issues.

4.0 Surveillance and Testin 4.2 Review and evaluate the technical adequacy and accuracy ofthe technical specification surveillance procedures and inservice test procedures performed in the past two operating cycles (minimum of two years) for the SWS, Review the SWS design and licensing bases.

4.3 Verify that test acceptance criteria are consistent with the design bases to ensure the SWS testing adequately demonstrates that the SWS will operate as designed.

4.4 Review indicators of SWS performance to identify ifany testing inadequacies exist or if testing frequency is appropriate.

4.5 Determine if surveillance test procedures comprehensively address required SWS responses.

4.6 Review results from preoperational testing to determine whether the SWS capabilities and limitations were appropriately demonstrated.

Determine whether appropriate controls were established to avoid unacceptable system or component operating regimes.

4.7 Evaluate the support systems and plant modifications selected for review by the D NAD EAR P NT SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION SELF-ASSESSMENT PLAN

0 4.8 engineering team to ensure that surveillance and testing has been properly performed.

Review the inservice test records for valves and pumps in the SWS.

4.9 Review how specific SWS instruments are calibrated and tested.

4.10 Verify that the tolerance used for instrument accuracy is acceptable.

4.11 Ifpossible, witness post-maintenance, surveillance, and inservice tests performed on the SWS.

4.12 Review procedures for periodic testing of safety-related heat exchanger heat transfer capability and the trending of such results.

4.13 For the two previous operating cycles (two years minimum) preceding the inspection, ascertain the system, train, pumps, or significant component unavailability during power and shutdown conditions.

Assess the degree to which the licensee has input accurate unavailability data into the IPE.

4.14 Verify that the installed SWS components are tested to ensure the components will perform in accordance with their design bases.

4.15 Review the implementation of the periodic inspection program to detect flow blockage from biofouling in other systems.

Review testing on one air-to-water heat exchanger served by the SWS to ensure proper heat transfer.

Examine the air side for fouling.

5.0 uali Assurance and Corrective Actions 5.1 5.2 Review the meeting minutes of the plant onsite safety review committee and the offsite safety review committee for the past six months for items pertaining to the SWS.

Review the operational history of the SWS.

5.3 Compare the results of the team's assessment of the areas inspected for the SWS with the results of applicable licensee quality verification activities in the same areas.

Determine why quality verTiication activities did not uncover significant issues identified by the team.

5.4 Review the timeliness and technical adequacy of licensee resolution of findings from its self-assessments.

Review the open item tracking system items pertaining to the SWS for adequate tracking and closure of identified deficiencies.

D NA D K

EARPLA T SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION SELF-ASSESSMENT PLAN

5.5 Evaluate the interface between engineering and technical support (EBTS) and plant operations, regarding corrective actions to resolve operational problems.

6.0 Electrical and I&C 6.1 Review the design-basis, and other design documents such as calculations and analyse's for the electrical and instrumentation components and systems supporting the SWS and each active component during accident or abnormal conditions.

6.2 Evaluate the design criteria including the requirements for layout, redundancy and diversity, electrical separation, seismic, EQ, safe shutdown, containment isolation, and electrical and IBC safety-related functions.

6.3 Evaluate single active failure vulnerabilities of the system and the resulting impact on interfacing system components.

6.4 Evaluate the adequacy of 18C to support the control room operators during normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions.

6.5 Review several design modifications packages to ensure that all related issues were addressed adequately.

6.6 Perform a " Human Factors" evaluation to verify the ease of operation ofthe system and review control room and equipment layouts.

6.7 Review how specific SWS instruments are calibrated and tested.

D A D K

U EARPLA T SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION SELF-ASSESSMENT PLAN

ATTACHMENTA ASSESSMENT RECORD FORM

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONALPERFORMANCE INSPECTION ASSESSMENT RECORD TOPIC:

TOPIC NO.

REFERENCES/REF.NO.:

INTERVIEWEES:

NAME DATE ACTIVITYWITNESSED:

ACTIVITY DATE OBSERVATIONS:

Deficiencies:

Weaknesses:

Strengths:

ASSESSMENT:

PAGE 1

OF

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE INSPECTION ASSESSMENT RECORD ASSESSMENT (continued):

PAGE of

ATTACHMENTB SWSOPI REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FORM (RFI)

SWSOPI REQUEST FOR INFORMATIONFORM (RFQ INSPECTOR:

QUESTIO¹ DATE:

CONCER¹ YES RELATED PLAN SECTION ¹:

TL/ATLAPPROVAL:

RESPONSE

NO RFI ¹:

CLOSED BY:

RESPONSE TL:

DATE:

ATTACHMENTC SWSOPI CONCERNS FORM

RFI P:

CONCERN 0:

DESCRIPTION:

SWSOPI CONCERNS DATE:

PRELIMINARYINVESTIGATION:

CATEGORY (A, B, C):

INVESTIGATEDBY:

RESPONSE TL APPROVAL:

(CAT.C) SUBMIT RESPONSE:

(CAT.B) FURTHER INVESTIGATIONBY:

DATE:

DATE ASSIGNED:

DATE DUE:

(CAT.A) CONDITION REPORT ¹:

DATE ISSUED:

ATTACHMENT8 CONDITION REPORTS

CONDITION REPORTS CR 95-0372 No instrument uncertainties or head corrections were considered for calculation of the ESW low header pressure pump start switch setpoint.

Assigned to S. Farlow.

Due April 20, 1995.

Closed April 13, 1995.

CR 95-0382 Hanger nut missing on ESW pipe support.

Assigned to G. Weber.

Due May 12, 1995.

CR 95-0389 ESW pumps operated at flow rates less than the minimum recommended flow.

Assigned to W. Nichols.

Due May 12, 1995.

CR 95-0421 Partial summary report not issued for RFC 12-3076.

Assigned to L. Van Ginhoven.

Due June 2, 1995.

CR 95-0435 Piping to and from 2-QP-56W is 1/2" vs. 1" on OP flow diagram.

Assigned to A. Lotfi. Due April 20, 1995.

Closed April 17, 1995.

CR 95-0475 EDG aftercooler temperature indicator attached by masking tape.

Assigned to T. Beilman.

Due April 30, 1995.

Closed April 27, 1995, American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection - Page 1 of 3

CR-0476 ESW pump impeller upgrades.

Assigned to L. Van Ginhoven.

Due May 14, 1995.

CR-0506 Tracking of various procedure change requests.

Assigned to W. Nichols.

Due May 24, 1995.

CR-QSQ7 Training of maintenance personnel on GL 89-13 issues.

Assigned to P. Carteaux.

Due May 24, 1995.

CR-0508 Additions to vendor documents (OTH) without engineering approval.

Assigned to W. Burgess, Due June 8, 1995.

CR-0509 No formal program for capturing inspection data when system components are opened for maintenance.

Assigned to G. Weber.

Due June 8, 1995.

CR-0510 Small margins in flow to CTS heat exchangers during flow balancing.

Assigned to D. Powell.

Due May 10, 1995.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment B - Page 2 of 3

CR-0511 Insufficient proceduralized acceptance criteria for inspection of safety-related heat exchangers.

Assigned to D. Powell.

Due May 10, 1995.

CR-0512 Testing and analysis of heat exchanger performance do not meet the requirement of GL 89-13 to calculate the heat transfer at design conditions after obtaining the fouling factors from the test data.

Assigned to D. Powell.

Due MAy 10, 1995.

CR 95-0513 Evaluate whether there are potentially adverse effects due to the vacuum condition in the CTS heat exchanger.

Assigned to D. Powell.

Due May 10, 1995.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service VVater System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment B - Page 3 of 3

ATTACHMENTC ESW JOB ORDER

SUMMARY

-GI 89-13 CORROSION MONITORING

ESW JOB ORDER SUKBIARY-GL S9-13 CORROSION MONITORING Examples of ESW Component Job Orders Reflecting Corrosion and/or Silt Build-Up JOB COMPONENT ORDER DATE NOTED CORROSION COMMENTS 1-ESW-101E R20791 3/94 Pitting/corrosion on piping flanges and valve discs.

No history on 1-ESW-101W.

2-ESW-102W C442 4/92 Pitting noted on flange.

No history on 2-ESW-102E, RT A52455, no JOA, 5 RFOs.

1-QP-56E C14554 3/93 Found valve "fullof rust and corrosion."

1-QP-56W, A52815, no JOA, 5 year.

2-QP-S6W R41744 3/95 Corrosion & MIC evident.

Rodded out vent inlet and outlet piping.

2-QP-56E, A52815, no JOA for 5 years.

1-T-131-1 C4539 3/93 Replaced trap due to internal A10880 written 12/91 from rust/ corrosion.

Artemis AR files. RT A52064 established RCM 2 RFOs.

1-T-131-3 C1966 7/93 Replaced due to corrosion.

A4784 written 9/21.

References Artemis JOA 17272.

2-T-131-2 C17419 11/93 Replaced trap.

A44780, 5/93 leaks by. No RT for periodic inspections on Unit 2 traps.

2-T-131-1 C9346 3/93 Trap in "bad" condition; suggest replacement.

A14861, 2/92, leaks by.

WMOs-744, 753, 754 Both units, no history on NPM.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment C - Page 1 of 2

COMPONENT JOB ORDER DATE NOTED CORROSION COMMENTS WRVs 721-728 Both units, no history on NPM.

OME-34E(W)

Both units, no history on NPM.

2-SV-14W C1280 5/92 SV internals badly pitted, coated with "red clay-like substance."

1-SV-14E 1-SV-16CD R21374 C1500 3/94 Internals found "muddy."

7/92 Buildup on seats.

2-SV-14W C8292 5/92 Stuck open from dirt and trash.

2-SV-14W C14562 2/93 Stuck open from small abrasive particles.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service YVater System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment C - Page 2 of 2

ATTACHMENTD GENERIC LETTER 89-13 ACTIONS SVMMARY

GENERIC LETTER 89-13 ACTIONS

SUMMARY

ACTION I - BIOFOULING CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE TECHNI UES Action I of GL 89-13 requested implementation of an ongoing program of surveillance and control techniques to significantly reduce incidence of flow blockage problems as a result of biofouling.

The SWS has experienced blockage and silt accumulation in the past, and zebra mussels have been found in the ESW system.

Inspections of the intake for biofouling control meet the requirements.

The chlorination treatment program and application of clamtrol have been reasonably effective.

Occasionally in the past, the as-found flow balance did not meet the requirements.

The CTS heat exchanger has had high differential pressures and subsequently was chemically cleaned twice.

The most recent fiow balances have had CTS outlet valves positioned in the full or almost full open position.

While design flows are achieved, there is minimal fiow margin to the CTS heat exchanger.

Silt accumulation in the ESW lines to the CCW heat exchanger upstream of the flow orifice could be the cause of false low flow readings.

Higher actual fiows to the CCW heat exchanger; higher flow balance settings; and degraded pump performance in conjunction with a test flow rate beyond the design point could be the root cause of the reduced measured flow to the CTS heat exchanger.

ACTION II - MONITORING SAFETY RELATED HEAT EXCHANGER PERFORMANCE Action II requested implementation of test programs to periodically verify the heat transfer capability of all safety related heat exchangers cooled by service water.

The test program for heat exchangers meets commitments but is incomplete since all previous test data have not been analyzed on the CCW heat exchangers.

Analytical results from the Unit 1 outage have not been finalized.

The 1994 Unit 2 CCW data did not yield meaningful results.

Analysis results have not been submitted to Cook Nuclear Plant for the Unit 1W CCW heat exchanger.

Heat transfer testing of the CCW heat exchanger has experienced difficulties. Even with errant data, it appears that the CCW heat exchangers are performing in accordance with the design specification.

Improved test data for ESW fiow measurements and CCW and ESW temperature measurements is needed.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment D - Page 1 of 3

Operating data indicates that performance of the diesel generator coolers is acceptable.

Diesel generator heat exchangers are inspected each outage.

There is no formal trending of performance test results.

ACTION III - ROUTINE INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE Action III requested implementation of routine inspection and maintenance programs for open-cycle SWS piping and components to ensure that corrosion, erosion, protective coating failure, silting, and biofouling cannot degrade performance of the safety related systems supplied by service water.

Inspection and maintenance of components relating to MIC and biofouling meet commitments but are deficient.

Maintenance personnel are not fullycognizant of microbiological induced corrosion.

Silt has accumulated in various components including the CCW and CTS heat exchangers.

No programmatic inspection of the ESW piping has been scheduled.

The SWS strainers have not been opened for inspection and cleaning for at least six years.

Acceptance criteria for component inspections are not provided.

Records of inspection are informal and, in some cases, not in agreement with photographs of inspected components.

Improved quantification of the inspection findings is required.

There is no formal trending of inspection data.

ACTION IV - DESIGN FUNCTION VERIFICATION AND SINGLE FAILURE ANALYSIS Action IV requested confirmation that the service water system willperform its intended function in accordance with the licensed basis for Cook Nuclear Plant.

The single failure analysis review performed for the GL 89-13 response did not cover the SI signal to the ESW pumps but was analyzed and found acceptable during the assessment.

A design function verification was not documented in the GL 89-13 submittal.

A DBD was recently completed for the ESW system.

DBD development was found to be an acceptable method for design verification of the ESW system.

ACTION V - TRAINING Action V requested confirmation than maintenance practices, operating and emergency procedures, and training involving the SWS were adequate to ensure the safety related equipment cooled by the service water system willfunction as intended and that operators of this equipment willperform effectively.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment D - Page 2 of 3

Management and technical staff are trained regarding the impact of MIC, corrosion, biofouling, and mitigating features (chemical treatment)

. Training was found to be satisfactory.

Training of maintenance personnel, on awareness of MIC could be improved.

Operator training on the ESW system and associated procedures was found to be acceptable.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment D - Page 3 of 3

ATTACHMENTE RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS To maintain the ESW system and to retain its capability to perform its safety related functions, the following actions are recommended:

R1 Evaluate the CCW heat exchanger supply piping for silt accumulation and reconfirm the flow instrumentation.

Ifsilt accumulations show potential impact on indicated flow, reperform the flow balance, i.e., ifthe actual flows in the line are found to be higher than previously thought.

This extra flow to the CCW heat exchanger takes flow away from the CTS heat exchanger.

(Ref: Plan Item 1.8)

Continue development of the computer model for hydraulic analysis of the ESW system.

Evaluate the flow balance for LOCA conditions when two pumps per train (one in Unit 1 and one in Unit 2) are expected to be running.

Confirm that the flow balance valve lineup is valid under the operating case of the open train cross-tie valves (between units) with the other unit in each of its possible configurations.

(Ref: Plan Item 1.1)

Develop a heat exchanger heat transfer test program for testing and analyzing CCW heat exchangers which includes a basis for test requirements for the following:

type of instrumentation number of each type sensor location Test data analysis methodology should also include; source references for the equations used, sample calculations, and a calculation which supports the design data sheet.

Verification should be completed for the analysis methodology.

(Ref:

Plan Items 1.19 and 4.13)

R4 Establish the flow rates in the flow balance at values close to the required fiow rates.

Currently, excess flow rates are established to the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and CCW heat exchangers which contribute to low flow to the CTS heat exchangers.

(Ref: Plan Item 1.8)

Develop a pipe inspection program.

The program should focus on the key Generic Letter 89-13 issues of silt accumulation, mussels, MIC, and corrosion and should include a timeline for completion.

Inspection of the embedded piping in the turbine building foundation should be included. (Ref: Plan Item 3.7)

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment E - Page 1 of 3

R6 Change the test flow rate for the IST Pump Test.

The pump is tested at a flow rate of 7,000 gpm.

The accident flow rates in the flow balance are 9,126 gpm plus up to 80 gpm for the control room air conditioning (CRAC).

Therefore, the test flow rate should be on the order of 9,200 gpm. (Ref: Plan Item 4.1)

R7 Since silt accumulation has been a historical condition at Cook Nuclear Plant, the piping should be radiographed at key locations to determine the extent of silt accumulation.

These locations should include the following:.

the low points in the line to the CTS heat exchanger, the upstream and downstream piping adjacent to the flow orifices monitoring the CTS and CCW heat exchanger

flows, and the 12" piping upstream of the 3" takeoff to the CRAC.

Cook Nuclear Plant has been in operation for over twenty years; therefore, silt accumulation could be significant at these low point and low flow condition locations in the piping. (Ref: Plan Item 3.4)

RS Develop inspection criteria for components in the ESW system which include quantifiable parameters.

(Ref: Plan Item 3.4)

Implement additional training for the maintenance supervisors and mechanics including topics such as silt accumulation, MIC, mussels, and corrosion (pipe wall loss). (Ref: Plan Item 3.13)

R10 Review implementation of significantly delayed modification packages to ensure the information is current from a technical and administrative aspect.

(Ref: Plan Items 4.7 and 6.5)

Rll Add guidance to the annunciator response procedure for low forebay level on how to establish alternate means to restore the heat sink, in addition to the existing guidance on restoring the ESW flow path by opening the sluice gates WMO-17/27, ifcirculating water is lost. (Ref: Plan Item 1.10)

R12 Ensure that maintenance procedures for rubber expansion joints (12MHP.5021.

001.154 and 12MHP.5021.019.022) reference each other and use consistent terminology.

Inspect all expansion joints in the ESW pipe tunnel to ensure that maximum/minimum travel stops are installed and properly adjusted for the particular joint. Attachment 1 of 12MHP.5021.001.154 should be reviewed against the uncontrolled list of expansion joints (provided under RFI 033) to include those not shown in the procedure attachment.

(Ref: Plan Item 3.3)

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization t

Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment E - Page 2 of 3

RI3 Provide additional guidance in the instructions for performing cleaning of heat exchangers to specify the cleaning processes to be used. (Ref: Plan Item 3.3)

R14 Develop maintenance procedures for:

a)

ESW pump discharge strainers, b)

ESW control valves to EDG aftercoolers, c) CCW heat exchanger outlet valves, and d) plugging of heat exchanger tubes. (Ref: Plan Item 3.4)

RIS Include information available in vendor document for ESW pump into the maintenance procedure.

(Ref: Plan Item 3.5)

RI6 Resolve the apparent discrepancy between PMI-2291 and SAM 5.14 regarding use of priority 37 classification.

(Ref: Plan Items 3.9 and 3.12)

R17 Complete the implementation of the material changeout for the BSW pumps from aluminum-bronze to stainless steel as soon as possible.

RIS Several parts of the DBD require clarification or additional input, or correction.

See the listing of comments on the DBD provided separately.

O R19 Improve the settings for the flow balance tests.

The as-left values are significantly above the required values in the procedures.

As a result of existing practices, the pump operates further out on its curve than desired.

The lower pressure and additional flows result in reduced pressure available at the CTS heat exchanger.

(Ref: Plan Item 1.8)

R20 During the reviews for Inspection Program and MIC Program implementation and the review and evaluation of the many job orders on ESW valve maintenance, many opportunities were identified during which BSW system internal inspections could have been performed.

These instances, ifinspected and recorded in accordance with standardized criteria, would provide a cost effective process to collect a great deal of valuable GI. 89-13 corrosion data.

The Systems Engineer should take advantage of the opportunities to collect such data.

Processes should be implemented to effectively and consistently obtain this data and become part of the piping and MIC inspection program.

R21 The ESW Strainers have not been manually inspected or cleaned since about 1989.

Based on the grass matting seen on the CCW heat exchanger tubesheet, it appears the ESW Strainers should be periodically inspected and manually cleaned.

This inspection should also confirm the condition of the strainer. baskets themselves.

American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment E - Page 3 of 3

ATTACHMENTF REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION NO.

TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 1

TEN YEAR HYDRO PLAN 2

OP/OHP INSTRUMENT DISCREPANCIES 3

OP/OHP VALVEDISCREPANCIES JMO AT/JPO JPO/AT X

X PROVIDED PCR 95-0246 ISSUED PCR 95-0246 ISSUED 4

LOOSE GREASE SUPPLY FITTING 5

U1 E&W UNSEALED PENETRATION, NO DAMPER LOOSE CONDUIT FITTINGS TO FOUR COMPONENTS JH/CH JH/CH JH/CH X

AR 91599 ISSUED X

RESPONSE ACCEPTABLE AR 91600 ISSUED 7

REQUEST FOR VARIOUS CALCULATIONS 8

HEAT EXCHANGER TUBE SHEET MAPS HEAT REMOVALCAPABILITIESDURING RECIRCULATIONTHROUGH SLUICE GATES RTS GH GH X

X PROVIDED RESPONSE ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE PROVIDED, RFI 35 ISSUED 0

ASME SECTION XITEST RESULTS REQUEST JO/WM X

PROVIDED 11 INTAKEINSPECTION REPORT 12 REQUEST FOR FSAR 9.8-5 SUPPORTING CALCULATION GH GH X

PROVIDED PROVIDED 13 PLUGGING ALLOWANCEON HX CALCULATIONS 14 LOOSE THERMOLAG, CCHX ESW OUTLET VALVECONTROL BOX 15 SAFETY VALVETESTING INFORMATION GH JH/CH X

RESPONSE ACCEPTABLE X

AR A91643 ISSUED PROVIDED 16 CHECK VALVEPROGRAM INFORMATION WM 17 PUMP MATERIALCHANGE INFORMATION RTS PROVIDED PROVIDED 18 CR 94-2138: CONTROL CIRCUIT DESIGN DEK X

RESPONSE PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 1 of 10

NO.

TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 19 WPS-701 MERCOID NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION DEK X

PROVIDED 20 21 22 23 WRA-713 POWER CABLE STOWAGE X-TIEHEADER PRESSURE CALC/HEAD CORRECTION REQUEST FOR VARIOUS CR'S AND PR'S REQUEST FOR VARIOUS DRAWINGS Ec RFC 3076 JH DEK RTS RTS X

X RESPONSE PROVIDED RFI 59 ISSUED CONDITION REPORT 95-372 ISSUED PROVIDED PROVIDED ESW PUMP BYPASS A INOPERABLE ALARM DEK X

RESPONSE PROVIDED 25 26.

27 28 29 FSAR VS DBD FLOW REQUIREMENTS REQUEST FOR COPY OF DAILYPOD HX15W OUTLET PIPE SUPPORT MISSING NUT ESW EXPANSION JOINT INSTALLATION DEFICIENCIES SETPOINT CALC/ECP FOR VARIOUS INSTRUMENTS GH DP RTS RTS GH X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

X RESPONSE PROVIDED X

PROVIDED PROVIDED CONDITION REPORT 95-382 ISSUED AR 91654 ISSUED 30 31 PROVIDE CCW HX VENDOR MANUAL JH/CH X

INTAKE/FOREBAYINSPECTION RESULTS JH/CH X

PROVIDED PROVIDED 32 CALC TO SUPPORT EDG FLOW REDUCTION 610/540 XJ INSTALLATIONPROCEDURE, INSPECTION RESULTS GH GH X

RESPONSE PROVIDED PROVIDED 1" TEN YEAR HYDRO RESULTS, DRAFT 95/96 PROCEDURE JMO X

PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 2 of 10

O.

TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 35 36 FOLLOW UP ON RFI 009, RE/MAINT/TEST OF SLUICE GATES DIFFERENT MAXTEMP LIMITSPMSO.111 VS. OHP GH GH X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

PCR 95-0259 ISSUED 37 10/93 J.O. COMPLETE ON WRV-767, TAG NOT CLEARED JH/CH X

CR 95-137 PREVIOUSLY ISSUED 38 39 40 41 42 43 45 46 47 PROGRAM FOR S.E. NOTIFICATIONOF AR TAGS COPY OF NRC VIOLATION/RESPONSE RE:AR TAGS COPY OF NUREG-1275, VOL. 3 PIPE CAP MISSING ON I-WTX-737W WALKDOWNDISCREPANCIES VS. OHP J.O. DOCUMENTATIONFOR DG A/C INSPECTION CONFIRM CCW HX BOLTING/MOUNTING PER VICS ADEQUATE CONTROL OF RFC BOUNDARY VALVES COPY OF MM-454, SCEW V06 SAFETY CLASS INCONSISTENCY MM513 VS 503 JH/CH X

RESPONSE ACCEPTABLE JH/CH X

PROVIDED X

PROVIDED AT/JPO X

CAP WAS INSTALLED AT/JPO X

PCR95-258 WAS ISSUED JH GH X

INFORMATIONWAS PROVIDED X

RESPONSE ACCEPTABLE AT/JP0 RESPONSE PROVIDED CR95-0241 ISSUED DEK X

PROVIDED DEK X

RESPONSE ACCEPTABLE 48 49 HANDLINGOF ISSUED DESIGN CHANGE FOR WHICH IMPLEMENTATIONIS SUBSEQUENTLY DELAYED REQUEST FOR THE EQUIVALENCY PROCEDURE DEK GH X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 3 of 10

NO.

TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 50 51 52 PROCEDURE FOR CALC DISTRIBUTION/REVIEWVS DBD COPIES OF 3 PR'S ESW PUMP TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT LOCATION COPIES OF SOER 85-5, PM-1187, MM-235 GH DP RTS GH X

X ACCEPTABLERESPONSE PROVIDED RESPONSE PROVIDED PROVIDED 54 55 56 ADHERENCE TO PUMP MINIMUMFLOW REQUIREMENTS PROVIDE COPY OF HVAC CALC REFERENCE FAILURE OF S.C. IIICRAC CONDENSER PROVIDE ACCEPTANCE DOCUMENTATION FOR ESW HYDRO JMO RTS GH JMO X

CONDITION REPORT 95-389 ISSUED PROVIDED PROVIDED X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE TRAININGPER 89-13 V NOT CONDUCTED CH/JH X

RESPONSE PROVIDED 59 CABLE ROUTING FOLLOW-UP TO RFI-20 JH/CH X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE 60 NO REFERENCE TO WMO-17/27 OPENING ON PUMP START ALARM AT/JPO X

PCR'S 95-0278 Ec 954279 ISSUED 61 62 PROVIDE DBD REFERENCES ON STRAINER BACKWASH PROVIDE RESPONSE ON L.S. NON-QUALIFIEDWIRE NRC BULLETIN AT DEK X

PROVIDED PROVIDED 63 JUSTIFY SEISMIC MOUNTINGON INSTRUMENTTUBINGWITH FRICTION MOUNTS DEK X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE 65 PROVIDE INSTRUMENT SETPOINT METHODOLOGY TRAININGRECORDS FOR CHC602 AND MAINT/MECH JH X

DEK X

PROVIDED PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 4 of 10

O.

TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 66 HX EVALUATIONMETHODOLOGYFOR CCW AND DG AND THE INSPECTION CRITERIA FOR THE CTS.

67 PROCEDURE FOR HANDLINGOPERATING EXPERIENCE 68 COPY OF PR-90-619 RTS AT DP X

PROVIDED PROVIDED PROVIDED 69 ES 1.3 DOES NOT STATE TO CLOSE WMO-717/715 70 PROVIDE UPDATED SWS EXPANSION JOINT DATABASE AT CH X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE PROVIDED 71 PROCEDURE FOR HX INSPECTIONS, CRITERIA, CORRECTIVE ACTIONS JH/CH RESPONSE PROVIDED 72 METHODOLOGYOF EDG FLOW REDUCTION CALCULATION RTS RFI 103 ISSUED 73 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION INSTRUMENT DISCREPANCIES GH X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE 74 COPY OF APP R SAFE SHUTDOWN COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS 75 YEARLY/TOTALRUN TIMES ON ESW PUMP/MOTOR 76 DISSIMILARMETALCONNECTIONS ON TUBING 77 COPY OF EPRI NP4582 "MICAT NUKES" 78 COPY OF SINGLE ACTIVEFAILURE REVIEW FOR 89-13 79 DIFFICULTYREADING 1000 GPM ON WFI-735 IN CONTROL ROOM JH JH DEK JH RTS DEK X

X PROVIDED RESPONSE PROVIDED ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE COPY PROVIDED RESPONSE PROVIDED ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE 80 ESW PUMP ROOM INSTRUMENT RACK ACCESSIBILITY DEK X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 5 of 10

NO.

TOPIC REU'R RETN'D NOTES 81 2-ESW-213 PRACTICALLYINACCESSIBLE FOR VENTING COPY OF CR 94-1622/LER 94-005 AT/JPO X

RESPONSE ACCEPTABLE AT/JPO X

PROVIDED 83 ELIMINATIONOF PM TASK TO SAMPLE ESW PUMP OIL JH X

SEE RFI 112 84 85 86 87 8&

ARTEMIS HISTORY ON DUPLEX STRAINER JO'S VENDOR MANUALFOR QP-56E,W DP RESULTS DURING WMO-713,714,716,718 MOV TESTS THP 4030 STP.241 FLOW BALANCEREFS TO DBD/FSAR RESULTS OF R002081 HX 47-CDS CLEAN/INSPECTION/MIC CH/JH X

PROVIDED JH X

PROVIDED JO/WM X

PROVIDED JH X

PROVIDED JMO X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE 90 91 92 INCOMPLETE DOCUMENTATIONHX15E CLEAN/INSPECTION HXP&41106 FLOW CALC CLARIFICATION HXP900626AF SUCTION LiFT/HEAD DIFFERENTIAL BASIS FOR E/C STATEMENTS IN AEP/NRC:1104A JH RTS RTS JH X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

PROVIDED X

RESPONSE PROVIDED 93 94 96 TESTING FOR FSAR MINFLOWS ON AFW AND CRAC PR 92-316 REVIEW OF HX CONNECTION DETAIL CR 94-546 FLOW DISCREPANCY WITH FSAR UNGROUNDED 220V CONTROL CIRCUITS ANALYSIS X

RESPONSE PROVIDED DP X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE WM X

RESPONSE PROVIDED DEK X

RESPONSE PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 6 of 10

O.

TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 97 98 99 101 102 PROVIDE AR 77901, IC-004, CR 94-2138 COMMITMENT JUSTIFY PRIORITY 37 FOR 2-XTI-301 FOCUS REPORT ON PAST 2 YEARS PMS JUSTIFY PRIORITY 37 FOR XTCI-301, 302 PROVIDE DCC PV301/302 QCS SPECS PROVIDE SYSTEM ENGINEER PROGRAM DEK X

PROVIDED JH/CH X

PROVIDED JH/CH X,

SEE RFI 115 & 159 JH/CH X

PROVIDED JH/CH X

SEE RFI 115 & 159 JH/CH X

PROVIDED 103 CLARIFYFLOW REQUIREMENT IN HXP9500531AF RTS X

PROVIDED 105 106 107 108 109 VACUUMCONDITIONIN THE CTS HX CIRTS PRINTOUT OF OPEN/UNRESOLVED NRC ITEMS PROVIDE FIRE ZONE ROUTING FOR 4ESW PUMP CONTROL PROVIDE MMC29 PROVIDE AR TAGS FROM CR 95-137, 94-1653 LOCAL/NORMALVS HSD/CONTROL ROOM GH DP X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

PROVIDED DEK X

PROVIDED JH/CH X

PROVIDED AT/JPO X

PCR95-0290 & 95-0291 ISSUED 110 PR 492, 493 LETTER FROM QVAP 92-2 EDG FLOW REQUIREMENTS FOR 90'F LAKE DP RTS X

PROVIDED X

PROVIDED 112 113 114 PROVIDE COPY OF AR'S FROM RFI-83 1/2" INSTALLEDPIPING QP-56W, DWG SHOWS 1" PIPE NO MIC INSPECTION WHEN 2-QP-56W WAS REMOVED JH/CH X

PROVIDED JH/CH X

CONDITION REPORT 95-435 ISSUED JH/CH X

RESPONSE PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 7 of 10

NO.

TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 115 JOB ORDER PRIORITIAATIO,FOLLOW RFI'S 98 Ec 100 116 PROVIDE COPY OF ROBERT SHAW VALVE PROCEDURE 117 SEISMIC CLASSIFICATIONOF PIPE TUNNEL 118 INSPECTION CRITERIA GUIDELINES 119 PROVIDE CR'S RELATIVECTS HX CHEMICALCLEANING 120 FUSE CONTROL PROGRAM 121 IMPELLERREPLACEMENT J.O.

DOCUMENTATION 122 PROVIDE A COPY OF AEP:NRC 90205 123 DESIGN TEMPERATURE OF ESW PIPE ON CTS HX OUTLET 124 ESW PUMP START LOGIC ON SI 125 ESW PUMP AUTOSTART FLOW POINT 126 PROVIDE I&CDRAWINGS AND STANDARDS 127 SETPOINT CONTROL AND FUSE TEST PROGRAMS 128 COPY OF JOHNSON VTM "OTH" DOCUMENTS 129 REFERENCE TO AIRAFTERCOOLER IN VICS MANUAL 130 PROVIDE CALC AND WCAPS 131 OHPP021-028-014 STEPS REGARDING ISOLATINGCRACS JH/CH JH/CH RTS CH/JH JH DEK JH JH RTS RTS RTS DEK DEK JH JH RTS AT X

SEE RFI 159 X

PROVIDED X

RESPONSE PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 8 of 10

TO TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 132 PROVIDE TEST DATAON 4 CCW HX RTS X

PROVIDED t'33 SEISMIC CLASS OF CTS HX VENT VALVE GDH X

RESPONSE PROVIDED 134 135 COPY OF DG 102.3 STATUS OF SQUG ACTIVITIES DEK X

GDH X

PROVIDED PROVIDED 136 137 PROVIDE SBICI VIOLATIONRESPONSE RE:TRAINING PROVIDE QAVP 92-02 RECOMMENDATIONIDOCUMENTON CCW HX TESTING I.E. ACCURACIES DEK DFP X

PROVIDED PROVIDED 138 139 140 LINKFROM PS-FUSE-001 TO PMP 6065-FUS-001 COMMITMENTCLOSEOUT FOR 8 CIRTS ITEMS LACKOF PRECAUTION IN 12OHP 4021.057.001 DEK DFP AT X

RESPONSE PROVIDED PROVIDED PCR 95-0311 ISSUED 141 142 143 SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF I&C EQUIPMENT INSTRUMENT CALIBRATIONHISTORY CLASSIFICATIONOF WRV-711 DEK WEM RTS X RESPONSE PROVIDED PROVIDED PROVIDED 145 146 VERIFICATIONOF CALC N931001'EEE-384 FUSE TESTING FOR NON-1E ISOLATION SINGLE FAILURE OF TRIP COIL DURING LOOP RTS DEK DEK ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

RESPONSE PROVIDED 147 CABLE SEPARATION OF 11AC, 11BD BREAKERS DEK X

RESPONSE PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 9 of 10

NO.

TOPIC REV'R RETN'D NOTES 148 SAFETY CLASS DOCUMENTATIONFOR RFC-1753 GDH X

PROVIDED 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 FLOW ELEMENT SIZING CALC FOR WFA-702, 705 PRESSURE SWITCHES REVERSED IN OHP 40%.104 3 RFO HX INSPECTIONS - FUTURE PLANS INSPECTION OF ESW PIPING TO THE CRAC PURPOSE OF DP ACROSS JW COOLER IN THP 6040.PER.002 EDG JUSTIFY HOW RESPONSE TO RFI-17 COMPLIES WITHAPPLICABLE PROCEDURES COPIES OF COMPLETED CR'S FLOW RESTRICTION IN CTS HX PIPING ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA CURVES FOR CCW HX PROVIDE NED MAN-DAYSAT PLANT XTI-301, XTC-301/302 FUNCTIONALITY, EDG OPERABILITY HEAT TRANSFER ACROSS CTS WITHAIR INTRUSION JMO JMO JH JH JMO DFP AT RTS RTS DFP JH GH X

PROVIDED X

PCR 95-0317 ISSUED X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

~

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

ACCEPTABLE RESPONSE RESPONSE PROVIDED CR 95476 ISSUED X

PROVIDED X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

PROVIDED X

RESPONSE PROVIDED X

RESPONSE PROVIDED American Electric Power Nuclear Organization Service Water System Operational Performance Inspection Attachment F - Page 10 of 10

ML17332A761

Contents

Text

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

RESPONSE

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Navigation menu

ML17332A761

Text

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

RESPONSE

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

Navigation menu

Search