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{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT 2ATOC1099-07TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMAtuCEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGES~REVISEDPAGESUNIT13/46-13B3/46-3aPViOi9025b 9'Pi0i2PDRADQCK050003i5irm I~~I 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSSURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS Continued Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown, byverifying thateachautomatic valveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainment Pressure--High-High signal.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifying ath'iwater.flowrate)fromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation. | ||
pstg-.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1tPage3/46-13AMENDMENT 407,444,464 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalysis. | |||
3/4.6.2.2 SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethatI)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized. | |||
Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremoval'fficiency assumedintheaccidentanalysis. | |||
~::piiiiy"'d'ts'c'ha'i'je:.:"p'regs'ur'e'@2'5'5:':jsi'g., | |||
3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment. | |||
Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysisforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations: | |||
(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment. | |||
3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions. | |||
Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment. | |||
Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheelementisatatemperature aboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/46-3 ATTACHMENT 2BTOC1099-07TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/46-12B3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSSURVEILL'ANCE REUIREMENTS Continued Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown, byverifying thateachautomatic valveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainment Pressure-High-High testsignal.+Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifying athewaterflowrate)fromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation. | |||
p&g-.+Theprovisions ofTechnical Specification 4.0.8areapplicable. | |||
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/46-12AMENDMENT 45,97,434,458 | |||
ATTACHMENT 3ATOC1099-07PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/46-13B3/46-3 (3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSSURVEILf;ANCE REUIREMENTS Continued C.Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown, byverifying thateachautomatic valveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainment Pressure-High-High signal.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifying theflowratefromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation. | |||
)'II1k4 3/4BASES3/4. | COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/46-13AMENDMENT 407,444,464 | ||
)'II1k4 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalysis. | |||
3/4.6.2.2 SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized. | |||
Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalysis. | |||
Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d isperformed byverifying awaterflowratep20gpmandg50gpmfromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation withapumpdischarge pressurep255psig.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialto'hecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment. | |||
Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysisforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations: | |||
(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment. | |||
3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions. | |||
Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment. | |||
Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheelementisatatemperature aboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/46-3 ATTACHMENT 3BTOC1099-07PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/46-12B3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSSORVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS Continued Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown, byverifying thateachautomatic valveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainment Pressure-High-High testsignal.'. | |||
Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifying theflowratefromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation. | |||
+Theprovisions ofTechnical Specification 4.0.8areapplicable. | |||
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/46-12AMENDMENT 45,97,434,458 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4:6.2DI'.PRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalysis. | |||
3/4.6.2.2 SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHvolumeandconcentration ensureapHvalueofbetween8.5and11.0forthesolutionrecirculated withincontainment afteraLOCA.ThispHbandminimizes theevolution ofiodineandminimizes theeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosion onmechanical systemsandcomponents. | |||
Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalysis. | |||
Thecontained watervolumelimitincludesanallowance forwaternotusablebecauseoftankdischarge locationorotherphysicalcharacteristics. | |||
Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d isperformed byverifying awaterflowratep20gpmandg50gpmfromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation withapumpdischarge pressurep255psig.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESITheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment. | |||
Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysisfor.aLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations: | |||
(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment. | |||
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/46-3AMENDMENT 63,465 ATTACHMENT 4TOC1099-07NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION IndianaMichiganPowerCompany(18'),theLicenseeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)Units1and2,proposestoamendAppendixA,Technical Specifications (T/S),ofFacilityOperating LicensesDPR-58andDPR-74.I@MproposestoreviseT/SSR4.6.2.2.d forthesprayadditivesystemtorelocatethedetailsassociated withtheacceptance criteriaandtestparameters totheassociated T/SBases.Additionally, certainadministrative textformatchangesarealsobeingproposed. | |||
IAMhasevaluated thisproposedamendment anddetermined thatitdoesnotinvolveasignificant hazard.According to10CFR50.92(c), | |||
aproposedamendment toanoperating licenseinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration ifoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot:1.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzed; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Thedetermination thatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendment requestisindicated below.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated? | |||
Theproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociated withtheacceptance criteriaandtestparameters fromtheT/SSRtotheassociated Basesanddonotaffectsystemoperability orperformance. | |||
Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrative innatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation. | |||
Relocation ofthisinformation totheBasesisadministrative innatureanddoesnotaffecttheprobability orconsequences ofanyaccidentpreviously evaluated. | |||
Noactualchangetotherequirement ismade.Actualplantoperation isnotaffectedbytheadministrative changes.Nomethodsofoperation ofplantsystems,structures orcomponents arechanged.Operation ofaccidentmitigation featuresisnotchanged.Consequently, thereisnoaffectupontheprobability ofanypreviously analyzedaccident, transient, accidentinitiators, orprecursor events.Additionally, becausethereisnoactualchangeinplantdesignoroperation, thereisnoaffectuponradioactive materialinventories, plantshielding, orefHuentreleasepoints.Therefore, thesechangesdonotsignificantly increasetheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated. | |||
p~~~ | p~~~ | ||
Attachment 4toC1099-07Page22.Doesthechangecreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated? | |||
Theproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociated withtheacceptance criteriaandtestparameters fromtheT/SSRtotheassociated Basesanddonotaffectsystemoperability orperformance. | |||
Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrative innatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation. | |||
Facilityoperation andprocedures arenotchanged.Relocation ofthisinformation totheBasesisadministrative innatureanddoesnotaffectcreateanynewaccidentscenarios, accidentinitiators, orprecursor events.Therefore, theproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated. | |||
3.Doesthechangeinvolvea'significant reduction inamarginofsafety/Theproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociated withacceptance criteriaandtestparameters fromtheT/SSRtotheassociated BasesanddonotmodifyT/Ssafetysettings, setpoints, orothervalues.Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrative innatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation. | |||
Thereisnoeffectuponoperating marginsandaccidentmarginsbec'ausetheadministrative changesdono(changethemannerofoperation ofplantsystems,structures, orcomponents. | |||
Plantemergency andabnormaloperating procedures arenotaffected.; | |||
Thereisnochangeofactualtestingmethodology, test'parameters, oracceptance criteria. | |||
Theresponseoftheplanttoaneventisthesame.Potential offsitedosesareunaffected because:, | |||
operation ofthefacilityisunchanged. | |||
Relocation ofthetestirigdetailstotheBasesisacceptable becausecontrolsareinplaceforT/SBaseschangeswhichrequireevaluation ofchangesundertheprovisions of10CFR50.59.Therefore, theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation, I&Mhasconcluded thattheproposedamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration. | |||
C's\ | C's\ | ||
ATTACHMENT 5TOC1099-07ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IndianaMichiganI'owerCompany(IAM)hasevaluated thislicenseamendment requestagainstthecriteriaforidentification oflicensing andregulatory actionsrequiring environmental assessment inaccordance with10CFR51.21.IRMhasdetermined thatthislicenseamendment requestmeetsthecriteriaforacategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9). | |||
Thisdetermination isbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendment toalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirement withrespecttoinstallation oruseofafacilitycomponent locatedwithintherestricted area,'sdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspection orasurveillance requirement, andtheamendment meetsthefollowing specificcriteria: | |||
(i)Theamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration. | |||
Asdemonstrated inAttachment4, theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration. | |||
(ii)Thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant. | |||
increaseintheamountsofany,eEuentthatmaybereleasedoA'site.Becausethereisnochangeinplantdesignoroperation, thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesor,significant increaseintheamountsofanyefHuentsreleasedoAsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure. | |||
Thechangesdonotresultinsignificant changesintheoperation orconfiguration ofthefacility. | |||
Thereisnochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodology usedforprocessing ofradioactive efHuentsorhandlingofsolidradioactive waste,nordothechangesresultinanychangeinthenormalradiation levelswithintheplant.Therefore, thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposureresulting fromthesechanges. | |||
yAr'CIl'I}} | yAr'CIl'I}} | ||
Revision as of 07:04, 29 June 2018
| ML17335A558 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1999 |
| From: | INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17335A556 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9910190256 | |
| Download: ML17335A558 (21) | |
Text
ATTACHMENT 2ATOC1099-07TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMAtuCEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGES~REVISEDPAGESUNIT13/46-13B3/46-3aPViOi9025b 9'Pi0i2PDRADQCK050003i5irm I~~I 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSSURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS Continued Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown, byverifying thateachautomatic valveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainment Pressure--High-High signal.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifying ath'iwater.flowrate)fromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation.
pstg-.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1tPage3/46-13AMENDMENT 407,444,464 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalysis.
3/4.6.2.2 SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethatI)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized.
Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremoval'fficiency assumedintheaccidentanalysis.
~::piiiiy"'d'ts'c'ha'i'je:.:"p'regs'ur'e'@2'5'5:':jsi'g.,
3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.
Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysisforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:
(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment.
3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.
Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.
Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheelementisatatemperature aboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/46-3 ATTACHMENT 2BTOC1099-07TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESMARKEDTOSHOWPROPOSEDCHANGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/46-12B3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSSURVEILL'ANCE REUIREMENTS Continued Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown, byverifying thateachautomatic valveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainment Pressure-High-High testsignal.+Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifying athewaterflowrate)fromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation.
p&g-.+Theprovisions ofTechnical Specification 4.0.8areapplicable.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/46-12AMENDMENT 45,97,434,458
ATTACHMENT 3ATOC1099-07PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT13/46-13B3/46-3 (3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSSURVEILf;ANCE REUIREMENTS Continued C.Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown, byverifying thateachautomatic valveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainment Pressure-High-High signal.Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifying theflowratefromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1Page3/46-13AMENDMENT 407,444,464
)'II1k4 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4.6.2DEPRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalysis.
3/4.6.2.2 SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHminimumvolumeandconcentration, ensurethat1)theiodineremovalefficiency ofthespraywaterismaintained becauseoftheincreaseinpHvalue,and2)corrosion effectsoncomponents withincontainment areminimized.
Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalysis.
Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d isperformed byverifying awaterflowratep20gpmandg50gpmfromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation withapumpdischarge pressurep255psig.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialto'hecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.
Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysisforaLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:
(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment.
3/4.6.4COMBUSTIBLE GASCONTROLTheOPERABILITY oftheequipment andsystemsrequiredforthedetection andcontrolofhydrogengasensuresthatthisequipment willbeavailable tomaintainthehydrogenconcentration withincontainment belowitsflammable limitduringpost-LOCA conditions.
Eitherrecombiner unitiscapableofcontrolling theexpectedhydrogengeneration associated with:1)zirconium-water reactions; 2)radiolytic decomposition ofwater;and3)corrosion ofmetalswithincontainment.
Theacceptance criterion of10,000ohmsisbasedonthetestbeingperformed withtheheaterelementatanambienttemperature, butcanbeconservatively appliedwhentheelementisatatemperature aboveambient.COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 1PageB3/46-3 ATTACHMENT 3BTOC1099-07PROPOSEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PAGESREVISEDPAGESUNIT23/46-12B3/46-3 3/4LIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION ANDSURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMSSORVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS Continued Atleastonceper18monthsduringshutdown, byverifying thateachautomatic valveintheflowpathactuatestoitscorrectpositiononaContainment Pressure-High-High testsignal.'.
Atleastonceper5yearsbyverifying theflowratefromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation.
+Theprovisions ofTechnical Specification 4.0.8areapplicable.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2Page3/46-12AMENDMENT 45,97,434,458 3/4BASES3/4.6CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS3/4:6.2DI'.PRESSURIZATION ANDCOOLINGSYSTEMS3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAYSYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment spraysystemensuresthatcontainment depressurization andcoolingcapability willbeavailable intheeventofaLOCA.Thepressurereduction andresultant lowercontainment leakagerateareconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheaccidentanalysis.
3/4.6.2.2 SPRAYADDITIVESYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthesprayadditivesystemensuresthatsufficient NaOHisaddedtothecontainment sprayintheeventofaLOCA.ThelimitsonNaOHvolumeandconcentration ensureapHvalueofbetween8.5and11.0forthesolutionrecirculated withincontainment afteraLOCA.ThispHbandminimizes theevolution ofiodineandminimizes theeffectofchlorideandcausticstresscorrosion onmechanical systemsandcomponents.
Theseassumptions areconsistent withtheiodineremovalefficiency assumedintheaccidentanalysis.
Thecontained watervolumelimitincludesanallowance forwaternotusablebecauseoftankdischarge locationorotherphysicalcharacteristics.
Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.2.d isperformed byverifying awaterflowratep20gpmandg50gpmfromthesprayadditivetanktestlinetoeachcontainment spraysystemwiththespraypumpoperating onrecirculation withapumpdischarge pressurep255psig.3/4.6.3CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVESITheOPERABILITY ofthecontainment isolation valvesensuresthatthecontainment atmosphere willbeisolatedfromtheoutsideenvironment intheeventofareleaseofradioactive materialtothecontainment atmosphere orpressurization ofthecontainment.
Containment isolation withinthetimelimitsspecified ensuresthatthereleaseofradioactive materialtotheenvironment willbeconsistent withtheassumptions usedintheanalysisfor.aLOCA.Theopeningofcontainment purgeandexhaustvalvesandlockedorsealedclosedcontainment isolation valvesonanintermittent basisunderadministrative controlincludesthefollowing considerations:
(1)stationing aqualified individual, whoisinconstantcommunication withcontrolroom,atthevalvecontrols, (2)instructing thisindividual toclosethesevalvesinanaccidentsituation, and(3)assuringthatenvironmental conditions willnotprecludeaccesstoclosethevalvesandthatthisactionwillpreventthereleaseofradioactivity outsidethecontainment.
COOKNUCLEARPLANT-UNIT 2PageB3/46-3AMENDMENT 63,465 ATTACHMENT 4TOC1099-07NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION EVALUATION IndianaMichiganPowerCompany(18'),theLicenseeforDonaldC.CookNuclearPlant(CNP)Units1and2,proposestoamendAppendixA,Technical Specifications (T/S),ofFacilityOperating LicensesDPR-58andDPR-74.I@MproposestoreviseT/SSR4.6.2.2.d forthesprayadditivesystemtorelocatethedetailsassociated withtheacceptance criteriaandtestparameters totheassociated T/SBases.Additionally, certainadministrative textformatchangesarealsobeingproposed.
IAMhasevaluated thisproposedamendment anddetermined thatitdoesnotinvolveasignificant hazard.According to10CFR50.92(c),
aproposedamendment toanoperating licenseinvolvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration ifoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot:1.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; 2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanypreviously analyzed; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Thedetermination thatthecriteriasetforthin10CFR50.92aremetforthisamendment requestisindicated below.1.Doesthechangeinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated?
Theproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociated withtheacceptance criteriaandtestparameters fromtheT/SSRtotheassociated Basesanddonotaffectsystemoperability orperformance.
Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrative innatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.
Relocation ofthisinformation totheBasesisadministrative innatureanddoesnotaffecttheprobability orconsequences ofanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Noactualchangetotherequirement ismade.Actualplantoperation isnotaffectedbytheadministrative changes.Nomethodsofoperation ofplantsystems,structures orcomponents arechanged.Operation ofaccidentmitigation featuresisnotchanged.Consequently, thereisnoaffectupontheprobability ofanypreviously analyzedaccident, transient, accidentinitiators, orprecursor events.Additionally, becausethereisnoactualchangeinplantdesignoroperation, thereisnoaffectuponradioactive materialinventories, plantshielding, orefHuentreleasepoints.Therefore, thesechangesdonotsignificantly increasetheprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
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Attachment 4toC1099-07Page22.Doesthechangecreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated?
Theproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociated withtheacceptance criteriaandtestparameters fromtheT/SSRtotheassociated Basesanddonotaffectsystemoperability orperformance.
Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrative innatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.
Facilityoperation andprocedures arenotchanged.Relocation ofthisinformation totheBasesisadministrative innatureanddoesnotaffectcreateanynewaccidentscenarios, accidentinitiators, orprecursor events.Therefore, theproposedchangesdonotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
3.Doesthechangeinvolvea'significant reduction inamarginofsafety/Theproposedchangesrelocatethedetailsassociated withacceptance criteriaandtestparameters fromtheT/SSRtotheassociated BasesanddonotmodifyT/Ssafetysettings, setpoints, orothervalues.Theformatchangesinthetextoneachpageareadministrative innatureanddonotresultinanychangeinplantoperation.
Thereisnoeffectuponoperating marginsandaccidentmarginsbec'ausetheadministrative changesdono(changethemannerofoperation ofplantsystems,structures, orcomponents.
Plantemergency andabnormaloperating procedures arenotaffected.;
Thereisnochangeofactualtestingmethodology, test'parameters, oracceptance criteria.
Theresponseoftheplanttoaneventisthesame.Potential offsitedosesareunaffected because:,
operation ofthefacilityisunchanged.
Relocation ofthetestirigdetailstotheBasesisacceptable becausecontrolsareinplaceforT/SBaseschangeswhichrequireevaluation ofchangesundertheprovisions of10CFR50.59.Therefore, theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Insummary,basedupontheaboveevaluation, I&Mhasconcluded thattheproposedamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.
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ATTACHMENT 5TOC1099-07ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT IndianaMichiganI'owerCompany(IAM)hasevaluated thislicenseamendment requestagainstthecriteriaforidentification oflicensing andregulatory actionsrequiring environmental assessment inaccordance with10CFR51.21.IRMhasdetermined thatthislicenseamendment requestmeetsthecriteriaforacategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9).
Thisdetermination isbasedonthefactthatthischangeisbeingproposedasanamendment toalicenseissuedpursuantto10CFR50thatchangesarequirement withrespecttoinstallation oruseofafacilitycomponent locatedwithintherestricted area,'sdefinedin10CFR20,orthatchangesaninspection orasurveillance requirement, andtheamendment meetsthefollowing specificcriteria:
(i)Theamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration.
Asdemonstrated inAttachment4, theproposedchangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.
(ii)Thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant.
increaseintheamountsofany,eEuentthatmaybereleasedoA'site.Becausethereisnochangeinplantdesignoroperation, thereisnosignificant changeinthetypesor,significant increaseintheamountsofanyefHuentsreleasedoAsite.(iii)Thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Thechangesdonotresultinsignificant changesintheoperation orconfiguration ofthefacility.
Thereisnochangeinthelevelofcontrolsormethodology usedforprocessing ofradioactive efHuentsorhandlingofsolidradioactive waste,nordothechangesresultinanychangeinthenormalradiation levelswithintheplant.Therefore, thereisnosignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposureresulting fromthesechanges.
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