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~C'!~iJl'14 e.Charcoaladsorbersshallbeinstalledintheventilationsystemexhaustfromthespentfuel3.11.2storagepitareaandshallbeoperable.Radiationlevelsinthespentfuelstorageareashall3.11.3bemonitoredcontinuously.Thetrolleyoftheauxiliarybuildingcraneshall3.11.43.11.5neverbestationedorpermittedtopassoverstoragerackscontainingspentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperatureshallbelimitedto150F.Thespentfuelshippingcaskshallnotbecarriedbytheauxiliarybuildingcrane,pendingtheevaluationofthespentfuelcaskdropaccidentandthecranedesignbyRGGEandNRCreviewandapproval.Basis:Charcoaladsorberswillreducesignificantlytheconsequencesofarefuelingaccidentwhichconsidersthecladfailureofasingleirradiatedfuelassembly.Therefore,charcoaladsorbersshouldbeemployedwheneverirradiatedfuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilationsystemshouldbeoperatinganddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiatedfuel,isfromI'theoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperatingfloorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughtheadsorbers,andoutthroughtheventilationsystemexhausttothefacilityvent.Operationofamainauxiliarybuilding3.11-2AmendmentNo.,4,6proposed exhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilationsystemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedto*thefacilityvent.OperationofamainauxiliarybuildingexhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilationsystemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedtothefacilityvent.Operationoftheexhaustfanforthespentfuelstoragepitareacausesairmovementontheoperatingfloortobetowardsthepit.Pioperoperationofthefansandsettingofdamperswouldresultinanegativepre'ssureontheoperatingfloorwhichwillcauseairleakagetobeintothebuilding.Thus,theoverallairflowisfromthelocationoflowactivity(outsidethebuilding)totheareaofhighestactivity(spentfuelstoragepit).Theexhaustairflowwouldbethrougharoughingfilterandcharcoalbeforebeingdischargedfromthefacility.Theroughingfilterprotectstheadsorberfrombecomingfouledwithdirt;theadsorberremovesiodine,theisotopeofhighestradiologicalsignificance,resultingfromafuelhandlingaccident.Theeffectivenessofcharcoalfoiremovingiodineisassuredbyhavingahighthroughputandahighremovalefficiency.Thethroughputisattainedbyoperationoftheexhaustfans.Thehighremovalefficiencyisattainedbyminimizingtheamountofiodinethatbypassesthecharcoalandhavingcharcoalwithahighpotenti;alfor'removingtheiodinethat'doespassthroughthecharcoal.3~113AmendmentNo.P1,P6Proposed AttachmentBIn1976,RochesterGas&ElectricreplacedtheoriginalR.E.Ginnaspentfuelstorageracks,increasingthestoragecapacityofthepoolbydecreasingthecenter-to-centerspacingofthestoragelocations.Inevaluatingtheradiologicalconsequencesofmissiles,RG&Eproposedaspentfuelstoragepatternwherebytheprobabilityofamissileimpactonspentfuelthathaddecayedlessthan60dayswasnotincreased.Therefore,thedensityoffissionproductinventorymaintainedinanylocalareawaslessthanthatwhichhadbeenstoredintheoriginalstorageracks.ThiswasacceptedbytheNRCandtherequiredstoragepatternwasincorporatedintotheTechnicalSpecifications(Reference1).Becauseofanticipatedrequirementsuponthestoragecapacityoftheracks,RG&ErequestedU.S.Tool&Die(USTD)toperformananalysisoftheeffectofaverticalandhorizontalimpactofthemissilewiththegreatestpotentialfordamagetotherackandcontainedfuelassemblies(attached).Designvaluesfortornado.windspeedandmissilecharacteristicswerethoseestablishedin'-.theNRCreviewofSystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)TopicsIII-2,WindandTornadoLoadings,andIII-4.A,TornadoMissiles(Ref.4and5).Thismissileischaracterizedasa1490lb.woodpole,35ft.inlengthwithadiameterof13.5inches.USTDassumedatornadowindvelocityof132mphandaccountedforthedrageffectsofthepoolwaterabovetheracksusingReference3.Theresultsofthisanalysisindicatedthatverticaldefor-mationwouldbenogreaterthan1.40inchesandtherewouldbenodeformationfromahorizontalimpact.Thislimiteddeformationdoesnotchangeappreciablyforhighertornadowindspeeds.Additionalmarginsareavailabletoaccommodatehighertornadowindspeeds.Forexample,calculationsperformedassumingatornadowindspeedof200mphyieldaverticaldeformationof1.8inchesandatworstasmallamountoflocalizedplasticdeformationforahorizontalimpact.Theseresultsareconservativeforthefollowingreasons:1.Theenergyabsorbedbythepoleisneglected.Itislikelythat.uponimpactthepole,would,split,.alongthegrainreducingthefractionoftotalenergyabsorbedbytherack.2.Itisassumedthatthemissileentersthewateratanorientationexposingtheminimumcrosssectionalareaperpendiculartothedirectionoftravel.Foraverticalimpactinthe132mphcase,achangeinthemissileorientationofonly5'oulddecreasethekineticenergyonimpactfrom79,000ft./lb.toapproximately12,000ft./lb.Similarreductionswouldoccurathigherwindspeedsalso.
~C'!~iJl'14 e.Charcoaladsorbersshallbeinstalledintheventilationsystemexhaustfromthespentfuel3.11.2storagepitareaandshallbeoperable.Radiationlevelsinthespentfuelstorageareashall3.11.3bemonitoredcontinuously.Thetrolleyoftheauxiliarybuildingcraneshall3.11.43.11.5neverbestationedorpermittedtopassoverstoragerackscontainingspentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperatureshallbelimitedto150F.Thespentfuelshippingcaskshallnotbecarriedbytheauxiliarybuildingcrane,pendingtheevaluationofthespentfuelcaskdropaccidentandthecranedesignbyRGGEandNRCreviewandapproval.Basis:Charcoaladsorberswillreducesignificantlytheconsequencesofarefuelingaccidentwhichconsidersthecladfailureofasingleirradiatedfuelassembly.Therefore,charcoaladsorbersshouldbeemployedwheneverirradiatedfuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilationsystemshouldbeoperatinganddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiatedfuel,isfromI'theoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperatingfloorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughtheadsorbers,andoutthroughtheventilationsystemexhausttothefacilityvent.Operationofamainauxiliarybuilding3.11-2AmendmentNo.,4,6proposed exhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilationsystemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedto*thefacilityvent.OperationofamainauxiliarybuildingexhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilationsystemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedtothefacilityvent.Operationoftheexhaustfanforthespentfuelstoragepitareacausesairmovementontheoperatingfloortobetowardsthepit.Pioperoperationofthefansandsettingofdamperswouldresultinanegativepre'ssureontheoperatingfloorwhichwillcauseairleakagetobeintothebuilding.Thus,theoverallairflowisfromthelocationoflowactivity(outsidethebuilding)totheareaofhighestactivity(spentfuelstoragepit).Theexhaustairflowwouldbethrougharoughingfilterandcharcoalbeforebeingdischargedfromthefacility.Theroughingfilterprotectstheadsorberfrombecomingfouledwithdirt;theadsorberremovesiodine,theisotopeofhighestradiologicalsignificance,resultingfromafuelhandlingaccident.Theeffectivenessofcharcoalfoiremovingiodineisassuredbyhavingahighthroughputandahighremovalefficiency.Thethroughputisattainedbyoperationoftheexhaustfans.Thehighremovalefficiencyisattainedbyminimizingtheamountofiodinethatbypassesthecharcoalandhavingcharcoalwithahighpotenti;alfor'removingtheiodinethat'doespassthroughthecharcoal.3~113AmendmentNo.P1,P6Proposed AttachmentBIn1976,RochesterGas&ElectricreplacedtheoriginalR.E.Ginnaspentfuelstorageracks,increasingthestoragecapacityofthepoolbydecreasingthecenter-to-centerspacingofthestoragelocations.Inevaluatingtheradiologicalconsequencesofmissiles,RG&Eproposedaspentfuelstoragepatternwherebytheprobabilityofamissileimpactonspentfuelthathaddecayedlessthan60dayswasnotincreased.Therefore,thedensityoffissionproductinventorymaintainedinanylocalareawaslessthanthatwhichhadbeenstoredintheoriginalstorageracks.ThiswasacceptedbytheNRCandtherequiredstoragepatternwasincorporatedintotheTechnicalSpecifications(Reference1).Becauseofanticipatedrequirementsuponthestoragecapacityoftheracks,RG&ErequestedU.S.Tool&Die(USTD)toperformananalysisoftheeffectofaverticalandhorizontalimpactofthemissilewiththegreatestpotentialfordamagetotherackandcontainedfuelassemblies(attached).Designvaluesfortornado.windspeedandmissilecharacteristicswerethoseestablishedin'-.theNRCreviewofSystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)TopicsIII-2,WindandTornadoLoadings,andIII-4.A,TornadoMissiles(Ref.4and5).Thismissileischaracterizedasa1490lb.woodpole,35ft.inlengthwithadiameterof13.5inches.USTDassumedatornadowindvelocityof132mphandaccountedforthedrageffectsofthepoolwaterabovetheracksusingReference3.Theresultsofthisanalysisindicatedthatverticaldefor-mationwouldbenogreaterthan1.40inchesandtherewouldbenodeformationfromahorizontalimpact.Thislimiteddeformationdoesnotchangeappreciablyforhighertornadowindspeeds.Additionalmarginsareavailabletoaccommodatehighertornadowindspeeds.Forexample,calculationsperformedassumingatornadowindspeedof200mphyieldaverticaldeformationof1.8inchesandatworstasmallamountoflocalizedplasticdeformationforahorizontalimpact.Theseresultsareconservativeforthefollowingreasons:1.Theenergyabsorbedbythepoleisneglected.Itislikelythat.uponimpactthepole,would,split,.alongthegrainreducingthefractionoftotalenergyabsorbedbytherack.2.Itisassumedthatthemissileentersthewateratanorientationexposingtheminimumcrosssectionalareaperpendiculartothedirectionoftravel.Foraverticalimpactinthe132mphcase,achangeinthemissileorientationofonly5'oulddecreasethekineticenergyonimpactfrom79,000ft./lb.toapproximately12,000ft./lb.Similarreductionswouldoccurathigherwindspeedsalso.
3.Forahorizontalimpact,theincreaseinthedistancethatthemissilemusttravelthroughwaterrelativetoaverticalimpactwasneglected.InOctober1981,theNRCcompletedanevaluationoftheconsequencesofapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontain-ment(Reference2).In'thisevaluationthestaffcalculatedtheoffsitedoseconsequencesassumingdamagetoalltherodsofonefuelassemblyoccurring100hoursaftershutdown,and100%oftheactivityreleasedfromthepoolwasreleasedtotheatmosphere.TheresultingcalculateddoseattheEABwas96rem.4.3ThisanalysisusedaX/Qvalueof4.8x10sec/mcorres-pondingtoaprobabilitylevelof.5%.TheRG&EsubmittalofJune30,1981forSEPTopicII-2.Cdeterminedthat5thedirectiondependentX/Qat.a5%probabilitylevelis6x10sec/m.Thisvalueisstillveryconservativeandmoreappropriategiventhehighwindsandexcellentdispersionassociatedwithtornadoconditions.Ifthe5%X/Qvaluewasused,thedoseatthe(Exclusion5Areaboundary)EABwouldbereducedbyafactorof8(6x10/4.4x10)resultinginavalueof12remfordamagetoallrodsof=.onefuelassembly100hoursaftershutdown.Theworstpositionforimpactofamissilewouldbecenteredonafuelstoragelocationwhere,becauseofthe13.5inchmissileradiuscomparedtoadiagonaldimensionoftheboxof11.9inches,thecornersoffourotherfuelstoragelocationswouldbedamaged.Becauseofthelimiteddeformationofthestoragebox,itisdifficulttopostulatedamagebeyondtheequivalentofoneassembly.However,evenassumingthatall5fuelassemblieswereseverelydamaged,andthatallfuelassembliescouldbemovedtothespentfuelpoolwithin100hours,andthatall5fuelassemblieswerepeakpowerassemblies,theupperboundonthedoseattheEABwouldbe5x12or60rem.Thisresultiswellwithintheguide-linesof10CFR100(300rem)andislessthanwhattheNRCpreviouslyconsideredacceptableandapprovedforGinnaforthepostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment.Thereforeitisacceptabletodeletetherestrictiononstorageofrecentlydischargedfuelinthespentfuelpool.
3.Forahorizontalimpact,theincreaseinthedistancethatthemissilemusttravelthroughwaterrelativetoaverticalimpactwasneglected.InOctober1981,theNRCcompletedanevaluationoftheconsequencesofapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontain-ment(Reference2).In'thisevaluationthestaffcalculatedtheoffsitedoseconsequencesassumingdamagetoalltherodsofonefuelassemblyoccurring100hoursaftershutdown,and100%oftheactivityreleasedfromthepoolwasreleasedtotheatmosphere.TheresultingcalculateddoseattheEABwas96rem.4.3ThisanalysisusedaX/Qvalueof4.8x10sec/mcorres-pondingtoaprobabilitylevelof.5%.TheRG&EsubmittalofJune30,1981forSEPTopicII-2.Cdeterminedthat5thedirectiondependentX/Qat.a5%probabilitylevelis6x10sec/m.Thisvalueisstillveryconservativeandmoreappropriategiventhehighwindsandexcellentdispersionassociatedwithtornadoconditions.Ifthe5%X/Qvaluewasused,thedoseatthe(Exclusion5Areaboundary)EABwouldbereducedbyafactorof8(6x10/4.4x10)resultinginavalueof12remfordamagetoallrodsof=.onefuelassembly100hoursaftershutdown.Theworstpositionforimpactofamissilewouldbecenteredonafuelstoragelocationwhere,becauseofthe13.5inchmissileradiuscomparedtoadiagonaldimensionoftheboxof11.9inches,thecornersoffourotherfuelstoragelocationswouldbedamaged.Becauseofthelimiteddeformationofthestoragebox,itisdifficulttopostulatedamagebeyondtheequivalentofoneassembly.However,evenassumingthatall5fuelassemblieswereseverelydamaged,andthatallfuelassembliescouldbemovedtothespentfuelpoolwithin100hours,andthatall5fuelassemblieswerepeakpowerassemblies,theupperboundonthedoseattheEABwouldbe5x12or60rem.Thisresultiswellwithintheguide-linesof10CFR100(300rem)andislessthanwhattheNRCpreviouslyconsideredacceptableandapprovedforGinnaforthepostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment.Thereforeitisacceptabletodeletetherestrictiononstorageofrecentlydischargedfuelinthespentfuelpool.
References1.Letter,A.Schwencer,USNRCtoL.D.White,RGSE,November15,1976.2.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield,USNRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,October7,1981.3.D.R.Miller,W.A.Williams,"TornadoProtectionfortheSpentFuelStoragePool,"GeneralElectricAPED-5696,November1968.4.5.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield,USNRCtoJ.E.Maier,RG&E,August22,1983.NUREG-0821,SupplementNo.1,IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessment,SystematicEvaluationProgram,August1983.3  
References1.Letter,A.Schwencer,USNRCtoL.D.White,RGSE,November15,1976.2.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield,USNRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,October7,1981.3.D.R.Miller,W.A.Williams,"TornadoProtectionfortheSpentFuelStoragePool,"GeneralElectricAPED-5696,November1968.4.5.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield,USNRCtoJ.E.Maier,RG&E,August22,1983.NUREG-0821,SupplementNo.1,IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessment,SystematicEvaluationProgram,August1983.3}}
}}

Revision as of 14:28, 18 May 2018

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Spacing of Recently Discharged Fuel in Spent Fuel Storage Racks
ML17255A636
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Issue date: 01/18/1984
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ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
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ML17255A634 List:
References
NUDOCS 8401250301
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AttachmentA1.MakethefollowingchangesintheTechnicalSpecifications.RemoveInsertpages3.11-2through3.11-33.11-5pages3.11-2through3.11-3r8401250301840ii8PDRADOCK05000244PDRj

~C'!~iJl'14 e.Charcoaladsorbersshallbeinstalledintheventilationsystemexhaustfromthespentfuel3.11.2storagepitareaandshallbeoperable.Radiationlevelsinthespentfuelstorageareashall3.11.3bemonitoredcontinuously.Thetrolleyoftheauxiliarybuildingcraneshall3.11.43.11.5neverbestationedorpermittedtopassoverstoragerackscontainingspentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperatureshallbelimitedto150F.Thespentfuelshippingcaskshallnotbecarriedbytheauxiliarybuildingcrane,pendingtheevaluationofthespentfuelcaskdropaccidentandthecranedesignbyRGGEandNRCreviewandapproval.Basis:Charcoaladsorberswillreducesignificantlytheconsequencesofarefuelingaccidentwhichconsidersthecladfailureofasingleirradiatedfuelassembly.Therefore,charcoaladsorbersshouldbeemployedwheneverirradiatedfuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilationsystemshouldbeoperatinganddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiatedfuel,isfromI'theoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperatingfloorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughtheadsorbers,andoutthroughtheventilationsystemexhausttothefacilityvent.Operationofamainauxiliarybuilding3.11-2AmendmentNo.,4,6proposed exhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilationsystemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedto*thefacilityvent.OperationofamainauxiliarybuildingexhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilationsystemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedtothefacilityvent.Operationoftheexhaustfanforthespentfuelstoragepitareacausesairmovementontheoperatingfloortobetowardsthepit.Pioperoperationofthefansandsettingofdamperswouldresultinanegativepre'ssureontheoperatingfloorwhichwillcauseairleakagetobeintothebuilding.Thus,theoverallairflowisfromthelocationoflowactivity(outsidethebuilding)totheareaofhighestactivity(spentfuelstoragepit).Theexhaustairflowwouldbethrougharoughingfilterandcharcoalbeforebeingdischargedfromthefacility.Theroughingfilterprotectstheadsorberfrombecomingfouledwithdirt;theadsorberremovesiodine,theisotopeofhighestradiologicalsignificance,resultingfromafuelhandlingaccident.Theeffectivenessofcharcoalfoiremovingiodineisassuredbyhavingahighthroughputandahighremovalefficiency.Thethroughputisattainedbyoperationoftheexhaustfans.Thehighremovalefficiencyisattainedbyminimizingtheamountofiodinethatbypassesthecharcoalandhavingcharcoalwithahighpotenti;alfor'removingtheiodinethat'doespassthroughthecharcoal.3~113AmendmentNo.P1,P6Proposed AttachmentBIn1976,RochesterGas&ElectricreplacedtheoriginalR.E.Ginnaspentfuelstorageracks,increasingthestoragecapacityofthepoolbydecreasingthecenter-to-centerspacingofthestoragelocations.Inevaluatingtheradiologicalconsequencesofmissiles,RG&Eproposedaspentfuelstoragepatternwherebytheprobabilityofamissileimpactonspentfuelthathaddecayedlessthan60dayswasnotincreased.Therefore,thedensityoffissionproductinventorymaintainedinanylocalareawaslessthanthatwhichhadbeenstoredintheoriginalstorageracks.ThiswasacceptedbytheNRCandtherequiredstoragepatternwasincorporatedintotheTechnicalSpecifications(Reference1).Becauseofanticipatedrequirementsuponthestoragecapacityoftheracks,RG&ErequestedU.S.Tool&Die(USTD)toperformananalysisoftheeffectofaverticalandhorizontalimpactofthemissilewiththegreatestpotentialfordamagetotherackandcontainedfuelassemblies(attached).Designvaluesfortornado.windspeedandmissilecharacteristicswerethoseestablishedin'-.theNRCreviewofSystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)TopicsIII-2,WindandTornadoLoadings,andIII-4.A,TornadoMissiles(Ref.4and5).Thismissileischaracterizedasa1490lb.woodpole,35ft.inlengthwithadiameterof13.5inches.USTDassumedatornadowindvelocityof132mphandaccountedforthedrageffectsofthepoolwaterabovetheracksusingReference3.Theresultsofthisanalysisindicatedthatverticaldefor-mationwouldbenogreaterthan1.40inchesandtherewouldbenodeformationfromahorizontalimpact.Thislimiteddeformationdoesnotchangeappreciablyforhighertornadowindspeeds.Additionalmarginsareavailabletoaccommodatehighertornadowindspeeds.Forexample,calculationsperformedassumingatornadowindspeedof200mphyieldaverticaldeformationof1.8inchesandatworstasmallamountoflocalizedplasticdeformationforahorizontalimpact.Theseresultsareconservativeforthefollowingreasons:1.Theenergyabsorbedbythepoleisneglected.Itislikelythat.uponimpactthepole,would,split,.alongthegrainreducingthefractionoftotalenergyabsorbedbytherack.2.Itisassumedthatthemissileentersthewateratanorientationexposingtheminimumcrosssectionalareaperpendiculartothedirectionoftravel.Foraverticalimpactinthe132mphcase,achangeinthemissileorientationofonly5'oulddecreasethekineticenergyonimpactfrom79,000ft./lb.toapproximately12,000ft./lb.Similarreductionswouldoccurathigherwindspeedsalso.

3.Forahorizontalimpact,theincreaseinthedistancethatthemissilemusttravelthroughwaterrelativetoaverticalimpactwasneglected.InOctober1981,theNRCcompletedanevaluationoftheconsequencesofapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontain-ment(Reference2).In'thisevaluationthestaffcalculatedtheoffsitedoseconsequencesassumingdamagetoalltherodsofonefuelassemblyoccurring100hoursaftershutdown,and100%oftheactivityreleasedfromthepoolwasreleasedtotheatmosphere.TheresultingcalculateddoseattheEABwas96rem.4.3ThisanalysisusedaX/Qvalueof4.8x10sec/mcorres-pondingtoaprobabilitylevelof.5%.TheRG&EsubmittalofJune30,1981forSEPTopicII-2.Cdeterminedthat5thedirectiondependentX/Qat.a5%probabilitylevelis6x10sec/m.Thisvalueisstillveryconservativeandmoreappropriategiventhehighwindsandexcellentdispersionassociatedwithtornadoconditions.Ifthe5%X/Qvaluewasused,thedoseatthe(Exclusion5Areaboundary)EABwouldbereducedbyafactorof8(6x10/4.4x10)resultinginavalueof12remfordamagetoallrodsof=.onefuelassembly100hoursaftershutdown.Theworstpositionforimpactofamissilewouldbecenteredonafuelstoragelocationwhere,becauseofthe13.5inchmissileradiuscomparedtoadiagonaldimensionoftheboxof11.9inches,thecornersoffourotherfuelstoragelocationswouldbedamaged.Becauseofthelimiteddeformationofthestoragebox,itisdifficulttopostulatedamagebeyondtheequivalentofoneassembly.However,evenassumingthatall5fuelassemblieswereseverelydamaged,andthatallfuelassembliescouldbemovedtothespentfuelpoolwithin100hours,andthatall5fuelassemblieswerepeakpowerassemblies,theupperboundonthedoseattheEABwouldbe5x12or60rem.Thisresultiswellwithintheguide-linesof10CFR100(300rem)andislessthanwhattheNRCpreviouslyconsideredacceptableandapprovedforGinnaforthepostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment.Thereforeitisacceptabletodeletetherestrictiononstorageofrecentlydischargedfuelinthespentfuelpool.

References1.Letter,A.Schwencer,USNRCtoL.D.White,RGSE,November15,1976.2.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield,USNRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,October7,1981.3.D.R.Miller,W.A.Williams,"TornadoProtectionfortheSpentFuelStoragePool,"GeneralElectricAPED-5696,November1968.4.5.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield,USNRCtoJ.E.Maier,RG&E,August22,1983.NUREG-0821,SupplementNo.1,IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessment,SystematicEvaluationProgram,August1983.3

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