ML13277A041

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units 1 & 2 - Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) - NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition

ML13277A041
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	09/19/2013
From:	Carolina Power & Light Co
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC ME9623, TAC ME9624
Download: ML13277A041 (108)

Text

Enclosure 3Revised Brunswick NFPA 805 Transition Report,Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) -NFPA 805Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protectionfor Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,2001 Edition, Transition Report,September 19, 2013Main Report Without Attachments Carolina Power & LightBrunswick Steam Electric PlantUnits 1 and 2Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) -NFPA 805Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection forLight Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants,2001 EditionTransition ReportSeptember 19, 2013 CP&L NFPA 805 Transition ReportTABLE OF CONTENTSRevision Summary ......................................................................................................... iExecutive Summary ...................................................................................................... iiAcronym List ................................................................................................................ iii

1.0 INTRODUCTION

................................................................................................ I1 .1 B a ckg ro u nd ........................................................................................................ 11.1.1 NFPA 805 -Requirements and Guidance ................................................. 11.1.2 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) ................................................................ 21.2 Purpose ........................................................................................................ 32.0 OVERVIEW OF EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ............................ 42.1 Current Fire Protection Licensing Basis ......................................................... 42.2 NRC Acceptance of the Fire Protection Licensing Basis ............................... 43.0 TRANSITION PROCESS .................................................................................... 83.1 Background ..................................................................................................... 83.2 NFPA 805 Process ...................................................................................... 83.3 NEI 04-02 -NFPA 805 Transition Process .................................................. 103.4 NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) .......................................... 114.0 COMPLIANCE WITH NFPA 805 REQUIREMENTS ........................................ 124.1 Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements ...................... 124.1.1 Overview of Evaluation Process ........................................................ 124.1.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ...................................................... 144.1.3 Definition of Power Block and Plant .................................................... 154.2 Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria ........................................................... 154.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology ........................... 154.2.2 Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluation Transition .................... 234.2.3 Licensing Action Transition .................................................................. 244.2.4 Fire Area Transition ............................................................................. 244.3 Non-Power Operational Modes .................................................................... 284.3.1 Overview of Evaluation Process ........................................................ 284.3.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ...................................................... 314.4 Radioactive Release Performance Criteria .................................................. 324.4.1 Overview of Evaluation Process ........................................................ 324.4.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ...................................................... 324.5 Fire PRA and Performance-Based Approaches .......................................... 50BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page i CP&LNFPA 805 Transition Report4.5.1 Fire PRA Development and Assessment ............................................. 514.5.2 Performance-Based Approaches ......................................................... 524.6 M onitoring Program .................................................................................... 574.6.1 Overview of NFPA 805 Requirements and NEI 04-02 Guidance on theNFPA 805 Fire Protection System and Feature Monitoring Program ...... 574.6.2 Overview of Post-Transition NFPA 805 Monitoring Program .............. 584.7 Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance ........ 634.7.1 Compliance with Documentation Requirements in Section 2.7.1 ofN F P A 805 ......................................................................................... ..634.7.2 Compliance with Configuration Control Requirements in Section 2.7.2 and2.2.9 of N FPA 805 ............................................................................... 664.7.3 Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805 .... 704.8 Sum m ary of Results ..................................................................................... 724.8.1 Results of the Fire Area Review ........................................................ 724.8.2 Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed During the ImplementationP hase ................................................................................................ ..734.8.3 Supplemental Information -Other Licensee Specific Issues ............... 73

5.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

......................................................................... 835.1 Introduction- 10 CFR 50.48 ....................................................................... 835.2 Regulatory Topics ....................................................................................... 885.2.1 License Condition Changes ................................................................ 885.2.2 Technical Specifications ...................................................................... 885.2.3 Orders and Exemptions ...................................................................... 885.3 Regulatory Evaluations ................................................................................ 885.3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration ................................................. 885.3.2 Environmental Consideration ............................................................. 885.4 Revision to the UFSAR ................................................................................ 895.5 Transition Implementation Schedule ........................................................... 896.0 REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 90ATTACHMENTS ....................................................................................................... 92A. NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program &Design Elements ........................................................................................... A-1B. NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment -MethodologyReview ............................................................................................................ B -1C. NEI 04-02 Table B Fire Area Transition .................................................. C-1D. NEI 04-02 Non-Power Operational Modes Transition ................................. D-1BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page ii IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page ii I CP&LNFPA 805 Transition ReportE. NEI 04-02 Radioactive Release Transition ................................................. E-1F. Fire-Induced Multiple Spurious Operations Resolution ............................. F-1G. Recovery Actions Transition ....................................................................... G-1H. NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Question Summary Table ............................ H-1I. Definition of Power Block .............................................................................. I-1J. Fire Modeling V&V ........................................................................................ J-1K. Existing Licensing Action Transition ......................................................... K-1L. NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval (10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii) .... L-1M. License Condition Changes ......................................................................... M-1N. Technical Specification Changes ............................................................... N-10. Orders and Exemptions ................................................................................ 0-1P. RI-PB Alternatives to NFPA 805 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4) ................................... P-1Q. No Significant Hazards Evaluations ................................................................ Q-1R. Environmental Considerations Evaluation .................................................. R-1S. Modifications and Implementation Items .................................................... S-1T. Clarification of Prior NRC Approvals ........................................................... T-1U. Internal Events PRA Quality ......................................................................... U-1V. Fire PRA Q uality ........................................................................................... V-1W. Fire PRA Insights ........................................................................................ W-1BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page iii IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page iii I CP&LNFPA 805 Transition ReportRevision SummaryLatestAttachment Title RevisionAttachment A NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire 2Protection Program & Design ElementsAttachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability 2Assessment -Methodology ReviewAttachment C NEI 04-02 Table B Fire Area Transition 2Attachment D NEI 04-02 Non-Power Operational Modes Transition 0Attachment E NEI 04-02 Radioactive Release Transition 0Attachment F Fire-Induced Multiple Spurious Operations 0ResolutionAttachment G Recovery Actions Transition 2Attachment H NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Question Summary 0TableAttachment I Definition of Power Block 0Attachment J Fire Modeling V&V 2Attachment K Existing Licensing Action Transition 0Attachment L NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval 2(10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii)Attachment M License Condition Changes 0Attachment N Technical Specification Changes 0Attachment O Orders and Exemptions 0Attachment P RI-PB Alternatives to NFPA 805 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4) 0Attachment Q No Significant Hazards Evaluations 0Attachment R Environmental Considerations Evaluation 0Attachment S Modifications and Implementation Items 2Attachment T Clarification of Prior NRC Approvals 0Attachment U Internal Events PRA Quality 0Attachment V Fire PRA Quality 2Attachment W Fire PRA Insights 3BSEP LAR Rev 3 Pagei I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page i 1 CP&LExecutive SummaryExecutive SummaryCP&L will transition the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP), Units 1 and 2 fireprotection program to a new Risk-Informed, Performance-Based (RI-PB) alternative per10 CFR 50.48(c) which incorporates by reference NFPA 805. The licensing basis perLicense Condition 2.B.(6) will be superseded.The transition process consisted of a review and update of BSEP documentation,including the development of a Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) usingNUREG/CR-6850 as guidance. This Transition Report summarizes the transitionprocess and results. This Transition Report contains information:" Required by 10 CFR 50.48(c)." Recommended by guidance document Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-02Revision 2 and appropriate Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)." Recommended by guidance document Regulatory Guide 1.205, Revision 1.Section 4 of the Transition Report provides a summary of compliance with the followingNFPA 805 requirements:" Fundamental Fire Protection Program Elements and Minimum DesignRequirements" Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria, including:o Non-Power Operational Modeso Fire Risk Evaluationso Radioactive Release Performance Criteria" Monitoring Program" Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality AssuranceSection 5 of the Transition Report provides regulatory evaluations and associatedattachments, including:" Changes to License Condition" Changes to Technical Specifications, Orders, and Exemptions" Determination of No Significant Hazards and evaluation of EnvironmentalConsiderationsThe attachments to the Transition Report provide detail to support the transition processand results.Attachment H contains the approved FAQs not yet incorporated into the endorsedrevision of NEI 04-02. These FAQs have been used to clarify the guidance inRG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and the requirements of NFPA 805 and in the preparation of thisLicense Amendment Request.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page ii I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page ii I CP&LAcronym ListCP&L Acronym ListAcronym ListABH Auxiliary Boiler HouseAC Alternating CurrentAC/DC Alternating Current/Direct CurrentACLE Allowable Combustible Load EquivalentADAMS Agency wide Documents Access and ManagementSystemADANX Admin -Annex Building (Security Office Building)ADS Automatic Depressurization SystemAFEB Alternate Fire Equipment BuildingAFFF Aqueous Film Forming FoamAHJ Authority having jurisdictionANS American Nuclear SocietyAO Auxiliary OperatorAOG Augmented Off-Gas BuildingAOV Air Operated ValveAPCSB Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems BranchASME American Society of Mechanical EngineersASSD Alternate Safe ShutdownASTM American Society for Testing and MaterialsATWS Anticipated Transient Without ScramBGA Brunswick Global AnalysisBKR BreakerBNP Brunswick Nuclear Plant (i.e., BSEP)BOP Balance of PlantBSEP Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2BTP Branch Technical PositionBWR Boiling Water ReactorBWROG Boiling Water Reactor Owner's GroupCAC Containment Atmosphere ControlBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page iii IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page iii I CP&LAcronym ListCP&L Acronym ListCAFTACAPCASCASBCHCATCBCBDTM/THERPCBTCBDTMCCCCICCDFCCDPCDFCDMCETCFASTCFDCFRCGBCLBCLBCLERPCLKCMCP&LCPTCR3CRDCRSCSComputer Aided Fault Tree AnalysisCorrective Action ProgramCentral Alarm StationCaswell BeachCapability CategoryControl BuildingCause Based Decision Tree Method/Techniques forHuman Error Rate PredictionComputer Based TrainingCause Based Decision Tree MethodCapability CategoryCapability Category IConditional Core Damage FrequencyConditional Core Damage ProbabilityCore Damage FrequencyCurrent Design MethodCore Exit ThermocouplesConsolidated Model of Fire and Smoke TransportCondensate Filter DemineralizerCode of Federal RegulationCable Gripping BushingChlorination BuildingCurrent Licensing BasisConditional Large Early Release ProbabilityNelson Firestop CLTTM Silicone SealantClean MaintenanceCarolina Power and LightControl Power TransformersCrystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Power PlantControl Rod DriveControl Room SupervisorCore SprayBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page iv I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page iv I CP&LAcoymLsCP&L Acronym ListCSD Cold ShutdownCSS Core Spray SystemCST Condensate Storage TankCSW Conventional Service WaterCTPH1 Condensate Transfer Pump House Unit 1CW Circwater YardCW Circulating Water SystemCWOD Circulating Water Ocean DischargeDBA Design Basis AccidentsDBD Design Basis DocumentDC Direct CurrentDFO Diesel Fuel OilDG Diesel Generator BuildingDGB Diesel Generator BuildingDID Defense-in-DepthDSO Director of Site OperationsDWT Demineralized Water TankEC Engineering ChangeECCS Emergency Core Cooling SystemEDB Equipment DatabaseEDG Emergency Diesel GeneratorEEE Engineering Equivalency EvaluationsEEEE Existing Engineering Equivalency EvaluationsEHC Electro-Hydraulic ControlEOOS Equipment Out-of-ServiceEPRI Electric Power Research InstituteEQ Environmental QualificationERFBS Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier SystemsESFAS Engineered Safeguards Actuation SignalEY East YardFC Fire CompartmentF&O Facts and ObservationsBSEP LAR Rev 3 Pagev I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page v I CP&LAcronym ListCP&L Acronym ListFAQ Frequently Asked QuestionFB Fire BrigadeFDS Fire Dynamics SimulatorFDT Fire Dynamics ToolsFHA Fire Hazards AnalysisFICF Fire Induced Circuit FailureFIN Fix It NowFMEA Failure Modes and Effects AnalysisFP Fire ProtectionFPIP Fire Protection Initiatives ProjectFPPM Fire Protection Program ManualFPRA Fire Probabilistic Risk Analysis or AssessmentFRE Fire Risk EvaluationFSA Fire Safety AnalysisFSAR Final Safety Analysis ReportFSSPMD Fire Safe Shutdown Program Manager DatabaseFTL Fault Tree LogicGDC General Design CriterionGL Generic LicenseGPAB Global Plant Analysis BoundaryGPM Gallons per MinuteHCTL Heat Capacity Temperature LimitHEAF High Energy Arcing FaultHEP Human Error ProbabilitiesHEPA High Efficiency Particulate AirHFE Human Failure EventHGL Hot Gas LayerHLP High/Low Pressure InterfaceHNP Shearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantHP Health PhysicsHPCI High Pressure Coolant InjectionHPI High Pressure InjectionBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page viIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page vi I CP&LAcronym ListHR Human Reliability Analysis technical element from thePRA standardHRA Human Reliability AnalysisHRE Higher Risk EvolutionsHRR Heat Release RateHSD Hot ShutdownHSM Horizontal Storage ModuleHSS High Safety SignificanceHVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air ConditioningHX Heat ExchangerI&C Instrumentation and ControlsIE Initiating Event technical element from PRA standardInternal Flood Scenario Development technical elementfrom the PRA standardInternal Flood Source Identification technical elementfrom the PRA standardIPE Individual Plant ExaminationISB ISFSI Storage BuildingISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage InstallationKPI Key Performance IndicatorKSF Key Safety FunctionkV KilovoltkW KilowattLA Licensing ActionLAR License Amendment RequestLCO Limiting Condition of OperationLDSHD Load Shed PRA model basic eventLERF Large Early Release FrequencyLFS Limiting Fire ScenarioLOCA Loss of Coolant AccidentLOOP Loss of Off-site PowerLOP Loss of PowerLOSP Loss of Off-site Power!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page vii I CP&LAcronym ListCP&L Acronym ListLPCILPILSSMAAPMAFMBOCAMBPAMCAMCCMCRMEFSMHIFMGMOMOSMOVMQHMSFMSIVMSLMSOMSRMUDMWTNCRNDENEINEILNFPANFPA 805NPPNPOLow Pressure Coolant InjectionLow Pressure InjectionLow Safety SignificanceModular Accident Analysis ProgramManual Action FeasibilityMiscellaneous Buildings -Owner Controlled AreaMiscellaneous Buildings Pre-fire Plans -Protected AreaMultiple Compartment Evaluation ApproachMotor Control CenterMain Control RoomMaximum Expected Fire ScenarioMultiple High Impedance FaultMotor GeneratorMotor OperatedMaintenance Occupancy and StorageMotor Operated ValveMethod of McCaffrey, Quintiere, and HarkleroadMembers of the Security ForceMain Steam Isolation ValveMain Steam LineMultiple Spurious OperationMoisture Separator ReheaterMake-Up DemineralizerMakeup Water Treatment BuildingNuclear Condition ReportNon-Destructive ExaminationNuclear Energy InstituteNuclear Electric Insurance LimitedNational Fire Protection AssociationNational Fire Protection Association Standard 805Nuclear Power PlantNon-Power OperationsBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page viiiIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page viii I CP&LAcronym ListCP&L Acronym ListNPOPMDNPSHNRCNRRNSCANSELNSPNSWNUREGNWYO&MOCAOMAOMBOOSORAMOSI PIOSPPAMPBPBAAPDCPFPPGMP&IDPLCPMPPNLPNSCPOMPORVPOSNon-Power Operations Program Manager DatabaseNet Positive Suction HeadNuclear Regulatory CommissionOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationNuclear Safety Capability AssessmentNuclear Safety Equipment ListNon-Suppression ProbabilityNuclear Service WaterUS Nuclear Regulatory Commission RegulationNorthwest YardOperations and MaintenanceOwner Controlled AreaOperator Manual ActionOperations/Maintenance BuildingOut-of-ServiceOutage Risk Assessment and ManagementReal Time plant data tracking softwareOn-Site PowerPost-Accident MonitoringPerformance BasedPower Block Auxiliary AreasPower Distribution CenterPre-Fire PlansPlant General ManagerPiping and Instrumentation DiagramProfessional Loss ControlPumpPanelPlant Nuclear Safety CommitteePlant Operating ManualPower Operated Relief ValvesPlant Operational StateBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page ix IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page ix I CP&LAcronym ListPRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment or AnalysisPVC Polyvinyl-chloridePWR Pressurized Water ReactorFire Qualitative Screening technical element from thePRA standardQU Quantification technical element from the PRA standardRA Recovery ActionsRAI Request for Additional InformationRAW Risk Achievement WorthRB Reactor BuildingRBCCW Reactor Building Closed Cooling WaterRCA Radiologically Controlled AreaRCIC Reactor Core Isolation CoolingRCR Reactor Coolant RecirculationRCS Reactor Coolant SystemRFP Reactor Feed PumpRFPT Reactor Feed Pump TurbineRG Regulatory GuideRHR Residual Heat RemovalRI-PB Risk-Informed Performance-BasedRIS Regulatory Issues SummaryRMA Radioactive Materials AreaRMCSB Radioactive Material -Container Storage BuildingRPDC Recirc Power Distribution CenterRPS Reactor Protection SystemRPV Reactor Pressure VesselRSDP Remote Shutdown PanelRW RadwasteRWB Radwaste BuildingRWCU Reactor Water Cleanup SystemSAMA Severe Accident Mitigation AlternativeSAP Secondary Access Point!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page x I CP&LAcronym ListCP&L Acronym ListSAR Safety Analysis ReportSAT Startup Auxiliary TransformerSBGT Standby Gas TreatmentSBO Station BlackoutSCAFF Clean Scaffold Material StorageSCBA Self Contained Breathing ApparatusSD System DescriptionSDC Shutdown CoolingSDV Scram Discharge VolumeSE Safety EvaluationSER Safety Evaluation ReportSFPC Spent Fuel Pool CoolingSFPE Society of Fire Protection EngineersSHF Sodium Hypochlorite FacilitySIC Site Incident CommanderSJAE Steam Jet Air EjectorSLC Standby Liquid ControlSM Safety MarginSP Suppression PoolSPC Suppression Pool CoolingSR Supporting RequirementSRV Safety Relief ValveSSA Safe Shutdown AnalysisSSC Structures, Systems, and ComponentsSSD Safe ShutdownSSE Safe Shutdown EarthquakeSSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment ListSTORES Hot Shop/Material Issue/WarehouseSTORM Storm Drain MonitoringSW Service WaterSWB Service Water BuildingSWGR SwitchgearBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page xi IlBSEP LAR Rev 3Page xi I CP&LAcronym ListCP&L Acronym ListSWY SwitchyardSY SwitchyardTAP Training Administrative ProcedureTB Turbine BuildingTS Technical SpecificationUAT Unit Auxiliary TransformerUFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis ReportVFDR Variances from the deterministic requirementsVFDs Variable Frequency DrivesV&V Verification and ValidationWFSS Water-based Fire Suppression SystemWW Wet wellZOl Zone of InfluenceBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page xii!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page xii I CP&L1.0 Introduction

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has promulgated an alternative rule for fireprotection requirements at nuclear power plants, 10 CFR 50.48(c), National FireProtection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805). CP&L is implementing the NuclearEnergy Institute methodology NEI 04-02, "Guidance for Implementing a Risk-informed,Performance-based Fire Protection Program Under 10 CFR 50.48(c)", to transitionBSEP from its current fire protection licensing basis to the new requirements as outlinedin NFPA 805. This report describes the transition methodology utilized and documentshow BSEP complies with the new requirements.1.1 Background1.1.1 NFPA 805 -Requirements and GuidanceOn July 16, 2004 the NRC amended 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, to add a newsubsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), which establishes new Risk-Informed, Performance-Based (RI-PB) fire protection requirements. 10 CFR 50.48(c) incorporates byreference, with exceptions, the National Fire Protection Association's NFPA 805,Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor ElectricGenerating Plants -2001 Edition, as a voluntary alternative to 10 CFR 50.48Section (b), Appendix R, and Section (f), Decommissioning.As stated in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(i), any licensee's adoption of a RI-PB program thatcomplies with the rule is voluntary. This rule may be adopted as an acceptablealternative method for complying with either 10 CFR 50.48(b), for plants licensed tooperate before January 1, 1979, or the fire protection license conditions for plantslicensed to operate after January 1, 1979, or 10 CFR 50.48(f), plants shutdown inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1).NEI developed NEI 04-02 to assist licensees in adopting NFPA 805 and making thetransition from their current fire protection licensing basis to one based on NFPA 805.The NRC issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.205, Risk-Informed, Performance-Based FireProtection for Existing Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, which endorses NEI 04-02,with exceptions, in December 2009.1A depiction of the primary document relationships is shown in Figure 1-1:1 Where referred to in this document NEI 04-02 is Revision 2 and RG 1.205 is Revision 1.IBSEP LAR Rev 3Pagel 1 CP&L1.0 IntroductionCP&L 1.0 IntroductionNFPA 805 Incorporation by ' U iu4r(C2001 ed. Reference 50.48(c)E -Performance-BasedStandard for FP for National FireLight Water Reactor ProtectionElectric Generating AssociationPlants Standard NFPA805NEI 04-02 RG 1.2050 I Endorsement0 GUIDANCE FOR RI-PB FP FOR EXISTINGIMPLEMENTING A RI-PB LIGHT-WATER NUCLEARFP PROGRAM UNDER 10 POWER PLANTSCFR 50.48(c)Figure 1-1 NFPA 805 Transition -Implementation Requirements/Guidance1.1.2 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c)1.1.2.1 Start of TransitionCP&L submitted a letter of intent to the NRC on June 10, 2005 (ML051720404), for theShearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP) to adopt NFPA 805 in accordance with10 CFR 50.48(c). This letter of intent also addressed other CP&L plants (BrunswickSteam Electric Plant Units No. 1 and 2, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2,and Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant). The letter of intent requested threeyears of enforcement discretion and proposed that HNP be considered a Pilot Plant forthe NFPA 805 transition process.By letter dated April 29, 2007 (ML070590625), the NRC granted a three yearenforcement discretion period. In accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, theenforcement discretion period will continue until the NRC approval of the licenseamendment request (LAR) is completed.1.1.2.2 Transition ProcessThe transition to NFPA 805 includes the following high level activities:0 Complete Safe Shutdown Analysis Reconstitution (activities started in 2003)BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page2 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 2 1 CP&L1.0 Introduction" A new Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) using NUREG/CR-6850,EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities, as guidanceand a revision to the Internal Events PRAs to support the Fire PRAs" Completion of activities required to transition the pre-transition licensing basis to10 CFR 50.48(c) as specified in NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205The project was implemented using a comprehensive project plan and individualprocedures/instructions for individual scopes of work. These procedures/instructions(e.g., Project Instruction "FPIP" series procedures referenced in this report) weredeveloped for the purposes of NFPA 805 transition. Appropriate technical contentfrom these procedures were and will be incorporated into technical documents andconfiguration control procedures, as required.1.2 PurposeThe purpose of the Transition Report is as follows:1) Describe the process implemented to transition the current fire protectionprogram to comply with the additional requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c).2) Summarize the results of the transition process.3) Explain the bases for conclusions that the fire protection program complies with10 CFR 50.48(c) requirements.4) Describe the new fire protection licensing basis.5) Describe the configuration management processes used to manage post-transition changes to the station and the fire protection program, and resultingimpact on the licensing basis.BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 3 CP&L2.0 Overview of Existinq Fire Protection Proqram2.0 OVERVIEW OF EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM2.1 Current Fire Protection Licensing BasisBrunswick Steam Electric Plant was licensed to operate on September 8, 1976, forUnit 1 and December 27, 1974, for Unit 2. As a result, the Brunswick Steam ElectricPlant fire protection program is based on evaluation and NRC acceptance against therequirements of Design Criterion 3, Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 Part 50, and 10 CFR 50Appendix R, Sections III.G and J. The following License Condition 2.B(6) inAmendment No. 169 to the Facility Operating License No. DPR-71 (i.e., Unit 1) andAmendment No. 200 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-62 (i.e., Unit 2) states:"Carolina Power and Light Company shall implement and maintain in effect allprovisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final SafetyAnalysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Safety Evaluation Report,dated November 22, 1977, as supplemented April 1979, June 11, 1980, December30, 1986, December 6, 1989, and July 28, 1993 and February 10, 1994,respectively, subject to the following provision:The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection programwithout prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would notadversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the eventof a fire."2.2 NRC Acceptance of the Fire Protection Licensing BasisThe Commission issued, on November 22, 1977, Amendment No. 11 to the FacilityOperating License No. DPR-71, for Unit No. 1, and Amendment No. 37 to FacilityOperating License No. DPR-62, for Unit No. 2, of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant.These amendments added license conditions relating to the completion of the facilitymodifications for fire protection and resolution of incomplete items. The amendment forUnit 1 also incorporated limiting conditions for operations and surveillance requirementsfor existing fire protection systems and administrative controls.Amendment No. 11 contained the following changes to 2.B(6) and 2.C.(2):2.B(6) The licensee may proceed with and is required to complete the modificationsidentified in Paragraphs 3.1.1 through 3.1.35 of the NRC's Fire ProtectionSafety Evaluation Report on the Brunswick facility dated November 22, 1977.These modifications shall be completed by the end of the first refuelingoutage of Brunswick Unit 1 and prior to return to operation of Cycle 2. Inaddition, the licensee shall submit the additional information identified inTable 3.1 of this Safety Evaluation Report in accordance with the schedulecontained therein. In the event these dates for submittal cannot be met, thelicensee shall submit a report explaining the circumstances, together with arevised schedule.2.C.(2) The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A, A-Prime and B,attached hereto, as revised through Amendment No. 11, are herebyincorporated in this license. Appendix A shall be effective from the date ofIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 4 1 CP&L2.0 Overview of Existinq Fire Protection ProqrarnCPL20Oeve fEitn FiePoeto rgaissuance of the Unit 1 operating license until the Appendix A-Prime becomeseffective on or before the initial criticality of Brunswick Unit 2 following itsinitial refueling outage. Carolina Power & Light Company shall operate thefacility in accordance with the Technical Specifications as indicated above.The licensee shall inform the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II,of the date that the Appendix A-Prime becomes effective.Amendment No. 37 contained the following changes to 2.B(7):2.B(7) The licensee may proceed with and is required to complete the modificationsidentified in Paragraphs 3.1.1 through 3.1.35 of the NRC's Fire ProtectionSafety Evaluation Report on the Brunswick facility dated November 22, 1977.These modifications shall be completed by the end of the second refuelingoutage of Brunswick Unit 2 and prior to return to operation of Cycle 3. Inaddition, the licensee shall submit the additional information identified inTable 3.1 of this Safety Evaluation Report in accordance with the schedulecontained therein. In the event these dates for submittal cannot be met, thelicensee shall submit a report explaining the circumstances, together with arevised schedule.The Commission issued, on April 6, 1979, Amendment No. 23 to the Facility OperatingLicense No. DPR-71, for Unit No. 1, and Amendment No. 47 to Facility OperatingLicense No. DPR-62, for Unit No. 2, of the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant. Theseamendments consisted of changes to the operating licenses for both units to allowrevised implementation dates for certain modifications intended to improve the level offire protection. Supplement 1 of the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report was alsoincluded in this transmittal which addressed certain items that were identified asincomplete and requiring further information from the licensee and evaluation by thestaff. The SER, Supplement 1, also listed several modifications proposed by thelicensee to improve fire protection.The Commission issued Supplement 2 to the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reporton June 11,1980, which contained evaluations associated with four areas: 1) Protectionof Redundant Safe Shutdown Cabling (greater than five foot separation, 2) Protection ofRedundant Safe Shutdown Cabling (less than five foot separation), 3) Fire ProtectionLoop Isolation Valve, 4) Door Frames for Fire Doors.The Commission granted, on November 10, 1981, an exemption from the requirementsof 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.G.3, with regard to fixed fire suppression in theControl Room.The Commission granted, on July 27, 1983, exemptions from the requirements of10 CFR 50 Appendix R,Section III.G.3, with regard to fixed fire suppression in theseven fire zones in the Control Building Cable Vaults.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page5 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 5 1 CP&L2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection ProgramThe Commission granted, on September 17, 1986, an exemption from the licenseecommitment to install an excess flow switch and automatic shut-off valve in the fuelsupply line for the diesel fire pump to automatically isolate in the event of a fuel linerupture. The Safety Evaluation concluded that the previous commitment to provideautomatic isolation of the diesel fuel line need not be implemented because of thealternative fire protection measures provided.The Commission granted, on December 30, 1986, exemptions from the requirements ofAppendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, Sections IIL.G and J. Exemptions were granted for thefollowing:1) Reactor Buildings, Units 1 and 2 (Fire Areas RBI-1 and RB2-1)2) Emergency Core Cooling System Rooms, Units 1 and 2 (Fire Areas RB1-6 andRB2-6)3) Diesel Generator Building Basement (Fire Area DG-1)4) Service Water Building (Fire Area SW-I)5) Diesel Generator Building (DG-08)6) Fixed Fire Suppression System for Alternative Shutdown Areas (Fire Areas TB-i,CB-1, CB-7, CB-8, CB-9, CB-10, DG-6, DG-7, DG-9, DG-11, DG-12, DG-13 andDG-14)7) East Yard AreaThe Staff concluded that the exemption request for the Control Building Extended (FireArea CB-23E) was not needed.The Commission issued, on May 29, 1987, a Safety Evaluation approving the use ofhigher unexposed side temperatures for fire barrier seals than that required by theBranch Technical Position (BTP) ASB 9.5-1 of NUREG-0800. The evaluation concludedthat the acceptance criteria of 325 'F above ambient, versus 250 'F above ambient,was an acceptable deviation and was not considered likely to significantly add to therisk of igniting material on the unexposed side of the barrier.The Commission granted, on August 27, 1987, an Exemption from 10 CFR Part 50,Appendix R, Section Ill.J, from the requirement for emergency lighting units with at leastan 8-hour battery supply in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment.The exemption permits substitution of 8-hour battery lighting with:1) The use of diesel generators to power lighting in the plant control room upon lossof offsite power.2) The use of two-hour battery-powered lighting upon loss of diesel generatorsconcurrent with loss of offsite power.3) Assurance that power sources are routed underground and are separated by atleast a three-hour rated fire barrier.The Commission issued an Appendix R Safety Evaluation Clarification and Revision onDecember 6, 1989. Brunswick Steam Electric Plant had identified nineteen items!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 6 1 CP&L2.0 Overview of Existinq Fire Protection Proqramassociated with the Staffs December 30, 1986, Safety Evaluation where revisions wererequired to 1) correct specific errors, 2) clarify potentially confusing language, or 3)more accurately state actual conditions. The Staff provided clarifications for fifteen ofthe nineteen items requested. These clarifications appended the December 30, 1986,Safety Evaluation.The Commission issued, on July 28, 1993, a Safety Evaluation approving a request todowngrade the three-hour rated masonry block walls in the control building cableaccess ways (separating fire areas CB-01a/b, CB-02a/b, CB-12a/b and CB-13a/b) tonon-rated walls. The Staff found this change did not have an adverse impact on theIII.G.3 exemption granted for the lack of fire suppression in the control building andwould not impact the alternate shutdown capability.The Commission issued, on February 10, 1994, a Safety Evaluation that revised theplant fire protection licensing condition and Technical Specifications (TS). In accordancewith Generic Letter 86-10 and 88-12, CP&L requested that fire protection be removedfrom the Technical Specifications and a standard fire protection licensing condition beimplemented. The following Technical Specification changes were proposed andgranted by the NRC:1) Delete TS 3.3.5.7 (Fire Detection Instrumentation), TS 3.7.7.1 (Fire SuppressionWater System), TS 3.7.7.2 (Spray and/or Sprinkler Systems), TS 3.7.7.3, (HighPressure Carbon Dioxide), TS 3.7.7.4 (Fire Hose Stations), TS 3.7.7.5, (FoamSystems), and TS 3.7.8 (Fire Barrier Penetrations) and their associated basesand incorporate into the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).2) Delete TS 6.2.2.g for site fire brigade staffing and incorporate into the UFSAR3) Delete TS 6.4.2 requirements related to the fire brigade training program andincorporate into the UFSAR.4) Add TS 6.5.3.8(m) to include the review of the fire protection program andimplementing procedures as an additional responsibility of the Plant NuclearSafety Committee (PNSC).5) Delete TS 6.9.2.d related to the requirement for special reports for the firedetection instrumentation.6) Delete TS 6.9.2.g related to the requirement for special reports for firesuppression systems.7) Delete TS 6.9.2.h related to the requirement for special reports for fire barrierpenetrations.CP&L also proposed, and the NRC granted the request, to replace the current fireprotection licensee condition with the standard license condition provided in GL 86-10.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page7 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 7 1 CP&L3.0 Transition Process3.0 TRANSITION PROCESS3.1 BackgroundSection 4.0 of NEI 04-02 describes the process for transitioning from compliance withthe current fire protection licensing basis to the new requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c).NEI 04-02 contains the following steps:1) Licensee determination to transition the licensing basis and devote the necessaryresources to it;2) Submit a Letter of Intent to the NRC stating the licensee's intention to transitionthe licensing basis in accordance with a tentative schedule;3) Conduct the transition process to determine the extent to which the current fireprotection licensing basis supports compliance with the new requirements andthe extent to which additional analyses, plant and program changes, andalternative methods and analytical approaches are needed;4) Submit a LAR;5) Complete transition activities that can be completed prior to the receipt of theLicense Amendment;6) Receive a Safety Evaluation; and7) Complete implementation of the new licensing basis, including completion ofmodifications identified in Attachment S.3.2 NFPA 805 ProcessSection 2.2 of NFPA 805 establishes the general process for demonstrating compliancewith NFPA 805. This process is illustrated in Figure 3-1. It shows that, except for thefundamental fire protection requirements, compliance can be achieved on a fire areabasis either by deterministic or RI-PB methods. Consistent with the guidance inNEI 04-02, CP&L has implemented the NFPA 805, Section 2.2 process, by firstdetermining the extent to which its current fire protection program supports findings ofdeterministic compliance with the requirements in NFPA 805. RI-PB methods are beingapplied to the requirements for which deterministic compliance could not be shown.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page8 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 8 1 CP&L3.0 Transition ProcessEstablish fundamental fireprotection elements(Chapter 3)Identify fire hazardsNFPA 805 Section 2.2(a)NFPA 805 Section 2.2(b)NFPA 805 Section 2.2(c)Evaluate compliance toperformance criteriaNuclear safetyLife safetyProperty damagelbusinessInterruptionRadiation releaseNFPA 805 Section 2.2(d)NFPA 805 Section 2.2(e)Deterministic ApproachMaintain compliance with existing plantlicense basis (10 CFR 50 App. R, ApprovedExemptions, Engineering Evaluations)Performance-Based ApproachEvaluate ability to satisfy performancerequirements(Chapter 4)4-De i Bi ExistingDeterministic Basis EngineeringEquivalencyVerify deterministic requirements are met EvaluationsNFPA 805 Section 2.2(f)Performance BasisDefine fire scenarios and fire design basisfor each fire area being considered.Evaluate using, e.g.," Fire modeling to quantify the fire riskand margin of safety" PSA to examine impact on overall plantriskNFPA 805 Section 2.2(g)Risk-Informed ChangeEvaluationNFPA 805 Section 2.2(h)Evaluate risk impact of changes tothe approved design basisNo ExamplesDesign B~asis DocumentsDocumentation and configuration Fire hazards analysisNFPA 805 Section 2.2(0) Douettontr an cofgrto Nuclear safety capability assessmentcontrolSupporting engineering calculations~Probabilistic safety analysisRisk-informed change evaluationsFeedbackEstablish monitoring progr NFPA 805 Section 2.2(i)Figure 3-1 NFPA 805 Process [NEI 04-02 Figure 3-1 based on Figure 2-2 of NFPA 805]22 Note: 10 CFR 50.48(c) does not incorporate by reference Life Safety and Plant Damage/BusinessInterruption goals, objectives and criteria. See 10 CFR 50.48(c) for specific exceptions to theincorporation by reference of NFPA 805.IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 9 1 CP&L3.0 Transition Process3.3 NEI 04-02 -NFPA 805 Transition ProcessNFPA 805 contains technical processes and requirements for a RI-PB fire protectionprogram. NEI 04-02 was developed to provide guidance on the overall process (i.e.,programmatic, technical, and licensing) for transitioning from a traditional fire protectionlicensing basis to a new RI-PB method based upon NFPA 805, as shown in Figure 3-2.Section 4.0 of NEI 04-02 describes the detailed process for assessing a fire protectionprogram for compliance with NFPA 805, as shown in Figure 3-2.Transition ReportSect. 4.1Transition ReportSect. 4.2Use PB Approach ifNeeded (Fire Modeling orFire Risk Evaluations)I} TransitionReportSect. 4.5Figure 3-2 Transition Process (Simplified) [based on NEI 04-02 Figure 4-1]BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 10 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 10 1 CP&L3.0 Transition Process3.4 NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)The NRC has worked with NEI and two Pilot Plants (Oconee Nuclear Station and HNP)to define the licensing process for transitioning to a new licensing basis under10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805. Both the NRC and the industry recognized the needfor additional clarifications to the guidance provided in RG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and therequirements of NFPA 805. The NFPA 805 FAQ process was jointly developed by NEIand NRC to facilitate timely clarifications of NRC positions. This process is described ina letter from the NRC dated July 12, 2006, to NEI (ML061660105) and in RegulatoryIssue Summary (RIS) 2007-19, Process for Communicating Clarifications of StaffPositions Provided in RG 1.205 Concerning Issues Identified during the Pilot Applicationof NFPA Standard 805, dated August 20, 2007 (ML071590227).Under the FAQ Process, transition issues are submitted to the NEI NFPA 805 TaskForce for review, and subsequently presented to the NRC during public FAQ meetings.Once the NEI NFPA 805 Task Force and NRC reach agreement, the NRC issues amemorandum to indicate that the FAQ is acceptable. NEI 04-02 will be revised toincorporate the approved FAQs. This is an on-going revision process that will continuethrough the transition of NFPA 805 plants. Final closure of the FAQs will occur whenfuture revisions of RG 1.205, endorsing the related revisions of NEI 04-02, are approvedby the NRC. It is expected that additional FAQs will be written, and existing FAQs willbe revised, as plants continue NFPA 805 transition after the Pilot Plant SafetyEvaluations.Attachment H contains the list of approved FAQs not yet incorporated into the endorsedrevision of NEI 04-02. These FAQs have been used to clarify the guidance inRG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and the requirements of NFPA 805 and in the preparation of thisLAR.BSEP LAR Rev 3p7-age 11 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.0 COMPLIANCE WITH NFPA 805 REQUIREMENTS4.1 Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design ElementsThe Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements are established inChapter 3 of NFPA 805. Section 4.3.1 of NEI 04-02 provides a systematic process fordetermining the extent to which the pre-transition licensing basis and plant configurationmeets these criteria and for identifying the fire protection program changes that wouldbe necessary for compliance with NFPA 805. NEI 04-02 Appendix B-1 providesguidance on documenting compliance with the program requirements of NFPA 805Chapter 3.4.1.1 Overview of Evaluation ProcessThe comparison of the BSEP Fire Protection Program to the requirements of NFPA 805Chapter 3 was performed and documented in Attachment A, Table B-I, NFPA 805Ch. 3 Transition Details. The analysis used the guidance contained in NEI 04-02,Section 4.3.1 and Appendix B-1 (See Figure 4-1).Each section and subsection of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 was reviewed against the currentfire protection program. Upon completion of the activities associated with the review,the following compliance statement(s) was used:" Complies -For those sections/subsections determined to meet the specificrequirements of NFPA 805." Complies with Clarification -For those sections/subsections determined to meetthe requirements of NFPA 805 with clarification." Complies by previous NRC approval -For those sections/subsections where thespecific NFPA 805 Chapter 3 requirements are not met but previous NRCapproval of the configuration exists." Complies with use of Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations (EEEEs) -For those sections/subsections determined to be equivalent to the NFPA 805Chapter 3 requirements as documented by engineering analysis." Submit for NRC Approval -For those sections/subsections for which approval issought in this LAR submittal in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii). Asummary of the bases of acceptability is provided (see Attachment L for details).In some cases, multiple compliance statements have been assigned to a specificNFPA 805 Chapter 3 section/subsection. Where this is the case, eachcompliance/compliance basis statement clearly references the correspondingrequirement of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 12 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 12 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsEnteE xsinte Fundprome" Dn t Reeen nrences Nnot'Compuei'

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• Doeurnent Retenenoet Doal ro rent eny e Op n fl iepross e u ofboonrartetinrgrthe B-Ou Teife. For ttheric ailo Requival enhIe.'ýpnaa in Compliaent TSketetenrt tound dunng Rereur ihold be resolied prior to subbmeittng the LAR. If they are not then aField onfon ra toty c tioltyt 7 foute be edd ed to th e LA R subr io ttalPreviousAp roalin Chooý r.' _.nse I n tC m B ssFe ld In Compere nce BD- -.Field p oi d I h R f r n e o e tFel Nxov te 2: Ei stn En ie rn[q iae c v la ln p o syk o na ~ ~CL te 8 1 v la in .- m to s00. tee of Doremern RLienee Amtnendment provde: p Cooreftivoe APrttons. ds epgropseteRequired' EquialencyyofbluatWfSum bases fo Document~eene 1 Ocmn n OpenFigure 4 Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements Transition Process[Based on NEI 04-02 Figure 4-2]33 Figure 4-1 depicts the process used during the transition and therefore contains elements (i.e., open items) that represent interim resolutions. Additional detailon the transition of EEEEs is included in Section 4.2.2.NoPLRRv ae1IBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 13 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.1.2 Results of the Evaluation Process4.1.2.1 NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Met or Previously Approved by theNRCAttachment A contains the NEI 04-02, Table B-i, Transition of Fundamental FireProtection Program and Design Elements. This table provides the compliance basis forthe requirements in NFPA 805 Chapter 3. Except as identified in Section 4.1.2.3,Attachment A demonstrates that the fire protection program at BSEP either:" Complies directly with the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3," Complies with clarification with the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3," Complies through the use of existing engineering equivalency evaluations whichare valid and of appropriate quality, or" Complies with a previously NRC approved alternative to NFPA 805 Chapter 3and, therefore, the specific requirement of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 is supplanted.4.1.2.2 NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Requiring Clarification of Prior NRCApprovalNPFA 805 Section 3.1 states in part, "Previously approved alternatives from thefundamental protection program attributes of this chapter by the AHJ take precedenceover the requirements contained herein." In some cases, prior NRC approval of anNFPA 805 Chapter 3 program attribute may be unclear. CP&L requests that the NRCconcur with their finding of prior approval for the following sections of NFPA 805Chapter 3:0 None.4.1.2.3 NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Not Previously Approved by NRCThe following sections of NFPA 805, Chapter 3, are not specifically met nor do previousNRC approvals of alternatives exist:0 3.5.16 -Approval is requested for the use of fire protection water for specificplant evolutions.E 3.2.3(1) -Approval is requested for the use of performance-based methods toestablish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies forfire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805.The specific deviation and a discussion of how the alternative satisfies10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii) requirements are provided in Attachment L. CP&L requestsNRC approval of these performance-based methods.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 14 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 14 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.1.3 Definition of Power Block and PlantWhere used in NFPA 805, Chapter 3, the terms "Power Block" and "Plant" refer tostructures that have equipment required for nuclear plant operations, such asContainment, Auxiliary Building, Service Building, Control Building, Fuel Building,Radioactive Waste, Water Treatment, Turbine Building, and intake structures orstructures that are identified in the facility's pre-transition licensing basis.All structures within the BSEP Owner Controlled Area were reviewed to determine thepotential impact of fire on the nuclear safety and radioactive release criteria described inSection 1.5 of NFPA 805. This was accomplished by identifying the structures thatcontain either* Equipment that could affect" Plant operation for power generation" Ability to maintain nuclear safety performance criteria in the event of afire, including Safe Shutdown CapabilityOR-Radioactive materials that could potentially be released in event of a fireThese structures are listed in Attachment I and define the "power block" and "plant".4.2 Nuclear Safety Performance CriteriaThe Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria are established in Section 1.5 of NFPA 805.Chapter 4 of NFPA 805 provides the methodology to determine the fire protectionsystems and features required to achieve the performance criteria outlined inSection 1.5. Section 4.3.2 of NEI 04-02 provides a systematic process for determiningthe extent to which the pre-transition licensing basis meets these criteria and foridentifying any necessary fire protection program changes. NEI 04-02, Appendix B-2,provides guidance on documenting the transition of Nuclear Safety CapabilityAssessment Methodology and the Fire Area compliance strategies.4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment MethodologyThe Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) Methodology review consists of fourprocesses:" Establishing compliance with NFPA 805 Section 2.4.2" Establishing the Safe and Stable Conditions for the Plant" Establishing Recovery Actions" Evaluating Multiple Spurious OperationsThe methodology for demonstrating reasonable assurance that a fire during non-poweroperational (NPO) modes will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining thefuel in a safe and stable condition is an additional requirement of 10 CFR 50.48(c) andis addressed in Section 4.3.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 15 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 15 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.2.1.1 Compliance with NFPA 805 Section 2.4.2Overview of ProcessNFPA 805 Section 2.4.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment states:"The purpose of this section is to define the methodology for performing anuclear safety capability assessment. The following steps shall be performed:(1) Selection of systems and equipment and their interrelationships necessary toachieve the nuclear safety performance criteria in Chapter 1(2) Selection of cables necessary to achieve the nuclear safety performancecriteria in Chapter 1(3) Identification of the location of nuclear safety equipment and cables(4) Assessment of the ability to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteriagiven a fire in each fire area"The NSCA methodology review evaluated the NSCA methodology against the guidanceprovided in NEI 00-01, Revision 1 (ML050310295) Chapter 3, "DeterministicMethodology," as discussed in Appendix B-2 of NEI 04-02. The methodology isdepicted in Figure 4-2 and consisted of the following activities:" Each specific section of NFPA 805 2.4.2 was correlated to the correspondingsection of Chapter 3 of NEI 00-01 Revision 1. Based upon the content of theNEI 00-01 methodology statements, a determination was made of theapplicability of the section to the station." The plant-specific methodology was compared to applicable sections ofNEI 00-01 and one of the following alignment statements and its associatedbasis were assigned to the section:o Alignso Aligns with intento Not in Alignmento Not in Alignment, but Prior NRC Approvalo Not in Alignment, but no adverse consequences" For those sections that do not align, an assessment was made to determine if thefailure to maintain strict alignment with the guidance in NEI 00-01 could haveadverse consequences. Since NEI 00-01 is a guidance document, portions of itstext could be interpreted as 'good practice' or intended as an example of anefficient means of performing the analyses. If the section has no adverseconsequences, these sections of NEI 00-01 can be dispositioned without furtherreview.The comparison of the BSEP existing post-fire Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA)methodology to NEI 00-01 Chapter 3 (NEI 04-02 Table B-2) was performed anddocumented in Attachment B, Table B-2 Nuclear Safety Capability AssessmentMethodology Review.In addition, a review of NEI 00-01, Revision 2, (ML091770265) Chapter 3, wasconducted to identify the substantive changes from NEI 00-01, Revision 1 that areapplicable to an NFPA 805 fire protection program. This review was performed andIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 16 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirementsdocumented in Attachment B, Table B-2 Nuclear Safety Capability AssessmentMethodology Review.Results from Evaluation ProcessThe method used to perform the existing post-fire SSA with respect to selection ofsystems and equipment, selection of cables, and identification of the location ofequipment and cables, either meets the NRC endorsed guidance from NEI 00-01,Revision 1, Chapter 3 (i.e., as supplemented by the gap analysis) directly or met theintent of the endorsed guidance with adequate justification as documented inAttachment B.Step 1 1 < Assemble DocumentationSe 2Determine and DocumentStep 2 [ Applicability of NEI 00-01K SectionsFor Applicable NEI 00-01Sections, Perform Comparisonof SSD Method vs. NEI 00-01< In Strict Alignment with No eet~s Intent of NEI 00-01 No Can lack of alignment Yes Has NRC approvalb11 NEI 00-01 Guidance? Guidance? potentially result in obtained for methoStep 3 *< < dverse consequences?NoStep 4*!Figure 4 Summary of Nuclear Safety Methodology Review Process (FAQ 07-0039)BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 17 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 17 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsComparison to NEI 00-01 Revision 2An additional review was performed of NEI 00-01, Revision 2, Chapter 3, for specificsubstantive changes in the guidance from NEI 00-01, Revision 1 that are applicable toan NFPA 805 transition. The results of this review are summarized below:" Post fire manual operation of rising stem valves in the fire area of concern(NEI 00-01 Section 3.2.1.2)A review of the NSCA results indicated that there are no recovery actions ordefense-in-depth recovery actions that require manual operation of a rising stemvalve in the fire area of concern." Analysis of open circuits on a high voltage (e.g., 4.16 kV) ammeter currenttransformers (NEI 00-01 Section 3.5.2.1)The evaluation concludes that this failure mode is unlikely for CTs that couldpose a threat to safe shutdown equipment." Analysis of control power for switchgear with respect to breaker coordination(NEI 00-01 Section 3.5.2.4)Control power is modeled in the safe shutdown fault tree used to develop theNSCA. A loss of control power results in an assumed loss of the switchgear, andthere are no cases where a bus is credited to remain operable without controlpower.4.2.1.2 Safe and Stable Conditions for the PlantOverview of ProcessThe nuclear safety goals, objectives and performance criteria of NFPA 805 allow moreflexibility than the previous deterministic programs based on 10 CFR 50 Appendix Rand NUREG 0800, Section 9.5-1 (and NEI 00-01, Chapter 3) since NFPA 805 onlyrequires the licensee to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition rather thanachieve and maintain cold shutdown.NFPA 805, Section 1.6.56, defines Safe and Stable Conditions as follows"For fuel in the reactor vessel, head on and tensioned, safe and stable conditionsare defined as the ability to maintain Keff <0. 99, with a reactor coolant temperatureat or below the requirements for hot shutdown for a boiling water reactor and hotstandby for a pressurized water reactor. For all other configurations, safe and stableconditions are defined as maintaining Keff <0. 99 and fuel coolant temperature belowboiling."The nuclear safety goal of NFPA 805 requires "...reasonable assurance that a fireduring any operational mode and plant configuration will not prevent the plant fromachieving and maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition" without a specificreference to a mission time or event coping duration.For the plant to be in a safe and stable condition, it may not be necessary to perform atransition to cold shutdown as currently required under 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.Therefore, the unit may remain at or below the temperature defined by a hotstandby/hot shutdown plant operating state for the event.IBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 18 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsResultsBased on the criteria discussed in NCSA calculation BNP-E-9.010, "Safe ShutdownAnalysis in Case of Fire," the NFPA 805 licensing basis for BSEP is to achieve andmaintain hot shutdown conditions following any fire occurring prior to establishing coldshutdown. Specifically, the conditions include:" the reactor operating at power," a shutdown immediately prior to aligning the RHR system for shutdown cooling,or" the "transition" mode between these two operational phases.Immediately following the reactor scram, RCS inventory and pressure control ismaintained using the high pressure systems, HPCI and RCIC, or the low pressureinjection systems using the SRV's for pressure reduction, which are the RHR System inLPCI mode or Core Spray System. For the most limiting fire scenarios in every firearea, BNP-E-9.010 documents the availability of long term cooling using the RHRsystem, in either the Normal Shutdown Cooling Mode or Alternate Shutdown CoolingMode, or the Core Spray System, all of which are characterized by low pressureinjection and at least 1 SRV available to provide core flow. The RHR Service Watersystem rejects decay heat to the ultimate heat sink.Notably, initiation of RHR in the suppression pool cooling mode does not imply that theplant would proceed all the way to cold shutdown. Following stabilization at hotshutdown, a long term strategy for decay heat removal and inventory/pressure controlwould be determined based on the extent of equipment damage. If an assessment ofthe post-fire conditions indicated that placing RHR in the Shutdown Cooling or AlternateShutdown Cooling modes would be advisable, then activities would commence in a safeand controlled manner to align plant equipment required for reactor cooldown.The long-term actions required to maintain safe and stable conditions are relatively lowrisk activities that are largely routine and within the normal capabilities of site personnel,even in the face of fire damage, due to the assured availability of at least one train ofRHR and either onsite or offsite power sources. Repairs to safe shutdown equipmentwould not be required and the management of the onsite inventories of makeup water,nitrogen and diesel fuel would not require resources beyond those available fromnormal operations staff and emergency response personnel.Demonstration of the Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria for safe and stable conditionswas performed in two analyses.> At-Power analysis, Modes 1-3. This analysis is discussed in Section 4.2.4., Non-Power Operations analysis that includes cold shutdown and below, orModes 4 and 5. This analysis is discussed in Section 4.3.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 19 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 19 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.2.1.3 Establishing Recovery ActionsOverview of ProcessNEI 04-02 and RG 1.205 suggest that a licensee submit a summary of its approach foraddressing the transition of OMAs as recovery actions in the LAR (i.e., RegulatoryPosition 2.2.1 and NEI-04-02, Section 4.6). As a minimum, NEI 04-02 suggests that theassumptions, criteria, methodology, and overall results be included for the NRC todetermine the acceptability of the licensee's methodology.The discussion below provides the methodology used to transition pre-transition OMAsand to determine the population of post-transition recovery actions. This process isbased on FAQ 07-0030 (ML1 10070485) and consists of the following steps:" Step 1: Clearly define the primary control station(s) and determine whichpre-transition OMAs are taken at primary control station(s) Activities that occur inthe Main Control Room are not considered pre-transition OMAs. Activities thattake place at primary control station(s) or in the Main Control Room are notrecovery actions, by definition." Step 2: Determine the population of recovery actions that are required to resolvevariances from deterministic requirements (VFDRs) (i.e., to meet the riskacceptance criteria or maintain a sufficient level of defense-in-depth)." Step 3: Evaluate the additional risk presented by the use of recovery actionsrequired to demonstrate the availability of a success path" Step 4: Evaluate the feasibility of the recovery actions" Step 5: Evaluate the reliability of the recovery actionsResultsThe review results are documented in the Fire Safety Analysis for each area. Refer toAttachment G for the detailed evaluation process and summary of the results from theprocess.4.2.1.4 Evaluation of Multiple Spurious OperationsOverview of ProcessNEI 04-02 suggests that a licensee submit a summary of its approach for addressingpotential fire-induced MSOs for NRC review and approval. As a minimum, NEI 04-02recommends that the summary contain sufficient information relevant to methods, tools,and acceptance criteria used to enable the NRC to determine the acceptability of thelicensee's methodology. The methodology used to address MSOs for Brunswick issummarized below.As part of the NFPA 805 transition project, a review and evaluation of Brunswicksusceptibility to fire-induced MSOs was performed. The process was conducted inaccordance with NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205, as supplemented by FAQ 07-0038Revision 3 (ML110140242). The BWR Generic MSO list from NEI 00-01, Revision 3was utilized.BSEP LAR Rev 3Tage 20 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsThe approach outlined in Figure 4-3, below, (i.e., based on Figure 4-8 fromFAQ 07-0038) is the method used to address fire-induced MSOs for BSEP. Thismethod used insights from the Fire PRA developed in support of transition to NFPA 805and consists of the following:" Identifying potential MSOs of concern." Conducting an expert panel to assess plant specific vulnerabilities (e.g., perNEI 00-01, Rev. 1 Section F.4.2)." Updating the Fire PRA model and existing post-fire SSA / NSCA to include theMSOs of concern." Evaluating for NFPA 805 compliance." Documenting results.This process is intended to support the transition to a new licensing basis.Post-transition changes would use the RI-PB change process. The post-transitionchange process for the assessment of a specific MSO would be a simplified version ofthis process, and may not need the level of detail shown in the following section (e.g.,an expert panel may not be necessary to identify and assess a new potential MSO.Identification of new potential MSOs will be part of the plant change review processand/or inspection process).BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 21 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 21 1 CP&L,4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsIdentify Potential MSOs of Concern* SSAStep 1 -Generic List of MSOs" Self Assessments* PRA Insights* Operating ExperienceExpert PanelStep 2 Identify and Document MSOs ofConcemUpdate PRA model & NSCA (asappropriate) to include MSOs ofconcernStep 3

• ID equipment* ID logical relationships* ID cables* ID cable routingEvaluate for NFP 0 NoStep 4 Compliance Pursue other resolutionCompliant withNFPA 805?YesStep 5 Document ResultsFigure 4 Multiple Spurious Operations -Transition Resolution Process(Based on FAQ 07-0038)ResultsRefer to Attachment F for the process used by BSEP.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 22 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 22 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.2.2 Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluation TransitionOverview of Evaluation ProcessThe EEEEs that support compliance with NFPA 805 Chapter 3 or Chapter 4 (i.e., boththose that existed prior to the transition and those that were created during thetransition) were reviewed using the methodology contained in NEI 04-02. Themethodology for performing the EEEE review included the following determinations:" The EEEE is not based solely on quantitative risk evaluations," The EEEE is an appropriate use of an engineering equivalency evaluation," The EEEE is of appropriate quality," The standard license condition is met," The EEEE is technically adequate," The EEEE reflects the plant as-built condition, and" The basis for acceptability of the EEEE remains validIn accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 2.3.2 and NEI 04-02,as clarified by FAQ 07-0054, Demonstrating Compliance with Chapter 4 of NFPA 805,EEEEs that demonstrate that a fire protection system or feature is "adequate for thehazard" are summarized in the LAR as follows:" If not requesting specific approval for "adequate for the hazard" EEEEs, then theEEEE was referenced where required and a brief description of the evaluatedcondition was provided." If requesting specific NRC approval for "adequate for the hazard" EEEEs, thenEEEE was referenced where required to demonstrate compliance and wasincluded in Attachment L for NRC review and approval.In all cases, the reliance on EEEEs to demonstrate compliance with NFPA 805requirements was documented in the LAR.ResultsThe review results for EEEEs are documented in Attachment A.In accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 2.3.2,NEI 04-02, as clarified by FAQ 07-0054, Demonstrating Compliance with Chapter 4 ofNFPA 805, EEEEs used to demonstrate compliance with Chapters 3 and 4 ofNFPA 805 are referenced in the Attachments A and C as appropriate.None of the transitioning EEEEs require NRC approval.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 23 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 23 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.2.3 Licensing Action TransitionOverview of Evaluation ProcessThe existing licensing actions (i.e., Appendix R exemptions) review was performed inaccordance with NEI 04-02. The methodology for the licensing action review includedthe following:" Determination of the bases for acceptability of the licensing action." Determination that these bases for acceptability are still valid and required forNFPA 805." Additionally, variances from the deterministic requirements were identified in theNEI 04-02, Table B-3 (See Attachment C). Some of these variances weresubsequently dispositioned via the use of the performance-based approach.ResultsAttachment K contains the detailed results of the Licensing Action Review.None of the licensing actions will be transitioned into the NFPA 805 fire protectionprogram. The licensing actions listed in Attachment K are no longer necessary and willnot be transitioned into the NFPA 805 fire protection program. The justifications,grouped by the nature of the exemption, are provided in Attachment 0, Orders andExemptions.Since the exemptions are either compliant with 10 CFR 50.48(c) or no longernecessary, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(i), CP&Lrequests that the exemptions listed in Attachment K be rescinded as part of the LARprocess. It is CP&L's understanding that implicit in the superseding of the currentlicense condition, all prior fire protection program Safety Evaluations and commitmentswill be superseded in their entirety.4.2.4 Fire Area TransitionOverview of Evaluation ProcessThe Fire Area Transition (i.e., NEI 04-02 Table B-3) was performed using themethodology contained in NEI 04-02 and FAQ 07-0054. The methodology forperforming the Fire Area Transition, depicted in Figure 4-4, is outlined as follows:Step 1 -Assembled documentation. Gathered industry and plant-specific fire areaanalyses and licensing basis documents.Step 2 -Documented fulfillment of nuclear safety performance criteria." Assessed accomplishment of nuclear safety performance goals. Documentedthe method of accomplishment, in summary level form, for the fire area.0 Documented evaluation of effects of fire suppression activities. Documented theevaluation of the effects of fire suppression activities on the ability to achieve thenuclear safety performance criteria." Performed licensing action reviews. Performed a review of the licensing aspectsof the selected fire area and documented the results of the review. SeeSection 4.2.3.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 24 I CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements" Performed existing engineering equivalency evaluation reviews. Performed areview of existing engineering equivalency evaluations, or created newevaluations, documenting the basis for acceptability. See Section 4.2.2." Pre-transition OMA reviews. Performed a review of pre-transition OMAs todetermine those actions taking place outside of the main control room or outsideof the primary control station(s). See Section 4.2.1.3.Step 3 -VFDR Identification and characterization and resolution considerations.Identified variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.Documented variances as either a separation issue or a degraded fire protectionsystem or feature. Developed VFDR problem statements to support resolution.Step 4 -Performance-Based evaluations (i.e., Fire Modeling or Fire Risk Evaluations)See Section 4.5.2 for additional information.Step 5 -Final Disposition." Documented final disposition of the VFDRs in the fire safety analysis for eacharea." For recovery action compliance strategies, ensured the manual action feasibilityanalysis of the required recovery actions was completed. Note: If a recoveryaction cannot meet the feasibility requirements established per NEI 04-02, thenalternate means of compliance was considered." Documented the post transition NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance basis.Step 6 -Documented required fire protection systems and features. Reviewed theNFPA 805, Section 4.2.3, compliance strategies (i.e., including fire area licensingactions and engineering evaluations) and the NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4, compliancestrategies (i.e., including simplifying deterministic assumptions) to determine the scopeof fire protection systems and features 'required' by NFPA 805 Chapter 4. The 'required'fire protection systems and features are subject to the applicable requirements ofNFPA 805, Chapter 3.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 25 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 25 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsCP&L 4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFigure 4 Summary of Fire Area Review[Based on FAQ 07-0054 Revision 1]BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 26 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 26 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsResults of the Evaluation ProcessAttachment C contains the results of the Fire Area Transition review (i.e., NEI 04-02,Table B-3). On a fire area basis, Attachment C summarizes compliance with Chapter 4of NFPA 805.NEI 04-02, Table B-3, includes the following summary level information for each firearea:" Regulatory Basis -NFPA 805 post-transition regulatory bases are included." Performance Goal Summary -An overview of the method of accomplishment ofeach of the performance criteria in NFPA 805 Section 1.5 is provided." Reference Documents -Specific references to Nuclear Safety CapabilityAssessment Documents are provided." Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria -Asummary of the method of accomplishment is provided." Licensing Actions -BSEP is not transitioning any existing Licensing Actions, asnoted in Attachment K." EEEE -Specific references to EEEE that rely on determinations of "adequate forthe hazard" that will remain part of the post-transition licensing basis. A briefdescription of the condition and the basis for acceptability should be provided." VFDRs -Specific variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805Section 4.2.3. Refer to Section 4.5.2 for a discussion of the performance-basedapproach.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 27 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.3 Non-Power Operational Modes4.3.1 Overview of Evaluation ProcessBSEP implemented the process outlined in NEI 04-02, Guidance for implementing aRisk-Informed, Performance-Based Program under 10 CFR 50.48(c), andFAQ 07-0040, Clarification on Non-Power Operations. The goal (i.e., as depicted inFigure 4-6) is to ensure that contingency plans are established when the plant is in aNon-Power Operational (NPO) mode where the risk is intrinsically high. During low riskperiods, normal risk management controls and fire prevention/protection processes andprocedures will be utilized.The process to demonstrate that the nuclear safety performance criteria are met duringNPO modes involved the following steps:" Reviewed the existing Outage Management Processes" Identified Equipment/Cables:o Reviewed plant systems to determine success paths that support each of thedefense-in-depth Key Safety Functions (KSFs), ando Identified cables required for the selected components and determined theirrouting." Performed Fire Area Assessments (identify pinch points -plant locations wherea single fire may damage all success paths of a KSF)." Manage pinch-points associated with fire-induced vulnerabilities during theoutage.The process is depicted in Figures 4-5 and 4-6. The results are presented inSection 4.3.2.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 28 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsCP&L 4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFigure 4-5 Review POSs, KSFs, Equipment, and Cables, and Identify Pinch PointsBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 29 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsCP&L 4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsHigher Risk Evolution as Defined by Plant SpecificOutage Risk Criteria for example1) Time to Boil2) Reactor Coolant System and Fuel Pool Inventory3) Decay Heat RemovalFigure 4-6 Manage Pinch PointsBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 30 IlBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 30 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 806 Requirements4.3.2 Results of the Evaluation ProcessBSEP outage management processes were reviewed. Based on FAQ 07-0040, thePlant Operating States considered for equipment and cable selection are documentedin calculation BNP-E-9.01 1, "NFPA 805 Transition -NPO Modes Review." Using aCAFTA fault tree that models NPO requirements, systems and components wereidentified to provide three KSFs: Decay Heat Removal, Inventory Control, and ElectricalPower Availability (i.e., to the extent that it supports the Decay Heat Removal andInventory Control functions).For those components not already in the BSEP Access Database or those with afunctional state for non-power operations differing from that in the At-Power Analysis,circuit analysis, cable selection and routing were performed as described in the plant'sNSCA methodology. Once all information had been entered into the BSEP AccessDatabase, the ARCTM software package in conjunction with the NPO fault tree was usedto determine KSF Pinch Points.Calculation BNP-E-9.011 provides the results of the fire area assessments for the PinchPoint analysis and provides recommendations for changes to fire risk and outagemanagement procedures and other administrative controls. These include:" Prohibition or limitation of hot work in fire areas during periods of increasedvulnerability." Prohibition or limitation of combustible materials in fire areas during periods ofincreased vulnerability." Provision of additional fire watches in affected fire areas during increasedvulnerability.* Identification and monitoring of in-situ ignition sources for "fire precursors" (e.g.,equipment temperatures).* Review of work activities for possible rescheduling* Equipment realignment (e.g., Swing pumps, Backfeed, etc.)* Identified procedures to be briefed or walked down.* Posting of protected equipment." Use of recovery actions to mitigate potential losses of KSF success paths.Attachment D provides a more detailed discussion. Based on incorporation of therecommendations from BNP-E-9.011 into appropriate plant procedures in conjunctionwith establishment of the NFPA 805 fire protection program, the performance goal forNPO modes (i.e., maintain KSF availability) is fulfilled and the requirements ofNFPA 805 are met.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 31 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.4 Radioactive Release Performance Criteria4.4.1 Overview of Evaluation ProcessThe review of the fire protection program against NFPA 805 requirements for firesuppression related radioactive release was performed using the methodologycontained in NEI 04-02, Table E-1, and was performed using the methodologycontained in Project Instruction FPIP-0121, Radiological Release Reviews During FireFighting Operations, Rev. 1. The methodology consisted of the following:" A review of fire pre-plans and fire brigade training materials to identify fireprotection program elements (e.g., systems / components / procedural controlactions / flow paths) that are being credited to meet the radioactive release goals,objectives, and performance criteria during all plant operating modes, includingfull power and non-power conditions. Specifically for BSEP, a review wasconducted by a review panel to ensure specific steps are included forcontainment and monitoring of potentially contaminated materials so as to limitthe potential for release of radioactive materials due to firefighting operations.The review panel consisted of representatives from Operations, Engineering (i.e.,Fire Protection, HVAC Systems), Operations Fire Brigade Training, andRadiation Protection. Site pre-fire plans were screened to identify thoselocations that have the potential for radiological contamination based on locationwithin plant Radiological Controlled Areas, areas containing potentiallycontaminated systems, or locations where radioactive materials are routinelystored. In addition, the site fire brigade training materials were reviewed by thesame review panel to ensure specific steps are included addressing containmentand monitoring of potentially contaminated materials and monitoring of potentiallycontaminated fire suppression products following a fire event." A review of engineering controls to ensure containment of gaseous and liquideffluents (i.e., smoke and fire fighting agents). This review included all plantoperating modes (i.e., including full power and non-power conditions).Otherwise, provided a bounding analysis, quantitative analysis, or other analysisthat demonstrates that the limitations for instantaneous release of radioactiveeffluents specified in the unit's Technical Specifications are met.4.4.2 Results of the Evaluation ProcessFire Pre-Plan review;The review determined the Fire Protection Program (i.e., Pre-Fire Plans) meets theradioactive release performance criteria by ensuring that radioactive materials (i.e.,radiation) generated as a direct result of fire suppression activities is contained andmonitored prior to release to unrestricted areas, such that release would be as low asreasonably achievable and would not exceed applicable 10 CFR, Part 20 limits.Containment and monitoring is ensured through elements of the fire brigade training,guidance provided in pre-fire plans and certain plant features (i.e., engineering controls)such as curbs and ventilation systems or actions provided to control smokemanagement or fire suppression water run-off.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 32 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 32 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsSite specific review of associated fire event and fire suppression related radioactiverelease is summarized in Attachment E, NEI 04-02, Table E-1. Containment andmonitoring actions associated with fire fighting operations are included in the pre-fireplans for fire areas as appropriate based on the screening criteria previously stated (i.e.,ref. Table 4-3 and Attachment E) to meet the radiological performance criteria.The standardized pre-fire plan outline identifies typical fixed radiological hazards foreach area. All BSEP pre-fire plans were screened for applicability. Pre-fire plans thataddress areas where there is no possibility of radiological hazards were screened outfrom further review. A summary cross-reference of fire compartment, fire area, andpre-fire plan to plant fire areas, and radioactive release input results is provided inTable 4-3. This information was included as input to the individual fire area Fire SafetyAnalyses (FSA's) calculations. The FSA is the Design Basis Document for NFPA 805compliance for each fire area and will serve as the location for maintenance andconfiguration control of the radioactive release review results. Change, modification, orrevision to the FSA's is controlled under existing plant engineering configuration controlprocesses.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 33 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 33 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsTable 4 BSEP Pre-Fire Plan ScreeningFire Rad InFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Fire Release RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input Y/N(Screened)Unit 1 Cable Access Way (North East Rattle GB-I CB-1A Unit 1 Cable Access OPFP-CB 1 PFP-GB-i Out YSpace) 23ft. Elevation Ways______Unit 1 Cable Access Way (North West Rattle CB-01 B Unit 1 Cable Access OPFP-CB 1 PFP-CB-1 Out YSpace) 23ft. Elevation WaysUnit 1 Cable Access Way (North East Rattle CB-i CB-12A Unit 1 Cable Access OPFP-GB lPFP-CB-12 Out YSpace) 49ft. Elevation WaysUnit 1 Cable Access Way (North West Rattle GB-i CB-12B Unit 1 Cable Access OPFP-GB 1PFP-GB-12 Out YSpace) 49ft. Elevation WaysBattery Room 2B3 23ft. Elevation GB-1 G B-1 Unit 2 Division 11 Battery OPFP-GB 2PFP-CB-10 Out YRoomUnit 2 Cable Access Way (South East Rattle CB-2 CB-02A Unit 2 Cable Access OPFP-CB 2PFP-CB-2 Out YSpace) 23ft. Elevation WaysUnit 2 Cable Access Way (South West CB-2 CB-02B Unit 2 Cable Access OPFP-CB 2PFP-CB-2 Out YRattle Space) 23ft. Elevation WaysC-0C1RoUnit 2 Cable Access Way (South East Rattle CB-2 GB-i 3A Unit 2 Cable Access OPFP-GB 2PFP-CB-13 Out YSpace) 49ft. Elevation WaysUnit 2 Cable Access Way (South West Rattle CB-2 CB-1 3B Unit 2 Cable Access OPFP-GB 2PFP-GB-13 Out YSpace) 49ft. Elevation WaysUnit 1 Northwest Stairwell 23ft. and 49ft CB-23E CB-03 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB 1 PFP-CB-4 Out YElevationsUnit 2 Southwest Stairwell 23ft. and 49ft CB-23E CB-04 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB 2PFP-CB-3 Out YElevationsUnit 1 Cable Spreading Room 23ft. CB-23E CB-05 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB iPFP-CB-5 Out YElevation ____________Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room 23ft. CB-23E CB-06 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB 2PFP-CB-6 Out YElevation ____________Control Building Elevator and Shaft CB-23E CB-0 1 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-3 1 Out YUnit 1 Computer Room North 49ft. Elevation CB-23E CB-14 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-14 Out YUnit 2 Computer Room South 49ft. Elevation CB-23E CB-15 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-14 Out YBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 34 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 34 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Fire Release RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input Y/N(Screened)Auxiliary Operator Briefing Room CB-23E CB-16 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-23 Out YOperator Break Room CB-23E CB-17 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-23 Out YLadies Washroom CB-23E CB-18 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-23 Out YCentral Alarm Station (CAS) 52ft. Elevation CB-23E CB-19 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-19 Out YUnit 1 Northwest Back Panel Area CB-23E CB-20 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-23 Out YUnit 2 Southwest Back Panel Area CB-23E CB-21 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-23 Out YMen's Washroom CB-23E CB-22 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-23 Out YControl Room 49ft. Elevation CB-23E CB-23 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-23 Out YHVAC Equipment Room -70ft CB-23E CB-24 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-24 Out YAir Conditioning Condenser Area -70ft CB-23E CB-25 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-25 Out YControl Building Elevator Machinery Room -CB-23E CB-26 Control Room Extended OPFP-CB OPFP-CB-26 Out Y70ftBattery Room 1A 23ft. Elevation CB-7 CB-07 Unit 1 Division I Battery OPFP-CB 1PFP-CB-7 Out YRoomBattery Room 1B 23ft. Elevation CB-8 CB-08 Unit 1 Division II Battery OPFP-CB 1PFP-CB-8 Out YRoomBattery Room 2A 23ft. Elevation CB-9 CB-09 Unit 2 Division I Battery OPFP-CB 2PFP-CB-9 Out YRoomDG Building Basement -2ft DG-1 DG-01 Diesel Generator OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-1 Out NBasementDG Building Loading Dock, 20ft DG-10 DG-10 Loading Dock OPFP-DG OPFP-013 Out NEl Switchgear Room, 50ft DG-1 1 DG-1 1 El Switchgear OPFP-DG 1 PFP-DG-1 1 Out NE2 Switchgear Room, 50ft DG-12 DG-12 E2 Switchgear OPFP-DG 1PFP-DG-12 Out NE3 Switchgear Room, 50ft DG-13 DG-13 E3 Switchgear OPFP-DG 2PFP-DG-13 Out NE4 Switchgear Room, 50ft DG-14 DG-14 E4 Switchgear OPFP-DG 2PFP-DG-14 Out NSupply Air Plenum, 50ft DG-16E DG-15 Fan Room Extended OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-15 Out NDiesel Building Supply Fan Room, 50ft DG-16E DG-16 Fan Room Extended OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-15 Out NDiesel Building North Air Lock, 50ft DG-16E DG-17 Fan Room Extended OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-15 Out NBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 35IBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 35 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA. 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre-Plan Input RCA?Procedure Pr-lnIpt Y/N(Screened)Diesel Building South Air Lock, 50ft DG-16E DG-18 Fan Room Extended OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-15 Out NAFFF System Room, 50ft DG-16E DG-23 Fan Room Extended OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-15 Out NDiesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank Cell #1, 2ft DG-19 DG-19 Fuel Oil Tank Cell 1 OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-19 Out NDiesel Generator Cell 4 -20ft DG-2 DG-02 Diesel Cell 4 OPFP-DG 2PFP-DG-2 Out NDiesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank Cell #2, 2ft DG-20 DG-20 Fuel Oil Tank Cell 2 OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-19 Out NDiesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank Cell #3, 2ft DG-21 DG-21 Fuel Oil Tank Cell 3 OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-19 Out NDiesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank Cell #4, 2ft DG-22 DG-22 Fuel Oil Tank Cell 4 OPFP-DG OPFP-DG-19 Out NDiesel Generator Cell 3 -20ft DG-3 DG-03 Diesel Cell 3 OPFP-DG 2PFP-DG-3 Out NDiesel Generator Cell 2 -20ft DG-4 DG-04 Diesel Cell 2 OPFP-DG 1 PFP-DG-4 Out NDiesel Generator Cell 1, 20ft DG-5 DG-05 Diesel Cell 1 OPFP-DG 1 PFP-DG-5 Out NE5 Switchgear Room, 20ft DG-6 DG-06 E5 Switchgear OPFP-DG 1 PFP-DG-6 Out NE6 Switchgear Room, 20ft DG-7 DG-07 E6 Switchgear OPFP-DG 1 PFP-DG-7 Out NE7 Switchgear Room, 20ft DG-8 DG-08 E7 Switchgear OPFP-DG 2PFP-DG-8 Out NE8 Switchgear Room, 20ft DG-9 DG-09 E8 Switchgear OPFP-DG 2PFP-DG-9 Out NCaswell Beach Pumping Station CASBCH CASBCH Caswell Beach Pumping OPFP-Station MBOCA 0PFP-CAS Out NHydrogen/Oxygen OPFP- 0PFP-HOSF Out NHydrogen/Oxygen Storage Facility HOSF HOSF Storage Facility MBOCASodium Hypochlorite Facility SHF SHF Sodium Hypochlorite OPFP-SiHphrealyHSFacility MBOCA 0PFP-SHF Out NSwitchyard YARD SY Yard OPFP- 0PFP-RELAY Out NMBOCA OF-EA uAuxiliary Boiler House ABH ABH Auxiliary Boiler House OPFP-MBPA OPFP-ABH Out NAdmin -Annex Building (Security Office ADANX ADANX Admin -Annex Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-ADANX Out NBuilding) ADANX_ ADANX_(Security Office Building) 0PFP-MBPA 0PFP-ADANX_ OutNAdmin Building -First Floor ADMIN ADMIN-01 Administration Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-ADMIN-1 Out NAdmin Building -Second Floor ADMIN ADMIN-02 Administration Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-ADMIN-2 Out NClean Maintenance Shop -First Floor CM CM-01 Clean Maintenance Shop OPFP-MBPA OPFP-CM-1 Out NBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 36 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 36 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre-Plan Input RCA?Procedure Pr-lnIpt Y/N(Screened)Clean Maintenance Shop -Second Floor CM CM-02 Clean Maintenance Shop OPFP-MBPA OPFP-CM-2 Out NFab Shop #1/MOV and Electrical FAB FAB-01 Fab Shops OPFP-MBPA OPFP-FAB1 Out NFab Shop #3/Diesel Repair FAB FAB-03 Fab Shops OPFP-MBPA OPFP-FAB3 Out NFire House FH FH Fire House OPFP-MBPA OPFP-FH Out NISFSI Storage Building ISB ISB ISFSI Storage Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-ISFSI-SB IN YLube Oil and Paint Storage Building LUBE LUBE Lube Oil and Paint OPFP-MBPA OPFP-LUBE Out NStorage BuildingI&C Breaker TestINDE Building MAINT MAINT l&C Breaker TestINDE OPFP-MBPA OPFP-MAINT Out NBuildingMini Warehouse/Mini Warehouse/Equipment- Outage MINI MINI Equipment -Outage 0PFP-MBPA 0PFP-MINI Out NStorage Building Storage BuildingMakeup Water Treatment Building MWT-1 MWT-01 Makeup Water Treatment OPFP-MBPA 0PFP-MWT Out NO&M Building -First Floor OMB OMB-01 O&M Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-OMB-1 Out NO&M Building -Second Floor OMB OMB-02 O&M Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-OMB-2 Out NO&M Building -Third Floor OMB OMB-03 O&M Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-OMB-3 Out NRadioactive Material -Radioactive Material -Container Storage RMCSB RMCSB Container Storage OPFP-MBPA OPFP-RMCSB IN YBuilding BuildingSecondary Access Point SAP SAP Secondary Access Point OPFP-MBPA OPFP-SAP Out NClean Scaffold Building SCAFF SCAFF Clean Scaffold Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-SCAFF Out NService Building -First Floor SERV SERV-01 Service Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-SERV-1 IN YService Building -Second Floor SERV SERV-02 Service Building OPFP-MBPA OPFP-SERV-2 IN YHot Shop/Stores/Warehouse Building STORES STORES Hot Shop/Stores/ OPFP-MBPA OPFP-STORES IN YWarehouse BuildingStorm Drain Rad Monitor Building STORM STORM Storm Drain Rad Monitor OPFP-MBPA OPFP-STORM IN YBuilding____Augmented Off-Gas Building AOG-1 AOG-01 Augmented Off-Gas OPFP-PBAA OPFP-AOG-1 IN YBuilding 0PFP-PBAA _0PFP-AOG-1_INYBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 37 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 37 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre Input RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input Y/N(Screened)Unit 1 Recirc Power Distribution Center RPDC1 RPDC1 Unit 1 Recirc Power OPFP-PBM OPFP-RPDC Out N(PDC) Distribution Center (PDC)Unit 2 Recirc Power Distribution Center RPDC2 RPDC2 Unit 2 Recirc Power OPFP-PBM OPFP-RPDC Out N(PDC) Distribution Center (PDC)Radwaste Building Tank Room, minus 3ft RW-1 RW-01A Radwaste Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-RW-la IN YRadwaste Building CFD Area, 23ft RW-1 RW-01B Radwaste Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-RW-lb IN YRadwaste Building Processing, 35ft RW-1 RW-01C Radwaste Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-RW-lc IN YRadwaste Building Processing, 47ft RW-1 RW-01D Radwaste Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-RW-ld IN YRadwaste Building Roof, 44ft RW-1 RW-01E Radwaste Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-RW-le IN YRadwaste Building Elevator Machinery RW-1 RW-01F Radwaste Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-RW-lf IN YRoom, 70ftService Water Building Pump Area, 20ft SW1-1 SWi-01A Service Water Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-SW-la Out NService Water Building Basement, 4ft SWI-1 SW1-01B Service Water Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-SW-lb Out NService Water Building Sump, minus 13ft SWIA SWl-01C Service Water Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-SW-lb Out NEast Yard Open Area YARD EY Yard OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY IN NTransformer Yard YARD TY Yard OPFP-PBAA OPFP-TY Out NChlorination Building CLB CLB Chlorination Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY Out NUnit 1 Condensate Transfer Pump House CTPH1 CTPH1 Unit 1 Condensate 0PFP-PBAA 0PFP-EY IN YTransfer Pump House OF-BA OF-YIUnit 2 Condensate Transfer Pump House CTPH2 CTPH2 Unit 2 Condensate OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY IN YTransfer Pump HouseDuct Bank under East Yard DUCTBANK DUCTBANK DUCTBANK OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY Out NUnit 1 HPCI C02 Bottle Room HCB1 HCB1 Unit 1 HPCI C02 Bottle OPFP-PBAA OPFP-TY IN YRoomUnit 2 HPCI C02 Bottle Room HCB2 HCB2 Unit 2 HPCI C02 Bottle OPFP-PBAA OPFP-TY IN YRoomHVAC Cooling Towers HCT HCT HVAC Cooling Towers OPFP-PBAA OPFP-TY Out NOld NDE Shack NDE NDE Old NDE Shack OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY Out NBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 38 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 38 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA. 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre-Plan Input RCA?Procedure PePa n Y/N(Screened)Stack Filter House SFH SFH Stack Filter House OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY IN YStack Monitoring House SMH SMH Stack Monitoring House OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY Out NSewage Treatment Plant STP STP Sewage Treatment Plant OPFP-PBAA OPFP-TY Out NUnit 1 Valve Pit VP1 VP1 Unit 1 Valve Pit OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY Out NUnit 2 Valve Pit VP2 VP2 Unit 2 Valve Pit OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY Out NCircwater Yard YARD CW Yard OPFP-PBAA OPFP-EY Out NRadwaste Loading Dock YARD RWLD Yard OPFP-PBAA OPFP-RW-lb IN YNorthwest Yard YARD NWY Yard OPFP-PBAA OPFP-TY Out NRadwaste Building Elevator RW-1 RW-01G Radwaste Building OPFP-PBAA OPFP-RW-lf Out YReactor Building Southwest Core Spray, RB1-1 RB1-01A Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-1a IN Yminus 17ft General AreasReactor Building Northwest Core Spray, RB1-1 RB1-01B Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RBI-1b IN Yminus 17ft General AreasReactor Building Northeast RHR Room, RB1-1 RB1-01C Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-1c IN Yminus 17ft General AreasReactor Building Southeast RHR Room, RB1-1 RB1-01D Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-ld IN Yminus 17ft General AreasReactor Building Northeast RHR Heat RB1-1 RB1-O1E Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-1e IN YExchanger, 20ft General AreasReactor Building Southeast RHR Heat RB1-1 RBl-01F Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lf IN YExchanger, 20ft General AreasReactor Building East Central, 2Oft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-1g N IN Y01G(EC) General Areas 1PFP-RB1-lg SReactor Building North Central, 20ft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lg N IN Y01G(NC) General AreasReactor Building Northeast Corner, 20ft RBI-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lg N IN YO1G(NE) General Areas _____Reactor Building Northwest Corner, 20ft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building IPFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lg N IN YR B N C 21 General AreasReactor Building South Central, 20ft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lg S IN YReactorBuildingSouthCentral,_20ft_ RBI-1 01G(SC) General AreasBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 39 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 39 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre-Plan Input RCA?Procedure Pr-lnIpt Y/N(Screened)Reactor Building Southeast Corner, 20ft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lg S IN YRc Blgoe onfB 01G(SE) General AreasReactor Building Southwest Corner, 20ft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lg S IN Y___________________________ ~General AreasReactor Building East Central, 5Oft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lh E IN YReactorBuildingEas__entral,_50ft _ RBI-1 01 H(EC) General AreasReactor Bid Nrth Central, 50ft R11 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lh E IN Yuling 0 , -01H(NC) General Areas 1PFP-RBI-1 h WReactor uilding Northeast Corner, 50ft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lh E IN YReactorBuildingNortheastCorner,_50ft RB-1 01H(NE) General AreasReactor Building Northwest Corner, 50ft RB1-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lh W IN YR B g e n t01HNW) General AreasReactor Building Southeast Corner, 50ft R11-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lh E IN YReactorBuildingSotheastorner50f BI-1 01H(SE) General AreasReactor Building Southwest Corner, 50ft R11-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lh W IN YReactorBidingSothwestoner,_50f _B-1_ 01_H(SW) General AreasReactor Building West Central, 5ft R131-1 RB1- Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lh W IN YReactoruildingWestCenral,_50tRBI-1 01H(WC) General AreasReactor Building RWCU Access Room, 77ft RB1-1 R131-11 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-12 IN YReactor___Building __RW _U__Access __Room, 7t IB0 General AreasReactor Building West, 80ft RB1-1 RB1-01J Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lj W IN Y________________________________ __________General Areas _________Reactor Building East, 80ft RB1-1 RB1-01K Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lk IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building Spent Fuel Pool, 117ft RB1-1 RB1-O1L Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lm IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building Refueling Floor, 117ft RB1-1 RB1-01M Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB IPFP-RBI-lm IN YGeneral AreasReactor Bidg HPCI Roof Mezzanine 5ft R11 R11N Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFPRB 1PFP-RB1-le IN Yuling ae, --General Areas 1PFP-RB1-lfReactor Building ECCS Tunnel Roof, 36ft RB1-1 RB1-010 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-1o IN Y____________________ I____I___I_ GeneralAreas I_______ I____I___I _BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 40 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 40 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Fire Release RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input Y/N(Screened)Reactor Building HPCI Room, minus l7ft RB1-1 RBl-02 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-2 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building Drywell and Torus RB1-1 RBl-03 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-3 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building MSIV Pit, 5ft R131-1 RBl-04 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-4 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building HP Field Office, RBI-1 RB1-05 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lgS IN YDecontamination Room, 20ft General AreasReactor Building Drywell Entry, 2ft R131-1 RBl-07 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-7 IN YRc Blgr ln,0R 11 General AreasReactor Building TIP Room, 20ft R11-1 RBl-08 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-8 IN YReatorBuidigTPRom20tRI- RB1-General AreasReactor Building Elevator Shaft R11-1 RBl-09 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-9 IN YReatorBuidigEevaorShatR -RBGeneral AreasReactor Building RWCU Pump and Heat RB1-1 RBl-10 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB lPFP-RBl-10 IN YExchanger Room, 50ft General AreasReactor Building New Fuel Vault, 117ft R11-1 RBl-11 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB lPFP-RBl-16 IN YRectruldngNe ueVul,11ft RB- RBGeneral AreasReactor Building RWCU Backwash Tank RB1-1 RBl-12 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB lPFP-RBl-12 IN YRoom, 77ft RBI-1__ B1-12 General Areas 1PPRB 1F-R112I_Reactor Building CRD Repair Room, 80ft RB1-1 RB1-13 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB lPFP-RBl-13 IN YEast General Areas 1PPR_1F-B1-3 I_Reactor Building Skimmer Surge Tank Vault, RB1-1 RB1-14 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-14 IN Y117ft General AreasReactor Building Elevator Machinery Room, RB1-1 RBl-15 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RBl-15 IN Y133ft General AreasReactor Building 1A RWCU Filter Pit, 117ft RB1-1 RB1-16 Unit 1 ReactorBuilding IPFP-RB lPFP-RB1-16 IN Y___________ ~General Areas _______Reactor Building lB RWCU Filter Pit, 17ft RB1-1 RBl-17 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-16 IN YReactorBuilding_1BRWCUFilterPit,_117ft RBI-1____ R17 General AreasReactor Building Supply Room, 9ft RB1 -1 RBl-18 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lp IN YReactorBuildingSupplyRoom,_98ftRB-1 RB1-18 _ General Areas IReactor Building Platform, 98ft R11-1 RBl-18GA Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-lp IN YGeneral Areas 1PFP-RB1-19BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 41 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 41 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre-Plan Input RCA?Procedure Pr-lnIpt Y/N(Screened)Reactor Building Clothing Change room, 98ft RB1-1 RBl-19 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-19 IN YReactorBuildingClothingChangeroom 98ft RBI-1 RB1-19 General AreasReactor Building RWCU Valve Room, 77ft RB1-1 RBl-20 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-12 IN YReactorBuildingRWCUValveRoom,77f RBGeneral AreasReactor Building Resin Storage Room, 80ft RB1-1 RB1-21 Unit 1 Reactor Building 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-21 IN YEast General AreasReactor Building ECCS Mini Steam Tunnel, RB1-6 RB1-06 Mini Steam Tunnel 1PFP-RB 1PFP-RB1-6 IN Y20ftElectrical Tunnel, 9ft TB1 ET Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-ET IN YAreasPipe Tunnel, -3ft T11 PT Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 0PFP-RW-1a IN YPipe__Tunnel,__-3ftTB1 PTAreasUnit 1 TB Breezeway South, 20ft TB1 TB1-01A Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-1 IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Breezeway North, 2ft T131 TBl-01B Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-1 IN YUnit_1TBBreezewayNorh,20ftTB TB1-01B AreasUnit 1 TB Mechanical Vacuum Pump Area, TB1 TB1-01C Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-lc IN Y20ft AreasUnit 1 TB Air Compressor Area, 20ft TB1 TB1-01D Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-ld IN YAreasUnit 1 TB 2A Air Dryer Area, 20ft TB1 TB1-01E Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-le IN YAreasUnit 1 TB 4KV Switchgear Area, 20ft TB1 TB1-01F Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-lf IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Hydrogen Seal Oil Area, 20ft TB1 TB1-01G Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-lg IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Condensate Pump Area, 20ft TB1 TB1-01H Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-lh IN YAreasUnit 1 TB 1A Reactor Recirc MG Set Room, TB1 TB1-011 ATurbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-li &j IN Y38ft AreasUnit 1 TB 1B Reactor Recirc MG Set Room, TB1 TB1-01J Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-li & j IN Y38ft AreasUnit 1 TB South 38ft and 45ft TB1 TB1-01K Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-lk IN YAreasBSEP LAR Rev 3Tage 42 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 806 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre Input RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input Y/N(Screened)Unit 1 TB3 Supply Fan Room 55f T131 TB1-1L Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TBl-11 IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Main Turbine Front Standard Area, TB1 TB1-01M Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-lm IN Y70ft AreasUnit 1 TB Main Turbine and MSR Area, 70ff TB1 TB1-O1N Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-1n IN YU 1B nr aM A ,f1 AreasUnit 1 TB Main Generator and Exciter area, TB1 TB1-010 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-lo IN Y70ft AreasUnit 1 TB 1B SJAE Room, 20ft TB1 TB1-02 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-2 IN YAreasUnit 1 TB 1A SJAE Room, 20ft TB1 TB1-03 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-3 IN Y_______________________________AreasUnit 1 TB 1B RFPT Room, 20ft T11 TBl-04 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-4 IN YAreasUnit 1 TB 1A RFPT Room, 20ff TB1 TBl-05 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-5 IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Condensate Booster Pump Room, TB1 TB1-06 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-6 IN Y20ft AreasUnit 1 TB Heater Drain Pump Room, 9ff T11 TB1-07 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-7 IN YUnit_1_TBHeaterDrainPumpRoom,_9f TB1_TB1-07 AreasUnit 1 TB Condenser Bay Area, 20ff T11 TBl-08A Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-8a IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Condenser Pit East Area, 20ff TB1 TBl-08B Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-8b IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Condenser Pit West Area, 20ft T11 TBl-08C Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-8c IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Condenser Bay Area, 45ft T131 TBl-8D Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-8d IN YUtTC eeaA ,5T- AreasUnit 1 TB Condenser Pit East Area, 45f T131 TBl-08E Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-8e IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Condenser Pit West Area, 45ft TB1 TB1-08F Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-8f IN YAreasUnit 1 TB EHC and Lube Oil Room, 20ff TBI TBl-09A Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-9a IN YUnit_1_TBEHCandLubeOlRoom,_20ft _TB1_TB1-09A AreasBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 43 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 43 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre Input RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input Y/N(Screened)Unit 1 TB EHC and Lube Oil Room, 45ft TB1 TB1-09B Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-9b IN YAreasUnit 1 TB Exhaust Fan Room, 45ft TB1 TBI-10 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TBI-10 IN Y_____________________________AreasUnit 1 TB A Train HP Feedwater heater TB1 TBl-12 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-12 IN YRoom, 45ft AreasUnit 1 TB B Train HP Feedwater heater TB1 TBl13 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-13 IN YRoom, 45ft TB1_TB1-13 AreasUnit 1 TB Receiving Area T11 TBl-15 Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB OPFP-013 IN YUnit__1_TBReceiving__Area_ TB1 TB1-15 AreasUnit 1 Heater Bay Roof YARD TB11- Yard 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TBI-1m IN Y________________________ _______HBROOF Yad1FTB PPTB-m IYTurbine Building 1 Dragon's Breath T11 TB1-DB Turbine Building General 1PFP-TB 1PFP-TB1-12 IN YTurbineBuilding_1_DragonsBreath _ TB1 TB1-DB__AreasReactor Building Southwest Core Spray, RB2-1 RB2-01A Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-la IN Yminus 17ft General AreasReactor Building Northwest Core Spray, RB2-1 RB2-01B Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-1b IN Yminus 17ft General AreasReactor Building Northeast RHR Room, RB2-1 RB2-01C Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-1c IN Yminus 17ft General AreasReactor Building Southeast RHR Room, RB2-1 RB2-01 D Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-ld IN Yminus 17ft General AreasReactor Building Northeast RHR Heat R12-1 RB2-01 E Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-1e IN YExchanger, 20ft General AreasReactor Building Southeast RHR Heat R12-1 R12-01F Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lf IN YExchanger, 20ft RB2-1 General AreasReactor Building East Central, 20ft R12-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lg N IN YReactorBuildingEastCentral,_20ftRB2-1 01G(EC) General Areas 2PFP-RB2-lg SReactor Building North Central, 2Oft RB2-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lg N IN YReactorBuildingNorthCentral,_20ftRB2-1 01G(NC) General AreasReactor Building Northeast Corner, 20ft R12-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lg N IN Y01 G(NE) General AreasReactor Building Northwest Corner, 20ft R12-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lg N IN YReactorBuildingNorthwestCorner,20ft RB2-1 01 G(NW) General AreasBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page~ IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 44 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre Input RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input Y/N(Screened)Reactor Building South Central, 20ft R12-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lg S IN YReactorBuildigSoutCentrl,_20f_ RB2-1 01G(SC) General AreasReactor Building Southeast Corner, 20ft RB2-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lg S IN Y01G(SE) General AreasReactor Building Southwest Corner, 20ft R12-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lg S IN Y01G(SW) General AreasReactor Building East Central, 50ft RB2-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lh E IN Y01 H(EC) General AreasReactor Bid Nrth Ctl 50ft RB21 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lh E IN Yuling o enra, -01 H(NC) General Areas 2PFP-RB2-1h WReactor Building Northeast Corner, 5Oft RB2-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lh E IN YR tBd Nt so r0R 01 H(NE) General AreasReactor Building Northwest Corner, 50ft RB2-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-1h W IN YR01H(NW) General AreasReactor Building Southeast Corner, 5Oft RB2-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lh E IN YReactor Building Sotheast Corner,50f R-01H(SE) General AreasReactor Building Southwest Corner, 50ft R12-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lh W IN YReactorBuildingSouthwestCorner,50ft RB2-1V General AreasReactor Building West Central, 50ft R12-1 RB2- Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-1h W IN Y01 H(WC) General AreasReactor Building RWCU Access Room, 77ft RB2-1 R12-011 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-12 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building West, 80ft R12-11 R12-1J Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lj W IN YReactorBuildngWest,_80ftRB2-1_RB2-01J General AreasReactor Building East, 80ft RB2-1 RB2-01 K Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-1k IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building Spent Fuel Pool, 117ft R132-1 RB2-01 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-1m IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building Refueling Floor, 117ft RB2-1 RB2-1 M Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-1m IN YGeneral AreasReactor Bilding HPCI Rf Me 5ft R21 R21N Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-le IN Yuidg 0 ezzanine, --General Areas 2PFP-RB2-lfBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 45 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 45 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre Input RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input Y/N(Screened)Reactor Building EGGS Tunnel Roof, 36ft R132-1 RB2-01 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lo IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building HPCI Room, minus 17ff RB2-1 RB2-02 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-2 IN YReactor__BuildingHP__Room,_minus_17ft RBGeneral AreasReactor Building Drywell and Torus RB2-1 R12-03 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-3 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building MSIV Pit, ft R132-11 R12-04 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-4 IN YRcriiMVi5tB2 General AreasReactor Building HP Field Office, RB2-1 RB2-05 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lg IN YDecontamination Room, 20ft General AreasReactor Building Drywell Entry, 20ft RB2-1 RB2-07 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-7 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building TIP Room, 20ff RB2-1 R32-08 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-8 IN YReactorBuildigTIPRom,_20tRB2-1 RB2-08 General AreasReactor Building Elevator Shaft RB2-1 R12-09 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-9 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building RWCU Pump and Heat R12-1 R12-10 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-10 IN YExchanger Room, 50ft General AreasReactor Building New Fuel Vault, 117ff RB2-1 R32-1 1 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lm IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building RWCU Backwash Tank RB2-1 R12-12 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-12 IN YRoom, 77ft General AreasReactor Building CRD Repair Room, 80ft RB2-1 RB2-13 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-13 IN YEast General AreasReactor Building Skimmer Surge Tank Vault, RB2-1 RB2-14 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-14 IN Y117ft General AreasReactor Building Elevator Machinery Room, RB2-1 RB2-15 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-15 IN Y133ft General AreasReactor Building 2A RWCU Filter Pit, 117ff R12-1 R12-16 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-16 IN YReactorBuding2AWCUFilterPit,117f RB2-1B2General AreasReactor Building 2B RWCU Filter Pit, 117ff RB2-1 R32-17 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-16 IN YReactorBuildng_2BRWCUFiterPit,_1_7f __B2-1 _ _B2-17 _ General AreasReactor Building Supply Room, 98ff R12-1 RB2-18 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lp IN YReactorBuildingSupplyRoom,_98ftB2-1 RB2-18 _ General AreasBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 46 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 46 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan re Release RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input YIN(Screened)Reactor Building Platform, 98ft RB2-1 RB2-18GA Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-lp IN Y__________General AreasReactor Building Clothing Change room, 98f RB32-1 RB2-19 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-19 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building Resin Storage Room, 80ft RB2-1 RB2-20 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-20 IN YEast RB2-1_ RB2-20 General AreasReactor Building RWCU Valve Room, 77ft RB2-1 RB2-21 Unit 2 Reactor Building 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-12 IN YGeneral AreasReactor Building EGGS Mini Steam Tunnel, RB2-6 RB2-06 Mini Steam Tunnel 2PFP-RB 2PFP-RB2-6 IN Y20ffUnit 2 TB Breezeway North TB1 TB2-01A Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-1 IN YAreas BuildingGeneralUnit 2 TB Breezeway South TB1 TB2-01 B Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-1 IN YAreasUnit 2 TB Mechanical Vacuum Pump Area, TB2OIC Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-lc IN Y20ft TB1 AreasUnit 2 TB Air Compressor Area, 20ft TB1 TB2-01 D Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-ld IN YAreasUnit 2 TB 2A Air Dryer Area, 20ft TB1 TB2-01 E Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-le IN YAreasUnit 2 TB 4KV Switchgear Area, 20ft TB1 TB2-01F Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-lf IN YAreasUnit 2 TB Hydrogen Seal Oil Area, 20ft TB1 TB2-01G Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-lg IN YAreasUnit 2 TB Condensate Pump Area, 20ft TB1 TB2-01 H Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-lh IN YAreasUnit 2 TB 2B Reactor Recirc MG Set Room, TB1 T12-01 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-1 & j IN Y38ft Areas 2F-B P-T-i& INUnit 2 TB 2A Reactor Recirc MG Set Room, TB1 TB2-01J Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-1i & j IN Y38ff AreasUnit 2 TB North 38ft and 45ft TB1 TB2-01 K Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-lk IN YAreasUnit 2 TB Supply Fan Room 55ft TB1 TB2-01L Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-1l IN YI Areas 2PFP-TB_2PFP-TB2-11 _IN _ YBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 47 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 47 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre Input RCA?Procedure Pre-Plan Input YIN(Screened)Unit 2 TB Main Turbine Front Standard Area, TB1 TB2-01M Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-1m IN Y70ft AreasUnit 2 TB3 Main Turbine and MSR Area, 70ft T1 T12-01N Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-1n IN YUnit_2_TBMainTubineandMSRArea 70fTBTB-01 AreasUnit 2 TB Main Generator and Exciter area, TB1 TB2-010 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-lo IN Y70ft AreasUnit 2 TB 2B SJAE Room, 20ft T11 T12-02 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-2 IN YUnit__2__TB_2B __SJAERoom, __20ft _ TB1 T-AreasUnit 2 TB 2A SJAE Room, 20ft TB1 TB2-03 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-3 IN YAreasUnit 2 TB 2B RFP Room, 20ft TB1 TB2-04 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-4 IN YAreasUnit 2 TB 2A REP Room, 20ft T11 T12-05 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-5 IN YUnit__2_TB_2ARFPRoom,_20ft _ TB1 TB2-05_AreasUnit 2 TB Condensate Booster Pump Room, TB1 TB2-06 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-6 IN Y20ft AreasUnit 2 TB Heater Drain Pump Room, 20ft TB1 TB2-07 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-7 IN YAreasUnit 2 TB Condenser Bay Area, 20ft TB1 TB2-08A Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-8a IN YAreasUnit 2 TB Condenser Pit East Area, 20ft TB1 TB2-08B Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-8b IN YAreasUnit 2 TB Condenser Pit West Area, 20ft T131 T2-08C Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-8c IN YUnit_2_TBCondenserPitWestArea,20 _ T2AreasUnit 2 TB Condenser Bay Area, 45ft TB1 TB2-08D Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-8d IN YAreasUnit 2 TB3 Condenser Pit East Area, 45ft TB1 T2-08E Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-8e IN YAreasUnit 2 TB Condenser Pit West Area, 45ft TBI TB2-08F Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-8f IN YAreasUnit 2 TB EHC and Lube Oil Room, 20ft TB1 TB2-09A Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-9a IN YAreasUnit 2 TB EHC and Lube Oil Room, 45ft TB1 TB2-09B Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-9b IN YAreasBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 48 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 48 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Rad InFieFire Release RAFire Zone Description Fire Area Fire Zone Fire Area Description Pre-Plan Pre-Plan Input RCA?Procedure Pr-lnIpt Y/N(Screened)Unit 2 TB Exhaust Fan Room, 45ft T131 T12-1 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-10 IN YAreasUnit 2 TB A Train HP Feedwater heater T11 T1212 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-12 IN YRoom, 45ft TB1_TB2-_2 AreasUnit 2 TB B Train HP Feedwater heater T11 TB21 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-13 IN YRoom, 45ft TB1_TB2-13 AreasTurbine Building Elevator Shaft T131 T132-14 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-14 IN YT ieud EetStT2 Areas 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-14 IN _ YTurbine Building Elevator Machinery Room TB1 T12-15 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-15 IN YT iBd EvrceR TT- AreasTurbine Building Laydown Area TB1 TB2-16 Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-16 IN Y___ ___ ___ Areas _ _ _ _ _ _ ________ _ _ _ _ _Unit 2 Heater Bay Roof YARD TB12- Yard 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-1m IN YHBROOF Yad2FTB PPTB-m IYTurbine Building 2 Dragon's Breath TB1 TB2-DB Turbine Building General 2PFP-TB 2PFP-TB2-12 IN YTuneBidig2Drgn'_ratBT2D AreasUnit 1 Control Building Roof YARD CB-ROOF1 Yard OPFP-013 *New PFP IN YUnit 2 Control Building Roof YARD CB-ROOF2 Yard OPFP-013 *New PFP IN YReactor Building 1 Roof YARD RB1-ROOF Yard OPFP-013 *New PFP IN YBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 49 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 49 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFire Brigade Training Plan Review;BSEP has completed transition of its fire brigade and site incident commander lessonplans to a fleet standard, NFPA 600 compliant format, aligning with NFPA 805, Section3.4.1. Attributes are included within the new NFPA 600 lesson plans to address theRadioactive Release objectives. Lesson plan topics are technical skill-set based ratherthan fire area specific. As such, discussion points were noted for the topics applicableto, or having potential impact to radioactive release due to firefighting activities.Discussion points are included regarding containment and monitoring of potentiallycontaminated fire suppression agents and products of combustion for the followinglesson plan topical areas;" Safety and Orientation" Personnel Protective Equipment" Fire Hose" Forcible Entry" Ventilation" Overhaul" Fire AttackEngineering Controls Review;The review panel determined Engineering Controls are adequate to ensure thatradioactive materials (i.e., radiation) generated as a direct result of fire suppressionactivities is contained and monitored prior to release to unrestricted areas such thatsuch release would be as low as reasonably achievable and would not exceedapplicable 10 CFR, Part 20 limits. Engineering controls such as use of forced airventilation and damming for fire suppression agent run-off was considered duringreview of fire pre-plans, for areas in which this is the anticipated response identified inthe pre-fire plan. No new engineering controls were identified or established as a resultof this review, and all present controls are as currently in place under the approvedpre-transitional fire protection program.Documentation;Results of the radioactive release reviews described above have been documented insummary format in Attachment E. Open Items identified in the review process will beincorporated into the indicated fire pre-plans.4.5 Fire PRA and Performance-Based ApproachesRI-PB evaluations are an integral element of an NFPA 805 fire protection program. Keyparts of RI-PB evaluations include:" A Fire PRA (i.e., discussed in Section 4.5.1 and Attachments U, V, and W)." NFPA 805 Performance-Based Approaches (i.e., discussed in Section 4.5.2).BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 50 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.5.1 Fire PRA Development and AssessmentIn accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, a Fire PRA model was developed forBSEP in compliance with the requirements of Part 4, "Requirements for Fires At PowerPRA," of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009,"Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment forNuclear Power Plant Application," (i.e., hereafter referred to as Fire PRA Standard).CP&L conducted a peer review by independent industry analysts in accordance withRG 1.200 prior to a risk-informed submittal. The resulting fire risk assessment model isused as the analytical tool to perform Fire Risk Evaluations during the transitionprocess.Section 4.5.1.1 describes the Internal Events PRA model. Section 4.5.1.2 describes theFire PRA model. Section 4.5.1.3 describes the results and resolution of the peer reviewof the Fire PRA, and Section 4.5.1.4 describes insights gained from the Fire PRA.4.5.1.1 Internal Events PRAThe Brunswick Unit 1 and 2 base internal events PRA (i.e., Calculation BNP-PSA-030)was the starting point for the Fire PRA. Attachment U provides a discussion of theinternal events PRA and the results and disposition of the most recent peer review.4.5.1.2 Fire PRAThe internal events PRA was modified to capture the effects of fire both as an initiator ofan event and as a potential failure mode of affected circuits and individual targets. TheFire PRA was developed using the guidance for Fire PRA development inNUREG/CR-6850/EPRI TR 1011989, approved FAQs, and EPRI TR 1016735.The Fire PRA quality and results are discussed in the subsequent sections and inAttachments V and W, respectively.Fire Model Utilization in the ApplicationRG 1.205, Regulatory Position 4.2 and Section 5.1.2 of NEI 04-02, provide guidance ondocumenting the fire models used, and justifying that these fire models and methodsare acceptable for use in performance-based analyses when performed by qualifiedusers, have been verified and validated, and are used within their limitations and withthe rigor required by the nature and scope of the analyses.As part of the NFPA 805 transition, fire modeling was performed as part of the Fire PRAdevelopment (i.e., NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.2) and, therefore, maximum expected firescenario (MEFS)/limiting fire scenario (LFS) were not analyzed separately. RG 1.205,Regulatory Position 4.2 and Section 5.1.2 of NEI 04-02, provide guidance to identify firemodels that are acceptable to the NRC for plants implementing a risk-informed,performance-based licensing basis.The following fire models were used:" Fire Dynamics Tools (FDT's)" Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport (CFAST)" Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS)IBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 51 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsThe approach taken at BSEP to simplify the analysis process incorporates features ofseveral fire model tools covered by NUREG-1824, as well as additional features. Theapproach is collectively referred to as the Fire Modeling Generic Treatments. Theanalysis basis and Verification and Validation (V&V) documentation was provided in aproprietary Hughes Associates, Inc. report to the NRC on January 24, 2008. The reportentitled "Generic Fire Modeling Treatments" is effectively a technical reference guide, auser's guide, and the V&V basis.The use of the Generic Treatments in specific applications at BSEP falls within theirlimitations as described in the "Generic Fire Modeling Treatments". In addition to thegeneric fire modeling treatments that were used in the hazard analysis, severalcalculations were produced that used FDS, CFAST, and the FDT's as documented inNUREG-1824.The acceptability of the use of these fire models is included in Attachment J.4.5.1.3 Results of Fire PRA Peer ReviewThe Brunswick Unit 1 and 2 Fire PRA (i.e., Calculations BNP-PSA-080 andBNP-PSA-082) was peer reviewed against the requirements ofASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Part 4 and Regulatory Guide 1.200, revision 2.The results (i.e., Supporting Requirement capability assessments and Facts &Observations (F&Os)) documented in the February 2012 Fire PRA peer review report,and subsequent focused scope peer review reports, were used to support the Fire PRAfor the NFPA 805 application.The Fire PRA update addressed the Supporting Requirement assessed deficiencies(i.e., Not Met or Capability Category I (CC I)). Completion of recommendations relatedto Supporting Requirement assessments and 'Finding' F&Os results in a CapabilityCategory II assessment for the associated Supporting Requirements. Some items arenot completed at this time and are deferred. These items have been dispositioned forthe potential impact on the Fire PRA and the application. The results of the peer revieware summarized in Attachment V.4.5.1.4 Risk InsightsRisk insights were documented as part of the development of the Fire PRA. The totalplant fire CDF/LERF was derived using the NUREG/CR-6850 methodology for fire PRAdevelopment and is useful in identifying the areas of the plant where fire risk is greatest.A review of the fire initiating events that collectively represent 95% of the calculated firerisk is included as Attachment W.4.5.2 Performance-Based ApproachesNFPA 805 outlines the approaches for performing performance-based analyses. Asspecified in Section 4.2.4, there are generally two types of analyses performed for theperformance-based approach:" Fire Modeling (i.e., NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.1)." Fire Risk Evaluation (i.e., NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2).BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 52 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 52 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.5.2.1 Fire Modeling ApproachThe fire modeling approach was not utilized for demonstrating compliance withNFPA 805 for BSEP.4.5.2.2 Fire Risk ApproachOverview of Evaluation ProcessThe Fire Risk Evaluations were completed as part of the BSEP NFPA 805 transition.These Fire Risk Evaluations were developed using the process described below. Thismethodology is based upon the requirements of NFPA 805, industry guidance inNEI 04-02, and RG 1.205. These are summarized in Table 4-1.Table 4-1 Fire Risk Evaluation Guidance Summary TableDocument Section(s) TopicNFPA 805 2.2(h), 4.2.4, A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4, D.5 Change Evaluation (2.2(h), 2.2.9, 2.4.4A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4, D.5)Risk of Recovery Actions (4.2.4)Use of Fire Risk Evaluation (4.2.4.2)NEI 04-02 Revision 2 4.4, 5.3, Appendix B, Appendix I, Change Evaluation, Change EvaluationAppendix J Forms (App. I), No specific discussion ofFire Risk EvaluationRG 1.205 Revision 1 C.2.2.4, C.2.4, C.3.2 Risk Evaluations (C.2.2.4)Recovery Actions (C.2.4)During the transition to NFPA 805, variances from the deterministic approach in Section4.2.3 of NFPA 805 were evaluated using a Fire Risk Evaluation per Section 4.2.4.2 ofNFPA 805. A Fire Safety Analysis was performed for each fire area. For areascontaining variances from the deterministic requirements (VFDRs) of Section 4.2.3 ofNFPA 805, a Fire Risk Evaluation was performed for each fire area containing VFDRs.If the Fire Risk Evaluation meets the acceptance criteria, this is confirmation that asuccess path effectively remains free of fire damage and that the performance-basedapproach is acceptable per Section 4.2.4.2 of NFPA 805.The Fire Risk Evaluation process consists of the following steps (Figure 4-7 depicts theFire Risk Evaluation process used during transition. This is generally based onFAQ 07-0054 Revision 1:Step 1 -Preparation for the Fire Risk Evaluation." Definition of the Variances from the Deterministic Requirements. The definitionof the VFDR includes a description of problem statement and the section ofNFPA 805 that is not met, type of VFDR (e.g., separation issue or degraded fireprotection system), and proposed evaluation per applicable NFPA 805 section." Preparatory Evaluation -Fire Risk Evaluation Team Review. Using theinformation obtained during the development of the NEI 04-02 B-3 Table and theFire PRA, a team review of the VFDR was performed. Depending on the scopeand complexity of the VFDR, the team may include the Safe shutdown/NSCABSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 53 IlBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 53 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsEngineer, the Fire Protection Engineer, and the Fire PRA Engineer. The purposeand objective of this team review was to address the following;o Review of the Fire PRA modeling treatment of VFDRo Ensure discrepancies were captured and resolvedStep 2 -Performed the Fire Risk EvaluationThe Evaluator coordinated as necessary with the Safe shutdown/NSCAEngineer, Fire Protection Engineer and Fire PRA Engineer to assess the VFDRusing the Fire Risk Evaluation process to perform the following:o Change in Risk Calculation with consideration for additional risk of recoveryactions and required fire protection systems and features due to fire risk.o Fire area change in risk summaryStep 3 -Reviewed the Acceptance CriteriaThe acceptance criteria for the Fire Risk Evaluation consist of two parts. One isquantitatively based and the other is qualitatively based. The quantitative figuresof merit are ACDF and ALERF. The qualitative factors are defense-in-depth andsafety margin.o Risk Acceptance Criteria. The transition risk evaluation was measuredquantitatively for acceptability using the ACDF and ALERF criteria fromRG 1.174, as clarified in RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 2.2.4.o Defense-in-Depth. A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depthwas performed, using the guidance NEI 04-02. NFPA 805 definesdefense-in-depth as:-Preventing fires from starting-Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly thosefires that do occur, thereby limiting damage-Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems andcomponents important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptlyextinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from beingperformed.In general, the defense-in-depth requirement was considered to be satisfied ifthe proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among theseelements (or echelons).The review of defense-in-depth was qualitative and addressed each of theelements with respect to the proposed change. Defense-in-depth wasperformed on a fire area basis.Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure defense-in-depthwere identified as a result of the assessment of defense-in-depth.o Safety Margin Assessment. A review of the impact of the change on safetymargin was performed. An acceptable set of guidelines for making thatassessment is summarized below. Other equivalent acceptance guidelinesmay also be used.lBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 54 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements-Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRCare met, and-Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR,supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account foranalysis and data uncertainty.The requirements related to safety margins for the change analysis aredescribed for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the FireRisk Evaluation (FRE).BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 55 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsCP&L 4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsPrepare for Fire RiskEvaluationDetermine How to Model iDiscuss and Document inthe VFDR in the Fire PRA l Fire PRA and Fire RiskEvaluation DocumentationPerform Fire RiskEvaluationReview of AcceptanceCriteriaFigure 4 Fire Risk Evaluation Process (NFPA 805 Transition)[Based on FAQ 07-0054 Revision 1]BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 56 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 56 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsResults of Evaluation ProcessDisposition of VFDRsThe BSEP existing post-fire SSA / NSCA and the NFPA 805 transition project activitieshave identified a number of variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805Section 4.2.3. These variances were dispositioned using the fire risk evaluationprocess.Each variance dispositioned using a Fire Risk Evaluation was assessed against the FireRisk Evaluation acceptance criteria of ACDF and ALERF; and maintenance of defense-in-depth and safety margin criteria from Section 5.3.5 of NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205. Theresults of these calculations are summarized in Attachment C.Following completion of transition activities and planned modifications and programchanges, the plant will be compliant with 10 CFR 50.48(c).Risk Change Due to NFPA 805 TransitionIn accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, Section C.2.2.4, Risk Evaluations, riskincreases or decreases for each fire area using Fire Risk Evaluations and the overallplant should be provided. Note that the risk increase due to the use of recovery actionswas included in the risk change for transition for each fire area.RG 1.205 Section C.2.2.4.2 states in part"The total increase or decrease in risk associated with the implementation of NFPA805 for the overall plant should be calculated by summing the risk increases anddecreases for each fire area (including any risk increases resulting from previouslyapproved recovery actions). The total risk increase should be consistent with theacceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.174. Note that the acceptanceguidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.174 may require the total CDF, LERF, or both, toevaluate changes where the risk impact exceeds specific guidelines. If the additionalrisk associated with previously approved recovery actions is greater than theacceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.174, then the net change in total plantrisk incurred by any proposed alternatives to the deterministic criteria in NFPA 805,Chapter 4 (other than the previously approved recovery actions), should be riskneutral or represent a risk decrease."The risk increases and decreases are provided in Attachment W.4.6 Monitoring Program4.6.1 Overview of NFPA 805 Requirements and NEI 04-02 Guidance on theNFPA 805 Fire Protection System and Feature Monitoring ProgramSection 2.6 of NFPA 805 states:"A monitoring program shall be established to ensure that the availability andreliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained and to assessthe performance of the fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria.Monitoring shall ensure that the assumptions in the engineering analysis remainvalid."BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 57 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 57 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsAs part of the transition review, the adequacy of the inspection and testing program toaddress fire protection systems and equipment within plant inspection and thecompensatory measures programs should be reviewed. In addition, the adequacy ofthe plant corrective action program in determining the causes of equipment andprogrammatic failures and minimizing their recurrence should also be reviewed as partof the transition to a risk-informed, performance-based licensing basis.4.6.2 Overview of Post-Transition NFPA 805 Monitoring ProgramThis section describes the process that will be utilized to implement the post-transitionNFPA 805 monitoring program. The monitoring program will be implemented after thesafety evaluation issuance as part of the fire protection program transition to NFPA 805.See item for implementation in Attachment S. The monitoring process is comprised offour phases." Phase 1 -Scoping" Phase 2 -Screening Using Risk Criteria" Phase 3- Risk Target Value Determination" Phase 4- Monitoring ImplementationFigure 4-8 provides detail on the Phase 1 and 2 processes.The results of these phases will be documented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Programscoping document developed during implementation.Phase 1 -ScopingIn order to meet the NFPA 805 requirements for monitoring, the following categories ofSSCs and programmatic elements will be reviewed during the implementation phase forinclusion in the NFPA 805 monitoring program:" Structures, Systems, and Components required to comply with NFPA 805,specifically:o Fire protection systems and features-Required by the Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment-Modeled in the Fire PRA-Required by Chapter 3 of NFPA 805o Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment equipment4-Nuclear safety equipment-Fire PRA equipment-NPO equipmento Structures, systems and components relied upon to meet radioactive releasecriteria" Fire Protection Programmatic Elements4 For the purposes of the NFPA 805 Monitoring, "NSCA equipment" is intended to include Nuclear SafetyEquipment, Fire PRA equipment, and NPO equipment.!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 58 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsPhase 2 -Screening Using Risk CriteriaThe equipment from Phase 1 scoping will be screened to determine the appropriatelevel of NFPA 805 monitoring. As a minimum, the SSCs identified in Phase 1 will bepart of an inspection and test program and system/program health reporting. If not inthe current program, the SSCs will be added in order to assure that the criteria can bemet reliably.The following screening process will be used to determine those SSCs that may requireadditional monitoring beyond normal inspection and test program and system/programhealth reporting and will be documented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scopingdocument.1. Fire Protection Systems and FeaturesThose fire protection systems and features identified in Phase 1 are candidates foradditional monitoring in the NFPA 805 program commensurate with risk significance.Risk significance is determined at the component, programmatic element, and/orfunctional level on an individual fire area basis. Compartments smaller than fire areasmay be used provided the compartments are independent (i.e., share no fire protectionSSCs). If compartments smaller than fire areas are used, the basis will be documentedin the calculation, BNP-PSA-082.The Fire PRA is used to establish the risk significance based on the following screeningcriteria:Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) of the monitored parameter > 2.0(AND) eitherCore Damage Frequency (CDF) x (RAW) > 1.OE-7 per year(OR)Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) x (RAW) -> 1.0E-8 per yearCDF, LERF, and RAW(monitored parameter) are calculated for each fire area. The 'monitoredparameter' will be established at a level commensurate with the amenability of theparameter to risk measurement (e.g., a fire barrier may be more conducive to riskmeasurement than an individual barrier penetration) and will be documented in thecalculation, BNP-PSA-082.Fire protection systems and features that meet or exceed the criteria identified aboveare considered High Safety Significant (HSS) and will be included in the NFPA 805Monitoring Program The HSS fire protection systems and features not alreadymonitored via an existing inspection and test program and/or in the existing system /program health reporting, as described in procedure EGR-NGGC-0010, will be added tothe NFPA 805 Monitoring Program and documented in the NFPA 805 MonitoringProgram scoping document.2. Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment EquipmentRequired NSCA equipment, except the NPO scope, identified in Phase 1 will bescreened for safety significance using the Fire PRA and the Maintenance RuleIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 59 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirementsguidelines differentiating HSS equipment from Low Safety Significant (LSS) equipment.The screening will also ensure that the Maintenance Rule functions are consistent withthe required functions of the NSCA equipment.HSS NSCA equipment not currently monitored in Maintenance Rule will be added intoMaintenance Rule. All NSCA equipment that are not HSS are considered LSS andneed not be included in the monitoring program.For non-power operational modes, the qualitative use of fire prevention to manage firerisk during Higher Risk Evolutions does not lend itself to quantitative risk measurement.Therefore, fire risk management effectiveness is monitored programmatically similar tocombustible material controls and other fire prevention programs. Additional monitoringbeyond inspection and test programs and system/program health reporting is notconsidered necessary.3. SSCs Relied upon for Radioactive Release CriteriaThe evaluations performed to meet the radioactive release performance criteria arequalitative in nature. The SSCs relied upon to meet the radioactive releaseperformance criteria are not amenable to quantitative risk measurement. Additionally,since 10 CFR Part 20 limits (i.e., which are lower than releases due to core damage andcontainment breach) for radiological effluents are not being exceeded, equipment reliedupon to meet the radioactive release performance criteria is considered inherently lowrisk. Therefore, additional monitoring beyond inspection and test programs andsystem/program health reporting is not considered necessary.4. Fire Protection Programmatic ElementsMonitoring of programmatic elements is required in order to "assess the performance ofthe fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria". These programs formthe bases for many of the analytical assumptions used to evaluate compliance withNFPA 805 requirements. Programmatic aspects include:" Prompt Detection, including incipient detection fire watch and hot work fire watch" Transient Combustible Controls Program Violations against FIR-NGGC-0009" Fire Brigade Effectiveness including Fire Brigade Response Time, Fire BrigadeFire Drill, and Fire Brigade Fire Drill ObjectivesMonitoring of programmatic elements is more qualitative in nature since the programsdo not lend themselves to the numerical methods of reliability and availability.Therefore, monitoring is conducted using the existing program health programs. Fireprotection health reports, self-assessments, regulator and insurance company reportsprovide inputs to the monitoring program.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 60 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsCP&L 4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsPhase 3 -Risk Target Value DeterminationFailure criteria is established by an expert panel based on the required fire protectionand nuclear safety capability SSCs and programmatic elements assumed level ofperformance in the supporting analyses established in Phase 2. Action levels areestablished for the SSCs at the component level, program level, or functionally throughthe use of the pseudo system or 'performance monitoring group' concept. The actualaction level is determined based on the number of component, program or functionalfailures within a sufficiently bounding time period (i.e., 3 operating cycles).Since the HSS NSCA equipment have been identified using the Maintenance Ruleguidelines, the associated equipment specific performance criteria will be established asin the Maintenance Rule, provided the criteria are consistent with Fire PRAassumptions.When establishing the action level threshold for reliability and availability, the actionlevel will be no lower than the fire PRA assumptions. Adverse trends and unacceptablelevels of availability, reliability, and performance will be reviewed against establishedaction levels.Documentation of the monitoring program failure criteria and action level targets will becontained in a documented evaluation. It is anticipated that the availability and reliabilitycriterion for High Safety Significant Performance Monitoring Groups will use theguidance included in several industry documents tempered by site-specific operatingexperience, Fire PRA assumptions, and equipment types (and vendor data or validdesign input when available). Industry documents such as the EPRI Fire ProtectionEquipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide TR-1006756, FinalReport July 2003, NFPA codes, and/or the NRC Fire Protection SignificanceDetermination Process in addition to site specific operating experience data may beused. The monitoring program failure criteria and action level targets will bedocumented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document.Note that fire protection systems and features, NSCA equipment, SSCs required tomeet the radioactive release criteria, and fire protection program elements that do notmeet the screening criteria in Phase 2 will be included in the existing inspection and testprograms and the system and program health programs. Reliability and availabilitycriteria will not be assigned.Phase 4 -Monitoring ImplementationPhase 4 is the implementation of the monitoring program, once the monitoring scopeand criteria are established. Monitoring consists of periodically gathering, trending, andevaluating information pertinent to the performance, and/or availability of the equipmentand comparing the results with the established goals and performance criteria to verifythat the goals are being met. Results of monitoring activities will be analyzed in a timelymanner to assure that appropriate action is taken. The corrective action process will beused to address performance of fire protection and nuclear safety SSCs that do notmeet performance criteria.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 61 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 61 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsFor fire protection systems and features and NSCA HSS equipment that are monitored,unacceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance will be reviewed againstthe established action levels. If an action level is triggered, corrective action inaccordance with procedure, CAP-NGGC-0200 will be initiated to identify the negativetrend. A corrective action plan will then be developed to ensure the performancereturns to the established level.When applicable, a sensitivity study can be performed to determine the margin belowthe action level that still provides acceptable fire PRA results to help prioritize correctiveactions if the action level is reached.A periodic assessment will be performed (i.e., at a frequency of approximately every twoto three operating cycles), taking into account, where practical, industry wide operatingexperience. Issues that will be addressed include:" Review systems with performance criteria. Do performance criteria stilleffectively monitor the functions of the system? Do the criteria still monitor theeffectiveness of the fire protection and NSCA systems?" Have the supporting analyses been revised such that the performance criteriaare no longer applicable or new fire protection and NSCA SSCs, programmaticelements and/ or functions need to be in scope?" Based on the performance during the assessment period, are there any trends insystem performance that should be addressed that are not being addressed?BSEP [AR Rev 3 Page 62 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 62 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements*Fully describe process used*Figure 4 NFPA 805 Monitoring -Scoping and Screening4.7 Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance4.7.1 Compliance with Documentation Requirements in Section 2.7.1 ofNFPA 805In accordance with the requirements and guidance in NFPA 805 Section 2.7.1, andNEI 04-02, BSEP has documented analyses to support compliance withBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 63d CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements10 CFR 50.48(c). The analyses are being performed in accordance with CP&L'sprocesses for ensuring assumptions are clearly defined, that results are easilyunderstood, that results are clearly and consistently described, and that sufficient detailis provided to allow future review of the entire analyses.Analyses, as defined by NFPA 805 Section 2.4, performed to demonstrate compliancewith 10 CFR 50.48(c) will be maintained for the life of the plant and organized tofacilitate review for accuracy and adequacy. Note these analyses do not include itemssuch as periodic tests, hot work permits, fire impairments, etc.The Fire Protection Design Basis Document described in Section 2.7.1.2 of NFPA 805and necessary supporting documentation described in Section 2.7.1.3 of NFPA 805have been created as part of transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) to ensure programimplementation following receipt of the safety evaluation. Figure 4-9 shows the PlannedPost-Transition Documents.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 64 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsNFPA 806 DOCUMENTS*NSCA DatabaseSNSEL Comp CalePRA Equipment No-weand Data Equipment andData.. ... ....... .... ............... ....... ... ..... ..........................Comp &Cable FA AssessmentMethod/Results Method/ResultsMSO and OMA SSA DrawingsTreatment.......... .... ......... .................. -- ------- -----NSCA SUPPORTING INFOManual ActionT-H Calculations FeasibilityB- B-3 TableCoordinationPlant DBDs thatCalculations / Support NSCAMHIFNon-Power Mode NSCA TreatmentNon-Power Operations CalculationsJFIRE SAFETY ANALYSIS(DBD), On a Fire Area Basis-Fire Area Description* FHA Database information-Nuclear Safety Performance CriteriaCompliance Summary (NEI 04-02 B-3 TableResults)-Non-Power Evaluation Results Summary* Radioactive Release Summary" On a Generic Basis-B-1 Table ResultsalUIaCLUVO Wease I raIlnIing-Monitoring ProgramNFPA 806 FIRE RISK EVALUATIONSFire Risk Evaluation Calculation(s)...................F............................ --ire PRAFHA DATABASE DATA :Ignition Sources FP Systems and& Scenarios Features DataInventory of B-ITableHazards Detaildoata.. ............. ...... .... .. ... .......... ......FHA SUPPORT DOCUMENTATIONFP SystemsFCode Compliance FP DrawingsEvaluations BoldSold tFP System andl EngineeringFPaSyDBDs EquivalencyEvaluationsRadioactiveFire Pre-Plans Release ReviewCalculationy,ext indicates new NFPA 805 documentsFigure 4 NFPA 805 Planned Post-Transition Documents and RelationshipsBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 65 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 65 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.7.2 Compliance with Configuration Control Requirements in Section 2.7.2 and2.2.9 of NFPA 805Program documentation established, revised, or utilized in support of compliance with10 CFR 50.48(c) is subject to CP&L configuration control processes that meet therequirements of Section 2.7.2 of NFPA 805. This includes the appropriate proceduresand configuration control processes for ensuring that changes impacting the fireprotection program are reviewed appropriately. The RI-PB post transition changeprocess methodology is based upon the requirements of NFPA 805, and industryguidance in NEI 04-02, and RG 1.205. These requirements are summarized inTable 4-2.Table 4-2 Change Evaluation Guidance Summary TableDocument Section(s) TopicNFPA 805 2.2(h), 2.2.9, 2.4.4, A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4, Change EvaluationD.5NEI 04-02 5.3, Appendix B, Appendix I, Change Evaluation, Change EvaluationAppendix J Forms (Appendix I)RG 1.205 C.2.2.4, C.3.1, C.3.2, C.4.3 Risk Evaluation, Standard LicenseCondition, Change Evaluation Process, FirePRAThe Plant Change Evaluation Process consists of the following 4 steps and is depictedin Figure 4-10:" Defining the Change" Performing the Preliminary Risk Screening." Performing the Risk Evaluation" Evaluating the Acceptance CriteriaChange DefinitionThe Change Evaluation process begins by defining the change or altered condition tobe examined and the baseline configuration as defined by the Design Basis andLicensing Basis (NFPA 805 Licensing Basis post-transition).1. The baseline is defined as that plant condition or configuration that is consistent withthe Design Basis and Licensing Basis (NFPA 805 Licensing Basis post-transition).2. The changed or altered condition or configuration that is not consistent with theDesign Basis and Licensing Basis is defined as the proposed alternative.Preliminary Risk ReviewOnce the definition of the change is established, a screening is then performed toidentify and resolve minor changes to the fire protection program. This screening isconsistent with fire protection regulatory review processes in place at nuclear plantsunder traditional licensing bases. This screening process is modeled after theNEI 02-03 process. This process will address most administrative changes (e.g.,changes to the combustible control program, organizational changes).BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 66 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 66 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsThe characteristics of an acceptable screening process that meets the "assessment ofthe acceptability of risk" requirement of Section 2.4.4 of NFPA 805 are:" The quality of the screen is sufficient to ensure that potentially greater thanminimal risk increases receive detailed risk assessments appropriate to the levelof risk." The screening process must be documented and be available for inspection bythe NRC." The screening process does not pose undue evaluation or maintenance burden.If any of the above is not met, proceed to the Risk Evaluation step.Risk EvaluationThe screening is followed by engineering evaluations. The results of these evaluationsare then compared to the acceptance criteria. Changes that satisfy the acceptancecriteria of NFPA 805 Section 2.4.4 and the license condition can be implemented withinthe framework provided by NFPA 805. Changes that do not satisfy the acceptancecriteria cannot be implemented within this framework. The acceptance criteria requirethat the resultant change in CDF and LERF be consistent with the license condition.The acceptance criteria also include consideration of defense-in-depth and safetymargin, which would typically be qualitative in nature.The risk evaluation involves the application of risk assessment techniques to obtain ameasure of the changes in risk associated with the proposed change. In certaincircumstances, an initial evaluation in the development of the risk assessment could bea simplified analysis using bounding assumptions provided the use of such assumptionsdoes not unnecessarily challenge the acceptance criteria discussed below.Acceptability DeterminationThe Change Evaluations are assessed for acceptability using the ACDF (i.e., change incore damage frequency) and ALERF (i.e., change in large early release frequency)criteria from the license condition. The proposed changes are also assessed to ensurethey are consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy and that sufficient safetymargins were maintained.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 67 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsDefining the Change (5.3.2)License N opis YAmendAentmRequest rvosyapveY esLicenseAmendmentRequest NOTRequiredPreliminary Risk Screening (5.3.3)Risk Evaluation (5.3.4)PRA Capability Category Assessment* Fire PRACapabilityCategoryAssessmentAcceptance Criteria (5.3.5)NoFigure 4-10 Plant Change Evaluation [NEI 04-02 Figure 5-1]Note references in Figure refer to NEI 04-02 SectionsBSEP [AR Rev 3 Page 68 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 68 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsThe BSEP Fire Protection Program configuration is defined by the programdocumentation. The existing configuration control processes for modifications,calculations and analyses, and Fire Protection Program License Basis Reviews will beutilized to maintain configuration control of the Fire Protection program documents. Theconfiguration control procedures which govern the various BSEP documents anddatabases that currently exist will be revised to reflect the new NFPA 805 licensingbases requirements (Implementation Item in Attachment S).Several NFPA 805 document types, such as NSCA Supporting Information, Non-PowerMode NSCA Treatment, generally require new control procedures and processes to bedeveloped since they are new documents and databases created as a result of thetransition to NFPA 805. The new procedures will be modeled after the existingprocesses for similar types of documents and databases. System level design basisdocuments will be revised to reflect the NFPA 805 role that the system components nowplay.The process for capturing the impact of proposed changes to the plant on the FireProtection Program will continue to be a multiple step review. The first step of thereview is an initial screening for process users to determine if there is a potential toimpact the Fire Protection program as defined under NFPA 805 through a series ofscreening questions/checklists contained in one or more procedures depending uponthe configuration control process being used. Reviews that identify potential FireProtection program impacts will be sent to qualified individuals (Fire Protection, SafeShutdown/NSCA, Fire PRA) to ascertain the program impacts, if any. If Fire Protectionprogram impacts are determined to exist as a result of the proposed change, the issuewould be resolved by one of the following:" Deterministic Approach: Comply with NFPA 805, Chapter 3 and 4.2.3requirements" Performance-Based Approach: Utilize the NFPA 805 change process developedin accordance with NEI 04-02, RG 1.205, and the NFPA 805 fire protectionlicense condition to assess the acceptability of the proposed change. Thisprocess would be used to determine if the proposed change could beimplemented "as-is" or whether prior NRC approval of the proposed change isrequired.This process follows the requirements in NFPA 805 and the guidance outlined inRG 1.174, which requires the use of qualified individuals, procedures that requirecalculations be subject to independent review and verification, record retention, peerreview, and a corrective action program that ensures appropriate actions are takenwhen errors are discovered. The plant documents that ensure these requirements aremet are:CAP-NGGC-0200 -Condition Identification and Screening ProcessEGR-NGGC-0005 -Engineering ChangeESGOl 01 N -Safe Shutdown Engineer (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)ESGO102N -Fire Protection Plant Change Impact ReviewESGO1 03N -Circuit Analysis (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 69 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 69 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsESGO104N -Fire Protection Engineer (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)ESG0105N -Basic Fire Modeling4.7.3 Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805Fire Protection Program QualityCP&L will maintain the existing fire protection quality assurance program.During the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), BSEP performed work in accordance with thequality requirements of Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805.Fire PRA QualityConfiguration control of the Fire PRA model will be maintained by integrating the FirePRA model into the existing processes used to ensure configuration control of theinternal events PRA model. This process complies with Section 1-5 of the ASME PRAStandard and ensures that CP&L maintains an as-built, as-operated PRA model of theplant. The process has been peer reviewed. Quality assurance of the Fire PRA isassured via the same processes applied to the internal events model.This process follows the guidance outlined in RG 1.174, which requires the use ofqualified individuals, procedures that require calculations be subject to independentreview and verification, record retention, peer review, and a corrective action programthat ensures appropriate actions are taken when errors are discovered. Although theentire scope of the formal 10 CFR 50, Appendix B program is not applied to the PRAmodels or processes in general, often parts of the program are applied as a convenientmethod of complying with the requirements of RG 1.174. For instance, the procedurewhich addresses independent review of calculations for 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, isapplied to the PRA model calculations, as well.With respect to Quality Assurance Program requirements for independent reviews ofcalculations and evaluations, those existing requirements for Fire Protection Programdocuments will remain unchanged. CP&L specifically requires that the calculations andevaluations in support of the NFPA 805 LAR, exclusive of the Fire PRA, be performedwithin the scope of the QA program which requires independent review as defined byplant procedures. As recommended by NUREG/CR-6850, the sources of uncertainty inthe Fire PRA were identified and specific parameters were analyzed for sensitivity insupport of the NFPA 805 Fire Risk Evaluation process.Specifically with regard to uncertainty, an uncertainty and sensitivity matrix wasdeveloped and included with BNP-PSA-080. In addition, sensitivity to uncertaintyassociated with specific Fire PRA parameters was quantitatively addressed inBNP-PSA-095.While the removal of conservatism inherent in the Fire PRA is a long-term goal, the FirePRA results were deemed sufficient for evaluating the risk associated with thisapplication. While CP&L continues to strive toward a more "realistic" estimate of firerisk, use of mean values continues to be the best estimate of fire risk. During the FireRisk Evaluation process, the uncertainty and sensitivity associated with specific FirePRA parameters were considerations in the evaluation of the change in risk relative tothe applicable acceptance thresholds.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 70 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsSpecific Requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.1 -ReviewAnalyses, calculations, and evaluations performed in support of compliance with10 CFR 50.48(c) are performed in accordance with procedures that require independentreview.Reference plant procedures:EGR-NGGC-0003 -Design Review RequirementsEGR-NGGC-0005 -Engineering ChangeEGR-NGGC-0017 -Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and CalculationsNFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.2 -Verification and ValidationCalculational models and numerical methods used in support of compliance with10 CFR 50.48(c) were verified and validated as required by Section 2.7.3.2 ofNFPA 805.NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.3 -Limitations of UseEngineering methods and numerical models used in support of compliance with10 CFR 50.48(c) were applied appropriately as required by Section 2.7.3.3 ofNFPA 805.NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.4 -Qualification of UsersCognizant personnel who use and apply engineering analysis and numerical methods insupport of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are competent and experienced asrequired by Section 2.7.3.4 of NFPA 805.During the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), work was performed in accordance with thequality requirements of Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805. Personnel who used and appliedengineering analysis and numerical methods (e.g., fire modeling) in support ofcompliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are competent and experienced as required byNFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.4.Post-transition, for personnel performing fire modeling or Fire PRA development andevaluation, CP&L has developed and maintains qualification requirements forindividuals assigned various tasks. Position-Specific Guides have been developed toidentify and document required training and mentoring to ensure individuals areappropriately qualified per the requirements of NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.4 to performassigned work. The following Training Guides have been developed and implemented.ESGO089N -Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Quantification),ESGO093N -Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Initial Development), andESGO094N -Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Data Development), andESGO105N -Basic Fire ModelingNFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.5 -Uncertainty AnalysisUncertainty analyses were performed as required by 2.7.3.5 of NFPA 805 and theresults were considered in the context of the application. This is of particular interest in!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 71 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirementsfire modeling and Fire PRA development. Note: 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(iv) states thatNFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.5 is not required for the deterministic approach becauseconservatism is included in the deterministic criteria.4.8 Summary of Results4.8.1 Results of the Fire Area ReviewA summary of the NFPA 805 compliance basis and the required fire protection systemsand features is provided in Attachment C. The table provides the following informationfrom the NEI 04-02 Table B-3:" Fire Area / Fire Zone: Fire Area/Zone Identifier." Description: Fire Area/Zone Description." NFPA 805 Regulatory Basis: Post-transition NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliancebasis" Required Fire Protection System / Feature: Detection / suppression required inthe Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance. Other RequiredFeatures may include Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems, fire barriers, etc.The documentation of required fire protection systems and features does notinclude the documentation of the fire area boundaries. Fire area boundaries arerequired and documentation of the fire area boundaries has been performed aspart of reviews of engineering evaluations, licensing actions, or as part of thereviews of the NEI 04-02 Table B-1 process. The basis for the requirement ofthe fire protection system / feature is designated as follows:o S -Separation Criteria: Systems/Features required for Chapter 4 SeparationCriteria in Section 4.2.3o E -EEEE/LA Criteria: Systems/Features required for acceptability of ExistingEngineering Equivalency Evaluations / NRC approved Licensing Action (i.e.,Exemptions/Deviations/Safety Evaluations) (Section 2.2.7)o R -Risk Criteria: Systems/Features required to meet the Risk Criteria for thePerformance-Based Approach (Section 4.2.4)o D -Defense-in-depth Criteria: Systems/Features required to maintainadequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach(Section 4.2.4)An evaluation of DID was performed for all fire areas as detailed in project procedureFPIP-129, NFPA 805 Fire Safety Analysis. This evaluation was performed for all areas,regardless of whether NFPA 805 compliance was demonstrated using a performancebased approach or a deterministic approach. Although a discussion of DID features isnot strictly required for areas that are deterministically compliant, the decision to includethe evaluation for such areas was based on two factors. First, it was seen as a way ofenhancing the overall approach to providing the plant's desired level of fire protection tothat area. Second, if future changes to deterministic areas dictate that a performancebased approach is desired, then including these features as credited DID features nowwill facilitate that transition. The regulatory basis for each fire area is provided inIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 72 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsAttachment C, but the presence of deterministic features in the DID discussion does notalter any conclusions regarding the post transition licensing basis.Attachment W contains the results of the Fire Risk Evaluations, additional risk ofrecovery actions, and the change in risk on a fire area basis.4.8.2 Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed During the ImplementationPhasePlanned modifications, studies, and evaluations to comply with NFPA 805 are describedin Attachment S.In Attachment S, two tables are listed. Table S-1 identifies Plant Modifications requiredto be completed. Table S-2 identifies training, programs, personnel equipment, anddocument changes and upgrades required to be completed.The Fire PRA model will represent the as-built, as-operated and maintained plantfollowing completion of the risk related modifications identified in Attachment S. In theevent the PRA model requires revision following completion of the modifications andimplementation items listed in Attachment S, the changes will be controlled throughnormal BSEP processes. These changes are not expected to be significant. The MainControl Room ceiling modification is the only outstanding change with respect to itsinclusion in the Fire PRA model.4.8.3 Supplemental Information -Other Licensee Specific IssuesThe development of a FPRA requires that assumptions and methods be expanded andupdated to provide more realistic treatment of the data and the phenomena involved.The updates and expansion of methods introduce differences in plant specific resultsdepending on which alternatives are used. This section captures the sensitivities andinsights based on these alternatives. These alternatives may be based on new analysismethods, new data, or deviations from guidance in NUREG/CR-6850 which wouldrequire sensitivity analyses to be performed for the license application.4.8.3.1 Unreviewed Analysis MethodsThe peer review of the BSEP FPRA identified one method that had not been reviewedby the methods panel concerning the use of a split fraction for closed cabinet fires thatresult in damage outside of the cabinet. This method was reviewed by the NRC for theHarris plant NFPA 805 pilot effort as documented in Section 3.4.7 and Table 3.4-6 ofthe Safety Evaluation for the Harris Plant license amendment (ML101130535).There is variation in the methods in treating how MCCs can be treated as "closed"cabinets. If a cabinet were always "closed" there would be no fire impact on externaltargets. However, there is always the potential for the cabinet to already be open or anarc fault to have enough energy to open the cabinet. For the BSEP FPRA, it wasassumed that one out of ten MCC fires may result in an "open" cabinet configuration.This is not applied to the HRR as a severity factor, but as a split fraction on thelikelihood that the cabinet remains "closed."BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 73 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 73 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 RequirementsThe guidance for characterizing closed cabinets at the Brunswick plant was the sameas that used for the Harris Nuclear Plant pilot effort. The use of split fractions asdescribed above was deemed acceptable for use by the NRC at HNP.A sensitivity analysis was performed on this method for the BSEP FPRA. Thesensitivity analysis essentially removed the split fraction, effectively treating the closedMCCs as always open. The results of the sensitivity study for the "closed" cabinetmethod are provided below.Table 4 Closed MCCs Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF ResultsUnit 1Unit 2ACDF [/yr]ALERF [lyr]ACDF [lyr]ALERF [lyr]VFDRs 1.2E-06 1.3E-08 2.7E-06 5.2E-09Recovery Actions 9.1 E-07 9.1 E-08 9.1E-07 9.1E-08Total 2.1 E-06 1.OE-07 3.6E-06 9.6E-08A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.Table 4 Closed MCCs Sensitivity Total CDF and Total LERF ResultsUnit I Unit 2CDF [Iyr] LERF [Iyr] CDF [/yr] LERF [Iyr]Internal Events plusExternal Flooding and 1.4E-05 6.2E-07 1.4E-05 6.2E-07High WindsFirel'1 2.1 E-05 4.3E-06 2.OE-05 4.OE-06Fire -Recovery Actions[2 1.OE-06 1.OE-07 1.OE-06 1.OE-07Total 3.6E-05 5.OE-06 3.5E-05 4.8E-06Ili Fire results do not credit control room abandonment for loss of control sequences.[2] Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 74 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 74 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.8.3.2 Concerns with NUREG/CR-6850 CPT CreditBased on preliminary results for fire circuit testing, the credit allowed in Tables 10-1 and10-3 of NUREG/CR-6850 for Control Power Transformers (CPT) in AC circuits wasquestioned by NRR. This is based on an RAI letter to Duane Arnold (ML12031A1 12).The sensitivity analysis was performed by removing the approximate factor of tworeduction in failure mode probability estimates between cables with CPT and thosewithout. The results of the sensitivity study analysis for the CPT credit are providedbelow.Table 4 CPT Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF ResultsUnit 1 Unit 2ACDF [lyr]ALERF [/yr]ACDF [/yr]ALERF [lyr]VFDRs 1.2E-06 1.4E-08 2.7E-06 5.2E-09Recovery Actions 9.1 E-07 9.1 E-08 9.1E-07 9.1E-08Total 2.1 E-06 1.OE-07 3.6E-06 9.6E-08A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.Table 4 CPT Sensitivity Total CDF and Total LERFUnit I Unit 2CDF [/yr] LERF [/yr] CDF [lyr] LERF [/yr]Internal Events plusExternal Flooding and 1.4E-05 6.2E-07 1.4E-05 6.2E-07High WindsFire[r] 2.1 E-05 4.3E-06 2.OE-05 4.OE-06Fire -Recovery Actions[21 1.OE-06 1.OE-07 1.OE-06 1.OE-07Total 3.6E-05 5.OE-06 3.5E-05 4.8E-06Ill Fire results do not credit control room abandonment for loss of control sequences.[21 Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 75 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 75 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.8.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis Required by FAQ 08-0048In order to use the updated fire bin ignition frequencies provided in Supplement 1 toNUREG/CR-6850, a sensitivity analysis must be performed comparing the impact ofthose bins characterized by an alpha from the EPRI TR-1 016735 analysis that is lessthan or equal to 1. While the new point estimates for the bin ignition frequencies betterrepresent the data, uncertainties are large and a sensitivity analysis using the olderconservative frequencies is required to assess the potential impact of using the newfrequencies.Table 4 Ignition Frequency Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF ResultsUnit IUnit 2ACDF [lyr]ALERF [lyr]ACDF [/yr]ALERF [Iyr]VFDRs 2.0E-06 2.2E-08 3.6E-06 6.9E-09Recovery Actions 2.7E-06 2.7E-07 2.7E-06 2.7E-07Total 4.6E-06 2.9E-07 6.3E-06 2.7E-07A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.Table 4 Ignition Frequency Sensitivity Total CDF and Total LERFUnit I Unit 2CDF [lyr] LERF [lyr] CDF [/yr] LERF [lyr]Internal Events plusExternal Flooding and 1.4E-05 6.2E-07 1.4E-05 6.2E-07High WindsFirer"] 3.4E-05 8.6E-06 3.6E-05 8.3E-06Fire -Recovery Actionst2 3.1 E-06 3.1 E-07 3.1 E-06 3.1 E-07Total 5.1 E-05 9.5E-06 5.3E-05 9.2E-06Ill Fire results do not credit control room abandonment for loss of control sequences.[2] Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.4.8.3.4 Main Control Room AbandonmentThe control room abandonment has a detailed human error analysis.Control room abandonment was not credited for loss of control scenarios.The Brunswick control room has two main areas that contribute to control roomabandonment: the area where in the control room staff generally manipulates controlsand, the area that is outside that region. The region that the control room staff generallyoccupies while manipulating the controls has a much lower ceiling height and smallerIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 76 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirementsfootprint than the remaining area and, as such, has a much shorter time to suppress afire prior to reaching control room habitability concerns that require abandonment. Ashorter time to suppress the fire increases the frequency of control room abandonmentwhich is directly proportional to CDF and LERF contributions for control roomabandonment. The control room abandonment risk is conservative since the firefrequency contribution from the cabinets that comprise the boundary for the controlmanipulation area is all applied to the small area when there is significant probabilitythat the fire would vent out of the back of the panels to the larger area with higherceilings. Since methods to determine a split fraction of fires that vent to the rear of thepanel were not peer reviewed, all of the frequency was conservatively applied to thesmaller region with the low ceiling resulting in conservative times to conditions requiringcontrol room abandonment.4.8.3.5 Reduction in Transient Source Heat Release RateFollowing transition to NFPA 805, BSEP will adopt a more restrictive transient controlprogram that will nominally limit the transient fire HRR to the 143 kW range instead ofthe 317 kW range. The transient control program is the fleet program and is already inuse at HNP. The 143 kW range was used for the transient fire locations in all areasexcept for the turbine building, which uses a 317 kW HRR.4.8.3.6 Incipient Detection in Main Control BoardsThe FPRA credits the use of air-aspirated incipient detection, also known as Very EarlyWarning Fire Detection Systems (VEWFDS) in NFPA 76, in the Main Control Boards(MCBs) because that modification is expected to be completed prior to the transition toNFPA 805. To support the use of incipient detection, a walkdown was performed for arepresentative sample of BSEP MCBs and determined the fraction of fast-actingcomponents to be very small (less than 0.5%) of the total component count.A sensitivity analysis was performed using the currently installed in-panel ion smokedetection rather than the incipient detection. The NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix L methodwas used to determine the frequency of self-fires that cause fire damage only within theMCBs, then the ignition frequency of NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1 was modified bythe "normal" non-suppression probability for ion smoke detectors and manualdetection/suppression for fires that also cause damage in the zone-of-influence outsidethe MCBs. For the zone-of-influence fires, the human reliability analysis for LERF wasfurther refined to account for operator actions to secure AC and DC power to primarycontainment isolation valves during MCR abandonment not related to habitabilityissues.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 77 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 ReauirementsTable 4-10 -MCB Incipient Detection Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF ResultsUnit I Unit 2ACDF [/yr] ALERF [/yr] ACDF [/yr] ALERF [/yr]VFDRs 1.2E-06 1.3E-08 2.7E-06 5.2E-09Recovery Actions [ 9.1E-07 9.1E-08 9.1 E-07 9.1 E-08Total 2.1 E-06 1.OE-07 3.6E-06 9.6E-08[] Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons andaddress those actions away from the remote shutdown panel.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.Table 4-11 -MCB Incipient Detection Sensitivity Total CDF and Total LERF ResultsUnit 1Unit 24CDF [/yr]LERF [/yr]CDF [/yr]LERF [/yr]Internal Events plus External 1.E-05 6.2E-07 1.E-05 6.2E-07Flooding and High WindsFire[11 4.8E-05 5.6E-06 5.1 E-05 5.5E-06Fire -Recovery Actions[21 1.OE-06 1.OE-07 1.OE-06 1.OE-07Total 6.3E-05 6.3E-06 6.6E-05 6.2E-06[1]Fire results credit operator actions to secure power during control room abandonment for loss of control sequences.[2] Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 78 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 78 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.8.3.7 Pump Heat Release Rate for Motor PumpsThe use of the 98th percentile HRR of 69kW for motor fires from NUREG/CR-6850 asopposed to the electrical pump fire HRR of 211 kW was questioned by NRR. Thesensitivity study changed the HRR to 211 kW for motor fires, which resulted in additionaltargets. The results of the sensitivity study are provided below.Table 4-12 -Pump HRR for Motor Pumps Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF ResultsUnit IUnit 2ACDF [lyr]ALERF [/yr]ACDF [lyr]ALERF [lyr]VFDRs 1.2E-06 1.3E-08 2.7E-06 5.2E-09Recovery Actions 9.1E-07 9.1 E-08 9.1E-07 9.1E-08Total 2.1 E-06 1.OE-07 3.6E-06 9.6E-08A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.Table 4-13 -Pump HRR for Motor Pumps Sensitivity Total CDF and Total LERF ResultsUnit I Unit 2CDF [/yr] LERF [lyr] CDF [lyr] LERF [/yr]Internal Events plus External 1.E-05 6.2E-07 1.E-05 6.2E-07Flooding and High WindsFirel11 2.OE-05 4.3E-06 2.OE-05 4.0E-06Fire -Recovery Actions[21 1.OE-06 1.OE-07 1.OE-06 1.OE-07Total 3.5E-05 5.OE-06 3.5E-05 4.8E-06[1]Fire results credit operator actions to secure power durng control room abandonment for loss of control sequences.[2] Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 79 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 79 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.8.3.8 Sensitive Electronics Sensitivity AnalysisA quantitative evaluation has been conducted for determining if the current treatment offire damage to sensitive electronics in the BSEP FPRA has a significant effect on thequantified fire risk values. The evaluation consisted of two main activities: 1) identifyingsensitive electronic components credited in the FPRA, and 2) adding the firecompartments of each identified sources full transient frequency to the IGF for eachsource containing sensitive electronic equipment. The results of the sensitivity studyare provided below.Table 4-14 -Sensitive Electronics Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF ResultsUnit IUnit 2ACDF [/yr]ALERF [/yr]ACDF [lyr]ALERF [lyr]VFDRs 1.2E-06 1.3E-08 2.7E-06 5.2E-09Recovery Actions 9.1E-07 9.1E-08 9.1E-07 9.1E-08Total 2.1 E-06 1.OE-07 3.6E-06 9.6E-08A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.Table 4-15 -Sensitive Electronics Sensitivity Total CDF and Total LERF ResultsUnit I Unit 2CDF [/yr] LERF [Iyr] CDF [Iyr] LERF [Iyr]Internal Events plus External 1.4E-05 6.2E-07 1.4E-05 6.2E-07Flooding and High WindsFirel1] 2.OE-05 4.3E-06 2.OE-05 4.OE-06Fire -Recovery Actions[21 1.OE-06 1.OE-07 1.OE-06 1.OE-07Total 3.5E-05 5.OE-06 3.5E-05 4.8E-06[I]Fire results credit operator actions to secure power during control room abandonment for loss of control sequences.[2] Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.4.8.3.9 Smoke Damage Sensitivity AnalysisA qualitative evaluation has been conducted for determining if the current treatment ofsmoke damage in the BSEP FPRA has a significant effect on the quantified fire riskvalues (i.e. CDF and LERF). The results of the evaluation suggest that the currenttreatment of smoke damage in the BSEP FPRA is consistent with the guidance inAppendix T of NUREG/CR-6850. The quantification approach for ignition sources andtargets inside and outside of the control room captures failure of the credited function inBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 80 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 80 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirementsthe FPRA that could be generated by smoke damage (i.e., function failures within thepanels connected to the panel of fire origin).4.8.3.10 Main Control Room Abandonment Bundle TreatmentA sensitivity analysis was done to treat all Main Control Board (MCB) panels as multi-bundle fires, rather than single bundle fires, in the MCR Abandonment study. The riskof abandonment with the single bundle treatment was compared to risk of abandonmentwith the multi-bundle treatment when taking credit for in-cabinet detection. The resultsof the sensitivity study are provided below.Table 4-16 -Main Control Room Abandonment Bundle Treatment Sensitivity Delta CDF and DeltaLERF ResultsUnit 1Unit 24 -~ACDF [lyr]ALERF [/yr]ACDF [/yr]ALERF [/yr]VFDRs 1.2E-06 1.3E-08 2.7E-06 5.2E-09Recovery Actions 1.OE-06 1.OE-07 1.OE-06 1.OE-07Total 2.2E-06 1.1 E-07 3.7E-06 1.1 E-07A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.Table 4-17 -Main Control Room Abandonment Bundle Treatment Sensitivity Total CDF and TotalLERF ResultsUnit I Unit 2CDF [lyr]LERF [lyr]CDF [/yr]LERF [lyr]Internal Events plus External 1.E-05 6.2E-07 1.E-05 6.2E-07Flooding and High WindsFire[1] 2.OE-05 4.3E-06 2.OE-05 4.OE-06Fire -Recovery Actions[21 1.2E-06 1.2E-07 1.2E-06 1.2E-07Total 3.6E-05 5.OE-06 3.5E-05 4.8E-06[1IFire results credit operator actions to secure power during control room abandonment for loss of control sequences.[2] Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 81 IlBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 81 1 CP&L4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements4.8.3.11 Maintenance Influence Factor SensitivityFire compartments that were assigned a maintenance influence factor of 10 wereconsidered in this sensitivity for re-assignment to a factor of 50. A total of 5 firecompartments were selected. One fire compartment was selected for theControl/Reactor Building area for each unit, and one fire compartment was selected forthe Turbine Building area for each unit. The single fire compartment selected for theBrunswick Wide area is common to both units. The results of the sensitivity study areprovided below.Table 4-18 -Maintenance Influence Factor Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF ResultsUnit IUnit 2ACDF [lyr]ALERF [lyr]ACDF [lyr]ALERF [lyr]VFDRs 1.2E-06 1.3E-08 2.7E-06 5.2E-09Recovery Actions 9.1E-07 9.1E-08 9.1E-07 9.1 E-08Total 2.1E-06 1.OE-07 3.6E-06 9.6E-08A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.Table 4-19 -Maintenance Influence Factor Sensitivity Total CDF and Total LERF ResultsUnit I Unit 2CDF [Iyr] LERF [lyr] CDF [lyr] LERF [lyr]Internal Events plus External 1.E-05 6.2E-07 1.E-05 6.2E-07Flooding and High WindsFire[1] 2.OE-05 4.3E-06 2.OE-05 4.0E-06Fire -Recovery Actions [2] 1.OE-06 1.OE-07 1.0E-06 1.OE-07Total 3.5E-05 5.OE-06 3.5E-05 4.8E-06[1]Fire results credit operator actions to secure power during control room abandonment for loss of control sequences.12] Values are for recovery actions associated with control room abandonment due to environmental reasons.A manual summation may differ from the Total due to rounding in the last digit.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 82 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 82 1 CP&L5.0 Reciulatory Evaluation

5.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

5.1 Introduction -10 CFR 50.48On July 16, 2004, the NRC amended 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, to add a newsubsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), which establishes alternative fire protection requirements.10 CFR 50.48 endorses, with exceptions, NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard forFire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants -2001 Edition(NFPA 805), as a voluntary alternative for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 50.48Section (b), Appendix R, and Section (f), Decommissioning.The voluntary adoption of 10 CFR 50.48(c) by BSEP does not eliminate the need tocomply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 3, Fire Protection. TheNRC addressed the overall adequacy of the regulations during the promulgation of10 CFR 50.48(c) (Reference Federal Register (FR) Notice 69 FR 33536 datedJune 16, 2004, ML041340086)."NFPA 805 does not supersede the requirements of GDC 3, 10 CFR 50.48(a), or10 CFR 50.48(o. Those regulatory requirements continue to apply to licenseesthat adopt NFPA 805. However, under NFPA 805, the means by which GDC 3or 10 CFR 50.48(a) requirements may be met is different than under10 CFR 50.48(b). Specifically, whereas GDC 3 refers to SSCs important tosafety, NFPA 805 identifies fire protection systems and features required to meetthe Chapter I performance criteria through the methodology in Chapter 4 ofNFPA 805. Also, under NFPA 805, the 10 CFR 50.48(a)(2)(iii) requirement tolimit fire damage to SSCs important to safety so that the capability to safely shutdown the plant is ensured is satisfied by meeting the performance criteria inSection 1.5.1 of NFPA 805. The Section 1.5.1 criteria include provisions forensuring that reactivity control, inventory and pressure control, decay heatremoval, vital auxiliaries, and process monitoring are achieved and maintained.This methodology specifies a process to identify the fire protection systems andfeatures required to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria in Section1.5 of NFPA 805. Once a determination has been made that a fire protectionsystem or feature is required to achieve the performance criteria of Section 1.5,its design must meet any applicable requirements of NFPA 805, Chapter 3.Having identified the required fire protection systems and features, the licenseeselects either a deterministic or performance-based approach to demonstratethat the performance criteria are satisfied. This process satisfies the GDC 3requirement to design and locate SSCs important to safety to minimize theprobability and effects of fires and explosions." (Reference FR Notice 69FR 33536 dated June 16, 2004, ML041340086)The new rule provides actions that may be taken to establish compliance with10 CFR 50.48(a), which requires each operating nuclear power plant to have a fireprotection program plan that satisfies GDC 3, as well as specific requirements in thatsection. The transition process described in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(ii) provides, inpertinent parts, that a licensee intending to adopt the new rule must, among otherthings, "modify the fire protection plan required by paragraph (a) of that section to reflectthe licensee's decision to comply with NFPA 805." Therefore, to the extent that theBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 83 CP&L5.0 Regulatory Evaluationcontents of the existing fire protection program plan required by 10 CFR 50.48(a) areinconsistent with NFPA 805, the fire protection program plan must be modified toachieve compliance with the requirements in NFPA 805. All other requirements of10 CFR 50.48(a) and GDC 3 have corresponding requirements in NFPA 805.A comparison of the current requirements in Appendix R with the comparablerequirements in Section 3 of NFPA 805 shows that the two sets of requirements areconsistent in many respects. This was further clarified in FAQ 07-0032,10 CFR 50.48(a), and GDC 3 clarification (ML081400292). The following tables providea cross-reference of fire protection regulations associated with the post-transition BSEPfire protection program and applicable industry and BSEP documents that address thetopic.10 CFR 50.48(a)Table 5-1 10 CFR 50.48(a) -ApplicabilitylCompliance Reference10 CFR 50.48(a) Section(s) ApplicabilitylCompliance Reference(1) Each holder of an operating license issued under this See belowpart or a combined license issued under part 52 of thischapter must have a fire protection plan that satisfiesCriterion 3 of appendix A to this part. This fireprotection plan must:(i) Describe the overall fire protection program for the NFPA 805 Section 3.2facility; NEI 04-02 Table B-1(ii) Identify the various positions within the licensee's NFPA 805 Section 3.2.2organization that are responsible for the program; NEI 04-02 Table B-1(iii) State the authorities that are delegated to each of NFPA 805 Section 3.2.2these positions to implement those responsibilities; and NEI 04-02 Table B-1(iv) Outline the plans for fire protection, fire detection NFPA 805 Section 2.7 and Chapters 3 and 4and suppression capability, and limitation of fire NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tablesdamage.(2) The plan must also describe specific features See belownecessary to implement the program described inparagraph (a)(1) of this section such as:(i) Administrative controls and personnel requirements NFPA 805 Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4for fire prevention and manual fire suppression NEI 04-02 Table B-1activities;(ii) Automatic and manually operated fire detection and NFPA 805 Sections 3.5 through 3.10 andsuppression systems; and Chapter 4NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables(iii) The means to limit fire damage to structures, NFPA 805 Section 3.3 and Chapter 4systems, or components important to safety so that the NEI 04-02 B-3 Tablecapability to shut down the plant safely is ensured.(3) The licensee shall retain the fire protection plan and NFPA 805 Section 2.7.1.1 requires thateach change to the plan as a record until the documentation (Analyses, as defined by NFPA 805Commission terminates the reactor license. The 2.4, performed to demonstrate compliance with thislicensee shall retain each superseded revision of the standard) be maintained for the life of the plant.procedures for 3 years from the date it was RDC-NGGC-0001superseded.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 84 IIBSEP LAIR Rev 3Page 84 1 CP&L5.0 Regulatory EvaluationTable 5-1 10 CFR 50.48(a) -ApplicabilityRCompliance Reference10 CFR 50.48(a) Section(s) Applicability/Complicance Reference(4) Each applicant for a design approval, design Not applicable. BSEP is licensed undercertification, or manufacturing license under part 52 of 10 CFR 50.this chapter must have a description and analysis of thefire protection design features for the standard plantnecessary to demonstrate compliance with Criterion 3of appendix A to this part.General Design Criterion 3Table 5-2 GDC 3 -Applicability/Compliance ReferenceGDC 3, Fire Protection, Statement Applicability/Compliance ReferenceStructures, systems, and components important to NFPA 805 Chapters 3 and 4safety shall be designed and located to minimize, NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tablesconsistent with other safety requirements, theprobability and effect of fires and explosions.Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be NFPA 805 Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.11.4used wherever practical throughout the unit, NEI 04-02 B-1 Tableparticularly in locations such as the containment andcontrol room.Fire detection and fighting systems of appropriate NFPA 805 Chapters 3 and 4capacity and capability shall be provided and designed NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tablesto minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures,systems, and components important to safety.Firefighting systems shall be designed to assure that NFPA 805 Sections 3.4 through 3.10 and 4.2.1their rupture or inadvertent operation does not NEI 04-02 Table B-3significantly impair the safety capability of thesestructures, systems, and componentsBSEP LAR Rev 3Fage 85 CP&L5.0 Regulatory Evaluation10 CFR 50.48(c)Table 5-3 10 CFR 50.48(c) -ApplicabilitylCompliance Reference10 CFR 50.48(c) Section(s) ApplicabilitylComplianceReference(1) Approval of incorporation by reference. National Fire Protection Association General Information.(NFPA) Standard 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for NFPA 805 (2001 edition) isLight Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition" (NFPA 805), the edition used.which is referenced in this section, was approved for incorporation byreference by the Director of the Federal Register pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)and 1 CFR part 51.(2) Exceptions, modifications, and supplementation of NFPA 805. As used in General Information.this section, references to NFPA 805 are to the 2001 Edition, with the NFPA 805 (2001 edition) isfollowing exceptions, modifications, and supplementation: the edition used.(i) Life Safety Goal, Objectives, and Criteria. The Life Safety Goal, The Life Safety Goal,Objectives, and Criteria of Chapter 1 are not endorsed. Objectives, and Criteria ofChapter 1 of NFPA 805 arenot part of the LAR.(ii) Plant Damage/Business Interruption Goal, Objectives, and Criteria. The The Plant Damage/BusinessPlant Damage/Business Interruption Goal, Objectives, and Criteria of Interruption Goal, Objectives,Chapter 1 are not endorsed. and Criteria of Chapter 1 ofNFPA 805 are not part of theLAR.(iii) Use of feed-and-bleed. In demonstrating compliance with the BSEP is a BWR. This is notperformance criteria of Sections 1.5.1(b) and (c), a high-pressure applicable.charging/injection pump coupled with the pressurizer power-operated reliefvalves (PORVs) as the sole fire-protected safe shutdown path formaintaining reactor coolant inventory, pressure control, and decay heatremoval capability (i.e., feed-and-bleed) for pressurized-water reactors(PWRs) is not permitted.(iv) Uncertainty analysis. An uncertainty analysis performed in accordance Uncertainty analysis was notwith Section 2.7.3.5 is not required to support deterministic approach performed for deterministiccalculations. methodology.(v) Existing cables. In lieu of installing cables meeting flame propagation Electrical cable constructiontests as required by Section 3.3.5.3, a flame-retardant coating may be complies with a flameapplied to the electric cables, or an automatic fixed fire suppression system propagation test that wasmay be installed to provide an equivalent level of protection. In addition, the found acceptable to the NRCitalicized exception to Section 3.3.5.3 is not endorsed, as documented in NEI 04-02Table B-1.(vi) Water supply and distribution. The italicized exception to Section 3.6.4 is BSEP complies asnot endorsed. Licensees who wish to use the exception to Section 3.6.4 documented in Attachment A.must submit a request for a license amendment in accordance with See NEI 04-02 Table B-1.paragraph (c)(2)(vii) of this section.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 86 I!BSEP LAR Rev 3Page 86 1 CP&L5.0 Regulatory EvaluationTable 5-3 10 CFR 50.48(c) -Applicability/Compliance Reference10 CFR 50.48(c) Section(s) ApplicabilitylComplianceReference(vii) Performance-based methods. Notwithstanding the prohibition in Section The use of performance-3.1 against the use of performance-based methods, the fire protection based methods for NFPA 805program elements and minimum design requirements of Chapter 3 may be Chapter 3 is requested. Seesubject to the performance-based methods permitted elsewhere in the Attachment L.standard. Licensees who wish to use performance-based methods for thesefire protection program elements and minimum design requirements shallsubmit a request in the form of an application for license amendment under §50.90. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or adesignee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director ordesignee determines that the performance-based approach;(A) Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, andperformance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety andradiological release;(B) Maintains safety margins; and(C) Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection,fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).(3) Compliance with NFPA 805. See below(i) A licensee may maintain a fire protection program that complies with The LAR was submitted inNFPA 805 as an alternative to complying with paragraph (b) of this section accordance withfor plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, or the fire protection 10 CFR 50.90. The LARlicense conditions for plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. The included applicable licenselicensee shall submit a request to comply with NFPA 805 in the form of an conditions, orders, technicalapplication for license amendment under § 50.90. The application must specifications/bases thatidentify any orders and license conditions that must be revised or needed to be revised and/orsuperseded, and contain any necessary revisions to the plant's technical superseded.specifications and the bases thereof. The Director of the Office of NuclearReactor Regulation, or a designee of the Director, may approve theapplication if the Director or designee determines that the licensee hasidentified orders, license conditions, and the technical specifications thatmust be revised or superseded, and that any necessary revisions areadequate. Any approval by the Director or the designee must be in the formof a license amendment approving the use of NFPA 805 together with anynecessary revisions to the technical specifications.(ii) The licensee shall complete its implementation of the methodology in The LAR and transition reportChapter 2 of NFPA 805 (including all required evaluations and analyses) summarize the evaluationsand, upon completion, modify the fire protection plan required by paragraph and analyses performed in(a) of this section to reflect the licensee's decision to comply with NFPA 805, accordance with Chapter 2 ofbefore changing its fire protection program or nuclear power plant as NFPA 805.permitted by NFPA 805.(4) Risk-informed or performance-based alternatives to compliance with NFPA No risk-informed or805. A licensee may submit a request to use risk-informed or performance- performance-basedbased alternatives to compliance with NFPA 805. The request must be in alternatives to compliancethe form of an application for license amendment under § 50.90 of this with NFPA 805 (perchapter. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4)) weredesignee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or utilized. See Attachment P.designee determines that the proposed alternatives:(i) Satisfy the performance goals, performance objectives, andperformance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety andradiological release;(ii) Maintain safety margins; and(iii) Maintain fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection,fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 87 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 87 1 CP&L5.0 Regulatory Evaluation5.2 Regulatory Topics5.2.1 License Condition ChangesThe current BSEP fire protection license condition 2.B.(6) is being replaced with thestandard license condition based upon Regulatory Position 3.1 of RG 1.205, as shownin Attachment M.5.2.2 Technical SpecificationsBSEP conducted a review of the Technical Specifications to determine which TechnicalSpecifications are required to be revised, deleted, or superseded. BSEP determinedthat the changes to the Technical Specifications and applicable justification listed inAttachment N are adequate for the BSEP adoption of the new fire protection licensingbasis.5.2.3 Orders and ExemptionsA review was conducted of the BSEP docketed correspondence to determine if therewere any orders or exemptions that needed to be superseded or revised. A review wasalso performed to ensure that compliance with the physical protection requirements,security orders, and adherence to those commitments applicable to the plant aremaintained. A discussion of affected orders and exemptions is included inAttachment 0.5.3 Regulatory Evaluations5.3.1 No Significant Hazards ConsiderationA written evaluation of the significant hazards consideration of a proposed licenseamendment is required by 10 CFR 50.92. According to 10 CFR 50.92, a proposedamendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration ifoperation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:" Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accidentpreviously evaluated; or" Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accidentpreviously evaluated; or" Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.This evaluation is contained in Attachment Q.Based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance thatthe health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposedmanner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission'sregulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the commondefense and security or to the health and safety of the public. BSEP has evaluated theproposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazardsconsideration.5.3.2 Environmental ConsiderationPursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an evaluation of the LAR has been performed todetermine whether it meets the criteria for categorical exclusion set forth inBSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 88 CP&L5.0 Regulatory Evaluation10 CFR 51.22(c). That evaluation is discussed in Attachment R. The evaluationconfirms that this LAR meets the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) for categoricalexclusion from the need for an environmental impact assessment or statement.5.4 Revision to the UFSARAfter the approval of the LAR, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e), the BSEP UFSARwill be revised. The content will be consistent with NEI 04-02.5.5 Transition Implementation ScheduleThe following schedule for transitioning BSEP to the new fire protection licensing basisrequires NRC approval of the LAR in accordance with the following schedule:" Implementation of new NFPA 805 fire protection program to include procedurechanges, process updates, and training to affected plant personnel. This willoccur 180 days after NRC approval. If the turnover is due to fall within an outagewindow then the changes will be implemented 60 days after startup from thescheduled outage." Modifications will be completed by the startup of the second refueling outage foreach unit after issuance of the Safety Evaluation (SE). Appropriatecompensatory measures will be maintained until modifications are complete.BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 89 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 89 1 CP&L6.0 References6.0 REFERENCESThe following references were used in the development of the TR. Additionalreferences are in the Attachments.NRC Documents1. Letter, NRC to NEI, Process for Frequently Asked Questions For Title 10 ofThe Code Of Federal Regulations, Part 50.48(c) Transitions, July 12, 2006(ML061660105).2. NRC Enforcement Policy, Policy Statement: Revision, Federal Register,Vol. 69, No. 115, June 16, 2004, pp. 33684-33685.3. NRC Generic Letter 86-10, Supplement 1, Fire Endurance Test AcceptanceCriteria for Fire Barrier Systems Used to Separate Redundant Safe ShutdownTrains Within the Same Fire Area, March 25, 1994.4. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2007-19: Communicating Clarifications ofStaff Positions in RG 1.205 Concerning Issues Identified During PilotApplication of NFPA Std 805, August 20, 2007 (ML071590227).5. NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear PowerFacilities, April 2005.6. Regulatory Guide 1.174, An Approach for Using Probabilistic RiskAssessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to theLicensing Basis, Revision 1 -November 2002.7. Regulatory Guide 1.200, An Approach for Determining the TechnicalAdequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-InformedActivities, Revision 2 -March 2009).8. Regulatory Guide 1.205, Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protectionfor Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, December 2009.9. Voluntary Fire Protection Requirement for Light-Water Reactors; Adoption ofNFPA 805 as a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Alternative, Final Rule,Federal Register, Vol. 69, No. 115, June 16, 2004, pp. 33536-33551.Other Industry Documents1. ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S 2008, Standard forLevel 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment forNuclear Power Plant Applications, American Society of MechanicalEngineers/American Nuclear Society, New York, NY.2. EPRI Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and MaintenanceGuide TR-1 006756, Final Report July 20033. NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis,Revision 1, January 2005.IBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 90 1 CP&L6.0 References4. NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Circuit Analysis,Revision 2, May 2009.5. NEI 04-02, Guidance for Implementing a Risk-Informed, Performance-BasedFire Protection Program under 10 CFR 50.48(c), Revision 2 April 2008.6. NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light WaterReactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition.Licensee Correspondence1. Letter CP&L to NRC, Letter of Intent to Transition to 10 CFR 40.48(c),June 10, 2005 (ML051720404)2. Letter NRC to CP&L, Grants Enforcement Discretion Regarding NFPAStandard 805, April 29, 2007 (ML070590625).3. Letter NRC to CP&L, Issuance of Amendment Regarding Adoption of NFPAStandard 805, Safety Evaluation for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,June 28, 2012 (ML1 01130535)BSEP LAR Rev 3 Page 91 IIBSEP LAR Rev 3Page 91 1