Letter Sequence RAI |
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TAC:ME8160, Eliminate Use of Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes (Withdrawn, Closed) TAC:ME8161, Eliminate Use of Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes (Withdrawn, Closed) TAC:ME8162, Eliminate Use of Term Core Alterations in Actions and Notes (Withdrawn, Closed) |
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MONTHYEARML12076A0452012-03-0808 March 2012 Request for Amendment to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Alteration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Request ML1213103802012-05-10010 May 2012 Acceptance Review Email, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Revision 3 Project stage: Acceptance Review ML12248A1502012-09-0404 September 2012 E-mail Draft Request for Additional Information, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Revision 3 Project stage: Draft RAI ML12250A7202012-09-11011 September 2012 Request for Additional Information, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Revision 3 Project stage: RAI ML12286A3302012-10-11011 October 2012 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Alteration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Response to RAI ML12341A1292012-12-0505 December 2012 E-mail, Draft Request for Additional Information, Round 2, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC ME8160/ME8162) Project stage: Draft RAI ML12347A0402012-12-19019 December 2012 Request for Additional Information, Round 2, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC ME8160-ME8162) Project stage: RAI ML12362A2922013-01-0303 January 2013 Request for Additional Information, Round 3, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC ME8160-ME8162) Project stage: RAI ML13039A0132013-01-31031 January 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Alteration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Response to RAI ML13072A1822013-03-13013 March 2013 Email, Draft Request for Additional Information, Round 4, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC ME8160-ME8162) Project stage: Draft RAI ML13127A2432013-05-0808 May 2013 5/29/13 Meeting Via Conference Call with Arizona Public Service Company to Discuss Palo Verde Request to Revise Technical Specifications; Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev 3 (TAC ME8160-ME81 Project stage: Meeting ML13150A0812013-06-0303 June 2013 Request for Additional Information, Round 4, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 Project stage: RAI ML13154A4502013-06-26026 June 2013 Summary of Meeting Via Conference Call with Arizona Public Service Co. to Discuss Palo Verde Request to Revise Technical Specifications; Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev 3 (TAC ME8160-ME816 Project stage: Meeting ML13210A2382013-07-25025 July 2013 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Alteration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Response to RAI ML14051A1032014-02-13013 February 2014 Withdrawal of Request for Amendment to Eliminate the Use of the Term Core Aleration in the Technical Specifications Project stage: Request ML14059A1782014-03-0707 March 2014 Withdrawal of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications; Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev 3 Project stage: Withdrawal ML14059A1812014-03-0707 March 2014 FRN - Withdrawal of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications; Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev 3 Project stage: Withdrawal 2013-01-03
[Table View] |
Palo Verde, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Request for Additional Information, Round 4, Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alteration Consistent w/TSTF-471 and NUREG-1432, Rev. 3 (TAC Nos. ME8160, ME8161, andML13150A081 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Palo Verde ![Arizona Public Service icon.png](/w/images/9/93/Arizona_Public_Service_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
06/03/2013 |
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From: |
Rankin J K Plant Licensing Branch IV |
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To: |
Edington R K Arizona Public Service Co |
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Rankin J K |
References |
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TAC ME8160, TAC ME8161, TAC ME8162 |
Download: ML13150A081 (8) |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24019A2012024-01-19019 January 2024 Fourth 10-Year Interval, Second Period Owners Activity Report Number 1R24 ML24019A1362024-01-18018 January 2024 Inservice Inspection Request for Information ML24012A2452024-01-12012 January 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information to Proposed Method to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue for the Pressurizer Surge Line ML24010A1532024-01-10010 January 2024 Information Request for the Cybersecurity Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection ML23341A0062023-12-21021 December 2023 Project Manager Assignment IR 05000528/20230112023-12-18018 December 2023 License Renewal Inspection Report 05000528/2023011 ML23335A0782023-11-30030 November 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23325A1602023-11-17017 November 2023 Supplemental Submittal - Relief Request 70 Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle IR 05000528/20234032023-11-13013 November 2023 NRC Security Inspection Report 05000528 2023403, 05000529 2023403, 05000530 2023403 (Full Report) ML23311A2082023-11-0909 November 2023 Reassignment of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch IV ML23299A3052023-10-26026 October 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Relief Request 70 Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle IR 05000528/20230032023-10-17017 October 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000528 2023003 and 05000529 2023003 and 05000530 2023003 ML23270B9232023-09-28028 September 2023 Notification of Age-Related Degradation Inspection (05000528/2024012, 05000529/2024012, and 05000530/2024012) and Request for Information ML23251A2332023-09-13013 September 2023 Notification of Post Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal and Request for Information Inspection (05000528/2023011) ML23241B0182023-09-13013 September 2023 Use of Honeywell Mururoa V4F1 and MTH2 Supplied Air Suits within Respiratory Protection Program IR 05000528/20243012023-09-0606 September 2023 Notification of NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination 05000528/2024301; 05000529/2024301; 05000530/2024301 IR 05000528/20230102023-08-22022 August 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000528/2023010, 05000529/2023010 and 05000530/2023010 IR 05000528/20230052023-08-21021 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (Report 05000528/2023005 and 05000529/2023005 and 05000530/2023005) ML23222A2762023-08-10010 August 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Registration of Dry Spent Fuel Transportable Storage Canister Identification Numbers AMZDFX175 and AMZDFX176 and Vertical Concrete Cask Identification Numbers AMZDNE175, and AMZDNE176 ML23199A2942023-08-0909 August 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 221, 221, and 221, to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-107, Separate Control Rods That Are Untrippable Versus Inoperable IR 05000528/20230022023-08-0808 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2023002 and 05000529/2023002 and 05000530/2023002 ML23207A2482023-07-26026 July 2023 License Renewal Pressurizer Surge Line Inspection ML23188A1872023-07-0707 July 2023 Fourth 10-Year Interval, Second Period Owners Activity Report Number 2R24 ML23166B0832023-07-0505 July 2023 Independence Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Issuance of Exemption ML23181A1602023-06-30030 June 2023 2 to Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and Revision 3 to Operations Quality Assurance Program Description ML23180A2222023-06-29029 June 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications (TS) 3.5.1, Safety Injection Tanks (Sits) - Operating, TS 3.5.2, Safety Injection Tanks (Sits) - Shutdown, and TS 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature ML23181A0772023-06-29029 June 2023 Program Review - Simulator Testing Methodology ML23157A1292023-06-0101 June 2023 Annual Report of Guarantee of Payment of Deferred Premium ML23144A3722023-05-24024 May 2023 Response to Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23143A3912023-05-23023 May 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from NAC-MAGNASTOR Certificate of Compliance 72-1031 - Cask Lid Batch 3 Design Requirements ML23145A2772023-05-17017 May 2023 10-PV-2023-05 Post-Exam Comments ML23132A3392023-05-12012 May 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications 3.3.11 to Adopt TSTF-266-A, Revision 3, Eliminate the Remote Shutdown System Table of Instrumentation and Controls IR 05000528/20230012023-05-0808 May 2023 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2023001 and 05000529/2023001 and 05000530/2023001 and 07200044/2023001 ML23128A0692023-05-0808 May 2023 Notification of Biennial Problem Dentification and Resolution Inspection and Request for Information ML23122A1822023-04-29029 April 2023 Transmittal of Technical Specification Bases Revision 76 ML23122A1912023-04-29029 April 2023 Unit 1 Core Operating Limits Report Revision 32, Unit 2 Core Operating Limits Report Revision 25, Unit 3 Core Operating Limits Report Revision 31 ML23116A2772023-04-26026 April 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report 2022 ML23115A4012023-04-26026 April 2023 Review of the 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspections During Refueling Outage 23 ML23115A4982023-04-25025 April 2023 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report IR 05000528/20230122023-04-19019 April 2023 Notification of Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection (05000528/2023012, 05000529/2023012, and 05000530/2023012) and RFI ML23108A0342023-04-18018 April 2023 NRC Initial Operator Licensing Examination Approval 05000528/2023301; 05000529/2023301; 05000530/2023301 ML23103A4642023-04-13013 April 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report 2022 ML23103A4312023-04-13013 April 2023 Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Evaluation Models, 10 CFR 50.46(a)(3)(ii) Annual Report for 2022 IR 05000528/20224012023-04-13013 April 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000528/2022401 and 05000529/2022401 and 05000530/2022401 ML23102A3292023-04-12012 April 2023 Application for Authorized Use of Mururoa Single-Use, Supplied Air Suits, Models V4F1 and MTH2 ML23102A3242023-04-12012 April 2023 Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-107-A, Separate Control Rods That Are Untrippable Versus Inoperable ML23089A4002023-03-30030 March 2023 Consolidated Decommissioning Funding Status Report - 2022 ML23088A4012023-03-30030 March 2023 Project Manager Assignment IR 05000528/20234022023-03-29029 March 2023 and 3 - NRC Security Inspection Report 05000528-2023402, 05000529-2023402, and 05000530-2023402, (Cover Letter Only) ML23080A3002023-03-21021 March 2023 Present Levels of Financial Protection 2024-01-19
[Table view] Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML24011A1002024-01-10010 January 2024 March 2024 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML23334A1612023-11-30030 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - RAIs Associated with License Renewal Commitment for Pressurizer Surge Line Welds Inspection Program to Manage Environmentally Assisted Fatigue ML23334A0072023-11-29029 November 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR That Revises TSs 3.5.1, SITs - Operating; 3.5.2, SIT Shutdown; 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature; and SRs for TS 3.5.1, SITs Operating ML23298A1232023-10-25025 October 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 1 - RAIs for Relief Request 70, Proposed Alternatives for Pressurizer Lower Shell Temperature Nozzle ML23031A3392023-01-31031 January 2023 In-service Inspection Request for Information ML23013A0632023-01-13013 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 -Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22348A1672022-12-14014 December 2022 March 2023 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML22339A2372022-12-0505 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Unit 1 Request for Additional Information - U1R23 Inspection Summary Report for Steam Generator Tubing ML22272A3252022-09-29029 September 2022 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML22209A1752022-07-28028 July 2022 Inservice Inspection Request for Information ML22187A2632022-07-0606 July 2022 Notification of Inspection (NRC IR 05000528/2022004, 05000529/2022004 and 05000530/2022004) and Request for Information ML22067A2292022-03-0202 March 2022 Inservice Inspection Inspection PWR Request for Information ML22055A5842022-02-24024 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Final RAIs for 22nd Refueling Outage (Spring 2021) Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection Report ML22035A3302022-02-10010 February 2022 Requests for Confirmation of Information for Exemption to Delete Diverse Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation System Based on Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations ML22025A4012022-01-0303 January 2022 March 2022 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML21245A2222021-09-0101 September 2021 Request for Information ML21200A2392021-07-20020 July 2021 Docs Request AC - AA August 2021 ML21154A0082021-05-26026 May 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2 and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Permanent Extension of Containment ILRT Frequency to 15 Years (Type a) and CIV Leak Rate Test Frequency to 75 Months (Type C) ML21064A2372021-03-0303 March 2021 ISI Request for Information Rls ML21042B9692021-02-18018 February 2021 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection and Initial Request for Information ML21043A1462021-02-11011 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAI for an Order Associated with Indirect License Transfer from Public Service Company of New Mexico to Avangrid, Inc ML21023A0212021-01-13013 January 2021 PVNGS PI&R Request for Information RA ML21011A1972021-01-12012 January 2021 Unit 2, and Unit 3 - Notification of an NRC Fire Protection Baseline Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2021012, 05000529/2021012 and 05000530/2021012) and Request for Information ML20227A0992020-08-14014 August 2020 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML20118D1362020-04-28028 April 2020 Licensed Operator Positive Fitness-For-Duty Test Request for Additional Information ML20049A0992020-02-14014 February 2020 Notification of Cyber Security Inspection (NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2020401; 05000529/2020401; and 05000530/2020401) and Request for Information ML20049A0252020-02-12012 February 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 - Official RAIs for License Amendment Request Associated with Changes to Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements ML20021A3172020-01-21021 January 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 - Official RAIs for Relief Request 64, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19317D0782019-11-13013 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1 - Requests for Additional Information on Unit 1 21st Refueling Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML19234A3202019-08-29029 August 2019 Redacted - Request for Additional Information for Amendment and Exemption Request to Support the Implementation of Framatome High Thermal Performance Fuel (EPID L-2018-LLA-0194; EPID L-2018-LLE-0010) ML19155A1842019-05-30030 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Mvib Official RAIs for RR-63, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19095A6552019-04-0404 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3 - Mphb Official RAIs for RR-63, Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year ISI Interval ML19044A7342019-02-13013 February 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde1, 2, and 3 - Official Requests for Additional Information for RR 62, Third and Fourth 10-Year ISI Intervals, Proposed Alternative - Pressurizer Heat Sleeve Repairs ML19008A3612019-01-0808 January 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for LAR Associated with Response Time Testing of Pressure Transmitters ML18341A0252018-12-0303 December 2018 Notification of NRC Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)(05000528/2019011, 05000529/2019011, and 05000530/2019011) and Initial Request for Information ML18271A0392018-10-0202 October 2018 Non Proprietary - Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested License Amendments and Exemptions Implementation of Framatome High Thermal Performance Fuel (Epids L-2018-LLA-0194 and L-2018-LLE-0010) ML18221A5102018-08-23023 August 2018 Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request to Adopt Risk-Informed Completion Times (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578; EPID: L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18229A3132018-08-17017 August 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Relief Request 58: Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Unit 2 - Second Se ML18227A8672018-08-15015 August 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Relief Request 58: Impractical Examinations for the Third 10-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generation Station, Unit 2 ML18124A0112018-05-0303 May 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official Eeob RAIs for TSTF-505 (4b) LAR (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578; EPID L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18099A0072018-04-0606 April 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for 10 CFR 50.69 LAR (CAC Nos. MF9971, MF9972, and MF9973; EPID L-2017-LLA-0276) ML18094B1122018-04-0404 April 2018 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Final RAIs for TSTF-505 (Initiative 4b) LAR (CAC Nos. MF6576, MF6577, and MF6578: EPID L-2015-LLA-0001) ML18066A7032018-03-0707 March 2018 Notification of Nrc Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Programs) 05000528/2018011, 05000529/2018011, and 05000530/2018011 Initial Request for Information ML17248A0162017-08-31031 August 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Final RAI for RRs PRR-03, PRR-04 and PRR-05, Pump Testing ML17107A0052017-04-14014 April 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3 - Ngf LAR and Exemption RAIs (CAC Nos. MF8076 to MF8081) ML17082A4462017-03-28028 March 2017 PVNGS Units 1, 2, and 3 Transition to CE 16x16 Ngf - Draft RAIs Rev 3 ML17003A0182017-01-0202 January 2017 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde, Unit 3 - Draft RAIs for the Second Emergency LAR Associated with EDG 3B Failure ML16258A0312016-09-14014 September 2016 PVNGS Units 1-3 - Notif of NRC Insp of the Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instr. Orders and Emer. Prep. Comm./Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plns(05000528/ 2016009;05000529/2016009;and 05000530/2016009) and ML16111B3312016-04-20020 April 2016 Notification of NRC Component Design Bases Inspection (05000528/2016007; 05000529/2016007; 05000530/2016007) and Initial Request for Information ML16083A2502016-03-23023 March 2016 NRR E-mail Capture - Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 - Official RAIs for EAL LAR 2024-01-10
[Table view] |
Text
UNITED NUCLEAR REGULATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 June 3, 2013 Mr. Randall K. Edington Executive Vice President Nuclearl Chief Nuclear Officer Mail Station 7602 Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ELIMINATE THE USE OF THE TERM CORE ALTERATION (TAC NOS. ME8160, ME8161, AND ME8162) Dear Mr. Edington: By letter dated March 8, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12076A045), as supplemented by letters dated October 11, 2012 and January 31,2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML12286A330 and ML 13039A013, respectively), Arizona Public Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3. The proposed amendment would eliminate the use of the term CORE ALTERATION from the Technical Specifications. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the information provided by the licensee and determined that the additional information identified in the enclosure to this letter is needed in order for the NRC staff to complete its review. The draft copy of the request for additional information (RAI) was provided to Mr. Robert Roehler of your staff via e-mail on March 13, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13072A 182). A clarifying telephone call was held on May 16,2013 on RAI Nos. 1 and 2. A public meeting held via conference call was noticed on May 8, 2013. to discuss RAI Nos. 3 and 4. The public conference call was held on May 29, 2013. Mr. Tom Weber agreed to respond to the RAls by July 18, 2013.
R. Edington -2 If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1530 or via e-mail at Jennivine.Rankin@nrc.gov. Sincerely, JYnnivine K. Rankin, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530 Enclosure: As stated cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ELIMINATE THE USE OF THE TERM CORE ALTERATION IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1,2, AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-528,50-529, AND 50-530 By letter dated March 8, 2012 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 12076A045), as supplemented by letters dated October 11, 2012, and January 31, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML 12286A330 and ML 13039A013, respectively), Arizona Power Service Company (APS, the licensee) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) in which it proposed to remove the use of the term CORE ALTERATION from the Technical Specifications (TSs) including TS 3.9.2, "Nuclear Instrumentation," for the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1,2, and 3 (PVNGS). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the submitted information and has determined that the following additional information is required to complete the review. Chapter 15, Section 15.4.6 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) indicates that during operational Modes 3 through 6, the operator relies upon a high neutron flux alarm from the Boron Dilution Alarm System (BDAS) to identify and terminate a boron dilution event. Pages 3 and 4 of the supplement dated January 31, 2013, indicates that the BDAS relies on the startup channels (source range monitor, SRM) in the excore neutron flux monitoring system (ENFMS) to provide source level neutron flux information. The last paragraph on Page 3 indicates that the ENFMS contains nonsafety-related channels. The regulations in 10 CFR 50.2 define safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) as those SSCs: that are relied upon to remain functional during and following deSign basis events to assure: The integrity of the reactor coolant boundary The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to the applicable guideline exposures set forth set forth in § 50.34(a)(1) or § 100.11 of this chapter, as applicable. Enclosure
-2 Please confirm whether the BOAS is a safety-related or nonsafety-related system. If the BOAS is a nonsafety-related system, please justify the adequacy of use of the BOAS for mitigating the consequences of the boron dilution event, a design-bas is-event (OBE). Adequacy of BOAS Alarm Setpoint during Core Offload in Mode 6 with one Operable SRM Paragraph 3 on page 4 of the supplement dated January 31, 2013, states, in part, that Once sufficient fuel assemblies have been removed, such that one SRM (and its associated BOAS channel) has indication of higher neutron flux level than the other SRM; the BOAS channel that is associated with the SRM that has reduced neutron flux indication will automatically reduce its setpoint to a lower value, commensurate with the lower neutron flex reading on the SRM. Thus, from this point in the core offload process until the core is entirely offloaded to the spent fuel pool, the two independent BOAS channel will have different setpoint but remain capable of indicating a boron dilution event. The above response addresses an automatic reduction in the BOAS alarm setpoint that is limited to core offloaded conditions in Mode 6 with two operable SRMs. It is unclear if the BOAS setpoint will decrease if only one SRM is operable. Please expand the information to address the adequacy of use of one operable SRM (with the other SRM failed, as specified in Condition A of TS 3.9.2) for monitoring the core sub-criticality in Mode 6 while fuel assemblies are being removed from the core in combination with occurrence of a boron dilution event. Paragraph 4 on page 6 of the supplement dated January 31, 2013, states: The proposed change would only allow the addition of soluble poison to the RCS [reactor coolant system] coolant (per TS 3.9.1 and COLR [Core Operating Limits Report] item 3.9.1) that increases the uniform RCS boron concentration. Such a change would not result in a positive change in core reactivity or a reduction in core sub-criticality. The above response does not consider the reduction in sub-criticality resulting from a boron dilution event, which may be caused by an operator error to inject unborated water into the RCS. Please explain how this is acceptable considering the fact that a boron dilution event is a UFSAR Chapter 15 OBE and would be expected to be considered in support of a TS change to remove the term, CORE ALTERATION, from the TS. Paragraph 6 on page 6 of the supplement dated January 31, 2013 states: Should the remaining operable SRM (when there is reduced numbers of fuel assemblies in the core) experience a failure, such that it is inoperable, then TS Bases 3.3.12, Action B.1, describes the redundant
-methods that are to be implemented when both independent channels of BOAS are inoperable. The use of redundant methods to monitor the RCS boron concentration provides alternate indications of inadvertent boron dilution. This will allow detection with sufficient time for termination of a boron dilution event before the reactor achieves criticality, consistent with the objectives of the SRP. The above response discussed the use of the sampling technique to monitor the RCS boron concentration as alternate indications of inadvertent boron dilution. The information does not discuss the frequency of the sampling and time to complete the sampling to assure that the operator can detect and terminate the boron dilution event before the core reaches criticality in 30 minutes, which is specified as an acceptance criterion in NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," (SRP) Section 15.4.6, "Inadvertent Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant System (PWR)," for a boron dilution event during the Mode 6 operation. Please provide information to show the adequacy of the BOAS alarm setpoint based on input from only one operable SRM for conditions where the fuel assemblies are being removed from the core during the Mode 6 operation. Please (1) discuss identification of the worst case, with fuel assembly removal in a configuration that results in the least effectiveness of the operable SRM to detect neutron fluxes, and the least time available for detection and termination of a boron dilution event; and (2) show that for the identified worst case, the BOAS based on one operable SRM provides adequate, reliable, and un-ambiguous signals for the operator to detect and terminate the boron dilution event before the core reaches criticality in the required 30 minutes in the Mode 6 operation. Also, please provide information to show that the frequency of the sampling of the RCS boron concentration is adequate and the time of completion of the sampling are sufficient in providing signals for the operator to detect and terminate the boron dilution event before the core reaches criticality in 30 minutes as specified in SRP Section 15.4.6. The NRC staff's RAI dated January 3, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12362A292) states, in part, that Based on the SRP summarized above, please state whether a dropped source or component (or any other item allowed to be moved by CORE ALTERATIONS) can damage a fuel assembly or break and create a radioactive source term. If so, please provide the analysis that shows that the dose consequences of these scenarios are less limiting than the current fuel handling accident. Provide the assumptions, inputs and results of these analyses.
-The APS supplement dated January 31, 2013 states, in part: Based on the conservative assumptions outlined above, the consequences of a dropped source or component (or any other item allowed to be moved by core alterations) are bounded by the current fuel handling accident analysis. Under routine plant operation, there are no sources present, other than used and new fuel assemblies. In the case of a prolonged shutdown, where a startup neutron source may be needed (e.g., all transuranium has decayed and there is not sufficient neutron flux to start-up using used fuel), the time since shutdown will be sufficiently long that the amount of the critical isotope present (i.e., iodine), is negligible. As a result, a drop of a source is bounded by the current fuel handling accident dose consequence analysis. Therefore, no specific analyses have been performed for other non-bounding drop events. PVNGS procedures control movement of heavy loads consistent with the current licensing basis with regard to NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants. Non-bounding load drop events do not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36, Technical specifications, subsection (c)(1 )(ii) for inclusion in the TS limiting conditions for operation (LCOs). As a result, it is appropriate to remove TS controls for such non-bounding events, as proposed by the LAR elimination of the term CORE ALTERATION. Currently, the term CORE ALTERATIONS would prohibit certain movement of loads over the reactor vessel if certain mitigating systems are not operable. It is unclear how the items listed as conservatisms in the RAI response would offset the relaxations proposed for mitigating systems (i.e., not requiring operable control room filtration or containment penetrations during CORE ALTERATIONS). The "conservatisms" listed in the RAI response either appear to be allowed operational parameters (i.e., uncertainty in core power, allowed time to offload (72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s>> or would likely not change the calculated dose results significantly (Le., 4.8 weight percent versus. 5.0 weight percent enrichment). Conversely, the proposed changes may have significant effects on the dose consequences. The control room filtration significantly decreases control room doses by filtering a source term and the lack of containment penetration operability can change the location of the release from containment and, therefore, change the atmospheric dispersion factors. From a qualitative standpoint, it is not apparent how the stated assumptions would offset the increases in dose due to the proposed changes. Therefore, the staff requests a quantitative assessment of the impact of the proposed changes on the PVNGS design basis radiological analyses (i.e., control room habitability, offsite dose). Please state whether a dropped source or component (or any other item allowed to be moved by CORE ALTERATIONS) can damage a fuel assembly or break and create a
-5 radioactive source term. If so, please provide the analysis that shows that the dose consequences of these scenarios are less limiting than the current fuel handling accident. Provide the assumptions, inputs, methodology, and results of these analyses. Also, please state what is meant by "non-bounding" load drop events. Please explain how a drop of a load that is not a "heavy load" is determined to be bounded by a drop of a fuel assembly. 4. The APS response dated January 31, 2013, to NRC Request 3 stated, in part, that In the PVNGS reactor design, control components (CEAs) are removed from the reactor vessel with the upper guide structure, so a drop of these components is not postulated, and excluded in the definition of CORE ALTERATION. The term CORE ALTERATION is defined in the PVNGS Technical Specifications as: CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components [excluding control element assemblies (CEAs) withdrawn into the upper guide structure], within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. Please explain if the CEAs can be decoupled into a fuel assembly or removed from the upper guide assembly and moved over the reactor core. If so, please justify why these CEA drop scenarios are not considered.
R. Edington -If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1530 or via e-mail at Jennivine.Rankin@nrc.gov. Sincerely, Ira! Jennivine K. Rankin, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530 Enclosure: As stated cc wtencl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION: PUBLIC LPLIV rtf RidsAcrsAcnw _MaiICTR Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl4 Resource RidsNrrDraAadb Resource RidsNrrDssSrxb Resource RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource RidsNrrPMPaloVerde Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource ADAMS Accession No.: ML 13150A081 "'via email OFFICE NRR/DORULPL4/PM NRR/DORL/LPL4/LA NRR/DSS/SRXB/BC (A) NAME JRankin .1 Burkhardt... SMiranda'" DATE 5/30/13 5/30/13 2/26/13 OFFICE NRR/DRAlAADB/BC NRRIDORULPL4/BC NRR/DORULPL4/PM NAME TTate'" MMarkley JRankin DATE 3/12/13 6/3113 6/3/13 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY