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IR 05000289/2015007; 1/26/2015 to 2/27/2015; Exelon Generation Company, Llc; Three Mile Island, Unit 1; Component Design Basis Inspection
	ML15097A069
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	04/07/2015
From:	Krohn P G; Engineering Region 1 Branch 2
To:	Bryan Hanson; Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
	IR 2015007
	Download: ML15097A069 (37)
	v • d • e

April 7, 2015

Mr. Bryan Hanson Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555

SUBJECT: THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 - NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASIS INSPECTION REPORT 05000289/2015007

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On February 27, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI) facility. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on February 27, 2015, with Mr. Rick Libra, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components and operator actions to mitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents. The inspection involved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, and interviews with station personnel. This report documents two NRC-identified findings which were of very low safety significance (Green). Both of these findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance of the violations and because they were entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any of the NCVs in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Three Mile Island. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Three Mile Island. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-289 License No.: DPR-50

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000289/2015007

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000289/2015007; 1/26/2015 - 2/27/2015; Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Three Mile Island, Unit 1; Component Design Basis Inspection. The report covers the Component Design Basis Inspection conducted by a team of seven NRC region based inspectors and two NRC contractors. The team identified two findings of very low safety significance (Green) and classified each as a non-cited violation (NCV). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual

Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)," dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects Within Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy dated July 9, 2013. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

The NRC identified an NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for failure to promptly identify and correct degraded borated water storage tank (BWST) level transmitter instrument line cold weather protection equipment. Specifically, station personnel performed periodic maintenance and testing activities to verify the adequacy of cold weather protection for the BWST level transmitters prior to the onset of cold weather, but did not identify existing uninsulated sections of the instrument lines or degraded heat trace circuit continuity. Consequently, on February 15, 2015, the sensing line for BWST level transmitter DH-LT-808 froze which challenged the operators' capability to successfully perform a critical design basis manual action. Namely, swapover from the injection to recirculation phase of ECCS operation following a LOCA. Immediate actions included entering the applicable technical specification (TS) limiting condition of operation (LCO), thawing the frozen instrument line, restoring DH-LT-808 to service, and exiting the TS LCO. Exelon entered the cold weather protection issue into their corrective action program as issue reports (IR) 2445164, 2451342, 02452858, and 02454925. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not affect design or qualification, did not represent a loss of system, did not cause at least one train of BWST level instrumentation to be inoperable for greater than its TS LCO allowed outage time, and did not involve external event mitigation systems. The team assigned a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Procedure Adherence (aspect H.8), because station personnel did not follow processes, procedures, and work instructions when performing maintenance and operational activities that should have identified degraded BWST level instrument cold weather protection equipment associated with missing insulation and loss of heat trace circuit continuity. (Section 1R21.2.1.2)iii

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

Green.

The NRC identified an NCV of Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for failure to establish and implement adequate design control measures to assure that the reactor building (RB) fan assemblies were capable of performing their design function to mitigate a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) event. Specifically, testing and design calculations used a non-conservative RB ventilation system alignment to determine the brake horsepower of the RB fan motors during a LOCA. As a result, engineers had not evaluated the capability of the RB fan motors to operate above their nameplate full load rating to perform their intended safety function. Additionally, RB fan motor electrical overload protection analyses were incorrect. Immediate corrective actions included interim calculations which demonstrated that the RB fan assemblies would remain capable of performing their safety functions and that the emergency diesel generators were capable of supplying the additional electrical load requirements. Exelon entered the issues into their corrective action program as IRs 2458932, 2458929, and 2451855. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the operational capability of the containment barrier to protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, the finding was similar to example 3.j in Appendix E of IMC 0612, in that the engineering calculation error resulted in a condition where there was reasonable doubt of the operability of the RB fan assemblies to perform their safety function during a design basis LOCA. The team determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it: did not affect the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary; did not affect the radiological barrier function of the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool systems or boundaries; and did not represent an actual open pathway in containment or involve a reduction in the function of hydrogen igniters. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the underlying cause was not indicative of current performance in that the non-conservative calculation error occurred in 1993. (Section 1R21.2.1.1)

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone:

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R21 Component Design Basis Inspection (IP 71111.21)

.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process

The team selected risk significant components for review using information contained in the Three Mile Island, Unit 1 (TMI) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model. Additionally, the TMI Significance Determination Process (SDP) analysis was referenced in the selection of potential components for review. In general, the selection process focused on components that had a Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) factor greater than 1.3 or a Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) factor greater than 1.005. The team also selected components based on previously identified industry operating experience issues and the component contribution to the large early release frequency (LERF) was also considered. The components selected were located within both safety-related and non-safety related systems, and included a variety of components such as pumps, breakers, heat exchangers, electrical buses, transformers, valves, and storage tanks.

The team initially compiled a list of components based on the risk factors previously mentioned. Additionally, the team reviewed the previous component design basis inspection reports (05000289/2007006, 2009006, and 2012007) to minimize the selection of those components previously inspected. The team then performed a margin assessment to narrow the focus of the inspection to 22 components and three industry operating experience (OE) samples. One component was selected because it was a containment-related component considered for LERF implications. The team's evaluation of possible low design margin included consideration of original design issues, margin reductions due to modifications, and margin reductions identified as a result of material condition/equipment reliability issues. The assessment also included items such as failed performance test results, corrective action history, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule (a)1 status, operability reviews for degraded conditions, NRC resident inspector insights, system health reports, and industry operating experience. Finally, consideration was given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design and the available defense-in-depth margins.

The inspection performed by the team was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.21. This inspection effort included: walkdowns of selected components; interviews with operators, system engineers, and design engineers; and reviews of associated design documents and calculations to assess the adequacy of the components to meet design and licensing basis requirements. A summary of the reviews performed for each component, operating experience sample, and the specific inspection findings identified are discussed in the subsequent sections of this report.

Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

.2 Results of Detailed Reviews

.2.1 Results of Detailed Component Reviews (22 samples)

.2.1.1 'B' Reactor Building Fan Assembly (AH-E-1B)

a. Inspection Scope

Three reactor building (RB) fan assemblies transfer heat from the containment atmosphere to the river water systems during normal and accident conditions. Each RB fan assembly consists of a fan, motor, normal cooling coils, separate emergency cooling coils, air manifolds, pressure relief valves, and a reinforced structural housing. The Technical Specifications (TS), operating procedures, and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) were reviewed to determine the licensing and operating basis for the fan assembly. The team reviewed performance requirements during accident conditions, including fan motor horsepower requirements, motor cooling requirements, and heat transfer capabilities. The team reviewed air flow and water flow testing to ensure adequate heat transfer would be available during operation under containment accident conditions, including design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and main steam line break conditions. The team interviewed the system engineer and reviewed the system health report to assess the material condition of the fan assembly. Maintenance histories and preventive maintenance (PM) histories were reviewed to ensure the fan, heat exchangers, and motor were properly maintained. The team reviewed selected calculations to verify the adequacy of voltage to the RB fan motor under design basis and degraded grid voltage (DGV) conditions. Additionally, the team reviewed motor breaker protection analysis to verify the RB fan motors would remain available to perform their design basis function during a sustained DGV event. Corrective Action documents were reviewed to ensure problems were identified and corrected. Seismic evaluation documents were reviewed to verify the fan assembly was seismically qualified.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The NRC identified a Green NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for failure to establish and implement adequate design control measures to assure that the RB fan assemblies were capable of performing their design function to mitigate a design basis LOCA event. Specifically, testing and design calculations used a non-conservative RB ventilation system alignment to determine the brake horsepower (BHP) of the RB fan motors during a LOCA. As a result, engineers had not evaluated the capability of the RB fan motors to operate above their nameplate full load rating to perform their intended safety function. Additionally, RB fan motor electrical overload protection analyses were incorrect. Consequently, Exelon did not assure that the Class 1E RB fan motors would not be damaged or become unavailable during a design basis LOCA and sustained DGV event.

Description.

The RB fans have two operational modes, normal and slow speed. During a LOCA, the fans operate on slow speed. The fan motor nameplate rating for fan horsepower (HP) operating at slow speed is 75 HP with a service factor of 1.0. Exelon calculation, "RB Vent Fan Brake HP during LOCA/LOOP Event," Revision 1, dated March 20, 1993, determined that the maximum RB fan BHP during a LOCA was 61 HP. Exelon performed additional fan motor testing in 2010 as a result of previous issues identified with achieving consistent and repeatable flow rates due to a lack of backdraft damper maintenance. The team noted fan motor current was significantly higher during the 2010 tests than during original plant construction testing. The team questioned the reason for the higher motor current and questioned whether the RB fan motors may have degraded. Additionally, the team questioned whether the increased current measured during normal plant conditions indicated that the RB fan motor current would exceed thermal overload (TOL) protection settings and trip the electrical supply breaker during a sustained DGV condition (IR 2451855).

Exelon reviewed the team's concerns and determined that calculation C-1101-823-5310-004 was based on a non-conservative RB fan configuration. Specifically, Exelon determined that the calculation used test data measured with all three RB fans operating at the same time. Single fan operation is more limiting condition, since one fan drawing on the common RB fan air inlet plenum would encounter greater flow resistance than when three fans were running. Therefore a single failure LOCA scenario, during which only one RB fan would operate, would require the RB fan to do more work (i.e., produce more HP) than previously evaluated. Exelon used the 2010 test data to reevaluate the maximum RB fan motor BHP requirement during a design basis LOCA. Their preliminary calculation determined the RB fan motor requirement was 85 HP. Additionally, during design DGV conditions the associated motor current would peak at 144 amps, which was above the motor breaker TOL setpoint of 141 amps.

The team questioned whether the RB fan motor was capable of performing its intended safety function which required operation above its nameplate full load rating and whether the increased load would damage the motor (IR 2458932). Exelon evaluated the motor torque capability and thermal effects on the motor and determined the motor was capable of performing its safety function without damage. Additionally, Exelon determined that although RB fan motor current would exceed the breaker TOL setpoint, the TOL inverse time characteristic would permit continued RB fan operation at this reduced voltage for the full period of the DGV relay time delay (12 seconds) without tripping the breaker. The team noted the most recent revision of calculation 1101-733-E420-022, "TOL/Amptector and Motor Operated Valve Confirmation for DGV," Revision 4, was deficient in that it misinterpreted the RB fan motor TOL protection curves and overestimated the TOL actuation time for the RB fan motor breakers (IR 2458929). Exelon also confirmed that the existing emergency diesel generator (EDG) loading had sufficient margin to accept the additional loading associated with the increased RB fan motor HP.

The team discussed the preliminary evaluations with Exelon, reviewed additional related engineering documents, and determined Exelon's preliminary conclusions were technically sound. The team concluded the RB fan motors remained capable of performing their safety function. Exelon entered this issue into its corrective action program as IRs 2458932, 2458929, and 2451855 to document the results of their preliminary evaluations, evaluate the extent-of-condition, and update affected design documents.

Analysis.

The team determined that the failure to verify the adequacy of design of the RB fan assemblies to perform their intended safety function under design basis LOCA conditions as required by 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, "Criterion III," was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because the finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the operational capability of the containment barrier to protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, the finding was similar to example 3.j in Appendix E of Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, in that the engineering calculation error resulted in a condition where there was reasonable doubt of the operability of the RB fan assemblies to perform their safety function during a design basis LOCA. The team evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The SDP for Findings At-Power," Exhibit 3, "Barrier Integrity Screening Questions," dated June 19, 2012. The team determined the finding was of very low safety significance because it: did not affect the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary; did not affect the radiological barrier function of the control room, auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool systems or boundaries; and did not represent an actual open pathway in containment or involve a reduction in the function of hydrogen igniters. Exelon's interim calculations and operability determinations demonstrated adequate motor capability and thermal overload protection during a design basis LOCA, such that RB fan assemblies would perform their safety functions. This finding was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect because the underlying cause was not indicative of current performance in that the non-conservative RB calculation error occurred in 1993. .

Enforcement.

Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that applicable design bases are correctly translated into specifications. Additionally, design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program.

Contrary to the above, since March 20, 1993, Exelon did not establish and implement adequate design control measures to assure that the most limiting RB fan assembly alignment (single fan assembly operation) was translated into calculations. Additionally engineers did not accurately verify or check the adequacy of the RB fan assembly calculations to ensure they were capable of performing their intended safety function during a design basis LOCA with sustained DGV. Consequently, Exelon did not recognize that the RB fan motors may be relied upon to operate above their full load nameplate ratings to perform their safety function. Furthermore, Exelon did not recognize or evaluate the associated increased EDG loading requirements. Immediate corrective actions included interim calculations which demonstrated the RB fan assemblies were capable of performing their safety functions and the EDGs were capable of supplying the additional electrical load requirements. This violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Exelon entered the issues into their corrective action program as IRs 2458932, 2458929, and 2451855. (NCV 05000289/2015007-01, Deficient Design Control for Verifying Reactor Building Fan Assembly Capability to Perform Design Basis Function)

.2.1.2 Borated Water Storage Tank (DH-T-1)

a. Inspection Scope

The borated water storage tank (BWST) provides a supply of borated water for core cooling and inventory makeup during the injection phase of the mitigating systems response to a design basis LOCA. Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps (building spray, high pressure injection, and low pressure injection) initially take suction from the BWST. Approximately a half hour into a LOCA, operators manually shift ECCS suction from the BWST to the containment sump to establish the long term recirculation phase of core cooling. The team reviewed TSs, operating procedures, and the UFSAR to determine the licensing and operating basis for the tank. The team reviewed tank usable volume calculations to ensure the required water volume was available. The team interviewed the system engineer, reviewed the system health report, and performed a walkdown of the tank, connected piping, and instruments to assess the material condition of the tank. Maintenance records were reviewed to ensure the tank structure was properly maintained. Corrective action documents were reviewed to ensure problems were identified and corrected. Seismic evaluation documents were reviewed to ensure the tank was seismically qualified. The team also reviewed the design, installation, operation, and maintenance of the BWST level instrument line heat trace circuits to provide reasonable assurance that both BWST level instruments would function reliably during periods of cold weather.

b. Findings

Introduction.

The NRC identified a Green NCV of Title 10 of the CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for failure to promptly identify and correct degraded BWST level transmitter instrument line cold weather protection equipment. Specifically, station personnel performed periodic maintenance and testing activities to verify the adequacy of cold weather protection for the BWST level transmitters prior to the onset of cold weather, but did not identify existing uninsulated sections of the instrument lines or degraded heat trace circuit continuity. Consequently, on February 15, 2015, the sensing line for BWST level transmitter DH-LT-808 froze which challenged the operators' capability to successfully perform a critical design basis manual action. Namely, swapover from the injection to recirculation phase of ECCS operation following a LOCA.

Description.

Manual pump suction swapover from the BWST to the containment sump for the recirculation phase of LOCA response is a time critical design basis manual operator action. Prior to swapping pump suction to the containment sump, operators must ensure enough BWST volume has been injected to support accident analysis assumptions (including sufficient containment sump level to meet ECCS pump net positive suction head (NPSH) requirements during recirculation mode). Operators must also ensure swapover is complete prior to BWST level lowering below the level needed to maintain ECCS pump NPSH requirements during the injection phase. Operators rely on BWST level instruments DH-LT-808 and DH-LT-809 to provide accurate level indication to support performance of the ECCS swapover to the recirculation phase. Technical specifications require both level transmitter indications to be operable. Heat trace circuits and insulation are installed on the BWST level transmitter instrument lines to ensure the lines do not freeze and adversely affect BWST level indication during periods of extreme cold weather.

On January 29, 2015, the team identified an 18-inch section of missing insulation and an improperly installed heat trace circuit on DH-LT-809. The affected section of the instrument line was located within an unheated concrete structure known as the BWST tunnel. Station personnel initiated prompt action to verify the instrument line was not frozen and properly reinstalled the heat trace line and missing insulation (IR 2445164). The team interviewed station personnel and reviewed records to determine how long this degraded condition existed and assessed the adequacy of station procedures and processes to maintain BWST level instrument operability during extreme cold weather. Procedure E-70, "Heat Trace Inspection," Revision 14, required technicians to visually inspect heat traced piping to ensure insulation is intact and properly installed. Procedure WC-AA-107, "Seasonal Readiness," Revision 14, required system engineers to ensure system readiness by verifying piping and instrument-tube sensing line insulation was properly installed where the line was susceptible to freezing. The team determined heat trace installation procedures and processes to verify cold weather readiness were adequate. Notwithstanding, during the prior 9 months station personnel missed several opportunities (annual heat trace inspection PM, annual cold weather preparation activity, and operation of a manual valve located on the uninsulated instrument line) to identify and correct the degraded condition. The team identified that the annual PM performed a functional check of the heat trace circuit, but not a calibration. Additionally, the PM activity did not test the heat trace circuit at the as-left setting or verify that the circuit would energize at the as-left setting. The team discussed these deficiencies with station personnel who entered them into the corrective action program (IR 2451342). On February 15, 2015, the sensing line for DH-LT-808 froze during an extended period of record low temperature and wind chill. Control room operators declared the BWST level instrument inoperable, appropriately entered a 72-hour TS limiting condition of operation (LCO), and initiated actions to restore the level instrument to service (IR 02452858). Technicians identified that a short section of the instrument sensing line (less than 6 inches) was uninsulated and was exposed to the cold winds. Additionally, the heat trace circuit did not energize as designed, despite the cold sensing line temperature. Initial troubleshooting identified the temperature controller had a dead spot at the location of the as-left temperature setting. DH-LT-808 was returned to service and operators exited the TS LCO on February 16, 2015.

Station personnel performed extent-of-condition walkdowns on all piping and instruments for the BWST and the 'A' and 'B' condensate storage tanks which were exposed to the outdoor climate. Several additional insulation and heat trace circuit deficiencies were identified and promptly corrected. The team determined the cause of DH-LT-808 freezing was the same as the performance deficiencies the team had previously identified for DH-LT-809. Additionally, because the PM activity did not verify heat trace circuit performance at the as-left setting, the team questioned the reliability of the eight BWST heat trace circuits to perform their design function during the continued extended period of extreme cold weather. Station management reviewed the issue and established an interim compensatory measure to monitor BWST level instrument line temperature each shift. This interim measure revealed additional instrument line temperature and heat trace circuit deficiencies which were promptly addressed. This team determined this compensatory measure was appropriate.

Analysis.

Portions of the BWST level instrument lines were not insulated and heat trace equipment did not properly operate to support reliable operation of DH-LT-808 and DH-LT-809 during cold weather. The team determined failure to promptly identify and correct BSWT level instrument line cold weather protection deficiencies during the conduct of heat trace and seasonal readiness inspections, as required by the TMI corrective action program, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment and human performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, the finding was similar to example 2.f in Appendix E of IMC 0612, in that failure to properly maintain cold weather protection equipment for the BWST level transmitters resulted in DH-LT-808 becoming inoperable. This adversely impacted availability of a BWST level indication necessary for operators to reliably perform a critical design basis manual action.

The team evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," Exhibit 2, "Mitigating Systems Screening Questions," dated June 19, 2012. The team determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect design or qualification, did not represent a loss of system, did not cause at least one train of BWST level instrumentation to be inoperable for greater than its TS LCO allowed outage time, and did not involve external event mitigation systems. The team determined that the issue had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Procedure Adherence, because station personnel did not follow processes, procedures, and work instructions when performing maintenance and operational activities associated with BWST level instrument cold weather protection equipment (IMC 0310, Aspect H.8).

Enforcement.

The team interviewed the system and design engineers to gain an understanding of maintenance issues and overall reliability of the chiller. The team conducted several walkdowns to assess both the 'A' and 'B' chillers' material condition, and to verify the installed configuration was consistent with design basis assumptions and plant drawings. Corrective action documents were reviewed to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and resolved and that the chiller was properly maintained.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.1 2 'B' Decay River Water Pump Discharge Motor-Operated Valve (DR-V-1B)

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the 'B' decay river water pump discharge MOV (DR-V-1B), to verify that it was capable of meeting its design basis requirements. The team reviewed the UFSAR, drawings, and procedures to identify the design basis requirements of the valve. The team also reviewed accident system alignments to determine if component operation would be consistent with the design and licensing basis assumptions. Applicable testing procedures and specifications were also reviewed to ensure consistency with design basis requirements. The team reviewed periodic verification diagnostic test results to verify acceptance criteria were met and consistent with the design basis.

The team interviewed the system and design engineers to gain an understanding of maintenance issues and overall reliability of the valve. The team conducted a walkdown to assess the material condition of the valve and associated components, and to verify the installed configuration was consistent with design basis assumptions and plant drawings. Corrective action documents were reviewed to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and resolved and that the valve was properly maintained. The team reviewed the corrective and preventive maintenance activities associated with the valve to gain an understanding of the performance history and overall component health.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.1 3 'B' Decay Heat Removal Pump Discharge Check Valve (DH-V-16B)

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the 'B' decay heat removal pump discharge check valve (DH-V-16B), to verify that it was capable of meeting its design basis requirements. The team reviewed the UFSAR, drawings, and procedures to identify the design basis requirements of the check valve. The check valve testing procedures and decay heat system hydraulic analyses were reviewed to verify the design basis requirements were appropriately incorporated into the test acceptance criteria. The team reviewed a sample of test results to verify the acceptance criteria were met. The team reviewed the corrective and preventive maintenance activities associated with the check valve to gain an understanding of the performance history and overall component health.

The team interviewed the system and design engineers to gain an understanding of maintenance issues and overall reliability of the check valve. The team conducted a walkdown to assess the material condition of the check valve and associated components including the 'B' decay heat removal pump, and to verify the installed configuration was consistent with design basis assumptions and plant drawings. Corrective action documents were reviewed to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and resolved and that the check valve was properly maintained and inspected.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.1 4 Manual Operator Action to Open Drop-Line Valves DH-V-1, 2, and 3 to Establish Decay

Heat Removal

a. Inspection Scope

The team evaluated the manual operator actions to open the decay heat drop-line valves DH-V-1, 2, and 3 to circulate water through the core following a cold-leg LOCA or a steam generator tube rupture in order to prevent the concentration of boron from exceeding its solubility limits. Precipitation of boron could result in clogged flow channels and limit the ability to remove heat. In addition, these valves perform a containment isolation function and are also opened to use the decay heat system as the normal and preferred method of placing and maintaining the reactor in the cold shutdown condition. Operator critical tasks included: Verify a RCS leak exists and incore shutdown margin is <25 F Verify indicated RCS pressure <5 psid (RCS is in pressure equilibrium with the reactor building) Verify DH-P-1B is operating Verify DH-V-6B is open Verify the breakers for DH-V-1, 2, and 3 are closed at the 1C ES Valves Motor Control Center (MCC) Reset bistables for DH-V-1 and 2 Jog open DH-V-3. Time open travel and release open pushbutton at 5.5 seconds Open DH-V-2 Open DH-V-1 Monitor DH-P-1B motor current and discharge pressure. The team interviewed licensed operators and control room simulator instructors and reviewed associated operating procedures and operator training documents to evaluate the operators' ability to perform the required actions. The team walked down applicable control and indicating panels in the simulator and observed operations personnel perform the required actions satisfactorily and within the required time to assess the likelihood of cognitive or execution errors. The team also walked down applicable controls and indicating panels in the main control room and evaluated the available time margins to perform the actions to verify the reasonableness of Exelon's operating procedures and risk assumptions. The team also reviewed equipment deficiency reports to access the material condition of the valves and performed independent field observations of valve DH-V-3 which was the only valve of the three drop-line valves accessible outside of primary containment.

The team reviewed the UFSAR, drawings, and procedures to identify the design basis requirements of the valves. The team also reviewed accident system alignments to determine if component operation would be consistent with the design and licensing basis assumptions. Applicable testing procedures and specifications were also reviewed to ensure consistency with design basis requirements. The team reviewed periodic verification diagnostic test results to verify acceptance criteria were met and consistent with the design basis. The team interviewed the system and design engineers to gain an understanding of maintenance issues and overall reliability of the valves. Corrective action documents were reviewed to verify that deficiencies were appropriately identified and resolved and that the valves were properly maintained. The team reviewed the corrective and preventive maintenance activities associated with the valves to gain an understanding of the performance history and overall component health.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. 2.1.15 1S 480V Engineered Safeguards Safety Bus (including 1S 4kV/480V Transformer, S1-02 and 1S-02 Breakers

a. Inspection Scope

The team inspected the 1S 480V Engineered Safeguards Safety Bus (including 1S 4kV/480V transformer, S1-02 and 1S-02 Breakers) to verify its ability to meet the design basis requirements in response to steady-state, transient, and accident events and conditions. Bus 1S-ESSB is fed from safety-related bus 4.16 kV bus 1E, through breaker S1-02 and the 1S 4kV/480V transformer. The bus incoming feeder breaker is 1S-02 on the low voltage side of the transformer. The team reviewed the electrical DBD to determine the required operational parameters. The team reviewed the vendor documentation to determine if the equipment was properly rated and to verify that it met the plant requirements. The team reviewed the maintenance and functional history of the switchgear by sampling corrective action reports, the system health report, operating procedures, and ST procedures and results. The team evaluated short circuit, voltage drop, and protective relaying calculations to ensure that adequate voltage and current would be available to meet design basis conditions. The team verified that protective relay and breaker setpoints were properly translated into system procedures and tests, and reviewed completed tests intended to demonstrate component operability. The team reviewed drawings, component calculations, and system calculations to verify that calculation inputs and assumptions were accurate and justified. The team reviewed the interlocking scheme to ensure that there was no single point vulnerability. The team also conducted several walkdowns to visually inspect the physical condition of the switchgear and transformer to ensure adequate configuration control.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. 2.1.16 1C 480V Engineered Safeguard Valve Motor Control Center (EE-MCC-ESV-1C)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed calculations and drawings to determine if the loading of the 1A 480V safety-related bus was within equipment ratings. The team reviewed the adequacy and appropriateness of design assumptions and calculations related to the battery charger, motor starting, and loading voltages to determine if the voltages, under worst case motor starting and loading conditions, would remain above the minimum acceptable values. On a sample basis, the team reviewed maintenance and test procedures and acceptance criteria to verify that the 1A 480V vital bus and the 1P feeder bus were capable of supplying the minimum voltage necessary to ensure proper operation of connected equipment during normal and accident conditions. The team reviewed the adequacy of the short circuit ratings of the switchgear and circuit breakers, and the adequacy of protective device coordination provided for a selected sample of equipment. The team reviewed the PM inspection and testing procedures to ensure that the breakers were maintained in accordance with industry and vendor recommendations.

The team performed a visual non-intrusive inspection of observable portions of the safety-related 480V switchgear to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards. The team also reviewed a sample of corrective action IRs related to the 1A 480V bus to ensure that Exelon appropriately identified, characterized, and corrected problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2.1.2 2 IA-P-4 Instrument Air Compressor (including IA-F2A/2B pre-filters and pressure switch IA-PS-1404)

b. Findings

No findings were identified. 2.2.3 NRC Bulletin 2012-01, Byron Event: Single Phase Failure at Switchyard Caused Plant Trip The team reviewed the plant approach to the issue described in NRC Bulletin 2012-01, Byron Event: Single phase failure at switchyard caused plant trip. The team reviewed the modification implemented to ensure that a single failure in the switchyard would not have undue consequences on the plant operation. The modification installed a new programmable relay, which was purported to be able to discriminate between normal plant events, such as transformer paralleling and fast bus transfers, and an event that involved an open phase. At the time of this inspection, the new protective scheme was set to alarm only, and it was closely monitored. The trip function of the scheme was scheduled to be implemented by the end of 2017. A similar scheme had been operating at Byron without any reported issues. The modification appeared to have considered all major issues involved.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed a sample of problems that Exelon identified and entered into their corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to evaluate whether Exelon had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to evaluate adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action program. Other corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit

On February 27, 2015, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Rick Libra, Site Vice President, and other members of the Exelon staff. The team verified that none of the information in this report is proprietary. Attachment: Supplementary Information ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Libra, Site Vice President

T. Haaf, Plant Manager

D. Atherholt, Manager, Regulatory Assurance

K. Baldwin, System Engineer

P. Bennett, Manager, Mechanical Design Engineering

A. Crawford, Design Engineer

S. Diven, System Engineer

R. Ezzo, Electrical Design Engineer

M. Fitzwater, Senior Regulatory Assurance Engineer

K. Heisey, MOV Program Engineer

E. Hickman, System Engineer

K. Hirstik, Mechanical Design Engineer

B. Hreha, TMI Site Risk Management Engineer

A. McDowell, System Engineer

J. Piazza, Senior Manager, Design Engineering

F. Reeser, System Engineer

J. Sherk, Electrical Design Engineer

T. Stertzel, System Engineer

G. Yockey, Manager, Operations Services

D. Williams, Supervisor, Work Control Operations

V. Zeppos, Mechanical Design Engineer

NRC Personnel

D. Werkheiser, Senior Resident Inspector, TMI

J. Heinly, Resident Inspector, TMI

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000289/2015007-01 NCV Deficient Design Control for Verifying Reactor Building Fan Assembly Capability to Perform Design Basis Function (Section 1R21.2.1.1)

05000289/2015007-02 NCV Untimely Identification and Correction of Degraded BWST Level Transmitter Cold Weather Protection Equipment (Section 1R21.2.1.2)

Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Audits and Self-Assessments

NOSMDA-TM-14-05, TMI1 Winter Readiness Assessment dated November 15, 2014

PI-AA-126-1001, TMI Readiness Review for 2015 NRC Component Design Basis Inspection, Revision 0

Calculations

268-TMI-027, Weak Link Analysis for Group No. 27, Walworth 12 inch , 1500 # Gate Valve, dated 10/3/2000 42047-C-002,

TMI-U1, Chiller Anchorage Evaluation, Revision 2, dated 2/22/90

C-1101-168-E410-003, River Water Level Indicator, Revision 0

C-1101-210-E510-074, Low Pressure Injection (LPI)/Decay Heat (DH) Removal Flow Calibration and Instrument Loop Error-CMT

606659, Revision A

C-1101-212-E410-081,

TMI-1: 1R14

DH-C-1A Performance Evaluation, Revision 0

C-1101-212-E410-084,

TMI-1:

DH-C-1A/B Design Analysis, Revision 0C-1101-212-E504-067,

TMI-1: DHR Heat Exchanger Performance Evaluation, Revision 1

C-1101-212-E510-074, low Pressure Injection (LPI)/Decay Heat (DH) Removal Flow Calibration and Instrument Loop Error, Revision 1

C-1101-531-5310-010,

TMI-1 Nuclear River Water System Performance, Revision 2

C-1101-531-E410-019,

TMI-1 Nuclear River Water System Pipe-Flo Model, Revision 1

C-1101-542-E540-014,

TMI-1: Decay Heat Service Closed Cooling Water Hydraulic Analysis, Revision 0A

C-1101-700-5350-006, Short Circuit Study, Revision 4

C-1101-700-E420-018, TMI1 Open Phase Study, Revision 0

C-1101-700-E510-010, Load Analysis, Revision 5

C-1101-700-E510-010, AC Voltage Regulation Study, Revision 6

C-1101-731-E420-006 Emergency Diesel Generators

EG-Y-1A/B Protective Relay Settings, Revision 1

C-1101-731-E420-007 Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage and Frequency Response -

CMT 608163, Revision 1

C-1101-732-5350-003, TMI Class 1E 480V Unit Substation Setting for Conversion to Solid State Trip Units, Revision 3

C-1101-732-5350-005

TMI-1 Protective Relays 4.16KV Class 1E Switchgear, Revision 8

C-1101-733-E420-022, TOL/Amptector Confirmation for

TDR-995 Conversion, Revision 3

C-1101-733-E420-022, TOL/Amptector Confirmation for Degraded Grid Voltage, Revision 4

C-1101-733-E510-024, 480V Under/Overvoltage (Alarm) Relay Settings, Revision 1 C1101-741-E510-005 Loading Summary of Emergency Diesel Generators and Engineered Safeguard Buses, Revision 5

C-1101-823-5310-004, RB Vent Fan Brake Horsepower during a RB LOCA/LOOP Event, Revision 0

C-1101-823-5310-004, RB Vent Fan Brake Horsepower during a RB LOCA/LOOP Event, Revision 1

C-1101-823-5450-001,

TMI-1 LBLOCA EQ Temperature Profile Using the GOTHIC Computer Code, Revision 9

C-1101-900-E410-049, Weal Link for TMI GL89-10 Valves, Revision 0

HAGPU-0898-052, Decay Heat River Water System Piping Evaluation, Revision 0

SQ-T1-AH-C-0004A, Seismic Qualification, Revision 1

Attachment

SQ-T1-DC-C0002B, Seismic Qualification for Decay Heat Service Heat Exchanger 2B, Revision 0

TDR-900, Reconciliation of Loss of Ventilation Systems Analysis and Tests, Revision 4, dated 5/9/2007

TMI-002, Weak Link Analysis for Group No. 2, 20 inch Ace Type 1500 Butterfly Valve, dated 7/23/2004

Issue Reports

01004908

01011715

01012195

01017471

01021772

01023997

01049556

01055676

01061194

01066123

01066638

01071239

01084788

01094461

01102739

01112241

01136439

01143407

01161423

01161995

01175143

01183728

01186666

01186845

01203459

01211027

212455

01217470

01240338

01252775

01262899

01269258

01269435

01272192

01274162

01274395

01280171

01281446

01286623

01287008

01289205

01305721

01314551

01317830

01322450

01363932

01392609

01409750

01460209

01470986

01471730

01578516

01583237

01583250

01583267

01584924

01584961

01585974

01607694

01636787

01643041

01657138

01665021

01689184

02175352

02414913

02414920

02434610

02435043

02439088*

02441183

02442676*

02443083*

02443205

02443687*

02444388*

02445115*

02445164*

02445250*

02446076*

02446393

02446655*

02446714*

02446903*

02446923*

02447581*

02447817*

02448096*

02448152*

02448638*

02448646*

02450373*

02451342*

02451855*

02452249*

02452333*

02452858

2453521

02453528

02453540

02454780*

02454925*

02455207

02455828

02456909

02458489*

02458491*

02458929*

02458932*

02458980*

02459579*

02461773*

02465143* * NRC identified during this inspection.

Design and Licensing Basis TMI Unit 1 Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 20

Safety Evaluation for

PCR-1-097-0519 to procedure 1104-4, Decay Heat Removal, Revision 107

SDBD-T1-642, Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (#642), Revision 7

SDBD-T1-700, Onsite electrical Distribution System, Revision 0

SDBD-T1-826/827, Control Building Ventilation Design Basis Document, Revision 9

Attachment

Drawings

1E-710-11-001, Electrical Schematic One Line Diagram 230kV, 6.9kV, 4.16 &480 SA &SB, Revision 9 1E-710-11-002, Electrical Schematic One Line Diagram 416V & 480V, Revision 1 201-044, 480V. Control Center 1B Engineered Safeguards, Revision 38 201-057, 480V Control Center 1B Turbine Plant, Sheet 2, Revision 26 201-173, 120/280V AC Distribution Panel (CC/CT-3, 1A Reactor Plant Cont. CTR), Revision 19 208-162, 4160V Switchgear (ES) (1E12) T1-02 Transformer 1T Feeder Breaker, Revision 4 208-163, 480V Control Center 1B Engineered Safeguards Screen House, Sheet 1, Revision 29 208-163, 480V Control Center 1B Engineered Safeguards Screen House, Sheet 2, Revision 26 208-293, Electrical Elementary Diagram, 480V Switchgear (ES) (1T-1B) 1T-02 1T Screen House ES Bus Feeder Breaker, Revision 5 208-561, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V. Control Center 1B Engineered Safeguards, Revision 38 229-002, Electrical Substation One Line Diagram, Revision 19 302-202, Nuclear Services River Water System, Revision 81 302-270, Instrument Air Flow Diagram, Revision 5 302-271, Instrument & Station Service Air Flow Diagram, Revision 72 302-640, Decay Heat Removal, Revision 84 302-645, Decay Heat Flow Diagram - Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Revision 39 308-572, Instrument Air Pressure Transmitter and Switches, Revision 6 308-707, Electrical Elementary Diagram Instrument Air Compressor

IA-P-4 & Isolation Valves

IA-V2104A & 2104B, Revision 1 B-308-810, Intermediate Cooling Surge Tank & BWST Level Transmitters, Revision 10 D-46290, 8" and 10" N-2376-SP, 300 Lb, Swing Check Assembly, Revision 2 E-206-011, Electrical Main One Line & Relay Diagram, Revision 54 E-206-021, One Line & Relay Diagram - 6900 V. & 4160 V. Switchgear, Revision 16 E-206-022, Electrical Main One Line & Relay Diagram, 4160 Volt Safeguard Systems, Revision 21 E-206-031, One

Line & Relay Diagram - Turbine & Serv. H.&V., Turb., Reactor, Aux. & F.B. H.&V. 480V. Swgr., Revision 27 E-206-032, One

Line & Relay Diagram - Engineered Safeguards Screen House, Reactor Building H&V, 480V Switchgear, Revision 18 E-206-051, Electrical One Line Diagram - 250/125V D.C. Sys. & 120V A.C. Vital Instrumentation, Revision 36 E-206-164, Electrical 4160V. Switchgear (1E3) G11-02 Diesel Generator 1B Breaker, Revision 27 E-208-161, Electrical 4160V. Switchgear (1E6) S1-02 Transformer 1S Feeder Breaker, Revision 5 E-208-291, Electrical Elementary Diagram. 480V Switchgear (ES) (1S-1B) 1S-02 IS ES Bus Feeder Breaker, Revision 5

IE-168-02-002, General Arrangement Intake and Pump House, Revision 7

SS-208-218, Electrical Elementary Diagrams 4160V. Switchgear (E.S.), Revision 6

SS-208-292, Electrical Elementary Diagrams 480V. Switchgear (E.S.) (1S-4A), Revision 2

SS-208-316, 480V Switchgear (E.S.) (1-T-1R), Revision 15

Attachment

Engineering Evaluations

ECR

TM 08-00607, Install New

AH-E-1A/B/C Starters and Components, Revision 3 ECR

TM 12-00240, Relay for Loss of Phase Event Modification, Revision 3

CGD-T1-92-0052, Bussman Non-Time Delay Fuse, Revision 1

CGD-T1-93-0066, Deep Groove Contact Ball Bearings, Revision 4

CGD-T1-94-0041, 13,000 Micro Farad Electrolytic Capacitor, Revision 1

Functional, Surveillance, and Modification Acceptance Testing

OP-TM-212-212, LPI Test of DH Train B, Revision 9, performed 11/11/13

OP-TM-212-244, Shutdown IST of DH Pump Check Valves, Revision 1, performed 11/10/13 1302-5.18, HPI/LPI Flow Channel Calibration, Revision 38 1303-13.4, Remote Shutdown System Functional Testing, Revision 9, performed 11/8/13 1303-13.4, Remote Shutdown System Functional Test, performed 11/11/13

OP-TM-642-232, ES Train B Emergency Sequence and Power Transfer Test, Revision 5 performed 11/1/13

Maintenance Work Orders A2351992

A2372886 A2372930

C2010971

C2023915

C2033926 M2308868 M2373871 R1825355

R1828686 R2055660 R2077423 R2101761 R2112737 R2140795 R2151809

R2153032 R2154464 R2160549 R2160565

R2168133

R2170879 R2183874 R2187263 R2190955

R2191421 R2191422 R2191561 R2196576 R2207879 R2212237 R2214290 R2219432

R2222110 R2224095 R2224650 R2225986 R2228925 R2229607 R2231491 R2239474 R2239621 R2246389 R2246506 R2246588 R2248187 R2249990

Miscellaneous

9100-IMP-3282.01, Installation of Temporary Shielding, Revision 2

A2134734, Technical Evaluation Supporting Normal Nuclear River System Configuration Parameters, dated 12/4/06 Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water System Health Report, 4Q2014

ECR 01-1035,

NR-P-1A Replacement, Johnston Pump, Revision 0

ECR-10-00696, Permanent Installation of Temporary Shielding #1, Revision 0

ECR-11-00511, T1R19

DC-C-2B Performance Evaluation, Revision 0 Low Voltage Circuit Breakers, PCM Template, dated 4/19/14 LPI/Decay Heat Removal System Health Report, 4Q2014 Maintenance Strategy

TMI-1-212-P-V-DH-V-16B, dated 12/15/11 Maintenance Strategy

TM-1-852-P4, dated 12/15/11 Medium Voltage Circuit Breakers, PCM Template, dated 4/19/14 Rotary Screw Air Compressor PCM Template, dated 1/21/02 Sample No. 745,

AH-C-4A, Analytical Ferrography Report, dated 4/4/14

SDBD-TI-533/543, System Design Basis Document for Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water (System 543), Revision 7

SP-1101-12-148, Specification for

NR-1A/1B/1C, dated 6/11/01

Attachment

Sulzer Product Manual Curve No.

SJT-861.000-63-11-00, dated 07/31/07

TDR 1183, Single Failure Analysis of Nuclear services Closed cooling Water and Nuclear Services River Water (NR) Systems, Revision 0

TDR-1212, TMI Response to Generic Letter 96-06, Revision 2

TE 728092-63, TMI System Evaluations for INPO SER 2-05, Revision 1 - Gas Intrusion in Safety Related Systems, dated 4/01/08 Transformer - Dry, PCM Template, dated 7/16/09

Operating Experience

NRC Bulletin 2012-01, Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System, issued July 27, 2012

Preventive Maintenance and Inspections 1303-4.16, Emergency Power System Surveillance Procedure, Revision 135

1420-AH-1,

AH-E-1A/B/C Motor Maintenance, performed 3/20/07

PM 204555, 480V Distribution System Thermography Survey

PM 004288,

EE-MCC-ESV-1C Cleaning and Inspection, performed 9/21/2013 Purchase Order

80017053, N-9745, Reactor Building Air Handling Units AC Induction Motor Final Test and Inspection dated 2/27/07

Procedures

1056, Protective Relay Settings, Revision 8 1104-19, Control Building Ventilation System Operating Procedure, Revision 81 1104-45R, Fire Protection System Operations Surveillance, Revision 59 1104-46, Electric Heat Tracing, Revision 60 1107-3, TMI - Diesel Generator Unit 1 Operating Procedure, Revision 142 1107-4.1, 480V Breakers Overcurrent Tripping Device Setpoints, Revision 19 1303-13.4, Remote Shutdown System Functional Test, Revision 9 1420-HT-1.3, Heat Trace Replacement, Revision 5 1450-026, 480V Under/Overvoltage (Alarm) Relay Maintenance, Revision 11 E-2, Dielectric Check of Insulation, Motors and Cables, Revision 15 E-21, Thermal Overload Devices Inspection and Testing, Revision 40 E-67, Air Blast Fans Checks and Lubrication, Revision 8

ER-AA-200-101, Equipment Classification, Revision 0

ER-TM-390-1001, Control Room Habitability Program Implementation, Revision 4

ER-TM-700-402, External Surfaces Monitoring Program, Revision 3

ES-024T, Overload Heater Selection for Electric Motors, Revision 4

ES-025T, Selection and Setting of Protective Devices, Revision 5

MA-TM-125-014, Inspection and Cleaning of 480 Volt Switchgear, Revision 1

MA-TM-125-029, 1E Station Battery Charger Cleaning and Inspection, Revision 2

MA-TM-135-650, Inspection Rubber Expansion Joints, Revision 4

OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection HPI/LPI, Revision 7

OP-TM-212-000, Decay Heat Removal System, Revision 19

OP-TM-212-911, Post LOCA Reactor Vessel Boron Concentration Control, Revision 2

OP-TM-340-1002, Guidance for Heat Exchanger Inspections and Cleaning at TMI, Revision 3

OP-TM-533-252, DR Train B Leakage Exam, Revision 8

OP-TM-533-272,

DC-C-2B Heat Transfer Test, Revision 8

OP-TM-541-000, Primary Component Cooling, Revision 21

OP-TM-541-231, IST of

NR-P-1A and Valves - Multiple Pump Operations, Revision 9

Attachment

OP-TM-541-461, IC & NS Temperature Controls, Revision 8

OP-TM-543-000, Decay Heat Closed System, Revision 8

OP-TM-543-202, IST of

DC-P-1B, Revision 3

OP-TM-543-251, DC Leakage Exam for IST, Revision 3

OP-TM-731-904, Energize 1L 480V Bus Using 1N Bus Cross Tie, Revision 3

OP-TM-861-902, Diesel Generator

EG-Y-1B Emergency Operations, Revision 16

OP-TM-AOP-001, Fire, Revision 12

OP-TM-AOP-014, Loss of 1E 4160V, Revision 9

OP-TM-AOP-020, Loss of Station Power, Revision 20

OP-TM-AOP-034, Loss of Control Building Cooling, Revision 11

OP-TM-AOP-0141, Loss of 1E 4160V Basis Document, Revision 6

OP-TM-AOP-0201, Loss of Station Power Basis Document, Revision 2

OP-TM-AOP-0341, Loss of Control Building Cooling Basis Document, Revision 4

OP-TM-EOP-010, Emergency Procedure Rules Guides and Graphs, Revision 18

OP-TM-EOP-020, Cooldown from Outside the Control Room, Revision 20

OP-TM-EOP-020, Attachment 1, Initiating DHR Train B from RSD Station, Revision 20

OP-TM-RCE-0205, Low Temperature Trace Heated Lines, Revision 0

PES-S-002, Shelf Life, Revision 7

PI-AA-125, Corrective Action Program, Revision 0

SM-AA-300, Procurement Engineering Support Activities, Revision 6

SM-AA-300-1001, Procurement Engineering Process and Responsibilities, Revision 17

WC-TM-430, Surveillance Test Procedure, Revision 0

Risk and Margin Management TMI Unit 1 List of Low Design Margin Issues dated12/10/2014

System Health, System Walkdowns, and Trending 7Kv/4Kv Power, Standard Quarterly System Health Challenge and Reporting, 04/01/2014-06/30/2014 480 V Power, Standard Quarterly System Health Challenge and Reporting, 04/01/2014-06/30/2014 250/125 Volt DC System, Standard Quarterly System Health Challenge and Reporting, 04/01/2014-06/30/2014

Vendor Technical Manuals

VM-TM-0029, Valve Operators, Revision 49

VM-TM-0041, Yuba Heat Transfer Corporation Shell and Tube Heat Exchanger, Revision 13

VM-TM-0160,

TMI-1 Vendor Manual C&D Autoreg Battery Charger, Revision 13

VM-TM-0191,

EG-Y-1B Vendor Manual, Revision 64

VM-TM-0283, 480V Switchgear Vendor Manual, Revision 0

VM-TM-0293, Butterfly Valves, Associated Control Equipment, Revision 8

VM-TM-0691, Remotely Operated Cast Steel Gate Valves for Auxiliary Services System, Revision 11

VM-TM-0822, Intermediate Close Cooling Water System, Revision 4

VM-TM-2911, Johnston Pump Company, Revision 4 Woodward Product Specification 03029, Revision K

Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADAMS [[]]

NRC 's Document System

BHP Brake Horsepower

BWST Borated Water Storage Tank

CCW Component Cooling Water

CDBI Component Design Basis Inspection

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CGD Commercial Grade Dedication

DBA Design Basis Accident

DBD Design Basis Document

DCCW Decay Closed Cooling Water

DGV Degraded Grid Voltage

DRS Division of Reactor Safety

ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

EOP Emergency Operating Procedure

ESAS Engineered Safeguards Actuation System

HPI High Pressure Injection

HP Horsepower

HX Heat Exchanger

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

IN [[[NRC] Information Notice]]

IP Inspection Procedure

IR Issue Report

IST In-Service Testing kV Kilovolt

LERF Large Early Release Frequency

LCO Limiting Condition of Operation

LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident

LPI Low Pressure Injection

MCC Motor Control Center

MOV Motor Operated Valve

MU Makeup

NCV Non-Cited Violation

NPSH Net Positive Suction Head

NR Nuclear River Water

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OE Operating Experience P&

ID Piping and Instrument Diagram

PM Preventive Maintenance

PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment

RAW Risk Achievement Worth

RB Reactor Building

RCS Reactor Coolant System

RRW Risk Reduction Worth

SCR Silicon Controlled Rectifier

SDP Significance Determination Process

Attachment

SPAR Standardized Plant Analysis Risk

SSC Structures, Systems, and Components

ST Surveillance Test

TMI Three Mile Island, Unit

1 TOL Thermal Overload

TS Technical Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report V Volt

@@ Line 2: / Line 2: @@
 | number = ML15097A069
 | issue date = 04/07/2015
-| title = IR 05000289/2015007; 1/26/2015 to 2/27/2015; Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Three Mile Island, Unit 1; Component Design Basis Inspection
+| title = IR 05000289/2015007; 1/26/2015 to 2/27/2015; Exelon Generation Company, Llc; Three Mile Island, Unit 1; Component Design Basis Inspection
 | author name = Krohn P G
 | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2

IR 05000289/2015007: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 21:21, 18 February 2018

Text

Dear Mr. Hanson:

Enclosure:

w/Attachment:

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone:

.1 Inspection Sample Selection Process

.2 Results of Detailed Reviews

.2.1 Results of Detailed Component Reviews (22 samples)

.2.1.1 'B' Reactor Building Fan Assembly (AH-E-1B)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

Introduction.

Description.

Analysis.

Enforcement.

.2.1.2 Borated Water Storage Tank (DH-T-1)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

Introduction.

Description.

Analysis.

Enforcement.

.2.1.3 'B' Intermediate Cooling Pump (IC-P-1B)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.4 Makeup Pump Suction Valve from the Borated Water Storage Tank (MU-V-14A)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.5 RCP Recirculation Valve (MU-V-37)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.6 'B' Decay Heat Removal Cooler (DH-C-1B)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.7 'B' Decay Heat Service Cooler (DC-C-2B )

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.8 Nuclear River Water Isolation Valve (NR-V-4A)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.9 'A' Nuclear River Water Pump (NR-P-1A)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.1 0 Closed Cooling Water Inlet Valve to 'B' Decay Heat Removal Cooler (DC-V-2B)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.1 1 'A' Control Building Chiller (AH-C-4A)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.1 2 'B' Decay River Water Pump Discharge Motor-Operated Valve (DR-V-1B)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.1 3 'B' Decay Heat Removal Pump Discharge Check Valve (DH-V-16B)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.1 4 Manual Operator Action to Open Drop-Line Valves DH-V-1, 2, and 3 to Establish Decay

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.1 9 1N 480 Volt Bus (EE-SWG-480V-1N)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.2 0 1T 480V Screen House Engineered Safeguards Bus Transformer (including Breakers 1T-02 and T1-02)

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.2.1.2 1 1A 480 Volt Engineered Safeguards Bus (EE-MCC-ES-1A)