ML20038D084

Nine-Month Response to Generic Ltr 81-07,Control of Heavy Loads.

ML20038D084
Person / Time
Site:	Prairie Island
Issue date:	11/30/1981
From:	FLUOR POWER SERVICE, INC. (SUBS. OF FLUOR CORP.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20038D073	List: ML20038D072 ML20038D084
References
REF-GTECI-A-36, REF-GTECI-SF, RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612, TASK-A-36, TASK-OR GL-81-07, GL-81-7, NSP-PI, NUDOCS 8112160047
Download: ML20038D084 (59)

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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l PROJECT: 21-7450-292 l NINE MONTH RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 81-07 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS NOVDiBER, 1981 l

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NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic letter 81-07 Item 2.2 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE VICINITY OF FUEL STORAGE POOLS Item 2.2.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, movable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads which could, if dropped, land or fall into the spent fuel pool.

RESPONSE

Auxiliary building crane, and new & spent fuel handling gantry crane are the only cranes which are physically capable of carrying loads into the spent fuel pool area.

Capacity Crane / Type Main Auxiliary Location Auxiliary Building 125 Ton 25 Ton Auxiliary Bridge Crane Building New & Spent Fuel 3 Ton Spent Fuel Handling Gantry Crane Pool Item 2.2.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of the hook centerline closer than 15 feet to the pool boundary, or by providing a suitable analysis demonstrating that for any failure mode, no heavy load can fall into the fuel-storage pool.

RESPONSE

None

• Item 2.2.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.2.1, above, that you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6 or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling-system (i.e., crane-load-combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

• The construction crane for the fuel storage expansion is not a permanent system and was approved for use by the NRC in License Amendments for Dockets 50-282/306 dated 5/13/81.

i a t FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 81-07

RESPONSE

The cranes identified in Section 2.2.1 are not in strict compliance with Section 5.1.6 " Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems."

The exclusion of these cranes was discussed in NSP's August 1981 response to Section 2.1, " General Requirements for Overhead Handling Systems." The salient aspects which justify exclusion of cranes per Section 5.1.2 subsection 2 of NUREG 0612 are presented.

Auxiliary Building Crane Sketch 17 shows relative locations of spent fuel pool, auxiliary building, and the travel path for the auxiliary building crane.

The fuel pool enclosure is a Class I reinforced concrete building with 12 to 24 inch thick walls and roof, that are integrally connected to the fuel pool structure. The fuel pool enclosure, which covers both new and spent fuel storage facilities, is completely contained in the auxiliary building and is beneath the auxiliary building crane. Normal and special ventilation systems are provided for the fuel pool. The fuel pool enclosure is provided with 3'-6" wide crane access slot and equipment handling doors. This physically limits the area of spent fuel pool over which fuel shipping casks or heavy objects can be moved. Administrative procedures prohibit the movement of heavy objects, except as allowed in the Technical Specifications, when fuel is stored in this area.

! There are no routine operations which require opening of the i access slots. Furthermore, the auxiliary building crane does l not have room above the enclosure to carry any significant loads; hence, load drop on the roof is not possible. Besides, l the slab is designed to withstand tornado missiles.

The access slot is provided over pool number 1, which is designed to store the spent fuel transfer casks. The loads lifted by the auxiliary building crane are restricted from l reaching the boundary of pool number 2 by the physical size of l the access slot. Spent fuel generally is stored in pool l number 2. The wall common to the two pools does not have an j opening below the top of the stored fuel. Hence, an accidental l loss of water from pool number one will not uncover fuel stored i in pool number 2.

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4 9 t FLUOR POWER SERVICES,1NC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Genaric Latter 91-n7 The auxiliary building crane is also used for the handling of new fuel shipping containers. The shipping containers are not handled in the vicinity of safety related equipment.

The new fuel assemblies do not qualify as heavy loads as defined in NUREG-0612.

The storage capacity of the spent fuel in the pool has been increased. This increased capacity provides storage space for all spent fuel until approximately 1989 (with a full core reserve).

Accordingly, no spent fuel cask handling operations are planned or anticipated until that time. Currently, NSP does not have a shipping cask at the Prairie Island site. Fue her evaluation will continue.

Spent Fuel Crane The spent fuel crane is used for the handling of new and spent fuel assemblies (by means of a long handling tool suspended from a hoist), divider gates, and pool covers. The travel of hoist and tool length are designed to limit maximum lift of a fuel assembly to a safe shielding depth.

The spent fuel storage facility is a contained structure, designed so that in case of a dropped fuel element accident, any release of radioactivity to the atmosphere is monitored and will not exceed the guidelines of 10CFR100. Normal and special ventilation systems are provided for the fuel pool enclosures.

Handling of Pool Divider Gates The pool divider gates are used to seal the fuel transfer openings located between pools 1 and 2 and between each pool and the fuel transfer canal. Each gate is a stainless steel device 27'-6" x 2'-2" x 3/4" and weighs approximately 2620 pounds. To reduce the likelihood of a gate drop due to a single failure of a crane, both hoists of the spent fuel pool bridge crane will be attached to the gate when the gate is moved in a pool containing fuel. The capacity of each hoist is 6000 pounds. The two hoist system will provide total redundancy, and the probability of dropping a gate carried in this manner will be extremely low.

, a t FLUOR POWER SERVICESJNC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 81-07 For handling the divider gates, a written procedure is in force at'the plant site. With these special provisions and procedures, the gates are not considered " heavy loads" as discussed in the NSP letter dated March 10, 1981 which provided supplemental information with respect..to_the._ fuel storage expansion.

Handling of Pool Covers In addition to the procedures for fuel handling and divider gates, detailed written procedures exist for lifting pool covers by the crane (not higher than 6").

Spent fuel pool #1 covers consist of three pieces, each weighing 1.85 tons. The covers are made of 3/16" thick stainless steel plate welded to a frame of built up, wide flange beams and structural tees of corten B. These covers are used to protect spent fuel stored in pool #1 when maintenance is being performed on pool #2. The pool covers are placed into position over pool

1. 1 using a spent fuel pool bridge crane. Two 3-ton trolleys are used with rigging extending down from each hook. The rigging engages at each end of the pool cover to handle each section.

The bottom edge of the cover is never lifted more than six inches above the floor. When the cover is moved above pool #1, the north and south ends of the cover extend past the edge of the fuel pool and over the floor at all times. This ensures that even if a cover section is dropped, it will land on the floor and will not fall into the fuel pool. Movement of the covers occurs very infrequently. No movement is anticipated after the completio.n of the spent fuel storage rack modification in 1982. A detailed discussion concerning the pool covers is included in the license amendment request for the fuel rack modification (Jan. 31, 1980) and supplements thereto, which were approved by the NRC on May 13, 1981.

Item 2.2.4 For cranes identified in 2.2.1, above, not categorized according to 2.2.3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the spent fuel area and your determination of compliance.

Item 2.2.4(a) Which alternatives (e.g., 2, 3, or 4) from those identified in NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.2, have been selected.

RESPONSE

The auxiliary building crane meets criteria 2 of Section 5.1.2 of NUREG 0612.

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n FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 61-07 As discussed in Section 2.2.3, the auxiliary building crane is physically limited from travelling over the spent fuel enclosure with 'any heavy load due to a very limited space above the enclosure.

The movement of the fuel shipping cask is restricted, inside the enclosure, by the 3' - 6" crane access slot in the enclosure.

Therefore, the fuel shipping cask cannot be moved overpoo1# 2.

The dis'ine'e t fr'om the slot to the edge of pool # 2 is less than the 15 foot guidance.

Item 2.2.4(b) If Alternative 2 or 3 is selected, discuss the crane motion limitation imposed by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops and indicate the circumstances, if any, under which these protective devices may be bypassed or removed. Discuss any administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of bypass or removal, and provide any related or proposed technical specification (operational.and surveillance) provided to ensure the operability of such electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.

RESPONSE

The access slots are covered with equipment handling doors, and movement of cranes in the area is regulated by the administrative procedures.

Item 2.2.4(c) Where reliance is placed on crane operational limitations with respect to the time of the storage of certain quantities of spent fuel at specific post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

RESPONSE

Not applicable.

Item 2.2.4(d) Where reliance is placed on the physical location of specific fuel modules at certain post-irradiation decay times, provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.

RESPONSE

Not applicable.

e r I FLUOR POWER SERVICES,1NC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic latter 81-07 .

Item 2.2.4(e) Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III should conform to the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate,_for each analysis performed.

RESPONSE

Not applicable, l

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FLUOR POWER SERVICES.lNC, NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Lette- 01-07 Item 2.3 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS OF OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN THE CONTAINMENT Item 2.3.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., taking no credit for any interlocks or operating procedures) of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel.

RESPONSE

Manipulator crane and containment polar cranes are the only cranes that are physically capable of carrying heavy loads over the reactor vessel.

CAPACITY Main Auxiliary Manipulator Crane 3 Ton Containment Building Containment Polar 230 Ton 20 Ton Containment Building Crane Item 2.3.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads, or are permanently prevented from the movement of any load, either directly over the reactor vessel or to such a location where in the event of any load-handling-system failure, the load may land in or on the reactor vessel.

RESPONSE

None Item 2.3.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.3.1, above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

. s t FLUOR POWER SERVICES,1NC, NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 81-07

RESPONSE

Manipulator Crane The manipulator crane, in our opinion, meets the intent of Section 5.1.6 of NUREG 0612, " Single-Failure-Proof Handling System." The multitude of safety features and interlocks to prevent an accidental load u.op for the crane are described in Section 9.5 of FSAR. The pertinent section is reproduced below.

The manipulator crane is a rectilinear bridge and trolley crane with a vertical mast extending down into the refueling water.

The bridge spans the refueling cavity and runs on rails set into the floor along the edge of the refueling cavity. The bridge and trolley motions are used to position the vertical mast over a fuel assembly in the core. A long tube with a pneumatic gripper on the end is lowered out of the mast to grip the fuel assembly. The gripper tube is long enough that the upper end is still contained in the mast when the gripper end contacts the fuel. A winch mounted on the trolley raises the gripper tube and fuel assembly up into the mast tube. The fuel is transported while inside the mast tube to its new position. The manipulator can lift only one fuel assembly at a time.

All controls for the manipulator crane are mounted on a console on the trolley. The bridge is positioned on a coordinate system laid out on one rail. The electrical readout system on the console indicates the position of the bridge. The trolley is positioned with the aid of scale on the bridge structure. The scale is read directly by the operator at the console. The drives for the bridge, trolley, and winch are variable speed and include a separate inching control on the winch. Electrical interlocks and limit switches on the bridge and trolley drives protect the equipment. In an emergency, the bridge, trolley, and winch can be operated manually using a handwheel on the motor shaft.

Safety features are incorporated in the system as follows:

a. Travel limit switches on the bridge and trolley drives.

b. Bridge, trolley, and winch drives which are mutually interlocked to prevent simultaneous operation of any two drives.

t FLUOR POWER CERVICES.INC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 81-07

c. A position safety switch, the GRIPPER TUBE UP position switch, which prevents bridge and trolley main motor drive operation except when it is actuated.

d. An interlock which prevents the opening of a solenoid valve in the air line to the gripper except when zero suspended weight is indicated by a force gage. As back-up protection for this interlock, the mechanical weight actuated lock in the gripper prevents operation of the gripper under load even if air pressure is applied to the operating cylinder.

e. The EXCESSIVE SUSPENDED WEIGHT switch, which opens the hoist drive circuit in the up direction when the loading is in excess of a preset limit.

f. An interlock on the hoist drive circuit in the up direction, which permits the hoist to be operated only when either the OPEN or CLOSED indicating switch ~on the gripper is actuated.

g. An interlock of the bridge and trolley drives, which prevents the bridge drive from traveling beyond the edge of the core unless the trolley is aligned with the refueling canal centerline. The trolley drive is locked out when the bridge is beyond the edge of the core.

Suitable restraints are provided between the bridge and trolley structures and their respective rails to prevent derailing, and the manipulator crane is designed to prevent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the gripper in the event of a Design Basis Earthquake.

The operation of the crane is also covered by administrative controls and procedures.

Polar Crane The containment polar crane identified in Section 2.3.1 is not in compliance with Section 5.1.6, " Single-Failure-Proof Handling Systems."

t FLUOR POWER SERVICES,1NC, NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 81-07 4

Item 2.3.4 For cranes identified in 2.3.1, above, not categorized according to 2.3.3, demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be demonstrated in your response to Section 2.4 of this request.

With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the containment and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane:

Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circumstances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action.

Discuss any related or proposed technical specification concerning the bypassing of such interlocks.

RESPONSE

The containment polar crane is used for the handling of missile shields, reactor vessel head, upper and lower internals, in-service inspection tools reactor coolant pump components and pressurizer safety valves.

The heavy load handling operations and maintenance of the polar crane in the reactor building are controlled by the administrative procedures listed in Table 1. The safe load paths for various loads are defined in NSP procedures D58, " Control of Heavy loads," as all paths except:

a. With the reactor head removed, the Reactor Building crane, main or auxiliary, load blocks with attached loads greater than 2100 pounds shall not be moved within 15 horizontal feet of the irradiated fuel without specific written procedures.

b. With the pressurizer missile shield removed, the Reactor Building crane load blocks with attached loads, greater than 4 tons shall not be moved over the open pressurizer vault.

The safe load paths for various loads are shown in sketches 18.

t FLUOR POWER SERVICES lNC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter ol-07 Safe shutdown equipment is that equipment required for continued decay heat removal and for maintaining the plant shutdown. The steam generators and/or residual heat removal systems are required per i.S.3.1. Since no single load can be carried over both steam generators, the auxiliary feedwater, main feedwater, and steam Diping in containment is considered part of the safe load path.

A completely redundant residual heat removal piping system is provided in the reactor building. The physical separation between the redundant piping in our judgment is adequate to preclude damage to both systems due to a single heavy load drop accident.

Current reactor vessel head removal procedures 03 and reactor vessel head replacement procedures D7 will be modified prior to the next refueling outage such that the head remotel and replacement will commence only after ascertaining tnat the two valves in both the supply and exhaust ducts are closed to isolate the containment vessel.

t FLUOR POWER SERVICEO INC.

NSP-PI Nine-Montn Response to Generic Letter 81-07 TABLE 1 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING OPERATIONS COMPONENT PROCEDURE Reactor Vessel Head Removal D3 Section 4.26, 4.27 Reactor Vessel Head Replacement D7 Section 4.7 Upper Internals Removal 04.1 Section 2.0 Upper Internals Replacement D6.1 Section 2.0 Lower Internals Removal D4.2 Section 2 Lower Internals Replacement No Procedure Written

• Reactor Vessel Missile Shield Removal D3 Section 4.28 Reactor Vessel Missile Shield D7 Section 4.23 Replacement Pressurizer Missile Shield Removal / 058.3.1 Replacement Reactor Coolant Pump Motor No Procedure Written

• Reactor Vessel ISI Tool No Procedure Written

• Reactor Coolant Pump Internals No Procedure Written

• MAINTENANCE, TESTING & INSPECTION PROCEDURES FOR CRANES CRANE / INSPECTION REFERENCE 11, 21 Reactor Bldg. Polar Crane PM 3160-1 Mechanical Inspection 11, 21 Reactor Bldg. Polar Crane PM 3160-11 Electrical Inspection 11, 21 Internals Lifting Rig Inspection PM 3560-51 11, 21 Reactor Head Lifting Rig Spreader PM 3560-52 Assembly Inspection Manipulator Crane PM 3160-6

• Procedures will be written prior to handling of these loads and will take into consideration circumstances present at the time.

k t FLUOR POWER SERVICES,lNC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic letter 81-07 Item 2.3.4(b) Where reliance is placed on other, site-specific considerations (e.g. , refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the continued validity of such considerations.

RESPONSE

See response to Section 2.2.4(a).

Item 2.3.4(c) Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteria I through III should conform with the guidelines of NUREG 0612, Appendix A. Justify ar.y exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.

RESPONSE

Compliance with NUREG 0612 Guidelines 5.1-I During refueling operations the containment air quality is maintained by ventilation. Each containment vessel is serviced by the containment purge system, which provides a supply of fresh tempered air at a rate that will result in 1-1/2 air changes per hour (33000 CFM). This system is common to both Units 1 and 2 and has been designed to ventilate only one unit at a time. The system supply and exhaust decting is provided with a string of valves and dampers which line the system up with the containment vessel for either Unit 1 or Unit 2. Supply air is provided by an axial fan from the discharge of the auxiliary building make-up fan 22. Exhaust air is drawn through a particulate filter and discharged to the atmosphere through the Unit 1 shield building exhaust vent. All requirements common to both units for the containment purge system are located in the auxiliary building near the Unit 1 shield building.

The containment vessel is isolated by the closing of two valves in both the supply and exhaust ducts. The valves in each duct are located adjacent to the containment vessel; one inside and one outside. Radiation releases resulting from fuel damaged by the drop of the reactor vessel head will be precluded by the administrative procedure requirement that the containment purge system isolation valves be closed before the reactor head and upper internals are lifted above the reactor vessel.

t FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 81-07 Compliance with NUREG 0612 Guideline 5.1 II The neutronics analysis for the PWR Core is evaluated on the basis of the NUREG-0612 criteria (page A-5) and the value given in table 3.2.1 of the FSAR.

K 0?hb.fortneuncrushedcorein2000ppmboronconcentrationis Then using the estimated .05 maximum reactivity insertion due to crushing, the maximum achievable K ,is still less than 0.95,whichmeetstherequirementofthe$bREG.

Compliance with NUREG 0612 Guidelines 5.1 III An accidental drop of the reactor vessel head and the lifting gear onto the vessel during a heavy load handling operation was postulated with the following conservative assumptions.

o Maximum drop of vessel head is 23 feet.

o Refueling pool is empty at the time of head. drop.

o Seals for the refueling pool will be broken as a result of a load drop.

o Reactor coolant loop may crack due to the load drop.

o Plastic impact between reactor vessel head and the pressure vessel.

The result of the load drop analysis concluded that under the postulated head drop, both 4" diameter SI lines will remain functienal. They will, therefore, be able to provide borated water to the reactor vessel to make up for any water lost due to boil off.

FLUOR POWER SERVICES,1NC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 81-07 Item 2.4 SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEMS OPERATING IN PLANT AREAS CONTAINING EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR REACTOR SHUTDOWN, CORE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL, OR SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING Item 2.4.1 Identify any cranes listed in 2.1.1 above, which you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis fcr this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).

For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.

RESPONSE

Manipulator cranes in containment building satisfy single failure proof criteria of NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6.

The detailed discussion for cranes are presented in Section 2.1.

Item 2, subsection J of reference 1, and Section 2.3.3 of this report.

Item 2.4.2(a) For any crane identified in 2.1.1 not designated as single-failure proof in 2.4.1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:

The presentation in a matrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided in 2.1.3(c). Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix.

RESPONSE

Attachment I lists all overhead load handling systems in the plant. The remarks column of the attachment provides final disposition of the crane.

Attachment II shows physical location for the load handling systems in the plant.

t FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letter 81-07 Attachment III lists the primary function of the load handling systems, weight and size of items handled by them.

Item 2.4.2(b) For each interaction identified, indicate which of the load and impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considerations.

Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned considerations should be supplemented by the following specific information:

(1) For load / target combinations eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety related equipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perform its safety-related function).

RESPONSE

The " remarks column" of Attachment I summarizes criteria for the exclusi.on of heavy load handling systems. The safe shutdown equipment in the vicinity of the cranes and their redundant systems are discussed in NSP's response to Section 2.1, Item 2 (Reference 1).

The cranes and equipment not discussed in Section 2.1 are presented here.

Portable 5-Ton Trolley above RHR Hx Removal Hatch See Attachment II, Sketch 4 for various locations of the trolley.

The trolley is used for maintenance of RHR heat exchangers.

Each unit has two heat exchangers which are redundant to one another. The use of the crane will be under administrative controls. The operability of the redundant exchanger will be established prior to using the crane. The trolley is excluded from further considerations on the basis of redundancy and operational controls.

Temporary 1-Ton Trolley - Fuel Rack Job See Attachment II, Sketch 5, for location of the trolley.

It is conceivable that during an accident, the trolley could rupture component cooling water pipe from the spent fuel heat exchanger. The pipe can be isolated easily without affecting

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t FLUOR POWER SERVICES,lNC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Letr.er el-0/

the operation of the reactor and without causing significant radiation problems. The crane is excluded from further considerations.

1-Ton Trolley - Above Relief Header See Attachment II, Sketches 11 & 14 for location of the trolleys.

The trolleys are used only for maintenance of the main steam safety valve and will not be operated when the pipe is pressurized or when containment integrity cannot be violated as described in Technical Specification TS 3.6.A.

Damage to main steam relief header or to control valve CV 31089 is not critical when the pipe is not pressurized.

Auxiliary Building special vent filter and ducts are approximately five feet away from the monorail and are not susceptible to any conceivable load drop accident of the crane. A continued use of the reactor in case of one train of the Auxiliary Building special ventilation system being operable is governed by Technical Specifications TS 3.6.3 and 5. The trolleys are excluded on the basis of operational controls.

(2) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited. Additionally, provide a discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of interlocks or removable stops, for verifying that interlocks are functional prior to crane use, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed.

RESPONSE

The mechanical stops are planned for the following heavy load handling systems..

1. Six-ton trolleys above residual heat removal pit covers.

2. Turbine building cranes.

Six-Ton Trolleys The mechanical stops for six-ton trolleys will consist of installing two angle irons on the monorails. The stops will be t FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic Lettea 81-07 located at quarter span from each end of the monorail. The removal of both mechanical stops will not be permitted except when repair or maintenance of the monorail is required. The removal of one of the two stops will be governed by the administrative procedtres.

Turbine Building Cranes NSP is presently studying the possibility to install weight sensors and an automatic power switch-off device for the turbine building cranes.

There is no safeguard equipment on the operating floor of the turbine building. However, redundant 4.16 kV switchgears are located in a Class I aisle between column rows 8 and 10 below the operating floor. It is conceivable that a load drop accident with a lifted load in excess of 12,500 lbs may cause excessive scabbing of the 18-inch thick concrete floor and damage the buses. In spite of the fact that the possibility of damaging both the redundant systems is extremely remote, NSP is investigating possible modifications to the crane. Possibilities include modifications such that lifting the loads in excess of 12,500 lb will require additional administrative control or making the crane single-failure proof. Detailed design analyses and feasibility studies will be done on several approaches before selecting one for implementation. Additional information will be submitted when a crane modification is selected.

FLUOR POWER SERVICES,1NC.

NSP-PI Nine-Month Response to Generic letter 81-07 (3) Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other, site specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative procedures or physical constraints invoked to ensure the continued validity of such considerations.

RESPONSE

None Item 2.4.2(c) For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.4.2(b),

above, identify any handling systems for specific loads that you have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features).

RESPONSE

None Item 2.4.2(d) For interactions not eliminated in 2.4.2(b) or 2.4.2(c), above, demonstrate, using appropriate analysis, that damage wculd not preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG 0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV).

RESPONSE

None

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t FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC, NSP-PI

Nine-Month Response to i

Generic letter 81-07 REFERENCE 1: Letter of transmittal to US NRC from L. O. Mayer, Aug 31, 81  !

with a report entitled, " Control of Heavy Loads, NRC Generic Letter 81-07," by NSP Co. , Prairie Island Nuclear Generating

Plant, Aug 31, 1981.

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• FLUOR POWER SERVICES,INC.

ATTACHMENT 1 GVER i:A0 !!":0LIG SYSTEMS Remarks

• A. SCREENHOUSE

1. Elev. 675' - NF-39260-2 X "A" - 2 Ton Trolley over #21 Cooling Water Pump X "B" - 2 Ton Trolley over #11 Cooling Water Pump

2. Elev. 695' and above - NF-39260-1 X "A" - Fisn Basket - Monorail and Chain Hoist X "B" - Chlorine House - Monorail and Chain Hoist X "C" - 2 Ton Trolley above Unit #2 Cire. Wtr. Pumps Bay 0,R "D" - 22 Cooling Water Pump Trolley - 3 Ton X "E" - Moveable Strainer Trolley - 1/2 Ton (can be moved to any of 4 strainers) 0,R "F" - 11 Cooling Water Pump Trolley - 3 Ton X "G" - Screenhouse Crane - (Trying Screen Crane) - 5 Ton X "H" - Outside Gate Slot Trolley - Electric Chain X "I" - Trash Rake

'o . GROUND FLOOR - ELEV. 695'

1. East - NF-39202 Outside X "A" - 2 Ton Swivel Trolley - Gas House Outside X "B" - 3 Ton Trolley - Gas Bottle Service Ha-2 0,R "C" 2 Diesel Generator - Trolley 5 Ton Ka-2 0,R "D" - D-1 Diesel Generator - Trolley 5 Ton F-5 x "E" - 5 Ton Trolley - fil & #12 Feedwater Pumps H-5.5 M "F" - 6 Ton Trolley - Above RHR Pit Covers J-9 X "G" - 2 Ton Trolley - Maintenance Area J-10 X "H" - Trolley Rail Hot Machine Shop Decon. Area Q-9a X "I" - 2 Ton Trolley - Trash Compactor Area

2. West - NF-39203 F-13 X "A" - 5 Ton Trolley - #21 & #22 Feedwater Pumps H-12. 5 M "B" - 6 Ton Trolley - Above RHR Pit Covers K-11 X "C" - 2 Ton " Swing" Trolley - Hot Machine Shop K-11.5 X "D" - 1 Ton Trolley - Hot Machine Shop C. MEZZANINE FLOOR

1. East - NF-39204 A-4,5 X "A" - 10 Ton Trolley - Condensate Polishing A-5 X "B" - 6 Ton Trolley - Condensate Polishing A-5.5 X "C" - 6 Ton Trolley - Condensate Polishing "D" - Portable 5-Ton Trolley - Above RHR Hx H-5 0,R E

Removal Hatch P-8 "E" - Temporary 1-Ton Trolley - Fuel Rack Job

• See bottom of next page for explanation of remarks.

(22)

t FLUOR POWZR CERVICECINC.

Attachment 1 Overhead Handlina Systems ' continued) Remarks *

2. West - NF-39205 "a" - 6 Ten Trolley - Condensate Dolkhing A-12.5 Y "B" - 6 Ton Trolley - Condensate Polishing A-13 X "C" - 6 Ton Trolley - Condensate Polishing A-13.5 X "D" - Portable 5 Ton Trolley Above RHR Hx Removal Hatch H-12 0,R D. OPERATING FLOOR

1. East - NF-39206 "A" - 2 Ton Swing Trolley - Maintenance Shop F-2 X "B" - Maintenance Shop Crane (F-Ma)-(1-2: X "C" - 1 Ton Trolley Above MSIV J-6 R "D" - Trolley - between MS and FW Lines J.7-6 0 "E" - 6 Ton Trolley - Demin Equip Hatches K.5-(8-10) X "F" - 6 Ton Trolley - Demin Equip Hatches L.2-8 X "G" - 6 Ton Trolley - Demin Equip Hatches L.2-10 X "H" - 1 Ton Trolley - 30" MS Relief Hdr N.5-6 0 "I" - Filter Room Crane (L.5-M.5)- R (7-11)

2. West - NF-39207 "A" - 1 Ton Trolley Above MSIV J-12 R E. FUEL HANDLING & VENT FAN ROOM - EAST

1. East - NF-39208 "A" - 1 Ton Trolley Above - SFP Special &

In-service Purge Filter G.5-6.5 R "B" - Trolley Above Relief Header J.5-5.5 0 "C" - Manipulator Crane Containment 0,S "D" - SFP Crane S.F.P. E "E"' - 3 Ton - New Fuel Handling Crane P-10 E

2. West - NF-39209 "A" - Trolley above Safety Relief Header J-12. 5 0 "B" - Manipulator Crane Containment S F. OTHERS "A", "B" - Turbine Bldg. Cranes (2) Turbine Bldg. F "C" - Aux Bldg Crane Aux. Bldg. O, E "D", "E" - Containment Polar Cranes (2) Containment - E , 0, R

• Explanation of Remarks E: Exclusion on the basis of damage due to an accident will be within guidelines of the Generic Letter 81-07.

F: Further Investigation in Progress.

M: Crane travel will be limited by mechanical stops.

0: Plant operational procedural controls will be exercised.

R: Exclusion on the basis of redundant systems.

S: Single failure proof crane X: Exclusion on the basis of no safeguard equipment in the vicinity of crane.

(23)

1 CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD H ANDLING SYSTEM

, A 20 MONORML WITH STOH HOIST FOR C00UNG WATER PUMPS A-2F A

• p*

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• 21 CootlHG WMig PUMP , , 'It coouMG WATre Puum V k

" y,((* Oy,0g3 ""'

L:En T.f.4 Ed- -- -

--l l

SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT

5. SV-33693,SV33828,SV33829,SV33696 i 1. DIESEL COOLING WATER PUMP FOR C0ftBUST10N AIR DANPERS

2. AIR COMPRESSOR MOTOR &

CD-34136 & CD-34139 CONTROLS

6. FUEL OIL DAY TANK & PIPIflG

3. VARIOUS CONDUlTS

4. PS16161 PS16184,PS16282,PS16283, 7. UNIT HEATER 1 8. PULL BOX 1281

9. AIR RECEIVERS

10. STATION AIR LINES SCREENHOUSE i PL AN AT EL.G95 0 FLUOR POWER SER llCES.INC.

(REF. DWG. H0 N F 3'3 2 6.0 l )

f m...... _o.n g ..u - 1..>.so- m

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' B-ID

.- -D-2 EMERGENCY DIESEL GEtlE RATOR PI l

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\ 1 . SAFETY RELATED EQUIPi1ENT i

< '. 1. DIESEL GENERATOR & CONTROLS

2. AIR COMPRESSOR & CONTROLS

- D-l EMERGENCY DIESEL 3. VARIOUS CONDUITS, LADDERL &

, , g GENERATOR TRAYS

'Ol

= 4. SV-33498, SV-33987 FOR DIESEL GEN. DAltPERS CD-34049 & LD-34049 I 5. FUEL OIL PIPING GROUND Fl00R PLAN AT EL.695' 0 N t FLUOR POWER SERVICES,lNC 1

(REF. DWG. NO. NF. 39202) f pat namio ., _ oR paoj na 4.7450-292 3r(- 2 cHtcuto av - L (3 j

1

! CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM MONORAll WITH G TON HOIST FOR REMOVAL OF REGIPUAL HE AT COMPONENTS. B-lF B-26 ..

ag _

MONORAll MONORAtt R.H PUMP 3 7 7 Il .@

3

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3 4 . .

NF-39202 B-IF i

SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT

! (HF 39203) lb- 2B 5. 11 & 12 RESIDUAL HEA1 PIT SUMP

1. MV-32129 (22 RSDL HEAT EXGR COMP. CLNT. INLT. MV) CGNTROL BOXES.

4

2. MV-32128 (21-RSDL. IlT. EXGR 6. MV-32094 (12 RSDL. HIAT EXGR.

i COMP CLNT. INLT. MV) COMP. CLNT. INLT. MV.)

3. #22 RHR PIT SLNP CONTROL 7. AUX. BLDG. SPEC. VEN f. DUCT STATION

4. #21 RHR PIT SUMP CONTROL l GROUND FLOOR' STATION PL AN AT EL. 695-o N t FLUOH POWER SERVICES,1NC.

(REF. DWG. NO. NF.39202 t NF 33103) 'enos w n.reso-292 p u paneo , 0 Ps ,

cnicue o av L (_,

l .3 K 3 1

4 I

CONTROL OF HEAVY LOA 05- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM PORTABLE 5 TON 'X' FRAh10 FOR RESIDUAL HE AT EXCH. REMOVAL.

i C-tD (ONE PORTAPaLE FRAME SER/ES 4 LOCATIOtis )

C-2D i

i PORTABLE X FRAME

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(NF 39205) C-2D (NF- 392.04) C-ID l

i SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT l 1. CONTAINMENT FAN C0ll DAMPER 3. P.T-21161 (RESIDUAL HElsT REMOVAL CONTROL PANEL UNITS 11 & 13 PUMP DSCH PRESSURE TRAllSMITTER

.i

! 2. VALVE OPERATOR RHR 4-1 ON 4. TRAY IAR-TB3 AND LADDEl! IAG-LBIO I EL. 695'-0 ME LZANINE FLOG,R f.

PLAN AT EL.'il5-0 N t FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC.

NF 3S204 4 tit 31205)

(REF. DWG. NO. pau aio s, 30 g enes . z .nso.29:

! f catcaso av L6 SV-4 1.

1 CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS-OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM TEMPORARY l-TON TROLLEY FOR FUEL R ACKS. C-lE 7

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1. COOLING WATER PIPE Cs)MPONENTS h - - 2. SPENT FUEL HEAT EXCHANGER i

I MEZZANINE Floor l PLAN AT EL.116-0 N t FLOOR POWER SERVICES,1NC.

i (REF. DWG. No. N F. 39204 )

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. CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM

MONORAll WITil 1-TON HOIST FOR MAIN STEAM 150. VALVE. D-IC D-ID AtlD SERVICE OF MAIH STEAM AND FEFD WATER LillEs. / , .,

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f 9 [ __

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FEED WATER gononut SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT

. 1. MV-32047 (LOOP B MAIN STEAM liEADER ISOL. VLV.EQLZG. MV)

2. MV-32243 ( 11-12 AUX. FW TO 12 STM.

h GEN. ISOL. MV.)

3. MV-32024 (FW TO 12 STM. GEN. ISOL . MV)

4. MV-32017 (LOOP B ltAIN STEAM 10 11 TO AUX. FW Pl#tP llV.) .

5. CONTROL B0X FOR CU-31099 (12 LOOP B MflN STEAM HOR. ISOL. CV.

6. CV31370 & ASSOC. SV's & LIMll SWITCHES (FW TO 12 STit. GEN. BYPASS CV.)

OPERATitlG FLOOR PL AN AT E L.735'-o *

(REF. DWG. NO- NF.3920G) PmLPanto av . 0.R .pmos , ii.7454.rs:

CHE CKE D tv ( (3 $$(. 6

CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD H ANDLING SYSTEM MONORAll WITil i TON HOIST FOR MAIN STEAM RELIEF HEADER D lH

\

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x. - M AlH STE AM

! MONORAllJ ~

RELitF HL ADER l _ _

P- . _ _ _ _ _ __

SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMEf4T

1. MV32016 (LOOP A flN. STil TO 11 TD AUX FW PitP MV.)

2. 1 CA-123 I LAl-26 OVER C.RAE & WITillfi 4 _o opt.it ATl!!G FL00R t FLUOR POWER SERi ICES,1NC. /

PL!.N AT EL. 735 0 N (REF. OwG. wo. Nr. 392 o c ) Patram:0 av 0R l*#03 *J 2 6 -7 4 S O - 19 3 CHE CWE D tv LQ $K -7 4

4 i

! CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM FILTER ROOM CRANE D-11 i

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(CRANE l l - - -

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j .

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SAFETY RELATED EOUIPMENT 4

1. FILTER HOUSINGS 2 FILTER PIPING I

PL AN AT EL.735-0 N t FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC.__

(REF. OWG. NO NF 3S200.)

1 t ..< .... ... o ._ 3-o,~ m.mo.m.

gc ica. ** L 4 SK- 8 2

CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM i

MONOR All WITH l-TON HOIST FOR MAIN STE AM 150. VALVE D -? A 12

. .5$

y; ,

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\ 30 MAIN STE AM MONORAIL C RESTRAINT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT

1. MV-32050 (LOOP B MN. STit.

IIDR. ISOL VLV EQLZG MV.)

2. MV-32020 (LOOP B 11N. STM. TO TD AUX. FW. PHP. [1V.)

3. MV-32249 (21/22 AUX FW TO 22 STM GEN ISOL MV.)

4. MV-32151 (22 FC CLG WTR RTRN ISOL 11V B) 5, 2CB-168 (3'-0 NORTH) 2CB-412 (4'-0 NORTH)

TB 2501 (WITHIN 3'-0 SOUTH)

OPERATING FLOOR PLAN AT EL. 735'-0 FLOOR POWER SERVICES.INC.

(REF. DWG. N0 NF. 39207 )

pate.nio .,. on  ; =no3 = , 2 a.so.23 casenso a' L4 SK-9 4

CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM MONORAll WITH I TON HolST FOR SPENT FULL SPECIAL AND lH SERVICE PURGE FILTER. E-lA 6 @

MONORAILN ~

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SPENT FUEL SF ECIAL & IN- SERVICE SAFETY RELATED EQUIP!1Efir PURGEFitTtg 1. CV-31085 (11 STM GEN 11N STM R1P TO ATM CV A1)

2. CV-31090 (12 STil GEN 11N STM OH D1P TO ATM CV B1)

3. CV-31091 (12 STM GEN MN STM Of1P TO ATH CV B2)

4. CV-31086 (11 STil GEN MN STM Dl1P TO ATM CV A2)

5. VARIOUS CONDUITS

6. 1 Au-TA6 i

PLAN AT EL. 755-0 FLOOR POWER SERVICES,1NC.

i l (RE F. DWG. NO. NF 39206) ;peos e.w t o -7 45 0 - 29 2 PmLPanso sv - O.R cat cuto av ..L (j S K-so

CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD H ANDLING SYSTEM MON 0RAll FOR HOIST ABOVE MAIN STEAM RELIEF HEADER. E-IB M S RELIEF llE ADER l' @

M r [ MONORAlt i

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. S i - SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMEin j' l 1. STEAi1 RELIEF VALVES !,PRiflG LOADED h --- . - - -

l 2. VARIOUS CONDulTS 1 3.115 RELIEF HEADER If1Ct.UDif4G i'

CV31089 1

PLAN AT EL.755-0 N FLOOR POWER SERVICES INC.

f NF. 39 20B )

(REF. DWG. NO ..t .. s o ., o.a . .. o 2 . a.,.so.rs:

tutcuto av -L 6 g l $K-il

j CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM MANIPULATOR CRANE E -l C t

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1 s

N 1. NEW & SPENT FUEL i

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PLAN AT EL.755-0 N t FLUOR POWER SEFl\/ ICES,INC.

(REF. DWG. H0, NF. 39208) pateaaio sc- o.n ==os o a .v.so-zsz

{ f catcaso av t4 ,

SK-12

CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OvtRHEAD H ANDLING SYSTEM

3 ToH FUEL HANDUNG GANTM CRANE FOR SMt4T FUEL POOL. E-ID 3 TOH NEW Futt. HAtIDut4G CRANE E-IE 1

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SPENT Futt Pool *2 i root

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i b 1. NEW & SPENT FUEL "EW " 2. 2 TR. "A" C0llDUITS ALO!iG co T ER5 tiORTH WALL (C0iiTIsiUE I!1TO

,p _ .. ,_. . _...___ - . _.* ~ FUEL POOL)

PLAN AT EL.755'o N t FLUOH POWER SERT / ICES.INC.

~

l (REF. DWG. NO. NF 3Satt) 9.se nio n . o.n emo2 1 ai mo.rsa I f .

c scuso ** L 4 l SK- 13

1 1

i CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM l

MON 0RAll FOR 110lST ABOVE MAlH STE AM REllEF HEADER. E-2A i

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1. STEAM RELIEF VALVES SPRINi LOADED l

2. CONDUlTS FR0tt A1079 PARALt.EL TO

{ STL. BEAtt 1

PLAN AT EL.755-o N t FLOOR POWER SERVICES,INC.

l (REF. DWG. NO. NF. 39209) pateameo av . o.R esos $ E 34so-rsa I f

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4 MANIPULATOR

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! t.

M ANIPUL AToR l. NEW & SPENT FUEL L

CRANE i

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PLAN AT EL. 755-o N t FLUOR. POWER SEFn/ ICES.INC.

l __.. . _ _ . . - ._.

j (REF. DWG. NO. NF. 39109) PatP6mio sv - O.R lPaos

• s 28 7450 292

^

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CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM TURBINE BUILDING CRAt4ES F-A F- B i

@ @ @ @ @ O l

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i-4 CRANE RAIL' , ,

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4 / $

I I ll L ill CS l lI ' ,l g g 7' i

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SAFETY RELATED EQUlPMENT

$ F EE D WAT E R

' L) ME S 1. MAIN STEAM & FEED WALER Lilies

' ' . 416 KV SWITCHCEAR (31LO!I l (d[ LOW OH HEZZ. FLO0l')

i

' PL AN AT EL.735' o N t FLUOR POWER SEFtVICES,1NC.

(REF. DWG. NO. NF.39206 4 NF 39207) Pateameo sv.. O.R peo; no 2s.7450 292 l Cett CEE D av L (i SK - I(>

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POOL

1. BORIC ACID TANKS f - SPEHT FUEL i

j h -- - __

2. LETDOWN llEAT EXCilANGERS

-f~ 3. SEALWATER llEAT EXCliANGERS I

L C RANE I

4. SPENT FUEL POOL j

i PL AN AT EL.155' o N t FLOOR POWER SEH CES,INC.

j j

(REF. DWCa. NO- NF. 39'208) f en **aio .. o.9 *aos ~ v. . o.rsa

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CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANES F-D F- E f

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( RE ACTOR #

Bt.DG. ,

UNIT l$2 m.

'g SAFETY RELATED EQUIPPEX

1. RESIDUAL HEAT PUMPS & PIPING i

i

2. REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS i i

3. STEAM GENERATOR I 4. AUXILIARY FEED WATER PIPING

- 5. MAIN FEED WATER PIPING

]

/ 6. MAIN STEAM PIPING

7. NEW & SPENT FUEL m'

PL AN AT EL. 821'-G FLUOR POWER SERVICES,INC.

f

~

(REF. DWG. N0 NF.3 J2to)

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3. STEAM GENERATOR

-/ [ MEA lk 4. AUXILIARY FEED WATER PIPING 3 Ccum 5. MAIN FEED WATER PIPIllG (d*D -

6 MAIN STEAM PIPING

7. NEW & SPENT FUEL PLAN AT EL. N FLUOR POWER SERulCES.INC.

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CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE F- D I

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CONTAtH ME NT - SAFE LOAD PATH RE ACTOR NE55EL i #" ##

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\ SAFETY RELATED EQUIPENT 3 t

' ' l l. RESIDUAL HEAT PUMPS & PIPING l 2. REACTOR COOLANT PUK)S

' -' i

3. STEAM GENERATOR

_._ f' s ^" ( 4.

5.

AUXILIARY FEED WATEA PIPING MAIN FEED WATER PIPING

6. MAIN STEAM PIPING

7. NEW & SPENT FUEL T Bk"

)

PLAN AT EL. N FLUOR POWER SERdK'ES,lNC.

(

(R t F. DWG. He. NF.3SZ ) .. e.a.. ., :. o . m .,a, 2.s.. ,

f a i c=cas . % SK- 18 t$ l

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1 i CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHE AD HANDLING SYSTEM CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE F-D ,

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j su,g lh /' t 4. AUXILIARY FEED WATER l'IPING

! cen / , S. MAIN FEED WATER PIPIMG

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7. NEW & SPENT FUEL

PL AN AT EL. N t R.UOR POWER SERVI;ES,fNC.

(att. owe.. we. Nr.ssz )

i n os.a. a..ns -as J ,.. .. .,:. o.m c= ca s o .. . . ._ q SK- 18L I 4

CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM

! CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE F-E

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l SAFETY RELATED EQUll'ITNT ..

6 545 ^" .,,,

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1 EINE ET PMS A MMM

2. REACTOR C00LMT PlW.

s \ // L1 3. STEM GENERATOR s N I/ N 4. AUXILIARY FEE 0 WATER PIPING I

N '

5.

N ~/ ' MAIN FEED WATER PIPIliG

6. MAIN STEAM PIPING

7. NEW & SPENT FUEL s.

-,m-

.i PLAN AT EL. N t FLUOR POWER SERVICES,1NC.

(REF. DWG. He NF.392 )

== m . .. :. o . a ...,... ...,....r, f

c= ca. ** % SK- 18 A2.

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t CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDUNG SYSTEM CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE F- E .

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. SAT'E LOAD PATil RtActoR Vf%t4.

ML$ tile Stutt t) Ra taovAL/RE PL ACE F48 tlT

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x g f' [N MisstLE siusto SAFETY RELATED EQUIPlENT _

sEnw x l. RESIDUAL HEAT PUMPS & PIPING N

\ f '

s 2 REACTOR COOLANT PUWS

\ w N i

' ( k{^ -

y' /,*

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r 3.

4.

STEAM GENERATOR AUXILIARY FEED WATER PIPING S. MAIN FEED WATER PIPIAG

6. MAIN STEAM PIPING i

7. NEW & SPENT FUEL i ~s w ,

PL AN AT EL. N FLUOR POWER SERvlCES.fNC.

l (RtF. DWG. He NF.3*JZ ) posesnio .,. o R emos=. M 4se.as f

_ . . . . m, s x . re a .

CONTROL OF HE AVY LOADS- OVERHEAD HANDLING SYSTEM CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE F- E

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2.

RESIDUAL HEAT PUMPS 4 PIPING REACTOR COOLANT PUW i s \N /' N P 3. STEAM GENERATOR X .I'f' N 4. AUXILIARY FEED WATER PIPING j s

/ 5. MAIN FEED WATER PIPldG

6. MAIM STEAM PIPING

7. NEW & SPENT FUEL s ,

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f

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I PL AN AT EL. FLOOR PCMIER SERVICES,1NC.

(REF. DWG. NO. NF.392 ) enae.ne. .c o.a e=os a. a..m.. a s s l

f macaso *- i SK- 18 C i

FLUOR POWER SERVICES.INC.

ATTACHMENT III FUNCTION OF CRANES i

)

{

l l

l l

(48)

--r- --

OVERilEAD llANDLING DIMENSION OF WEIGiT OF -(-

SYSTEM PRIMARY FUNCTION ITEM (S) IIANDLED ITEM llANDLED ITEM llANDLED i r

1. 11, #22 Diesel Cooling Assist in dismantling Various small compon- Various Typically less than C Water Pumps Trolley , diesel ents of Diesel Engine 500 lbs O A.2.D & F I

i

' 1

.. O D-1, D-2 Diesel Gener- Assist in dismantling! Engine Components Various Typically less than k ator B.l.C. D Diesel Generator 1000 lbs. j 1 UI 6 Ton Trolley above RilR Maintenance of Motor 1. 33" dia x 52" 1. 2400 lbs B.l.F, B.2.B RilR Pump l.

2. Pump 2. 36"x36"x40" 2. 2000 lbs a:-

3. Shield Block 3. 4'-11" sq x 2' (includes g casing) m

3. 7250 lbs m Z

_ Portable 5-Ton Trolley Maintenance of RilR 1. RilR Rx Shell 1 & 2.33" dia. x

• Combined Weignt 9 8 above RilR lix C.I.D lleat Exchanger 2. RilR lix Tube Bundle 22'-6" 10,500 lbs

3. Shield Block 3. 5'-5"x5'-5"x 10,000 lbs 2'-6" Trolleys for MSIV's MSIV Maintenance 1. MSIV and check 1. 38" dia x 5" 1600 lbs D.l.C.D valve bonnets thick Temporary 1-Ton Trolley- Lift a guage to check Drag guage size of Fuel < 500 lbs.

i Fuel Rack Job C.1.E dimensional toleran- Element ces of the new SFP racks >

i E

!1TonTrolley-30"MS Safety Valve Safety Valves 20"x 20" x 59 1," 1257 lbs y

Relief IIDR D.2.ll, E.1.B Maintenance g E.2.A "

C b g . ,~..

OVERilEAD llANDLING DIMENSION OF WEIGitT OF -(-

SYSTEM PRIMARY FUNCTION ITEM (S) llANDLED ITEM llANDLED ITEM llANDLED TI r

1 Ton Trolley above Removal of Aux. Bldg Aux. Bldg. General 45 3/4" dia x 55" 1900 lbs.

SFP Special & In- General Exhaust Fan Exhaust fan #11 l service Purge filter j lE.1.A t 1 i O I I 3 Ton new fuel llandling Aid in receipt of New Fuel Elements 8"x8"x13' 1650 lbs. j Crane E.I.E. new fuel ITI 21 Manipulator Crane Manuver Reactor Fuel 1) fuel Assembly Various 1260 lbs. <

,E.1.C, E.2.B Assemblies 2) TV Carintras

3) Tests 3

m i M j  :

I a Spent Fuel Pool Crane llandles new & spent 1) fuel 8"x8"x13' 1650 lbs. 2 l $;E.1.0 fuel O

3) Divider Gates 2'-6"x3/4"x27'-0" 2660 lbs 1

lTurbineBldg. Crane Turbine and Various llP Cover 14'x20' 81,700 lbs.

l F.A. & F.B. Other Turbine Bldg. LP#1 Outer Casing 28'x30' 122,300 lbs.

Equip. LP#2 Outer Casing 28'x30* 122,300 lbs.

LP#1 Inner Cyl.#1 8'x18' 50,000 lbs.

l LP#2 inner Cyl.#1 8'x18e 50,000 lbs.

LPfl Inner Cyl.#2 20'x20' 90,000 lbs.

SPECIAL LIFTING LP#2 Inner Cyl.#2 20'x20' 90,000 lbs.

DEVICES IIP Rotor 8'x24' 70,000 lbs.

l LP Rotor 15'x30' 160,000 lbs. 3

1) Load Spreader Condensate Pumps & 64" Dia x26'-b" Lg. 18,600 (pump) N for L.P. Turbine Motor 56" Dia,x110" Lg. 12,000(motor) E Spindle = Vertical Cooling Water 44.5" Dia.x6'-IdL9 1 6,400(motor) $

l 10,000 lbs. Pumps 68" Dia.x 44'-6" L9' 14,6/0 (pump) $

l Smaller Turbine Parts l Valves, etc. Z Spare Rotor Stands 6'x6*x8* 12,500 lbs. "

Load Block Irreg. Shape 7.000 lbs.

te OVERiiEAD liANDLING ,

DIMENSION OF WEIGilT OF 4 SYSTEM _

PRIMARY FUNCTION ITEMS (S)llANDLED _

ITEM llANDLED _ ITEM _.llANDLED _. y Auxiliary Building fuel & Various Crane F-C Aux. Bldg. Equip. 1) New Fuel Shipping 47"x45"x191" Lg. 6,600 lbs. h Containers 3

y

2) 11 eat Exchanger 7'-2"x7'-8"x2'-0"Thk O Removal llatches 16,600 lbs.

g

3) lleat Exchanger 2 12-3/4" 0.D.x8'-ll" 1,100 lbs.(Seal gg

8 Bundles Lg. water) m

, i 14" 0.D. x 13'-5"Lg . 1,900 lbs.(Let - 3 I

Irreg. Shape 7,000 lbs.down) <

l 4 Load Block g 1

_ m i

-UI O Containment Polar { Reactor Vessel & ,

1) Missile Shields -

r Cranes F-D-E . r u ntainment '

' a) Reactor 10*-6"x1'-0 x24'-6" 56,200 lbs.

.! b) Pressurizer 18'xl'-0"x15' 40,500 lbs.

l (Irreg shape) 1 SPECIAL LIFTING 2) Vessel llead DEVICES t

1574" Dia.x30" liigh 80,925 lbs.

3) Upper & Lower In- 10'-6" Dia. x10'-0 50,000 lbs.

ternals

1) sel llead Lift- 4) Vessel Studs liigh l 171,500 lbs.

46" x 40" '

7,200 lbs.

2) Upper Internals  ; (In handling box)

Lifting Rig 5) In-Service Insp. Tool I rreg. Shape 4,000 lbs.

t 3) Reactor Coolant 6) Reactor Coolant Pump Pump Lifting Ri9 a) Motor 78.6" Dia.x202.7"Lg. 79,500 lbs.

b) Pump 92" Dia.x112.5"Lg. 55,200 lbs.

c) Fly Wheel 75" Dia. 13,200 lbs. >

0

7) Load Block Irreg. Shape 15,000 lbs.  %

8) Pressurizer Safety 17"x49" Lg. 685 lbs. K Valves @

, l _ . _ _ . _ . _ . - . _.- _ .

9 WHITING CO A AORATION

- ATTACHMENT IV r

r i

I COMPARISON OF E.O.C.I. AND C.M.A.A.

The Following Comparison Righlights The- Areas Wherein E.O.C.I. is Deficient If a khiting Crane is to Meet C.M. A. A. #70 I

by James Luszyk l

l l

l i

l (52)

~

Page 1 WHITING CORPORATION COMPARTSON OF E.O.CI. and C.M. A. A.

E . O . C .1. C.M.A.A.

4.B. States " exact distance" C-C. 1.4.2 Tolerance added to C-C runway rails 1 1/8".

5.B. Current @ runway shall not be less 1.5.2 Refers to 5.13 - Voltage @ runway than 95% of the voltage for which conductor shall not be more than crane is designed. 105% nor less than 94% of specified system voltage supply, i 6. States " capacity plates attached to 1.6.1 Added " capacity plate attached to both sides of the crane in a position crane."

visible from operating floor."

7. States " allowable stress to be 207. 1.7.1 Excludes gearing from load carrying of assumed average ultimate strength." parts. Allowable stiess to be 207, of published average ultimate strength.

8. 1.8.2 Added " features of ANSI B30.2.0.

Appendix A 2. Added crane classification criteria.

16. Material to_be ASTM-A7 3.1 Material to be ASTM-A36

17. Welding per AWS recommendations. 3.2 Welding per AWS D14.1 with the ex-ception of Section 705.

18.A 3.3.1 Excluded the use of riveted box girders.

18.B.1.a.3 States 157. of rated capacity 3.3.2.1.1.3 Impact allowance shall be \7.

shall be minimum impact allowance. of the load per foot per minute of hoist speed but not less than 157.

of rated capacity.

18.B.1.b.1 Lateral load to be 57.. 3.3.2.1.2.1 Lateral load defined by Class 2k7. Class A 5% Class B, C, and D 10% Class E 18.B.1.b.2 Wind load to be 10 lbs. per 3.3.2.1.2.2 Wind load to be 5 lbs. per square foot of projected area. square foot of projected area. Also includes 1.6 factor for multiple sur-faces and 1.2 for single surface.

Does not mention wind loading in 3.3.2.2 Combined bending stress to include 18.B.2 combined bending stresses. stress due to wind load on outdoor cranes.

Continued . . . . . . ..- .-

(53)

~ - - - - - ~ ~ -

v- w -- , - - , , , - , , . . , , , _ . , ,

Page 2 WHITING COR AC AATION CQ4PARISON OF E.O.C. I. and C.M. A. A.

E.O.C.I. C.M.A.A.

18.C.1.a 1hashall not exceed 55 3.3.3.1.1 1/b shall not exceed 60 1/h not stipulated 1/h shall not exceed 25 h/t shall not exceed 240 or16000' the h/tshallnotexceed188ogigg value given by 81(K+1) q .

value given by 85 (K+1)i unless longitudinal stiffeners without longitudinal stiffeners.

are used in the compression Ratio is adjusted when longi-area of web plates. No cri- tudinal stiffeners are used, teria given for longitudinal stiffener.

--- 3.3.3.1.2 Criteria for longitudinal stiffe-ners added.

18.C.1.b. Allowable tension 16 ksi 3.3.3.1.3 Allowable tension 17.6 ksi Allowable comp. 16 kni when b/c 5 Allowable comp.17.6 ksi when b/c 2 38, 41, reduced stresses specified reduced stresses specified.

Allowable shear 12 ksi Allowable shear 13.2 ksi Allowable bearing not specified Allowable bearing 26.4 ksi Allowable stress ranga for repeated loads added 3.3.3.1.4 Criteria for longitudinal stiffe-ners added 18.C.2 Riveted box girder section not 3.3.3.1.5.3 Not applicable in CMAA 3.3.3.2 Not applicable 13.C.3 Allowable tension I-beam girder 3.3.3.3 Allowable tension I-beam girder 17.6 ksi 16 ksi ~

Allowable maximum comp. I-beam Allowable maximum comp. I-beam girder 16 ksi girder 17.6 kai Allowable shear I-beam girder Allowable shear I-beam girder 12 ksi 13.2 ksi 18.C.4 Box girder of double I-beam per 3,3.3.4 Box girder of double I-beam per box section design stresses I-beam design data to 19.C Minimum truck drop not/ be excessive. 3.4.3 Minimum truck drop specified @ 1" Allowable stresses not specified Allowable vertical stress w/o impact for bridge end trucks. Tension 14.4 ksi Comp. 14.4 ksi Shear 10.8 ksi Impact and duty cycle should be con-sidered for Class D and E cranes.

Continued . . . . . ..... . . .

(54)

4 D Page 3 WHITING COR AORATION COMPARISON OF E.O.C. I. and C.M. A. A.

E.O.C.I. C.M.A.A.

20. , 3.5 Added: All footwalks shall be de-signed fp a live load of 50

. Ibs./ft Allowable stresses:

Tension 20.0 ksi Comp. 20.0 ksi Shear 13.0 ksi

3.6.1 Added

Cab shall be braced to prevent 21.A swaying.

^

Cab support bolts should be in

• r .' ,

, shear.

. Cab shall have a suitable warn-ing device.

9 ,

3 . 6^. 2 Added: All cabo should be provided 21.B O pith a seat unless otherwise

'sj . 'specified. <

/ '

22.

3.7 Same as 3.4.3fabove - Plus: _

'e j, ,,

Whos b/c E 38, the allowable comp.- r

'f o ,; I ~ ,

. stress)is to be proportioned down. '

! 'l .

Rai'. stipulation data added.

/

--- - 3.8 . . , f .

I,

.c y 3.9 Caatry crans design cossidirations

' ' ~

added. I l'

3.10 Repeated load' conditions' add'e'd'. . ,

Table 3.10-1 ," ' . .

~

Figure 3.,1FI ~, '

' r. , ,

p #

/> 4.3.1 Sheaves shall be minimum ASDI Grade 25.A States simply cast iron A48-64 or later, Class 40 cast iron,

, j g, or equal. 1 ,.

26.A The drum shall be made of high 4 . 4.1' The druta-shall be steel or minimum ASTM Gcade A48-64 or later, Class 40 grade cast iron, or equal. Shall '

, f' cast iron, or eq ;.al. 'Shall be de-be designed to withstand maximum bending and crushing loads.

- .signef7to withstind combined crush ing f and bending) / .,

4.4.3.1 Recommeided'm'inimum$ drum groovebto

.b'e 3//lirops diameter was - added.

4.4.3.2 Recommended minimum dr'im grodve pitch to be 1.14 ' rope diameter or rope diameter + 1/S", whichever ,

is smaller 'was added. . .

I P r g

1 (55) Continued . . . . . . .... .

~

. _ _ _ _ - - . - _ - - - - - . _ - - - - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - . _ _ . _ - _ - - . - _ - _ . - - _ - - - _ . - .--.m - - - . . - - . - - . . - _ . . _ _ . - . . - - - _ . _ - . .-- _ - . - _ - . - - - _ . _ - - __a_---.' _ - -

Page 4 WHITING COR AC AATION COMPARISON OF E.O.C. I. and C.M. A. A.

E.O.C.I.

C.M.A.A.

27.

4.5 All gearing design criteria was added.

30.B Anti-friction bearing B-10 life 4.6.2 Anti-friction bearing B-10 life to to be: be:

1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> Class A & B 3000 hourc Class A & B 5000 hours0.0579 days <br />1.389 hours <br />0.00827 weeks <br />0.0019 months <br /> Class C 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> Class C 5000 hours0.0579 days <br />1.389 hours <br />0.00827 weeks <br />0.0019 months <br /> Class D 15000 houre Class D 25000 hourc Class E 10000 hcurs Class E 31.A.I.b Bridge brake with cab on trolley 4.7.2.2 Bridge brake with cab on trolley requires 507. motor torque. requires 757 motor torque.

31.3.1 Minimum torque ratings not speci- 4.7.4.2 Minimum torque ratings of hoict fled.

holding brake to be as follows:

1257. when control brake is not mechanical 1007. when control brake in mechanical 1007. when two holding braken are used 4.7.4.4 Hot metal cranes having power control braking shall have at least two holding braken.

^

4.8 Bridge drive criteria added.

'- Figure 4.8.1 4.9.1 Spacing between bridge crnno-chaft

' 28.

bearing adder per Table 4.9.1 5

f 'f . _.

t ,

r. 4.9. 2 Cross-shaft design criteria ndded

~

Table 4.9.2.

' 4.10.1 Cross-shaf t coupling material 29.A specifications added

,v W '

ea'321.1 4.11.1 Tolerance on wheels added e

,e-4.11.4 Specification of clearance between the wheel flanges and rail head

~~

, were added.

i .y ' ,

4.12 Specifications for humpern and ci rq.r.

-f-i- r were added.

4 5.2.4 specification of rated motor voltap,c

',-- added.

y 9 5.2.5 Motor recommendations for class D & r.

added.

(56) Continued . . .. .... .

y WHITING CORPORATION Page 5

• COMPARISON OF E.O.C. I. and C.M. A. A. .

E.O.C.I. C.M.A.A.

--- 5.2.6 Squirrel cage motor design criteria added.

--- 5.2.8 Rated motor voltage criteria added.

--- 5.3.3 Requirement dbat holding brakes shall have adjustment added.

--- 5.4.2 Specification of combination control added.

--- 5.4.3 Specification for remote control added.

--- 5.4.5.1 Magnetic control contactor criteria added.

--- 5.4.5.2 Squirrel cage motor contactor rating and criteria added.

--- 5.4.5.3 Minimum size contactor based on ser-vice class added.

--- 5.4.5.4 Minimum number of acceleration con-tactors, timers, and speed points added.

--- 5.4.5.5 Plugging protection specifications added.

--- 5.4.5.6 Squirrel cage full voltage control limitations added.

--- 5.4.5.7 Multi-motor drive contactor criteria added.

--- 5.4.6 Static control criteria added.

37. Resistors shall not be less than 5.5.1 Resistors shall'not be less than Class 150 for Class A, B, C, or D Class 150 for Class A, B, or C cnd and not less than Class 160 for not less than Class 160 for Class Class E. D or E.

--- 5.5.2 - 5.5.4 Additional resistor criteria.

5.6.2 Criteria for crane without spring return controllers added.

r4,~.

3- 1 5.6.4 Specifications for disconnecting means added.

s

. d .

(57) Continued . . . ......

mN( ,

~ ,

4

WHITING CORPORATION Page 6 COMPARISON OF E.O.C.I. and C.M. A. A.

E.O.C.I. C.M.A.A.

5.6.5 Added " overloads are required in 38.A two phases of AC motors. Each DC motor requires one inverse time element overload."

--- 5.6.6 Requirement for line contactor on DC cab cranes added.

--- 5.6.7 - 5.6.8 Criteria for radio control cranes added.

--- 5.6.9 Criteria for automatic cranes added.

5.6.10 Requirement for concurrence with ANSI B30.2 added.

Appendix C 5.7 Sketch 5.7 Criteria for direction of hook movement indication added.

5.8 Criteria for floor operated pendant pushbutton stations added.

--- 5.10 Criteria for electrical installation added.

5.13 Criteria for runway voltage drop added.

43. 5.14 Requirement for two sets of current collectors on magnet cranes added.

l l

(58) l

t FLUOR POWER SERVICES,lNC.

ATTACHMENT y

~

~

Manipu1ator Crane, The manipulator crane is a rectilinear bridge and trolley crane with a vertical mast extending down into the refueling water. The bridge spans the refueling cavity and runs on rails . set into the floor along the edge of the refueling cavity. The bridge arci trolley motions are used to position the vertical mast over a fuel assembly in the core. A long tube with a pneumatic gripper on the end is lowered out of the mast to grip the fuel assembly. The gripper tube is long enough so the upper end is still contained in the mast when the gripper end contacts the fuel. A winch mounted on the trolley raises the gripper tube and fuel assembly up into the mast tube. The fuel is transported while inside the mast tube to its new position. The manipulator can lift only one fuel assembly at a time.

All controls for the manipulator crane are mounted on a console on the trolley.

The bridge is positioned on a coordinate system laid out on one rail. The elec-trical readout system on the console indicates the position of the bridge. The trolley is positioned with the aid of a scale on the bridge structure. The scale is read directly by the operator at the console. The drives for the bridge, trol-ley, and winch are variable speed and include a separate inching control on the winch. Electrical interlocks and limit switches on the bridge and trolley drives protect the equipment. In an emergency, the bridge, trolley, and winch can be operated manually using a handwheel on the motor shaft.

Safety features are incorporated in the system as follows:

a) Travel limit switches on the bridge and trolley drives b) Bridge, trolley, and winch drives which are mutually interlocked to prevent simultareous operation of any two drives c) A position safety switch, the GRIPPER TUBE UP position switch, which prevents bridge and trolly main motor drive operation except when it is actuated.

1

! d) An interlock which prevents the opening of a solenoid valve in the air line to the gripper except when zero suspended weight is indicated by a force gage. As back-up protection for this interlock, the mechanical weight actuated lock in the gripper prevents operation of the gripper under load even if air pressure is applied to the operating cylinder.

e) The EXCESSIVE SUSPENDED WEIGHT switch, which opens the hoist drive circuit in the up direction when the loading is in excess of a preset limit.

f) An interlock on the hoist drive circuit in the up direction, which per-mits the hoist to be operated only when either the OPEN or CLOSED in-dicating switch on the gripper is actuated. <

l l g) An interlock of the bridge and trolley drives, which prevents the bridge l

drive from traveling beyond the edge of the core unless the trolley is aligned with the refueling canal centerline. The trolley drive is locked out when the bridge is beyond th e edge of the core.

Suitable restraints are provided between the bridge and trolley structures and their respective rails to prevent derailing and the manipulator crane is designed to prevent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the gripper in the event of a Design Basis earthquake. (5 9)

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