ML17264A147: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:IpRIORITY 3.(ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSING)
{{#Wiki_filter:IpRIORITY 3.
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9509070205 DOC.DATE: 95/09/01 NOTARIZED:
(ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSING)
NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 P AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T.
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C.
ACCESSION NBR:9509070205           DOC.DATE: 95/09/01 NOTARIZED: NO                     DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester                   G   05000244 P AUTH. NAME         AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T.       Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION J OHNSON,A.R.
MECREDY,R.C.         Rochester Gas     & Electric   Corp.
RECIP.NAME         RECIPIENT AFFILIATION J OHNSON,A.R.


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER 95-007-00:on 950803,lost power from 34.5 kV offsite ower Circuit 751 due to offsite electrical'torm, resulting n automatic start of EDG B.Offsite power restored,EDG B stopped&realigned&Circuit 751 cleared.W/950901 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTRl ENCL 1 SIZE:!l TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.0 R NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
LER   95-007-00:on 950803,lost power from 34.5 kV offsite                             0 ower Circuit 751 due       to offsite electrical'torm, resulting n automatic start of       EDG B.Offsite power restored,EDG B stopped & realigned & Circuit 751 cleared.W/950901 ltr.
05000244 T RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AE~O/SZD/~B
R DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T         COPIES RECEIVED:LTRl Event  Report (LER),
~ILE CENTER~Rim-B NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY.WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC POORE,W.NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 D,'M)N NOTE TO ALL"RZDS" RECIPIENTS:
ENCL 1 Incident SIZE: !
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083)
Rpt, etc.
TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION.LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 AND ROCHESTER GAS AND ElECTRTC CORPORATTON
l TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).                       05000244 T RECIPIENT           COPIES            RECIPIENT              COPIES ID  CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL        ID CODE/NAME           LTTR
+89 EASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, M Y 14649.0001 AREA CODE 716 54'6-27N ROBERT C.MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor Operotions September 1, 1995 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R.Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555  
                                                                                '
ENCL PD1-1 PD                 1    1      JOHNSON,A                  1 INTERNAL: AE~O/SZD/~B               2    2      AEOD/SPD/RRAB              1    1
        ~ILE
          ~Rim CENTER
                  -
B 1
1 1
1 NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB 1
1 1
1 NRR/DISP/PIPB            1    1      NRR/DRCH/HHFB              1   1               D,'
NRR/DRCH/HICB            1    1      NRR/DRCH/HOLB              1    1 NRR/DRPM/PECB            1    1      NRR/DSSA/SPLB              1    1 NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B          1    1      NRR/DSSA/SRXB             1    1 RES/DSIR/EIB            1    1      RGN1     FILE 01           1    1 EXTERNAL:  L ST LOBBY. WARD        1    1      LITCO BRYCE,J H           2    2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A          1    1      NOAC POORE,W.             1     1 NRC PDR                  1     1     NUDOCS FULL TXT            1     1 M)
N NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECIPIENTS:
CONTROL PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT FROM DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083) TO ELIMINATE   YOUR NAME DISTRIBUTION .LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR             26   ENCL     26
 
AND ROCHESTER GAS AND ElECTRTC CORPORATTON +       89 EASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, M Y 14649.0001 AREA CODE 716 54'6-27N ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor Operotions September 1, 1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R. Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
LER 95-007, Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of"B" Emergency Diesel Generator R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-007 is hereby submitted.
LER 95-007, Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of "B" Emergency Diesel Generator R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with           10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (iv), which requires a report of,         "Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-007 is hereby submitted.
This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr.Allen R.Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S.NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector t.(E<~950'9070205 9'50'st01 PDR ADOCK 05000244~gpss l)  
This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.
Very truly yours, Robert C. Mecredy xc:           U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Allen R. Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)
PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector t . (E <~
                                                                                                ~gpss l
                                                                                                        )
950'9070205 9'50'st01 PDR         ADOCK 05000244
 
HRC FORM    366                                  U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY IXNHISSIOH                    APPROVED BY  N5/31/953150-0104 EXPIRES HO.
(5-92)
ESTIHATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT                    (LER)                          FOR'WARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, (See reverse    for required  number  of digits/characters for      each  block)      WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001        AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION" PROJECT        (3180 0104),    OFFICE    OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.
FAGILITY NAME    (1) R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power                        Plant                DOCKET NNIBER 05000244 (2)                    PAGE  (3) 10F    10 TITLE  (4)          Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite PoMer      Circuit  751, Due    to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of          <<B<<
Emergency Diesel Generator EVEHT DATE  (5)                  LER NUMBER  (6)                REPORT DATE  (7)                OTHER  FACILITIES INVOLVED (S)
SEQUENTIAL    REVISION                              FACILITY HAHE                      DOCKET NUMBER HOHTH      DAY      YEAR    YEAR                                  MONTH      DAY    YEAR NUMBER          NUHBER
.08      03        95      95      --007--              00        09      01 FACILITY NAME                      DOCKET HUMBER OPERATING                THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5.              (Check one or more) (11)
H(NE  (9)        N        20.402(b)                          20.405(c)                          50.73(a)(2)(iv)              73.71 (b)
POWER 20 405(a  )(1)(i)                  50.36(c)(1)                        50.73(a)(2)(v)              73.71(c) 097                                                                                50.73(a)(2)(vii)
LEVEL  (10)                20.405(a)(l)(ii)                    50.36(c)(2)                                                      OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(iii)                  50.73(a)(2)(i)                      50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv)                    50.73(a)(2)(ii)                    50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract      below and in Text, 20.405(a)(1)(v)                    50 '3(a)(2)(iii)                    50.73(a)(2)(x)            HRC Form 366A)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER      (12)
HAME    John T. St. Martin - Technical Assistant                                                    TELEPHONE NUMBER    (include Area  Code)
(716) 771-3641 CNIPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT              (13)
REPORTABLE                                                                      REPORTABLE CAUSE      SYSTEH      COMPONENT    HANUFACTURER                                CAUSE    SYSTEH      COHPOHENT      HANUFACTURER TO NPRDS                                                                        TO NP)DS EA        CBL5            X000              N, SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED      (14)                                    EXPECTED MONTH      DAY      YEAR YES                                                                                            SUSHI SSI OH (If yes,  complete  EXPECTED SUBHISSION  DATE).
X  HO DATE (15)
ABSTRACT      (Limit to  1400 spaces,  i.e., approximately    15 single-spaced    typegrit ten lines) (16)
On    August          3,      1995,      at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately                97%      steady state power, power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was lost. This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12B and "B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17. The "B" Emergency Diesel Generator                              (D/G) automatically started'nd reenergized buses 16 and 17 as per design.                                    There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.
Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses) to stabilize the plant and to verify that the "B" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 16 and 17.
The      cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was determined to be electrical storm "C"                activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the                          phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.
This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).
HRC FORH    366  (5-92)
 
HRC FORN  366A                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NHISSIOH              APPROVED BY  OIB HO- 3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                EXPIRES  5/31/95 ESTIHATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTINATE TO  BR'ORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                        THE INFORNATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(WNISSION ~
TEXT CONTINUATION                                        WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001      AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION    PROJECT    (3150-0104),    OFFICE            OF NANAGENENT AND BUDGET    WASHIHGTON  DC 20503-FACILITY HAHE  (1)                      DOCKET NWBER  (2)            LER NIMBER  (6)                PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL      REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                05000244 NUHBER        HUNBER 2 OF 10
                                                                                            -- 007--            00 TEXT (lf more  space  is required, use  additional copies of  HRC Form 366A)  (17)
I.        PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The    plant was at approximately 97% steady state reactor power. The "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G) had been removed from service earlier on August 3 to perform planned maintenance (and had been declared inoperable at 0422 EDST to perform this maintenance).                                                            By mid-afternoon on August 3, the maintenance had been completed, but the "B" Emergency D/G was                            still      considered inoperable, pending completion of post-maintenance testing. Due to weather conditions (a
        'hunderstorm              was    in progress in the vicinity of the plant), testing was    being deferred              until the thunderstorm passed. The Plant Manager recommended that the "B" Emergency D/G be aligned for auto standby (although still inoperable from an administrative viewpoint) to be an available source of power in the event of a "B"                                    loss of offsite power during the thunderstorm.                          Therefore, the                        Emergency D/G was aligned for auto standby.
The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the alternate "50% / 50%" offsite power lineup.                                This configuration uses Circuit 767 (instead of Circuit 751) to supply power to the "A" train of safeguards          equipment:
o    Circuit        751    (34.5    KV  offsite      power source)            was      supplying power to the    "B"    train    480    Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt                transformer          12A (12A transformer),                        via Circuit Breaker 52/12AX,              to  4160    Volt    bus    12B,      and    through        the    safeguards bus    4160    Volt    to    480    Volt    transformers.
o    Circuit        767 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was supplying power to the "A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12BY, to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.
See    the attached sketch of the offsite power distribution system.
II.      DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
o      August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Event date and time.
August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Discovery date and time.
HRC FORN  366A (5-92)
 
NRC FORH  366A                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQQII SSIOH              APPROVED BY  QIB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                EXPIRES  5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CONPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS ~
FORWARD CONNENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                        THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION                                          (HNBB 7714) ~ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSIOH ~
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001      AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION    PROJECT    (3150.0104),  OFFICE    OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.
FACILITY NAKE  (1)                        DOCKET NIHIBER (2)            LER NQIBER  (6                PAGE  (3)
SEQUENTIAL      REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                              05000244 NUHBER        NUHBER 30F10 95    -- 007--            00 TEXT (If more  space  is required, use  additional copies of  HRC  Form 366A)  (17)
August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Control Room operators "B" Emergency Diesel Generator                                                                verify the (D/G) operation                  and    that safeguards buses 16 and 17 are energized.
August 3, 1995,                1628 EDST: Safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit                  767 from the "B" Emergency D/G.
August 3, 1995, 1635 EDST: The "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.
o      August 3, 1995, 1644 EDST:                      Circuit 751 was declared operable.
August 7,          1995,      1228      EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate                    "50%    /    50%"    lineup.
B. EVENT:
On    August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97% steady state full power, the Control Room received numerous Main Control Board annunciator alarms.                                                    Among these alarms were L-20 (12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE), J-5 g12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH)i J 7 (480V MAIN OR TIE BREAKER (Ill    OR TRIP), J-9 (SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP), and J-32 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1B PANEL).                The Control Room operators determined that the following events had occurred:
o      Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was deenergized o      "B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 had lost their power supply from 4160                  Volt    bus 12B (buses                16 and 17 had been momentarily deenergized) o      The "B" Emergency              D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 16 and 17 The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load.                                            They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses) to stabilize the plant.                                          They verified that the "B" Emergency D/G was operating and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.                      The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 12B displayed zero (0) voltage.
NRC FORH 366A  (5-92)
 
NRC FORH  366A                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQIIISSIOH            APPROVED BY QIB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECT ION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORWARD CQDIENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                      THE I HFORHAT ION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, TEXT CONTINUATION                                        WASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001      AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION    PROJECT      (3180-0104) ~    OFFICE  OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET      WASHIHGTOH  DC  20503.
FACILITY NAHE  (1)                      DOCKET  NWER (2)              LER NWBER (6)                    PAGE  (3)
SEQUENTIAL        REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                                              NUMBER          NUNBER 05000244            95    007--                00        4  OF 10 TEXT (If more  space  is required, use  additional copies of  NRC Form 366A)  (17)
The    loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted "B"                                in undervoltage on safeguards            buses        16      and      17,      and      the                  Emergency            D/G automatically started within ten (10) seconds as per design and reenergized these buses.
Energy Operations personnel also identified the loss of power from Circuit 751, and promptly notified Ginna Control Room operators of. the loss of power from Circuit 751, which appeared to be caused by an offsite lightning strike that affected Circuit 751.
The      Control        Room      operators          referred to Equipment Restoration procedure          ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration of Offsite Power) to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12B and 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.            The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BX to energize bus 12B from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 1602 EDST. At approximately 1628 EDST, safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the "B" Emergency D/G.                                (Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying "A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18, throughout the event.)
At approximately 1635 EDST, August 3; 1995, the "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, pending performance of the post-maintenance testing.
Energy Operations                    subsequently            contacted            the Control Room operators and confirmed that the loss of power from Circuit 751 was caused by electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the "C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204),
deenergizing the circuit. Relays had been reset at Station 204, and Circuit 751 was reenergized                                    and declared                  operable at approximately            1644    EDST.
Circuit 751 was not immediately 'lined up to supply plant loads, but was maintained as the plant's backup supply of offsite power rather than realigning the electrical system during the thunderstorm conditions.
C.      INOPERABLE STRUCTURES,                  COMPONENTS'R SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED                                      TO THE EVENT:
None NRC FORH  366A  (5-92)
 
NRC FORM  366A                                U.S  NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                APPROVEO BY QNI NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                  EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50 0 HRS.
FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                        THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MAHAGEMEHT BRANCH (MMBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, TEXT CONTINUATION                                          NASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001        AND TO THE PAPERMORK REDUCTION    PROJECT      (3180-0104),  OFFICE  OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET iJASHINGTON DC 20503.
FACILITY MANE  (1)                      DOCKET NQIBER  (2)              LER NIBIBER  (6)                PAGE (3)
SEQUENTIAL        REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                05000244 NUMBER          NUMBER 5OF      10
                                                                                            -- 007--                00 TEXT (If more  space  is required, use  additional copies of  MRC Form 366A)    (17)
D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
The    thunderstorm conditions also affected some. telephone service.
At approximately 1539 EDST, the Emergency Notification System (ENS)      line for Ginna Station became inoperable.                                                  The Shift Technical Advisor notified                        the      NRC      Operations              Center      and the USNRC Ginna Senior                Resident        Inspector          of    the      loss        of  the    ENS at approximately            1544      EDST.        (The    ENS      was    subsequently                restored      to operable status              at  approximately            1401      EDST      on  August          4.)
E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
This event was immediately apparent due to numerous Main Control Board alarms and other indications                            in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.
F. OPERATOR ACTION:
Following'he undervoltage condition on buses '16 and 17, the "B" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.
The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the "B" Emergency D/G was operating and safeguards buses      16 and 17 were            energized.
The    Control        Room      operators manually restarted the "B" and "C" containment recirculation fans, which had tripped due to the loss of    bus 16.
The momentary            loss of power to buses 16 and 17 caused the                                        trip of the    common      sample pump for monitoring of the containment                                            (CNMT) atmosphere          by channels          R-10A      (iodine),          R-11      (particulate) and R-12 (noble gas).                The  Control Room          operator manually restarted the common sample pump at                  approximately 1535 EDST.
The    Control Room            operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767)      to buses 16 and 17, stopped the "B" Emergency D/G, and realigned testing of it the for auto standby, prior to starting post-maintenance D/G.
Subsequently,              the          Shift Supervisor notified the NRC at approximately            1748      EDST      per 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii), non-emergency        four    hour    notification.
HRC FORM 366A  (5-92)
 
NRC FORH.366A                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH              APPROVED BY OHB HO.      3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                  EXPIRES  5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                        THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS NANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, TEXT CONTINUATION                                        'WASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001        AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION    PROJECT      (3150 0104),    OFFICE  OF HAHAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.
FACILITY HAHE  (1)                      DOCKET NINBER  (2)            LER NIIIBER (6)                    PAGE (3)
S E DUE N T I AL  REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                              05000244 NUHBER          HUNGER 6 OF 10
                                                                                            -- 007--                00 TEXT (If more space  is required,  use  additional copies of NRC Form 366A)    (17)
G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
All safeguards              equipment functioned properly.                                The "B" Emergency D/G    automatically started due to the                                undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 16 and 17 to supply emergency power.
Running containment recirculation fans on bus 16 tripped as designed and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment.                          The running service water, pump on bus 17 tripped as designed and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 17.
III. CAUSE OF EVENT A., IMMEDIATE CAUSE:
The    automatic actuation of the                          "B" Emergency                    D/G was          due    to undervoltage on safeguards buses                          16 and 17.
B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:
The    undervoltage            on safeguards          buses          16 and          17    was    due      to the loss of power from Circuit                    751.
C. ROOT CAUSE:
The    underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was electrical storm activity that                                affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped                    the    "C"      phase        instantaneous overcurrent protective relay                for    Circuit      751      (at    Station            204), deenergizing Circuit      751.
This event is            NUREG-1022 Cause            Code (C), "External Cause".                                This loss of power and                subsequent        start      of    an  Emergency            D/G    does      not meet the NUMARC                93-01,      "Industry          Guideline              for    Monitoring            the Effectiveness            of    Maintenance        at  Nuclear          Power        Plants",        definition of a "Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".
HRC FORH 366A  (5-92)
 
NRC FORM  366A                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(HHISSIOM              APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                EXPIRES  5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY NITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORIIARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                        THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS NAMAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION                                        (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/
IIASHIMGTOH, DC 20555-0001    AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION    PROJECT    (3150.0104),      OFFICE  OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET    MASHINGTOM    DC  20503.
FACILITY NAME  (1)                      DOCKET MINBER  (2)            LER MINBER  (6                  PAGE  (3)
SEQUENTIAL      REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                              05000244 NUMBER        NUMBER 7OF10 95    -- 007--            00 TEXT (If more  space  is required, use additional copies of  NRC  Form 366A)  (17)
IV.      ANALYSIS OF EVENT:
This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (iv), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the "B" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.
An assessment was performed considering                                  both the safety consequences and implications of this event with                                        the following results and conclusions:
There were no operational or safety consequences                                          or implications attributed to the loss of Circuit                            751 and        start of the            Emergency D/G because:
All reactor control                    and      protection            systems          performed            as designed.
Although the maintenance work for the "B" Emergency D/G had been        completed,              the        "B"          Emergency            D/G          remained administratively inoperable. It was available for operation and subsequently functioned as designed to reenergize "B" train safeguards buses 16 and 17.
Whi'le      in this condition, the plant electrical power system (offsite        power sources              and the Emergency D/Gs) remained within the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2.2.b.l, which requires that the "A" Emergency D/G be demonstrated operable within'ne hour of the "B" Emergency D/G being inoperable and at least once per 24 hours thereafter.                                                    The "A" Emergency D/G had been demonstrated operable within one hour of 0422 EDST on August 3, so no further actions were required by TS for the short time that, Circuit 751 was also inoperable on August 3; Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the "A" train safeguards buses; subsequently, Circuit 767 was lined up to supply power to the "B" train safeguards buses also, as permitted by          TS.
HRC FORM 366A  (5-92)
 
NRC FORM  366A                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY  CQNI SSION              APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                  EXPIRES  5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
FORNARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                          THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION                                            (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/
MASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001    AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION    PROJECT    (3140-0104),      OFFICE  OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET    MASHINGTON    DC  20503 FACILITY NAHE  (1)                        DOCKET NQlBER  (2)            LER NIIIBER (6)                PAGE  (3)
SEQUENTIAL      REVISIOH YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                                                  NUHBER        NUHBER 05000244                    007                00        8 OF      10 TEXT (If more  space is required,  use  additional copies of  HRC Form 366A)    (17) o      Radiation monitor channels R-10A, R-11, and R-12 were temporarily lost.                      The common sample pump was manually restarted within a few minutes, which is within the required action time of TS 3.1.5.1.2 to obtain a grab sample at least once every 24 hours.
Based on. the above, safety was assured at all times.
it  can be concluded that the public's health and V.        CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION          TAKEN        TO      RETURN      AFFECTED          SYSTEMS        TO    PRE-EVENT            NORMAL STATUS:
o      Offsite        power was restored to safeguards buses 16 and 17 from Circuit        767, and the "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, prior to the start of post-maintenance testing of the "B" Emergency D/G.
o      Circuit          751      was      cleared        for        use      by    Energy        Operations, protective relays for Circuit 751 (at Station 204) were reset by Energy Operations, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and restored to operable status.
B. ACTION TAKEN              OR    PINNED        TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
As  stated in          LER      95-006, options              for offsite            power      configuration to the plant            will be        reevaluated to optimize reliability during adverse weather conditions.                            (Refer to LER 95-006, Revision 0, Docket      No. 50-244.)          The    primary option currently being evaluated would use a n100% / 0%" offsite power configuration as the preferred configuration, with Circuit 767 normally supplying power to both the "A" and "B" train safeguards buses.
NRC FORM  366A  (5-92)
 
NRC FORH 366A                                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION              APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)                                                                                                EXPIRES  5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY llITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REGUEST: 50.0 COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO    MRS'ORHARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                        THE INFORMATION AHD REQ)RDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION                                        (MHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, lIASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001    AND TO THE PAPERlSRK REDUCTION    PROJECT    (3180-0104),    OFFICE            OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET    MASHINGTON  DC  20503.
FACILITY NAME  (1)                      DOCKET HWBER  (2)              LER MQIBER  (6)                PAGE  (3)
SEQUENTIAL      REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                                              NUMBER        HUMBER 9OF10 05000244              95  007--              00 TEXT (If more space  is required, use  additional copies of  HRC Form 366A)  (17)
VI.      ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. FAILED          COMPONENTS:
None B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
A    similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs 91-002, 92-007, 94-012, and 95-006 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).
C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:
None HRC'ORM 366A  (5-92)


HRC FORM 366 (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY IXNHISSIOH APPROVED BY N HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)ESTIHATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FOR'WARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION" PROJECT (3180 0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FAGILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NNIBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)10F 10 TITLE (4)Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite PoMer Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of<<B<<Emergency Diesel Generator EVEHT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (S)HOHTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH NUMBER NUHBER DAY FACILITY HAHE YEAR DOCKET NUMBER.08 03 95 95--007--00 09 01 FACILITY NAME DOCKET HUMBER OPERATING H(NE (9)N THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5.(Check one or more)(11)20.402(b)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20.405(c)73.71 (b)POWER LEVEL (10)097 20 405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(l)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50'3(a)(2)(iii)
~  MRC FORM       366A                                                      U.S.     MUCI.EAR REGULATORY COWISSIOM                                                    APPROVED BY QGI HO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 (5.92)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(c)OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, HRC Form 366A)HAME John T.St.Martin-Technical Assistant TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)(716)771-3641 CNIPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT EA CBL5 HANUFACTURER X000 REPORTABLE TO NPRDS N, CAUSE SYSTEH COHPOHENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NP)DS SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).X HO EXPECTED SUSHI SSI OH DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typegrit ten lines)(16)On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state power, power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was lost.This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12B and"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)automatically started'nd reenergized buses 16 and 17 as per design.There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant and to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 16 and 17.The cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was determined to be electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).HRC FORH 366 (5-92)
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUESTS 50.0 FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)                                                                                             TNE INFORMATION AllO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION                                                                                       (liHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, llASNIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001                           AMD TO THE PAPERUORK REDUCTION               PROJECT             (3150.0104) I OFF ICE OF NAMAGENEHT AMD BUDGET                         MASHINGTON    DC   20503.
HRC FORN 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OIB HO-3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 BR'ORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTINATE TO THE INFORNATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(WNISSION
FACILITY NAME           (1)                                                 DOCKET NQIBER          (2)                           LER NLNBER          (6)                       PAGE   (3)
~WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF NANAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTON DC 20503-FACILITY HAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NWBER (2)05000244 LER NIMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--007--REVISION HUNBER 00 PAGE (3)2 OF 10 TEXT (lf more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 97%steady state reactor power.The"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)had been removed from service earlier on August 3 to perform planned maintenance (and had been declared inoperable at 0422 EDST to perform this maintenance).
SEQUENTIAL                 REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                                                             05000244 NUMBER                   NUMBER g5           -- 007--                             00      10 OF 10 TEXT   (If more     space     is required,           use additionaL copies                         of   NRC   Form 366A)           (17)
By mid-afternoon on August 3, the maintenance had been completed, but the"B" Emergency D/G was still considered inoperable, pending completion of post-maintenance testing.Due to weather conditions (a'hunderstorm was in progress in the vicinity of the plant), testing was being deferred until the thunderstorm passed.The Plant Manager recommended that the"B" Emergency D/G be aligned for auto standby (although still inoperable from an administrative viewpoint) to be an available source of power in the event of a loss of offsite power during the thunderstorm.
                                                                                                                                  $ 1$ IN~QfON UW SI>>Ilail  14 C    N
Therefore, the"B" Emergency D/G was aligned for auto standby.The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the alternate"50%/50%" offsite power lineup.This configuration uses Circuit 767 (instead of Circuit 751)to supply power to the"A" train of safeguards equipment:
                                                                          >>ICI                                                        1$ 111 St/                                                             Sl/
o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12AX, to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.
                                                                              >>>>1
o Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12BY, to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.
                                                                  $1 aY
See the attached sketch of the offsite power distribution system.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
                                                                          >>ICI ONS 1 Sll 41>>
o August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Event date and time.August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Discovery date and time.HRC FORN 366A (5-92)
SI.SCC ~ I
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQQII SSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QIB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CONPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS~FORWARD CONNENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714)~U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSIOH
                                                                                                      ~>>
~WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAKE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NIHIBER (2)05000244 LER NQIBER (6 SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 95--007--REVISION NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)30F10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Control Room operators verify the"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)operation and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 are energized.
I IO>>
August 3, 1995, 1628 EDST: Safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.August 3, 1995, 1635 EDST: The"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.o August 3, 1995, 1644 EDST: Circuit 751 was declared operable.August 7, 1995, 1228 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate"50%/50%" lineup.B.EVENT: On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state full power, the Control Room received numerous Main Control Board annunciator alarms.Among these alarms were L-20 (12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE), J-5 (Ill OR g12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH)i J 7 (480V MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP), J-9 (SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP), and J-32 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1B PANEL).The Control Room operators determined that the following events had occurred: o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was deenergized o"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12B (buses 16 and 17 had been momentarily deenergized) o The"B" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 16 and 17 The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load.They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant.They verified that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.
                                                                                                        ~ I CO>>
The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 12B displayed zero (0)voltage.NRC FORH 366A (5-92)
IW
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQIIISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QIB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECT ION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD CQDIENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE I HFORHAT ION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, WASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104)
                                                                                                                                      ~ $ 111 1\~Oil I St>> AN ICNCNONCO
~OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NWER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER NWBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER-007--REVISION NUNBER 00 PAGE (3)4 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted in undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17, and the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started within ten (10)seconds as per design and reenergized these buses.Energy Operations personnel also identified the loss of power from Circuit 751, and promptly notified Ginna Control Room operators of.the loss of power from Circuit 751, which appeared to be caused by an offsite lightning strike that affected Circuit 751.The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration of Offsite Power)to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12B and 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BX to energize bus 12B from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 1602 EDST.At approximately 1628 EDST, safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.(Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18, throughout the event.)At approximately 1635 EDST, August 3;1995, the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, pending performance of the post-maintenance testing.Energy Operations subsequently contacted the Control Room operators and confirmed that the loss of power from Circuit 751 was caused by electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.Relays had been reset at Station 204, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and declared operable at approximately 1644 EDST.Circuit 751 was not immediately
                                                                                                                                                        $ >>.SIC ~ I CC ~ I CC>>
'lined up to supply plant loads, but was maintained as the plant's backup supply of offsite power rather than realigning the electrical system during the thunderstorm conditions.
CtlCIOCI 4>>
C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS'R SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None NRC FORH 366A (5-92)
14
NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO BY QNI NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY MANE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQIBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)5OF 10 LER NIBIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER YEAR 00--007--ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50 0 HRS.FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MAHAGEMEHT BRANCH (MMBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, NASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERMORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET iJASHINGTON DC 20503.TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of MRC Form 366A)(17)D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: The thunderstorm conditions also affected some.telephone service.At approximately 1539 EDST, the Emergency Notification System (ENS)line for Ginna Station became inoperable.
                                                            ~ O&/$     Sl/                     St/   CCSO/S       CPS>>/C   St/
The Shift Technical Advisor notified the NRC Operations Center and the USNRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector of the loss of the ENS at approximately 1544 EDST.(The ENS was subsequently restored to operable status at approximately 1401 EDST on August 4.)E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
I SOS                    14$                         ISO>>
This event was immediately apparent due to numerous Main Control Board alarms and other indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.F.OPERATOR ACTION: Following'he undervoltage condition on buses'16 and 17, the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.
or/ Oalto/Is 11$     CSCOTS   CCNCO OI/
The Control Room operators manually restarted the"B" and"C" containment recirculation fans, which had tripped due to the loss of bus 16.The momentary loss of power to buses 16 and 17 caused the trip of the common sample pump for monitoring of the containment (CNMT)atmosphere by channels R-10A (iodine), R-11 (particulate) and R-12 (noble gas).The Control Room operator manually restarted the common sample pump at approximately 1535 EDST.The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767)to buses 16 and 17, stopped the"B" Emergency D/G, and realigned it for auto standby, prior to starting post-maintenance testing of the D/G.Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC at approximately 1748 EDST per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification.
I4 OU$
HRC FORM 366A (5-92)
tCOON  ~
NRC FORH.366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS NANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH,'WASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY HAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NINBER (2)05000244 LER NIIIBER (6)S E DUE N T I A L NUHBER--007--REVISION HUNGER 00 PAGE (3)6 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
14/ll Sl/
All safeguards equipment functioned properly.The"B" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 16 and 17 to supply emergency power.Running containment recirculation fans on bus 16 tripped as designed and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment.
11St 41$ 1$ $/IC IC St/
The running service water, pump on bus 17 tripped as designed and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 17.III.CAUSE OF EVENT A., IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The automatic actuation of the"B" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing Circuit 751.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C),"External Cause".This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".HRC FORH 366A (5-92)
I CSS O/tltO/lt IC            ~
NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(HHISSIOM LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY NITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORIIARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS NAMAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/
                                                          $ 1/     441 SO/tC IR                                                                                          ~
IIASHIMGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTOM DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET MINBER (2)05000244 LER MINBER (6 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95--007--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)7OF10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the"B" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
St/     ONS1
There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the loss of Circuit 751 and start of the Emergency D/G because: All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.Although the maintenance work for the"B" Emergency D/G had been completed, the"B" Emergency D/G remained administratively inoperable.
                                                                                                                                                                      >>I 4/I 1 St/
It was available for operation and subsequently functioned as designed to reenergize"B" train safeguards buses 16 and 17.Whi'le in this condition, the plant electrical power system (offsite power sources and the Emergency D/Gs)remained within the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)of Technical Specification (TS)3.7.2.2.b.l, which requires that the"A" Emergency D/G be demonstrated operable within'ne hour of the"B" Emergency D/G being inoperable and at least once per 24 hours thereafter.
11$$
The"A" Emergency D/G had been demonstrated operable within one hour of 0422 EDST on August 3, so no further actions were required by TS for the short time that, Circuit 751 was also inoperable on August 3;Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the"A" train safeguards buses;subsequently, Circuit 767 was lined up to supply power to the"B" train safeguards buses also, as permitted by TS.HRC FORM 366A (5-92)
OI$ 14/IS NC
NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQNI SSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORNARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/
                                                                                                                                                                                                              $ 1/
MASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQlBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NIIIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER-007-REVISIOH NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)8 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)o Radiation monitor channels R-10A, R-11, and R-12 were temporarily lost.The common sample pump was manually restarted within a few minutes, which is within the required action time of TS 3.1.5.1.2 to obtain a grab sample at least once every 24 hours.Based on.the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: o Offsite power was restored to safeguards buses 16 and 17 from Circuit 767, and the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, prior to the start of post-maintenance testing of the"B" Emergency D/G.o Circuit 751 was cleared for use by Energy Operations, protective relays for Circuit 751 (at Station 204)were reset by Energy Operations, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and restored to operable status.B.ACTION TAKEN OR PINNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
11$ $
As stated in LER 95-006, options for offsite power configuration to the plant will be reevaluated to optimize reliability during adverse weather conditions.(Refer to LER 95-006, Revision 0, Docket No.50-244.)The primary option currently being evaluated would use a n100%/0%" offsite power configuration as the preferred configuration, with Circuit 767 normally supplying power to both the"A" and"B" train safeguards buses.NRC FORM 366A (5-92)
1I$ 14/I ~
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY llITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REGUEST: 50.0 MRS'ORHARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AHD REQ)RDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, lIASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERlSRK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET HWBER (2)05000244 95 LER MQIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER-007--REVISION HUMBER 00 PAGE (3)9OF10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS:
IC CI           ~ic>>
None B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs 91-002, 92-007, 94-012, and 95-006 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None HRC'ORM 366A (5-92)
11           I IO                                                 10 ~
~MRC FORM 366A (5.92)U.S.MUCI.EAR REGULATORY COWISSIOM APPROVED BY QGI HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQIBER (2)LER NLNBER (6)PAGE (3)10 OF 10 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER YEAR 05000244 g5 00--007--ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUESTS 50.0 FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TNE INFORMATION AllO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (liHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, llASNIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AMD TO THE PAPERUORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104)
CI,         C~'
I OFF ICE OF NAMAGENEHT AMD BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.TEXT (If more space is required, use additionaL copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)SI>>Ilail 14 C N$1$IN~QfON UW>>ICI>>>>1 St/>>ICI$1 aY ONS 1 Sll 41>>~IW SI.SCC~I>>~I CO>>I IO>>1$111 Sl/~$111 1\~Oil I St>>AN ICNCNONCO 14$>>.SIC~I CC~I CC>>CtlCIOCI 4>>~O&/$Sl/I SOS St/CCSO/S CPS>>/C St/14$ISO>>or/Oalto/Is 11$CSCOTS CCNCO OI/OU$14/ll I4 tCOON~Sl/41$1$$/IC 11St IC St/O/tltO/lt$1/441 SO/tC I CSS IC~IR St/ONS1 4/I 1 St/OI$14/IS~>>I 11$$NC$1/1I$14/I~11$$IC CI~ic>>11 I IO 10~CI, CI C~&#x17d;~I>>IRN ICCICC~ICC>>COI C>>COCA I C>>Sl/OISI 1/I I~I~K St/O>>I I 1/I IC CCI~I IR INNC: OCS~SNCN IC>>ONC SSCIS t>>CC$1/~IS I I/I OS I~IC St/Ohl>>/ICC all>>l NO$1/Olt I tlttO I I IC St/NNCNC IC 1$1 IC (I)CORNO'$1/OI$11/SIC IC Ill IR~CCI OIS 11 St/CNS IC/l IC CC Nt AC (I)CCIN>>IICN C$1/41111/11~I~NC HRC FORM 366A (5-92)}}
CI
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ~I>>IRN ICCICC
                                                                                                                                                                                                                      ~ ICC>>COI C>>COCA I C>>
Sl/
I~
St/
CCI ~ I OISI 1/I I ~
K O>>I I 1/I IC IR OCS   ~           SNCN INNC:
IC>> ONC   SSCIS t>>CC
                                                                                                                                                                                    $ 1/
I~
                                                                                                                                                                                          ~ IS I I/IOS IC St/ Ohl>>/ICC all>>l NO St/   NNCNC IC 1 $1 IC
( I ) CORNO'                                                                                                                                   (  I
                                                                                                                                                                                        )CCIN>>IICN    C
    $ 1/  Olt I tlttO                                        $ 1/   OI$ 11/SIC                                                                       St/     CNS IC/lIC                                      $ 1/   41111/11 ~
Ill  IR                                                                              CC Nt    AC                                                I~
II  IC                                              IC                                                                                                                                                        NC
                          ~ CCI OIS 11 HRC FORM       366A   (5-92)}}

Revision as of 17:12, 29 October 2019

LER 95-007-00:on 950803,lost Power from 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Due to Offsite Electrical Storm,Resulting in Automatic Start of EDG B.Offsite Power Restored,Edg B Stopped & Realigned & Circuit 751 cleared.W/950901 Ltr
ML17264A147
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/01/1995
From: Mecredy R, St Martin J
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To: Andrea Johnson
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-95-007, LER-95-7, NUDOCS 9509070205
Download: ML17264A147 (13)


Text

IpRIORITY 3.

(ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSING)

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9509070205 DOC.DATE: 95/09/01 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 P AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

MECREDY,R.C. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION J OHNSON,A.R.

SUBJECT:

LER 95-007-00:on 950803,lost power from 34.5 kV offsite 0 ower Circuit 751 due to offsite electrical'torm, resulting n automatic start of EDG B.Offsite power restored,EDG B stopped & realigned & Circuit 751 cleared.W/950901 ltr.

R DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTRl Event Report (LER),

ENCL 1 Incident SIZE: !

Rpt, etc.

l TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). 05000244 T RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR

'

ENCL PD1-1 PD 1 1 JOHNSON,A 1 INTERNAL: AE~O/SZD/~B 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1

~ILE

~Rim CENTER

-

B 1

1 1

1 NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB 1

1 1

1 NRR/DISP/PIPB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 D,'

NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DSIR/EIB 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY. WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 2 2 NOAC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 M)

N NOTE TO ALL "RZDS" RECIPIENTS:

CONTROL PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT FROM DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME DISTRIBUTION .LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26

AND ROCHESTER GAS AND ElECTRTC CORPORATTON + 89 EASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, M Y 14649.0001 AREA CODE 716 54'6-27N ROBERT C. MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor Operotions September 1, 1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R. Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

LER 95-007, Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of "B" Emergency Diesel Generator R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (iv), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-007 is hereby submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Very truly yours, Robert C. Mecredy xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Allen R. Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)

PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector t . (E <~

~gpss l

)

950'9070205 9'50'st01 PDR ADOCK 05000244

HRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY IXNHISSIOH APPROVED BY N5/31/953150-0104 EXPIRES HO.

(5-92)

ESTIHATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FOR'WARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION" PROJECT (3180 0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FAGILITY NAME (1) R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NNIBER 05000244 (2) PAGE (3) 10F 10 TITLE (4) Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite PoMer Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of <<B<<

Emergency Diesel Generator EVEHT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (S)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILITY HAHE DOCKET NUMBER HOHTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NUHBER

.08 03 95 95 --007-- 00 09 01 FACILITY NAME DOCKET HUMBER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more) (11)

H(NE (9) N 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71 (b)

POWER 20 405(a )(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 097 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

LEVEL (10) 20.405(a)(l)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) Abstract below and in Text, 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50 '3(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) HRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

HAME John T. St. Martin - Technical Assistant TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)

(716) 771-3641 CNIPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT HANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEH COHPOHENT HANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NP)DS EA CBL5 X000 N, SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR YES SUSHI SSI OH (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).

X HO DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typegrit ten lines) (16)

On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97% steady state power, power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was lost. This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12B and "B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17. The "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G) automatically started'nd reenergized buses 16 and 17 as per design. There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.

Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses) to stabilize the plant and to verify that the "B" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 16 and 17.

The cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was determined to be electrical storm "C" activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.

This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).

HRC FORH 366 (5-92)

HRC FORN 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NHISSIOH APPROVED BY OIB HO- 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTINATE TO BR'ORWARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORNATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(WNISSION ~

TEXT CONTINUATION WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF NANAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTON DC 20503-FACILITY HAHE (1) DOCKET NWBER (2) LER NIMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 NUHBER HUNBER 2 OF 10

-- 007-- 00 TEXT (lf more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

I. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 97% steady state reactor power. The "B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G) had been removed from service earlier on August 3 to perform planned maintenance (and had been declared inoperable at 0422 EDST to perform this maintenance). By mid-afternoon on August 3, the maintenance had been completed, but the "B" Emergency D/G was still considered inoperable, pending completion of post-maintenance testing. Due to weather conditions (a

'hunderstorm was in progress in the vicinity of the plant), testing was being deferred until the thunderstorm passed. The Plant Manager recommended that the "B" Emergency D/G be aligned for auto standby (although still inoperable from an administrative viewpoint) to be an available source of power in the event of a "B" loss of offsite power during the thunderstorm. Therefore, the Emergency D/G was aligned for auto standby.

The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the alternate "50% / 50%" offsite power lineup. This configuration uses Circuit 767 (instead of Circuit 751) to supply power to the "A" train of safeguards equipment:

o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was supplying power to the "B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12AX, to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.

o Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was supplying power to the "A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12BY, to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.

See the attached sketch of the offsite power distribution system.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:

o August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Event date and time.

August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Discovery date and time.

HRC FORN 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQQII SSIOH APPROVED BY QIB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CONPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS ~

FORWARD CONNENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (HNBB 7714) ~ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSIOH ~

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAKE (1) DOCKET NIHIBER (2) LER NQIBER (6 PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 NUHBER NUHBER 30F10 95 -- 007-- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Control Room operators "B" Emergency Diesel Generator verify the (D/G) operation and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 are energized.

August 3, 1995, 1628 EDST: Safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the "B" Emergency D/G.

August 3, 1995, 1635 EDST: The "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.

o August 3, 1995, 1644 EDST: Circuit 751 was declared operable.

August 7, 1995, 1228 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate "50% / 50%" lineup.

B. EVENT:

On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97% steady state full power, the Control Room received numerous Main Control Board annunciator alarms. Among these alarms were L-20 (12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE), J-5 g12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH)i J 7 (480V MAIN OR TIE BREAKER (Ill OR TRIP), J-9 (SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP), and J-32 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1B PANEL). The Control Room operators determined that the following events had occurred:

o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source) was deenergized o "B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12B (buses 16 and 17 had been momentarily deenergized) o The "B" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 16 and 17 The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load. They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses) to stabilize the plant. They verified that the "B" Emergency D/G was operating and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized. The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 12B displayed zero (0) voltage.

NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQIIISSIOH APPROVED BY QIB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECT ION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD CQDIENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE I HFORHAT ION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, TEXT CONTINUATION WASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104) ~ OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTOH DC 20503.

FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NWER (2) LER NWBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant NUMBER NUNBER 05000244 95 007-- 00 4 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted "B" in undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17, and the Emergency D/G automatically started within ten (10) seconds as per design and reenergized these buses.

Energy Operations personnel also identified the loss of power from Circuit 751, and promptly notified Ginna Control Room operators of. the loss of power from Circuit 751, which appeared to be caused by an offsite lightning strike that affected Circuit 751.

The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration of Offsite Power) to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12B and 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17. The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BX to energize bus 12B from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 1602 EDST. At approximately 1628 EDST, safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the "B" Emergency D/G. (Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying "A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18, throughout the event.)

At approximately 1635 EDST, August 3; 1995, the "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, pending performance of the post-maintenance testing.

Energy Operations subsequently contacted the Control Room operators and confirmed that the loss of power from Circuit 751 was caused by electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the "C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204),

deenergizing the circuit. Relays had been reset at Station 204, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and declared operable at approximately 1644 EDST.

Circuit 751 was not immediately 'lined up to supply plant loads, but was maintained as the plant's backup supply of offsite power rather than realigning the electrical system during the thunderstorm conditions.

C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS'R SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None NRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO BY QNI NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50 0 HRS.

FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MAHAGEMEHT BRANCH (MMBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, TEXT CONTINUATION NASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERMORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET iJASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY MANE (1) DOCKET NQIBER (2) LER NIBIBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 NUMBER NUMBER 5OF 10

-- 007-- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of MRC Form 366A) (17)

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

The thunderstorm conditions also affected some. telephone service.

At approximately 1539 EDST, the Emergency Notification System (ENS) line for Ginna Station became inoperable. The Shift Technical Advisor notified the NRC Operations Center and the USNRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector of the loss of the ENS at approximately 1544 EDST. (The ENS was subsequently restored to operable status at approximately 1401 EDST on August 4.)

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

This event was immediately apparent due to numerous Main Control Board alarms and other indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

Following'he undervoltage condition on buses '16 and 17, the "B" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.

The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the "B" Emergency D/G was operating and safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.

The Control Room operators manually restarted the "B" and "C" containment recirculation fans, which had tripped due to the loss of bus 16.

The momentary loss of power to buses 16 and 17 caused the trip of the common sample pump for monitoring of the containment (CNMT) atmosphere by channels R-10A (iodine), R-11 (particulate) and R-12 (noble gas). The Control Room operator manually restarted the common sample pump at approximately 1535 EDST.

The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767) to buses 16 and 17, stopped the "B" Emergency D/G, and realigned testing of it the for auto standby, prior to starting post-maintenance D/G.

Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC at approximately 1748 EDST per 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (ii), non-emergency four hour notification.

HRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH.366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH APPROVED BY OHB HO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS NANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, TEXT CONTINUATION 'WASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY HAHE (1) DOCKET NINBER (2) LER NIIIBER (6) PAGE (3)

S E DUE N T I AL REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 NUHBER HUNGER 6 OF 10

-- 007-- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

All safeguards equipment functioned properly. The "B" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 16 and 17 to supply emergency power.

Running containment recirculation fans on bus 16 tripped as designed and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment. The running service water, pump on bus 17 tripped as designed and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 17.

III. CAUSE OF EVENT A., IMMEDIATE CAUSE:

The automatic actuation of the "B" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17.

B. INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:

The undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.

C. ROOT CAUSE:

The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the "C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing Circuit 751.

This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C), "External Cause". This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a "Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".

HRC FORH 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(HHISSIOM APPROVED BY OHB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY NITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORIIARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS NAMAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (HNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/

IIASHIMGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTOM DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET MINBER (2) LER MINBER (6 PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 NUMBER NUMBER 7OF10 95 -- 007-- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT:

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a) (2) (iv), which requires a report of, "Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the "B" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the loss of Circuit 751 and start of the Emergency D/G because:

All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.

Although the maintenance work for the "B" Emergency D/G had been completed, the "B" Emergency D/G remained administratively inoperable. It was available for operation and subsequently functioned as designed to reenergize "B" train safeguards buses 16 and 17.

Whi'le in this condition, the plant electrical power system (offsite power sources and the Emergency D/Gs) remained within the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2.2.b.l, which requires that the "A" Emergency D/G be demonstrated operable within'ne hour of the "B" Emergency D/G being inoperable and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter. The "A" Emergency D/G had been demonstrated operable within one hour of 0422 EDST on August 3, so no further actions were required by TS for the short time that, Circuit 751 was also inoperable on August 3; Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the "A" train safeguards buses; subsequently, Circuit 767 was lined up to supply power to the "B" train safeguards buses also, as permitted by TS.

HRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQNI SSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.

FORNARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/

MASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAHE (1) DOCKET NQlBER (2) LER NIIIBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISIOH YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant NUHBER NUHBER 05000244 007 00 8 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17) o Radiation monitor channels R-10A, R-11, and R-12 were temporarily lost. The common sample pump was manually restarted within a few minutes, which is within the required action time of TS 3.1.5.1.2 to obtain a grab sample at least once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Based on. the above, safety was assured at all times.

it can be concluded that the public's health and V. CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS:

o Offsite power was restored to safeguards buses 16 and 17 from Circuit 767, and the "B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, prior to the start of post-maintenance testing of the "B" Emergency D/G.

o Circuit 751 was cleared for use by Energy Operations, protective relays for Circuit 751 (at Station 204) were reset by Energy Operations, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and restored to operable status.

B. ACTION TAKEN OR PINNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

As stated in LER 95-006, options for offsite power configuration to the plant will be reevaluated to optimize reliability during adverse weather conditions. (Refer to LER 95-006, Revision 0, Docket No. 50-244.) The primary option currently being evaluated would use a n100% / 0%" offsite power configuration as the preferred configuration, with Circuit 767 normally supplying power to both the "A" and "B" train safeguards buses.

NRC FORM 366A (5-92)

NRC FORH 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92) EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY llITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REGUEST: 50.0 COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO MRS'ORHARD LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) THE INFORMATION AHD REQ)RDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (MHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, lIASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERlSRK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET HWBER (2) LER MQIBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant NUMBER HUMBER 9OF10 05000244 95 007-- 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A) (17)

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. FAILED COMPONENTS:

None B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs91-002, 92-007,94-012, and 95-006 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

None HRC'ORM 366A (5-92)

~ MRC FORM 366A U.S. MUCI.EAR REGULATORY COWISSIOM APPROVED BY QGI HO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 (5.92)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUESTS 50.0 FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TNE INFORMATION AllO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH TEXT CONTINUATION (liHBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, llASNIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AMD TO THE PAPERUORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104) I OFF ICE OF NAMAGENEHT AMD BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NQIBER (2) LER NLNBER (6) PAGE (3)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION YEAR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 05000244 NUMBER NUMBER g5 -- 007-- 00 10 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionaL copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

$ 1$ IN~QfON UW SI>>Ilail 14 C N

>>ICI 1$ 111 St/ Sl/

>>>>1

$1 aY

>>ICI ONS 1 Sll 41>>

SI.SCC ~ I

~>>

I IO>>

~ I CO>>

IW

~ $ 111 1\~Oil I St>> AN ICNCNONCO

$ >>.SIC ~ I CC ~ I CC>>

CtlCIOCI 4>>

14

~ O&/$ Sl/ St/ CCSO/S CPS>>/C St/

I SOS 14$ ISO>>

or/ Oalto/Is 11$ CSCOTS CCNCO OI/

I4 OU$

tCOON ~

14/ll Sl/

11St 41$ 1$ $/IC IC St/

I CSS O/tltO/lt IC ~

$ 1/ 441 SO/tC IR ~

St/ ONS1

>>I 4/I 1 St/

11$$

OI$ 14/IS NC

$ 1/

11$ $

1I$ 14/I ~

IC CI ~ic>>

11 I IO 10 ~

CI, C~'

CI

~I>>IRN ICCICC

~ ICC>>COI C>>COCA I C>>

Sl/

I~

St/

CCI ~ I OISI 1/I I ~

K O>>I I 1/I IC IR OCS ~ SNCN INNC:

IC>> ONC SSCIS t>>CC

$ 1/

I~

~ IS I I/IOS IC St/ Ohl>>/ICC all>>l NO St/ NNCNC IC 1 $1 IC

( I ) CORNO' ( I

)CCIN>>IICN C

$ 1/ Olt I tlttO $ 1/ OI$ 11/SIC St/ CNS IC/lIC $ 1/ 41111/11 ~

Ill IR CC Nt AC I~

II IC IC NC

~ CCI OIS 11 HRC FORM 366A (5-92)