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{{#Wiki_filter:Retrospective PRALecture 7-11 Schedule2Course OverviewWednesday 1/16Thursday 1/17Friday 1/18Tuesday 1/22Wednesday 1/23Module1: Introduction3: Characterizing Uncertainty5: Basic Events7: Learning from Operational Events9: The PRA Frontier9:00-9:45L1-1: What is RIDM?L3-1: Probabilistic modeling for NPP PRAL5-1: Evidence and estimationL7-1: Retrospective PRAL9-1: Challenges for NPP PRA9:45-10:00BreakBreakBreakBreakBreak10:00-11:00L1-2: RIDM in the nuclear industryL3-2: Uncertainty and uncertaintiesL5-2: Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)L7-2: Notable events and lessons for PRAL9-2: Improved PRA using existing technology11:00-12:00W1: Risk-informed thinkingW2: Characterizing uncertaintiesW4: Bayesian estimationW6: Retrospective AnalysisL9-3: The frontier: grand challenges and advanced methods12:00-1:30LunchLunchLunchLunchLunchModule2: PRA Overview4: Accident Sequence Modeling6: Special Technical Topics8: Applications and Challenges10: Recap1:30-2:15L2-1: NPP PRA and RIDM: early historyL4-1: Initiating eventsL6-1: Dependent failuresL8-1: Risk-informed regulatory applicationsL10-1: Summary and closing remarksL8-2: PRA and RIDM infrastructure2:15-2:30BreakBreakBreakBreak2:30-3:30L2-2: NPP PRA models and resultsL4-2: Modeling plant and system responseL6-2: Spatial hazards and dependenciesL8-3: Risk-informed fire protectionDiscussion: course feedback3:30-4:30L2-3: PRA and RIDM: point-counterpointW3: Plant systems modeling L6-3: Other operational modesL8-4: Risk communicationOpen DiscussionL6-4: Level 2/3 PRA: beyond core damage4:30-4:45BreakBreakBreakBreak4:45-5:30Open DiscussionW3: Plant systems modeling (cont.)W5: External Hazards modelingOpen Discussion5:30-6:00Open DiscussionOpen Discussion Learning ObjectivesRetrospective PRA concept and useNRC Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program and key resultsRelated activitiesOther uses3Overview ResourcesCommission Accident Sequence Precursor Program: 2017 Annual Precursor (ASP) Program https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/asp.htmlon the use of CCDPs in enterprise risk monitoring and Proceedings of ANS International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA 2017), Pittsburgh, PA, September 24-28, 2017.4Overview Other References-April 14, 2016. (ADAMS ML16105A427)NUREG/CP-0124, 1992.V.M. Bier (ed.), Accident Sequence Precursors and Probabilistic Risk Analysis, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 1998.NEA/CSNI/R(2003)11, 2003.J.R. Phimister, V.M. Bier, and H.C. Kunreuther, Accident Precursor Analysis and Management: Reducing Technological Risk Through Diligence, Committee on Precursors, National Academy of Engineering, National Academies Press, New York, 2004.J.W. Minarickand C.A. KukielkaAccidents: 1969--2497, June 1982.G. ApostolakisNuclear Science and Engineering, 70, 135-149, 1979.https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/program-documents.htmlManagement Directive 8.3, June 25, 2014. (ADAMS ML13175A294)5Overview What is a Retrospective PRA?identifying and prioritizing possibilities to assist forward-looking decision making-close did an incident come to becoming an accident?6What can go wrong?What are the consequences?How likely is it?What could have gone wrong?What would have been the consequences?How likely was it?Concept and Use Why Use Retrospective PRA?Support risk-informed prioritization of events for attention and further investigation, possible Support risk-informed, graded responses to inspection findingsProvide a different (but still risk-oriented) perspective on plant safety7Concept and Use Early Warning PotentialDavis-Besse(1977) -LER 346/77-016Partial loss of feedwater; stuck-open pressurizer PORV; operators failed to recognize stuck-open PORVCCDP = 7x10-2(analysis ~1982)*Three Mile Island 2 (1979) -LER 320/79-012Total loss of feedwater; stuck-open pressurizer PORV; operators failed to recognize stuck-open PORV; subsequent operator errors led to core damageCCDP = 18Adapted from cover page, M. Rogovinand G.T, Frampton, Jr., Group, January 1980.*Based on then-current models. Current estimate ~1E-Concept and Use Reminder NRC Regulatory Functions9Concept and Use Accident Sequence Precursor ProgramProgram recommended by WASH-1400 review group (1978)Provides risk-informed view of nuclear plant operating experienceCCDP (events)CDP (conditions)Supports reports to Congress*Supported by plant-specific Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models10Licensee Event Reports 1969-2017(No significant precursors since 2002)significantprecursor(ADAMS ML18130A856)precursor*Reports: Abnormal Occurrence, Congressional Budget Justification, Performance and AccountabilityASP Program Key MetricsEventsConditional Core Damage Probability (CCDP):ConditionsChange in core damage frequency (CDP):*11*Calculated for the duration of the condition.ASP Program Knowledge Check12P3VAP1P2VACCDP = ?ASP Program123 Top U.S. Precursors13PlantDescriptionCCDP/CDPEvent DatePlant TypeBrowns Ferry 1Cable tray fire caused extensive damage and loss of electrical power to safety systems0.403/22/1975BWRRancho SecoFailure of non-nuclear instrumentation leads to reactor trip and steam generator dry out.0.303/20/1978PWROyster CreekReactor trip results in loss of feedwater with subsequent failure of isolation condenser.0.0305/02/1979BWRDavis-BesseBoth emergency feedwater pumps found inoperable during testing0.0312/11/1977PWRKewauneeClogged suction strainers for emergency feedwater pumps0.0311/05/1975PWRTurkey Point 3Failure of three emergency feedwater pumps to start during test0.0305/08/1974PWRPoint Beach 1Clogged suction strainers for emergency feedwater pumps0.0304/07/1974PWRLa CrosseLoss of offsite power due to switchyard fire0.0203/24/1971BWRDavis-BesseLoss of feedwater; scram; operator error fails emergency feedwater; power-operated relief valve fails open.0.0106/09/1985PWRHatch 2Reactor trip with subsequent failure of high-pressure coolant injection pump to start and reactor core isolation cooling unavailable.0.0106/03/1979BWRFarley 1Reactor trip with all emergency feedwater pumps ineffective0.0103/25/1978PWRCooperBlown fuse leads to partial loss of feedwater and subsequent reactor trip; reactor core isolation cooling and high-pressure coolant injection pump fail to reach rated speed0.0108/03/1977BWRMillstone 2Loss of offsite power with failure of emergency diesel generator load shed signals0.0107/20/1976PWRHaddam NeckLoss of offsite power due to ice storm with failure of emergency diesel generator service water pump to start0.0101/19/1974PWRASP Program Most Recent Significant Precursors14PlantDescriptionCCDP/CDPEvent DatePlant TypeDavis-BesseReactor pressure vessel head leakage of control rod drive mechanism nozzles, potential unavailability of sump recirculation due to screen plugging, and potential unavailability of boron precipitation control.0.00602/27/2002PWRCatawba 2Plant-centered loss of offsite power (transformer ground faults) with an emergency diesel generator unavailable due to maintenance0.00202/06/1996PWRWolf CreekReactor coolant system blowdown (9,200 gallons) to the refueling water storage tank0.00309/17/1994PWRShearon HarrisHigh-pressure injection unavailable for one refueling cycle because of inoperable alternate minimum flow valves0.00604/03/1991PWRTurkey Point 3Turbine load loss with trip; control rod drive auto insert fails; manual reactor trip; power-operated relief valve sticks open0.00112/27/1986PWRCatawba 1CVCS system leak (130 gpm) from the component cooling water/CVCS heat exchanger joint (i.e., small-break loss-of-coolant accident)0.00306/13/1986PWRDavis-BesseLoss of feedwater; scram; operator error fails emergency feedwater; power-operated relief valve fails open0.0106/09/1985PWRHatch 1Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) water shorts panel; safety relief valve fails open; high-pressure coolant injection fails; reactor core isolation cooling unavailable0.00205/15/1985BWRLa Salle 1Operator error causes scram; reactor core isolation cooling unavailable; residual heat removal unavailable0.00209/21/1984BWRSalem 1Trip with automatic reactor trip capability failed0.00502/25/1983PWRASP Program Other Precursor ActivitiesPast WorkshopsAnnapolis, MD, 1992 (NUREG/CP-0124)Madison, WI, 1995 (Bier, 1998)Brussels, Belgium, 2001 (NEA, 2003)Washington, DC, 2003 (Phimister, 2004)PSA-Based Event Analysis (PSAEA)Annual international workshops led by BelgiumExchange results and experiences15Related Activities Significance Determination ProcessPart of Reactor Oversight ProgramDetermines significance of findingsCharacterize performance deficiencyUse review panel (if required)Obtain licensee perspectiveFinalizeDifferences from ASPSupports fault finding and responseFocuses on a single performance deficiency (i.e., not necessarily the combined effect of anomalies)Results are broad categories (colors)16CDF < 1E-6LERF < 1E-71E-6 < CDF < 1E-51E-7 < LERF < 1E-61E-5 < CDF < 1E-41E-6 < LERF < 1E-5CDF > 1E-4LERF > 1E-5CDF = Core damage frequencyLERF = Large early release frequencyRelated Activities Incident InvestigationManagement Directive (MD) 8.3Determines NRC response to an incidentNo additional inspectionSpecial Inspection Team (SIT)Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)Incident Inspection Team (IIT)Differences from ASPQuick turnaroundDetermines level of reactive inspection17Management Directive 8.3, June 25, 2014. (ADAMS ML13175A294)Related Activities Example: Robinson Fire (3/28/2010)Electrical fault causes fire and subsequent reactor trip with losses of main feedwater (MFW) and reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection/cooling (LER 261-10-002)Incident Response (MD 8.3)CCDP = 4x10-5=> augmented inspectionInitial evaluation recommended a special inspection; loss of RCP seal injection/cooling not known at the timeSignificance Determination Process (SDP)Two White findings: licensee performance deficiencies involving inadequate training and procedures. Five Green findingsAccident Sequence Precursor (ASP)CCDP = 4x10-4Non-recoverable loss of MFW modeled with RCP seal injection diverted away from RCP seals (unknown to operators) and component cooling water (CCW) isolated via return isolation valve (recovered by operators).18Related Activities IAEA/NEA International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)LevelDescription7Major Accident6Serious Accident5Accident with Wider Consequences4Accident with Local Consequences3Serious Incident2Incident1Anomaly19&#xa9; IAEA, 2013. https://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10508/INES-The-International-Nuclear-and-Radiological-Event-Scale-User-s-Manual-2008-EditionTool for communicating event safety significance to the publicLogarithmic scale for severityConsiders impacts onPeople and the environmentRadiological barriers and controlDefencein depthVoluntary use by Member StatesNot a notification or reporting system for emergency responseRelated Activities Other (Potential) Uses of Retrospective PRAFleet health indexAlternative method to estimate average CDF20Other Uses Integrated ASP Index (IAI)21ConceptUse numerical results of ASP analyses to indicate fleet performanceIncreases with number of precursorsIncreases with severity of precursorsDefinitionTCY= total calendar yearsMI= # initiating event precursorsMC= # degraded condition precursorsCCDP= conditional core damage probabilityCDP= change in core damage probabilityOther Uses 220.0E+001.0E-052.0E-053.0E-054.0E-055.0E-056.0E-057.0E-058.0E-05Significant Precursors"Original" PrecursorsLOOP PrecursorsAll Other PrecursorsCalendar YearIntegrated ASP IndexOther Uses Relationship with Fleet CDF?23A simple estimator, following Apostolakis and Mosleh (1979):Addresses aleatory uncertaintySame mathematical foundation as basic PRA (Barlow and Proschan, 1965)Other Uses Concept: use statistical estimates of CDF with CCDPs serving as dataProposed in early days of precursor analysis (1980s)Possibly reviving as part of statistical approaches using actual accidents (e.g., TMI-2, Chernobyl, Fukushima)Some earlier technical challenges have been addressed (e.g., more detailed models)Continuing technical challenges include:Model limitations (shared with prospective PRA)modeling, neglect of hazard variationsIncorporating full set of knowledge built into PRAs (e.g., risk from scenarios not involved in actual incident) 24Other Uses CommentsRetrospective PRA is an extremely valuable source of information generally overlooked by the broader PRA communityPRA-oriented, structured view of actual eventsPrioritization of issues needing attentionCurrent programmatic challenges to retrospective PRA analyses include:Resources spent on arguments over modeling and analysis resultsQuestions of added value given existing OpEprograms (e.g., NRC OpEClearinghouse)vs. what we can learn from different approaches)25 NRC OpEClearinghouse26ScreeningCommunicationEvaluationApplicationIncident Reporting System (IRS)International Nuclear Event Scale(INES)Bilateral ExchangesInternational OpEDaily Event Reports *Plant Status Reports *Licensee Event Reports *Part 21 Reports *INPO ReportsDomestic OpE: IndustryInspection Findings *Preliminary Notifications *Regional Project CallsConstruction ExperienceStudies/TrendsDomestic OpE: NRCOpE ClearinghouseGeneric Communications *OpE BriefingsCOMMunicationsPeriodic OpE NewsletterOpE NotesNotable OpETech Review Group ReportInforming StakeholdersInspection *Licensing *Influencing Agency programsRulemaking *Information Request *Taking Regulatory ActionsStorageOpE ProgramInputsProducts* Available on the public NRC Web Page}}
{{#Wiki_filter:Retrospective PRA Lecture 7-1 1
 
Course Overview Schedule Wednesday 1/16            Thursday 1/17              Friday 1/18              Tuesday 1/22            Wednesday 1/23 3: Characterizing                                 7: Learning from Module      1: Introduction Uncertainty 5: Basic Events Operational Events 9: The PRA Frontier L3-1: Probabilistic     L5-1: Evidence and                                 L9-1: Challenges for NPP 9:00-9:45  L1-1: What is RIDM?
modeling for NPP PRA    estimation L7-1: Retrospective PRA PRA 9:45-10:00 Break                    Break                    Break                    Break                    Break L1-2: RIDM in the nuclear L3-2: Uncertainty and   L5-2: Human Reliability   L7-2: Notable events and L9-2: Improved PRA using 10:00-11:00 industry                  uncertainties            Analysis (HRA)            lessons for PRA          existing technology L9-3: The frontier: grand W1: Risk-informed         W2: Characterizing                                 W6: Retrospective 11:00-12:00 thinking                  uncertainties W4: Bayesian estimation Analysis challenges and advanced methods 12:00-1:30  Lunch                    Lunch                    Lunch                    Lunch                    Lunch 4: Accident             6: Special Technical     8: Applications and Module      2: PRA Overview                                                                                        10: Recap Sequence Modeling        Topics                    Challenges L8-1: Risk-informed L2-1: NPP PRA and RIDM:                                                     regulatory applications 1:30-2:15  early history L4-1: Initiating events  L6-1: Dependent failures L8-2: PRA and RIDM L10-1: Summary and closing remarks infrastructure 2:15-2:30   Break                    Break                    Break                    Break L2-2: NPP PRA models     L4-2: Modeling plant and L6-2: Spatial hazards and L8-3: Risk-informed fire Discussion: course 2:30-3:30  and results              system response          dependencies              protection                feedback L6-3: Other operational L2-3: PRA and RIDM:       W3: Plant systems       modes 3:30-4:30  point-counterpoint        modeling                L6-4: Level 2/3 PRA:
L8-4: Risk communication  Open Discussion beyond core damage 4:30-4:45   Break                    Break                    Break                    Break W3: Plant systems       W5: External Hazards 4:45-5:30                            modeling (cont.)         modeling Open Discussion                                                              Open Discussion 5:30-6:00                            Open Discussion         Open Discussion 2
 
Overview Learning Objectives
* Retrospective PRA - concept and use
* NRC Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program and key results
* Related activities
* Other uses 3
 
Overview Resources
* I. Gifford, C. Hunter, and A. Gilbertson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Accident Sequence Precursor Program: 2017 Annual Report, May 2018. (ADAMS ML18130A856)
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/research/asp.html
* N. Siu, et al., Accidents, near misses, and probabilistic analysis:
on the use of CCDPs in enterprise risk monitoring and management, Proceedings of ANS International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA 2017), Pittsburgh, PA, September 24-28, 2017.
4
 
Overview Other References
* K.A. Coyne, Risk-Informed Regulation at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 14, 2016. (ADAMS ML16105A427)
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Workshop on the Use of PRA Methodology for the Analysis of Reactor Events and Operational Data, NUREG/CP-0124, 1992.
* V.M. Bier (ed.), Accident Sequence Precursors and Probabilistic Risk Analysis, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 1998.
* Nuclear Energy Agency, Proceedings of the Workshop on Precursor Analysis, NEA/CSNI/R(2003)11, 2003.
* J.R. Phimister, V.M. Bier, and H.C. Kunreuther, Accident Precursor Analysis and Management: Reducing Technological Risk Through Diligence, Committee on Precursors, National Academy of Engineering, National Academies Press, New York, 2004.
* J.W. Minarick and C.A. Kukielka, Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents: 1969-1979, a Status Report, NUREG/CR-2497, June 1982.
* G. Apostolakis and A. Mosleh, Expert opinion and statistical evidence: an application to reactor core melt frequency, Nuclear Science and Engineering, 70, 135-149, 1979.
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ROP References https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight/program-documents.html
* U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Incident Investigation Program, Management Directive 8.3, June 25, 2014. (ADAMS ML13175A294) 5
 
Concept and Use What is a Retrospective PRA?
* Preceding lectures address prospective PRA analysis
    - identifying and prioritizing possibilities to assist forward-looking decision making
* Retrospective PRA analysis applies a PRA modeling framework and what-if thinking to past events: how close did an incident come to becoming an accident?
What can go wrong?                   What could have gone wrong?
What are the consequences?          What would have been the How likely is it?                    consequences?
How likely was it?
6
 
Concept and Use Why Use Retrospective PRA?
* Support risk-informed prioritization of events for attention and further investigation, possible early warning signals
* Support risk-informed, graded responses to inspection findings
* Provide a different (but still risk-oriented) perspective on plant safety 7
 
Concept and Use Early Warning Potential
* Davis-Besse (1977) - LER 346/77-016
    - Partial loss of feedwater; stuck-open pressurizer PORV; operators failed to recognize stuck-open PORV
    - CCDP = 7x10-2 (analysis ~1982)*
* Three Mile Island 2 (1979) - LER 320/79-012
    - Total loss of feedwater; stuck-open pressurizer PORV; operators failed to recognize stuck-open PORV; subsequent operator errors led to core damage                      Adapted from cover page, M. Rogovin and G.T, Frampton, Jr.,
Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Review
    - CCDP = 1                                                Group, January 1980.
  *Based on then-current models. Current estimate ~1E-3 (still a significant precursor).                                                                                                8
 
Concept and Use Reminder - NRC Regulatory Functions 9
 
ASP Program Accident Sequence Precursor Program
* Program recommended by WASH-1400 review group (1978)                                                                         significant precursor
* Provides risk-informed view of nuclear plant operating experience
    - CCDP (events)
    - DCDP (conditions)                                                                                             precursor
* Supports reports to Congress*
* Supported by plant-specific Standardized Plant Analysis Risk                     Licensee Event Reports 1969-2017 models                                            (No significant precursors since 2002)
I. Gifford, C. Hunter, and A. Gilbertson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Accident Sequence Precursor Program: 2017 Annual Report, May 2018.
(ADAMS ML18130A856)
  *Reports: Abnormal Occurrence, Congressional Budget Justification, Performance and Accountability                                                                                        10
 
ASP Program Key Metrics Events                      Conditions Conditional Core Damage     Change in core damage Probability (CCDP):         frequency (DCDP):*
l       
                              *Calculated for the duration of the condition. 11
 
ASP Program Knowledge Check f3 f2 f1 CCDP = ?   VA    P1    VA P3 P2 12
 
ASP Program Top U.S. Precursors CCDP/ Event    Plant Plant          Description DCDP    Date    Type Cable tray fire caused extensive damage and loss of electrical power to safety Browns Ferry 1                                                                                      0.4 03/22/1975 BWR systems Failure of non-nuclear instrumentation leads to reactor trip and steam generator Rancho Seco                                                                                          0.3 03/20/1978 PWR dry out.
Reactor trip results in loss of feedwater with subsequent failure of isolation Oyster Creek                                                                                        0.03 05/02/1979 BWR condenser.
Davis-Besse    Both emergency feedwater pumps found inoperable during testing                      0.03 12/11/1977 PWR Kewaunee      Clogged suction strainers for emergency feedwater pumps                              0.03 11/05/1975 PWR Turkey Point 3 Failure of three emergency feedwater pumps to start during test                      0.03 05/08/1974 PWR Point Beach 1  Clogged suction strainers for emergency feedwater pumps                              0.03 04/07/1974 PWR La Crosse      Loss of offsite power due to switchyard fire                                        0.02 03/24/1971 BWR Loss of feedwater; scram; operator error fails emergency feedwater; power-Davis-Besse                                                                                        0.01 06/09/1985 PWR operated relief valve fails open.
Reactor trip with subsequent failure of high-pressure coolant injection pump to Hatch 2                                                                                            0.01 06/03/1979 BWR start and reactor core isolation cooling unavailable.
Farley 1      Reactor trip with all emergency feedwater pumps ineffective                          0.01 03/25/1978 PWR Blown fuse leads to partial loss of feedwater and subsequent reactor trip; reactor Cooper        core isolation cooling and high-pressure coolant injection pump fail to reach rated 0.01 08/03/1977 BWR speed Millstone 2    Loss of offsite power with failure of emergency diesel generator load shed signals  0.01 07/20/1976 PWR Loss of offsite power due to ice storm with failure of emergency diesel generator Haddam Neck                                                                                        0.01 01/19/1974 PWR service water pump to start 13
 
ASP Program Most Recent Significant Precursors CCDP/   Event    Plant Plant          Description DCDP    Date    Type Reactor pressure vessel head leakage of control rod drive mechanism nozzles, Davis-Besse    potential unavailability of sump recirculation due to screen plugging, and potential     0.006 02/27/2002 PWR unavailability of boron precipitation control.
Plant-centered loss of offsite power (transformer ground faults) with an emergency Catawba 2                                                                                              0.002 02/06/1996 PWR diesel generator unavailable due to maintenance Reactor coolant system blowdown (9,200 gallons) to the refueling water storage Wolf Creek                                                                                              0.003 09/17/1994 PWR tank High-pressure injection unavailable for one refueling cycle because of inoperable Shearon Harris                                                                                          0.006 04/03/1991 PWR alternate minimum flow valves Turbine load loss with trip; control rod drive auto insert fails; manual reactor trip; Turkey Point 3                                                                                          0.001 12/27/1986 PWR power-operated relief valve sticks open CVCS system leak (130 gpm) from the component cooling water/CVCS heat Catawba 1                                                                                              0.003 06/13/1986 PWR exchanger joint (i.e., small-break loss-of-coolant accident)
Loss of feedwater; scram; operator error fails emergency feedwater; power-Davis-Besse                                                                                            0.01  06/09/1985 PWR operated relief valve fails open Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) water shorts panel; safety relief Hatch 1        valve fails open; high-pressure coolant injection fails; reactor core isolation cooling 0.002 05/15/1985 BWR unavailable Operator error causes scram; reactor core isolation cooling unavailable; residual La Salle 1                                                                                              0.002 09/21/1984 BWR heat removal unavailable Salem 1        Trip with automatic reactor trip capability failed                                      0.005 02/25/1983 PWR 14
 
Related Activities Other Precursor Activities
* Past Workshops
  - Annapolis, MD, 1992 (NUREG/CP-0124)
  - Madison, WI, 1995 (Bier, 1998)
  - Brussels, Belgium, 2001 (NEA, 2003)
  - Washington, DC, 2003 (Phimister, 2004)
* PSA-Based Event Analysis (PSAEA)
  - Annual international workshops led by Belgium
  - Exchange results and experiences 15
 
Related Activities Significance Determination Process DCDF < 1E-6
* Part of Reactor Oversight Program                DLERF < 1E-7
* Determines significance of findings
  -  Characterize performance deficiency      1E-6 < DCDF < 1E-5
  -  Use review panel (if required)           1E-7 < DLERF < 1E-6
  -  Obtain licensee perspective
  -  Finalize                                  1E-5 < DCDF < 1E-4
* Differences from ASP                        1E-6 < DLERF < 1E-5
  - Supports fault finding and response
  - Focuses on a single performance               DCDF > 1E-4 deficiency (i.e., not necessarily the       DLERF > 1E-5 combined effect of anomalies)
  - Results are broad categories (colors) CDF = Core damage frequency LERF = Large early release frequency 16
 
Related Activities Incident Investigation
* Management Directive (MD) 8.3
* Determines NRC response to an incident
  -  No additional inspection
  -  Special Inspection Team (SIT)
  -  Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)
  -  Incident Inspection Team (IIT)
* Differences from ASP
  - Quick turnaround                Adapted from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Incident Investigation Program, Management Directive 8.3, June 25, 2014. (ADAMS ML13175A294)
  - Determines level of reactive inspection 17
 
Related Activities Example: Robinson Fire (3/28/2010)
* Electrical fault causes fire and subsequent reactor trip with losses of main feedwater (MFW) and reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection/cooling (LER 261-10-002)
* Incident Response (MD 8.3)
    -  CCDP = 4x10-5 => augmented inspection
    -  Initial evaluation recommended a special inspection; loss of RCP seal injection/cooling not known at the time
* Significance Determination Process (SDP)
    -  Two White findings: licensee performance deficiencies involving inadequate training and procedures.
    -  Five Green findings
* Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP)
    -  CCDP = 4x10-4
    -  Non-recoverable loss of MFW modeled with RCP seal injection diverted away from RCP seals (unknown to operators) and component cooling water (CCW) isolated via return isolation valve (recovered by operators).
18
 
Related Activities IAEA/NEA International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)
Level Description
* Tool for communicating event safety significance to the public                                                              7        Major Accident
* Logarithmic scale for severity                                                              6        Serious Accident
* Considers impacts on                                                                                  Accident with Wider People and the environment                                                      5        Consequences Radiological barriers and control                                                        Accident with Local Defence in depth                                                                4        Consequences
* Voluntary use by Member States                                                              3        Serious Incident
* Not a notification or reporting system for 2        Incident emergency response 1        Anomaly International Atomic Energy Agency, INES: The International Nuclear And Radiological Event Scale, Users Manual, 2008 Edition, &#xa9; IAEA, 2013.
https://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10508/INES-The-International-Nuclear-and-Radiological-Event-Scale-User-s-Manual-2008-Edition 19
 
Other Uses Other (Potential) Uses of Retrospective PRA
* Fleet health index
* Alternative method to estimate average CDF 20
 
Other Uses Integrated ASP Index (IAI)
* Concept
    - Use numerical results of ASP analyses to indicate fleet performance
    - Increases with number of precursors
    - Increases with severity of precursors
* Definition TCY = total calendar years
 
1                            MI = # initiating event precursors
  =      +            MC = # degraded condition precursors CCDP = conditional core damage probability
          =1        =1 DCDP = change in core damage probability 21
 
Other Uses 8.0E-05 7.0E-05                                    Significant Precursors "Original" Precursors Integrated ASP Index 6.0E-05 LOOP Precursors 5.0E-05 All Other Precursors 4.0E-05 3.0E-05 2.0E-05 1.0E-05 0.0E+00 Calendar Year Adapted from: I. Gifford, C. Hunter, and J. Nakoski, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Accident Sequence Precursor Program: 2016 Annual Report, May 2017. (ML17153A366)                                                               22
 
Other Uses Relationship with Fleet CDF?
 
                                = 
                                              =1 A simple estimator, following Apostolakis and Mosleh (1979):
                ,
1                      1                    1     
 
  =                  =              =
0         
                =1    =1              =1
* Addresses aleatory uncertainty 1                1
 
    =        =            = 1
* Same mathematical foundation as basic PRA (Barlow and
                    =1              =1 Proschan, 1965) 23
 
Other Uses An Alternative to Standard PRA?
* Concept: use statistical estimates of CDF with CCDPs serving as data
  - Proposed in early days of precursor analysis (1980s)
  - Possibly reviving as part of statistical approaches using actual accidents (e.g., TMI-2, Chernobyl, Fukushima)
* Some earlier technical challenges have been addressed (e.g.,
more detailed models)
* Continuing technical challenges include:
  - Model limitations (shared with prospective PRA)
  - Specifying the analysis conditions (the givens): failure memory modeling, neglect of hazard variations
  - Incorporating full set of knowledge built into PRAs (e.g., risk from scenarios not involved in actual incident) 24
 
Comments
* Retrospective PRA is an extremely valuable source of information generally overlooked by the broader PRA community
  - PRA-oriented, structured view of actual events
  - Prioritization of issues needing attention
* Current programmatic challenges to retrospective PRA analyses include:
  - Resources spent on arguments over modeling and analysis results
  - Questions of added value given existing OpE programs (e.g., NRC OpE Clearinghouse)
  - Potential for increased polarization (which is the right approach, vs. what we can learn from different approaches) 25
 
NRC OpE Clearinghouse Inputs                    OpE Program            Products Domestic OpE: Industry Influencing Agency programs Daily Event Reports
* Plant Status Reports
* Inspection
* Licensee Event Reports
* Licensing
* Part 21 Reports
* INPO Reports OpE Clearinghouse    Informing Stakeholders Domestic OpE: NRC                Screening Generic Communications
* Inspection Findings
* OpE Briefings Preliminary Notifications
* Communication            COMMunications Regional Project Calls                            Periodic OpE Newsletter Construction Experience          Evaluation                OpE Notes Studies/Trends                                      Notable OpE Tech Review Group Report International OpE                Application Incident Reporting System (IRS)                      Taking Regulatory Actions International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)                  Storage                  Rulemaking
* Bilateral Exchanges Information Request *
* Available on the public NRC Web Page                                             26}}

Revision as of 07:54, 20 October 2019

Lecture 7-1 Retrospective PRA 2019-01-22
ML19011A436
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Issue date: 01/16/2019
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Text

Retrospective PRA Lecture 7-1 1

Course Overview Schedule Wednesday 1/16 Thursday 1/17 Friday 1/18 Tuesday 1/22 Wednesday 1/23 3: Characterizing 7: Learning from Module 1: Introduction Uncertainty 5: Basic Events Operational Events 9: The PRA Frontier L3-1: Probabilistic L5-1: Evidence and L9-1: Challenges for NPP 9:00-9:45 L1-1: What is RIDM?

modeling for NPP PRA estimation L7-1: Retrospective PRA PRA 9:45-10:00 Break Break Break Break Break L1-2: RIDM in the nuclear L3-2: Uncertainty and L5-2: Human Reliability L7-2: Notable events and L9-2: Improved PRA using 10:00-11:00 industry uncertainties Analysis (HRA) lessons for PRA existing technology L9-3: The frontier: grand W1: Risk-informed W2: Characterizing W6: Retrospective 11:00-12:00 thinking uncertainties W4: Bayesian estimation Analysis challenges and advanced methods 12:00-1:30 Lunch Lunch Lunch Lunch Lunch 4: Accident 6: Special Technical 8: Applications and Module 2: PRA Overview 10: Recap Sequence Modeling Topics Challenges L8-1: Risk-informed L2-1: NPP PRA and RIDM: regulatory applications 1:30-2:15 early history L4-1: Initiating events L6-1: Dependent failures L8-2: PRA and RIDM L10-1: Summary and closing remarks infrastructure 2:15-2:30 Break Break Break Break L2-2: NPP PRA models L4-2: Modeling plant and L6-2: Spatial hazards and L8-3: Risk-informed fire Discussion: course 2:30-3:30 and results system response dependencies protection feedback L6-3: Other operational L2-3: PRA and RIDM: W3: Plant systems modes 3:30-4:30 point-counterpoint modeling L6-4: Level 2/3 PRA:

L8-4: Risk communication Open Discussion beyond core damage 4:30-4:45 Break Break Break Break W3: Plant systems W5: External Hazards 4:45-5:30 modeling (cont.) modeling Open Discussion Open Discussion 5:30-6:00 Open Discussion Open Discussion 2

Overview Learning Objectives

  • Retrospective PRA - concept and use
  • NRC Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) program and key results
  • Related activities
  • Other uses 3

Overview Resources

  • I. Gifford, C. Hunter, and A. Gilbertson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Accident Sequence Precursor Program: 2017 Annual Report, May 2018. (ADAMS ML18130A856)
  • N. Siu, et al., Accidents, near misses, and probabilistic analysis:

on the use of CCDPs in enterprise risk monitoring and management, Proceedings of ANS International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA 2017), Pittsburgh, PA, September 24-28, 2017.

4

Overview Other References

  • K.A. Coyne, Risk-Informed Regulation at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 14, 2016. (ADAMS ML16105A427)
  • U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Workshop on the Use of PRA Methodology for the Analysis of Reactor Events and Operational Data, NUREG/CP-0124, 1992.
  • V.M. Bier (ed.), Accident Sequence Precursors and Probabilistic Risk Analysis, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, 1998.
  • Nuclear Energy Agency, Proceedings of the Workshop on Precursor Analysis, NEA/CSNI/R(2003)11, 2003.
  • J.R. Phimister, V.M. Bier, and H.C. Kunreuther, Accident Precursor Analysis and Management: Reducing Technological Risk Through Diligence, Committee on Precursors, National Academy of Engineering, National Academies Press, New York, 2004.
  • J.W. Minarick and C.A. Kukielka, Precursors to Potential Severe Core Damage Accidents: 1969-1979, a Status Report, NUREG/CR-2497, June 1982.
  • G. Apostolakis and A. Mosleh, Expert opinion and statistical evidence: an application to reactor core melt frequency, Nuclear Science and Engineering, 70, 135-149, 1979.

Concept and Use What is a Retrospective PRA?

  • Preceding lectures address prospective PRA analysis

- identifying and prioritizing possibilities to assist forward-looking decision making

  • Retrospective PRA analysis applies a PRA modeling framework and what-if thinking to past events: how close did an incident come to becoming an accident?

What can go wrong? What could have gone wrong?

What are the consequences? What would have been the How likely is it? consequences?

How likely was it?

6

Concept and Use Why Use Retrospective PRA?

  • Support risk-informed prioritization of events for attention and further investigation, possible early warning signals
  • Support risk-informed, graded responses to inspection findings
  • Provide a different (but still risk-oriented) perspective on plant safety 7

Concept and Use Early Warning Potential

- Partial loss of feedwater; stuck-open pressurizer PORV; operators failed to recognize stuck-open PORV

- CCDP = 7x10-2 (analysis ~1982)*

- Total loss of feedwater; stuck-open pressurizer PORV; operators failed to recognize stuck-open PORV; subsequent operator errors led to core damage Adapted from cover page, M. Rogovin and G.T, Frampton, Jr.,

Three Mile Island: A Report to the Commissioners and to the Public, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Special Review

- CCDP = 1 Group, January 1980.

  • Based on then-current models. Current estimate ~1E-3 (still a significant precursor). 8

Concept and Use Reminder - NRC Regulatory Functions 9

ASP Program Accident Sequence Precursor Program

  • Program recommended by WASH-1400 review group (1978) significant precursor
  • Provides risk-informed view of nuclear plant operating experience

- CCDP (events)

- DCDP (conditions) precursor

  • Supports reports to Congress*
  • Supported by plant-specific Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Licensee Event Reports 1969-2017 models (No significant precursors since 2002)

I. Gifford, C. Hunter, and A. Gilbertson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Accident Sequence Precursor Program: 2017 Annual Report, May 2018.

(ADAMS ML18130A856)

  • Reports: Abnormal Occurrence, Congressional Budget Justification, Performance and Accountability 10

ASP Program Key Metrics Events Conditions Conditional Core Damage Change in core damage Probability (CCDP): frequency (DCDP):*

l

  • Calculated for the duration of the condition. 11

ASP Program Knowledge Check f3 f2 f1 CCDP = ? VA P1 VA P3 P2 12

ASP Program Top U.S. Precursors CCDP/ Event Plant Plant Description DCDP Date Type Cable tray fire caused extensive damage and loss of electrical power to safety Browns Ferry 1 0.4 03/22/1975 BWR systems Failure of non-nuclear instrumentation leads to reactor trip and steam generator Rancho Seco 0.3 03/20/1978 PWR dry out.

Reactor trip results in loss of feedwater with subsequent failure of isolation Oyster Creek 0.03 05/02/1979 BWR condenser.

Davis-Besse Both emergency feedwater pumps found inoperable during testing 0.03 12/11/1977 PWR Kewaunee Clogged suction strainers for emergency feedwater pumps 0.03 11/05/1975 PWR Turkey Point 3 Failure of three emergency feedwater pumps to start during test 0.03 05/08/1974 PWR Point Beach 1 Clogged suction strainers for emergency feedwater pumps 0.03 04/07/1974 PWR La Crosse Loss of offsite power due to switchyard fire 0.02 03/24/1971 BWR Loss of feedwater; scram; operator error fails emergency feedwater; power-Davis-Besse 0.01 06/09/1985 PWR operated relief valve fails open.

Reactor trip with subsequent failure of high-pressure coolant injection pump to Hatch 2 0.01 06/03/1979 BWR start and reactor core isolation cooling unavailable.

Farley 1 Reactor trip with all emergency feedwater pumps ineffective 0.01 03/25/1978 PWR Blown fuse leads to partial loss of feedwater and subsequent reactor trip; reactor Cooper core isolation cooling and high-pressure coolant injection pump fail to reach rated 0.01 08/03/1977 BWR speed Millstone 2 Loss of offsite power with failure of emergency diesel generator load shed signals 0.01 07/20/1976 PWR Loss of offsite power due to ice storm with failure of emergency diesel generator Haddam Neck 0.01 01/19/1974 PWR service water pump to start 13

ASP Program Most Recent Significant Precursors CCDP/ Event Plant Plant Description DCDP Date Type Reactor pressure vessel head leakage of control rod drive mechanism nozzles, Davis-Besse potential unavailability of sump recirculation due to screen plugging, and potential 0.006 02/27/2002 PWR unavailability of boron precipitation control.

Plant-centered loss of offsite power (transformer ground faults) with an emergency Catawba 2 0.002 02/06/1996 PWR diesel generator unavailable due to maintenance Reactor coolant system blowdown (9,200 gallons) to the refueling water storage Wolf Creek 0.003 09/17/1994 PWR tank High-pressure injection unavailable for one refueling cycle because of inoperable Shearon Harris 0.006 04/03/1991 PWR alternate minimum flow valves Turbine load loss with trip; control rod drive auto insert fails; manual reactor trip; Turkey Point 3 0.001 12/27/1986 PWR power-operated relief valve sticks open CVCS system leak (130 gpm) from the component cooling water/CVCS heat Catawba 1 0.003 06/13/1986 PWR exchanger joint (i.e., small-break loss-of-coolant accident)

Loss of feedwater; scram; operator error fails emergency feedwater; power-Davis-Besse 0.01 06/09/1985 PWR operated relief valve fails open Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) water shorts panel; safety relief Hatch 1 valve fails open; high-pressure coolant injection fails; reactor core isolation cooling 0.002 05/15/1985 BWR unavailable Operator error causes scram; reactor core isolation cooling unavailable; residual La Salle 1 0.002 09/21/1984 BWR heat removal unavailable Salem 1 Trip with automatic reactor trip capability failed 0.005 02/25/1983 PWR 14

Related Activities Other Precursor Activities

  • Past Workshops

- Annapolis, MD, 1992 (NUREG/CP-0124)

- Madison, WI, 1995 (Bier, 1998)

- Brussels, Belgium, 2001 (NEA, 2003)

- Washington, DC, 2003 (Phimister, 2004)

  • PSA-Based Event Analysis (PSAEA)

- Annual international workshops led by Belgium

- Exchange results and experiences 15

Related Activities Significance Determination Process DCDF < 1E-6

  • Part of Reactor Oversight Program DLERF < 1E-7
  • Determines significance of findings

- Characterize performance deficiency 1E-6 < DCDF < 1E-5

- Use review panel (if required) 1E-7 < DLERF < 1E-6

- Obtain licensee perspective

- Finalize 1E-5 < DCDF < 1E-4

- Supports fault finding and response

- Focuses on a single performance DCDF > 1E-4 deficiency (i.e., not necessarily the DLERF > 1E-5 combined effect of anomalies)

- Results are broad categories (colors) CDF = Core damage frequency LERF = Large early release frequency 16

Related Activities Incident Investigation

  • Management Directive (MD) 8.3
  • Determines NRC response to an incident

- No additional inspection

- Special Inspection Team (SIT)

- Augmented Inspection Team (AIT)

- Incident Inspection Team (IIT)

  • Differences from ASP

- Quick turnaround Adapted from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Incident Investigation Program, Management Directive 8.3, June 25, 2014. (ADAMS ML13175A294)

- Determines level of reactive inspection 17

Related Activities Example: Robinson Fire (3/28/2010)

- CCDP = 4x10-5 => augmented inspection

- Initial evaluation recommended a special inspection; loss of RCP seal injection/cooling not known at the time

- Two White findings: licensee performance deficiencies involving inadequate training and procedures.

- Five Green findings

  • Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP)

- CCDP = 4x10-4

- Non-recoverable loss of MFW modeled with RCP seal injection diverted away from RCP seals (unknown to operators) and component cooling water (CCW) isolated via return isolation valve (recovered by operators).

18

Related Activities IAEA/NEA International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES)

Level Description

  • Tool for communicating event safety significance to the public 7 Major Accident
  • Logarithmic scale for severity 6 Serious Accident
  • Considers impacts on Accident with Wider People and the environment 5 Consequences Radiological barriers and control Accident with Local Defence in depth 4 Consequences
  • Voluntary use by Member States 3 Serious Incident
  • Not a notification or reporting system for 2 Incident emergency response 1 Anomaly International Atomic Energy Agency, INES: The International Nuclear And Radiological Event Scale, Users Manual, 2008 Edition, © IAEA, 2013.

https://www-pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/10508/INES-The-International-Nuclear-and-Radiological-Event-Scale-User-s-Manual-2008-Edition 19

Other Uses Other (Potential) Uses of Retrospective PRA

  • Fleet health index
  • Alternative method to estimate average CDF 20

Other Uses Integrated ASP Index (IAI)

  • Concept

- Use numerical results of ASP analyses to indicate fleet performance

- Increases with number of precursors

- Increases with severity of precursors

  • Definition TCY = total calendar years

1 MI = # initiating event precursors

= + MC = # degraded condition precursors CCDP = conditional core damage probability

=1 =1 DCDP = change in core damage probability 21

Other Uses 8.0E-05 7.0E-05 Significant Precursors "Original" Precursors Integrated ASP Index 6.0E-05 LOOP Precursors 5.0E-05 All Other Precursors 4.0E-05 3.0E-05 2.0E-05 1.0E-05 0.0E+00 Calendar Year Adapted from: I. Gifford, C. Hunter, and J. Nakoski, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Accident Sequence Precursor Program: 2016 Annual Report, May 2017. (ML17153A366) 22

Other Uses Relationship with Fleet CDF?

=

=1 A simple estimator, following Apostolakis and Mosleh (1979):

,

1 1 1

=

0

=1 =1 =1

  • Addresses aleatory uncertainty 1 1

= = = 1

  • Same mathematical foundation as basic PRA (Barlow and

=1 =1 Proschan, 1965) 23

Other Uses An Alternative to Standard PRA?

  • Concept: use statistical estimates of CDF with CCDPs serving as data

- Proposed in early days of precursor analysis (1980s)

- Possibly reviving as part of statistical approaches using actual accidents (e.g., TMI-2, Chernobyl, Fukushima)

  • Some earlier technical challenges have been addressed (e.g.,

more detailed models)

  • Continuing technical challenges include:

- Model limitations (shared with prospective PRA)

- Specifying the analysis conditions (the givens): failure memory modeling, neglect of hazard variations

- Incorporating full set of knowledge built into PRAs (e.g., risk from scenarios not involved in actual incident) 24

Comments

  • Retrospective PRA is an extremely valuable source of information generally overlooked by the broader PRA community

- PRA-oriented, structured view of actual events

- Prioritization of issues needing attention

  • Current programmatic challenges to retrospective PRA analyses include:

- Resources spent on arguments over modeling and analysis results

- Questions of added value given existing OpE programs (e.g., NRC OpE Clearinghouse)

- Potential for increased polarization (which is the right approach, vs. what we can learn from different approaches) 25

NRC OpE Clearinghouse Inputs OpE Program Products Domestic OpE: Industry Influencing Agency programs Daily Event Reports

  • Plant Status Reports
  • Inspection
  • Licensee Event Reports
  • Licensing
  • Part 21 Reports
  • INPO Reports OpE Clearinghouse Informing Stakeholders Domestic OpE: NRC Screening Generic Communications
  • Inspection Findings
  • OpE Briefings Preliminary Notifications
  • Communication COMMunications Regional Project Calls Periodic OpE Newsletter Construction Experience Evaluation OpE Notes Studies/Trends Notable OpE Tech Review Group Report International OpE Application Incident Reporting System (IRS) Taking Regulatory Actions International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) Storage Rulemaking
  • Bilateral Exchanges Information Request *
  • Available on the public NRC Web Page 26