ML19011A441
| ML19011A441 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/16/2019 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research |
| To: | |
| Nathan Siu 415-0744 | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19011A416 | List:
|
| References | |
| Download: ML19011A441 (25) | |
Text
Risk Communication Lecture 8-4 1
Key Topics
- Definition
- Challenges
- Dos and Donts 2
Overview
Resources J.L. Marble, N. Siu, and K. Coyne, Risk communication within a risk-informed regulatory decision-making environment, Proceedings International Conference on Probabilistic Safety and Assessment (PSAM 11/ESREL 2012), Helsinki, Finland, June 25-29, 2012. (ADAMS ML120480139)
J. Persensky, et al., Effective Risk Communication: The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Guidelines for External Risk Communication, NUREG/BR-0308, January 2004.
A. Szabo, et al., Effective Risk Communication: Guidelines for Internal Risk Communication, NUREG/BR-0318, December 2004.
3 Overview
Other References National Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society, P.C. Stern and H.V. Fineberg (eds), National Academies Press, 1996.
V.T. Covello and F. Allen, Seven Cardinal Rules of Risk Communication, OPA-87-020, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 1988.
B. Fischhoff, Risk perception and communication unplugged: 20 years of process, Risk Analysis, 15, 137-145, 1995.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/ World Health Organization, Risk Characterization of Microbiological Hazards in Foods: Guidelines, Microbiological Risk Assessment Series, 17, Rome, 2009.
P.S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1978.
4 Overview
Defining Risk Communication For PRA/RIDM advocates usually viewed as
- imparting rather than interchange, education rather than dialog (information deficit model)
- a means to an end (a desired point of view, decision)
Note: educational approach
- Works for some, can be resented and resisted (equal and opposite reaction) by others
- Requires effort (apparent as well as actual) to understand audience needs
- Involves more than just the numbers - needs to address mental models of processes creating and controlling risk 5
Com*mu*ni*ca*tion, n. The imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information.
Definition
Points of Communication Breakdowns
- Between risk managers and public:
- Differences in perception of information
- Relevance
- Consistency with prior beliefs
- Lack of understanding of underlying science
- Conflicting agendas
- Failure to listen
- Trust
- Given breadth of risk problems, likely similar concerns with internal risk communication 6
Challenges
Different Perceptions of Information Perception is subjective => varies with stakeholders; beware of stereotypes (e.g., the public)
Relevance
- Does risk information address important issues?
- Is information timely? ( traffic cop vs. co-pilot)
Frameworks and language: what are we talking about?
- Technical, e.g., Risk {si, Ci, pi}
- Others, e.g., Risk Hazard + Outrage 7
Language is not merely a tool for human communication; language is itself a means by which the realities of the world are divided and viewed.
- P.S. Dull, 1978 Challenges
Relevance: Example Stakeholder Issues Appropriateness of PRA modeling concept of aleatory (random) failures to stakeholders domain of expertise
- Digital I&C
- Security-related applications Completeness of scenarios
- Acknowledged gaps (known unknowns)
- Unrecognized gaps (unknown unknowns)
Relevance of computed consequence metrics to values
- Personal impact (non-radiological effects, disruption)
- Impact on particular groups (sensitive cohorts)
- Environment (contamination)
Scope of risk management actions 8
Lack of Understanding Simplifications Can be affected by personal preferences of actors (communicators and recipients) and by organizational processes Require considerable effort (messaging)
Can be overdone => sound bites, memes Education is only part of solution Emphasize science/engineering, not math Intended recipient needs to be receptive Major decision problems can last for years
=> educational strategy needs to account for stakeholder changes 9
Challenges Aleatory Risk information is broad, complex, and uncertain - unrealistic to expect effective communication of all details?
Conflicting Agendas
- Neutral: Interchange to inform upcoming decisions
- Advocacy
- Persuade (e.g., desired responses to emergency directions, acceptance of nuclear technology, relaxation of regulatory criteria and processes)
- Rationalize past decisions 10 Risk Information Challenges
Failure to Listen
- Failure to hear underlying questions and concerns
- Various drivers
- Social (e.g., anxiety to achieve objective, make a key point, demonstrate expertise, establish hierarchy)
- Cultural differences (e.g., frameworks, language)
- Common behaviors
- Ignoring
- Talking over
- Helpful translation
- Leads to polarization, increasing barriers to communication 11 Challenges
Trust
- Critical to effective communication
- Is a result of social processes
- Can be difficult to gain, easy to lose
- For complex subjects, can be a substitute for understanding
- Past relationships (rapport) and credentials can be important
- Can be affected by demonstrated actions, e.g.,
- Right actions demonstrating shared values
- Acceptance of new information 12 Challenges
Communication Considerations Communications 101
- Why are we communicating?
- Who is our audience?
- What do our audiences want to know?
- How will we communicate?
- How will we respond?
- Who will carry out the plans? When?
- What problems or barriers have we planned for?
- Have we succeeded (in communicating)?
For risk communication
- Special challenges are technical (e.g., rarity of events, complexity of subject, analysis uncertainties) and organizational (importance =>
multiple stakeholders at different levels, multiple views => alternate sources, increased complexity)
- No cookbook beyond general good practices; need to treat as a dynamic, interactive process 13 Dos and Donts Social Aspect =>
No Easy Solution (One mans meat)
Sympathetic Listening:
Critical to trust by some
Viewed as sign of weakness by others
Additional Cautions
- Be extremely careful when using PRA to prove plant safety
- Technical limitations (particularly completeness uncertainties)
- Long experience (starting with WASH-1400) =>
argument doesnt work with many stakeholders (often including intended target audience)
- Can lead to bad behaviors 14 Dos and Donts
WASH-1400 (1975) 15 Dos and Donts
Current Discussions on Safety Margins and Regulatory Relaxation 16 Dos and Donts G. Krueger and F. Ferrante, Facilitating Regulatory Change through an Understanding of the Current Levels of Safety, November 28, 2018 (ADAMS ML18331A373).
Additional Cautions
- Recognize framing effect, sometimes resulting from simplifications during communication
- Metric
- Frequency vs. probability
- Radiological vs. all effects
- Unit of analysis
- Single plant
- Fleet 17 Dos and Donts
Additional Cautions
- Recognize human heuristics for dealing with uncertain information (e.g., representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment) and resulting biases.
- Examples
- Desire for certainty (one-handed scientist)
- Responses to different presentation modes
- Analytics vs. stories
- Biasing from video 18 Dos and Donts
Analytics vs. Narratives (Stories)
BAC 0.08 State Total Number MA 316 96 31 MD 513 159 31 USA 35,092 10,265 29 On the evening of June 25, 2015, Sam, Wootton High Schools star quarterback was going over 100 mph on a neighborhood road, trying to go fast enough to avoid speed camera detection
("whipping"). Out of control on a sweeping curve, the car hit a fence and two trees, and flipped. Two unbelted passengers were ejected and died at the scene. Sam and the front seat passenger were seriously injured. All four were teenagers. All had just left an underage drinking party and were drunk. Sam was indicted on counts of vehicular manslaughter, alcohol related vehicular homicide and causing a life-threatening injury while driving under the influence of alcohol. The parent of the girl hosting the party, pled guilty to two criminal citations for allowing underage drinking at his home and was ordered to pay $5,000 in fines.
19 Traffic Accident Fatalities (2015)
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts: Alcohol-Impaired Driving, DOT HS 812 350, December 2016.
Dos and Donts
Video - Some Subjects Are Easy
- 9/11
- Fire and Explosions
- Flood 20 Dos and Donts Simulation from Idaho National Laboratory research supported by the U.S.
Department of Energy https://safety.inl.gov/public/
OECD/NEA High Energy Arcing Fault (HEAF) Program Phase 1 Project information: http://www.oecd-nea.org/jointproj/heaf.html HEAF Video Tsunami Video
Others Require More Work (Story Telling +
Viewer Processing)
- Human Errors
- Successes/Safety 21 Dos and Donts Non-Event Video
Additional Cautions
- Be cognizant of potential unintended consequences
- Message persistence
- Unanticipated response to message 22 Dos and Donts
Message Persistence Recognize that risk communication aimed at supporting an immediate decision establishes anchors (knowledge, biases, attitudes) that can influence later decisions 23 Dos and Donts
Unanticipated Responses 24 Dos and Donts ID Fire PRA Issue ID Fire PRA Issue I1 Adequacy of fire events database P1 Circuit interactions I2 Scenario frequencies P2 Availability of safe shutdown equipment I3 Effect of plant operations, including comp measures P3 Fire scenario cognitive impact I4 Likelihood of severe fires P4 Impact of fire induced environment on operators E1 Source fire modeling P5 Role of fire brigade in plant response E2 Compartment fire modeling R1 Main control room fires E3 Multi-compartment fire modeling R2 Turbine building fires E4 Smoke generation and transport modeling R3 Containment fires H1 Circuit failure mode and likelihood R4 Seismic/fire interactions H2 Thermal fragilities R5 Multiple unit interactions H3 Smoke fragilities R6 Non-power and degraded conditions H4 Suppressant-related fragilities R7 Decommissioning and decontamination B1 Adequacy of data for active and passive barriers R8 Fire-induced non-reactor radiological releases B2 Barrier performance analysis tools R9 Flammable gas lines B3 Barrier qualification R10 Scenario dynamics B4 Penetration seals R11 Precursor analysis methods S1 Adequacy of detection time data R12 Uncertainty analysis S2 Fire protection system reliability/availability O1 Learning from experience S3 Suppression effectiveness (automatic, manual)
O2 Learning from others S4 Effect of compensatory measures on suppression O3 Comparison of methodologies S5 Scenario-specific detection and suppression analysis O4 Standardization of methods From: N. Siu, J.T. Chen, and E. Chelliah, Research Needs in Fire Risk Assessment, NUREG/CP-0162, Vol. 2, 1997.
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Looking Ahead - Beyond Paper?
Many displays based on paper forms
- Not always easy to understand
- Effectiveness in message transmission?
Retention?
Technology can enable different ways to engage audience
- Video
- Others?
- Interaction
- Immersion
- Non-visual Need to consider biases, appropriate balancing 25