ML19011A441

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Lecture 8-4 Risk Communication 2019-01-22
ML19011A441
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/16/2019
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
Nathan Siu 415-0744
Shared Package
ML19011A416 List:
References
Download: ML19011A441 (25)
v • d • e


Text

Risk Communication Lecture 8-4 1

Overview Key Topics

  • Definition
  • Challenges
  • Dos and Donts 2

Overview Resources

  • J.L. Marble, N. Siu, and K. Coyne, Risk communication within a risk-informed regulatory decision-making environment, Proceedings International Conference on Probabilistic Safety and Assessment (PSAM 11/ESREL 2012), Helsinki, Finland, June 25-29, 2012. (ADAMS ML120480139)
  • J. Persensky, et al., Effective Risk Communication: The Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Guidelines for External Risk Communication, NUREG/BR-0308, January 2004.
  • A. Szabo, et al., Effective Risk Communication: Guidelines for Internal Risk Communication, NUREG/BR-0318, December 2004.

3

Overview Other References

  • National Research Council, Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic Society, P.C. Stern and H.V. Fineberg (eds), National Academies Press, 1996.
  • B. Fischhoff, Risk perception and communication unplugged: 20 years of process, Risk Analysis, 15, 137-145, 1995.
  • Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/ World Health Organization, Risk Characterization of Microbiological Hazards in Foods: Guidelines, Microbiological Risk Assessment Series, 17, Rome, 2009.
  • P.S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy (1941-1945), Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1978.

4

Definition Defining Risk Communication Com*mu*ni*ca*tion, n. The imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information.

  • For PRA/RIDM advocates usually viewed as

- imparting rather than interchange, education rather than dialog (information deficit model)

- a means to an end (a desired point of view, decision)

  • Note: educational approach

- Works for some, can be resented and resisted (equal and opposite reaction) by others

- Requires effort (apparent as well as actual) to understand audience needs

- Involves more than just the numbers - needs to address mental models of processes creating and controlling risk 5

Challenges Points of Communication Breakdowns

  • Between risk managers and public:

- Differences in perception of information

  • Relevance
  • Consistency with prior beliefs

- Lack of understanding of underlying science

- Conflicting agendas

- Failure to listen

- Trust

  • Given breadth of risk problems, likely similar concerns with internal risk communication 6

Challenges Different Perceptions of Information

  • Perception is subjective => varies with stakeholders; beware of stereotypes (e.g., the public)
  • Relevance

- Does risk information address important issues?

- Is information timely? ( traffic cop vs. co-pilot)

  • Frameworks and language: what are we talking about?

- Technical, e.g., Risk {si, Ci, pi}

- Others, e.g., Risk Hazard + Outrage Language is not merely a tool for human communication; language is itself a means by which the realities of the world are divided and viewed.

- P.S. Dull, 1978 7

Relevance: Example Stakeholder Issues

  • Appropriateness of PRA modeling concept of aleatory (random) failures to stakeholders domain of expertise

- Digital I&C

- Security-related applications

  • Completeness of scenarios

- Acknowledged gaps (known unknowns)

- Unrecognized gaps (unknown unknowns)

  • Relevance of computed consequence metrics to values

- Personal impact (non-radiological effects, disruption)

- Impact on particular groups (sensitive cohorts)

- Environment (contamination)

  • Scope of risk management actions 8

Challenges Lack of Understanding Risk information is broad, complex, and uncertain - unrealistic to expect effective communication of all details?

  • Simplifications

- Can be affected by personal preferences of actors (communicators and recipients) and by organizational processes

- Require considerable effort (messaging)

- Can be overdone => sound bites, memes

  • Education is only part of solution Aleatory

- Emphasize science/engineering, not math

- Intended recipient needs to be receptive

- Major decision problems can last for years

=> educational strategy needs to account for stakeholder changes 9

Challenges Conflicting Agendas

  • Neutral: Interchange to inform upcoming decisions Risk Information
  • Advocacy

- Persuade (e.g., desired responses to emergency directions, acceptance of nuclear technology, relaxation of regulatory criteria and processes)

- Rationalize past decisions 10

Challenges Failure to Listen

  • Failure to hear underlying questions and concerns
  • Various drivers

- Social (e.g., anxiety to achieve objective, make a key point, demonstrate expertise, establish hierarchy)

- Cultural differences (e.g., frameworks, language)

  • Common behaviors

- Ignoring

- Talking over

- Helpful translation

  • Leads to polarization, increasing barriers to communication 11

Challenges Trust

  • Critical to effective communication
  • Is a result of social processes

- Can be difficult to gain, easy to lose

- For complex subjects, can be a substitute for understanding

- Past relationships (rapport) and credentials can be important

  • Can be affected by demonstrated actions, e.g.,

- Right actions demonstrating shared values

- Acceptance of new information 12

Dos and Donts Communication Considerations

  • Communications 101 Social Aspect =>

- Why are we communicating? No Easy Solution

- Who is our audience? (One mans meat)

- What do our audiences want to know?

Sympathetic Listening:

- How will we communicate? Critical to trust by some

- How will we respond? Viewed as sign of weakness by others

- Who will carry out the plans? When?

- What problems or barriers have we planned for?

- Have we succeeded (in communicating)?

  • For risk communication

- Special challenges are technical (e.g., rarity of events, complexity of subject, analysis uncertainties) and organizational (importance =>

multiple stakeholders at different levels, multiple views => alternate sources, increased complexity)

- No cookbook beyond general good practices; need to treat as a dynamic, interactive process 13

Dos and Donts Additional Cautions

  • Be extremely careful when using PRA to prove plant safety

- Technical limitations (particularly completeness uncertainties)

- Long experience (starting with WASH-1400) =>

argument doesnt work with many stakeholders (often including intended target audience)

- Can lead to bad behaviors 14

Dos and Donts WASH-1400 (1975) 15

Dos and Donts Current Discussions on Safety Margins and Regulatory Relaxation G. Krueger and F. Ferrante, Facilitating Regulatory Change through an Understanding of the Current Levels of Safety, November 28, 2018 (ADAMS ML18331A373).

16

Dos and Donts Additional Cautions

  • Recognize framing effect, sometimes resulting from simplifications during communication

- Metric

  • Frequency vs. probability
  • Radiological vs. all effects

- Unit of analysis

  • Single plant
  • Fleet 17

Dos and Donts Additional Cautions

  • Recognize human heuristics for dealing with uncertain information (e.g., representativeness, availability, anchoring and adjustment) and resulting biases.
  • Examples

- Desire for certainty (one-handed scientist)

- Responses to different presentation modes

  • Analytics vs. stories
  • Biasing from video 18

Dos and Donts Analytics vs. Narratives (Stories)

Traffic Accident Fatalities (2015) On the evening of June 25, 2015, Sam, Wootton High Schools star quarterback was going over 100 BAC 0.08 mph on a neighborhood road, trying to go fast State Total Number  % enough to avoid speed camera detection

("whipping"). Out of control on a sweeping curve, MA 316 96 31 the car hit a fence and two trees, and flipped. Two unbelted passengers were ejected and died at the MD 513 159 31 scene. Sam and the front seat passenger were seriously injured. All four were teenagers. All had USA 35,092 10,265 29 just left an underage drinking party and were National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts: Alcohol- drunk. Sam was indicted on counts of vehicular Impaired Driving, DOT HS 812 350, December 2016.

manslaughter, alcohol related vehicular homicide and causing a life-threatening injury while driving under the influence of alcohol. The parent of the girl hosting the party, pled guilty to two criminal citations for allowing underage drinking at his home and was ordered to pay $5,000 in fines.

19

Dos and Donts Video - Some Subjects Are Easy

  • Flood Tsunami Video Simulation from Idaho National Laboratory research supported by the U.S.

Department of Energy https://safety.inl.gov/public/ 20

Dos and Donts Others Require More Work (Story Telling +

Viewer Processing)

  • Human Errors
  • Successes/Safety Non-Event Video 21

Dos and Donts Additional Cautions

  • Be cognizant of potential unintended consequences

- Message persistence

- Unanticipated response to message 22

Dos and Donts Message Persistence Recognize that risk communication aimed at supporting an immediate decision establishes anchors (knowledge, biases, attitudes) that can influence later decisions 23

Dos and Donts Unanticipated Responses ID Fire PRA Issue ID Fire PRA Issue I1 Adequacy of fire events database P1 Circuit interactions I2 Scenario frequencies P2 Availability of safe shutdown equipment I3 Effect of plant operations, including comp measures P3 Fire scenario cognitive impact I4 Likelihood of severe fires P4 Impact of fire induced environment on operators E1 Source fire modeling P5 Role of fire brigade in plant response 42 E2 Compartment fire modeling R1 Main control room fires E3 Multi-compartment fire modeling R2 Turbine building fires E4 Smoke generation and transport modeling R3 Containment fires H1 Circuit failure mode and likelihood R4 Seismic/fire interactions H2 Thermal fragilities R5 Multiple unit interactions H3 Smoke fragilities R6 Non-power and degraded conditions H4 Suppressant-related fragilities R7 Decommissioning and decontamination B1 Adequacy of data for active and passive barriers R8 Fire-induced non-reactor radiological releases B2 Barrier performance analysis tools R9 Flammable gas lines B3 Barrier qualification R10 Scenario dynamics B4 Penetration seals R11 Precursor analysis methods S1 Adequacy of detection time data R12 Uncertainty analysis S2 Fire protection system reliability/availability O1 Learning from experience S3 Suppression effectiveness (automatic, manual) O2 Learning from others S4 Effect of compensatory measures on suppression O3 Comparison of methodologies S5 Scenario-specific detection and suppression analysis O4 Standardization of methods From: N. Siu, J.T. Chen, and E. Chelliah, Research Needs in Fire Risk Assessment, NUREG/CP-0162, Vol. 2, 1997.

24

Looking Ahead - Beyond Paper?

  • Many displays based on paper forms

- Not always easy to understand

- Effectiveness in message transmission?

Retention?

  • Technology can enable different ways to engage audience

- Video

- Others?

  • Interaction
  • Immersion
  • Non-visual
  • Need to consider biases, appropriate balancing 25
Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML19011A441&oldid=1916365"