ML063070472

October 2006 Exam - Final Section C Operating Exam (Folder 3)

ML063070472
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	09/15/2006
From:	AmerGen Energy Co
To:	D'Antonio J Operations Branch I
Sykes, Marvin D.
References
Download: ML063070472 (64)

Text

NRC 3 Page 1 of 24Scenario OutlineFacility: Oyster Creek

Scenario No.: NRC 3 Op Test No.:

NRC 2006-1 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: The plant is in 5-loop operation at 95% power. Cleanup Pump B is out of service for motor repair, and is expected to return to service tomorrow. Isolation Condenser System A was removed from service two hours ago and is isolated, due to motoroperated valve torque switch replacement. Technical Specifications applicability has been reviewed.The system is expected to return to an operable status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. IRM 14 failed during the control rod withdrawal to critical, and is BYPASSED. Technical Specificationsapplicability has been reviewed and an IR has been generated. Procedure 634.2.004, 24 Volt DC Battery Weekly Surveillance, is in progress.Turnover: Place Instrument Air Compressor #2 in LEAD and place Instrument Air compressor #1 in LAG IAWprocedure 334. A Non Licensed Operator and Field Supervisor are already in the field and will becontrolling the evolution. Control manipulations of the air compressors will be from the Control Room.Event No.Malf. No.Event Type*EventDescription 1N BOPSwaps Instrument Air compressors.2TS SRORespond to field report of loss of oil in Core Spray backup pump.

3 C TS BOP RO SRORespond to trip of Reactor Protection System (RPS) MG Set 1 andsingle control rod scram.

4C ROResponds to control rod high temperature.5RRORespond to loss of feedwater heating.

6C BOP RORespond to turbine high vibrations and turbine thrust bearing highannunciator with failure of turbine to auto trip.7MCrewRespond to break in cleanup system with failure to isolate.8CCrewRespond to failure of Reactor Building ventilation radiation monitorsto automatically initiate SGTS.*(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient, (TS) Tech Specs IC-65 NRC 3 Page 2 of 24Total Malfunctions (5-8):8Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)1 Abnormal Events (2-4)4 Major Transients (1-2)2 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)1 EOP Contingencies w/ substantive actions (0-2)1 Critical Tasks (2-3)2EventPlayerTypeDescription3ROCRespond to trip of RPS MG Set 1 and single control rod scram4ROCResponds to control rod high temperature5RORRespond to loss of FW heatingEventPlayerTypeDescription1BOPNSwaps Instrument Air compressors3BOPCRespond to trip of RPS MG Set 1 and single control rod scram6BOPCRespond to failure of turbine to auto tripEventPlayerTypeDescription6CrewMRespond to turbine high vibr ations and turbine thrust bearinghigh annunciator7CrewMRespond to break in cleanup system with failure to isolate8CrewC after EOPRespond to failure of RB vent radiation monitorsEventPlayerTypeDescription2SROTSRespond to field report of loss of oil in Core Spray backuppump (TS 3.4.A)3SROTSRespond to trip of RPS MG Set 1 and single control rod scram (TS 3.2)

NRC 3 Page 3 of 24 Scenario Summary1. The BOP will swap Instrument Air co mpressors IAW procedure 334, Instrument and Service Air System. (NORMAL EVOLUTION)2. A Non Licensed Operator will call the Control Room to explain that while onRounds, he's found a considerable amount of oil on the floor surrounding the core spray main backup pump NZ01C, and that the glass oil cup is broken. It is expected

that the SRO will declare the pump inoperable and apply Tech Specs 3.4.A. (TS)3. The crew will respond to the trip of RPS MG Set 1 and a single control rod scram to position 04 (RAP-G2c, ABN-6, CRD Fail ures, ABN-50, Loss of VMCC 1A2). The BOP will re-power the RPS Bus and the RO will reset 1/2 scram and 1/2 isolations. The Crew may attempt to manually insert t he scrammed control rod from 04-00. If attempted, the rod stuck malfunction will be deleted and the rod will insert fully. The SRO will review TS 3.2.B.4 and declare t he control rod inoperable, and valve-out the control rod at position at 04. (COMPONENT FAILURE) (ABN) (TS)

4. The RO will respond to a control rod high temperature alarm (RAP-H5c). The RO will apply stall flows IAW 617.4.002 (CRD Exer cise and Flow Test/IST Cooling Water Header Check Valve), which will clear the alarm. (COMPONENT FAILURE) (ABN)

5. The crew will respond to a loss of feedwat er heating. The SRO will direct a power reduction (ABN-17, Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions). (COMPONENTFAILURE) (ABN) (REACTIVITY MANIPULATION)

.6. Turbine vibration annunciators (Q3b) will alarm, and the turbine thrust bearing high alarm (Q2b) (causes auto turbine trip).

The turbine will fail to auto trip and can be successfully tripped by the operator. The scram will be successful and ABN-1 (Scram), and ABN-10 (Turbi ne Trip) will be entered. (COMPONENT FAILURE)(ABN) (MAJOR)

7. A cleanup system break occurs with failure of automatic isolation, and it cannot be isolated. Secondary Containment Control EO P is entered. Two areas (cleanup andcleanup pump/heat exchanger areas) will exceed MAX SAFE parameters and the SRO will direct Emergency Depressurizati on (IAW Emergency Depressurization -No ATWS) or may anticipate ED and direct a rapid RPV depressurization with ICs

and TBVs. (EOP) (MAJOR) (EOP CONTINGENCY)

8. As Reactor Building radiation levels ri se, the RB vent radiation monitors will increase to the setpoint of auto isolation of RB HVAC and auto start of SGT. Not all of these automatic actions will occur, but are expected to be performed by the operators. (COMPONENT FAILURE)

NRC 3 Page 4 of 24 Critical Tasks1.Initiate Emergency Depressurization when two areas exceed the MAX SAFE levels for radiation or temperature, or rapidly depressu rize the RPV with TBVs/ICs when ED is anticipated. This places the RPV in the lowest energy state to minimize the amount of energy deposited outside of Secondary C ontainment (radioactivity barrier).2.With the RB HVAC vent exhaust radi ation monitors above the high setpoint for automatic initiation of SGTS and SG TS not running, manually initiate SGT. This automatic action minimizes the off-site radiological dose. To ensure protection of the public, a manual system initiation will fulfill this function.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 5 of 24Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 3 Event No.: 1Event

Description:

Place Instrument Air Compressor #2 in LEAD and place Instrument Air compressor

1. 2 in LAG IAW procedure 334.Initiation: Following shift turnover.

Cues: When notified by In-Plant Operator/Field Supervisor.TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAYAs the Field Supervisor, call the Control Room and report: Steps 5.4.1.1 through 5.4.1.4 ofprocedure 334 have been completed. The local display indicates "ready for start local or remote"for air compressor #2. Start air compressor #2 per step 5.4.1.5 of procedure 334.

Sim.OperatorEnsure #2 air compressor is selected as LEAD locally (LOA-CAS038 to LEAD).

SRO Allows continuing placing air compressors #2 in the LEAD, and #1 aircompressor in LAG, IAW procedure 334, Section 5.

4 (start will be from theControl Room) (attached)

BOP Makes plant page regarding starting #2 air compressor Places #2 air compressor as the LEAD by:

(7F)o Place COMPRESSOR 2 switch to the START position for 3-5 seconds o Reports to the Field Supervisor that step 5.4.1.5 is complete. Places #1 air compressor as the LAG o Place the COMPRESSOR 1 switch to the START position for 3-5seconds o Confirm #1 air compressor runs unloaded for 10 minutes and then autoshuts down Verify #2 air compressor loads and unloads to maintain system pressure 85-105 psig (7F) Reports air compressor status to SRO Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 6 of 24 ROLE PLAYAs the Field Supervisor, after completion of step 5.4.1.5 (#2 air compressor running), call theControl Room and report: Compressor #2 is operating normally. Step 5.4.1.7 of procedure 334has been completed satisfactorily. Request that the Control Room stop #1 Compressor IAW Step5.4.1.8. Compressor settings for air compressor #1 have been confirmed IAW step 5.4.1.9. Placeair compressor #1 in LAG IAW step 5.4.1.9.2.

Terminus:#2 air compressor is running as the LEAD, and #1 air compressor is running as the LAG (do notneed to wait for auto shutdown of #1 air compressor)

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 7 of 24Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 3 Event No.: 2Event

Description:

Report of oil leak on Core Spray Main Backup Pump NZ01C Initiation: #2 air compressor is running as the LEAD, and #1 air compressor is running as the LAG Cues: Call from in-plant Non Licensed OperatorTimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior ROLE PLAYAs the NLO, call the Control Room with the following report: While on Rounds, I found aconsiderable amount of oil on the floor surrounding Core Spray Main Pump NZ01C, and the glassoil cup is broken. I have contained the oil and none has reached a floor drain. I will continuecleaning up the oil.If requested to check the other core spray pumps, report that there are no visible deficiencies withthe other core spray pumps.

SRO Reviews Tech Spec 3.4.A (attached) o CONDITION: Any active loop component becomes inoperable o REQUIREMENT: The Reactor may remain in operation for a period not toexceed 15 Days.

o PROVIDED: Both Emergency Diesel Generators are OPERABLE. TheRedundant active loop components within the same loop as theinoperable components are verified OPERABLE on a daily basis.Specification 3.4.A.3 is met unless only a core spray booster pump isinoperable 3.4.A.3: APLHGR shall not exceed 90% of the limits (attached) o Declares Core Spray Main Pump NZ01C inoperable Notifies Work Week manager for repair Protects the other Core Spray Pumps and EDGs Updates the CrewNoteUnexpected Plant Change ChecklistRedundant System Verification FormOP-OC-101-1000 Terminus:Core Spray Main Backup Pump NZ01C has been declared inoperable and the Crew has beenupdated.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 8 of 24 Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 9 of 24Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Trip of RPS MG 1 and single control rod scram (which sticks initially at a non-fully inserted position) (control rod 14-43)

Initiation: Core Spray Main Backup Pump NZ01C has been declared inoperable and the Crew has beenupdatedCues: Annunciator G2c, RPS MG SET 1 TRIP; G1c, SCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN; H6a, RODDRIFT; 9XF3a, PROT SYS PNL PWR LOST (plus RPS A 1/2 scram annunciators)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO Responds to annunciators G1c, SCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN and H6a, ROD DRIFT o Reports loss of RPS A o Reports single control rod scram 14-43: did not scram full-in o Refers to ABN-6, Control Rod Drive System o May insert control rod 14-43 Following restoration of RPS A, resets the following:

(4F)o Half scram Depresses SCRAM SYSTEM RESET pushbutton o Main Steam isolation Depresses MAIN STEAM ISOLATION RESET pushbutton o Associated annunciators SimOperatorIF the RO attempts to manually insert the scrammed stuck rod, DELETE the stuck rodmalfunction.

BOP Refers to annunciator G2c, RPS MG SET 1 TRIP and 9XF3a, PROT SYS PNL PWR LOST o Checks MG status lights and voltage (6R)o Verifies loss of power to RPS A components o Dispatches NLO to investigate RPS MG 1 Restores System Panel 1 (PSP-1) from Transformer PS-1 IAW procedure408.12, Operation of Reactor Protection System Panel 1-1 and Transformer PS-1, Section 5.4 (6R) (attached) Following restoration of RPS A, resets components IAW procedure 408.12:

o Steps 5.4.8 - 5.4.12 (attached)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 10 of 24 Monitor 4160V level for Transformer PS-1 hourly (8F/9F)ROLE PLAYAs the NLO, when requested to investigate RPS MG 1, report the following: RPS A MG Set input breaker is open (EPA brea kers EPA-1 and EPA-2 are open also??), with no indications of a fault.

SRO Directs the rod scram event o Directs entry into ABN-6, Control Rod Drive System o May direct control rod 14-43 be manually inseted o Declare the control rod inoperable and directs to isolate the control rodIAW 302.1, Control Rod Drive System o Applies TS 3.2.B.4 (attached) o Applies TS 3.2.A (attached) o May also apply TS 3.13, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, while RPSA is de-energized (due to loss of one channel of Wide Range Torus WaterLevel indication and one channel of Containment High Range Radiationinstrument).

o Notify Reactor Engineering of control rod event Directs the loss of RPS event o Directs restoration of Protection System Panel 1 (PSP-1) fromTransformer PS-1 IAW procedure 406.12, Operation of ReactorProtection System Panel 1-1 and Transformer PS-1 o Notifies Work Week manager of RPS MG set and scrammed control rod o May direct shutdown of the RPS A MG Set SimOperatorWhen the scram is reset, DELETE the control rod scram malfunction.

ROLE PLAYAs the NLO, when requested to isolate the scrammed control rod, report back a few minutes laterthat the control rod is isolated IAW 302.1, Control Rod Drive System Terminus:RPS A has been transferred to Transformer PS-1 and alarms/isolations reset (not required to waitfor MG Set shutdown)

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 11 of 24Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

High temperature control rod 02-19 Initiation: RPS A has been transferred to Transformer PS-1 and alarms/isolations reset Cues: Annunciator H5c, CRD TEMP HI (4F)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO Responds to annunciator H5c, CRD TEMP HI o Confirm CRD cooling water differential pressure/flow within limits of302.1, Control Rod Drive System (15 psid at 30-45 GPM) o Direct NLO to check leaky scram discharge valve for control rod 02-19 o Attempt to clear the alarm: Apply stall flow signals to control rod 02-19 IAW procedure 617.4.002,CRD Exercise and Flow Test/IST C ooling Water Header Check Valve(attached)

ROLE PLAYAs NLO, when requested to check leaky scram discharge valve for control rod 02-19, report thatthe scram discharge piping is no warmer than other control rods in the area.

Sim.OperatorWhen the RO is applying stall flow, DELETE the CRD high temperature malfunction (it will takeabout 30 seconds to clear the annunciator).

BOP Responds to annunciator H5c, CRD TEMP HI o Determines which control rod is effected (02-19) and reports (8R) Verifies control rod 02-19 temperature normal following stall flow (8R)CUE:Control Rod Drive Temperature recorders on Panel 8R are SIMULATED. When the BOPinvestigates, he should read a note that the only alarming control rod is Control Rod 02-19indicates 260° F and steady. PLACE a note on the recorder PRIOR to this event that rod 02-19indicates 260° F and steady.Following the stall flow, when the BOP goes to monitor CRD temperatures, tell the BOP thatcontrol rod 02-19 indicates 235° F and steady.

Terminus:CRD 02-19 shows normal temperature.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 12 of 24 Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 13 of 24Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 3 Event No.: 5Event

Description:

Loss of Feedwater Heating Initiation: CRD 02-19 shows normal temperatureCues: Annunciator N3d, HP A3 LEVEL HI/LO (7F)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to annunciator N3d, HP A3 LEVEL HI/LO; N2d, HP A3 MRVOPEN; N1d, HP A3 REV CK VLV TRIP (and similar for FWH A1 and A2) (7F)o Monitors feedwater temperature (5F/6F) and reports FW temperature value/trend o Refers to ABN-17, Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions Monitor off-gas activity (1R) Monitor Main Steam Line radiation (1R) Monitor FLLLP (PPC)o May adjust RPV pressure with EPR changes ROLE PLAYAs the NLO and when requested, notify the Control Room that HP (IP, LP) feedwater heater level is high.RO Monitors reactor power Reduces reactor power as directed to 20% less than the pre-trip value withrecirc. flow o Rotates the MASTER RECIRC SPEED CONTROLLER knob in thecounter-clockwise direction (4F)o Monitors the Power Operations Curve SRO Directs entry into ABN-17, Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions o Direct reactor power reduction with recirculation flow to maintain 20%below the pre-trip power level or until 8.5 x 10 4 GPM o Maintains plant load less than 502.5 MWe ISW ABN-17 with 1 bank (LP,IP and HP) heaters lost o Notifies Work Week Manager for repair o Makes notification for down-power Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 14 of 24 Sim.OperatorThe intent is to trip all three FW heaters in string A. If they do not all trip as designed, then activatethe associated annunciators to simulate the trip (annunciators N1d through N8d).

Terminus:Reactor power has been lowered with recirc. flow Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 15 of 24Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 3 Event No.: 6Event

Description:

High main turbine vibrations, high main turbine thrust bearing wear and failure of main turbine to auto tripInitiation: Reactor power has been stabilized from the down-power.

Cues: Annunciator Q3b, VIBRATION HI, follow ed by annunciator Q2b, THRUST BRG WEAR HITimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Respond to Annunciator Q3b, VIBRATION HI, and Q2b, THRUST BRG WEAR HI o Verify thrust bearing indication (7F) and report indication is above theturbine trip setpoint o Report that scram and turbine trip required IAW RAP-Q2b (Following the scram) Depresses TURBINE EMERGENCY TRIPpushbuttons (7F) Confirm the following: Main Stop valves closed Turbine Control valves closed Turbine Reheat and Intercept valves closed HWC H2 inlet Isolation valve, V-567-005, closed 230 KV breakers GC1 and GD1 open Plant electrical loads are transferred to the Startup Transformers SA, SB Maintain RPV pressure 800-1000 psig with TBVs IAW RPV Control - No ATWS SimOperator Input the EVENT 7 items (Cleanup leak and radiation response) when the reactor is manuallyscrammed.RO Manually scrams the reactor and carries out ABN-1, Reactor Scram (attached)(4F)o Scrams the reactor o Inserts SRMs/IRMs o Maintains RPV water level SRO Direct reactor scram and turbine trip Directs entry into RPV Control - No ATWS Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 16 of 24 o Directs auto actions confirmed o Directs RPV water level 138" - 175" with feedwater o Directs RPV pressure 800 - 1000 psig with turbine bypass valves Terminus:The reactor has been scrammed and main turbine tripped, and ABN-1 immediate actions havebeen performed.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 17 of 24Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 3 Event No.: 7Event

Description:

Non-isolatable leak from the Cleanup System into the Secondary Containment(with failure of system isolation valves to close) and fuel failuresInitiation: When the reactor is manually scrammedCues: Annunciators 10F1f, VENT HI; 10F3k, CU SYS AREA; followed by annunciator D8d, CU ROOMTEMP HI (3F);TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Respond to annunciators 10F1f, VENT HI; 10F3k, CU SYS AREA o Reports failure of Cleanup System to automatically isolate and manuallyattempts to close the following valves by taking the respective switch tothe CLOSE position: V-16-1, CU Inlet IV from RPV V-16-2, Inlet IV to CU Aux. Pump V-16-14, CU Inlet IV V-16-61, Heat Exchanger Outlet to RPV Reports that the valves V-16-1 and V-6-14 will not close Dispatches NLO to manually close the valves Re-established RB HVAC IAW Support Procedure 50 (following RB HVAC tripon high RB P from the leak, followed by alarm RB P LO, L6c) Respond to radiation alarms:

AREA MON HI (10F1k), CU SYS AREA HI(10F3k), VENT HI (10F1f) (10F)o Verify radiation monitors (2R)o Evacuate the Reactor Building o Confirm Secondary Containment initiations and isolations IAW SupportProcedure 49 (after VENT HI alarm) Initiates SGT by placing EXHAUST FAN 1-8 (1-9) switch to the HANDposition (11R) (CT) Verifies SUPPLY FAN 1-12 and 1-14 OFF (Place SUPPLY FAN 1-12,1-14 to the OFF position) Reports 2 areas above MAX SAFE temperature For rapid RPV depressurization, opens TBVs fully For Emergency Depressurization:

o Stops injection with Core Spray not required for adequate core coolingIAW Support Procedure 10 (1F/2F) Depress the OVERRIDE switches for all sensors that are lit Depress all ACTUATED switches Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 18 of 24 Confirm closed Core Spray Parallel Isolation Valves not required tobe open for adequate core cooling Place PARALLEL ISOL switches to the CLOSE position forCore Spray pumps not required Secure Core Spray Booster pumps not required for adequate corecooling Place BOOSTER PUMP switches to the STOP position forCore Spray Booster pumps not required Secure Core Spray Main pumps not required for adequate corecooling Place MAIN PUMP switches to the STOP position for CoreSpray Main pumps not required Bypass ROPS (Reactor Overfill Protection) (4F) Report Torus water level > 90" Open 5 EMRVs (1F/2F) (CT) Place AUTO DEPRESS VALVE switches in the MAN positionRole PlayWhen the RB P Low annunciator alarms, as the NLO call the Control Room that steam is visiblecoming from the Reactor Water Cleanup cage and that you have exited the RB.

SRO Directs entry into EMG-3200.11, Secondary Containment Control o Directs isolation of systems discharging into Secondary Containment o Directs rapid RPV depressurization when ED is anticipated o Directs Emergency Depressurization when 2 area radiation levels or 2area temperatures exceed the MAX SAFE level (CT) Directs entry into EMG-3200.04A, Emergency Depressurization - No ATWS Direct stopping injection with Core Spray not required foradequate core cooling IAW Support Procedure 10 Directs ROPS bypass Directs verification of Torus water level Directs 5 EMRVs open Directs evacuation of Reactor Building from high radiation Directs initiation of SGT (CT)Terminus:The RPV has been emergency depressurized Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 19 of 24 Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 20 of 24Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 3 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

Failure of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System to auto-initiateInitiation: During the steam leak into the secondary containment Cues: Annunciator 10F1f, VENT HI (10F)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Responds to annunciator 10F1f, VENT HI (10F)o Verifies radiation monitor VENT MANIFOLD 1, 2 readings (2F)o Reports failure of SGT to auto initiate o Manually starts SGT 1 (2) (11R) Confirm STANDBY GAS SELECT in SYS 1 (SYS 2) Start exhaust Fan EF-1-8 (9) by placing EXHAUST FAN 1-8 (1-9) to the HAND position Verify exhaust fan starts and valves open Verify RB Main Supply valves close Verify RB Containment Isolation valves close Verify RB Supply Fans trip and Exhaust Fans trip and Supply valvesclose SRO Directs manual start of SGT IAW Support Procedure 49 (CT)Terminus:SGT has been initiatedEmergency Plan Classification: Site Area Emergency, FS1: Potential Reactor Coolant SystemBarrier Loss (Unisolable primary system leakage outside of the DW as indicated by one or more area temperatures greater than the MAX NORMAL) and Primary Containment Barrier loss (Failureof any line penetrating the Primary Containment to close when required AND downstreampathway exists to the environment OR Unisolable primary system leakage outside of the DW asindicated by one or more area temperatures greater than the MAX NORMAL).

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 21 of 24 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 22 of 24 Malfunction List Presets: IRM 14 failed: MAL-NIS010D Cleanup Pump B OOS - Pump switch in PTL After shift turnover, PLACE a note on the CRD Temperature recorder PRIOR to event 4 that rod 02-19 indicates 260° F and steady.

Event 1: Swap air compressors LOA-CAS038 to LEAD to place air compressor #2 in Lead LOA-CAS037 to LAG to place air compressor #1 in Lag Event 2: Report of oil leak on Core Spray Backup Main Pump NZ01C None Event 3: Trip of RPS MG Set A and scram of control rod 14-43 (from position 48) Note: The 3 malfunctions below all go in together. LOA-RPS001; RPS MG Set 1-1 Supply Breaker Trip MAL-CRD011_1443 (with an 8 second del ay) Scram of control rod 14-43 o it takes about 8 seconds for 1/2 scram on loss of AC input breaker to RPS MG Set MAL-CRD007_1443 (with a 12 second delay) Stuck Rod 14-43 o The additional time delay lets the control rod scram part way in before becoming stuck Event 4: High temperat ure on control rod 02-19 MAL-CRD013_0219: Plugged cooling orifice for control rod 02-19 o it takes about 30-45 seconds for hi gh temp. alarm to come in, and about 30-45 seconds to clear once deleted o this malfunction must be deleted when the RO takes expected actions to do stall flow for control rod 02-19 Event 5: FW Heater A3, A2, and A1 high level and fuel failures CNH-001B to 0 (high level): High level in A3 FW Heater o shortly after high level annunciator, steam admission reverse check valve closes and moisture removal valve will auto open (both annunciated). CNH-FWH004B to 0 delayed 15 seconds (high level): High level in A2 FW heater (and eventual heater trip) CNH-FWH007B to 0 delayed 30 seconds (high level): High level in A1 FW heater (and eventual heater trip) o These FW heater malfunctions can all be placed in at the same time MAL-RXS001 to 0.001 over 15 minutes (added in Event 8)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 23 of 24 Event 6: Main turbine high vibrations with high thrust bearing vibr ation with failure of main turbine to auto trip on high thrust bearing vibration MAL-TSI002A thru TSI002J to 11-13 mils (all bearings high vibrations are not required) To simulate a turbine thrust bearing trip: ANN-Q-2b to ON: this simulates a high thrust bearing with failure of main turbine to auto trip (manual and other auto trips still function) STL-TSI002 to ON: this activates t he thrust trip amber light on Panel 7F Event 7: Leak in the Cleanup System with fa ilure of the Cleanup System isolation to close (failure of both auto and manual) Al so put in Event 9 malfunction now.) MAL-RCU013 to 20% over 15 minutes Cleanup System leak Fail CU IVs:

o VLV-RCU001 to Mech Seize (V-16-1) o VLV-RCO004 to Mech Seize (V-16-14) Fuel Failures o MAL-RXS001 to 0.001 over 15 minutes o ICH-RMS028A to 1.85 5-minute ra mp with 2-minute delay for SDC ARM o ICH-RMS025A to 2.5 5-minute ra mp with 2-minute delay for RWCU ARM o ICH-RMS027A to 1.5 5-minute ramp with 2-minute delay for IC ARM o ICH-RMS035A to 1.25 6-minute ra mp with 2-minute delay for #1 vent rad. monitor o ICH-RMS036A to 1.15 6-minute ra mp with 2-minute delay for #2 vent rad. monitor Failure of SGTS to auto start o MAL- SCN005 Event 8: Failure of SGT to auto start on high radiation in RB HVAC discharge MAL- SCN005 NOTE: This malfunction may not be requir ed. On high RB pressure, normal HVAC trips and isolates. Secondary Containment EOP states that if RBHV isolates or shuts-down, it is re started by Support Procedure 50. The jumper used to allow manual start of RB HVAC al so over-rides an auto shutdown of RB HVAC from high RB Building HVAC radi ation monitors. When these radiationmonitors do go high, normal HVAC and SGTS remains unaffected. The

Operator must manually start SGTS and secure the other valves.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 3 Page 24 of 24Procedure #Procedure NameRevision1334Instrument and Service Air932RAP-G2cRPS MG SET 1 TRIP03RAP-G1cSCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN14RAP-H6aROD DRIFT05ABN-6Control Rod Drive System26408.12Operation of Reactor Protection System Panel 1-1 and Transformer PS-1 127RAP-H5cCRD TEMP HI08302.1Control Rod Drive System929617.4.002CRD Exercise and Flow Test/IST Cooling Water Header Check Valve 4410RAP-N3dHP A3 LEVEL HI/LO011RAP-N1dHP A3 REV CK VLV TRIP012ABN-17Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions313RAP-N2dHP A3 MRV OPEN014ABN-38Station Seismic Event315RAP-Q3bVIBRATION HIGH216RAP-Q2bTHRUST BRG WEAR HI017ABN-1Reactor Scram218ABN-10Turbine Generator Trip219RAP-D1dRWCU HELB I220RAP-D2dRWCU HELB II221EMG-3200.11Secondary Containment Control1222EMG-3200-04AEmergency Depressurization - No ATWS423RAP-10F1fVENT HI024330Standby Gas Treatment System4325317.1Feedwater Heaters36 NRC 2 Page 1 of 20Appendix DScenario OutlineAttachment 1Facility: Oyster Creek

Scenario No.:

NRC 2 Op Test No.:

NRC 2006-1Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: The plant is in 4-loop operation at 100% power. Cleanup Pump B is out of service for motor repair, and is expected to return to service tomorrow. Isolation Condenser System A was removed from service two hours ago and is isolated, due to motoroperated valve torque switch replacement. Technical Specifications applicability has been reviewed.The system is expected to return to an operable status in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. IRM 14 failed during the control rod withdrawal to critical, and is BYPASSED. Technical Specificationsapplicability has been reviewed and an IR has been generated. Surveillance procedure 604.4.016, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Operability and In-Service Test, isin-progress for a normal surveillance. The surveillance is being controlled by the in-plant Operators. The main generator is in manual voltage control. The amplidyne is ready to be placed back intoservice following minor maintenance, IAW 336.1, 24 KV Main Generator Electrical System.Turnover: Restore the amplidyne to service and transfer the main generator from manual voltage control toautomatic voltage control IAW procedure 336.1.Event No.Malf. No.Event Type*EventDescription1NBOPRestore the amplidyne to service and transfer the main generatorfrom manual voltage control to automatic voltage control.2TSSRORespond to Drywell-Torus vacuum breaker fail to close.3CBOPRespond to indications of low TBCCW cooling.

4 R C TS RO BOP SRORespond to Reactor Recirculation Pump alarms.5IRORespond to failure of RPV water level input to Feed Water LevelControl System (LT ID13A and LT ID13C).6CRORespond to failure of Average Power Range Monitor 7 (APRM).7MCrewRespond to loss of stator cooling.8MCrewRespond to steam leak in the primary containment with failure ofthe Containment Spray system.9CCrewRespond to failure of primary containment to automatically isolate.

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient, (TS) Tech Specs IC 172 NRC 2 Page 2 of 20Total Malfunctions (5-8):8Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)2 Abnormal Events (2-4)4 Major Transients (1-2)2 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)1 EOP Contingencies w/ substantive actions (0-2)1 Critical Tasks (2-3)2EventTypePositionDescription4RRORespond to recirculation pump alarms5IRORespond to failure of RPV level input to FWLC (LTID13A and LT ID13C)6CRORespond to failure of APRM 7EventTypePositionDescription1NBOPRestore amplidyne to service3CBOPRespond to indications of low TBCCW cooling4CBOPRespond to recirculation pump alarmsEventTypePositionDescription7MCrewRespond to loss of stator water cooling8MCrewRespond to steam leak in the drywell with failure ofcontainment spray9CCrewRespond to failure of drywell equipment drain and floorsump isolation valves to auto close on the primarycontainment isolation signal (V-22-1, V-22-2, V-22-28,and V-22-29)EventTypePositionDescription2TSSRORespond to vacuum breaker failure (open) (TS 3.5.A.5)4TSSRORespond to recirculation pump alarms NRC 2 Page 3 of 20 Scenario SummaryThe scenario will begin with field personnel continuing the drywell-torus vacuumbreaker surveillance test. No actions ar e taken by control room operators except communicating with the field personnel and annunciation acknowledgement. The last valve is to be tested. Field personnel will continue with the surveillance after being notified by the control room that the test may reconvene (after placing theamplidyne in service).1. The BOP will swap from main generator manual voltage control to automatic voltage control IAW 336.1, 24 KV Main Generator Electrical System. (NORMAL EVOLUTION)

2. Operators in the fiel d are performing the DW/Torus vacuum breaker exercise test. The last vacuum breaker te sted (V-26-14) opens with a little more resistance than the others, makes a strange noise when fully opened, then remains open after being allowed to close. Alarms of the open valve are present in the control room. The SRO will declare the valve inoperable and applies TS 3.5.A.5 (TS)3. One of the operating TBCCW pumps will trip, and the low system pressure switch to start the standby pump will not function. The Stator Temp Hiannunciator will alarm. The BOP will deduc t the reduced system pressure and start another TBCCW pump IAW ABN-20, TBCCW Failure Response.(COMPONENT FAILURE) (ABN)

4. The operators will respond to alarms for a recirculation pump. Alarms for low oil and high vibrations (RAP-E2d, RAP-E 6d) will require an immediate pump trip by the BOP. The RO will make changes to power to ensure recirc pump limitations and power/flow considerations are met (recirc flow and/or CRAM rods). The SRO will apply TS 3.3.F, Re circ Loop Operability, and 3.10.A, Core Limits (as required by the Co re Operating Limits Report). (COMPONENT FAILURE) (REACTIVITY MANIPULATION) (TS) (ABN)

5. The RO will respond to a leak in the common leg to RPV water leveltransmitters ID13A and ID13C which input to feed water level control. The crew will enter ABN-17, Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions. The RO will take manual control of feed water and return water level to the normal band. The ROwill swap level transmitters to Feedw ater Level Control IAW procedure 317, Feedwater System. (INSTRUMENT FAILURE)

6. The next event is an INOP failure of APRM 7 causing a 1/2 scram. The RO will bypass the APRM and reset the 1/2 scram.

The SRO will verify compliance with Tech Specs. (COMPONENT FAILURE)

NRC 2 Page 4 of 207. The crew will receive annunciator STATOR CLG TROUBLE (R6c) andindications of the loss of one pump and aut o start of the standby stator water pump. The standby pump will then trip caus ing a turbine runback. The Crew will implement ABN-11, Loss of Generator Stator Cooling, and will scram the reactor and perform ABN-1, Reactor Scram. (MAJOR) (ABN)

8. A steam leak in the primary contai nment occurs and the crew will enter the Primary Containment Contro l EOP. Because a drywell-to-torus vacuum breaker is open, the pressure suppression functi on of the torus is lost/reduced. The Containment Spray System 1 will not f unction in the Containment Spray mode (Some of System 2 will function). The SRO will direct emergency depressurization (IAW Emergency Depressu rization - No ATWS) as primary suppression pressure limits are approac hed. The SRO may also anticipate emergency depressurization and order a rapid RPV depressurization with TBVs and ICs. (MAJOR) (EOP) (COMPONENT FAILURE) (EOP CONTINGENCY)

9. The Operators will recogn ize that the drywell equipment drain isolation valves and drywell sump isolation valves faile d to close on a primary containmentisolation signal and will manually close t he valves (V-22-1,V-22-2, and V-22-28, V-22-29) (COMPONENT FAILURE) (CT)

Critical Tasks1.With a failure of primary containment isolation on a valid isolation signal, manually isolate the primary containment. With a Primary Containment isolat ion signal present and the failure of the Primary Containment to isolat e, manual actions should occur to complete the isolation.2.Initiate Emergency Depressurizati on with EMRVS prior to exceeding Primary Suppression Pressure Li mit (PSP), or when the Primary Containment bulk temperature cannot be maintained below 281° F; or, anticipating ED and performing a rapi d RPV depressurization before the limits are exceeded. Performing an Emergency Depressurization (or performing an anticipatory ED rapid depressu rization) ensures the Primary Containment does not fail.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 5 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 2 Event No.: 1Event

Description:

Shift from manual generator voltage control to automatic generator voltage controlIAW procedure 336.1, 24 KV Main Generator Electrical System, Section 6.0Initiation: Following shift turnover Cues: As directed by the SROTimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Direct the BOP to shift from manual generator voltage control to automaticgenerator voltage control IAW procedure 336.1, 24 KV Main Generator Electrical System, Section 6.0.BOPShift from manual generator voltage control to automatic generator voltage control IAWprocedure 336.1, 24 KV Main Generator Electrical System, Section 6.0 (8F/9F)(attached) Makes plant announcement prior to starting the amplidyne Shifts voltage control IAW procedure 336.1, section 6.0. (attached) After placing the amplidyne in auto, reports the amplidyne is in serviceRole PlayAs the NLO, when directed to verify the amplidyne running, state the amplidyne is running.

Terminus:The amplidyne is in automatic control.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 6 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 2 Event No.: 2Event

Description:

DW/Torus vacuum breaker V-26-14 will not close after being manually openedlocally for surveillance.

Initiation: The amplidyne has been placed in automatic.Cues: Notification from in-plant Operator.TimePositionApplicant's Actions or BehaviorRole PlayAs the in-plant Operator, call the Control Room and report: The final DW/Torus vacuum breaker isready to be tested (V-26-14). IAW the surveillance procedure, Step 6.3.

12, you will receive twoalarms when the vacuum breaker is opened (C4f, TORUS/DW I VAC BRKR OPEN and C5f,TORUS/DW 2 VAC BRKR OPEN). The Control Room is to make an announcement over the pagephone or radios when both alarms are received (step 6.3.12).BOPNotifies In-Plant Operator when annunciators C4f and C5f (TORUS/DW VAC BRKR OPEN I and II) are received Sim.OperatorWhen the Role Play in-plant operator is ready to open the last vacuum breaker, V-26-14, then open the valve.Role PlayAs the in-plant Operator, call the Control Room and report: vacuum breaker V-26-14 open, but willnot close and cannot be closed.SROTorus/DW Vacuum Breaker V-26-14 will not close Declares the vacuum breaker inoperable Review Tech Spec 3.5.A.5.a (attached) o 3.5.A.5.a: When primary containment is required, all suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers shall be OPERABLE except during testing and asstated in Specification 3.5.A.5.b and c, below.

o 3.5.A.5.b: Five of the fourteen suppression chamber - drywell vacuumbreakers may be inoperable provided that they are secured in the closedposition.o 3.5.A.5.d: If Specifications3.5.A.5(a), (b) or (c) can not be met, the reactorshall be PLACED IN the COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

o Refers to OP-OC-100, Oyster Creek Conduct of Operations Notifies Work Week manager for repair Notifies plant management about TS required shutdown Updates the Crew Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 7 of 20 ROLE PLAY:When alerted to the required Shutdown by the SRO (as Operations Management), tell the SRO NOT to start the shutdown right now. We will first try to repair the valve.

Terminus:TS 3.5.A.5 has been reviewed and the Crew has been updated.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 8 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 2 Event No.: 3Event

Description:

The running TBCCW pump trips (without trip annunciation), combined with thefailure of standby TBCCW pump to auto start (PS-116 fails to trip)Initiation: TS 3.5.A.5 has been reviewed and the Crew has been updated.Cues: Annunciator R6c, STATOR CLG TROUBLE (8F/9F)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or BehaviorBOPResponds to Annunciator R6c, STATOR CLG TROUBLE Request NLO investigate the Stator Water Cooling System (TB Basement) Reports TBCCW Pump 1-1 has tripped Reports the standby TBCCW Pump did not auto start on low TBCCW dischargepressure; and, starts the standby TBCCW Pump 1-2 (13R) Places TBCCW Pump 1-2 switch to START Verifies TBCCW pump start and system pressure Enters ABN-20, TBCCW Failure Response, if directed.

SRO May direct entry into ABN-20, TBCCW Failure Response Notifies Work Week Manager about the failed TBCCW pump and the failure ofthe standby TBCCW to auto startRole PlayAs the NLO investigating the Stator Water Cooling System, report stator cooling pressure is steadyat 80 psig. Tank level is normal. There has been no change in stator water pump status (I pumprunning).As the NLO, if asked to check TBCCW Pumps, report that only TBCCW Pump 1-3 is running.

Sim.OperatorA minute after the standby TBCCW Pump is started, delete the annunciator for R6c, STATOR CLG TROUBLE.Terminus:The standby TBCCW Pump has been manually started.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 9 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 2 Event No.: 4Event

Description:

Reactor Recirculation Pump A abnormal operation requiring pump shutdown (low oil level and high vibration)

Initiation: Following TBCCW evolution Cues: Annunciators E6d, OIL LEVEL HI/LO, and E2d, VIBRATION HI ATimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior BOPResponds to Annunciators VIBRATION HI A E2d, and OIL LEVEL HI/LO E6d, (3F) Annunciator VIBRATION HI A, E2d o Attempts to reset vibration alarm (3F) Annunciator OIL LEVEL HI/LO, E6d o Reports that immediate pump trip is required IAW the RAP-E6d Manually trips Reactor Recirc. Pump A o Place Recirc Pump A DRIVE MOTOR switch to STOP position (3F) Refers to ABN-2, Recirculation System Failures, Section 3.1.2 (attached) o Close the Pump A DISCHARGE valve (3F)o Selects an operating recirc loop temperature point (3F)o Monitors for fuel failures Changes reactor pressure, if directed, by changing the EPR setpoint (980-1020)(7F)RORefers to ABN-2, Recirculation System Failures Verifies operation NOT within the Exclusion Zone Reports recirc. flow > 8.5 E4 GPM and pump speed > 33 Hz Reduces reactor power IAW ABN-2, Section 3.1.2.E (attached) o Lowers reactor power with recirc flow to 8.5 E4 GPM OR until pump speed

< 33 Hz (4F)o With recirc speed still > 33 Hz, lowers reactor power to about 55% power byinserting CRAM rods using the ROD CONTROL swiych to ROD IN (4F)o Once at about 55% power, lower recirc pump speed to < 33 Hz Verifies position on Power Operations Curve Reports having entered the Buffer Zone on the Power Operations Curve Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 10 of 20 o Maintains heightened awareness of plant parameters o May range down on IRM Ranges to clear IRM D/S alarms SRO Directs trip of Reactor Recirc. Pump A, IAW RAPs Directs reactor power reduction IAW ABN-2 Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.F, 3.10.A (3.3.F attached) o Tech Spec 3.3.F.2b: When there are 2 inoperable recirculation loops, thereactor core thermal power shall not exceed 90% of rated power. Notify System Owner/Dispatcher, Chemistry, Reactor Engineering May direct other actions such as raising reactor pressure IAW procedure 202.1,Power Operations, Section 6.3.7, Power Reductions Terminus:Recirc Pump A has been manually tripped; reactor power has been reduced IAW with ABN-2.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 11 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 2 Event No.: 5Event

Description:

Leak in variable leg to RPV water level transmitters ID13A & ID13C (inputs intoFeedwater Level Control System, FWLC)Initiation: Reactor power is stable and notifications of the down-power event are made.

Cues: RPV water level indicators ID13A and ID13C both lowering (5F/6F), and other RPV water levelindicators rising (5F/6F) rising and feedwater flow rising (5F/6F); followed by annunciator J8c,FCS/RFCS; followed by annunciator H7e, RX LVL HI/LO (5F/6F);TimePositionApplicant's Actions or BehaviorROReports RPV water level indicators ID13A and ID13C are lowering and other RPVwater level indicators are rising and FW flow is rising (5F/6F)Refer ABN-17, Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions, Section 3.2.1 Changes the Level Select into Feedwater Level Control IAW procedure 317,section 11.8 (attached) (4F)o When the RPV water level input has been changed: Monitor feedwater flow and RPV water level Reports Level Control is selected to B and that FW/RPV water level areresponding BOPResponds to annunciator J8c (FCS/RFCS) and H7e(RX LVL HI/LO) Checks RPV water level indication (5F/6F)o Reports RPV water level indicators ID13A and ID13C are rising and otherRPV water level indicators lowering Checks DW bulk temperature (PPC) Checks DW pressure (4F, 1F/2F) Refer to ABN-17, Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions SRO Directs entry into ABN-17, Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions May refer to ABN-59, RPV Level Instrument Failures Directs changing the Level Select input into Feedwater Level Control IAWprocedure 317, Section 11.8 (from ABN-17) Notifies Work Week manager for repair Refers to Tech Spec 3.3.D if DW unidentified leak rate increases > 2 GPM(attached)

Terminus:ID13B is the selected RPV water level input to FWLC and RPV water level and FW flow are at/nearnormal values.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 12 of 20 Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 13 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 2 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

INOP failure of APRM 7Initiation: 2 minutes after ID13B is the selected RPV water level input to FWLC and RPV water level and FW flow are at/near normal values.Cues: Annunciators G2f, APRM HI-HI/INOP II (3F); G1c, SCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN (3F)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO Responds to annunciators G2f, APRM HI-HI/INOP II (3F); G1c, SCRAMCONTACTOR OPEN (3F)o Reports DN SCL INOP light ON for APRM CH 7 and normal reading on theother operable APRMs Bypasses APRM 7 (3F)o Places APRM BYPASS joystick to the CH 7 position Resets the 1/2 scram (3F)o Presses SCRAM SYSTEM RESET pushbutton BOP Checks APRM cabinets (5R)SRO Reviews Tech Spec 3.1 o Declares APRM 7 inoperable Directs APRM 17 bypassed Directs 1/2 scram reset Notifies Work Week Manager for repair Terminus:APRM 7 is bypassed.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 14 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 2 Event No.: 7Event

Description:

Loss of Stator Water Cooling PumpsInitiation: 2-3 minutes after APRM 7 is placed in bypassed.Cues: Annunciator R6c, STATOR CLG TROUBLE (7F)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Respond to annunciator R6c, STATOR CLG TROUBLE o Dispatch NLO to the Stator Water Cooling Panel (Role Play) o Monitors stator temperature o Enters ABN-11, Loss of Generator Stator Cooling o Reports generator runback (TBVs opening) Following the scram, maintains reactor pressure 800-1000 with TBVs (or asdirected)Role PlayAs the NLO sent to the Stator Water Cooling Panel, report that the running Stator Water CoolingPump has tripped, and the standby stator cooling pump has started. (About 2 minutes later, trip thesecond pump as the SIM OPERATOR) and report that the second Stator Water Cooling Pump alsotripped and that neither pump can be started.

SRO Directs entry into ABN-11, Loss of Generator Stator Cooling Directs the RO to scram the reactor and perform ABN-1, Reactor Scram, due togenerator runback Directs entry into RPV Control -

No ATWS EOP on low RPV water level o Directs RPV water level 138"-175" with feedwater/condensate IAW SupportProcedure 2 (attached) o Directs RPV pressure 800-1000 psig with TBVs May direct a reactor cooldown at below 100° F/Hr RO Manually scrams the reactor and carries out ABN-1, Reactor Scram, Section 3.2through 3.7, and 3.10 (attached) o Scrams the reactor o Inserts SRMs and IRMs BOP Performs ABN-1, Reactor Scram actions, Section 3.8, and 3.11 (attached)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 15 of 20 Terminus:The reactor is scrammed; RPV Control - No ATWS EOP has been entered and RPV water leveland RPV pressure are being controlled in the desired band.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 16 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 2 Event No.: 8/9 Event

Description:

Steam leak in the Primary Cont ainment with failure of Containment Spray System

1. 1 and failure of Containment Spray Pump 51C, which leads to Emergency Depressurization of theRPV due to PSP ConcernsInitiation: The reactor and turbine have tripped; RPV water level is in/near the normal bandCues: Increasing DW pressure and temperature; Annunciators C3f DW PRESS HI/LO, followed byH1d, H2d, DW PRESS HI-HI I & 11TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior BOP/RO Responds to annunciat or C3f, DW PRESS HI/LO Reports hi containment pressure and entry into Primary Containment ControlEOP and RPV Control - No ATWS Monitors/reports Primary Containment parameters Confirms automatic actions, IAW Support Procedure 1 (attached) o Reports that Drywell Equipment Drain Isolation Valves, V-22-1 and V-22-2,and DW Sump valves V-22-28 and V-22-29 did not close, and closes the valves Place EQUIP SUMP switches to the CLOSE position (11F) (CT) Places DW SUPM switches to the CLOSE position (11F) (CT) Lines-up and sprays the DW IAW Support Procedure 29 (attached) Reports that PSP is rising For Emergency Depressurization: (CT2)o Stops injection with Core Spray not required for adequate core cooling IAWSupport Procedure 10 (1F/2F) (attached) o Bypass ROPS (Reactor Overfill Protection) (4F)o Report Torus water level > 90" (1F/2F)o Open 5 EMRVs by placing AUTO DEPRESS VALVE switches in the MANposition (1F/2F) Initiates torus cooling, as directed, IAW Support Procedure 25 (attached)(1F/2F)SRO Directs entry into Primary Containment Control EOP and re-enters RPV Control

- No ATWS o Directs automatic actions confirmed IAW Support Procedure 1 o Before DW/Torus reaches 12 psig, directs lineup of Drywell Sprays IAWSupport Procedure 29 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 17 of 20 o When DW/Torus exceeds 12 psig, or before bulk DW temperature reaches281° F, directs initiation of Drywell Sprays IAW Support Procedure 29 o When it has been determined that bulk DW temperature cannot berestored/maintained below 281° F or it has been determined that Toruspressure cannot be maintained below Pressure Suppression Pressure, thendirect Emergency Depressurization (CT)o Enters EMG-3200-04A, Emergency Depressurization - No ATWS Direct stopping injection with Core Spray not required for adequate corecooling IAW Support Procedure 10 Directs ROPS bypass Directs verification of Torus water level Directs 5 EMRVs open o May direct torus cooling be placed into service IAW Support Procedure 25Terminus:The RPV has been emergency depressurized with EMRVs and RPV water level has beenstabilized.

Notes/CommentsEmergency Plan Classification: Alert, FA1; DW pressure GT 3 psig and indication of RCS leakage in the DW.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 18 of 20 Malfunction List Presets: IRM 14 failed: MAL-NIS010D Cleanup Pump B OOS - place control switch in PTL Event 1: Shifting to automatic generator voltage control None Event 2: DW/Torus vacuum breaker V-26-14 opens MAL-PCN001N to 100%

Event 3: Trip of TBCCW Pump 1-1 combined with failure of auto-start of the standby TBCCW Pump, failure of TBCCW Pump 1-1 Trip annunciator (Q3f)

MAL-TBC001A, Trip of TBCCW Pump 1-1 PSW-TBC001A to Fail to Trip (prevents auto start of standby TBCCW pump 1-2) ANN-Q-3f to OFF to fail TBCCW PUMP 1 TRIP annunciator (Q3f) ANN-R-6b to ON for H2 System Trouble alarm Event 4: Low oil level in Recirc Pump A, followed by Recirc Pump A high vibration LOA-RCP001 to TRUE ANN-E-6D Hi/Lo oil level annunciator for Recirc Pump A (delayed 1-2 minutes from high vibration annunciator)

Event 5: Variable leg leak in common leg to RPV level transmitters ID13A and ID13C (indicators on 5F/6F and input into FW level control)

MAL-NSS012E to 5% over 12 minutes Event 6: High trip of APRM 7 MAL-NIS021G INOP trip of APRM 7 Event 7: Failure of stator water pumps MAL-GEA005A Trip of Stator Water Cooling Pump A - ON MAL-GEA005B Trip of Stator Water Cooling Pump B - ON o Delay trip of the second stator cooling pump by 10-20 seconds from NLO role play at the stator cooling control panel verifying auto start of the standby stator cooling pump Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 2 Page 19 of 20 Event 8: Steam leak in DW with failure of Containment Spray System 1 (torus cooling valve stays open) and Containment Spray 52C will not start MAL-NSS017A to 10% over 20 minutes steam leak in DW SWI-CNS011C to OFF Containment Spray System 1 fails in torus cooling mode SWI-CNS004C to ON Disables Containment Spray Pump 51C o PLACE Event 9 malfunctions in at this time also Event 9: Failure of DWEDT isolation valves and DW Sump isolation valves to auto close on high DW pressure [valves V-22-1 and V-22-2 (equipment drains), V-22-28 and V-22-29 (sump drains)]

MAL-RPS007A to Fail to Actuate Setup Notes - IC-1721.Cleanup Pump B control switch is in PTL with a clearance tag applied2.Isolation Condenser A is isolated (steam and condensate return valves closed and tagged), with vents open3.IRM 14 is failed and bypassed with a clearance tag 4.The main generator is in manual voltage control with yellow magnetic operator aids applied on the panel5.Have a copy of 604.4.016, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Operability and In-Service Testavailable for crew reference6.Have a copy of Attachment 403-2, LPRM and APRM Status Information Sheet filled out withinoperable LPRMs/APRMs7.Ensure generator voltage is in manual and that to get to automatic, an adjustment must be made (ie, vary something so BOP will need to adjust when going to AUTO).8.Have a copy of 604.4.016 for the crew.

9.May need to reduce cooling due to the tripped recirc. MG set NRC 2 Page 20 of 20Procedure #Procedure NameRevision1336.124 KV Main Generator Electrical System452604.4.016Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Operability andIn-Service Test 343Tech Specs4RAP-C4fTorus/DW 1 Vac Brkr Open05RAP-C5fTorus/DW 2 Vac Brkr Open06ABN-2Recirculation System Failures57ABN-17Feedwater System Abnormal Conditions38317Feedwater749RAP-R6bH2 System Trouble010ABN-20TBCCW Failure Response211RAP-G2fAPRM HI-HI/INOP212RAP-G1cSCRAM CONTACTOR OPEN113RAP-R6cSTATOR CLG TROUBLE014ABN-1Reactor Scram215EMG-3200.01ARPV Control - No ATWS1216EMG-3200.02Primary Containment Control1717EMG-3200.04AEmergency Depressurization - No ATWS418RAP-H7eRX LVL HI/LO019202.1Power Operation9820ABN-11Loss of Generator Stator Cooling021RAP-E2dVIBRATION HI A022RAP-E6dOIL LEV L HI/LO A0 NRC 1 Page 1 of 20Appendix DScenario OutlineAttachment 1Facility: Oyster Creek

Scenario No.:

NRC 1 Op Test No.:

NRC 2006-1 Examiners: Operators: Initial Conditions: The reactor is starting up, after a 5-day forced outage, with the MODE SWITCH in STARTUP. Cleanup Pump B is out of service for motor repair, and is expected to return to service tomorrow. IRM 17 failed during the control rod withdrawal to critical, and is BYPASSED. Technical Specificationsapplicability has been reviewed and an IR has been generated.Turnover: Complete the withdrawal of control rods in the current Group, and then transfer from the Low FlowRegulating Valve (LFRV) to the Main Flow Regulating Valve (MFRV)

.Event No.Malf. No.Event Type*EventDescription1RROWithdraw control rods.2NBOPTransfers from the LFRV to the MFRV.3TSSRORPV High Pressure Instrument RE15 to Isolation CondenserInitiation Logic Fails High4IBOPRespond to failed acoustic monitor for Electromatic Relief Valve (EMRV)5C R TS RO RO SRORespond to Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valve (CRD FCV)failed closed followed by control rod drift6CRORespond to Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) 11, which fails low.7CBOPRespond to Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR) fluctuations.8MCrewRespond to failure of the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR)and Anticipated Trip Without Scram (ATWS) (electric).9MCrewRespond to a LOCA.*(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient, (TS) Tech Spec IC-174 NRC 1 Page 2 of 20Total Malfunctions (5-8):8Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2)1 Abnormal Events (2-4)4 Major Transients (1-2)2 EOPs entered requiring substantive actions (1-2)2 EOP Contingencies w/ substantive actions (0-2)0 Critical Tasks (2-3)2EventTypePositionDescription1RROWithdraw control rods5C/RROFailed closed of CRD FCV6CRODrifting low IRMEventTypePositionDescription2NBOPTransfer from the LFRV to the MFRV4CBOPEMRV acoustic monitor failure7CBOPEPR FluctuationsEventTypePositionDescription8MCrewMPR failure plus ATWS9MCrewLOCA in primary containmentEventTypePositionDescription3TSSRORPV High Pressure Instrument RE15A to Isolation Condenser Initiation Logic Fa ils High (TS Table 3.1.1.C.1)5TSSROControl rod 10-07 isolated at position 00 (TS 3.2.B.4)

NRC 1 Page 3 of 20 Scenario SummaryThe scenario will begin with Instrument Maintenance calibrating the drywell wide range pressure transmitters PT-53 (IAW 604.3.018, Wide Range Drywell Pressure Calibration).1. The RO will withdraw control rods IAW procedure 201, Plant Startup.(REACTIVITY MANIPULATION)

2. The BOP will successfully transfer from the LFRV to the MFRV per procedure (This will be directed by procedure 201, step 6.57, and performed in procedure 317, step 6.3.15) (NORMAL EVOLUTION)

3. RPV high pressure instrument RE15A to Isolation Condenser Initiation Logic fails high. No Isolation Condenser initiati on will/should occur from this failure. TheSRO will review/apply TS Table 3.1.1, part C.1. (TS)4. The BOP will respond to a failure of the acoustic monitor for EMRV NR-108A.Annunciator B4g, SV/EMRV NOT CLOS ED, will alarm and the effected EMRVwill still indicate closed. The BOP will defeat the alarm IAW procedure 413, Operation of the Safety Valve/EM RV Acoustic Monitoring System.(INSTRUMENT FAILURE) (ABN)5. The in-service CRD FCV (NC30A) will fail closed. Several panel indicationsare available to diagnose the problem.

The RO will swap to the alternate FCV IAW procedure 302.1 (Control Rod Drive S ystem), step 4.3.3. ABN-6, Control Rod Drive System may be entered. Followin g restoration of a CRD FCV, control rod 10-07 will drift inward.(COMPONENT FAILURE) (ABN)6. IRM 11 will fail low causing a rodbl ock (RAP-G1e, G2e). The IRM can be bypassed, and the rodblock cleared. The SRO will verify TS, and that no actions

are required. (TS 3.1.1) (COMPONENT FAILURE)

NRC 1 Page 4 of 20

7. Small step changes in the EPR begins, which affect reactor power and pressure. ABN-9, EPR Malfunctions, shoul d be entered. It is expected that the BOP will transfer to the Mechanical Pressure Regulator (MPR) IAW 315.4, Transferring Pressure Regulators. (COMPONENT FAILURE) (ABN)8. The MPR will fail causing all turbine bypass valves (TBVs) to go closed, causing RPV pressure to increase. The RO may attempt to scram prior to the RPV high pressure scram setpoint, but an electrical ATWS will occur and no control rods will insert. The crew will ent er RPV Control - With ATWS. The crew will insert control rods by venting t he scram air header (IAW SP-21, Alternate Insertion of Control Rods). RPV pressure control will be available with both loops of isolation condensers and electrom atic relief valves (EMRVs). (EOP) (MAJOR)

9. A LOCA in the primary containment will require the Cr ew to enter the Primary Containment Control EOP.

The operator will spray the containment (IAW SP-29, Initiation of the Containment Spray System for Drywell Sprays). (EOP) (MAJOR)

Critical Tasks1.With a scram signal present and the reactor not shutdown, initiate alternate control rod insertion met hods to bring the reactor shutdown. These actions act to shutdown the reactor given that a reactor scram setpoint has been reached (high reac tor pressure) and the reactor did not automatically shutdown.2.Sprays the Drywell when Drywell/

Torus pressure exceeds 12 psig. This action ensures the cont inued operability of the PrimaryContainment as a viable fission product barrier.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 5 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 1Event

Description:

Raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods IAW 302.2, Control Rod Drive ManualControl System, step 3.3/4.3. (as directed from procedure 201, Plant Startup.). Complete the withdrawal ofcontrol rods in the current group. Continuous withdrawal is allowed.Initiation: Following the shift turnover and the Crew assumption of the shift.

Cue: As directed by SROTimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Direct control rod withdrawals to raise power IAW procedure 201, Plant Startup,with control rod manipulations performed IAW procedure 302.2, Control RodDrive Manual Control System, step 3.3.

RO Withdraws control rods IAW procedure 302.2, Control Rod Drive Manual ControlSystem, step 3.3 (attached). (Panel 3F)

BOP The individual performing the peer check shall verify that the correct control rodhas been selected by comparing the control rod selected with the governingprocedure. The individual performing the peer check shall state agreement with the control rod selection, its initial position, its target position, the method (i.e. single notchor continuous) and the direction of movement. Observe the actions of the RO to verify movement of the correct control rod toits target position.

Terminus:Control rods in the current group have been withdrawn to their target position.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 6 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Transfers from Low Flow Regul ating Valve (LFRV) to the Main Feed RegulatingValve (MFRV) for Feedwater Pump A, IAW pr ocedure 317, Feedwater System, section 6.3.15.Initiation: Directly following control rod withdrawals.

Cue: As directed by SRO following control rod withdrawals.TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Direct BOP to transfer from the Low Flow Regulating Valve (LFRV) to theMain Feed Regulating Valve (MFRV) and then place on the MASTER FEEDWATER LEVEL CONTROLLER in AUTO IAW procedure 317,Feedwater System, section 6.3.15.

BOP Transfers from the Low Flow Regulating Valve (LFRV) to the Main FeedRegulating Valve (MFRV) and places on the MASTER FEEDWATERLEVEL CONTROLLER in AUTO IAW pr ocedure 317, Feedw ater System,section 6.3.15. (attached). Report the MFRV for FW Pump A is in service in AUTO.

Terminus:Feedwater flow control has been transferred from the LFRV to the MFRV and placed on theMASTER FEEDWATER LEVEL CONTROLLER in AUTO.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 7 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RPV High Pressure Instrument RE15A to Isolation Condenser Initiation Logic Fails High.Initiation: Following the shift from the LFRV to the MVRV.

Cue: Annunciator C1a, LOGIC TRAIN 1 ACTUATEDTimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to annunciator C1a, LOGIC TRAIN 1 ACTUATED Reports no Isolation Condenser System initiation and no Recirculation Pumps tripped SRO Review Tech Specs Table 3.1.1, Section C.1 (attached) Determines that there is one operable and one tripped Trip Systems and thatno further TS actions are required Notifies Work Week manager for investigation/repair Updates the Crew Terminus:The SRO has applied TS Table 3.1.1, updated the Crew, and requested repair.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 8 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Acoustic monitor for EMRV NR-108A fails.Initiation: Following Crew update of failed DW Pressure Transmitter PT-53.

Cue: Annunciator B4g, SV/EMRV NOT CLOSED, is in alarm.TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Responds to annunciator B4g, SV/EMRV NOT CLOSED alarm (1F/2F)o Verifies RPV pressure, checks for Auto-Depressurization and checks ValveOpen position indication (1F/2F)o Reports that EMRV NR-108A shows open by acoustic monitor but no otherindications show that the valve is open o Defeats the alarm IAW procedure 413, section 4.3.6 (Panel 15R) Switches the HI-ALARM switch to DEFEAT Switches the LO-BIAS switch to DEFEAT Presses the associated Alarm Reset push-button SRO Directs BOP to defeat the acoustic monitor alarm Directs EMRV tailpiece temperature monitoring once/shift Notifies Work Week manager for repair Reviews Tech Spec 3.13, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation (no actionsrequired)ROLE PLAYIf asked as the NLO, report that all EMRV Thermocouples on RB 23' indicate normal Terminus:The acoustic monitor has been defeated for EMRV NR-108A.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 9 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

In-Service CRD FCV (NC30A) fails closed. A control rod drift will occur when theCRD FCV is recovered.Initiation: Following defeat of acoustic monitor for EMRV NR-108ACue: COOLING WATER FLOW, CLG WTR/REACTOR P, DRV WTR/REACTOR P indicators showdownscale; position indicator for NC30A indicates closed; (4F) CRD TEMP HI annunciator H5c(5F/6F)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO Responds to annunciator H5c, CRD TEMP HI (5F/6F) Reports off-normal CRD indications Reports CRD FCV NC30A indicates closed Dispatches NLO to investigate (Role Play) Places alternate CRD FCV in service IAW procedure 302.1, Control Rod DriveSystem, section 4.3.3. (Panel 4F) (attached) Reports CRD parameters have returned to normal with CRD FCV NC30B inservice. Responds to annunciator H6a, ROD DRIFT Reports control rod 10-06 drifting in Selects control rod 10-06 and takes the ROD CONTROL switch to ROD IN untilfully inserted (4F)

Sim.Operator /

Role Play As the NLO directed to investigate the CRD FCV A, report to the Control Room: There is aleak in the air line to CRD FCV A, and that you have isolated it. (FCV fails closed on loss of air) When requested to place CRD FCV B in service, insert LOA-CRD012 to "1" (open) for theFCV inlet valve and LOA-CRD011 to "1" (open) for the FCV outlet valve. No need to isolatethe failed CRD FCV. When complete, ROLE PLAY as the NLO and report the CRD FCV B has been lined-up. After the RO places the CRD FLOW CONTROL VALVES switch toNC30B and when asked, report that the 4-way valve has been placed in the correct position. After the above, INSERT the control rod drift (IN) for rod 10-07 (MAL-CRD006_1007). When requested to isolate control rod 10-07, DELETE the drift malfunction, then reportcontrol rod 01-07 is isolated.

BOP Verifies CRD temperatures at CRD Temperature recorders (Panel 8R)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 10 of 20 NOTE:The CRD Temperature recorders (8R) are NON-FUNCTIONAL in the simulator. If the BOP goesback to read these recorders, state that several control rods indicate greater than 250° F (this isthe alarm setpoint).

SRO Directs RO to place the alternate CRD FCV in service IAW procedure 302.1,Control Rod Drive System (section 4.3.3). Notifies Work Week manager for FCV air line repair. Directs entry into ABN-6, Control Rod Drive System for the rod drift Directs control rod 10-07 be isolated IAW 302.1 Reviews TS 3.2.B.4. Verifies less than 6 inoperable control rods. (attached)Role Play Terminus:CRD FCV B (NC30B) is in service with all CRD parameters returned to normal. Control rod 10-07is valved out at position 00, and The Tech. Specs. have been applied Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 11 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 6 Event

Description:

Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) 11 fails lowInitiation: Control rod 10-07 has been isolated and Crew brief by the SROCue: Annunciator G4e, IRM DSCL, and H7a, ROD BLOCKTimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO Responds to annunciator G4e (3F), IRM DSCL and H7a, ROD BLOCK (5F/6F)o Reports IRM 11 is downscale and all other operable IRMs show normalindications Bypasses IRM 11 IAW procedure 402.4, IRM Bypass Operation (4F)o Place IRM BYPASS joystick in the CH 11 position o Verify alarms clear o Verify IRM 11 HI-HI, HIGH, and DN SCL OR INOP lights illuminated o Reports IRM 11 bypassed BOP Checks IRM 11 drawer (3R) and reports IRM 11 is downscale and all otheroperable IRMs show normal indications Verify IRM BYPASS light is illuminated on the SRM-IRM AUXILIARIES drawer(when bypassed) (3R)SRO Verifies Tech Spec 3.1.1, and directs IRM 11 bypassed Notifies Work Week Manager for repair Terminus:IRM 11 is bypassed Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 12 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 7 Event

Description:

Electronic Pressure Regulator (EPR) fluctuations Initiation: Following IRM 11 bypass Cue: Changes in reactor pressure and power (4F), Changes in EPR relay position indication (7F),Changes in Turbine Bypass valve positions (7F)TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO Report change in reactor power and pressure BOP Reports change in EPR Relay position Enters ABN-9, Electronic Pressure Regulator Malfunction o Transfers RPV pressure control to the Mechanical Pressure Regulator(MPR) IAW procedure 315.4, Transferring Pressure Regulators (7F) Lower the MPR setpoint by placing the MPR RELAY POSITION switchto the lower position (%) for approximately 1 second periods until theMPR indicator moves in the direction of and reaches the EPR setting When the MPR is in control, TURN OFF the EPR power switch Raise RPV pressure to normal, as directed by the SRO SRO Directs entry into ABN-9, Electronic Pressure Regulator Malfunction, to swap to the MPR Directs raising RPV pressure back to normal with the MPR Notifies Work Week Manager for repair Terminus:The MPR has been placed in control of RPV pressure.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 13 of 20 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 14 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 8Event

Description:

Failure of the MPR causing all Turbine Bypass Valves to go closed and electric ATWSInitiation: After the MPR has been placed in control of RPV pressureCue: Turbine Bypass Valves (TBV) indicate closed; RPV pressure rises.TimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO Reports RPV pressure and power rising Manually scrams the reactor and carries out ABN-1, Reactor Scram Scrams the reactor Inserts SRMs Reports control rods not inserted and reports reactor power Initiates Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI)

(4F) Bypasses ROPS (Reactor Overfill Protection System)

(4F) Maintain RPV water level in the band 138" - 175" TAF IAW Support Procedure19 (attached) Insert control rods IAW Support Procedure 21 (CT) (attached) o Vent the Scram Air Header o Manual Control Rod Insertion (4F)o Directs NLO to close CRD Charging Water Valve V-15-52 Reports all control rods inserted Sim.Operator/ROLE PLAYTo vent the scram air header, insert LOA-CAS021 to "0" to close the scram air inlet valve and LOA-CAS024 to "1" to open the scram air vent valve.To close the CRD charging header supply valve V-15-52, insert LOA-CRD024 to "0".To close CRD Charging Water Valve V-15-52: LOA-CRD024 to "0" ROLE PLAY as required toreport valve closed.

BOP May report TBV indicate closed Confirms EOP automatic actions IAW Support Procedure 1 (attached) Prevents ADS by placing ADS Timer switches in Bypass (1F/2F) Bypass MSIV Low-Low water level isolation IAW Support Procedure 16(attached) Bypass RBCCW Drywell Isolation IAW Support Procedure 18 (attached) Trips recirc. pumps, as directed (3F)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 15 of 20 Controls RPV pressure 800-1000 psig with Support Procedure 11/12 o EMRVs: Cycle EMRV control switch to MAN/AUTO to open/close the valve(1F/2F)o Isolation Condensers: Cycle IC Condensate Return Valves (1F/2F)SRO May directs reactor scram and ABN-1, Reactor Scram, prior to reactor pressurescram setpoint (1045 psig) Directs entry into RPV Control - With ATWS o Directs ARI initiation o Directs ROPS bypassed o Directs confirmation of automatic actions IAW Support Procedure 1 o Directs ADS Timer switches in Bypass o Directs bypass MSIV Low-Low water level isolation IAW Support Procedure 16 o Directs bypass of RBCCW isolation IAW Support Procedure 18 o Directs RPV water level band 138" - 175" TAF IAW Support Procedure 19 o Directs Crew to insert control rods IAW Support Procedure 21 o Directs 800 - 1000 psig RPV pressure with Isolation Condensers IAWSupport Procedure 11 and EMRVs IAW Support Procedure 12 o Directs recirc. pumps tripped Directs entry into RPV Control - No ATWS (following cont rol rod insertions) o May direct ADS placed back to AUTO Terminus:All control rods have been inserted, and RPV water level and pressure are under control.

Notes/Comments Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 16 of 20Op-Test No.: NRC 2006-1 Scenario No.: NRC 1 Event No.: 9 Event

Description:

Recirc Leak in the Primary ContainmentInitiation: When all control rods are fully insertedCue: Annunciator C3f, DW PRESS HI/LO, H1d, H2d, DW PRESS HI-HI I & II, drywell temperature and pressure risingTimePositionApplicant's Actions or Behavior RO/BOP Respond to annunciator C3f, DW PRESS HI/LO (1F/2F) Report Primary Containment Control EOP entry and RPV Control - No ATWSEOP at 3 psig DW pressure Confirms EOP automatic actions IAW Support Procedure 1 (attached) Lines-up Containment Spray IAW Support Procedure 29 (attached) Initiates Drywell Spray IAW Support Procedure 29 (CT) (attached) RPV water level control o Uses FW (IAW Support Procedure 2, Feed and Condensate SystemOperation), and Core Spray (Support Procedure 9, Lineup for Core SpraySystem Injection) to control RPV water level above TAF (attached) o Lowers RPV pressure to allow Core Spray injection SRO Directs entry into RPV Control - No ATWS o Directs using FW/Cond, Core Spray for RPV water level control IAWSupport Procedure 2 and Support Procedure 9 o Directs lowering RPV pressure to a llow low pressure injection systems Direct entry into Primary Containment Control EOP o Direct isolations confirmed IAW Support Procedure 1 o Prior to 12 psig PC pressure, directs lineup of Drywell Sprays IAWSupport Procedure 29 o When PC pressure exceeds 12 psig, direct initiation of Drywell SpraysIAW Support Procedure 29 Terminus:Drywell sprays are in service controlling drywell pressure.

Notes/CommentsEmergency Plan Classification: Failure of Reactor Protection System: MS4

- Site Area Emergency; Auto andManual Scram NOT Successful Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 17 of 20 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 18 of 20 Malfunction List Presets: Cleanup Pump B out-of-service: PTL control switch IRM 17 failed: MAL-NIS010H (and bypassed) EPR in serviceEvent 1: Raise reactor power with control rods None Event 2: Transfer from LFRV to MFRV None Event 3: Failure of RPV high pressure input to Isolation Condenser initiation ICH-NSS087A to 1200 psig Event 4: Failure of EMRV NR-108A Acoustic Monitor MAL-NSS026A to 120% EMRV NR0108A acoustic monitor fails upscale Event 5: In-service CRD flow control valve NC30A fails closed/Control rod 10-07 drifts IN MAL-CRD001A to "0" fails CRD FCV closed MAL-CRD006_1007To place the alternate CRD FCV in service: LOA-CRD012 to "1" to open standby CRD FCV NC30B inlet valve LOA-CRD011 to "1" to open standby CRD FCV NC30B outlet valve Note: No need to isolate the failed FVC Event 6: IRM 15 fails low MAL-NIS009E to "0" Event 7: EPR fluctuations MAL-TCS010 to 980 psig over 15 second ramp MAL-TCS010 to 970 psig over 15 second ramp (one-two minutes after initial TCS010 malfunction)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2NRC 1 Page 19 of 20 Event 8: Failure of MPR causing increased reactor pressure and TBVs fail closed plus Electric ATWS MAL-TCS008 to 1084 psig (raises reactor pressure) (MAY NOT BE NECESSARY) MAL-TCS006A through TCS006I to "0" (individual malfunctions to close each TBV) BUT fail 1 st and 2 nd TBV (MAL-TCS006A and MAL-TCS006B over 12 minutes. Electric ATWS (CAED ATWS)

To vent the scram air header: LOA-CAS021 to 0 (close air inlet valve) AND LOA-CAS022 to 1 (open vent valve)

To close the CRD charging header supply valve V-15-52 to insert control rods during ATWS: LOA-CRD024 to 0 Event 9: Recirc LOCA inside primary containment MAL-NSS004A recirc suction break to 5% over 10 minutes Set-Up Notes - IC-1741.Have a marked-up copy of the startup procedure, 201 (2 copies: one for RO, one for SRO)2.IRM-17 is bypassed 3.Cleanup Pump B is in PTL with a clearance tag on the panel control switch 4.The EPR is in control NRC 1 Page 20 of 20

References:

Procedure #Procedure NameRevision1201Plant Startup392317Feedwater System743302.2Control Rod Drive Manual Control System284302.1Control Rod Drive System925RAP-H5cCRD TEMP HI06RAP-H7aRod Block27402.4IRM Bypass Operation98ABN-9Electronic Pressure Regulator Malfunction19315.4Transferring Pressure Regulators210EMG-3200-01BRPV Control - With ATWS1411EMG-3200-02Primary Containment Control1712401.3Operation of the Nucl ear Instrumentation SRM Channel during and After Shutdown 913402.3IRM Operation During Plant Shutdown1114SP-1Confirmation of Automatic Initiations and Isolations1715SP-29Initiation of the Cont ainment Spray System for Drywell Sprays 1716RAP-B4gSV/EMRV NOT CLOSED017SP-2Feed and Condensate System Operation1218SP-9Lineup for Core Spray System Injection1219EMG-32-01AARPV Control - No ATWS1220413Operation of the Safe ty Valve/EMRV Acoustic Monitoring System 1721SP-21Alternate Insertion of Control Rods1422Tech Specs