ML14058A030: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:2 U3,'1t' ui'iaiu , -ensi [/U.SNRC ""=I In nf6~ d'n Oconee Flood Protection and the 10 CFR 50,54() Response NRR ET Meeting October 23, 2008 October 23, 2008 fri , i,, I knlxt -1 S caiuse )ensi ve (Ij2S.NRC  
{{#Wiki_filter:2 U3,'1t' ui'iaiu , -ensi [/U.SNRC ""=I In nf6~ d'n Oconee Flood Protection and the 10 CFR 50,54() Response NRR ET Meeting October 23, 2008 October 23, 2008 fri , i,, I knlxt -1 S caiuse )ensi ve (Ij2S.NRC  
=naIUnat Nifectil h~opfa and ihg &avironmw"I-Objectives Purposes-Summarize the licensee's responses-Discuss the staff's evaluation-Receive ET feedback on the merits of proposed key messages to the licensee October 23, 2008 2 unfici ausenai ensiv USNRC Ia Infar, Nwcing People and Ow Envronment Background , NRC inspections in 1994 and 2005 Issues regarding Oconee external flooding licensing basis , FERC-required inundation study (1992)-Site flood height as high as 16.8 fp.et , Unclear demonstration of flood height for adequate protection s Underestimated Jocassee Dam failure frequency@ 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter to Duke to address flooding concerns October 23, 2008 3  
=naIUnat Nifectil h~opfa and ihg &avironmw"I-Objectives Purposes-Summarize the licensee's responses-Discuss the staff's evaluation-Receive ET feedback on the merits of proposed key messages to the licensee October 23, 2008 2 unfici ausenai ensiv USNRC Ia Infar, Nwcing People and Ow Envronment Background , NRC inspections in 1994 and 2005 Issues regarding Oconee external flooding licensing basis , FERC-required inundation study (1992)-Site flood height as high as 16.8 fp.et , Unclear demonstration of flood height for adequate protection s Underestimated Jocassee Dam failure frequency@ 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter to Duke to address flooding concerns October 23, 2008 3
( USNRC P*fiq~an P"oPke : te £acwomwuld Principal 10 CFR 50.54(f Questions Regarding Oconee Flood 1. Explain the bounding external flood hazard at Oconee and the basis for excluding consideration of other external flood hazards, such as those described in the Inundation Study, as the bounding case.2. Provide your assessment of the Inundation Study and why it does or does not represent the expected flood height following a Jocassee Dam failure.3. Describe in detail the nuclear safety implications of floods that render unavailable the SSF and associated support equipment with a concurrent loss of all Alternating Current power.October 23, 2008 Official ly -Se it e 4 x,-~f'rnal Info 't~o iLicensee's Response Written response-Assessed inundation levels based on current drought conditions
( USNRC P*fiq~an P"oPke : te £acwomwuld Principal 10 CFR 50.54(f Questions Regarding Oconee Flood 1. Explain the bounding external flood hazard at Oconee and the basis for excluding consideration of other external flood hazards, such as those described in the Inundation Study, as the bounding case.2. Provide your assessment of the Inundation Study and why it does or does not represent the expected flood height following a Jocassee Dam failure.3. Describe in detail the nuclear safety implications of floods that render unavailable the SSF and associated support equipment with a concurrent loss of all Alternating Current power.October 23, 2008 Official ly -Se it e 4 x,-~f'rnal Info 't~o iLicensee's Response Written response-Assessed inundation levels based on current drought conditions
-Committed to increase current flood walls by 2.5 feet by February 2009-Proposed further analysis by February 2010-Relied heavily on test and inspection of dam to support low frequency assumptions
-Committed to increase current flood walls by 2.5 feet by February 2009-Proposed further analysis by February 2010-Relied heavily on test and inspection of dam to support low frequency assumptions
-Asserted that seismic failure is "not credible"-Asserted that other dam failure modes (i.e., overtopping) "not credible"@ Oral response-Stated that watertight doors could be procured for the SSF-Stated that SSF walls can accommodate the impact of a 16.8 foot flood October 23, 2008 0 ff'IUse -Sen sve 5 Intr Inora ' n  
-Asserted that seismic failure is "not credible"-Asserted that other dam failure modes (i.e., overtopping) "not credible"@ Oral response-Stated that watertight doors could be procured for the SSF-Stated that SSF walls can accommodate the impact of a 16.8 foot flood October 23, 2008 0 ff'IUse -Sen sve 5 Intr Inora ' n
(-ýUS.NRCC In omt Review of Licensee's Response@ Interim continued operation acceptable if:-Licensee commits to water management of Jocassee Lake levels-Licensee addresses SSF availability
(-ýUS.NRCC In omt Review of Licensee's Response@ Interim continued operation acceptable if:-Licensee commits to water management of Jocassee Lake levels-Licensee addresses SSF availability
# Insufficient basis for final resolution-current and future-Limited scope> Lack of adequate seismic analysisLack of a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) analysis-Inadequate dam failure modeling Time of failure> Size of breachAnalysis model-Inadequate probabilistic argument October 23, 2008 6 I I?megdteEzRC Inm rng Proposed Key Messages For November 5, 2008 Meeting with Licensee s Interim continued operation acceptable if:-Licensee commits to water management of Jocassee Lake levels-Licensee addresses SSF availability e Insufficient basis for final resolution-current and future-Limited scope> Lack of adequate seismic analysis> Lack of a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) analysis-Inadequate dam failure modeling> Time of failure> Size of breach> Analysis model-Inadequate probabilistic argument.SSF improvements
# Insufficient basis for final resolution-current and future-Limited scope> Lack of adequate seismic analysisLack of a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) analysis-Inadequate dam failure modeling Time of failure> Size of breachAnalysis model-Inadequate probabilistic argument October 23, 2008 6 I I?megdteEzRC Inm rng Proposed Key Messages For November 5, 2008 Meeting with Licensee s Interim continued operation acceptable if:-Licensee commits to water management of Jocassee Lake levels-Licensee addresses SSF availability e Insufficient basis for final resolution-current and future-Limited scope> Lack of adequate seismic analysis> Lack of a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) analysis-Inadequate dam failure modeling> Time of failure> Size of breach> Analysis model-Inadequate probabilistic argument.SSF improvements
-Scope, timing, and commitment unclear.Emphasis on timely resolution
-Scope, timing, and commitment unclear.Emphasis on timely resolution
.Letter conveying these concerns will be issued by November 21, 2008 October 23, 2008 7}}
.Letter conveying these concerns will be issued by November 21, 2008 October 23, 2008 7}}

Revision as of 11:31, 28 April 2019

NRR ET Meeting on Oconee Flood Protection and the 10 CFR 50.54(f) Response
ML14058A030
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/23/2008
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML14055A421 List: ... further results
References
FOIA/PA-2012-0325
Download: ML14058A030 (7)


Text

2 U3,'1t' ui'iaiu , -ensi [/U.SNRC ""=I In nf6~ d'n Oconee Flood Protection and the 10 CFR 50,54() Response NRR ET Meeting October 23, 2008 October 23, 2008 fri , i,, I knlxt -1 S caiuse )ensi ve (Ij2S.NRC

=naIUnat Nifectil h~opfa and ihg &avironmw"I-Objectives Purposes-Summarize the licensee's responses-Discuss the staff's evaluation-Receive ET feedback on the merits of proposed key messages to the licensee October 23, 2008 2 unfici ausenai ensiv USNRC Ia Infar, Nwcing People and Ow Envronment Background , NRC inspections in 1994 and 2005 Issues regarding Oconee external flooding licensing basis , FERC-required inundation study (1992)-Site flood height as high as 16.8 fp.et , Unclear demonstration of flood height for adequate protection s Underestimated Jocassee Dam failure frequency@ 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter to Duke to address flooding concerns October 23, 2008 3

( USNRC P*fiq~an P"oPke : te £acwomwuld Principal 10 CFR 50.54(f Questions Regarding Oconee Flood 1. Explain the bounding external flood hazard at Oconee and the basis for excluding consideration of other external flood hazards, such as those described in the Inundation Study, as the bounding case.2. Provide your assessment of the Inundation Study and why it does or does not represent the expected flood height following a Jocassee Dam failure.3. Describe in detail the nuclear safety implications of floods that render unavailable the SSF and associated support equipment with a concurrent loss of all Alternating Current power.October 23, 2008 Official ly -Se it e 4 x,-~f'rnal Info 't~o iLicensee's Response Written response-Assessed inundation levels based on current drought conditions

-Committed to increase current flood walls by 2.5 feet by February 2009-Proposed further analysis by February 2010-Relied heavily on test and inspection of dam to support low frequency assumptions

-Asserted that seismic failure is "not credible"-Asserted that other dam failure modes (i.e., overtopping) "not credible"@ Oral response-Stated that watertight doors could be procured for the SSF-Stated that SSF walls can accommodate the impact of a 16.8 foot flood October 23, 2008 0 ff'IUse -Sen sve 5 Intr Inora ' n

(-ýUS.NRCC In omt Review of Licensee's Response@ Interim continued operation acceptable if:-Licensee commits to water management of Jocassee Lake levels-Licensee addresses SSF availability

  1. Insufficient basis for final resolution-current and future-Limited scope> Lack of adequate seismic analysisLack of a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) analysis-Inadequate dam failure modeling Time of failure> Size of breachAnalysis model-Inadequate probabilistic argument October 23, 2008 6 I I?megdteEzRC Inm rng Proposed Key Messages For November 5, 2008 Meeting with Licensee s Interim continued operation acceptable if:-Licensee commits to water management of Jocassee Lake levels-Licensee addresses SSF availability e Insufficient basis for final resolution-current and future-Limited scope> Lack of adequate seismic analysis> Lack of a probable maximum precipitation (PMP) analysis-Inadequate dam failure modeling> Time of failure> Size of breach> Analysis model-Inadequate probabilistic argument.SSF improvements

-Scope, timing, and commitment unclear.Emphasis on timely resolution

.Letter conveying these concerns will be issued by November 21, 2008 October 23, 2008 7