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(4) Vehicle Bomb Control Program (Section 13.6.9 of SSER 20) During the period of the exemption granted in paragraph 2.D.(3) of this license, in implementing the power ascension phase of the approved initial test program, TVA shall not exceed 50% power until the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and (8) are fully implemented. | (4) Vehicle Bomb Control Program (Section 13.6.9 of SSER 20) During the period of the exemption granted in paragraph 2.D.(3) of this license, in implementing the power ascension phase of the approved initial test program, TVA shall not exceed 50% power until the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and (8) are fully implemented. | ||
TVA shall submit a letter under oath or affirmation when the requirements of 73.55(c)(7) and (8) have been fully implemented. | TVA shall submit a letter under oath or affirmation when the requirements of 73.55(c)(7) and (8) have been fully implemented. | ||
Facility License No. NPF-90 Amendment No. 112 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3.6 Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 APPLICABILITY: | Facility License No. NPF-90 Amendment No. 112 | ||
===3.3 INSTRUMENTATION=== | |||
Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3.6 Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 APPLICABILITY: | |||
ACTIONS The Containment Vent Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE. | ACTIONS The Containment Vent Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE. | ||
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ------------------------------------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------- | MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ------------------------------------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------------------------------- | ||
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. | Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. | ||
CONDITION A. One radiation monitoring channel inoperable. | CONDITION A. One radiation monitoring channel inoperable. | ||
Watts Bar-Unit 1 A.1 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Restore the affected channel to 4 hours OPERABLE status. (continued) 3.3-52 112 CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The CREVS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE. | Watts Bar-Unit 1 A.1 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Restore the affected channel to 4 hours OPERABLE status. (continued) 3.3-52 112 CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION | ||
====3.3.7 Control==== | |||
Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The CREVS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE. | |||
APPLICABILITY: | APPLICABILITY: | ||
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. | MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
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Sepa rate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. | Sepa rate Condition entry is allowed for each Function. | ||
CONDITION A. One or more Functions with one channel or train inoperable. | CONDITION A. One or more Functions with one channel or train inoperable. | ||
Watts Bar-Unit 1 A.1 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Place one CREVS train in 7 days emergency radiation protection mode. (continued) 3.3-57 Amendment No. 112 ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8 APPLICABILITY: | Watts Bar-Unit 1 A.1 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Place one CREVS train in 7 days emergency radiation protection mode. (continued) 3.3-57 Amendment No. 112 ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION | ||
====3.3.8 Auxiliary==== | |||
Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8 APPLICABILITY: | |||
ACTIONS The ABGTS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE. | ACTIONS The ABGTS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE. | ||
According to Table 3.3.8-1. ---------------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------------ | According to Table 3.3.8-1. ---------------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------------ | ||
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AND B.1.2 Enter applicable Conditions Immediately and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.12, "Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation. | AND B.1.2 Enter applicable Conditions Immediately and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.12, "Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation. | ||
OR (continued) | OR (continued) | ||
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.3-61 Amendment 112 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.17 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) TUBE INTEGRITY LCO 3.4.17 SG tube integrity shall be maintained SG Tube Integrity 3.4.17 All SG tubes satisfying the tube repair criteria shall be plugged in accordance with the Steam Generator Program. APPLICABILITY: | Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.3-61 Amendment 112 | ||
===3.4 REACTOR=== | |||
COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.17 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) TUBE INTEGRITY LCO 3.4.17 SG tube integrity shall be maintained SG Tube Integrity 3.4.17 All SG tubes satisfying the tube repair criteria shall be plugged in accordance with the Steam Generator Program. APPLICABILITY: | |||
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS --------------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------- | MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS --------------------------------------------------------------------NOTE-------------------------------------------------------- | ||
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG tube. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more SG tubes A.1 Verify tube integrity of the 7 days satisfying the tube repair affected tube(s) is maintained criteria and not plugged in until the next refueling outage accordance with the Steam or SG tube inspection. | Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG tube. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more SG tubes A.1 Verify tube integrity of the 7 days satisfying the tube repair affected tube(s) is maintained criteria and not plugged in until the next refueling outage accordance with the Steam or SG tube inspection. | ||
Generator Program AND A.2 Plug the affected tube(s) in Prior to entering accordance with the Steam MODE 4 following Generator Program. the next refueling outage or SG tube inspection B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SG tube integrity not maintained Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.4-43 Amendment%, 112 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) LCO 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE. | Generator Program AND A.2 Plug the affected tube(s) in Prior to entering accordance with the Steam MODE 4 following Generator Program. the next refueling outage or SG tube inspection B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours SG tube integrity not maintained Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.4-43 Amendment%, 112 | ||
===3.7 PLANT=== | |||
SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) LCO 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
CREVS 3.7.10 -----------------------------------------------N 0 TE------------------------------------------------ | CREVS 3.7.10 -----------------------------------------------N 0 TE------------------------------------------------ | ||
T he control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control. APPLICABILITY: | T he control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control. APPLICABILITY: | ||
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not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated OR fuel assemblies. | not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated OR fuel assemblies. | ||
C.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. | C.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.7-25 CREATCS 3.7.11 COMPLETION TIME 30 days 6 hours 36 hours Immediately Immediately (continued) 112 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3. 7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) LCO 3.7.12 Two ABGTS trains shall be OPERABLE. | Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.7-25 CREATCS 3.7.11 COMPLETION TIME 30 days 6 hours 36 hours Immediately Immediately (continued) 112 | ||
===3.7 PLANT=== | |||
SYSTEMS 3. 7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) LCO 3.7.12 Two ABGTS trains shall be OPERABLE. | |||
APPLICABILITY: | APPLICABILITY: | ||
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One ABGTS train A.1 Restore ABGTS train to inoperable. | MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One ABGTS train A.1 Restore ABGTS train to inoperable. | ||
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(7) TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 1 O CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). | (7) TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 1 O CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p). | ||
The TVA approved CSP was discussed in NUREG-0847, Supplement 28, as amended by changes approved in License Amendment No. 7. (8) TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as described in NUREG-0847, Supplement 29, subject to the following provision: | The TVA approved CSP was discussed in NUREG-0847, Supplement 28, as amended by changes approved in License Amendment No. 7. (8) TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as described in NUREG-0847, Supplement 29, subject to the following provision: | ||
Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 Amendment No. 9 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The CREVS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE. | Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 Amendment No. 9 | ||
===3.3 INSTRUMENTATION=== | |||
CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The CREVS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE. | |||
APPLICABILITY: | APPLICABILITY: | ||
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. | MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
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* Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.196, "Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors," Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML063560144). | * Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.196, "Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors," Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML063560144). | ||
TVA referenced the following precedents, which obtained NRC approval, in support of this amendment request: 1. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, License Amendment No. 94, dated January 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13338A295). | TVA referenced the following precedents, which obtained NRC approval, in support of this amendment request: 1. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, License Amendment No. 94, dated January 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13338A295). | ||
: 2. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendments Nos. 187 and 179, respectively, dated October 17, 1994 (ADAMS Accession No. ML013310385). | : 2. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendments Nos. 187 and 179, respectively, dated October 17, 1994 (ADAMS Accession No. ML013310385). | ||
3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION 3.1 Proposed Editorial Changes to WBN Units 1 and 2 TSs The licensee's submittal proposed several editorial changes to the WBN Units 1 and 2 TSs. Specifically, the licensee proposed removal of an expired footnote in WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, and to correct editorial inconsistencies in the Applicability statements for TS 3.3.6, TS 3.3.7, TS 3.3.8, TS 3.4.17, TS 3.7.10, TS 3.7.11, TS 3.7.12 for WBN Unit 1, and TS 3.3.7 for WBN Unit 2. In reference to the NRG-approved (footnote) change to WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, Amendment No. 85 dated February 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 110190280), was a "one-time," Cycle 1 O and 11, TS change regarding the Main Control Room Chiller Completion Time Extension, and was applicable during plant modifications to upgrade the Unit 1 CREATCS chillers. | |||
===3.0 TECHNICAL=== | |||
EVALUATION | |||
===3.1 Proposed=== | |||
Editorial Changes to WBN Units 1 and 2 TSs The licensee's submittal proposed several editorial changes to the WBN Units 1 and 2 TSs. Specifically, the licensee proposed removal of an expired footnote in WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, and to correct editorial inconsistencies in the Applicability statements for TS 3.3.6, TS 3.3.7, TS 3.3.8, TS 3.4.17, TS 3.7.10, TS 3.7.11, TS 3.7.12 for WBN Unit 1, and TS 3.3.7 for WBN Unit 2. In reference to the NRG-approved (footnote) change to WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, Amendment No. 85 dated February 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 110190280), was a "one-time," Cycle 1 O and 11, TS change regarding the Main Control Room Chiller Completion Time Extension, and was applicable during plant modifications to upgrade the Unit 1 CREATCS chillers. | |||
This TS change established an applicability time period between March 1, 2011, and April 30, 2012, which has since expired. Therefore the referenced footnote for WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, is no longer valid and can be removed. The TS Applicability statements, as listed above, include several editorial inconsistencies associated with common syntax (i.e., commas and periods). | This TS change established an applicability time period between March 1, 2011, and April 30, 2012, which has since expired. Therefore the referenced footnote for WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, is no longer valid and can be removed. The TS Applicability statements, as listed above, include several editorial inconsistencies associated with common syntax (i.e., commas and periods). | ||
By letter dated February 14, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12046A089), the Industry submitted to the NRC, Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) report, "Transmittal of Report TSTF-GG-05-01, Revision 1, "Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical Specifications," a writers guide, which reflects the proper format and content for licensee use for the development and implementation of the Improved Standard Technical Specifications. | By letter dated February 14, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12046A089), the Industry submitted to the NRC, Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) report, "Transmittal of Report TSTF-GG-05-01, Revision 1, "Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical Specifications," a writers guide, which reflects the proper format and content for licensee use for the development and implementation of the Improved Standard Technical Specifications. | ||
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No review or approval was requested. | No review or approval was requested. | ||
TVA used this TSTF report in the development of its submittal to correct the identified syntax errors. The corrections do not impact the content or intent of the TSs. 3. 1.1 Conclusion The NRC staff determined the previously approved TS 3.7.11 change in Amendment No. 85, as discussed above, established a time of applicability, which has since expired. Therefore the footnote reference is no longer valid and should be removed. The staff determined that the proposed TS editorial changes are consistent with the previously established industry standards for Improved Standard Technical Specification format, and are acceptable. | TVA used this TSTF report in the development of its submittal to correct the identified syntax errors. The corrections do not impact the content or intent of the TSs. 3. 1.1 Conclusion The NRC staff determined the previously approved TS 3.7.11 change in Amendment No. 85, as discussed above, established a time of applicability, which has since expired. Therefore the footnote reference is no longer valid and should be removed. The staff determined that the proposed TS editorial changes are consistent with the previously established industry standards for Improved Standard Technical Specification format, and are acceptable. | ||
Therefore, the staff concludes that TVA's proposed TS changes will continue to provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety, and are therefore, acceptable. | Therefore, the staff concludes that TVA's proposed TS changes will continue to provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety, and are therefore, acceptable. | ||
3.2 Proposed Change to WBN Unit 2, TS 3.7.10 3.2.1 Description of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Included as a CRHS, as described in Section 2.0 in this safety evaluation (SE), WBN Unit 2 is designed with CREVS, which consists of two independent redundant trains that circulate and filter air in the main control room habitability zone (also referred to as the CRE). Each CREVS train consists of a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity, and a fan. Two independent redundant control building emergency pressurization fans, each with their own outside air intake, are also part of the CREVS trains, pressurize the CRE, and maintain a minimum 1/8-inch positive pressure relative to the outdoors and adjoining spaces. A cross-connection is provided just upstream of the control building emergency pressurization fans that allows either fan to draw air from either emergency air intake, if necessary. | |||
===3.2 Proposed=== | |||
Change to WBN Unit 2, TS 3.7.10 3.2.1 Description of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Included as a CRHS, as described in Section 2.0 in this safety evaluation (SE), WBN Unit 2 is designed with CREVS, which consists of two independent redundant trains that circulate and filter air in the main control room habitability zone (also referred to as the CRE). Each CREVS train consists of a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity, and a fan. Two independent redundant control building emergency pressurization fans, each with their own outside air intake, are also part of the CREVS trains, pressurize the CRE, and maintain a minimum 1/8-inch positive pressure relative to the outdoors and adjoining spaces. A cross-connection is provided just upstream of the control building emergency pressurization fans that allows either fan to draw air from either emergency air intake, if necessary. | |||
Actuation of the CREVS occurs automatically upon receipt of a safety injection signal or a control room air intake radiation monitor signal, which provides indication of high radiation in the outside air supply. Actuation of the CREVS in the emergency mode of operation closes the unfiltered outside air intake and unfiltered exhaust dampers, and aligns the system for recirculation of the air within the CRE through the redundant trains of air handling units, with a portion of the stream of air directed through HEPA and charcoal filters. The emergency mode also initiates pressurization and filtered ventilation of the air supply to the CRE. Pressurization of the CRE prevents infiltration of unfiltered air from the surrounding areas of the building. | Actuation of the CREVS occurs automatically upon receipt of a safety injection signal or a control room air intake radiation monitor signal, which provides indication of high radiation in the outside air supply. Actuation of the CREVS in the emergency mode of operation closes the unfiltered outside air intake and unfiltered exhaust dampers, and aligns the system for recirculation of the air within the CRE through the redundant trains of air handling units, with a portion of the stream of air directed through HEPA and charcoal filters. The emergency mode also initiates pressurization and filtered ventilation of the air supply to the CRE. Pressurization of the CRE prevents infiltration of unfiltered air from the surrounding areas of the building. | ||
A single CREVS train operating at a flow rate of 4000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) +/- 10 percent (that includes a pressurization flow of less than 711 cfm) will pressurize the CRE to a minimum of 0.125-inch water gauge relative to adjacent areas. However, during a tornado warning, the tornado dampers are closed, which isolates the CRE from the outside air supply, thus precluding the pressurization function of the CREVS. 3.2.2 WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7.10 TS 3.7.10 for WBN Unit 2, requires two independent CREVS trains to be OPERABLE in all MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. | A single CREVS train operating at a flow rate of 4000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) +/- 10 percent (that includes a pressurization flow of less than 711 cfm) will pressurize the CRE to a minimum of 0.125-inch water gauge relative to adjacent areas. However, during a tornado warning, the tornado dampers are closed, which isolates the CRE from the outside air supply, thus precluding the pressurization function of the CREVS. 3.2.2 WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7.10 TS 3.7.10 for WBN Unit 2, requires two independent CREVS trains to be OPERABLE in all MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. | ||
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This allowance (i.e., to include a specific shutdown action within TS 3. 7 .10) is consistent with TS 3. 7 .10 Condition C that applies when the Required Actions of Condition B (that also could affect both CREVS trains) are not met within the associated Completion Time. The change is acceptable because the requirements to shutdown the unit to Mode 3 and 2 NRC approval to modify WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7 .10, as proposed, is consistent with the current WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.10 requirements (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13338A295). Mode 5 are similar to the current requirements (with the exception of the intermediate Required Action and Completion Time to be in Mode 4), and the required Completion Times are 1 hour less than the existing LCO 3.0.3 Completion Times that currently apply. Deletion of the intermediate action is acceptable because placing the unit in Mode 3 ensures the reactor is subcritical, and the requirement to be in Mode 5 will ensure the unit is cooled down to 200 degrees F. 3.2.3 Conclusion The NRC staff considered the licensee's justification and determined that while new Condition F contains no specified time to reach MODE 4 (hot shutdown), the proposed change is, overall, a more restrictive change to TS requirements because of the reduced time to reach MODE 5 compared to LCO 3.0.3 requirements. | This allowance (i.e., to include a specific shutdown action within TS 3. 7 .10) is consistent with TS 3. 7 .10 Condition C that applies when the Required Actions of Condition B (that also could affect both CREVS trains) are not met within the associated Completion Time. The change is acceptable because the requirements to shutdown the unit to Mode 3 and 2 NRC approval to modify WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7 .10, as proposed, is consistent with the current WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.10 requirements (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13338A295). Mode 5 are similar to the current requirements (with the exception of the intermediate Required Action and Completion Time to be in Mode 4), and the required Completion Times are 1 hour less than the existing LCO 3.0.3 Completion Times that currently apply. Deletion of the intermediate action is acceptable because placing the unit in Mode 3 ensures the reactor is subcritical, and the requirement to be in Mode 5 will ensure the unit is cooled down to 200 degrees F. 3.2.3 Conclusion The NRC staff considered the licensee's justification and determined that while new Condition F contains no specified time to reach MODE 4 (hot shutdown), the proposed change is, overall, a more restrictive change to TS requirements because of the reduced time to reach MODE 5 compared to LCO 3.0.3 requirements. | ||
Additionally, the staff determined the proposed TS would add clarity to the control room operators during an event that Condition E.1 would exist. The staff determined the licensee's proposed TS change for the new Condition F is consistent with the requirements of Section 50.36 of 10 CFR, "Technical specifications," which will continue to be met and is therefore acceptable. | Additionally, the staff determined the proposed TS would add clarity to the control room operators during an event that Condition E.1 would exist. The staff determined the licensee's proposed TS change for the new Condition F is consistent with the requirements of Section 50.36 of 10 CFR, "Technical specifications," which will continue to be met and is therefore acceptable. | ||
The staff also determined that the proposed TS changes will continue to provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed changes to WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7.10, are acceptable. | The staff also determined that the proposed TS changes will continue to provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed changes to WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7.10, are acceptable. | ||
3.3 Control Room Area Ventilation System As stated, in part, in Section 9.4, "Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilation Systems," of the WBN Units 1 and 2 (Rev. 0) Dual Unit Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) dated July 29, 2016: The Control Building heating, ventilating, air-conditioning (HVAC), and air cleanup systems are designed to maintain temperature and humidity conditions throughout the building for the protection, operation, and maintenance and testing of plant controls, and for the safe, uninterrupted occupancy of the main control room (MCR) habitability system (MCRHS) area during an accident and the subsequent recovery period ... The Control Building air-conditioned equipment areas and normally occupied personnel spaces are maintained in the range of 60 °F minimum to 104 °F maximum temperature during all modes of operation. | |||
===3.3 Control=== | |||
Room Area Ventilation System As stated, in part, in Section 9.4, "Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilation Systems," of the WBN Units 1 and 2 (Rev. 0) Dual Unit Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) dated July 29, 2016: The Control Building heating, ventilating, air-conditioning (HVAC), and air cleanup systems are designed to maintain temperature and humidity conditions throughout the building for the protection, operation, and maintenance and testing of plant controls, and for the safe, uninterrupted occupancy of the main control room (MCR) habitability system (MCRHS) area during an accident and the subsequent recovery period ... The Control Building air-conditioned equipment areas and normally occupied personnel spaces are maintained in the range of 60 °F minimum to 104 °F maximum temperature during all modes of operation. | |||
Adequate environmental conditions are provided for equipment operation and protection, and personnel comfort in the control room during normal, accident, and post-accident recovery conditions. | Adequate environmental conditions are provided for equipment operation and protection, and personnel comfort in the control room during normal, accident, and post-accident recovery conditions. | ||
The Control Building outside air intakes are provided with radiation monitors, and smoke detectors. | The Control Building outside air intakes are provided with radiation monitors, and smoke detectors. | ||
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MCR common annunciation is provided. | MCR common annunciation is provided. | ||
Isolation of the MCRHZ occurs automatically upon the actuation of a safety injection signal from either unit or upon indication of high radiation, or smoke concentrations in the outside air supply stream to the building. | Isolation of the MCRHZ occurs automatically upon the actuation of a safety injection signal from either unit or upon indication of high radiation, or smoke concentrations in the outside air supply stream to the building. | ||
The Control Building HVAC outside air intakes can also be isolated by closing the tornado dampers. The tornado dampers are closed manually from the MCR during a tornado warning to protect the Control Building from tornado depressurization effects. Thus, the environmental requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 are met as referenced in Section 2.0 of this SE. The NRC staff reviewed the WBN Unit 2 system design to affirm control room personnel protection would not be adversely affected by the proposed TS change. The staff determined the WBN Unit 2 design was acceptable because the control room area ventilation system continues to meet the intent of NUREG-0800, Section 9.4.1, and therefore continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 and GDC 19. 3.3.1 Conclusion Based on the NRC staff's evaluation documented in NUREG-0847 (including Supplements), including the staff's evaluation of the information in the licensee's submittal, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 control room area ventilation system will continue to meet the relevant requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 and GDC 19. The staff's evaluation was in respect to protection against natural phenomena, environmental effects, adequate access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions and control of release of gaseous radioactive effluents to the environment, and will continue to meet the guidelines of RG 1.196, and therefore, is acceptable. | The Control Building HVAC outside air intakes can also be isolated by closing the tornado dampers. The tornado dampers are closed manually from the MCR during a tornado warning to protect the Control Building from tornado depressurization effects. Thus, the environmental requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 are met as referenced in Section 2.0 of this SE. The NRC staff reviewed the WBN Unit 2 system design to affirm control room personnel protection would not be adversely affected by the proposed TS change. The staff determined the WBN Unit 2 design was acceptable because the control room area ventilation system continues to meet the intent of NUREG-0800, Section 9.4.1, and therefore continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 and GDC 19. 3.3.1 Conclusion Based on the NRC staff's evaluation documented in NUREG-0847 (including Supplements), including the staff's evaluation of the information in the licensee's submittal, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 control room area ventilation system will continue to meet the relevant requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 and GDC 19. The staff's evaluation was in respect to protection against natural phenomena, environmental effects, adequate access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions and control of release of gaseous radioactive effluents to the environment, and will continue to meet the guidelines of RG 1.196, and therefore, is acceptable. | ||
3.4 Control Room Habitability Systems As stated in Section 6.4, "Habitability Systems," of the WBN Units 1 and 2 (Rev. 0) Dual Unit UFSAR dated July 29, 2016: The Main Control Room Habitability System (MCRHS) is the set of equipment, components, supplies, and other features, including the building enclosure, provided to ensure that a suitable environment is maintained for personnel and equipment in the MCRHS area for safe, long-term occupancy during normal and emergency operations of the plant. The Main Control Room Habitability Zone (MCRHZ) is the envelope of spaces which are maintained habitable by pressurization to 1/8 inch water gage minimum above atmospheric to minimize infiltration of airborne contaminants which may be present outside the pressure boundary. | |||
===3.4 Control=== | |||
Room Habitability Systems As stated in Section 6.4, "Habitability Systems," of the WBN Units 1 and 2 (Rev. 0) Dual Unit UFSAR dated July 29, 2016: The Main Control Room Habitability System (MCRHS) is the set of equipment, components, supplies, and other features, including the building enclosure, provided to ensure that a suitable environment is maintained for personnel and equipment in the MCRHS area for safe, long-term occupancy during normal and emergency operations of the plant. The Main Control Room Habitability Zone (MCRHZ) is the envelope of spaces which are maintained habitable by pressurization to 1/8 inch water gage minimum above atmospheric to minimize infiltration of airborne contaminants which may be present outside the pressure boundary. | |||
It is also called the MCRHS area. Included in the design basis of the system is the capacity to continue to function during such outside environmental conditions as a design-bases tornado. The essential components of the system remain functional because the components are located in a Seismic Category I structure that is designed to resist damage by tornado missiles. | It is also called the MCRHS area. Included in the design basis of the system is the capacity to continue to function during such outside environmental conditions as a design-bases tornado. The essential components of the system remain functional because the components are located in a Seismic Category I structure that is designed to resist damage by tornado missiles. | ||
For mitigation of potential rapid atmosphere negative pressure transient due to a tornado, the intake and exhaust dampers are closed, this protects the ductwork and filter housings from potential damage due to negative pressure. | For mitigation of potential rapid atmosphere negative pressure transient due to a tornado, the intake and exhaust dampers are closed, this protects the ductwork and filter housings from potential damage due to negative pressure. | ||
Line 179: | Line 215: | ||
==4.0 STATE CONSULTATION== | ==4.0 STATE CONSULTATION== | ||
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on March 8, 2017. The State official had no comments. | In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on March 8, 2017. The State official had no comments. | ||
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. | |||
===5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL=== | |||
CONSIDERATION The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. | |||
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on August 2, 2016 (81 FR 50740). Accordingly, the amendments meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). | The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on August 2, 2016 (81 FR 50740). Accordingly, the amendments meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). | ||
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment. | Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment. |
Revision as of 08:13, 9 October 2018
ML16330A347 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Watts Bar ![]() |
Issue date: | 03/28/2017 |
From: | Haskell R S Plant Licensing Branch III |
To: | Shea J W Tennessee Valley Authority |
Haskell R S, NRR/DORL/LPLIII-2, 415-1129 | |
References | |
CAC MF7993, CAC MF7994 | |
Download: ML16330A347 (30) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Mr. Joseph W. Shea Vice President, Nuclear Licensing Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 3R-C Chattanooga, TN 37 402-2801 March 28, 2017
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING MODIFICATION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.10 DISCREPANCIES IN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AND OTHER EDITORIAL CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (CAC NOS. MF7993 AND MF7994)
Dear Mr. Shea:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 112 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit 1 and Amendment No. 9 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 for WBN Unit 2. This amendment consists of changes to the licenses and the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated June 7, 2016. The amendment authorizes Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, or the licensee) to make TS changes to remove an expired footnote in WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, "Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)," and to correct several editorial inconsistencies identified in the WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS Applicability statements.
Additionally, the amendment modifies WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7 .10, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)," Actions, to include a new Condition F with specific shutdown Required Actions and associated Completion Time when Condition Eis not met (i.e., "Two CREVS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning").
This change also results in current TS 3. 7.10, Conditions F and G, being re-lettered as Conditions G and H, respectively.
This action is consistent with an NRC-approved license amendment previously issued to WBN Unit 1 for TS 3.7.10.
J. Shea A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed.
The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice. Docket Nos. 50-390 and 50-391
Enclosures:
- 1. Amendment No. 112 to NPF-90 2. Amendment No. 9 to NPF-96 3. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv Robert G. Schaaf, Senior Project M nager Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-390 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 112 License No. NPF-90 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) dated June 7, 2016, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Enclosure 1 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-90 is hereby amended to read as follows: (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 112 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented no later than 60 days from the date of its issuance.
Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License and the Technical Specifications FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION Benjamin G. Beasley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance:
March 2 8, 2O1 7 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 112 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-90 DOCKET NO. 50-390 Replace the following page of Facility Operating License NPF-90 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change. Remove 3 Insert 3 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Remove 3.3-52 3.3-57 3.3-61 3.4-43 3.7-22 3.7-25 3.7-27 Insert 3.3-52 3.3-57 3.3-61 3.4-43 3.7-22 3.7-25 3.7-27 (4) TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required, any byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis, instrument calibration, or other activity associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and (5) TVA, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility.
C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 1 O CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below. (1) Maximum Power Level TV A is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3459 megawatts thermal. (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 112 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. (3) Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) (Section 18.2 of SER Supplements 5 and 15) Prior to startup following the first refueling outage, TVA shall accomplish the necessary activities, provide acceptable responses, and implement all proposed corrective actions related to having the Watts Bar Unit 1 SPDS operational.
(4) Vehicle Bomb Control Program (Section 13.6.9 of SSER 20) During the period of the exemption granted in paragraph 2.D.(3) of this license, in implementing the power ascension phase of the approved initial test program, TVA shall not exceed 50% power until the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7) and (8) are fully implemented.
TVA shall submit a letter under oath or affirmation when the requirements of 73.55(c)(7) and (8) have been fully implemented.
Facility License No. NPF-90 Amendment No. 112
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3.6 Containment Vent Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 APPLICABILITY:
ACTIONS The Containment Vent Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ------------------------------------------------------------------NOTE---------------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION A. One radiation monitoring channel inoperable.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 A.1 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Restore the affected channel to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE status. (continued) 3.3-52 112 CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
3.3.7 Control
Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The CREVS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS ----------------------------------------------------------------
N 0 TE----------------------------------------------------------
Sepa rate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION A. One or more Functions with one channel or train inoperable.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 A.1 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Place one CREVS train in 7 days emergency radiation protection mode. (continued) 3.3-57 Amendment No. 112 ABGTS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
3.3.8 Auxiliary
Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8 APPLICABILITY:
ACTIONS The ABGTS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE.
According to Table 3.3.8-1. ---------------------------------------------------------------NOTE------------------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Place one ABGTS train in 7 days one channel or train operation.
B. One or more Functions with B.1.1 Place one ABGTS train in Immediately two channels or two trains operation.
AND B.1.2 Enter applicable Conditions Immediately and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.12, "Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS)," for one train made inoperable by inoperable actuation instrumentation.
OR (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.3-61 Amendment 112
3.4 REACTOR
COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.17 STEAM GENERATOR (SG) TUBE INTEGRITY LCO 3.4.17 SG tube integrity shall be maintained SG Tube Integrity 3.4.17 All SG tubes satisfying the tube repair criteria shall be plugged in accordance with the Steam Generator Program. APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS --------------------------------------------------------------------NOTE--------------------------------------------------------
Separate Condition entry is allowed for each SG tube. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more SG tubes A.1 Verify tube integrity of the 7 days satisfying the tube repair affected tube(s) is maintained criteria and not plugged in until the next refueling outage accordance with the Steam or SG tube inspection.
Generator Program AND A.2 Plug the affected tube(s) in Prior to entering accordance with the Steam MODE 4 following Generator Program. the next refueling outage or SG tube inspection B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> SG tube integrity not maintained Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.4-43 Amendment%, 112
3.7 PLANT
SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) LCO 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE.
CREVS 3.7.10 -----------------------------------------------N 0 TE------------------------------------------------
T he control room envelope (CRE) boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control. APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train to 7 days inoperable for reasons OPERABLE status. other than Condition B. B. One or more CREVS trains B.1 Initiate action to implement Immediately inoperable due to mitigating actions. inoperable CRE boundary in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4. AND B.2 Verify mitigating actions ensure 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> CRE occupant exposures to radiological and chemical hazards will not exceed limits and CRE occupants are protected from smoke hazards. AND B.3 Restore CRE boundary to 90 days OPERABLE status. (continued)
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.7-22 Amendment 6&;--+Q, 112
- 3. 7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)
LCO 3.7.11 Two CREATCS trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One CREA TCS train A.1 Restore CREATCS train to inoperable.
OPERABLE status. B. Required Action and associated B.1 Be in MODE 3. Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. C. Required Action and associated C.1 Place OPERABLE CREATCS Completion Time of Condition A train in operation.
not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated OR fuel assemblies.
C.2 Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.7-25 CREATCS 3.7.11 COMPLETION TIME 30 days 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours Immediately Immediately (continued) 112
3.7 PLANT
SYSTEMS 3. 7.12 Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) LCO 3.7.12 Two ABGTS trains shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION A. One ABGTS train A.1 Restore ABGTS train to inoperable.
OPERABLE status. B. Required Action B.1 Be in MODE 3. and associated Completion Time of AND Condition A not met. B.2 Be in MODE 5. OR Two ABGTS trains inoperable.
Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.7-27 ABGTS 3.7.12 COMPLETION TIME 7 days 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours Amendment No. 112 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY DOCKET NO. 50-391 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 9 License No. NPF-96 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: A. The application for amendment by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) dated June 7, 2016, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Enclosure 2 2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 is hereby amended to read as follows: (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 9 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance, and shall be implemented no later than 60 days from the date of its issuance.
Attachment:
Changes to the Operating License and the Technical Specifications FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Benjamin G. Beasley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch 11-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Date of Issuance:
March 28, 2017 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 9 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-96 DOCKET NO. 50-391 Replace the following page of Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change. Remove 3 Insert 3 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change. Remove 3.3-59 3.7-22 3.7-23 Insert 3.3-59 3.7-22 3.7-23 Unit 2 C. The license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act, and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect, and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below. (1) Maximum Power Level TV A is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3411 megawatts thermal. (2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through Amendment No. 9 and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this license. TVA shall operate the facility in accordance with the Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. (3) TVA shall implement permanent modifications to prevent overtopping of the embankments of the Fort Loudon Dam due to the Probable Maximum Flood by June 30, 2018. (4) PAD4TCD may be used to establish core operating limits for Cycles 1 and 2 only. PAD4TCD may not be used to establish core operating limits for subsequent reload cycles. (5) By December 31, 2017, the licensee shall report to the NRC that the actions to resolve the issues identified in Bulletin 2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System," have been implemented.
(6) The licensee shall maintain in effect the provisions of the physical security plan, security personnel training and qualification plan, and safeguards contingency plan, and all amendments made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 50.54(p).
(7) TVA shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 1 O CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).
The TVA approved CSP was discussed in NUREG-0847, Supplement 28, as amended by changes approved in License Amendment No. 7. (8) TVA shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Protection Report for the facility, as described in NUREG-0847, Supplement 29, subject to the following provision:
Facility Operating License No. NPF-96 Amendment No. 9
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION
CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The CREVS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
ACTIONS --------------------------------------------------------N 0 TE-------------------------------------------------------------
S e para te Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
CONDITION A. One or more Functions with A.1 one channel or train inoperable.
Watts Bar -Unit 2 REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Place one CREVS train in 7 days emergency radiation protection mode. 3.3-59 (continued)
Amendment 9
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION C. Required Action and C.1 associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. C.2 D. Required Action and D.1 associated Completion Time of Condition A not met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel OR assemblies.
D.2 E. Two CREVS trains E.1 inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning. F. Required Action and F.1 associated Completion Time of Condition E not met. F.2 Watts Bar -Unit 2 REQUIRED ACTION Be in MODE 3. Be in MODE 5. Place OPERABLE CREVS train in emergency mode. Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
Restore one CREVS train to OPERABLE status. Be in MODE 3. AND Be in MODE 5. 3.7-22 CREVS 3.7.10 COMPLETION TIME 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 36 hours Immediately Immediately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 6 hours 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (continued)
Amendment 9
ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION G. Two CREVS trains G.1 Suspend movement of inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, irradiated fuel assemblies or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
OR One or more CREVS trains inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
H. Two CREVS trains H.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B or E. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE SR 3. 7 .10.1 Operate each CREVS train for 15 minutes. SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). SR 3. 7.10.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates on an actual or simulated actuation signal. SR 3. 7.10.4 Perform required CRE unfiltered air inleakge testing in accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. Watts Bar -Unit 2 3.7-23 CREVS 3.7.10 COMPLETION TIME Immediately Immediately FREQUENCY 31 days In accordance with the VFTP 18 months In accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program Amendment 9
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NOS. 112 AND 9 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-90 AND NPF-96 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-390 AND 50-391
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated June 7, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 16159A208}, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2. TVA's proposed license amendment request (LAR) would revise the TSs to remove an expired footnote in TS 3. 7.11, "Control Room Emergency Air Temperature Control System (CREATCS)," for WBN Unit 1, and would correct editorial inconsistencies in the Applicability statements in TS 3.3.6, TS 3.3.7, TS 3.3.8, TS 3.4.17, and TS 3.7.10, TS 3.7.11, TS 3.7.12 for WBN Unit 1 and TS 3.3.7 for WBN Unit 2. Additionally, the proposed amendment would modify WBN Unit 2, TS 3.7.10, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS}," Actions, to include a new Condition F with specific shutdown Required Actions and associated Completion Times when Condition Eis not met (i.e., "Two CREVS trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning").
This change also results in current TS 3.7.10, Conditions F and G, being relettered as Conditions G and H, respectively.
This licensing action is consistent with NRG-approved Amendment No. 85 dated February 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 110190280), issued to WBN Unit 1 for changes to TS 3.7.10.
2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION
The control room is the plant area defined in the facility licensing basis from which actions are taken to operate the plant safely under normal conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe condition during accident situations.
The control room envelope (CRE) is the plant area defined in the facility licensing basis, which encompasses the control room and may encompass other plant areas. The structures that make up the CRE are designed to limit the in-leakage of airborne radioactivity and hazardous materials from areas external to the CRE. Control room habitability systems (CRHSs) typically provide the functions of shielding, isolation, pressurization, heating, ventilation, air conditioning and filtration, monitoring, and the sustenance and sanitation necessary to ensure that the control room operators can remain in the control room and take actions to operate the plant under normal and accident conditions.
The personnel protection features incorporated into the design of a particular plant's CRHSs Enclosure 3 depend on the nature and scope of the plant-specific challenges to maintaining control room habitability.
In the majority of the CRHS designs, isolation of the normal supply and exhaust flow paths and pressurization of the CRE relative to adjacent areas are fundamental to ensuring a habitable control room. During the design of a nuclear power plant, licensees perform analyses to demonstrate that the CRHSs, as designed, provide a habitable environment during postulated design-basis events. These design analyses model the transport of potential contaminants into the CRE and their removal. The amount of in-leakage of assumed contaminants is important to these analyses.
Unaccounted-for contaminants entering the CRE, may impact the ability of the operators to perform plant control functions.
If contaminants impair the response of the operators to an accident, there could be increased consequences to the public health and safety. The NRC staff considered the following applicable regulatory requirements and guidance documents for the review of the proposed LAR:
- Title 10, of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria [GDC] for Nuclear Power Plants," GDC 4, "Environmental and dynamic effects design bases," insofar, as it requires, in part, that: Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents
.... These structures, systems, and components shall be appropriately protected against dynamic effects ....
- GDC 19 "Control room," of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, states, in part: A control room shall be provided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear power unit safely under normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions, including loss-of-coolant accidents.
Adequate radiation protection shall be provided to permit access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of 5 rem [roentgen equivalent man] whole body, or its equivalent to any part of the body, for the duration of the accident.
Equipment at appropriate locations outside the control room shall be provided (1) with a design capability for a prompt hot shutdown of the reactor, including necessary instrumentation and controls to maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot shutdown, and (2) with a potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown of the reactor through the use of suitable procedures.
The acceptance criterion to establish compliance with 1 O CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 for facilities licensed with an accident source term is the 5 rem total effective dose equivalent criterion of 10 CFR 50.67(b)(2)(iii).
- Section 50.36of10 CFR, "Technical specifications." This regulation requires that the TSs include items in the following categories:
(1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings, (2) limiting conditions for operation, (3) surveillance requirements, (4) design features, and (5) administrative controls.
- Section 50.59 of 10 CFR, "Changes, tests, and experiments," requires a licensee to submit an LAR if a change to the TS is required.
- NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR [Light-Water Reactor] Edition, Section 6.4, "Control Room Habitability System," Revision 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070550069);
and Section 9.4.1 "Control Room Area Ventilation System," Revision 3 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070550045).
- NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications -Westinghouse Plants: Specifications," Revision 4, Volume 1, TS 3. 7.10, "Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS)" (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12100A222), for the isolation dampers.
- NUREG-0847, "Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2."
- Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.196, "Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors," Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession No. ML063560144).
TVA referenced the following precedents, which obtained NRC approval, in support of this amendment request: 1. Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, License Amendment No. 94, dated January 14, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13338A295).
- 2. Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Amendments Nos. 187 and 179, respectively, dated October 17, 1994 (ADAMS Accession No. ML013310385).
3.0 TECHNICAL
EVALUATION
3.1 Proposed
Editorial Changes to WBN Units 1 and 2 TSs The licensee's submittal proposed several editorial changes to the WBN Units 1 and 2 TSs. Specifically, the licensee proposed removal of an expired footnote in WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, and to correct editorial inconsistencies in the Applicability statements for TS 3.3.6, TS 3.3.7, TS 3.3.8, TS 3.4.17, TS 3.7.10, TS 3.7.11, TS 3.7.12 for WBN Unit 1, and TS 3.3.7 for WBN Unit 2. In reference to the NRG-approved (footnote) change to WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, Amendment No. 85 dated February 8, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 110190280), was a "one-time," Cycle 1 O and 11, TS change regarding the Main Control Room Chiller Completion Time Extension, and was applicable during plant modifications to upgrade the Unit 1 CREATCS chillers.
This TS change established an applicability time period between March 1, 2011, and April 30, 2012, which has since expired. Therefore the referenced footnote for WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.11, is no longer valid and can be removed. The TS Applicability statements, as listed above, include several editorial inconsistencies associated with common syntax (i.e., commas and periods).
By letter dated February 14, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML 12046A089), the Industry submitted to the NRC, Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) report, "Transmittal of Report TSTF-GG-05-01, Revision 1, "Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical Specifications," a writers guide, which reflects the proper format and content for licensee use for the development and implementation of the Improved Standard Technical Specifications.
The TSTF provided this document to the NRC for information.
No review or approval was requested.
TVA used this TSTF report in the development of its submittal to correct the identified syntax errors. The corrections do not impact the content or intent of the TSs. 3. 1.1 Conclusion The NRC staff determined the previously approved TS 3.7.11 change in Amendment No. 85, as discussed above, established a time of applicability, which has since expired. Therefore the footnote reference is no longer valid and should be removed. The staff determined that the proposed TS editorial changes are consistent with the previously established industry standards for Improved Standard Technical Specification format, and are acceptable.
Therefore, the staff concludes that TVA's proposed TS changes will continue to provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety, and are therefore, acceptable.
3.2 Proposed
Change to WBN Unit 2, TS 3.7.10 3.2.1 Description of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Included as a CRHS, as described in Section 2.0 in this safety evaluation (SE), WBN Unit 2 is designed with CREVS, which consists of two independent redundant trains that circulate and filter air in the main control room habitability zone (also referred to as the CRE). Each CREVS train consists of a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, an activated charcoal adsorber section for removal of gaseous activity, and a fan. Two independent redundant control building emergency pressurization fans, each with their own outside air intake, are also part of the CREVS trains, pressurize the CRE, and maintain a minimum 1/8-inch positive pressure relative to the outdoors and adjoining spaces. A cross-connection is provided just upstream of the control building emergency pressurization fans that allows either fan to draw air from either emergency air intake, if necessary.
Actuation of the CREVS occurs automatically upon receipt of a safety injection signal or a control room air intake radiation monitor signal, which provides indication of high radiation in the outside air supply. Actuation of the CREVS in the emergency mode of operation closes the unfiltered outside air intake and unfiltered exhaust dampers, and aligns the system for recirculation of the air within the CRE through the redundant trains of air handling units, with a portion of the stream of air directed through HEPA and charcoal filters. The emergency mode also initiates pressurization and filtered ventilation of the air supply to the CRE. Pressurization of the CRE prevents infiltration of unfiltered air from the surrounding areas of the building.
A single CREVS train operating at a flow rate of 4000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) +/- 10 percent (that includes a pressurization flow of less than 711 cfm) will pressurize the CRE to a minimum of 0.125-inch water gauge relative to adjacent areas. However, during a tornado warning, the tornado dampers are closed, which isolates the CRE from the outside air supply, thus precluding the pressurization function of the CREVS. 3.2.2 WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7.10 TS 3.7.10 for WBN Unit 2, requires two independent CREVS trains to be OPERABLE in all MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.
TS 3.7.10 Action Condition E describes the Required Action and Completion Time when two CREVS trains are inoperable in MODEs 1, 2, 3, or 4 due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning. Required Action E.1 requires restoration of one CREVS train to OPERABLE status within a Completion Time of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. However, there is no specific Required Action and Completion Time if Required Action E.1 and associated Completion Time is not met. WBN Unit 2, TS 3.0, "Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) Applicability," LCO 3.0.3 states: When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable.
Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in: a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />; b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />. Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.
Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.
LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. The licensee identified that the WBN Unit, 2, TS 3.7.10, Condition F, does not currently require an Action in the event Condition E.1 is not met. Therefore, and as stated, in part, in the licensee's application, " ... there is a potential conflict in applying the appropriate actions for not meeting the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E." TVA's submittal further states, in part: To resolve this potential conflict, a change is proposed to TS 3.7.10 to add a new Condition F to require a specific Required Actions and Completion Times when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition E is not met. This would preclude any misunderstanding by operations personnel as to whether LCO 3.0.3 is required to be entered. This change is consistent with the WBN Unit 1 TS 3.7.10, which was revised by the license amendment request (LAR) submitted by TVA [by letter dated November 19, 2012; ADAMS Accession No. ML 12333A240]
and approved by the NRC [by letter dated January 14, 2014; ADAMS Accession No. ML 13338A295].
At the time that the referenced LAR was submitted, the WBN Unit 2 Technical Specifications were being developed and TVA did not recognize that the revision to the WBN Unit 1 TS 3. 7 .10 required a similar change to the WBN Unit 2 TS 3. 7 .10. This error was entered into the TVA Corrective Action Program (CAP). In order to clarify the Required Action for not meeting Required Action E.1 and associated Completion Time, the licensee proposes to revise TS 3. 7.10 for WBN Unit 2, to add a new Condition F to state 2: CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition E not AND met. F.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> The licensee states that as a result of this change, the following conforming changes to TS 3.7.10 Actions are required:
Current Condition Fis changed to Condition G and current Required Action F.1 is changed to Required Action G.1. Current Condition G is changed to Condition H and current Required Action G.1 is changed to Required Action H.1. In Section 3.2.1, "Addition of Specific Shutdown Required Actions," of the licensee's submittal dated June 7, 2016, the licensee provided justification for the proposed change to TS 3.7.10 for WBN Unit 2 by stating, in part: The proposed change adds a specific requirement for a unit shutdown within the TS 3.7.10 Conditions instead of entering LCO 3.0.3 when both CREVS trains are inoperable in Mode 1, 2, 3, or 4 due to actions taken as because of a tornado warning and the Completion Time of eight hours for restoration of at least one CREVS train to OPERABLE status is not met. The proposed new Condition F would apply in this situation, and proposed Required Actions F.1 and F.2 would require the unit to be in MODE 3 within a Completion Time of six hours, and in Mode 5 within a Completion Time of 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, respectively.
This proposed new Condition F provides a similar requirement as the current LCO 3.0.3 Action, in that the unit will be required to be placed in a subcritical condition (Mode 3) within a finite time and in cold shutdown (Mode 5) within a finite time. The proposed new Condition F does not include the additional time (one hour) allowed by LCO 3.0.3 to be in the respective Mode, thus decreasing the Completion Times to be in Mode 3 and Mode 5 by one hour. In addition, the proposed-new Condition F does not include the intermediate action to be in Mode 4 (i.e., less than 350 degrees F [Fahrenheit]).
This allowance (i.e., to include a specific shutdown action within TS 3. 7 .10) is consistent with TS 3. 7 .10 Condition C that applies when the Required Actions of Condition B (that also could affect both CREVS trains) are not met within the associated Completion Time. The change is acceptable because the requirements to shutdown the unit to Mode 3 and 2 NRC approval to modify WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7 .10, as proposed, is consistent with the current WBN Unit 1, TS 3.7.10 requirements (ADAMS Accession No. ML 13338A295). Mode 5 are similar to the current requirements (with the exception of the intermediate Required Action and Completion Time to be in Mode 4), and the required Completion Times are 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> less than the existing LCO 3.0.3 Completion Times that currently apply. Deletion of the intermediate action is acceptable because placing the unit in Mode 3 ensures the reactor is subcritical, and the requirement to be in Mode 5 will ensure the unit is cooled down to 200 degrees F. 3.2.3 Conclusion The NRC staff considered the licensee's justification and determined that while new Condition F contains no specified time to reach MODE 4 (hot shutdown), the proposed change is, overall, a more restrictive change to TS requirements because of the reduced time to reach MODE 5 compared to LCO 3.0.3 requirements.
Additionally, the staff determined the proposed TS would add clarity to the control room operators during an event that Condition E.1 would exist. The staff determined the licensee's proposed TS change for the new Condition F is consistent with the requirements of Section 50.36 of 10 CFR, "Technical specifications," which will continue to be met and is therefore acceptable.
The staff also determined that the proposed TS changes will continue to provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety. Therefore, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed changes to WBN Unit 2, TS 3. 7.10, are acceptable.
3.3 Control
Room Area Ventilation System As stated, in part, in Section 9.4, "Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilation Systems," of the WBN Units 1 and 2 (Rev. 0) Dual Unit Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) dated July 29, 2016: The Control Building heating, ventilating, air-conditioning (HVAC), and air cleanup systems are designed to maintain temperature and humidity conditions throughout the building for the protection, operation, and maintenance and testing of plant controls, and for the safe, uninterrupted occupancy of the main control room (MCR) habitability system (MCRHS) area during an accident and the subsequent recovery period ... The Control Building air-conditioned equipment areas and normally occupied personnel spaces are maintained in the range of 60 °F minimum to 104 °F maximum temperature during all modes of operation.
Adequate environmental conditions are provided for equipment operation and protection, and personnel comfort in the control room during normal, accident, and post-accident recovery conditions.
The Control Building outside air intakes are provided with radiation monitors, and smoke detectors.
Indicators are provided with the radiation monitors.
MCR common annunciation is provided.
Isolation of the MCRHZ occurs automatically upon the actuation of a safety injection signal from either unit or upon indication of high radiation, or smoke concentrations in the outside air supply stream to the building.
The Control Building HVAC outside air intakes can also be isolated by closing the tornado dampers. The tornado dampers are closed manually from the MCR during a tornado warning to protect the Control Building from tornado depressurization effects. Thus, the environmental requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 are met as referenced in Section 2.0 of this SE. The NRC staff reviewed the WBN Unit 2 system design to affirm control room personnel protection would not be adversely affected by the proposed TS change. The staff determined the WBN Unit 2 design was acceptable because the control room area ventilation system continues to meet the intent of NUREG-0800, Section 9.4.1, and therefore continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 and GDC 19. 3.3.1 Conclusion Based on the NRC staff's evaluation documented in NUREG-0847 (including Supplements), including the staff's evaluation of the information in the licensee's submittal, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2 control room area ventilation system will continue to meet the relevant requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 and GDC 19. The staff's evaluation was in respect to protection against natural phenomena, environmental effects, adequate access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions and control of release of gaseous radioactive effluents to the environment, and will continue to meet the guidelines of RG 1.196, and therefore, is acceptable.
3.4 Control
Room Habitability Systems As stated in Section 6.4, "Habitability Systems," of the WBN Units 1 and 2 (Rev. 0) Dual Unit UFSAR dated July 29, 2016: The Main Control Room Habitability System (MCRHS) is the set of equipment, components, supplies, and other features, including the building enclosure, provided to ensure that a suitable environment is maintained for personnel and equipment in the MCRHS area for safe, long-term occupancy during normal and emergency operations of the plant. The Main Control Room Habitability Zone (MCRHZ) is the envelope of spaces which are maintained habitable by pressurization to 1/8 inch water gage minimum above atmospheric to minimize infiltration of airborne contaminants which may be present outside the pressure boundary.
It is also called the MCRHS area. Included in the design basis of the system is the capacity to continue to function during such outside environmental conditions as a design-bases tornado. The essential components of the system remain functional because the components are located in a Seismic Category I structure that is designed to resist damage by tornado missiles.
For mitigation of potential rapid atmosphere negative pressure transient due to a tornado, the intake and exhaust dampers are closed, this protects the ductwork and filter housings from potential damage due to negative pressure.
The NRC staff evaluated the WBN Unit 2 habitability design basis and determined the system, as designed, was acceptable because under postulated accident conditions it will continue to meet the intent of NUREG-0800, Section 6.4, and therefore, continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 and GDC 19. 3.4.1 Conclusion Based on the NRC staff's evaluation of the information provided by the licensee's submittal and furnished design-basis documentation, the staff concludes that the WBN Unit 2, MCRHS, continues to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 4, and GDC 19, and the guidance of RG 1.196, and, is therefore, acceptable to support the proposed TS changes. 3.5 Overall Conclusion As described above, the NRC staff reviewed TVA's assumptions, inputs, and methods used to assess the impact of the proposed LAR. The NRC staff concludes with reasonable assurance that the proposed TS changes satisfy the relevant regulatory requirements (e.g., 10 CFR 50.36. 10 CFR 50.67, GDC 4 and GDC 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50) and are consistent with the guidance in RG 1.196 and NUREG-0800, Sections 6.4 and 9.4.1.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Tennessee State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments on March 8, 2017. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSIDERATION The amendments change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on August 2, 2016 (81 FR 50740). Accordingly, the amendments meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. Principal Contributor:
R. Haskell Date: March 28, 201 7 J. Shea
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 -ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT REGARDING MODIFICATION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.10 DISCREPANCIES IN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION AND OTHER EDITORIAL CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (CAC NOS. MF7993 AND MF7994) DATED MARCH 28, 2017 DISTRIBUTION:
PUBLIC LPL2-2 r/f RidsACRS _MailCTR Resource RidsNrrDorllpl2-2 Resource RidsNrrDssSbpb Resource RidsNrrDssStsb Resource RidsNrrLABClayton Resource RidsNrrPMWattsBar Resource RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource MChernoff, NRR GCurran, NRR RHaskell, NRR NKaripineni, NRR JParillo, NRR ADAMS Accession No.: ML 16330A347 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL3/PM NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/LA NRR/DSS/SBPB/BC*
NAME RHaskell BClayton (PBlechman for) RDennig DATE 12/1/16 2/15/17 12/6/16 OFFICE OGC-NLO NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/BC NRR/DORL/LPL2-2/PM NAME STurk BBeasley RSchaaf DATE 3/1/17 3/28/17 3/28/17 OFFICIAL AGENCY RECORD *by email NRR/DSS/STSB/BC*
AKlein 3/16/17