ML19344E989

Response to Licensee Interrogatories Re Emergency Plan, Revision 2.Testimony Re Midas Radiological Assessment Sys Must Be Provided by Licensee.Supporting Documentation & Certificate of Svc Encl.Related Correspondence

ML19344E989
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	09/03/1980
From:	Pell D ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP REPRESENTING YORK, PELL, D.M.
To:	METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
References
ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8009120226
Download: ML19344E989 (12)

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOA vi  ?/ IN THE MATTER 9F  : METROPOL TAN-EDISON COMPANY  : DOCKET No. 50-289 (Restart) (Three-Mi' n Island Nuclear  : Generating Station,  : Unit No. 1)  : ANSWERS TO LICENSEE'S INTERROGATORIES TO INTERVENOR, ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP REPRESENTING YORK, ON REVISION TWO OF LICENSEE'S EMERGENCY PLAN 1. (a) yes (b) Contention 2 (a) is directed to the adequacy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Order on restart dated August 9, 1979 (44 F.R. 47821-25) which Order does not provide reasonable assurance that such resumption can occur without endangering the public health and safety, for the reason that the NRC fails to require the development and effectuation of adequate and effective radiological emergency response plans. Specifically, this contention goes to the fact that the radiological emergency response plan of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not required to be brought into compliance with applicable standards of adequacy and effectiveness for such plans. See Contention II(A) . Consequently, it does not matter whether or not the licensee has amended its plan to include as an appendix the revisad Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan, Annex E, Fixed Nuclear Facility Incidents. The contention goes to the adequacy of the August 19, 1979 Order itself. 2. (a) yes (b) The basis of this conclusion is identical with the ' answer contained in No. 1(b) above; that is to say, this contention attacks the adequacy of the NRC Order dated August 19, 1979, as set forth above to reqJ re counties to come into compliance with reasonable standards of adequacy and effectiveness for county plans as set forth in Contention II(A) and (D). 8 0 0 9 1 2 0 2L2El# p, l

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S (a) yes G (b) Section 4.6.3.5 still does not require permanent off-site monitoring devices which register all forms of ionizing radiation and which can be remotely read on site. j (c) Refused. This information goes beyond the scope of the contention 2 F 1 since the contention in itself makes no allegations concerning'the precise numbers of monitors needed. The second part.of 3 (c) is answered rather obviously that real time monitors would give instantaneous information necessary to  ; Response teams merely adequate and efficient accident assessment. check out radiation levels off site and, therefore, there is lag time between their deployment and a developing accident scenario, so that the information is stale with respect to accident assessment evaluation. (d) yes (e) There is no information which has been supplied by I the licensee which leads ANGRY to believe that the MIDAS radio-logical assessment system equals or exceeds that provided by the ARAC system. Our concerns on both the ARAC system and the MIDAS system are that whatever computer program is used by the licensee that it provides information analysis capability sufficient to permit the licensee to rapidly assess any accident so that the relevant information can be conveyed to PEMA and/or VRP. It is suggested that it is the licensee's responsiblity to provide testimony that the MIDAS radiological assessment system will. provide adequate information analysis capability necessary to obtain and analyze the volume of information essential for the protection of the public health and safety. . Moreover, this l contention goes to the adequacy of the August 19, 1979 NRC Order l itself, since that Order fails to require an adequate computer , program capable of analyzing the information sferred to earlier, ) prior to restart. (f) ANGRY is uncertain or the capabilities of the MIDAS assessment system at this time. Those capabilities which must be part of the MIDAS system are described in A Concept for an Atmospheric Release Advisory Capacity (ARAC), UC RL- 516 5 6 , University of California, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, October 2, 1974; and I Atmospheric Release Advisory Capacity, Development and Plan for Implementation, UCRL-518 3 9, Juns 5, 1975, and the update thereto dated 1979. See also NUREG 06e4, I. Accident Assessment, NUREG 0654, appendix two, and any computer system should also have the I capabilities establishing a nuclear data link as required in NUREG 0696, section V. l 1

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(a) yes  : ~1

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(b) With respect to the plans of the licensee, 10 CFR, l Part 50 requires the licensee to have in' its EP provisions for.The. licensee's revi [[ protective actions regarding livestock.  : s The critique of i II to its EP fails to provide these provisions.the Commonwealth's ,

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III(BJ) . ANGRY's critique of the York EP in this regard isThe types contained would.be any at III(C13) and all .livestock of farmers in the applicable EPZ. f S. .;. ] (a) yes (b) These letters fail to meet the requirement set out form and content of in NUREG 0654. See for example section J.,III, which provides: plans, II A, Evaluation Criteria, "Each plan shall include written agreements referring to appropriate legal instruments such as legislation, among federal, state and local agencies and other support organizations having emergency response The role agreement within the shall emergency planning zo'nes. identify the emergency measures to be provided in a mutually acceptable criteria for their implementation, and specify the arrangements for exchange of information. " (c) (1) Letter dated January 21, 1980 fails to set forth precisely what the various utilities will do, how many d personnel would be committed, when they would be c event of an emergency. (2) Letter dated January 3, 1980, from PEMA fails to outline a precise action which PEMA will take. fails to state what (3) Letter dated April 2 5,198 0, arrangements Lebanon County would make available, what statutes it is operating (4) under. Letter dated April 24, 1980, Kevin J. Malloy, same objections as Letttr above. dated December 23, 1979, same objections (5) as above. 1979, Lancaster County (6) Letter dated December sane as 24, above. Emergency Management Department,

OAK RIDGE N ATIONAL LABORATORY OPERA?EO sv union CARBIDE CORPORATION - NUCLEAR DIVISION POST OFFICE 80X X OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE 3700 March 11, 1980 Mr. John Bowers Deep Run Farm Community R. D. 7 - Box 338 York, Pennsylvania 17402

Dear l'r. Bowers:

Mr. Eisenhauer has passed your letter of February 28, 1980 There towas me aassix-I was concerned more with the area of interest to you. person task group which studied the overall health physics functions at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station. The bulk of the standards for specific parts of a large health physics program are stated explicitly in the various parts of the Code of Federal Regulations, in NRC Regulatory Guides, and in ANSI Standards. However, in a large composite program, the general performcnce of the professional can be compared to that of persons certified by the American Board of Health Physics. In these respects, the staff at TMI were Our criticism qualified by training and experience to do a proper job. was not that they were inadequately trained but rather that there were too few of them. It was apparent that a great deal of health physics Though this may have worked support was accomplished by contractors. adequately under routine conditions, it resulted in fewer qualified persons in-plant to handle an accident. We also found that the number of instruments of various kinds ready for service, in an accident situation, was inadequate.

• In conclusion, the answer to both your questions can be summarized as:

            "too few instruments and health physicists." Our opinion was that this was at least partially due to the large fraction of the work done by outside contractors.

Sincerely,

                                                            .h dhnA.Auxler, Director Industrial Safety & Applied Health Physics JAA:wn

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(7') Letter dated May 28, 1980, from Middletown Fire Department fails to describe legislation under which [: I ~. Middletown Fire Department is operating and fails to set forthThe mutually acceptable criteria for implementation of its plan. remaining 19 letters of agreement all fail in similar fashion Addi-to meet the requirements of NUREG 0654 as specified above. tionally, the proposed letter of agreement from Hershey Medical Center is not available for review.  ! Moreover, none of the letters reviewed provide any basis  ! for mutually acceptable criteria of implementation of emergency measures nor are specific arrangements An acceptable made forwould letter implementation obtain all or { exchange of information. information required by NUREG 0654 as cited above. . 6. EE

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(a) yes gp (b) See report of the Health Physics Task Force to the Ef President's Commission on Three-Mile Island and also see letterAuxier, Director H. dated March 11, 1980, from John A. R Safety and Applied Health Physics of the Oakridge National Ei E Laboratory,(c)a copy of which is attached hereto. ANGRY is going to be in con E at the Oakridge National Laboratory and provide him with a copy [ of table B-1 to see whether or not in his opinion it meets the [ minimum staffing requirements necessary to protection of the,p E i health answer and safety.in that it has no information to believe that table of no, i B-1 of NUREG 0654 contains insufficient minimum staffing j requirements for health physics personnel. 7.

                                                                                                                   ]i (a)     yes                                                      the (b)      ANGRY has deleted from contention III(AG) language and mix of radionuclides discharged, but with that exception, the licensee's EP still fails,to provide the information specified in contention III(AG) .

8. (a) yes (b) Neither the licensee's plan as set forth in contention III(AH) at Page 8-8 of its EP nor the plan of the Commonwealth contained at its appendix 14 provides for parti-cipation of Federal agencies in the conduct of a radiation emergency exercise. l

9. (a) yes (b) NUREG 0654 J.7. provides as follows:

                                                               "As specified in NUREG-0610, prompt notifi-cation shall be made directly to the off-site authorities responsible for implementing protective measures within the plume exposure emergency planning zone."

A notification to York and Lancaster counties under Annex B of the revised emergency plan does not change the fact that the plan does not provide for direct notification to York County and Lancaster County. The fact is is that Dauphin County is notified first and then after notifications to PEMA and from PEMA to BRP and then PEMA back to Dauphin, York and Lancaster are finally notified. This does not meet the requirements of the quoted section of NUREG 0654. See too, Appendix 3 to Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Disaster Operations Plan, Annex E. 10. (a) yes. See NUREG 0654, Table 2, Page 14. (b) See answer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to ANGRY, first set of Interrogatories, Answer 7-C. See also the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's response to ANGRY's first set of Interrogatories, Answer 7-B. 11. (a) yes !- (b) The basis for the concern contained in contention l- ,. III-bel remains valid because the BRP plan still does not require the licensee to provide protective actions, guide and/or other l criteria for implementing specific protective actions. However, is this is a more technical aspect of the contention. Of key concern 7M to ANGRY is that no where is the licensee required to provide, j] nor does the plan contain an analysis of'how variation of the

===, factor of time to onset of release will affect the choice of 9555 appropriate protective. action. What we are concerned with here SM is a quantitative analysis of what protective action will be

, -jjg required based upon specific warning times. For example, what isEE will be done if there is a one-hour warning time as opposed to a "flsi six-hour warning time. The concern expressed in contention IIIBE 3E3 (2) still remains valid for the reasons stated above. The BRP

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plan fails to require the licensee responsibility for providing t E. variations of protective actions on such variables as time

• i required to effect relocation, i= paired =chility of parts of $

the population and potential i= pedi =ents to use of egress routes . $ such as rush hour traffic and incle=ent weather. See also NUREG -S 0654 J.10., Evaluation Criteria L and M. j gi e, ,== '

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t s E E ANGRY adopts Mr. Steven Shelly's answer to licensee's j interrogatory no. 5, served by Mr. Sholly on August 4, 1980, j upon the licensee a,nd the board and incorporates his answers ~ herein as though set forth fully at this point.

13. _:.

ANGRY adopts Mr. Steven Sholly's answer to licensee's interrogatory no. 6, served by Mr. Sholly on August 4, 1980, upon the licensee and the board and incorporates same herein. 14. ANGRY adopts Mr. Steven Shelly's answer to licensee's interrogatory no. 7 served by Mr. Sholly.on August 4, 1980, upon the licensee and the board and incorporates sa=e herein. i-

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(a) yes. See ANGRY's revised contentien 3-c. See also Sholly's answer to licensee's interrogatory no. 3, served by Mr. Shelly on August 4, 1980, upon the licensee and the board and incorporates same herein. (b) yes. See ANGRY contention 3-c as revised and y see also Mr. Sholly's answer to licensee's interrogatory no. 4 served by Mr. Shelly on August 4, 1980, upon the licensee and the board and incorporates same herein. 16. (a) no. See Sholly's answer to licenseet interrogatory  ; no. S, which ANGRY adopts, as though set forth fully herein as ' answered by Mr. Sholly en August 4, 1980 and served upon the ' licensee and the board on said date. Add thereto, additicnally, ANGRY is seeking information on this issue and intends to address same in its direct testimony. (b) no. ANGRY adopts Mr. Shelly's answer to licensee's interrogatory no. 8 served by Mr. Shelly on August 4, 19E0, upon -

t. a licensee and the board and incorperates sane herein. And add e m

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i thereto additionally, there are no adequate current studies  ; g which can predict human behavior or fleeing responses in large -

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numbers such as the total population at risk within the 20-mile l [ EPZ as' set forth in York County's proposed emergency plan. / i, Consequently, there is no possibility of asserting with any El accuracy whether or not there will be a " conflict" in use of E access and egress routes. Ii 17. (a) ANGRY is investigating the factual basis of this , contention at this' time and will supplement its answers thereto and/or address same in its direct testimony. (b) Same as a. (c) There are no special notification provisions in the } Lancaster County plan to notify old order ' Amish. i 18. (a) yes. The standard review plan is generally applicable to all proceedings and is a generally accepted standard for nuclear regulation. ANGRY knows of no reason why this guidance should not apply to this proceeding. (b) yes. See Page 69 as follows:

                                                       "The plant has the capability to dispatch two radiation monitoring teams and receive                                                  ,

initial monitoring data within one-half hour of the emergency declaration." This statement impliedly warrants that the licensee must have at least one-half hour to undertake accident assessment. (c) no. , (d) This reference is a proper reference, the standard review plan, section 13.3 (II) (III) NUREG-75/087 does exist. 19. (a) yes. If there are no local plans, there is no assurance that the duties of the local government units with regard to emergency preparedness.and planning will be carried out. (b) no. j no. 20. The inability of the Commonwealth to comprehend distinction between core melt and melt-through accidents is disclosed in the Commonwealth's answer to follow up interrogatory

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e" $5f Also see Commonwealth's response to ANGRY's . Qij of ANGRY, No. 40. *; gll second set of Interrogatories, Answer thereto No. 23-b. In a B; melt-through~ accident, the core melts down and-into the ground. L There is a continuous release of radioactivity over a long period ' gi ; of time. In a core melt accident, the core melts down, and EE somehow there is a release into the atmosphere, most likely through Ml es a breech of containment. The significance of the failure to grasp l this distinction is that people would die due to inappropriate l

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selection of protective actions. , 21 . E' e See Commonwealth's response to ANGRY's follow on Interrogatory No. 40. The information contained in EPA 520/1 001B is all significant. ANGRY has the right as do all people in the area of Three-Mile Island to depend upon state of the art ' technology which is represented by said document. 22. The training program did not exist until March 1980. A training program less than six months old could not have been completed yet. Also see Commonwealth's responses to ANGRY's second set of interrogatories, Answers no. 32 and no. 33.

23. .

(a) yes (b) Farmers cannot merely stay inside, they have to care for their livestock. (c) Farmers should be indoctrinated into the use of protective clothing, the use of gas masks and proper procedures for cleansing exposed parts of their bodies and such other provisions which are appropriate. 24. (a) See the deposition of Thomas Jerusky, dated Monday, March 24, 1980, in the above-captioned matter at Pages 15 through 18. See 24(a) (b) This information it not known to ANGRY. above. 25. (a) yes satisfy the requirements of NUREG (b) Annex N, does not 0654 section L.

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The contention adequately states the concern. The significance of the Commonwealth being assigned the responsibility for arranging emergency wrecker and fuel services to risk counties, and York County's delegation of that responsibility to the National Guard is that this critical function may not be done; i.e., there is no assurance that it will be carried out. - 27. In NUREG 0654, section F-1 (a), the term " local" means county and mun'icipalities and townships. 28. A written agreement described in NUREG 0654, criterion a-3, are required to give assurance to the public that the knowledge and ability to perform the responsibilities as delegated to various organizations under the plan will be carried out in the event of a nuclear accident at Three-Mile Island. 29. None.

30. ,

(a) See answer to Interrogatory No. 28 above. (b) See answer to Interrogatory No. 28 above. (c) See answer to Interrogatory No. 28 above. 31. For example, Appendix 3 to Annex A regarding protective actions governing the York County plan with reference to health-medical operations, provides that in a take-cover situation, medical personnel should "be prepared to assist State Department of Health in distributing thyroid blocking and other radiological health materials." Nowhere is it specified how the distribution of potassium iodide from the Department of health officials is to be accomplished. Appendix I to the state plan indicates that no SSKI is to be administered to general public during precautionary evacuation stage. See Page 12 of Appendix I. Yet, Annex A regarding _9_ '

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health-medical operations sem=s to i= ply that medical personnel T T should be prepared to assist in the distributien of thyroid 5 blocking agent even in event of a take cover. Moreover, it is 1. E= unclear whether a take cover is ecuivalent to trigger the same ' protective actions as provided for a precautionary This is because the state and evacuation York County M under the state plan. plans are not coordinated. Tne York County plan does not provide j EE any specific direction to medical personnel as to how they are to

                                                                                                                    .E_E link up with Department of Health personnel to provide for                          No                        M effective and timely distribution of potassiu= iodide.                                                       .=

specific reference can be made to the provisions of the York l ' E County plan on this =atter since there are no specific directions l t i given to medical personnel. i =

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32. I. l E

                                                                                    -                                  z If pre-planning with respect to distribution of infor-                                     ,
       =ation concerning the agricultural information center progra= is not carried ot.::, no one will know what to do in the event of an emergency at Three-Mile Island.

(a) The essential persons are farmers and their employees. (b) Sec contention 3-c-13. (c) See first answer to Interrogatory No. 32. (d) So that farmers will know sne various protective action alternatives available to the=, and so that in the event of an emergency they will know what to do. (e) See first answer to this interrogatory and (d) above. 33. The York County plan assumes a 20-mile EPZ. The infor-mation cener is within the 20-mile EPZ. See also section 3-i of the York County plan. Respectfu submitted 1980 ., W // . 4_

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Danlei M. Fell, Esquire Atte rney for A';C-RY 32 South Seaver Street u ' '  ! . York, PA 17401 x ,y3 (717) 345-6291 k./, . - .. ,,. a

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,=t.=1 g X#iW [ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE , I, Daniel M. Pell, Esquire, hereby certify that I served ~ a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Answers to Licensee's Interrogatories on the following individuals by placing a copy of same in the U. S. Mails, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows onishptember 3 , 1980. Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Executive Legal Director Atomic Safety and Licensing U. S. Nuclear Board Panel Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Washington, DC Regulatory Commission 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Jordan D. Cunningham, Esquire Fox, Farr & Cunningham Dr. Walter H. Jordon 2320 North Second Street 881 West Outer Drive Harrisburg, PA 17110 Oakridge, TN 37830 Mr. Steven C. Sholly Dr. Linda W. Little 304 South Market Street 5000 Hermitage Drive Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 Raleigh, NC 27612 Ellen R. Weiss, Esquire George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Harman and Weiss Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1725 I Street, N.W. 1800 M Street, N.W. Suite 506 Washington, DC 20006 Washington, DC 20006 Docketing and Service Section Theodore A. Adler, Esquire U. S. Nuclear Widoff, Reager, Selkowit: Regulatory Commission and Adler, P.C. Washington, DC 20555 P. O. Box 1547 Harrisburg, PA 17105 Awan Daniel M. Pell, fsquire i}}