ML17244A281

16C4384-RPT-005, Rev 005, 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation.

ML17244A281
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	05/08/2017
From:	Masiunas A Stevenson & Associates
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
References
16C4384-RPT-005, Rev 005
Download: ML17244A281 (49)

Text

Document No: 16C4384-RPT-005 SA Stevenson & Associates Engmeermg So/1111 onsfor N11clear Energy Revision 0 May 8, 2017 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Prepared for:

Nebraska Public Power District Cooper Nuclear Station Brownville, Nebraska Stevenson & Associates 1626 North Litchfield Road, Suite 170 Goodyear, AZ 85395

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 Page 2 of49 REVISION RECORD Initial Issue (Rev. 0)

Prepared by: 5/8/2017 Reviewed by: 5/8/2017 ons antmos konomou Approved by:

a~ 51812017 Revision Historv Rev . Prepared by/ Reviewed by/ Approved by/ Description of Revision No. Date Date Date

l 6C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic Hi¥h Frequency Confirmation Page 3 of 49 TABLE OF CONTENTS:

Introducti on ..... ........................................... .. ... ..... ............. .................................... ...... ............ 6 I.I Purpose ... .......... ............ .............. ............................ ............. ................... ..................... ..... 6 1.2 Background ............................................... .... ... ......................................... ....................... 6 I .3 Approach ......... .. .... .......................................................................................... .. ............... 7 1.4 Plant Screening ... ............ ....... ....................... ......... ............. ............ .................................. 7 2 Selection of Components for High-Frequency Screening ............... ................ ....................... 8 2.1 Reactor Trip/Scram .............................. .............. .. ............................................................ 8 2.2 Reactor Vessel Inventory Control .................................................................................... 8 2.3 Reactor Vessel Pressure Control ...................... ..................................... .. ....................... 10 2.4 Core Cooling ................. ....................... .............. ................... .... ............ ................ ......... 11 2.5 AC/DC Power Support Systems ............................. ..................................................... .. 13 2.6 Summary of Selected Components ................ ...... .... ...................................................... 17 3 Seismic Evaluation ........... .................................. ...................... .. ........ ................................... 18 3.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand ........ ... .. .... .......................................................................... 18 3.2 Vertical Seismic Demand ................................................................................. ....... ....... 18 3 .3 Component Horizontal Seismic Demand .............. ......................................................... 21 3.4 Component Vertical Seismic Demand ................. ... .................................... ......... .... ...... 22 4 Contact Device Evaluations ..... ...... ........... ...... ................................................................ ...... 23 5 Conclusions ........................................... ........... .... ................................................................. 24 5.1 General Conclusions ......... ................................................. .. .. ......... .. ................... .......... 24 5 .2 Identification of Follow-Up Actions ............. .. ...... ....... ....... .................................. ......... 24 6 References ........... .. ........................ .... ... ............... ... .. ............... ...................... ........ ................ 25 A. Representative Sample Component Evaluations ...... ...... ..... ................................... .............. 32 A.1 High Frequency Seismic Demand ............................ ........ ..... ............... .. ........................ 32 A.2 High Frequency Capacity ... ................. .. ....... .................................... .............................. 36 B. Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation ................. .................................. 38 TABLE OF TABLES:

Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity vs. Depth Profile ....... .................... .......................... 19 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra ....... .......... ..................... 20 Table B-1 : Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation ............ .... ...... .. ................ 38 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation ..... 48

I 6C4J84-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(f) N!TF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 4 o f4 9 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in its March 12, 2012 letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deterred status [1]. In particular, this report provides information requested to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of ltem (4),

Enclosure l, Recommendation 2.1: Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [ l ].

Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March 11, 2011 , Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Tenn Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine if the agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system . The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena [2].

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(f) letter on March 12, 2012 [I], requesting information to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(t) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under 10 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(t) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI I 025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1:

Seismic" [3] provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(t) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and was subsequently endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRI 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [4] and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [5].

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [6).

This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Cooper Nuclear Station. The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confinnation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

!6C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) N!TF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 5 of 49 EPRI 3002004396 [4] is used for the Cooper Nuclear Station engineering evaluations described in this report. In accordance with Reference [4], the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• Process of selecting components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of a vertical ground motion response spectrum (GMRS)

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic demand for subject components

• Estimation of in-cabinet seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) N!fF 2. l Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 6 of49 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose The purpose of this report is to provide information as requested by the NRC in its March 12, 2012 50.54(f) letter issued to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status [ 1). In particular, this report provides requested information to address the High Frequency Confirmation requirements of Item (4), Enclosure l, Recommendation 2. l:

Seismic, of the March 12, 2012 letter [l] .

1.2 Background Following the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant resulting from the March l I, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a Near Term Task Force (NTTF) to conduct a systematic review ofNRC processes and regulations and to determine ifthe agency should make additional improvements to its regulatory system . The NTTF developed a set of recommendations intended to clarify and strengthen the regulatory framework for protection against natural phenomena [2].

Subsequently, the NRC issued a 50.54(t) letter on March 12, 2012 [ 1], requesting in formation to assure that these recommendations are addressed by all U.S. nuclear power plants. The 50.54(t) letter requests that licensees and holders of construction permits under I 0 CFR Part 50 reevaluate the seismic hazards at their sites against present-day NRC requirements and guidance. Included in the 50.54(f) letter was a request that licensees perform a "confirmation, if necessary, that SSCs, which may be affected by high-frequency ground motion, will maintain their functions important to safety."

EPRI 1025287, " Seismic Evaluation Guidance: Screening, Prioritization and Implementation Details (SPID) for the resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2. l:

Seismic" [3) provided screening, prioritization, and implementation details to the U.S. nuclear utility industry for responding to the NRC 50.54(f) letter. This report was developed with NRC participation and is endorsed by the NRC. The SPID included guidance for determining which plants should perform a High Frequency Confirmation and identified the types of components that should be evaluated in the evaluation.

Subsequent guidance for performing a High Frequency Confirmation was provided in EPRl 3002004396, "High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," [4) and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [5] .

Final screening identifying plants needing to perform a High Frequency Confirmation was provided by NRC in a letter dated October 27, 2015 [6].

On March 31, 2014, Cooper Nuclear Station submitted a reevaluated seismic hazard to the NRC as a part of the Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [7]. By letter dated October 27, 2015 [6],

the NRC transmitted the results of the screening and prioritization review of the seismic hazards reevaluation.

l 6C43 84-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(f) N!TF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 7 of 49 This report describes the High Frequency Confirmation evaluation undertaken for Cooper Nuclear Station using the methodologies in EPRI 3002004396, " High Frequency Program, Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," as endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated September 17, 2015 [5].

The objective of this report is to provide summary information describing the High Frequency Confirmation evaluations and results. The level of detail provided in the report is intended to enable NRC to understand the inputs used, the evaluations performed, and the decisions made as a result of the evaluations.

1.3 Approach EPRI 3002004396 [4 J is used for the Cooper Nuclear Station engineering evaluations described in this report. Section 4. 1 of Reference (4] provided general steps to follow for the high frequency confirmation component evaluation . Accordingly, the following topics are addressed in the subsequent sections of this report:

• Cooper Nuclear Station' s SSE and GMRS Information

• Selection of components and a list of specific components for high-frequency confirmation

• Estimation of seismic demand for subject components

• Estimation of seismic capacity for subject components

• Summary of subject components' high-frequency evaluations

• Summary of Results 1.4 Plant Screening Cooper Nuclear Station submitted reevaluated seismic hazard information including GMRS and seismic hazard information to the NRC on March 3 l, 2014 (7] and amended this information on February I 1, 2015 [8] . In a letter dated September 8, 2015, the NRC staff concluded that the submitted GMRS adequately characterizes the reevaluated seismic hazard for the Cooper Nuclear Station site [9] .

The NRC final screening determination letter [6] concluded that the Cooper Nuclear Station GMRS to SSE comparison resulted in a need to perform a High Frequency Confirmation in accordance with the screening criteria in the SPID [3].

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(t) N!TF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 8 of 49 2 SELECTION OF COMPONENTS FOR HIGH-FREQUENCY SCREENING The fundamental objective of the high frequency confirmation review is to determine whether the occurrence of a seismic event could cause credited equipment to fail to perform as necessary.

An optimized evaluation process is applied that focuses on achieving a safe and stable plant state following a seismic event. As described in Reference [4], this state is achieved by confirming that key plant safety functions critical to immediate plant safety are preserved (reactor trip, reactor vessel inventory and pressure control, and core cooling) and that the plant operators have the necessary power available to achieve and maintain this state immediately following the seismic event (AC/DC power support systems).

Within the applicable functions, the com ponents that would need a high frequency confirmation are contact control devices subject to intermittent states in seal-in or lockout (SILO) circuits.

Accordingly, the objective of the review as stated in Section 4.2. 1 of Reference [4] is to determine if seismic induced high frequency relay chatter would prevent the completion of the following key functions .*

2.1 Reactor Trip/Scram The reactor trip/SCRAM function is identified as a key function in Reference [4] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that, "the design requirements preclude the app lication ofseal-in or lockout circuits that prevent reactor trip/SCRAM/unctions" and that "No high-frequency review of the reactor trip/SCRAM ~ystems is necessary. "

2.2 Reactor Vessel Inventory Control The reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control systems were reviewed for contact control dev ices in seal-in and lockout (S ILO) circuits that would create a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) . The focus of the review was contact control devices that could lead to a significant leak path. Check valves in series with active valves would prevent significant leaks due to misoperation of the active valve; therefore, SILO circuit reviews were not required for those active valves.

Reactor coolant system/reactor vessel inventory control system reviews were performed for valves associated with the following functions:

• Main Steam,

• High Pressure Core Injection,

• Residual Heat Removal,

• Control Rod Drive,

• Reactor Water Clean-Up

• T he selection of components for hi gh fre quency screening is described in Stevenson & Associates report J 6C4384-RPT-OO J [72] and is sum marized herein.

SA I 6C43 84-RPT-005 Rev . 0 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 9 of49 A table listing the valves selected for analysis and their associated P&ID is included as Table B-2 of this report.

2.2. I Main Steam Valves Main Steam Isolation Valves MS-AO-A080AIBICID, MS-AO-A086AIBICID Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays l 6A-K 14, l 6A-K 16, l 6A-K5 l and l 6A-K52. These relays are slaves to l 6A-K7 A/ B/C/D isolation logic relays [ 10, 11 ].

These relays are energized for at-power operation and de-energized to close the valves [12, 13].

In the energized state l 6A-K7 A/B/C/D are sealed in and any chatter in the control logic would break the seal-in and close the valves. This action is a desired response to the seismic event and for this reason chatter is acceptable and no contact devices in this circuit meet the selection criteria.

Main Steam Line Drain Valves MS-MOV-M074, MS-MOV-M0 77 These normally-open motor-operated valves close on an isolate signal from 16A-K7A/B/C/ D via slave relays 16A-K56 and 16A-K57 [14, 15, 16]. Limit switches in the opening circuits prevent seal-in of the opening contactors and there are no permissive contacts in the close circuit which could block valve closure manually or automatically via an isolation signal.

Auto Slowdown Valves MS-RV-71ARVIBRVICRVIERVIGRVIHRV Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays 2E-K6A/B and 2E-K 7A/B.

These relays are controlled by the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Low Level Logic, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump Discharge Pressure relays 1OA-K101 A/B and 1OA-K102A/B, and the Core Spray Pump Discharge Pressure relays 14A-K23A/B and 14A-K25A/B [17, 18, 19].

The RHR and Core Spray Pump Pressure relays do not seal-in [20, 21, 221 and, based on initial conditions at the time of the event, would block any inadvertent seal-in of the RPV Low Level Logic. Thus, there are no SILO relays in this logic which could cause the Auto Slowdown Valves to remain open following a seismic event.

Main Blowdown Valves MS-RV-71 DRVIFRV Electrical control for the solenoid-operated pilot valves is via relays 821 M-2E-K20A/B and 821 M-2E-K21A/B. Seal-in of these relays is blocked by pressure switches 2-3-51 Band 2 51 D [23].

2.2.2 High Pre sure Core Injection Valves High Pressure Core Injection Steam Supply Line Isolation Valves HPCI-MOV-15, HPC/-MOV-16 These normally-open motor-operated valves supply steam to the HPCI turbine. The opening circuit is controlled by a rugged hand switch and permissive from 23A-K5 I, 23A-K44, 23A-K 15, and 23A-K34 [24]. There is no seal-in in the opening circuit. The closing circuit is controlled manually by a rugged hand switch or automatically via the auto isolation relays 23A-K34 and 23A-K34, or the low steam pressure relays 23A-Kl5 and 23A-KS I [25, 26]. Any chatter in the isolation or low steam pressure logic would close the valves. Since RCCC, not HPCI, is credited for core cooling this seal-in causing valve closure is not a selection criterion.

SA t6C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page to of 49 There is no SILO which would prevent closure of these valves and thus no contact devices in this circuit meet the selection criteria.

2.2.3 Residual Heat Removal Valves RHR Suction Cooling lsola1ion Valves RIIR-MOV-M0/7, RHR-MOV-M0/ 8 These normally-closed motor-operated valves are opened via a normally-open control switch and relay permissive. The valves can be closed manually via the control switch and automatically via an isolation signal. Sympathetic chatter on 16A-K29 and 42/0 auxiliary contact could cause valve RHR-MOV-MO 18 to open; and sympathetic chatter on l 6A-K30 and 72/ 10 auxiliary contact could cause valve RHR-MOV-MO 17 to open [27] . However, the low reactor pressure permissive in the control logic would prevent a seal-in of I 6A-K29 or I 6A-K30 [28]. After the period of strong shaking the normally-closed contacts of I 6A-K29 and I 6A-K30 would command these valves to reclose. Because there is no seal-in and the valves reclose without operator intervention, chatter is acceptable and no contact devices in this circuit meet the selection criteria.

2.2.4 Control Rod Drive Valves Control Rod Manual Positioning Valves CRD-SOV-S0/20, CRD-SOV-S0/21, CRD-SOV-S0/22, CRD-SOV-S0/23; Control Rod Scram Valve CRD-AOV-CV/26 These valves are part of the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Positioning System [29] and as such they are covered under the Reactor Trip/Scram category. For more information, see Section 2.1 above.

2.2.5 Reactor Water Clean-Up Valves Reactor Water Clean-Up Isolation Valves RWCU-MOV-M015, RWCU-MOV-M0/8 These are normally-open motor-operated valves which close upon an isolation signal. Open limit switches in the opening circuit prevent seal-in of the opening contactor auxiliary contact and no contacts prevent valve closure via the control switch or isolation relays I 6A-K26 and I 6A-K27 [27). These relays are energized for at-power operation and de-energized to close the valves [28] . In the energized state 16A-K26 and 16A-K27 are sealed in and any chatter in the control logic would break the seal-in and close the valves. This action is a desired response to the seismic event and for this reason chatter is acceptable and no contact devices in this circuit meet the selection criteria.

2.3 Reactor Vessel Pressure Control The reactor vessel pressure control function is identified as a key function in Reference [4] to be considered in the High Frequency Confirmation. The same report also states that "required post event pressure control is typically provided by passive devices" and that "no specific high frequency component chatter review is required for this fanction ." L4, pp. 4-6)

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50 .54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 11 of49 2.4 Core Cooling Core cooling is also a key function in Reference [4] . The core cooling systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that would prevent at least a single train of non-AC power driven decay heat removal from functioning.

For BWR plants, the decay heat removal mechanism involves the transfer of mass and energy from the reactor vessel to the suppression pool. This requires the replacement of that mass to the reactor vessel via some core cooling system, e.g., reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC).

Therefore, for this evaluation the following functions need to be checked: ( 1) Steam from the reactor pressure vessel to the RCIC turbine and exhausted to the suppression pool; (2) coolant from the suppression pool to the reactor via the RCIC pump; and (3) steam from the reactor pressure vessel vented to the suppression pool via the Safety Relief Valves (SR Vs). The selection of contact devices for the SR Vs overlaps with the RCS/Reactor Vessel Inventory Control Category.

The selection of contact devices for RCIC was based on the premise that RCIC operation is desired, thus any SILO which would lead to RCIC operation is beneficial and, for that reason, does not meet the criteria for selection . Only contact devices which could render the RCIC system inoperable were considered.

Seismically-induced contact chatter could lead to a false RCIC isolation Signal or false Turbine Trip, which would prevent RCIC operation. A false steam line break trip has the potential to delay RCIC operation while confirmatory inspections are being made. Chatter in the contacts of RCIC Isolation Signal Relay 13A-K 15, the Steam Line High Differential Pressure Time Delay Relay RCIC-TDR-Kl2, the Steam Line Space Excess Temperature Relays 13A-KIO and 13A-KI I, or the Reactor Pressure Relay 13A-Kl3 may lead to a RCiC Isolation Signal and seal-in of 13A-Kl5 [30]. This would cause the RCIC isolation Valves to close and the RCIC Trip and Throttle Valve to trip. Simultaneous chatter in identical contact devices controlling these relays could also lead to seal-in: TS- I 3-79A/C, TS-13-SOA/C, TS-13-8 IA/C, TS-13-82A/C, and PS 87 A/C. (The 3.5 second time delay t associated with RCIC-TDR-K 12 [31] will mask any chatter on dPIS-13-83, so it is excluded.) The same selection rationale applies to the identical Division 2 devices: 13A-K33, RCIC-TDR-K32, 13A-K30, 13A-K3 l, TS-13-798/D, TS-13-808/D, TS-13-818/D, TS-13-828/D, and PS-13-878/D [32].

Any chatter that may lead to the energization of the Trip and Throttle Valve Remote Trip Circuit is considered as SILO, as it will close the valve and require a manual reset prior to restoration of the RCiC system. Chatter in Turbine Trip Auxiliary Relay 13A-K8, or in the devices which control this relay; the Turbine Exhaust High Pressure Relay l 3A-K6, the Pump Suction Low Pressure Relay l3A-K7, and the isolation Signal Relay I 3A-K 15 [30]. Similar chatter in the contact devices that drive those relays (and not already covered in the RCJC Isolation Signal t High frequem;y t:hatter is not expected to cause continuous contact closure for more than 100 milliseconds at any one time. When contact chatter applies power to the coil of a time delay relay with delay times significantly longer than this, the coil is not continually energized long enough to satisfy the timing function and thus the time delay relay will not change state.

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Pag e 12 of 49 analysis) could also lead to a turbine trip: PS-13-72A/B. (The time delay associated with 13A-K7 will mask any chatter on PS-13-67-1, so it is excluded.)

In addition to control of the RCIC Isolation Valves, several other valves need to be properly aligned for RCIC operation. Steam-to-Turbine Valve RCIC-M0-131 is normally closed and opens on a reactor low level signal or control hand switch [33 , 34, 30]. Once open, it is reclosed on a reactor hi gh water level or control hand switch. Chatter in the closing circuit of this normally-closed valve is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches. Chatter in the opening circuit could lead to valve opening, which would be beneficial to RCIC operation.

Based on this analysis, there are no moving contact devices in the control circuit of this valve that meet the selection criteria.

Pump Suction from Suppression Pool Valve RCIC-M0-41 is normally closed and opens on an Emergency Condensate Storage Tank (ECST) low level signal or control hand switch [35, 34, 32, 36]. Once open, it is reclosed by a control hand switch only. Chatter in the closing circuit of this normally-closed valve is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches. Chatter in the opening circuit could lead to valve opening, which would in turn close Pump Suction from ECST Valve RCIC-M0-18 and align pump suction from the suppression pool. This would not impact RClC's ability to provide core cooling and based on this, there are no moving contact devices in the control circuit of this valve that meet the selection criteria.

Pump Suction from Emergency Condensate Storage Tank Valve RCIC-M0-18 is normally open and closes automatically when Suppression Pool Valve RCIC-M0-41 is fully open, or manually via a control hand switch [35, 36, 30, 32]. Contact chatter in the valve closing circuit could close the valve, however the valve would reopen automatically in response to RCIC initiation on a low reactor level signal, or would open upon operator command via a control hand switch!. Based on this analysis, there are no moving contact devices in the control circuit of this valve that meet the selection criteria.

Pump Discharge Valve RCIC-M0-20 is normally open and closes via a control hand switch only

[35 , 36, 30]. Chatter in the closing contactor auxiliary contacts could cause valve closure, however the valve would reopen automatically in response to RCIC initiation on a low reactor level signal, or would open upon operator command via a control hand switch. Based on this anal ysis, there are no moving contact devices in the control circuit of this valve that meet the selection criteria.

Pump Discharge Valve RCIC-M0-21 is normally closed and opens on a reactor low level signal or control hand switch [35, 36, 30] . Once open, it is reclosed by a control hand switch only.

Chatter in the closing circuit of this normally-closed valve is blocked by open rugged limit and torque switches. Chatter in the opening circuit could lead to valve opening, which would be beneficial to RCIC operation. Based on this analysis, there are no moving contact devices in the control circuit of this valve that meet the selection criteria.

Manual RC!C initiatio n is presum ed to include operator al ignm ent of valves via the RC!C system contro ls, inc luding pump suctio n lo tht: dt:sired so urce.

16C4384-RPT-OOS Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 13 o f49 2.5 AC/DC Power Support Systems The AC and DC power support systems were reviewed for contact control devices in seal-in and lockout circuits that prevent the availability of DC and AC power sources. The following AC and DC power support systems were reviewed:

• Emergency Diesel Generators,

• Battery Chargers and Inverters,

• EDG Ancillary Systems, and

• Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs.

Electrical power, especially DC, is necessary to support achieving and maintaining a stable plant condition following a seismic event. DC power relies on the availability of AC power to recharge the batteries. The availability of AC power is dependent upon the Emergency Diesel Generators and their ancillary support systems. EPRI 3002004396 (4) requires confirmation that the supply of emergency power is not challenged by a SILO device. The tripping of lockout devices or circuit breakers is expected to require some level of diagnosis to determine ifthe trip was spurious due to contact chatter or in response to an actual system fault. The actions taken to diagnose the fault condition could substantially delay the restoration of emergency power.

In order to ensure contact chatter cannot compromise the emergency power system, control circuits were analyzed for the Diesel Generators (DG), Battery Chargers, Vital AC Inverters, and Switchgear/Load Centers/MCCs as necessary to distribute power from the DGs to the Battery Chargers and DG Ancillary Systems. General information on the arrangement of safety-related AC and DC systems, as well as operation of the DGs, was obtained from Cooper' s UFSAR [37) .

Cooper has two (2) DGs which provide emergency power for their two (2) divisions of Class IE loads, with one DG for each division (38). Four (4) battery chargers provide DC power and battery recharging functions [39). (The output disconnect switches of the 250V IC and 125V IC chargers are locked open and for this reason were not considered in this analysis.)

The analysis considers the reactor is operating at power with no equipment failures or LOCA prior to the seismic event. The Diesel Generators are not operating but are available. The seismic event is presumed to cause a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) and a normal reactor SCRAM.

In response to bus undervoltage relaying detecting the LOOP, the Class IE control systems must automatically shed loads, start the DGs, and sequentiall y load the diesel generators as designed.

Ancillary systems required for DG operation as well as Class 1E battery chargers and inverters must function as necessary. The goal of this analysis is to identify any vulnerable contact devices which could chatter during the seismic event, cause a circuit seal-in or lock-out, and prevent these systems from performing their intended safety-related function of supplying electrical power during the LOOP.

The following sections contain a description of the analysis for each element of the AC/DC Support Systems. Contact devices are identified by description in this narrative and apply to all divisions. The selected contact devices for all divi sions are included in Table 8-1.

16C4384-R.PT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 14 of 49 2.5.1 Emergency Diesel Generators The analysis of the Emergency Diesel Generators is broken down into the generator protective relaying and diesel engine control. General descriptions of these systems and controls appear in the UFSAR [37] . The control circuitry associated with each train is identical and for this reason only one train is described herein, however Table B-1 includes both trains.

Generator Protective Relaying The closure of the 52 EG 1 DG Circuit Breaker is prevented when either the 86 DG l Generator Lockout Relay or 86 JFE Bus Lockout Relay is tripped [40]. The control circuits for the DG Lockout Relay [41] include the 40 DGl Field Failure; 87-1DGl , 87-2 DGJ , and 87-3 DGl Differential Trip; 51 V-1 DG 1, 51 V-2 DG 1, and 51 V-3 DG l Phase Overcurrent; 67 DG I Directional Overcurrent; and 27/59DG1 Abnormal Voltage protective relays. Chatter in any of these relays may trip the DG Lockout Relay. Chatter in the 50151-1 I FE, 50/51-2 I FE, and 50151-3 I FE Phase Overcurrent protective relays associated with the normal power feed could lead to the tripping of the Bus Lockout Relay [42].

Diesel Engine Control Starting of the DG is blocked when the 86 DG 1 Generator Lockout Relay is tripped; and chatter in the 481SEX Incomplete Start Sequence, 630SDX Overspeed Shutdown, 4EMX or 4EMX3 Emergency Master, 14RX3 Running Master, or 14RY1 Running Slave relays could break the start seal-in and shut down the engine [43].

Chatter in the 62CLX Cranking Limit Timer may seal in the Incomplete Start Sequence Relay 48ISEX which would prevent engine start [43]. The coil of 62CLX is energized at the beginning of the start sequence. Any chatter in the contacts comprising the coil circuit would be beneficial as it would reset the timer and prevent tripping the Incomplete Start Sequence circuit.

The Overspeed Shutdown Relay may seal-in if chatter occurs in the 630SDL or 630SDR Overspeed Switches; or in the 140S Overspeed Auxiliary Relay, RI04 Auxiliary Speed Relay, or RT Relay Tachometer [43, 44J.

The Running Master Relay 14RX3 is energized by either the RT Relay Tachometer RT, via Auxiliary Speed Relay RI 02, or by the Magnetic Pickup Bypass Relay 14MPFB [43] . It is unlikely that chatter would occur in these diverse input contacts simultaneously in a way that would drop out I 4RX3, and thus they are not considered in this analysis. Running Relay I 4RY 1 is energized by 14RX3 and is therefore covered by its analysis.

2.5 .2 EDG Ancillary Systems In order to start and operate the Diesel Generators require a number of components and systems.

For the purpose of identifying electrical contact devices, only systems and components which are electrically controlled are analyzed. Information in the UFSAR [37] was used as appropriate for this analysis.

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confinnation Page 15 of49 Starting Air Based on Diesel Generator availability as an initial condition the passive air reservoirs are presumed pressurized and the only active components in this system required to operate are the air start solenoids [45], which are covered under the DG engine control analysis above.

Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust The combustion air intake and exhaust for the Diesel Generators are passive systems [46] which do not rely on electrical control.

Lube Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical lubrication oil pumps [47] which do not rely on electrical control.

Fuel Oil The Diesel Generators utilize engine-driven mechanical pumps and DC-powered booster pumps to supply fuel oil to the engines from the day tanks [45]. The day tanks are re-supplied using AC-powered Diesel Oil Transfer Pumps. Chatter analysis of the control circuits for the electrically-powered transfer [48, 49] and booster pumps [44, 50], as well as the Fuel Oil Shutoff Solenoid Operated Valves [51, 52] concluded they do not include SILO devices. The mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control.

Cooling Water The Diesel Generator Cooling Water System is described in the UFSAR [37]. This system consists of two cooling loops, jacket water and Service Water (SW). Engine driven pumps are credited for jacket water when the engine is operating (53]. These mechanical pumps do not rely on electrical control.

Four SW pumps, 1A, I B, IC, and ID, provide cooling water to the heat exchangers associated with the two DGs (54, 55, 45, 56] . There are no electrically operated valves in this flow path. In automatic mode, these pumps are started via a low discharge pressure signal and sequencing signal following DG start [57]. In standby mode, these pumps are sequenced to start automatically following a DG start. There is no SILO associated with the low discharge pressure signal. Chatter analysis of the DG start signal is included in the DG engine control analysis above. An analysis of the 52 SWPIA (52 SWPIB, 52 SWPIC, 52 SWPID) SW pump circuit breaker trip control circuits indicates chatter in the Pump Lockout Relay 86 S WP! A (86 SWPIB, 86 SWPIC, 86 SWPI D) or the Phase Overcurrent Relays 50/51 0A SWPlA and 50/51 0C SWPIA (50/51 0A SWPIB, 50/51 0C SWPIB, 50/5 l 0A SWPIC, 50/5 l 0C SWPlC, 50/51 0A S WP l D, 50/5 l 0C S WP 10) could trip the circuit breaker and prevent pump operation following the seismic event.

Ventilation The Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System is described in the UFSAR [37]. During Diesel Generator Operation, ventilation is provided by Heating and Ventilation Units HV-DG-lC and HV-DG-10 and Exhaust Fans EF-DG-lA and EF-DG-IB [58]. In automatic mode,

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 16 of49 these fans are started via the DG Start Signal. Chatter analysis of the DG start signal is included in the DG engine control analysis above. Other than SILO devices identified for the DG start signal, chatter analysis of the control circuits for these ventilation components [59, 60]

concluded they do not include SILO devices.

2.5.3 Battery Chargers Chatter analysis on the battery chargers was performed using information from the UFSAR as well as vendor schematic diagrams [61 , 62, 63]. Each battery charger has a high voltage shutdown circuit which is intended to protect the batteries and DC loads from output overvoltage due to charger failure. The K3 High Voltage Shutdown (HVSD) circuits [64] in the 125V and 250V chargers have an output relay which shunt-trips the AC input circuit breaker, shutting the charger down. Chatter in the contacts of these output relays may disable the battery chargers, and for this reason meet the selection criteria.

2.5 .4 Inverters Analysis of schematics for the I A Static Inverter [65, 66] revealed no vulnerable contact devices and thus chatter analysis is unnecessary.

2.5.5 Switchgear, Load Centers, and MCCs Power distribution from the DGs to the necessary electrical loads (Battery Chargers, Inverters, Fuel Oil Pumps, and DG Ventilation Fans) was traced to identify any SILO devices which could lead to a circuit breaker trip and interruption in power. This effort excluded the DG circuit breakers, and the SW Pump breakers which are covered above, as well as component-specific contactors and their control devices, which are covered in the analysis of each component above.

The medium- and low-voltage circuit breakers in 4 I 60V and 480V AC Switchgear [38]

supplying power to loads identified in this section (battery chargers, EDG ancillary systems, etc.)

have been identified for evaluation: 52 I FE, 52SS1 F, 52 MCC K, 52 MCC LX; 52 lGE, 52 SSlG, 52 MCC S, 52 MCC TX.

Bus Feeder Breaker Power from the Diesel Generator is fed to the 4 l 60 Switchgear Critical Bus IF (I G) via the I FE (I GE) circuit breakers. This circuit breaker is tripped and locked-out by Lockout Relays 86 I FE and 86 DG I, which are covered above, as well as Lockout Relays 86 IF A and 86 IFS, associated with the Normal Feeder Breaker and the Emergency Startup Transformer Breaker respectivel y

[42]. Lockout Relay 86 1FA is tripped by Phase Overcurrent Relays 5 I 0A IFA, 51 0B 1FA, 51 0C 1FA. Lockout Relay 86 l FS is tripped by Phase Overcurrent Relays 51 0A IFS, 51 0B IFS, 51 0C IFS [67]. Chatter in any of these relays could trip the Bus Feeder Breaker.

Station Service Step-Down Transformer The close control for the Station Service Step-Down Transformer IF circuit breaker is via a normally-open manual control switch. For this reason, any chatter that leads to a circuit breaker trip would not be automatically reset, leaving the breaker in the tripped position. There are two potentially vulnerable contact devices which could trip this breaker if they chatter, the Phase Overcurrent Relays 50/51 0A SS IF and 50/51 0C SS IF [67] .

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(f) N!fF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 17 of 49 480V AC, 120V AC, 250 VDC, and 125V DC Distribution and MCCs The 480V AC Load Centers and MCCs, and the 120V AC, 250 VDC, and 125V DC Distribution

[38, 68, 69, 70, 71, 39) all use either Molded-Case Circuit Breakers or fused disconnect switches, both of which are seismically rugged [4, pp. 2-11].

2.6 Summary of Selected Components The investigation of high-frequency contact devices as described above was performed in Ref.

[72] . A list of the contact devices requiring a high frequency confirmation is provided in Appendix B, Table B-1.

SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 Page 18 of 49 3 SEISMIC EVALUATION 3.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand Per Reference [4], Section 4.3, the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the horizontal direction is the Cooper Nuclear Station horizontal ground motion response spectrum (GMRS), which was generated as part of the Cooper Nuclear Station Seismic Hazard and Screening Report [7] submitted to the NRC on March 31 , 2014, amended on February I l, 2015 [8], and accepted by the NRC on September 8, 2015 [9].

It is noted in Reference [4] that a Foundation Input Response Spectrum (FIRS) may be necessary to evaluate buildings whose foundations are supported at elevations different than the Control Point elevation. However, for sites founded on rock, per Reference [4], "The Control Point GMRS developed for these rock sites are typically appropriate for all rock-founded structures and additional FIRS estimates are not deemed necessary for the high frequency confirmation effort." For sites founded on soil, the soil layers will shift the frequency range of seismic input towards the lower frequency range of the response spectrum by engineering judgment.

Therefore, for purposes of high-frequency evaluations in this report, the GMRS is an adequate substitute for the FIRS for sites founded on soil.

The applicable buildings at Cooper Nuclear Station are founded on soil and have only the Control Point GMRS defined; therefore, the Control Point GMRS is conservatively used as the input at the building foundation.

The horizontal GMRS values are provided in Table 3-2 .

3.2 Vertical Seismic Demand As described in Section 3.2 of Reference [4], the horizontal GMRS and site soil conditions are used to calculate the vertical GMRS (VGMRS), which is the basis for calculating high-frequency seismic demand on the subject components in the vertical direction.

The site's soil mean shear wave velocity vs. depth profile is provided in Reference [7] Table 2.3.2-2, and reproduc~d below in Table 3-1.

SA I 6C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(f) NTTF 2 .1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 19 of 49 Table 3-1: Soil Mean Shear Wave Velocity vs. Depth Profile Depth Thickness, di VSi Vs30 Layer di I Vsi I [di I Vsi)

(ft) (ft) (ft/s) (ft/s)

I 10.0 10.0 1,020 0.0098 0.0098 2 14.5 4 .5 1,020 0.0044 0.01 42 3 24 .5 10.0 1.030 0.0097 0.0239 4 34.5 10.0 1,040 0.0096 0.033 5 5 40.5 6.0 1,040 0.0058 0.0393 6 49.5 9.0 l , 120 0.0080 0.0473 7 59.5 10.0 1.620 0.0062 0.053 5 1,369 8 69.5 10.0 1.760 0.0057 0.0592 9 79.5 10.0 1,760 0.0057 0.0649 10 84.5 5.0 1,760 0.0028 0.0677 II 94.5 10.0 2.750 0.0036 0.07 14 12 97.0 2.5 7.292 0.0003 0.07 17 13 98.4 1.4 7.294 0.0002 0.0 71 9 Using the shear wave velocity vs. depth profile, the velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of30m (98.4ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) is calculated per the methodology of Reference [4], Section 3.2.

• The time for a shear wave to travel through each soil layer is calculated by dividing the layer depth (d;) by the shear wave velocity of the layer (Vs1).

• The total time for a wave to travel from a depth of 30m to the surface is calculated by adding the travel time through each layer from depths ofOm to 30m (E[d;N s1]).

• The velocity of a shear wave traveling from a depth of 30m to the surface is therefore the total distance (30m) divided by the total time; i.e., Vs30 = (30m)/L[d;N s1J .

The site' s soil class is determined by using the site' s shear wave velocity (V s30) and the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the GMRS and comparing them to the values within Reference

[4], Table 3-1. Based on the PGA of 0.241 g and the shear wave velocity of I 369ft/s, the site soil class is A-Intermediate.

Once a site soil class is determined, the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each frequency are determined by using the site soil class and its associated V/H values in Reference

[4], Table 3-2.

The vertical GMRS is then calculated by multiplying the mean V/H ratio at each frequency by the horizontal GMRS acceleration at the corresponding frequency. It is noted that Reference [4],

Table 3-2 values are constant between 0. 1Hz and l 5Hz.

The V/H ratios and VGMRS values are provided in Table 3-2 of this report.

Figure 3-1 below provides a plot of the horizontal GMRS, V/H ratios, and vertical GMRS for Cooper Nuclear Station .

~ 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0

~ Confirmation Page 20 of49 Table 3-2: Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra Frequency HG MRS V/H VGMRS (Hz) (!!) Ratio (!!)

100 0.241 0.78 0.188 90 0.242 0.82 0.198 80 0.245 0.86 0.211 70 0.249 0.91 0.227 60 0.258 0.93 0.240 50 0.282 0.95 0.268 40 0.321 0.91 0.292 35 0.342 0.86 0.294 30 0.359 0.79 0.284 25 0.386 0.72 0.278 20 0.417 0.67 0.279 15 0.463 0.67 0.310 12.5 0.486 0.67 0.326 10 0.465 0.67 0.312 9 0.449 0.67 0.301 8 0.430 0.67 0.288 7 0.417 0.67 0.279 6 0.422 0.67 0.283 5 0.454 0.67 0.304 4 0.415 0.67 0.278 3.5 0.364 0.67 0.244 3 0.294 0.67 0. 197 2.5 0.209 0.67 0. 140 2 0.162 0.67 0. 109 1.5 0.116 0.67 0.078 1.25 0.096 0.67 0.064 I 0.082 0.67 0.055 0.9 0.076 0.67 0.051 0.8 0.069 0.67 0.046 0.7 0.063 0.67 0.042 0.6 0.060 0.67 0.040 0.5 0.055 0.67 0.037 0.4 0.044 0.67 0.030 0.35 0.039 0.67 0.026 0.3 0.033 0.67 0.022 0.25 0.028 0.67 0.019 0.2 0.022 0.67 0.015 0.15 0.0 17 0.67 0.011 0.1 25 0.0 14 0.67 0.009 0.1 0.011 0.67 0.007

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 21of 49 0.60 1.0 0

- HGMRS

- VGMRS ,,

I '

0.50 - - - V/H Ratio (A-Intermediate) I '

,' \ 0.9 0 I \

0.40 I

,I \

\

\

I \

\ 0.80 c

• 0

+;

0 cu

Q cu 0 .30 a:::

~

Q) o; I 0.70 >

~

0 0.20 * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

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0.60 0 .10 0.00 0.50

0. 1 10 100 Fre uen cy Hz Figure 3-1: Plot of the Horizontal and Vertical Ground Motions Response Spectra and V/H Ratios 3.3 Component Horizontal Seismic Demand Per Reference [4] the peak horizontal acceleration is amplified using the following two factors to determine the horizontal in-cabinet response spectrum:

• Horizontal in-structure amplification factor AFsH to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building's foundation

• Horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor AFc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AfsH is derived from Figure 4-3 in Reference [4]. The in-cabinet amplification factor, AFc is associated with a given type of cabinet construction. The three general cabinet types are identified in Reference [4] and Appendix I of EPRI NP-7148 [73]

assuming 5% in-cabinet response spectrum damping. EPRI NP-7148 [73] classified the cabinet types as high amplification structures such as switchgear panels and other similar large flexible panels, medium amplification structures such as control panels and control room benchboard panels and low amplification structures such as motor control centers.

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTIF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 22 o f 49 All of the electrical cabinets containing the components subject to high frequency confirmation (see Table B- l in Appendix B) can be categorized into one of the in-cabinet amplification categories in Reference [4] as follows:

• Typical motor control center cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections. Each section is a relatively narrow cabinet structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 4.5 that allow the cabinet framing to be efficiently used in flexure for the dynamic response loading, primarily in the front-to-back direction. This results in higher frame stresses and hence more damping which lowers the cabinet response. In addition, the subject components are not located on large unstiffened panels that could exhibit high local amplifications. These cabinets qualify as low amplification cabinets.

• Switchgear cabinets EE-SWGR-4160F, EE-SWGR-4160G, EE-SWGR-480F, EE-SWGR-480G, EE-SWGR-4160DGI and EE-SWGR-4160DG2 are large cabinets consisting of a lineup of several interconnected sections typical of the high amplification cabinet category. Each section is a wide box-type structure with height-to-depth ratios of about 1.5 and may include wide stiffened panels. This results in lower stresses and hence less damping which increases the enclosure response. Components can be mounted on the wide panels, which results in the higher in-cabinet amplification factors.

• Control cabinets DG-PNL-DG I ECP, DG-PNL-DG2 ECP, EE-CHG-125 l A, EE-CHG-125 lB, EE-CHG-250 IA, EE-CHG-250 IB, LRP-PNL-25-58, LRP-PNL-9-30 and LRP-PNL-9-3 l are in a lineup of several interconnected sections with moderate width. Each section consists of structures with height-to-depth ratios of about 3 which results in moderate frame stresses and damping. The response levels are mid-range between MCCs and switchgear and therefore these cabinets can be considered in the medium amplification category.

3.4 Component Vertical Seismic Demand The component vertical demand is determined using the peak acceleration of the VGMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz and amplifying it using the following two factors:

• Vertical in-structure amplification factor Afsv to account for seismic amplification at floor elevations above the host building' s foundation

• Vertical in-cabinet amplification factor Afc to account for seismic amplification within the host equipment (cabinet, switchgear, motor control center, etc.)

The in-structure amplification factor AFsv is derived from Figure 4-4 in Reference [4]. The in-cabinet amplification factor, AFc is derived in Reference [4] and is 4.7 for all cabinet types.

SA 16C4384-RPT -005 Rev. 0 50.54(f) NTIF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 23 of 49 4 CONTACT DEVICE EVALUATIONS Per Reference [4], seismic capacities (the highest seismic test level reached by the contact device without chatter or other malfunction) for each subject contact device are determined by the following procedures:

(I) If a contact device was tested as part of the EPRI High Frequency Testing program [74],

then the component seismic capacity from this program is used.

(2) If a contact device was not tested as part of [74J, then one or more of the following means to determine the component capacity were used:

(a) Device-specific seismic test reports (either from the station, manufacturer/vendor, or from the SQURTS testing program).

(b) Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) capacities per [75] and [76].

(c) Assembly (e.g. electrical cabinet) tests where the component functional performance was monitored.

The high-frequency capacity of each device was evaluated with the component mounting point demand from Section 3 using the criteria in Section 4.5 of Reference [4]. The high-frequency evaluations as described above were performed in Ref. [77] .

Where applicable, operator actions that are included in existing station procedures [78] are used to resolve functional failures of contact devices that impact the operation of essential plant components.

A summary of the high-frequency evaluation conclusions is provided in Table B-1 in Appendix B.

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 24 of 49 5 CONCLUSIONS 5.1 General Conclusions Cooper Nuclear Station has performed a High Frequency Confirmation evaluation in response to the NRC's 50.54(f) letter [I] using the methods in EPRI report 3002004396 [4].

The evaluation identified a total of 136 components that required evaluation. As summarized in Table 8-1 in Appendix 8, 89 of the devices have adequate seismic capacity, two (2) have existing plant procedures to cope with the effect of contact chatter, and 45 components required resolution following the criteria in Section 4.6 of Reference [4].

To improve plant safety, Cooper Nuclear Station intends to address equipment sensitive to high frequency ground motion for the reevaluated seismic hazard information through mitigation strategies in lieu of a separate resolution of the 45 components identified under the letter [I]

which do not impact the credited path for mitigation strategies.

5.2 Identification of Follow-Up Actions Based on the general conclusions above, no follow-up actions are necessary.

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev . 0 SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2. I Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 25 of 49 6 REFERENCES

[I] NRC (E. Leeds and M. Johnson) Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees et al., "Request for information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(t) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3 and 9.3 ofthe Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number MLl2053A340, March 12, 2012.

[2] NRC Report, "Recommendations for Enhancing Reactor Safety in the 21st Century,"

ADAMS Accession Number MLl I I 861807, July 12, 2011.

[3] EPRI Report 1025287, "Seismic Evaluation Guidence: Screening, Prioritization, and lmplimentation Details (SPID) for the Resolution of Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1: Seismic," Final Report, February 2013.

[4] EPRI Report 3002004396, "High Frequency Program: Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility Evaluation," Final Report, July 2015.

[5] NRC (J. Davis) Letter to Nuclear Energy lnstitute (A. Mauer), "Endorsement of Electric Power Research Institute Final Draft Report 3002004396, 'High Frequency Program:

Application Guidance for Functional Confirmation and Fragility.'," ADAMS Accession Number ML I 52 l 8A569, September 17, 2015.

[6] NRC (W. Dean) Letter to the Power Reactor Licensees on the Enclosed List, "Final Determination of Licensee Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessments Under the Request for Information Pursuant to Title I 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(t) Regarding Recommendation 2. I 'Seismic' of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML 15I94AO15, October 27, 2015.

[7] NPPD Letter (NLS2014027) to NRC, "Nebraska Public Power District's Seismic Hazard and Screening Report (CEUS Sites) - Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2. I of the Near-Term Task Force Review of insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number MLl4094A040, March 31, 2014.

[8] NPPD Letter ( LS2015017) to NRC, "Revision to Nebraska Public Power District's Response to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Request for Information Pursuant to I OCFR 50.54(t) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML!5050A 165, February l I, 2015.

l6C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 26 of 49

[9] NRC (F. Vega) Letter to NPPD (0. Limpias), "Cooper Nuclear Station - Staff Assessment of Information Provided Pursuant to Title I0 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Section 50.54(f), Seismic Hazard Reevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," ADAMS Accession Number ML I 5240A030, September 8, 2015.

[10] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 10 Rev. 14/AA, Elementary Diagram, Primary Containment Isolation System.

[ 11] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 11 Rev. 13/AB, Elementary Diagram, Primary Containment Isolation System.

[12] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 5 Rev. 15/AA, Elementary Diagram, Primary Containment Isolation System.

[ 13] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 6 Rev. 16/ AA, Elementary Diagram, Primmy Containment Isolation System.

[14] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 7 Rev. 30/AA, Elementary Diagram, Primary Containment Isolation System.

[ 15] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 8 Rev. 091AA, Elementary Diagram, Primary Containment Isolation System.

[ 16] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 14 Rev . 04/ AA, Elementary Diagram, Primary Containment Isolation System.

[ 17] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E253 Sheet I Rev. 30/ AA, Elementary Diagram, Automatic Blowdown System.

[ 18] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E253 Sheet 2 Rev. 28/ AA, Elementary Diagram, Automatic Blowdown System.

[19] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791E253 Sheet 3 Rev. 12/AA, Elementary Diagram, Automatic Blowdown System.

(20] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E26 l Sheet 5 Rev. 23/ AA, Elementary Diagram, Residual Heat Removal System.

(21] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E26 l Sheet 8 Rev. 23/ AA, Elementary Diagram, Residual Heat Removal System.

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev . 0 SA 50.54(t) N}TF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 27 of 49 (22] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791E265 Sheet 2 Rev. 23/AA, Elementary Diagram, Core Spray System.

(23] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 944E689 Sheet I Rev. 13/AA, Elementary Diagram, Low-Low Set.

(24] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791E271Sheet7 Rev. 25/AA, Elementary Diagram, High Pressure Core Injection System.

[25] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E271 Sheet 3 Rev. 23/AA, Elementary Diagram, High Pressure Core Injection System.

[26] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E27 I Sheet 4 Rev. 24/ !\A, Elementary Diagram, High Pressure Core Injection System.

[27] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 12 Rev. 19/ AC, Elementary Diagram, Primary Containment Isolation System.

[28] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E266 Sheet 13 Rev. 25 /AC, Elementary Diagram, Primary Containment Isolation System.

[29] Cooper Nuclear Station Document l04R907BB Rev. 06/AA, "P&ID, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System".

l 30J Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E264 Sheet 2 Rev. 28/ AA, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.

[31] Cooper Nuclear Station Surveillance Procedure 6. l RCIC.30 I Rev. I 0, "RCIC Steam Line High Flow Channel Caibration (Division l )".

[32] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E264 Sheet 3 Rev. 21/AA, Elementary Diagram.

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.

[33] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2041 Rev. 87/AA, Flow Diagram, Reactor Building Main Steam System.

[34] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 £264 Sheet 7 Rev. 15/AA, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.

(35] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2043 Rev. 56/AC, Flow Diagram, Reactor Core Isolation Coolant and Reactor Feed Systems.

SA 16C43 84-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(!) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 28 of49 l36J Cooper Nuclear Station Document 791 E264 Sheet 6 Rev. 13/AA, Elementary Diagram, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System.

[37] Cooper Nuclear Station, "Updated Safety Analysis Report," List of Effective Pages XXVII 5.

(38] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3002 Sheet I Rev. 52/AE, Auxiliary One line Diagram, Motor Control Center Z, Switchgear Bus I A, I B, IE. and Critical Switchgear Bus IF, 1G.

[39] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3058 Rev. 66/AI, DC One Line Diagram.

[40] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3024 Sheet 8 Rev. 35/AE, Elementary Diagrams, 4160 V Switchgear.

[41] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 14EK-0144 Rev. 23/AA, Schematic Diagram, Diesel Engine Generator.

[42] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3020 Sheet 4 Rev. 20/ AA, Elementary Diagrams, 4/60V Switchgear.

[43] Cooper Nuclear Station Document G5-262-743 Sheet I Rev. 26/AA, Electrical Schematic, Emergency Diesel Generator#! .

[44] Cooper Nuclear Station Document G5-262-743 Sheet IA Rev. 12/AD, Electrical Schematic, Emergency Diesel Generator #1.

[45] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2077 Rev. 78/AA, Flow Diagram, Diesel Generator Building Service Water, Starting Air, Fuel Oil. Sump System, and RoofDrains.

[46] Cooper Nuclear Station Document KSV96-3 Rev. 06/AA, Piping Schematic, Air Intake and Exhaust.

[47] Cooper Nuclear Station Document KSV 46-5 Rev . 26/ AB, Piping Schematic, Lube Oil.

[48] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3040 Sheet 9 Rev. 38/AK, Control Elementary Diagrams.

(49] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3045 Sheet 14 Rev . 50/AB, Control Elementary Diagrams.

[50] Cooper Nuclear Station Document G5-262-743 Sheet l OA Rev. 06/ AD, Electrical Schematic, Emergency Diesel Generator #2.

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev . 0 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Pagt: 29 o f 49

[51] Cooper Nuclear Station Document G5-262-743 Sheet 2 Rev. 20/ AC, Electrical Schematic, Emergency Diesel Generator # !.

[52] Cooper Nuclear Station Document GS-262-743 Sheet 11 Rev. 14/AC, Electrical Schematic, Emergency Diesel Generator #2.

[53] Cooper Nuclear Station Document KSV47-9NP Rev. 08/AJ, Piping Schematic, Jacket Water.

[54] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2006 Sheet I Rev. 90/AN, Flow Diagram, Circulating, Screen Wash, and Service Water Systems.

[55] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2006 Sheet 3 Rev. 55/AC, Flow Diagram, Circulating, Screen Wash, and Service Water Systems.

[56] Cooper Nuclear Station Document KSV47-8 Rev . 27/AA, Piping Schematic, Diesel Generator I and 2 Cooling Water.

[57] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3022 Sheet 6 Rev. 49/AH, Elementary Diagrams, 4160 V Switchgear.

[58] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2024 Sheet 2 Rev. 38/AA, Flow Diagram, HVAC Miscellaneous Service Buildings.

[59] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3065 Sheet 17 Rev. 47/AB, Control Elementary Diagrams.

(60] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3065 Sheet 17A Rev. 12/AB, Control Elementary Diagrams.

[61] Cooper Nuclear Station Document INV-3C-70048 Sheet 2 Rev. 02/AA, Schematic Diagram, ARRI 30K200F.

[62] Cooper Nuclear Station Document INV-4C-01410 Sheet 2 Rev. 02/AA, Schematic Diagram, ARR260K200F.

[63] Cooper Nuclear Station Document VM-0228 Rev. 19, Vendor Manual, Batteries and Chargers.

[64] Cooper Nuclear Station Document MBC-2920 Sheet Bl Rev. 00/AA, Schematic, High Voltage Shutdown.

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(f) N:11F 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confinnat1on Page 30 of 49

[65] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 20-100287 Sheet I Rev. 0 I/AA, Schematic, JOkVA Inverter 210-280 VDC 1201240 VAC 3-Wire 60Hz.

[66] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 20-100288 Sheet I Rev. 00/AA, Schematic, JOkVA Static Switch 2-Pole 1201240 VAC 1-Phase 60Hz.

[67] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3025 Sheet 9 Rev. 29/ AH, Elementary Diagrams, 4160V Switchgear.

[68] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3004 Sheet 3 Rev . 22/AA, Auxiliary One line Diagram, Motor Control Centers C, D, H, .!, DG!, DG2.

[69] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3006 Sheet 5 Rev. 84/ AG, Auxiliary One Line Diagram, Starter Racks lZ and TZ, Motor Control Centers K, l, LX, RA, RX, S, T, TX, X

[70] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 3010 Sheet I Rev . 82/AH, Vital One line Diagram.

[71] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 30 I 0 Sheet 2 Rev. l 0/ AE, load and Fuse Schedule, Critical Distribution Panel CDP/A.

[72] Stevenson & Associates Report 16C4384-RPT-001, Rev. 2, "Selection of Relays and Switches for High Frequency Seismic Evaluation".

[73] EPRI Report NP-7148-SL, "Procedure for Evaluating Nuclear Power Plant Relay Seismic Functionality," Final Report December 1990.

[74] EPRI Report 3002002997, "High Frequency Program: High Frequency Testing Summary,"

Final Report, September 2014.

[75] EPRf Report NP-7147-SL, "Seismic Ruggedness of Relays," Final Report August 1991.

[76] SQUG Advisory 2004-02, "Relay GERS Corrections," September 7, 2004.

[77J Stevenson & Associates Calculation l6C4384-CAL-OOI , Rev. 0, "High Frequency Functional Confinnation and Fragility Evaluation of Relays".

[78] Cooper Nuclear Station Emergency Procedure 5.8. l Rev. 27, "RPV Pressure Control Systems".

[79] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2028 Rev. 52/AA, Flow Diagram, Reactor Building and Drywell Equipment Drain System.

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 31of49 (80] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2040 Sheet 1 Rev. 82/AA, Flow Diagram. Residual Heat Removal System.

[81] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2040 Sheet 2 Rev. 19/ AB, Flow Diagram. Residual Heat Removal System Loop B.

[82] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2042 Sheet I Rev. 35/AA, Flow Diagram, Reactor Water Clean-Up System.

[83] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2039 Rev. 61/AD, Flow Diagram, Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System.

(84] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2045 Sheet I Rev. 58/AA, Flow Diagram, Core Spray System.

(85] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2045 Sheet 2 Rev. 21/AA, Flow Diagram, Standby Liquid Control System.

[86] Cooper Nuclear Station Document 2044 Rev. 74/AB, Flow Diagram, High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Feed Systems.

16C4384-RPT-OOS Rev. 0 SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 32 of4 9 A. REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE COMPONENT EVALUATIONS A detailed example analysis of two components is provided within thi s section. This example is intended to illustrate each step of the high frequency analysis methodology given in Section 4 of Ref. [4] .

A.1 High Frequency Seismic Demand Calculate the high-frequency seismic demand on the components per the methodology from Reference [4].

Sample calculations for the high-frequency seismic demand of components DG-LMS-DG 1 630SDL contained in control cabinet DG-PNL-DG I ECP and located in the Diesel Generator Building at elevation 903 ' and EE-REL-I FA 86 contained in switchgear EE-SWGR-4 l 60F and located in the Reactor Building at elevation 932' . Ref. (77] calculates the high-frequency seismic demand for all the subject components.

A. 1.1 Horizontal Seismic Demand The horizontal site-specific CNS GMRS data can be found in Section 6 of Ref. (77] .

Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

Peak Acceleration of Horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Table 6.2 of Ref. [77]): SAaMRS = 0.463g (at 15 Hz)

Work the distance between the component floor and foundation with Ref. [4], Fig. 4-3 to calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor:

Bottom of Deepest Foundation Elevation: ELround = 903 ft Diesel Generator Building ELround == 860 ft Reactor Building Component Floor Elevation: ELcomp = 903 ft DG-LMS-DGJ 630SDL ELcomp = 932 ft EE-REL-I FA 86 Distance Between Component Floor and Foundation Elevation : hcomp == ELcomp - ELround == 0 ft DG-LMS-DGJ 630SDL hcomp = ELcomp - ELround = 72 ft EE-REL-I FA 86

SA 16C4384-RPT -005 Rev. 0 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Con ti nnation Pagt! 33 of49 Calculate the horizontal in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the bottom of the foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation:

Slope of Amplification Factor Line, Oft < hcomp < 40ft: ffih = 2.1 - 1.2 = 0.0225 2_

40fc-Oft ft Intercept of Amplification Factor Line with Amplification Factor Axis:

Horizontal In-Structure Amplification Factor (Ref. [4], p.4-1 l): AFsH(hcomp) = (mh

• hcomp+ bh) ifhcomp <= 40ft 2.1 otherwise AF::rn(hcomp) = 1.2 DG-LMS-DG! 630SDL AFs1-1(hcomp) = 2. 1 EE-REL-JFA 86 Calculate the horizontal in-cabinet amplification factor based on the type of cabinet that contains the subject component:

Type of Cabinet: cab I = "Control Cabinet for DG-LMS-DGJ 630SDL" (enter "MCC", "Switchgear", cab2 = "Switchgear for EE-REL-I FA 86" "Control Cabinet", or "Rigid")

Horizontal In -Cabinet Amplification Factor (Ref [4], p. 4-13): AFc.h(cab) = 3.6 if cab= "MCC" 7.2 if cab = "Switchgear" 4.5 if cab = "Control Cabinet" 1.0 if cab= "Rigid" AFc h(cabl) = 4.5 AFch(cab2) = 7.2 Multiply the peak horizontal GMRS acceleration by the horizontal in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the components:

Horizontal In-Cabinet Response Spectrum : lCRSc h = Afs1-1

• AFc h

• SAoMRS ICRSc.h = 1.2*4.5*0.463=2 .Sg DG-LMS-DGI 630SDL lCRSc h =2.1 *7.2*0.463=7g EE-REL- I FA 86

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 50.54(f) NTTF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 34 of 49 A.1.2 Vertical Seismic Demand Determine the peak acceleration of the horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz:

Peak Acceleration of Horizontal GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz (see Table 6.2 of Ref. [77]): SAaMRS = 0.463g (at 15 Hz)

Obtain the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of the horizontal GMRS (See Table 6.2 of Ref. (77]) :

Peak Ground Acceleration (GMRS) : PGAaMRS = 0.241 g Calculate the shear wave velocity traveling from a depth of30m (98.4 ft) to the surface of the site (Vs30) from Ref. [4]:

V _ (30m)

Shear Wave Velocity:

s3 o - -l:(-,--d i.)

Vst where, di: Thickness of the layer (ft),

Vs;: Shear wave velocity of the layer (ft/s)

Per Table 6.1 of Ref. [77], the sum of thickness of each layer over shear wave velocity of each layer is 0.0719 sec. The shear wave velocity is calculated as:

Shear Wave Velocity: V sJO = 98.4ft I 0.07 l 9sec = 1369 ft/sec Work the PGA and shear wave velocity with Ref. [4], Table 3-1 to determine the soil class of the site. Based on the PGA of 0.241 g and shear wave velocity of 1369 ft/sec at C S, the site soil class is A-Intermediate. Work the site soil class with Ref. [4], Table 3-2 to determine the mean vertical vs. horizontal GMRS ratios (V/H) at each spectral frequency. Multiply the V/H ratio at each frequency between 15Hz and 40Hz by the corresponding horizontal GMRS acceleration at each frequency to calculate the vertical GMRS. Table 6.2 of Ref. [77] calculates the vertical GMRS (equal to (V/H) x horizontal GMRS).

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confinnation Page 35 o f 49 Detennine the peak acceleration of the vertical GMRS (SAVGMRs) between frequencies of JSHz and 40Hz:

V/H Ratio at ISI-Iz (See Table 6.2 of Ref. [77]): VH=0.67 Horizontal GMRS at Frequency of Peak Vertical GMRS (at I SHz) (See Table 6.2 of Ref. [77]): HGMRS = 0.463g Peak Acceleration of Vertical GMRS between 15 Hz and 40 Hz: SA v GMRS = VH

• HGMRS =

0.67*0.463=0.3 IOg (at 15 Hz)

Work the distance between the component floor and foundation with Ref. [4], Fig. 4-4 to calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor:

Distance Between Component Floor and Foundation Elevation: hcomp = ELcomp - ELround = 0 ft DG-LMS-DGJ 630SDL hcomp = ELcomp - ELround = 72 ft EE-REL-JFA 86 Calculate the vertical in-structure amplification factor based on the distance between the plant foundation elevation and the subject floor elevation:

2.7- 1.0 Slope of Amplification Factor Line: mv = lOOft- Of t.

= 0.017 2:..

ft Intercept of Amplification Factor Line with Amplification Factor Axis: bv = 1.0 Vertical In-Structure Amplification Factor: AFsv(hcomp) = mv

• hcomp + bv AFsv(hcomp) = l.O DG-LMS-DGI 630SDL AFsv(hcomp) = 2.224 EE-REL-I FA 86 Per Ref. [4] the vertical in-cabinet amplification factor is 4.7 regardless of cabinet type:

Vertical In-Cabinet Amplification Factor: AFe v =4.7

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 36 of49 Multiply the peak vertical GMRS acceleration by the vertical in-structure and in-cabinet amplification factors to determine the in-cabinet response spectrum demand on the component:

Vertical In-Cabinet Response Spectrum (Ref. [4], p. 4-12, Eq . 4-lb) : ICRSc.v = AFsv

• AFcv

• SAVGMRS ICRSc.v =1.000*4. 7*0.31=1.458g DG-LMS-DGI 630SDL ICRSc v =2.224*4.7*0.3 l=3.243g EE-REL-1 FA 86 A.2 High Frequency Capacity A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic capacity of components DG-LMS-DG 1 630SDL (contained in DG-P L-DGl ECP) and EE-REL-lFA 86 (contained in EE-SWGR-4160F) is presented here.

A.2.1 Seismic Test Capacity The high frequency seismic capacity of a component can be determined from the EPRI High Frequency Testing Program or other broad banded low frequency capacity data such as the Generic Equipment Ruggedness Spectra (GERS) or other qualification reports.

The model for component DG-LMS-DG I 630SDL is a Namco Controls EA 180-32302 relay per Table I. I of Ref. [77) and was not tested as part of the high-frequency testing program. The seismic capacity was calculated in Table 9-1of16C4384-RPT-OOI (72] to be 9.52g per a low frequency qualification test.

The model for component EE-REL- IF A 86 is a General Electric I2HEA6 I relay per Table 1.1 of Ref. [77] and was tested as part of the high-frequency testing program . High Frequency capacity was determined to be 2 l.8g per l6C4384-RPT-001 [72J .

A.2.2 Seismic Capacitv Knockdown Factor Determine the seismic capacity knockdown factor for the subject relay based on the type of testing used to determine the seismic capacity of the relay. Using Table 4-2 of Ref. [4], the knockdown factors are chosen as:

Seismic Capacity Knockdown Factor: Fk = 1.2 Lowest Level Without Chatter DG-LMS-DG 1 630SDL Fk = 1. 11 Test Table Capacity EE-REL-1 FA 86 A.2.3 Seismic Te ting Single-Axis Correction Factor Determine the seismic testing single-axis correction factor of the subject relay, which is based on whether the equipment housing to which the relay is mounted has well-separated horizontal and

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev . 0 SA 50.54(t) NTIF 2. l Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 37 of4 9 vertical motion or not. Per Ref. [4], pp. 4-17 to 4-18, relays mounted within cabinets that are braced, bolted together in a row, mounted to both floor and wall, etc. will have a correction factor of 1.00. Relays mounted within cabinets that are bolted only to the floor or otherwise not well-braced will have a correction factor of 1.2. per Ref. [4 ], pp. 4-18.

Single-Axis Correction Factor (Ref. [4], pp. 4-17 to 4-18 and Table 6.4 of Ref. [77]): FMS = 1.2 DG-LMS-DGJ 630SDL FMs = LO EE-REL-JFA 86 A.2.4 Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration Calculate the effective wide-band component capacity acceleration per Ref. [4], Eq . 4-5 :

Effective Wide-Band Component Capacity Acceleration (Ref. [4], Eq. 4-5):

TRS = 9.52g DG-LMS-DGJ 630SDL TRS = l9.64g EE-REL- JFA 86 A.2.5 Component Margin Calculate the high-frequency seismic margin for relays per Ref. [4J, Eq. 4-6:

(A sample calculation for the high-frequency seismic demand ofrelay components DG-LMS-DG I 630SDL and EE-REL- I FA 86 is presented here. A table that calculates the high-frequency seismic margin for all of the subject relays listed in Table 6.4 of Ref. [77] .)

Horizontal Seismic Margin TRS 3.81 > 1.0, OK DG-LMS-DGJ 630SDL (Ref. [4], Eq . 4-6): ICRSc. h = 2.8 l> 1.0, OK EE-REL-JFA 86 Vertical Seismic Margin TRS 6.53> 1.0, OK DG-LMS-DG 1 630SDL (Ref. [4], Eq. 4-6): ICRSc. v = 6.06> 1.0, OK EE-REL-JFA 86

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rov 0 50.54(1) NTTF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 38 of 49 B. COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED FOR HIGH FREQUENCY CONFIRMA TIO'.'J Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Co mponent l!:ndosurc Floor Co mponen l i:Y*lu.ation No. *=

Device ID Type System Manuracturer Model ID *rn.*

BuiJdlnc Elev.

(0)

Basil for Evaluation Function C*p ecity Result rrocess Turhine Exhaust High LRP*PNl.r25* Control Operntor I I RCIC-PS*72A Barksdale D2H-Al50SS Rll 881 GERS Swttch Pressure 58 Cab met Action Process Turhme Exhaust High LRP-PNL-25* Control Operator 2 1 RCIC-PS-728 Barksdale D2H-A I SOSS RB 881 GERS Switch Pressure 58 Cabinet Ac11on Process 5N6-BBJ-U8- LRP-PNL Control Vendor J 1 RCIC* PS

• 87A Reactor l>rcssurc Stauc-0-Rins Rll 88 1 Cap > Dem Swirch C l A-TTNQ 58 Cabmel Report Process 5N6*BB3-U8- LRP-PNL-25* Control Vendor 4 I RCIC*PS-878 Reactor Pressure Staltc-0-Rmg RB 881 Cap > Dein Switch CI A-ITNQ 58 Cabinet Report Plocess SN6-BBJ - U8- LRP-PNL Control Vendor 5 1 RCIC*l'S*87C Reactor PrCllisure Stahc-0-Rmg Rll 881 Cap > Dem SW11Ch CIA-TI'NQ 58 Cabmet Report Process 5N6-BB3- U8- LRP-PNL *25- Control Vendor 6 1 RCIC-PS-8ID Reactor Pressure S1111c-O-R..in~ RH 881 Cap '> Dem Switch C IA-ITNQ 58 Cabinet Report Cocurol S1cam Lme Space Excess LRP-PNL Control 7 I RCIC-REL* K IO Geru:~r-o1.I Ekctnc 12HGAllA52F CB 903 GERS Cap .,. Ucm Relay Temperature JO Cabinet Control Stmun Linc Space Excess LRP*rNL*9* Control 8 I RrIC'-REl.-Kl I General Electric I 2J-IGA 11 AS2F CB 903 GERS Cap > Dem Relay Temperature 10 Cabinet Control Steam Lrnc High 700*RTC - LRP*P L Control SQURTS 9 I RCIC-REL-K12 Relay D1fTeren11al Pressure Allen Brad ley ll l lOU I 30 Cabinet rn 901 Report Cap > Dern Coolrol I.RP-Pi 1...-q- Con1rol 10 I RCIC-REL-KlJ Reactor Pressure Gt.-ncral Electric 1'.?llGA llAS2f 30 Cabinet CB 903 GERS \ap > Oem Relay Control RCJC Auto bolatmn LRP*PNL Control II I RCIC* REL-Kl S Relay Signal General Electric 12HFASIA42 F 30 Cabinet cu 901 GERS C1p > Oem Control Turbme Exhaust H1gt'I LRP-PNL*9- Con1rol 12 I RCJC *REL-K6 General Electric I 2HGA 11l\52F CB 901 GERS Cap > Dem Relay Pressure 30 Cab met National Control Pump Suction Low LRJ*-l"NL Cont rot f'NS 13 I RCIC-REl , K7 T~tinical  :-<TS-812 CB 903 Cap > Dem Relay Pressure JO Cabinet Repon sv~tems Control LRP*PNL Coot ro l 14 I RCIC* REL-K8 furb1nc Tnp General Electnc IZICFASIA42f Cl\ 90] GERS Cap '> Oem Relay 30 Cabinet

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev 0 50.54(1) NTIF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 39 of 49 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclosure fi'lOGr Compont!nt Evalualion No. *;; Bui.ldine, Elev.

> S)'l'l trm Basi1 for Evaluation Device ID Type Man"racturer Model ID TYJI* (ft)

Fu*ction Capacity Rt1 u.lt lj Con1rot St~m I.me Space Excess LRJ>-PNL*9- Concr"OI I RCIC*REL* KJO Generul Ele4:mc 1.lHGA 11A~2F CB 903 GERS Cap > Dem Relay Temper.uure 33 Cuburnt Con trol Steam Lme Space Excess LRP*PNl. Control 90'.\

16 I RCIC-REL-KJ l General Eloct n c 12HGAl 1.'\l2F CB GERS Cap>Dcm Relay Temperature 3l Cabinet Contro! Steam I.inc H1ch 700-RTC- LRP-PNL, Control SQURTS 17 I KCIC-1<.1'.L-KJ2 Allen Bradley CB 903 Cap >Dem Relay DttTerential Pressure llllOUI JJ Cabinet Report Control RCIC Auto lsolatioo LRP-PNL Control EPRI Hf 18 1 KCIC*KEL- KJ3 General Elccmc 12HFA1lli\2F CB 903 Cap > Dem Relay Signal J3 Cn bmet Test Process Steam Line Space Exc~s R1g1d Skid CNS 19 I RCIC-TS-nA Patel I Fenwnl 01-170230-090 N/A (Loca l) Rll 860 Crtp > Dem Swi tch Temperature Mounted Repor1 Proct!Ss Stc:sm Line Space E."'tcess Rigtd Skid CNS 20 l RClC-TS-79ll Switch Temperature Pa1el I Fenwal 0 1-170230-090 NIA (Local)

Mounted RB 860 Report Cap>Dcm Process Slcam Line Space Excess R1g1d Skid CNS 21 I RCIC-TS -79C Patel I Fcnwal 01 -170230-090 N/A(loca l) RB 881 Cap > Dem Swuch Temperature. Mounted Rt.11ort Process Steam Lme Sp3ce Excess K1g1d Skid OIS 22 I RCIC-TS-790 Patel I Fenwal 01-1 70230-0QO NIA (Local) RB 881 Cap > Dern 5W1tch Temperature Mounted Report Process Steam Line Space E'<ccss R1g1d Skid CNS Z3 I RC!C -TS-80A Patel I Fenwal 0 I -I 70230--090 NIA (Loca l) RB 860 Cap>Dem SW1tch Temperature Mounkd Roport 24 I RC!C-TS -8011 Process Steam Line Sp.:u:e Excess Patel I Fenwal 01-170:?]0-()0() ~IA  ! Local)

R191d kid RB 860 CNS Cnp > Dcm Switch Temperature Moun1ed Report Process S t~m Une S pare Excess R1g1d Skid CNS 25 I RCIC-TS-80C Pau~ I / FemYal 01 -170230...@0 NfA (Lcca l) RB 881 Cap > Dem SWTtcli Temperature Mounted Report Process StCllm Line Space E'<ccss Ri~Kl Skid CNS 26 I RCIC -TS -800 Patel I Fenwal UI - 170230-090 NI A (L-Ocal) RB 881 Cap'> Dem SW1lCh Temperature Mounl<Xi Report Process Stcu in Line Space Excess R1g1d Skid CNS 27 I RCIC-TS- 81 A Pntol / Fenwal 01-170210*090 NIA (Loca l) RD 860 Cap> Dem Switch Temperature Mounted Report Process Stea m Line Space Excess R1gtd Skid CNS 28 I RCIC-TS-810 Switch Temperatu re Pa cel *' Fenwal 0 1-170230-090 N/A (L-Ocal)

).ioonled RB 860 Report Cap> Dem Proc-ess Steam Line Space Excess R1g1d Sl..1d CNS 29 I RCIC-TS-8IC l'aiel I fenwal 01 *1 702J0-090 'll A (Loca l) RB 881 Cap '> Oem Switch Temperature Mounted Rl.-port

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev 0 50.54(!) NTIF 2. 1 Seismic lligh f requency Confirmation Pa~e 40 of49 Table B-1 : Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component Enclo.ture Floor Component Ellalua1lon No. *= Sys rem Building Elev. Bas is ror E*aluation

"' D~i<e ID Type Fu onion M*our*cturer Modd ID Type (0) Capa('ity ReJult ProcesJ Steam Une Space Excess R1g1d Skid CNS JO I RCIC-TS-810 Patel I Fcnwal 0 1- 170230-090 NIA (Local) RB 881 C1tp > r>cm Swnch Tempera1urc Mounted Report Process Steam U ne Sp3ce Excess R1g1d Skid CNS JI I RCIC-TS*82A ~tel I Fenwal 01

• 170230-090 N/ A(Loca l) RB RM Cap > Dem SW\!Ch Temperature Muunlud Report Process Stctm Line Space Excess R1g1d Skid CNS 32 I RCIC-TS-828 Patel I Fcm\111 01 - 1;o230-090 NIA (l.ocal) RB 860 Cap > Dem Swuch Temperawre Mounted Report 33 I RCfC-TS-82C Process Sleu.m Line Spece Excess Patel I Fenwal 01 - 170:?30*090 N/A(Local)

Rigid Skrd Rli 881 CNS Cap > Dem Swttch Temperature Mounted Report Process Steiim Line Space Excess Rigid Skid CNS 34 I RCIC

• TS*82D Pote! I Fenwal 01-170230-090 NIA (Loca l) RU S81 Cap > Dem Switch Temperature Mounted Report DG-LMS-DGI l'roc<!"S DG-PNL- Control CNS JS I Engin~ Overspaxl Na mco Con trols E,\ 180-32302 OGI 903 Cap > Dem 630SDL SW1 tch DGI ECP Cabinet Report DG-l .MS-DG1 Process DG-PNL- Control CNS 36 I Engine Overspued Namco Controls EA 18t>-Jll02 Q(jJ 90) Cap > Dem 630SDR Switcn DGI ECP Ca binet Report Control Potter & DG-PNL- Control CNS 37 I DG-R EL-DG I 140S Engine Overspeed KRPl4DG-125 DGI 903 C11p > Dcm Relay Brumfield DGI ECP Co.bmct Report DG-REL-DGI Control Potter&. DG-PNL- Control CNS 38 I Engine Rumung KRPI 4DG-125 DGI 903 Cap > Dem l4RX3 Relay Brumfield OGI ECP Cabuu.-t Repon DG-REL*DGI Control 700.RTC- DG-PNL- Control SQURfS 39 I Enij:ine Running Allen B rad~y DG I 903 Cap > Dem 14RYI Relay 11020UI DGI ECP Cabmcl Report Protective Generator Abnormal DG-PN L- Control CNS 40 I 00-REl.-DG I 27-59 Gen~ro l Electric 121AV7JAIA DGI 903 \ap > Dem Kclay Voltai,::o OGT EC'P Cnhrnct Report Protective UG-PNL- Control CNS 41 I DG-REL* DGI 40 Generator Field Failure General electnc 12CEHSIAIA DGI 903 Cap > Oem Relay OGl ECP Cobmet Repon DG*REL-DGI Control E11gmc (ncomplctc Sturt Potter& DG*P NL- Control CNS 42 I KRP I 4DG-1 25 DGI 903 Cap > Dem 481SEX Rclny Sequence Brumfield DGI ECP Ciibuu..-t Report DG-REL-DG I Control Potter& oc~PNL- Cont rol C: Dem 4E.'lllX Relay Brumlidd DG I EC!' Cabinet R..:pon DG-REL*DGI Control Potter& DG-PNL* Control CNS 44 I Fmcrgency Eng111e S1J11t KRPl4DG- 125 DG I 903 Cap ~ Dem 4EMX3 Relay Brumfield DGI ECI' Cab1m..'t Report

I 6C4384-RPT-005 Rev 0 50.54(t) NTH ' 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Pa e 41 of 49 Table B-1 : Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No. .;;>

Device lD Type Component System M1nufactun:r Model ID

[nclosure Ty pe Bui ldine, Ji'foor f.lev.

(rt)

Component Evalu1'tion Basis for Evaluation Funci ion Capacity Rtsull Prote<..11ve DG*PNL- Comrol Vendor 45 I DG-REl.-DGI SI i\ Phase Overcurrent General Electric IFCVSIAD DG I 903 Cap> D<rn Relay DGI ECP Cab1nel Report Pmlecll ve OG-PNL- Con1rol Vendor 46 I DG-RF.l.* DG I SI B Phase Overcurrem General Electr ic !FCVlli\D DGI 903 Cap> Dem Kcl.ay DGI ErP Cabinet Report Protective DG* PN L- Conlrol Vendor 47 I DG-REL-DGI 51 C Phase Overcurrent General Efectnc IFCV51AO OG I 903 Cap > Dem Relay OG I ECP Cab1m.."t Repo1t DG-REL*DG I Control Engine CranlC1ng L1m1 t Agastat Relay DG -PNL- Control EPlllHF 48 ( E70 I 2PDOODem 62Cl.X Relay Timer Co DG I EC P Cab1nd Test OG-REL- OGI Con trol Engine 0'¥erspeed Potter&. DG-PNL- Control CNS 49 ( KRP MOG-12l OG I 903 Cap > Dem 63 0SDX Rela.y SAutdown Brumfield DGl ECP Cabinet Repon Protective OCr PNI.- Conlrot SQURTS M111g:iuon so I OG- REL-DG I 67 Relay D.recuon.al Overcurrenf Genera l Electric ICW-l ! A DG I EC P Cabmet DG I 'IOJ Report Stra lCJ?1es Control OG-PNL* Control EPRI HF 51 I DG*REL*D GI 86 Diesel Generator Lockout General Electric 12HEA6 1 DGI 903 Cap>Dem Relay OG I ECP Cabinet Test Protective DG*PNL* Cooltol CNS M 1ug:uion l2 I DG*REL-DGI 87 A Generator D ifferential General Electric Cf0-128 DGI 903 Relay DGI EC P Cabinet Report S1ratcc1es Protecttvc OG-PNL* Con uol CNS Mmg11uon l3 I DG* R.EL-DGI 87 B Generator D1fferent1al General Elcctnc CF0- 121! DGI 901 Relay DGI ECI' Cabinet Report Stnuegtcs Protective DG-PNL- Control CNS M1t1g11.1ioo 54 ( OG-RE L-OGI 87 C Generator D1ffcrcnt1al Genera l Electric CFD*l2B DGI 903 Relay DGI EC P Cabinet Report Stratcgu:s Control Agaslat Relay DG-PNL* Control ll I DG-REL-DGI RI 04 Engine Speed EGPR004 DGI 903 GERS Cap> Dem Relay Co DG I EC P Cabinet Process DG-PNL- Cont rol CNS 56 I DG- KT-Jl42 Engme Tachometer Dynalco Corp SST*2400AN*l40 DGI 903 Cap> Dem Switch DGI ECP Cabinet Rcpon 57 I DG-LMS-OG2 Process Fngme Overspeed Nam co Controls EA ! 80-J2J02 DG-P:-.IL- Con1rol DG2 903 CNS Cnp> Dem 630SOL Swi tch DG2 ECP Cabin el Report OG-LMS- DG2 Process DG* PNL- Control CNS l8 l Engme Overspet.><l Na m"-o Controls EA I 80-3 I 302 DG2 903 Cap>Ocm 630S OR SWltch DG2 ECP Cabinet Kcpon Control Potter& DG-PNL- Control C:'>S l9 I DG-R EL-OG2 1405 Engine Ov~spc..-ctl KRP141JG-125 DG2 903 C1p>Oem Relay Orumfield DG2f'C'P Cabinet Report

I 6C4384-RPT-005 Rev 0 SA 50.54(t) T ff 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 42 of49 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Co nfirmation Compoaent E nclosure Floor Compooen1 Evaluation No. *;; Building [lev. [ valuation

> System Buis ror Device ID Type l\tanurachlrer Model ID Type (fl)

Function C* pa e:ity R"ult DG-REL-DG2 Control Potter& DG-PNL- Control CNS 60 I Engine Running KRPl4DG-J25 DG2 903 Cap>~

14RX3 Relay Brumfield DG2 ECP Cabinet Report DG-REL-DG2 Control 700-RTC- DC"PNL - Control SQURTS 61 I Engine Runn rng Allen Bradley DG2 903 Cap > Dcm 14RYI Relay I 1020UI DG2 EC P Cabinet Report Protective Generator Abnom\a I DG-PNL- Control CNS 62 I DG-REL-DG2 27-59 Genera l Elect ric 121AV7JAI A DGZ 903 Cap> Dem Relay Volta cc DGZ ECP Cab met Report Pn:Mthve DG-PNL- Control CNS 63 I DG-REL-DGZ 40 Generator Field Failure Guiera l Electnc 12Cf-H5JAIA DG2 903 Cap > Dem Relay DG2EC~ Cabinet Report DG-REL-DG2 Contra I Engine Jncompk:tc Start Pouer& [>G.PNL- Control CNS 64 I KRPl4DG-1 25 DG2 90J Cap > Dem 481SEX Relay Sequence Brumfield DG2cCP Cab met Report DG-REL-DG2 Control Potter& JJG-rNL- Control CNS 65 I Emergency Fngmc Stan KRl' l4 DG-125 DG2 903 C3p > Dem 4EMX Kclay Brumfi eld DG2 EC I' Cabinet Rcpon DG-REL-DG2 Control Potter & DG-PNL- Control CNS 66 I F.me*cency Engine Suut KRP1 4DG-125 DGZ 903 Ctip > Dem 4EMX3 K.clay Brum field DGZ ECP Caliim:t Repon Protective DG-~NL- Control Vendor 67 I DG-REL-DG2 51 A Phase Overcurrent Genera l Electnc IFCVSIAD DG2 903 Cap > Dem Relay DG2 ECP Cabmel Report Protcchvc DG-P L- Control Vt..-ndor 68 I DG-REL-DG2 5 1 B Phase Ovcrcurrcn t Genera l Electric IFCVSIAD IJ(j2 903 Cap > Dem Relay DG2 ECP Cabinet Report Protective DG-PNL- Control Vendor 69 I DG-REL-DG2 SI C Phase Owrcurrent GenL'Tal Electnc !FCVSJ AD DG2 903 Cap> Dem Relay DG2 ECP Cabmel Report DG-REL-DG2 Control Engmc Crankmg Lcmu DG-PNL- Control EPRI HF 70 I Thomas& Betts E7012PD004 DG2 903 Cap > Oem 62CLX Relay Timer DGZ EC P Cabinet r~1 DG-REL-IJG2 Conuol Rngtne Over.speed Potter & DG-PNL- Control CNS 71 I KRP J41JG- l 25 DG2 901 Cap > Oem 6JOSDX Relay Shutdown Brumfield DG2 ECP Cob met Report Protective DG-PNL- Control SQt;RTS Mitigation 72 I DG-RE L-DG2 67 D1rec1ionnl Ovcr<:urrcnt General Electnc !CW-SIA DG2 903 Relay DG2 EC P Cnbmel Report S1ra1eg1es Conica l Diesel Gi:ocrator Lockout DG-PNL- Control EPR! HF 73 I DG-REL-DGZ 86 Gcntrnl Electnc 12JIEA61 DG2 903 Cap">Dem Relay Relay DG2 ECP C11b1nct T.. 1 Prult.."Cf1ve DG-P L- Control CNS M1t1galton 74 I DG-REL-DG2 87 A Generator D1ffercnt1JI General Electnc CF D-120 DG2 903 Ralay D<.;2 cl'P C11bmet Reporl Slrategies

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev 0 50.54(f) TIF 2. 1 Seismic High frequency Confirmation Page 43 of49 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation No.

.., Component Eodoimrt" Building Floor El~v.

Componenl Enluation

, Sy1fem Basi.1for 1£valuation Device ID Type M ~ nufac h1re r Model ID 'fype (ft)

Function Capn~ily Result 75 I DG-REL-DG2 87 B Pmtcct1ve Generamr Oifferent111.I Gcricral Eleanc CFD- 126 DG-PNL- Contro l DG2 '1()3 css Mitigation Relay DG2 ECP Cahmct Report Strategics Protective OG-PNL- Control CNS M1t1gation 76 I DG-R.EL-DG2 87 C Genera1or D11Tt:tt.'1ll1al Gmeral Eleclnc CFD-128 DG2 903 Kclay DG2 ECP Cabinet Report Strategies Conlrol Agastat Relay DG-r L- Control 77 I DG-REL-OG2 RIO<I Engine Speed EGPBOO Dem Relay Co D02ECP Cabinet Process DG*PNL- Control CNS 78 I DG-RT-3143 Fn~ine Tachom~er Oynalco Corp SST-2400AN-140 llG2 903 C3p ':> Dcm Swuch DG2 ECP Cabmet Report C&D Control 79 Prott.'Chve EE-CHG-125 CNS I KJ Overvoli.age Shutdo\.Yfl Technolog1es ARRIJOICOOF Cabmct CB ')()] Cap > Dcm Relay IA Kcport Inc C&D Control Protective EE-CH0-125 CNS 80 I KJ R~lay Ovcrvoltagc Shutdown rechnolog1es ARRIJOK200F Cabmet CR 'I03 Cap > Dem IB Rep on In<:

C&D Conlrol Protocttve EE-CHG-250 CNS 81 I KJ Relay O"ervoltage Shutdown Technolocies ARR260K100F Cabmcl CB Q03 Cap > Dem IA Report Inc C&D Conlrol Proloct1ve EE-CHG-250 CNS 82 I KJ Rehay Overvoltage Shutdown Technologies ARR260K200F Cabinet CB 903 Cap>Dcm IB Report r..

EE-CB-4 I 60DGI MV Circuit AMH-4 76°250- EE-SWGR- Not MH1ga11on 83 I DG Output Lockout General Elcctnc Sw1tchr,ear DGI 903 EGI Rre:aker ID 4160DGI Av:11lablc S1rateg1es 84 I EE*CB-4160DG2 MY Ci rcuit AMH-4 76-250- EE-SWOR- Not Mit1gat10t1 DG Output Lockout General Electric Switchgear D02 Q03 E02 Brc:ak.~r ID 4160DG2 Available Strategu:s MY Circuit SW1td1gcar Feeder Ai\ifH-4 76-250- EE-SWOR- Not M1t1gat1on 85 I EE-CB-4 I 60f I FE General Electnc SW1tchgear RB 93::?

Bre.lker Lockout ID 4160F Available Strategies MVCircu1t Station Service AMH-4 76-250- EE-SWGR- Not M1t1gallon 86 I EE-CB-4 I 60F SS IF General Electric Switchgear RB 932 Breaker Transfonner Lockout ID 4160F Available Strc1tt:g1cs EE-C B-41 6-0P MY Circuit Service Water Pump 5GEHU-Jl0* EE-SW GR- CNS 87 I S1emt:ns SwitchKt:ar RB QJ2 Cap > Dem SWPIA Brcu.kBr Lockout 1200-78 41 60F Report EE-CB-4160F MVCircutl Service Wa ter Pump lGEHU-350- EE-SWGR- CNS 88 1 S1en11..-ns Switchgear RB 932 Cap > Dem SWl1 IC Breoker Lockout 1200-78 4160F Repon Protective EE-SWGR* M111gat1on 89 I EE-REL-IPA 5 I A Phase Overcurrent General l!IC1..-1:nc 121AC5J A Switchgear KB 932 <11-: RS Rtlay 4160F Strategies

l6C4384-RPT-005 Rev 0 50.54(f) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Pa~e 44 of 49 Table B-1: Components Identified for High l<'requcncy Confirmation No.

> Device ID Type Compo n~nt System Function Mao11facturer Model ID Endo1un T yl"'

BuiJdinc Floor Elev.

(rr)

Component Enlualitm Batis fo r Capacity Evaluation Re1ult Pru1cct1ve EE-S W GR- Mi11gat1un 90 I EE-Kl!L-1 t"A 5 1 H Phase Overcunent Genera I Elcctnc t2J AC 53A Switchgelr RD 932 GERS Relay 4160F Strategies P1otcct1ve EE-SWGR- Mitigation 91 I EE-REL- I FA 51 C Phase Overcurrcnt Gcm.-rml Electric 121AC53A Switch~ear JUI 932 GERS Reloy 4160F Str3.teg1es Control EE-SWGR- EPRJ HF 92 I EE-REL- IF A 86 Normal Feed Lockout Gencrsl EJectn..; 12HEA61 Sw11chg;ear RB 932 Cap > Dem Relay 4160P TC$!

EE-REL- I FE 50-51 Prot<..-ct1ve EE-SWGR- SQURTS Mitignt1on 93 I Phase Overcurrenl Gencrul Elccmc 121AC5313812A Switctlgmr RB 932 A Relay 4160F Report Strategics EE-REL-JFE 50-51 Proteci ive EE-SWGR - SQURTS Mitigation 94 I Phase Overcurrent Gcnernl Elc.:;111c l 21AC53 BSI 2A Sw11chgi:ar RB 9 32 B Relay 41 60f Report Stro.te~1cs EE-REL- I FE 50-5 1 Protective EE-SWGR- SQURTS Mill!llU1 on 95 I Phase Overcurren1 Generul Electric 12IAC5Jll812A Swttchucar RB 932 c Relay 4160F Report Slrategu:::s Control EE*SWGR- b~Rl HP 96 I EE-REL-I FE 86 Bus Lockout General Eleclnc 12HEAb l SW1tchgear RB 932 Cap > Dem Relay 4 160f Test Protective EE-SWGR - M1tig.allon 97 I EE-REL- IFS 51 A Phase Overcurrent Genera l Eleclnc 12 fAC5JA Swllchgt:ar RJ3 932 GERS l\elay 41 60f S1ru1eg1t:s Protective EE-S WGR- M1t1gaoon 98 I EE-REL- IFS 51 B Phase Overcurrcnl General Electm: 121AC53A Switchgear RD 932 GERS Relay 41 60F StniH.-gies Protcclrve EE-SWGR- Mihgallun 99 I EE-REL- IFS 51 C Phase Overcurrent G4...-nera l Electric 121AC53A Switchgear RB 932 GCKS Relay 41 60f Strategies Conlrol Emergency Starrup EE-SWGR- EPRJ HF JOO I EE-REL-I FS 86 General El~tnc 12Hl.:A61 Switchgear RB 932 Co.p > Dem Relay Transfom1er Feed Lockout 4160f Test EE-REL-SSIF 50-51 ProtL"Ctive EE-SWGR- Mit1g1111on JOI I Phase Overcurrcnt Genera l Electric 121AC53 Sw11chgcar RB 932 GERS A Relay 4160F Strategies EE-REL-SS I F 50-51 1>rotcct1vc EE-SW GR- Mi1iga11on 102 I Phase Overcmn:nt General Eloctric 1211\(53 Switchgeor RJ3 932 GERS c Relay 4160f Sm.1tcg1cs EE-REL-SWP I A 50- Protecltve EE-SWGR-9)2 EPRl HF M1tigat 1on 103 I Phase Ove1<.*1ment Genera l Electnc 121AC66 Swi tchgear RB 50-l l A Relay 4160F Test Strutcg1es EE-REL-SWPI A 50- Protecuvc EE-SWGR- EPRJ HF M1t1gat1on 104 I Phase Overcurrent General Electnc 121AC66 4160F Swnchgear RB 932 Stmtcg1es 50-51 c Relay Test

16C4384- RPT-005 Rev 0 SA 50.54(f) NTTF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confi nn ation Page 45 of 49 Table B-1: Co mponents Identified fo r High Frequency Confirmation Cumpunen t EnclO!"ure lli'loor Co mponent [ va lua tion No. *= Sys tem Bu ildina: Elev. Basis for Evalu a tion

"' Device ID Type Fun ction Man ufa c l\l r er M odel ID T ype (fr) Capacity Retulf Control Service Water L'ump EE-SWGR- EPRJ HF 105 EE. REL-SWPI/\ 86 General Elecmc lZllEA61 Switchgear Ril 932 Cap > Dem Relay L<>ckoul 4160F Test EE-REL-SWP IC 50- Protec1ive EE-SWGR- EPRJ HF Mitigation 106 Ph~e OvcrcUrTen t General Elecrnc 121AC66 Switchgear Ril 932 50-51 A Rday 4160F Test S1ra1cg1cs EE-REL-SWP IC 50- Protc:ctivc EErSWG R- EPRJ Hf "41t1gation 107 Pha.c;c Ovcrcurrent General Hcclnc 121AC6'i Switchgear RB 932 50-51 c Relay 4160f Test Strategies Control Service W!Her Pump EE-SW GR- EPRI HF 108 EE-REl,SWPI C 86 General Electric 12HEA61 SW'!tchgcar Ril 932 Cap > Dem Re1ay Lockout 4160F Test MVCircuit Switchgear Feeder AMH-4 76-250- EE -SW GR- Not Mitiga1ion 109 F.F-CR-4 160G IGE Genera l Electric Sw11chgcar RH 932 Breaker Lockout ID 41 60G Available Strategies MV Ci rcuit talion Service l\)..tfl-4 76 -250- EE-SWGR- N9t M1t 1 ~at1on 110 EE-CB -4 I 60G SS 1G General Eleclric Swt tchgea.r RJl 932 Brea ker T ro nsfonner Lockout 1D 4160G Ava ilable Strategies EE-CB-4 I 60G P...fV C1rcu1t Sta tion Service Water AMH*4 76-250* EE-SWGR- Nol Mitigation Ill General Electric Sw1tctigear RH 932 SWPlB Oreaker Pump Lockout ID 4 1MG Av111 lablc Strategics EE-CA-4 I 60G MVCirc:uit Sl.llt ion Service Water 5G EllU-J50- EE-SWGR- CNS 112 Siemens Swiichgear Rll 932 Cap > Dcm SWPI D Break.er Pump Lockoul 1200-78 4160G Report Protective F.E-SWGR- Mit1gat1on Il l EE-REL-I GB 5 1 /\

Relay Phase Overcurre11f General Electric 121AC5JA 4160G SW1tchgear RB 932 GERS Stralcgirs Protechve EE-SWGR- M il lK'!llOO 11 4 EE-REL- I GB 5 1 B Phase Oven::urrent General Elecmc 12JAC 5JA Swttchgear RB 932 GE!lS Relay 4160G Strategies Proteclive EE-S W GR- Miugauon tt5 EE-REL- I GB S 1 C' Phase Overcurrnnl G1.!ncral Elccmc 12IACS3A Swttchgc.3.r 932 liERS Relay 4 160G

"'" Strategies Control EE-SWGR- EPRJ lfF 116 EE-REL- I GB 86 ~formal 1:eed Lockout General Elec t ri~ 12HEA61 Swttctlgear RB 932 Cap > Dem Relay 1160G Test EE- REL- I GE 50-51 P1oleet.1ve EE-SW GR- SQURTS Mitigation 117 Phase Overcunent Genera l Flectnc I 21AC53 B8 12A Switchgear RB 932 A Relay 4160G Report Strategies EE-REL- I GE 50-5 I Procective EE-SWGR- SQURTS Mitigati on 118 Phase Overcu 1reo1 Genera l Electn\; t21/\C53 B81 2/\ Switdigear Ril 932 B Relay 4 160G Report S lr:iteg1cs EE-REL* I GE 50-51 Protective EE-S W GR- SQURTS M1t1gatton 119 l'hasc Overcuncnt General Electric 121AC53B8 12A Sw.tchgear RB 932 c Kclay 4160G Report Strareg1cs

SA 16C4384-RPT-005 Rev 0 50.54(!) NTTF 2. 1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 46 of49 Table 8-1 : Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Cumpunenf Encfo.m re Floer Component Evaluation No. *;; Buildin& i:lev.

Systnn Basis for [valuation

"' Devier. ID Type Function M*n11f11chtrer Model ID Type (R) Capaciry Ra uIt Control EE-SWGR* EPRJ HF 120 I EE-RE!,.\ GE 86 Bus Lockoul General Electric 12HEi\6\ SW'llchgcar RB 932 Cap > Dem Relay 4160G Test Protccuve EE-SWGR* Mrtigauon 121 I EE-REL- \ GS II A Relay Phase Ovcrcurrcn t Generitl Eleclric 12TAC5JA sw;1chgear RB 932 GERS 4160G Stm1eg1cs Protecti ve EE-SWG R- Mi11gat1on 122 I EE-REL-I GS II B Phase Ove<<:urrenl Gcncr::al Elcctnc 121AC5JA Switchgear RB 932 GERS Relay 4\60G Strategics Protechve EE-SW GR- M1t1galloo 123 I EE-REL* I GS ~IC Pho.sc Overcurn:nl Gcncrnl Electnc 121AC5JA Sw1tctlgc.1r RB 932 Gt RS Relay 4160G Stratqt1es Control Emergency Startup EE-SWGR- EPRJ HF 124 I EE-REL- \ GS 86 General Electric 12HEA61 Switchgear RB 932 Cap > Dem Relay Transfom1er Feed Lockout 4160G Test F.F.-REL-SS I G S0-51 l'rotcct1vc EE-SWGR- SQURTS Mitigation 125 I Phase Overcurrent Genera l Electnc 12\AC5JB SWltchgear RB 932 A Relay 4160G Rep on S1rateg1es EE-REi,.SSIG 50-51 Protective EE -SWGR- SQUR TS M1trgallon 126 I Phase Ovcrcum:nt General F.leclric 121AC53B Switchgear RB 932 c Relay 4160G Rep on Suategics EE-RE!,.SWPI B 50- Protective EE-SWGR* EPRJ HF M1t1ga1 1on 127 I Phe~c Overcurrent General Elt:"Ctnc 12\AC66K Switchgear RB 932 50-ST A Relay 4\60G Tcs1 Stralcgtcs EE-REJ..SWPIB 50- Protective EE-SWGR - EPRJ TIF M1uga1100.

128 I Pha.~e Overcurrcr11 Gtmera l Electric 12TAC66K Swi1chgeor RB 932 50-51 c Relay 4160G Tt:St Strategies Control Service Water Pump EE-SW GR- EPRJ HF 129 I EE-REl-SWPIR R6 Genera l Electnc 12HEA6\ Switch~ear RB 932 Cap > Dcm Re by Lockout 4 \ 60G Tes!

EE*REL-SWI'\ 0 SO* Pro1ect1vc EE-SWGR* EPRT HF Mitigation 130 I Phase Overcuuent General Electnc 121AC66 K Swnchgear RB 932 SO-SI A Relay 4160G Test Strategies EE-REi,.SWPID 50- Protective EE-SWGR- EPRI HF Mit l~t1on

\JI I Phase Ovcrcurrent General Electric 121AC66K Swttchgcar RB 932 S0-51 C Relay 4 \ 60G Test Strategics Control Service Water Pump EE*SWGR- EPRI HP 132 I EE-REL-SWPI 0 86 Genera.I Electric 12HEA6\ Switchgear RB 932 Cap > Oem Relay Lockout 4160G Test EE-CB-480F MCC- LV Circuit EE-SWGR- CNS 113 I MCC Feeder Lockout Wes11nghouse DB-50 Swuchgear Rli 932 Cap > Dttm K Breaker 480F Letter EE-CB-480F "1CC- LV Ci1cu1t EE-SW GR- CNS

\]4 I MCC t'ccdcr Lockout Westinghouse DB-50 Switchsear Rll 932 Cap > Oem LX Breaker 480F Letter

I 6C4384-RPT-005 Rev 0 50.54(t) NTIF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 47 of49 Table B-1: Components Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Component End Mure llloor Compueo* Evalaatioo No. *;; Build Inc Elev.

, S19tem Buiafor J

nluaOO.

Device ID Typo Maauf*cturer Model ID Typo (n )

Fuadioo Cap*citr Result EF.-C'B-4800 MCC* LY Circuit EE-SWGR- CNS 135 I MCC' Feed er Lockout Wcslmghouse DB-SO Swi tchgeot RB 932 Cup > Dem s Breaker 480G Letter EE-CB-4800 MCC

• LY Circuit EE-SWOR- CNS 136 I MCC Feeder Lockout Westinghouse DB-50 SW1tchgear RB 932 Cap > Dem TX ll<eakef 4800 Letter

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(f) N!TF 2. I Seismic High Frequency Contirmat1on Page 48 of 49 Table B-2: Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Valve ID P&ID Comment I lead Vent (called 738A V976P on the P&ID) is normally MS-AOV-738AV 2028 [79) closed at power and deactivated by manual valve PC-V-563 (no need to evaluate).

Head Vent (called 739AV976P on the P&ID) is normally MS-AOV-739A V 2028 [79) closed at power and deactivated by manual valve PC-V-561 (no need to evaluate).

MS-AO-A080A 2041 [33)

MS-/\0-A086J\ 2041 [33)

MS-AO-A0808 2041 (33)

MS-J\O-J\0868 2041 [33]

MS-AO-A080C 2041 (33)

MS-/\O-J\086C 2041 (331 MS-AO-A080D 2041 (33)

MS-A0-/\0860 2041 [331 llPCl-MOV-15 204 l (33]

HPCl-MOV-16 2041 [33J MS-MOV-M074 2041 [33]

MS Drain; Normally open drain line would only be a leak MS-MOV-M077 2041 [33]

path if MS-MOV-M074 does not close MS-RV-71ARV 2028 [79]

MS-RV-71BRV 2028 [79)

MS-RV-71CRV 2028 [79)

MS-RV-71DRV 2028 (79)

MS-RV-7LERV 2028 [79]

MS-RV-71FRV 2028 [791 MS-RV-71GRV 2028 [79)

MS-RV-71HRV 2028 [79)

RCIC-CV-26 2043 (35) Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

RF-CV-16 2043 f35l Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

RF-CV-15 2043 [35] Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

RHR-MOV-M017 2040 Sh. I [80] RHR Isolation RHR-MOV-M018 2040 Sh. l (80) RHR Isolation RHR-CV-27 2040 Sh. 2 [81] Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

Leak path blocked by upstream check valve RHR-CV-27 RHR-MOV

• M025B 2040 Sh. 2 [81]

(no need to evaluate).

RHR-CV-26 2040 Sh. l (80] Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

Leak path blocked by upstream check valve RHR-CV-26 RHR-MOV-M025A 2040 Sh. I [80)

(no need to evaluate).

RWC U-MOV-MOl5 2042 Sh. I [821 R WCU Isolation RWCU-MOV-MOL8 2042 Sh. I [821 R WCU Isolation CRD-SOV-SO 120 2039 l83 J Control Rod Manual Positioning CRD-SOV-S012l 2039 [83] Control Rod Manual Positioning

16C4384-RPT-005 Rev. 0 SA 50.54(t) NTTF 2.1 Seismic High Frequency Confirmation Page 49 of49 Table B-2! Reactor Coolant Leak Path Valves Identified for High Frequency Confirmation Valve ID P&ID Comment Normally Open; would only be a leak path ifC RD-SOV-CRD-SO V-SO 122 2039 [83)

SO 121 or CRD-SOV-SO 123 docs not close CRD-SOV-SO l 23 2039 [83) Control Rod Manual Positioning CRD-AOV-CVl26 2039 [83) Control Rod Scram CS-CV-18 2045 Sh. I [84) Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

Leak path blocked by upstream check valve CS-CV-18 (no CS-MOV-MO J2A 2045 Sh . I [84]

need to evaluate).

CS-CV-19 2045 Sh. I [84] Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

Leak path blocked by upstream check valve CS-CV-19 (no CS-MOV-MOl2B 2045 Sh . I [84]

need to evaluate).

SLC-CV-1 3 2045 Sh . 2 (85] Simp le Check Valve (no need to eval uate).

RF-CV- 14 2044 (86) Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

RF-CV-13 2044 [86] Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).

I-IPCl-CV-29 2044 [861 Simple Check Valve (no need to evaluate).