ML15148A263: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 28: Line 28:
Scott Lynch National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Ed Burchfield Keowee Hydro Upgrades Doug Phelps Tornado/High Energy Line Break (HELB)/
Scott Lynch National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Ed Burchfield Keowee Hydro Upgrades Doug Phelps Tornado/High Energy Line Break (HELB)/
Dave Baxter Main Steam Relief Valves (MSIVs)
Dave Baxter Main Steam Relief Valves (MSIVs)
Significant NRC Commitments Terry Patterson Fukushima Dana Jones External Flooding Dave Baxter Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Carrie Dunton Closing Remarks Preston Gillespie / Bill Pitesa 3 For Information Only
Significant NRC Commitments Terry Patterson Fukushima         Dana Jones External Flooding Dave Baxter Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Carrie Dunton Closing Remarks Preston Gillespie / Bill Pitesa 3 For Information Only


Opening Remarks Scott Batson Site Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Station 4 For Information Only
Opening Remarks Scott Batson Site Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Station 4 For Information Only
Line 138: Line 138:


Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 36 For Information Only SSF Trench /
Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 36 For Information Only SSF Trench /
CT-5 Trench Crossover
CT-5 Trench Crossover Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 37 For Information Only Unit 3 BWST Piping/Instrumentation Protection In Progress Photo Completed Photo
 
Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 37 For Information Only Unit 3 BWST Piping/Instrumentation Protection In Progress Photo Completed Photo


Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 38 For Information Only WPR/CDTR Fibrwrap & Steel Siding Installation
Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 38 For Information Only WPR/CDTR Fibrwrap & Steel Siding Installation
Line 238: Line 236:


External Flooding Modifications 1.Relocation of Back
External Flooding Modifications 1.Relocation of Back
-up Power (FANT Line
-up Power (FANT Line) - Completed 2.Discharge Diversion Wall  
) - Completed 2.Discharge Diversion Wall  
- Completed 3.Turbine Building drain isolation  
- Completed 3.Turbine Building drain isolation  
- Completed 4.East slope scour protection  
- Completed 4.East slope scour protection  
- In Progress (complete Jul 2015) 5.Intake dike scour protection  
- In Progress (complete Jul 2015) 5.Intake dike scour protection  
- In Progress (complete Dec 2015)
- In Progress (complete Dec 2015)
Jocassee Dam 65 For Information Only
Jocassee Dam 65 For Information Only


External Flooding Modifications Relocation of Back
External Flooding Modifications Relocation of Back
Line 273: Line 270:
- Mitigation Strategies deployed followed by:
- Mitigation Strategies deployed followed by:
Flooding with peak levels below site grade Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup SSF available to provide back up to plant SSCs Flooding levels above site grade but below top of SSF flood walls Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup until plant SSCs are lost SSF is staffed and available SSF provides feedwater and reactor coolant makeup if normal SSCs lost Flooding levels above SSF flood walls Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup until plant SSCs are lost SSF is staffed and available SSF provides feedwater and reactor coolant makeup when normal SSCs are lost When the SSF is lost, Mitigation Strategies are put into service providing Feedwater and reactor coolant makeup (diesel powered)
Flooding with peak levels below site grade Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup SSF available to provide back up to plant SSCs Flooding levels above site grade but below top of SSF flood walls Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup until plant SSCs are lost SSF is staffed and available SSF provides feedwater and reactor coolant makeup if normal SSCs lost Flooding levels above SSF flood walls Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup until plant SSCs are lost SSF is staffed and available SSF provides feedwater and reactor coolant makeup when normal SSCs are lost When the SSF is lost, Mitigation Strategies are put into service providing Feedwater and reactor coolant makeup (diesel powered)
Instrumentation Spent fuel pool make-up Bounding  level FHRR Level Site Grade Top of SSF Flood Wall Mitigation Strategies External Flooding Response Strategy For Information Only Physical Barriers 73 Regulatory Path Forward Regulatory Path Forward Establish new Jocassee Dam failure licensing basis Based on updated Jocassee FHRR Flooding Analysis New Beyond Design Basis Event to be included in Oconee UFSAR Chapter 2 2011 SE Flooding Levels become the bounding dam failure flood Mitigation Strategies for flooding will address maximum flooding levels from 2011 SE Safety Evaluation for EA 049 to be incorporated in the site licensing basis UFSAR Chapter 3 Flooding modifications and response strategies Jocassee dam failures are considered to be Beyond Design Basis events Site modifications required to support protection and mitigation strategies completed  
Instrumentation Spent fuel pool make-up Bounding  level FHRR Level Site Grade Top of SSF Flood Wall Mitigation Strategies External Flooding Response Strategy For Information Only Physical Barriers 73 Regulatory Path Forward Regulatory Path Forward Establish new Jocassee Dam failure licensing basis Based on updated Jocassee FHRR Flooding Analysis New Beyond Design Basis Event to be included in Oconee UFSAR Chapter 2 2011 SE Flooding Levels become the bounding dam failure flood Mitigation Strategies for flooding will address maximum flooding levels from 2011 SE Safety Evaluation for EA 049 to be incorporated in the site licensing basis UFSAR Chapter 3 Flooding modifications and response strategies Jocassee dam failures are considered to be Beyond Design Basis events Site modifications required to support protection and mitigation strategies completed  
- June 2016 Mitigation strategies as outlined in Final Integrated Plan (for EA 049) completed fall 2016 Ongoing CAL actions to be maintained after the CAL is closed  74 For Information Only
- June 2016 Mitigation strategies as outlined in Final Integrated Plan (for EA 049) completed fall 2016 Ongoing CAL actions to be maintained after the CAL is closed  74 For Information Only


Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Carrie Dunton Director, Site Support 75 For Information Only
Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Carrie Dunton Director, Site Support 75 For Information Only


Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Planned License Amendment Submittals Adoption of NEI 99
Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Planned License Amendment Submittals Adoption of NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 Emergency Action Limits TSTF-448, Control Room Habitability TSTF-523, Managing Gas Accumulation Gas Gap Release Fractions for High Burnup Fuel Add COPERNIC Fuel Performance Code to Tech Specs and Core Operating Limits Report Keowee Stator Replacement SSF Thermal Margin Self-approval for risk
-01, Rev. 6 Emergency Action Limits TSTF-448, Control Room Habitability TSTF-523, Managing Gas Accumulation Gas Gap Release Fractions for High Burnup Fuel Add COPERNIC Fuel Performance Code to Tech Specs and Core Operating Limits Report Keowee Stator Replacement SSF Thermal Margin Self-approval for risk
-informed Fire Protection Program Changes 76 For Information Only
-informed Fire Protection Program Changes 76 For Information Only


Line 292: Line 288:
Closing Remarks Preston Gillespie, Senior Vice President Bill Pitesa, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer 78 For Information Only
Closing Remarks Preston Gillespie, Senior Vice President Bill Pitesa, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer 78 For Information Only


Acronyms ADV - Atmospheric Dump Valve AWC - Alternate Chilled Water  BWST - Borated Water Storage Tank CAL - Confirmatory Action Letter CCW - Condenser Circulating Water CDF - Core Damage Frequency CDTR - Cask Decontamination Tank Room CTP - Chemical Treatment Pond EOC - End of Cycle EPR - East Penetration Room FHRR - Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report FLEX - Flexible & Diverse Mitigation Strategies HELB - High Energy Line Break HPI - High Pressure Injection I&C - Instrumentation and Control KHU - Keowee Hydro Unit LAR - License Amendment Request LIP - Local Intense Precipitation 79 For Information Only LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident MCC - Motor Control Center MS - Main Steam MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve NFPA - National Fire Protection Association PMP - Probable Maximum Precipitation PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSW - Protected Service Water RC - Reactor Coolant SE - Safety Evaluation Report SFP - Spent Fuel Pool S/G - Steam Generator SPRA - Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment SSF - Standby Shutdown Facility UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VAC - Volts Alternating Current WPR - West Penetration Room
Acronyms ADV - Atmospheric Dump Valve AWC - Alternate Chilled Water  BWST - Borated Water Storage Tank CAL - Confirmatory Action Letter CCW - Condenser Circulating Water CDF - Core Damage Frequency CDTR - Cask Decontamination Tank Room CTP - Chemical Treatment Pond EOC - End of Cycle EPR - East Penetration Room FHRR - Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report FLEX - Flexible & Diverse Mitigation Strategies HELB - High Energy Line Break HPI - High Pressure Injection I&C - Instrumentation and Control KHU - Keowee Hydro Unit LAR - License Amendment Request LIP - Local Intense Precipitation 79 For Information Only LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident MCC - Motor Control Center MS - Main Steam MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve NFPA - National Fire Protection Association PMP - Probable Maximum Precipitation PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSW - Protected Service Water RC - Reactor Coolant SE - Safety Evaluation Report SFP - Spent Fuel Pool S/G - Steam Generator SPRA - Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment SSF - Standby Shutdown Facility UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VAC - Volts Alternating Current WPR - West Penetration Room


80}}
80}}

Revision as of 03:29, 9 July 2018

Meeting Slides from the May 27, 2015 Oconee Major Projects Between Duke Energy and NRC
ML15148A263
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/27/2015
From:
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Plant Licensing Branch II
Whited J A
References
Download: ML15148A263 (80)


Text

Oconee Nuclear Station Major Projects Update Meeting May 27, 2015

Duke Participants Bill Pitesa

- Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Preston Gillespie

- Senior Vice President Scott Batson - Site Vice President Tom Ray - Plant Manager Ed Burchfield

- General Manager, Nuclear Engineering Dave Baxter

- General Manager, Significant Regulatory Projects Scott Lynch - Senior Project Director, PSW Project Carrie Dunton - Director, Site Support Dana Jones - Manager, Fukushima Response Doug Phelps - Director, Critical Systems Engineering Terry Patterson

- Director, Organization Effectiveness Chris Nolan

- Manager, Fleet Regulatory Affairs 2 For Information Only

Agenda Opening Remarks Scott Batson Protected Service Water (PSW)

Scott Lynch National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Ed Burchfield Keowee Hydro Upgrades Doug Phelps Tornado/High Energy Line Break (HELB)/

Dave Baxter Main Steam Relief Valves (MSIVs)

Significant NRC Commitments Terry Patterson Fukushima Dana Jones External Flooding Dave Baxter Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Carrie Dunton Closing Remarks Preston Gillespie / Bill Pitesa 3 For Information Only

Opening Remarks Scott Batson Site Vice President, Oconee Nuclear Station 4 For Information Only

PSW 5 For Information Only Scott Lynch Senior Project Director, PSW Project 5

PSW - Milestone Summary Update Completed Milestones:

Milestone 1

- Commercial Power Path to Standby Shutdown Facility Milestone 2

- Power Path from Keowee Hydro Milestone 3 - Power Path from PSW to High Pressure Injection (HPI) System Milestone 4

- Align PSW Pump to Steam Generators Remaining Milestones on track to meet required dates:

Milestone 5 - PSW System Complete

- February 4, 2016 Milestone 6

- Satisfy the Requirements of NFPA 805

- November 15, 2016 6 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 1 Milestone 1

- Commercial Power Path to Standby Shutdown Facility

- Complete Completed Items Milestone 1 completed and turned over to Operations A Selected Licensee Commitment was implemented to track unavailability of PSW power via Maintenance Rule 13% estimated Fire Core Damage Frequency improvement Milestone 1 completion notification letter submitted to NRC on August 28, 2013 7 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 1 8 PSW Building For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 1 9 PSW Building Switchgear For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 2 Milestone 2

- Power Path From Keowee Hydro

- Complete Completed Items Milestone 2 completed and turned over to Operations The Selected Licensee Commitment was revised to add Keowee power path to the tracking mechanism for unavailability of PSW power via Maintenance Rule Additional 1% estimated Fire Core Damage Frequency improvement Milestone 2 completion notification letter submitted to NRC on December 12, 2013 10 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 2 11 Keowee Switchgear Cabinet For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 3 Milestone 3

- Power Path From PSW to HPI System

- Complete Completed Items Milestone 3 completed and turned over to Operations The Selected Licensee Commitment was revised to add HPI to the tracking mechanism for unavailability of PSW power via Maintenance Rule Additional 8% estimated Fire Core Damage Frequency improvement Milestone 3 completion notification letter submitted to NRC on July 7, 2014 12 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 4 Milestone 4

- Align PSW Pump to Steam Generators

- Complete Completed Items Milestone 4 completed and turned over to Operations Installation and integrated testing of the PSW system Unit 1 Steam Generators supplied by PSW during the fall 2014 Refueling Outage Installation and integrated testing of the Alternate Chilled Water (AWC) system A Selected Licensee Commitment was implemented to define PSW allowed outage times, required actions, and surveillance requirements Additional 15% estimated Fire Core Damage Frequency improvement Milestone 4 completion notification letter submitted to NRC on March 24, 2015 13 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 4 Milestone 4

- NRC Inspection Results Onsite inspection began April 5, 2015; debrief conducted April 24, 2015 Inspectors identified discrepancies between the flow model and the as

-built plant Response to Inspection Results Cause Evaluation initiated on flow model discrepancies Field-verified system dimensional data and configuration Validated flow coefficients, flow requirements, and resistance values Updated flow model to resolve as

-built discrepancies On-site presence at vendor facility for flow model re-work Reevaluated design basis requirements for HPI motor coolers Follow-up onsite inspection began May 26, 2015 14 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 4 15 For Information Only PSW Booster Pump PSW Primary Pump PSW Pump Room

PSW - AWC Mechanical/Civil AWC - Unit 1 East Penetration Room Piping 16 For Information Only

PSW - AWC Chillers 17 For Information Only AWC Chillers

PSW - Milestone 5 Milestone 5

- PSW System Completion

- February 4, 2016 Scope Units 1, 2, and 3 Pressurizer Heater and Vital I&C Battery Charger Repowering from PSW Units 1, 2, and 3 Vital I&C Cable Reroutes Units 1, 2, and 3 Replace Pressurizer Heater Breaker Panels with Fuse Panels Units 1, 2, and 3 Vital I&C Battery Ventilation Fan Repowering 18 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 5 Milestone 5

- PSW System Completion

- February 4, 2016 Completed Items Infrastructure installation (cable tray, supports, termination boxes, etc.)

Cable pulls to MCCs to provide PSW power to select Pressurizer Heaters Cable pulls to provide PSW power to Vital I&C Battery Chargers Unit 2 Vital I&C cable reroutes Unit 2 Pressurizer Heater Fuse Panel installation 19 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 5 Milestone 5

- PSW System Completion

- February 4, 2016 In Progress Items Unit 1 Vital I&C cable reroutes Cable terminations in the PSW Building and Auxiliary Building Unit 1 Replacement of Pressurizer Heater breakers with fuses On track to meet February 4, 2016 completion date 20 For Information Only

PSW - Milestone 6 Milestone 6

- Satisfy the Requirements of NFPA 805

- November 15, 2016 Transition License Conditions The Transition License Conditions will be discussed by Ed Burchfield in the NFPA 805 presentation 21 For Information Only

NFPA 805 Ed Burchfield General Manager, Nuclear Engineering 22 For Information Only

Estimated Fire CDF Impact of Each Milestone 23 Estimated Fire CDF Impact of Each PSW Milestone For Information Only

NFPA 805 NFPA 805 Project Status NRC Safety Evaluation issued December 29, 2010 Program implemented January 1, 2013 All items on schedule Turbine Building / Auxiliary Building wall penetrations modifications completed Units 1 and 3 fire detection modifications completed Units 1, 2, and 3 Purge Inlet Room/West Penetration Room fire barrier modifications completed PSW Milestones 1

-4 completed 24 For Information Only

NFPA 805 Remaining NFPA 805 Items to Complete Unit 2 fire detection modifications PSW Milestone 5 modifications PSW Milestone 6 Incorporate the PSW modifications into site documents Update the fire PRA with as

-built data Confirm that the as

-built risk decrease from installation of PSW bounds the transition risk Complete the analysis of non

-power operation fire impacts 25 For Information Only

NFPA 805 Ongoing Actions until PSW modifications are complete Fire watches for Appendix R non

-compliances Additional prudent fire risk reduction compensatory actions Oconee's fire safety has benefited from the implementation of NFPA 805 and PSW 26 For Information Only

Keowee Hydro Upgrades Doug Phelps Director, Critical Systems Engineering 27 For Information Only

Keowee Hydro Upgrades Keowee Hydro Station commissioned in 1971 Previous Major Maintenance and Refurbishment Upgrades 1979 - Weld repair of turbine blades for each KHU 1987 - Keowee Hydro Unit (KHU)

-1 generator stator maintenance 1994 - Keowee transformer upgrade 2004 & 2005 for each KHU

- Turbine refurbishment; governor, voltage regulator, battery replacements 2008-2009 preventative maintenance inspections identified aging mechanisms in rotor pole assemblies 2009 Duke Energy started planning efforts to refurbish/overhaul both Keowee generators Refurbished/replaced all 56 generator field poles on each KHU KHU-2 completed February 28, 2014 KHU-1 completed August 1, 2014 28 For Information Only

Keowee Hydro Upgrades Planned Upgrades Online Monitoring System Provides real time and trend monitoring of turbine/generator Installed during normal maintenance windows Operational in 2015 Governor Oil Pump Unloaders Replace mechanical unloaders with electric unloaders Resolves obsolescence issues Increases operating margin No unavailability to install, test during normal maintenance windows On track for 2016 29 For Information Only

Keowee Hydro Upgrades Planned Upgrades Keowee Main Step

-up Transformer Replacement Contract issued to purchase Onsite October 2016 Install within allowed Technical Specification completion time Stator replacement for Keowee Unit 1 & 2 We are evaluating the feasibility to pre-build each stator on site and replace the entire stator Decreases outage duration Allows for testing of new stator prior to entering outage License Amendment Request (LAR) required is very similar to Generator Rotor Pole Project Planning pre

-submittal meeting in 3 rd quarter 2015 30 For Information Only

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs Dave Baxter General Manager, Significant Regulatory Projects 31 For Information Only

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs Tornado Mitigation Activities Completed Completion of PSW Milestones 1

-4 Milestone 1

- Commercial Power Path to Standby Shutdown Facility Milestone 2

- Power Path from Keowee Hydro Milestone 3

- Power Path from PSW to High Pressure Injection (HPI) System Milestone 4

- Align PSW Pump to Steam Generators 32 For Information Only

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs Tornado Mitigation Activities Completed (continued)

Unit 3 Control Room North Wall SSF/CT-5 Trench Crossover SSF Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Vent Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Piping/Instrumentation Protection West Penetration Room (WPR) and Cask Decontamination Tank Room (CDTR) Reinforced Siding and Fibrwrap Installation 33 For Information Only

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 34 For Information Only

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 35 For Information Only Unit 3 Control Room

- North Wall Construction

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 36 For Information Only SSF Trench /

CT-5 Trench Crossover Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 37 For Information Only Unit 3 BWST Piping/Instrumentation Protection In Progress Photo Completed Photo

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 38 For Information Only WPR/CDTR Fibrwrap & Steel Siding Installation

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 39 For Information Only High Energy Line Break Mitigation Activities Completed Completion of PSW Milestones 1

-4 Milestone 1

- Commercial Power Path to Standby Shutdown Facility Milestone 2

- Power Path from Keowee Hydro Milestone 3

- Power Path from PSW to High Pressure Injection (HPI) System Milestone 4

- Align PSW Pump to Steam Generators Implementation of Main Steam and Main Feedwater piping located in the East Penetration Room (EPR) inspection program

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 40 For Information Only High Energy Line Break Mitigation Activities Completed (continued)

Initial inspection and repair of EPR electrical penetration termination enclosures Implementation of EPR electrical penetration termination enclosure inspection program Installation of EPR Flood Outlet Device and Flood Impoundment Walls Replacement of valves 2/3HP-1 & 2 to allow termination of a postulated letdown break outside containment Installation of reach rods to valves 1/3HP

-103 & 107 to allow manual remote operation to terminate postulated High Pressure Injection Pump outlet breaks

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 41 For Information Only Unit 1 Flood Outlet Device

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 42 For Information Only Tornado/HELB/MSIV Current Activities Oconee Staff is fully engaged in implementing PSW, External Flood and Fukushima activities As we complete PSW implementation, we are refocusing on Tornado/HELB/MSIV activities Established new organization to support Tornado/HELB/MSIV Based on the complexity associated with installation of MSIVs, the new organization will begin a review of the project to determine any improvements/changes that may be needed to ensure the optimal solution is achieved to ensure appropriate design and viability of installation The final resolution will be selected based on the expectation that the three Oconee Units will operate for an extended period

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 43 For Information Only

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 44 For Information Only Remaining Tornado Mitigation Project Activities Modification to the SSF South End Double Doors for protection against tornado induced effects - scope, schedule and implementation date will be provided by September 30, 2015 Modification of the SSF North Trench for protection against tornado induced effects

- March 31, 2016 SSF Diesel Service Water Discharge for protection against tornado induced missiles

- March 31, 2016 Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 45 For Information Only Remaining Tornado Mitigation Project Activities (continued)

Modification of the Main Steam (MS) yard supports for protection of the MS lines from tornado induced missiles (U1

- Fall 2016; U2

- Fall 2015; U3

- Fall 2016)

Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) / Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) Installation in Tornado Protected Enclosure (Implementation 1EOC31 in 2020; 2EOC30 in 2021; 3EOC31 in 2022) Completion of PSW Milestone 5, PSW System Complete

- February 4, 2016

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 46 For Information Only Remaining HELB Project Activities Replacement of valves 1HP

-1 & 2 to allow for termination of a postulated letdown break outside containment

- Fall 2016 Installation of reach rods to valves 2HP

-103 & 107 to allow for termination of postulated High Pressure Injection Pump outlet breaks - Fall 2015 Protection of Control Complex Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) ductwork from postulated HELBs

- Schedule to be determined upon receipt of HELB SER Modification to certain Turbine Building columns to mitigate potential damage following postulated HELBs

- Schedule to be determined upon receipt of HELB SER

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 47 For Information Only Remaining HELB Project Activities (continued)

Replacement of Condenser Circulating Water (CCW) discharge stop gates

- Schedule to be determined upon receipt of HELB SER Completion of PSW Milestone 5 Milestone 5

- PSW System Complete

- February 4, 2016 Installation of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) / Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) in Tornado Protected Enclosure (Implementation 1EOC31 in 2020; 2EOC30 in 2021; 3EOC31 in 2022)

Tornado/HELB/MSIVs 48 For Information Only Licensing Tornado License Amendment Request and High Energy Line Break License Amendment Request deferred to focus on licensing PSW system Tornado and HELB LARs credit installation of MSIVs / ADVs PSW Safety Evaluation Report received from NRC on August 13, 2014 As we complete PSW implementation, we are refocusing on Tornado/HELB/MSIV activities

Significant NRC Commitments Terry Patterson Director, Organization Effectiveness 49 For Information Only

Significant NRC Commitments Oconee tracks NRC commitments in the Problem Identification Program (PIP) by assigning a unique flag to the Corrective Action On-going commitments are institutionalized in procedures or permanent plant modifications and any changes to the commitments are managed using the process outlined in NEI 99-04, Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes Oconee has open commitments being tracked in eight specific categories:

Tornado High Energy Line Break (HELB)

NFPA 805 including Protected Service Water (License Condition)

Fukushima Lessons Learned Cyber Security (Rule Implementation)

Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection Plan License Amendment Request (LAR) AREVA LOCA Analysis Thermal Conductivity Anomaly LAR submittal for TSTF

-523, Gas Accumulation in ECCS Systems 50 For Information Only

Significant NRC Commitments 51 For Information Only The status of commitments in the 8 specific categories is as follows:

Tornado 23 of 30 commitments are complete Remaining 7 on

-track High Energy Line Break 35 of 45 commitments are complete Remaining 10 on

-track NFPA 805 Modifications 4 of 6 commitments are complete Remaining 2 on

-track Remaining Fukushima Lessons Learned on

-track Significant NRC Commitments 52 For Information Only The status of commitments in the 8 specific categories is as follows: (continued)

Cyber Security Program Plan submitted in response to NRC Revision to 10 CFR 73 consisted of nine specific milestones Milestones 1

-7 complete Final 2 Milestones on

-track Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection EPRI MRP adoption on

-track AREVA LOCA Analysis Thermal Conductivity Error on

-track NRC approved approach to GL 2008-01, Gas Accumulation, on

-track Fukushima Dana Jones Manager, Fukushima Response 53 For Information Only

Fukushima Implementation Schedule 54 For Information Only Fall 2014 Spring 2015 Fall 2015 Spring 2016 Fall 2016 McGuire 1 10/2014 Complete Brunswick 2 4/2015 Complete McGuire 2 10/2015 Brunswick 1 4/2016 Oconee 1 11/2016 Catawba 2 4/2015 Complete Oconee 2 11/2015 Oconee 3 5/2016 Harris 5/2015 Complete Catawba 1 12/2015 Robinson 6/2015 In-Progress Fukushima Flexible and Diverse Mitigation Strategies (FLEX)

N 55 For Information Only 1 2 3 4a 4b 5 6a 6b 7 8 SSF - Phase 1 coping for T=0 event FLEX Building

- multiple deployment paths CTP supplies S/G feed inventory for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 3000 gpm portable pump

- provides S/G feed to all units (Warning Time event) 3000 gpm portable pump

- provides S/G feed to all units (T=0 event) 2500 psi portable pump

- provides RC make

-up per unit (both events) 600 VAC portable generator

- re-powers each unit through XPSW 1,2,3 (T=0 event) 120 VAC portable generator

- re-powers each unit through various panelboards (Warning Time event)

Intake - inventory for indefinite coping (T=0 event)

CCW piping

- inventory for S/G feed after CTP

-1 (Warning Time event) 55 Fukushima Flexible and Diverse Mitigation Strategies (FLEX)

Flexible and Diverse Mitigation Strategies (FLEX)

Compliance Dates: 2EOC27 (Fall 2015); 3EOC28 (Spring 2016); 1EOC29 (Fall 2016) 2 Strategies based on type of external events T=0 strategy (uses SSF for Phase 1 coping; all events except upstream dam failure)

Warning Time Strategy (based on 2011 SE Jocassee Dam Failure

- CAL) Equipment Most major components are onsite Remaining major components have been ordered Physical Modification Status Online Modifications

- Complete Outage Modifications Three on schedule to complete during 2EOC27, 3EOC28, and 1EOC29 56 For Information Only 56 Fukushima 57 For Information Only 57 Fukushima 58 For Information Only 58 Fukushima 59 For Information Only 59 Fukushima Spent Fuel Pool Level Indication Spent Fuel Pool Level Indication Compliance Dates:

2EOC27 (Fall 2015) for Unit 1&2 shared SFP 3EOC28 (Spring 2016

) Providing wide

-range level indication using Fleet

-consistent approach: AREVA Through-Air Radar System 2 channels per pool with local indication as well as indication in the Control Rooms Factory Acceptance Testing complete Equipment onsite Implementation In

-Progress on both pools On schedule for Fall 2015 implementation complete (both pools, Unit 1/2 and Unit 3) 60 For Information Only 60 Fukushima 50.54(f) Focus Areas: Seismic, EP, Flood Seismic Recommendation 2.3 Walkdowns Complete TI-188 Inspection Complete Recommendation 2.1 Updated Seismic Hazard Submittal Complete Oconee identified as Group 1 plant SPRA activities underway 61 For Information Only 61 Fukushima 50.54(f) Focus Areas: Seismic, EP, Flood Emergency Preparedness (EP)

Communications Assessment complete; review of potential enhancements in

-progress Staffing Phase 1 staffing study submittal complete Phase 2 staffing study complete

- on schedule for June 2015 submittal Flood Recommendation 2.3 Walkdowns Complete TI-187 Inspection Complete 62 For Information Only 62 Fukushima 50.54(f) Focus Areas: Seismic, EP, Flood Flood (continued)

Recommendation 2.1 Flood Hazard Reevaluation Complete Jocassee Dam Failure PMP/LIP Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) revision complete; submitted March 6, 2015 Flooding strategy Protection for flooding levels below the SSF Flood wall Mitigation for flooding levels above the SSF Flood wall Mitigation for indefinite coping capabilities Integrated Assessment on hold until COMSECY decision

- NRC 6 month due date extension to September 12, 2015 Protection Modifications in progress; on schedule to complete 2016 63 For Information Only 63 External Flooding Dave Baxter General Manager, Significant Regulatory Projects 64 For Information Only

External Flooding Modifications 1.Relocation of Back

-up Power (FANT Line) - Completed 2.Discharge Diversion Wall

- Completed 3.Turbine Building drain isolation

- Completed 4.East slope scour protection

- In Progress (complete Jul 2015) 5.Intake dike scour protection

- In Progress (complete Dec 2015)

Jocassee Dam 65 For Information Only

External Flooding Modifications Relocation of Back

-up Power Path

- Complete 66 For Information Only

Discharge Diversion Wall

- Complete 67 External Flooding Modifications For Information Only

Turbine Building Drain Isolation

- Complete 68 External Flooding Modifications For Information Only

7 6 11 5 3 4 2 Areas 3 & 4 Complete 12 Areas 5, 6, 7, 11 In Progress Areas 2 &12 Design Complete Scour Protection

- Plan View 69 External Flooding Modifications For Information Only

Scour Protection

- East Slope (Areas 3 & 4)

- Complete 70 External Flooding Modifications For Information Only

Scour Protection

- East Slope (Areas 5, 6) in progress 71 External Flooding Modifications For Information Only

Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) Status FHRR Update Interim Actions for flooding have been inspected and remain in place Revised FHRR submitted March 6, 2015 Regulatory Path Forward letter submitted March 6, 2015 Weekly webinars between NRR/NRO and Duke in

-progress FHRR Overview Seismic Dam Performance Hydraulic Modeling 72 For Information Only

Flooding Response Strategy

- Defense-in-depth Jocassee Dam failure

- Mitigation Strategies deployed followed by:

Flooding with peak levels below site grade Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup SSF available to provide back up to plant SSCs Flooding levels above site grade but below top of SSF flood walls Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup until plant SSCs are lost SSF is staffed and available SSF provides feedwater and reactor coolant makeup if normal SSCs lost Flooding levels above SSF flood walls Plant SSCs provide feedwater and reactor coolant makeup until plant SSCs are lost SSF is staffed and available SSF provides feedwater and reactor coolant makeup when normal SSCs are lost When the SSF is lost, Mitigation Strategies are put into service providing Feedwater and reactor coolant makeup (diesel powered)

Instrumentation Spent fuel pool make-up Bounding level FHRR Level Site Grade Top of SSF Flood Wall Mitigation Strategies External Flooding Response Strategy For Information Only Physical Barriers 73 Regulatory Path Forward Regulatory Path Forward Establish new Jocassee Dam failure licensing basis Based on updated Jocassee FHRR Flooding Analysis New Beyond Design Basis Event to be included in Oconee UFSAR Chapter 2 2011 SE Flooding Levels become the bounding dam failure flood Mitigation Strategies for flooding will address maximum flooding levels from 2011 SE Safety Evaluation for EA 049 to be incorporated in the site licensing basis UFSAR Chapter 3 Flooding modifications and response strategies Jocassee dam failures are considered to be Beyond Design Basis events Site modifications required to support protection and mitigation strategies completed

- June 2016 Mitigation strategies as outlined in Final Integrated Plan (for EA 049) completed fall 2016 Ongoing CAL actions to be maintained after the CAL is closed 74 For Information Only

Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Carrie Dunton Director, Site Support 75 For Information Only

Upcoming Regulatory Submittals Planned License Amendment Submittals Adoption of NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 Emergency Action Limits TSTF-448, Control Room Habitability TSTF-523, Managing Gas Accumulation Gas Gap Release Fractions for High Burnup Fuel Add COPERNIC Fuel Performance Code to Tech Specs and Core Operating Limits Report Keowee Stator Replacement SSF Thermal Margin Self-approval for risk

-informed Fire Protection Program Changes 76 For Information Only

Regulatory Submittals Under Review License Amendment Submittals Currently Under NRC Review Adoption of MRP-227 (Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection)

Adoption of ASME OM Code Revision to Technical Specification 3.5.2 (High Pressure Injection)

Adoption of TSTF

-513 (Reactor Coolant Leakage Monitoring Instrumentation)

Cyber Security Milestone 8 Adoption of TSTF

-510 (Steam Generator Inspection Program)

Addition of a High Flux Trip for 3 Reactor Coolant Pump Operation 77 For Information Only

Closing Remarks Preston Gillespie, Senior Vice President Bill Pitesa, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer 78 For Information Only

Acronyms ADV - Atmospheric Dump Valve AWC - Alternate Chilled Water BWST - Borated Water Storage Tank CAL - Confirmatory Action Letter CCW - Condenser Circulating Water CDF - Core Damage Frequency CDTR - Cask Decontamination Tank Room CTP - Chemical Treatment Pond EOC - End of Cycle EPR - East Penetration Room FHRR - Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report FLEX - Flexible & Diverse Mitigation Strategies HELB - High Energy Line Break HPI - High Pressure Injection I&C - Instrumentation and Control KHU - Keowee Hydro Unit LAR - License Amendment Request LIP - Local Intense Precipitation 79 For Information Only LOCA - Loss of Coolant Accident MCC - Motor Control Center MS - Main Steam MSIV - Main Steam Isolation Valve NFPA - National Fire Protection Association PMP - Probable Maximum Precipitation PRA - Probabilistic Risk Assessment PSW - Protected Service Water RC - Reactor Coolant SE - Safety Evaluation Report SFP - Spent Fuel Pool S/G - Steam Generator SPRA - Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment SSF - Standby Shutdown Facility UFSAR - Updated Final Safety Analysis Report VAC - Volts Alternating Current WPR - West Penetration Room

80