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| {{#Wiki_filter:NRCFORM366(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMHISSION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORllARDCOHMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEHENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMHISSION, WASHINGTON, OC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECI'3150.0104), | | {{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 366 (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORllARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECI'3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.FAcILITY NAHE (1)R.E~Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)10F8 TITLE (4)Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Oue to Offsite Lightning Strike, Results in Automatic Start of>>A>>Emergency Diesel Generator EVENT DATE (5)MONI'H DAY YEAR 06 30 95 YEAR 95 LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--006--REVISION NUMBER 00 HONTH DAY 07 31 YEAR 95 REPORT DATE (7)FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUHBER FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)OPERATING MODE (9)PONER LEVEL (10)N 097 THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT 20.402(b)20.405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(1)(i i)20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a>(1)(v) 20.405(c)50.36(c>(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ri) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(s)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2>(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)TO THE REQUIREHE:ITS OF 10 CFR rit (Check one or more)(11)LICENSEE COHTACT FOR THIS LER (12)NAHE John T.St.Hartin-Technical Assistant TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Ares Code)(716)771-3641 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COHPONEHT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COHPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEH COMPOHENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS~EA CBL5 XOOO SUPPLEHEHTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, corrplete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DA'IE).X NO EXPEC'TED SUBHISSION DATE (15>MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On June 30, 1995, at approximately 1528 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state power, power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was lost, due to a lightning strike on an offsite utility pole for Circuit 751.This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12A and"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18.The"A" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)automatically started and reenergized buses 14 and 18 as per design.There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant and to verify that the"A" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 14 and 18.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V.B.NRC FORM 366 (5 92)9508090ii2 950731 PDR ADQCK 05000244 S PDR NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150 0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORNARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(XQISSION, IIASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AHD BUDGET NASHINGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)RE ED Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95--006--RE VIS IOH NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)20F8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 97%steady state reactor power with no major operational activities in progress.A thunderstorm was in progress in the vicinity of the plant.The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the normal"50%/50%" offsite power lineup: Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer) to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers. |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETMASHINGTON DC20503.FAcILITYNAHE(1)R.E~GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUHBER(2)05000244PAGE(3)10F8TITLE(4)Lossof34.5KVOffsitePowerCircuit751,OuetoOffsiteLightning Strike,ResultsinAutomatic Startof>>A>>Emergency DieselGenerator EVENTDATE(5)MONI'HDAYYEAR063095YEAR95LERNUHBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--006--REVISIONNUMBER00HONTHDAY0731YEAR95REPORTDATE(7)FACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUHBERFACILITYNAMEDOCKETNUMBEROTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(8)OPERATING MODE(9)PONERLEVEL(10)N097THISREPORTISSUBHITTED PURSUANT20.402(b) 20.405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)
| | Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer) to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers. |
| (1)(ii)20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a>(1)(v) 20.405(c) 50.36(c>(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ri) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(s)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2>(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER(SpecifyinAbstractbelowandinText,NRCForm366A)TOTHEREQUIREHE:ITS OF10CFRrit(Checkoneormore)(11)LICENSEECOHTACTFORTHISLER(12)NAHEJohnT.St.Hartin-Technical Assistant TELEPHONE NUMBER(IncludeAresCode)(716)771-3641COMPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOHPONEHT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEMCOHPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSCAUSESYSTEHCOMPOHENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS~EACBL5XOOOSUPPLEHEHTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyes,corrplete EXPECTEDSUBHISSION DA'IE).XNOEXPEC'TED SUBHISSION DATE(15>MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)OnJune30,1995,atapproximately 1528EDST,withthereactoratapproximately 97%steadystatepower,powerfromCircuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)waslost,duetoalightning strikeonanoffsiteutilitypoleforCircuit751.Thisresultedindeenergization of4160Voltbus12Aand"A"train480Voltsafeguards buses14and18.The"A"Emergency DieselGenerator (D/G)automatically startedandreenergized buses14and18asperdesign.Therewasnochangeinreactorpowerorturbineload.Immediate corrective actionwastoperformtheappropriate actionsofAbnormalProcedure AP-ELEC.1 (Lossof12AAnd/Or12BBusses)tostabilize theplantandtoverifythatthe"A"Emergency D/Ghadstartedandreenergized buses14and18.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(C).Corrective actiontopreventrecurrence isoutlinedinSectionV.B.NRCFORM366(592)9508090ii2 950731PDRADQCK05000244SPDR NRCFORM366A(5-92)U.S~NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.31500104EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYMITHTHISINFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORNARDCOMMENTSREGARDIHG BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY C(XQISSION, IIASHIHGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104), | | II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES: |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT AHDBUDGETNASHINGTOH DC20503.FACILITYNAHE(1)REEDGinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2)05000244YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER95--006--REVISIOHNUMBER00PAGE(3)20F8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS Theplantwasatapproximately 97%steadystatereactorpowerwithnomajoroperational activities inprogress.
| | o June 30, 1995, 1528 EDST: Event date and time.o June 30, 1995, 1528 EDST: Discovery date and time.June 30, 1995, 1528 EDST: Control Room operators verify the"A" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)operation and that safeguards buses 14 and 18 and Instrument Bus"B" are energized. |
| Athunderstorm wasinprogressinthevicinityoftheplant.Theoffsitepowerconfiguration totheplantwasinthenormal"50%/50%"offsitepowerlineup:Circuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wassupplying powertothe"A"train480Voltsafeguards buses14and18through34.5KVto4160Volttransformer 12A(12Atransformer) to4160Voltbus12A,andthroughthesafeguards bus4160Voltto480Volttransformers.
| | June 30, 1995, 1702 EDST: Safeguards buses 14 and 18 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"A" Emergency D/G.June 30, 1995, 1708 EDST: The"A" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.June 30, 1995, 1814 EDST: Circuit 751 declared operable.o July 2, 1995, 2343 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the normal n50%/50%" lineup.HRC FORM 366A (5-92) |
| Circuit767(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wassupplying powertothe"B"train480Voltsafeguards buses16and17through34.5KVto4160Volttransformer 12B(12Btransformer) to4160Voltbus12B,andthroughthesafeguards bus4160Voltto480Volttransformers.
| | NRC FORH 366A (5.92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISS ION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 YEAR 95 LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--006--REVISIOH NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)3 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)B.EVENT: On June 30, 1995, at approximately 1528 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state full power, the Control Room received numerous annunciator alarms, including Annunciator E-14 (LOSS B INSTR.BUS).The Control Room operators determined that Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was deenergized, and that"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12A.The"A" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 14 and 18.Buses 14 and 18 had been momentarily deenergized and 120 Volt AC Instrument Bus"B" (powered from bus 14)had also been momentarily deenergized. |
| II.DESCRIPTION OFEVENTA.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES: | | The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load.They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant.They verified that the"A" Emergency D/G was operating properly and that safeguards buses 14 and 18 and Instrument Bus"B" were energized. |
| oJune30,1995,1528EDST:Eventdateandtime.oJune30,1995,1528EDST:Discovery dateandtime.June30,1995,1528EDST:ControlRoomoperators verifythe"A"Emergency DieselGenerator (D/G)operation andthatsafeguards buses14and18andInstrument Bus"B"areenergized.
| | The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 12A displayed zero (0)voltage.The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted in undervoltage on safeguards buses 14 and 18, and the"A" Emergency D/G automatically started within ten (10)seconds as per design and reenergized these buses.When bus 14 was reenergized, Instrument Bus"B" was also automatically reenergized. |
| June30,1995,1702EDST:Safeguards buses14and18weretransferred toCircuit767fromthe"A"Emergency D/G.June30,1995,1708EDST:The"A"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby.June30,1995,1814EDST:Circuit751declaredoperable.
| | Energy Operations personnel were notified concerning the loss of Circuit 751.Personnel from the"Engineering, Operations, and Gas Services" department investigated field conditions and determined that a lightning strike caused the loss of power from Circuit 751, and determined the location of the lightning strike.The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.l (Restoration of Offsite Power)to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12A and 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18.The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BY to energize bus 12A from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 1557 EDST.At approximately 1702 EDST, safeguards buses 14 and 18 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"A" Emergency D/G.(Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 throughout the event.)NRC FORH 366A (5 92) |
| oJuly2,1995,2343EDST:Offsitepowerconfiguration wasrestoredtothenormaln50%/50%"lineup.HRCFORM366A(5-92)
| | HRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECt (3140-0104), OFFICE OF DC 20503.MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKEl'UHBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 95--006--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)4OF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionaI copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)At approximately 1708 EDST, June 30, 1995, the"A" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.Circuit 751 was declared operable at approximately 1814 EDST, but was maintained as the plant's backup supply of offsite power rather than realigning the electrical system during continuing thunderstorm conditions. |
| NRCFORH366A(5.92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOHBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOHHENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEIHFORHATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(31500104),OFFICEOFMANAGEHENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUHBER(2)05000244YEAR95LERNUHBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--006--REVISIOHNUHBER00PAGE(3)3OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)B.EVENT:OnJune30,1995,atapproximately 1528EDST,withthereactoratapproximately 97%steadystatefullpower,theControlRoomreceivednumerousannunciator alarms,including Annunciator E-14(LOSSBINSTR.BUS).TheControlRoomoperators determined thatCircuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wasdeenergized, andthat"A"train480Voltsafeguards buses14and18hadlosttheirpowersupplyfrom4160Voltbus12A.The"A"Emergency D/Ghadautomatically startedandwastiedtosafeguards buses14and18.Buses14and18hadbeenmomentarily deenergized and120VoltACInstrument Bus"B"(poweredfrombus14)hadalsobeenmomentarily deenergized.
| | C INOPERABLE STRUCTURES I COMPONENTS r OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: The momentary loss of power to buses 14 and 18 (at 1528 EDST)caused the trip of the common sample pump for radioactive effluent monitoring of plant ventilation by channels R-10B (iodine), R-13 (particulate), and R-14 (noble gas).Channel R-14A remained operable, providing monitoring for iodine and noble gases, as required by Technical Specifications Table 3.5-5 Action 4~Channel R-14A also continuously collected samples for particulate monitoring, as required by Table 3.5-5 Action 5 and Table 4.12-2 Item E.The common sample pump was restarted at approximately 1544 EDST.E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY: |
| TheControlRoomoperators verifiedthatreactorcoolantsystemtemperature andpressurewerestable,andthattherewasnochangeinreactorpowerorturbineload.Theyperformed theappropriate actionsofAbnormalProcedure AP-ELEC.1 (Lossof12AAnd/Or12BBusses)tostabilize theplant.Theyverifiedthatthe"A"Emergency D/Gwasoperating properlyandthatsafeguards buses14and18andInstrument Bus"B"wereenergized.
| | This event was immediately apparent due to Main Control Board alarms and indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.These included Main Control Board Annunciator E-14 (LOSS B INSTR.BUS)and the indicating lights for bus 14 and bus 18 supply breakers.NRC FORH 366A (5-92) |
| TheControlRoomoperators observedthatCircuit751andbus12Adisplayed zero(0)voltage.ThelossofpowerfromCircuit751resultedinundervoltage onsafeguards buses14and18,andthe"A"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedwithinten(10)secondsasperdesignandreenergized thesebuses.Whenbus14wasreenergized, Instrument Bus"B"wasalsoautomatically reenergized.
| | NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISS ION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150.0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555 0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHEN'I AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER REVI SION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)5OF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)F.OPERATOR ACTION: Following the undervoltage condition on buses 14 and 18, the"A" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the"A" Emergency D/G was operating properly, safeguards buses 14 and 18 were energized, and Instrument Bus"B" was energized. |
| EnergyOperations personnel werenotifiedconcerning thelossofCircuit751.Personnel fromthe"Engineering, Operations, andGasServices" department investigated fieldconditions anddetermined thatalightning strikecausedthelossofpowerfromCircuit751,anddetermined thelocationofthelightning strike.TheControlRoomoperators referredtoEquipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.l (Restoration ofOffsitePower)torestoreoffsitepowerto4160Voltbus12Aand480Voltsafeguards buses14and18.TheControlRoomoperators closed4160Voltcircuitbreaker52/12BYtoenergizebus12AfromCircuit767,viathe12Btransformer, atapproximately 1557EDST.Atapproximately 1702EDST,safeguards buses14and18weretransferred toCircuit767fromthe"A"Emergency D/G.(Circuit767hadremainedinoperation, supplying "B"train480Voltsafeguards buses16and17throughout theevent.)NRCFORH366A(592)
| | When Instrument Bus"B" was reenergized, Rod Control generated an automatic signal to move control rods out.The Control Room operator noted this rod motion and tranferred Rod Control to manual.When the automatic signal stabilized, rods were transferred back to automatic (at approximately 1535 EDST).Letdown line flow and pressure were oscillating, and the demand signal for the letdown pressure control valve (PCV-135)was cycling in phase with these oscillations. |
| HRCFORH366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, DC20555-0001 AHDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECt(3140-0104),
| | PCV-135 was placed in manual to stabilize the letdown line parameters. |
| OFFICEOFDC20503.MANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKEl'UHBER (2)05000244YEARLERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER95--006--REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)4OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditionaI copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)Atapproximately 1708EDST,June30,1995,the"A"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby.Circuit751wasdeclaredoperableatapproximately 1814EDST,butwasmaintained astheplant'sbackupsupplyofoffsitepowerratherthanrealigning theelectrical systemduringcontinuing thunderstorm conditions.
| | Subsequently, PCV-135 was returned to automatic operation after letdown line parameters were stabilized. |
| CINOPERABLE STRUCTURES ICOMPONENTS rORSYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:NoneD.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
| | The Shift Supervisor notified higher supervision of the loss of Circuit 751, and contacted Energy Operations personnel to determine the problem with Circuit 751.The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767)to buses 14 and 18, stopped the"A" Emergency D/G, and realigned it for auto standby.Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC at approximately 1754 EDST per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii).G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES'll safeguards equipment functioned properly.The"A" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 14 and 18, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 14 and 18 to supply emergency power.Running containment recirculation fans on bus 14 tripped as designed, and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment. |
| Themomentary lossofpowertobuses14and18(at1528EDST)causedthetripofthecommonsamplepumpforradioactive effluentmonitoring ofplantventilation bychannelsR-10B(iodine),
| | Running service water pumps on bus 18 tripped as designed, and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 18.NRC FORH 366A (5-92) |
| R-13(particulate), | | HRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY IIITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHING'ION, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY HAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUEHTIAL NUMBER--006--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)6OF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)III.CAUSE OF EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The automatic actuation of the"A" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 14 and 18.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The undervoltage on safeguards buses 14 and 18 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751-was tripping of protective relays for Circuit 751 due to an electrical surge from a lightning strike on an offsite utility pole for Circuit 751.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C), External Cause.This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the"A" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.HRC FORM 366A (5 92) |
| andR-14(noblegas).ChannelR-14Aremainedoperable, providing monitoring foriodineandnoblegases,asrequiredbyTechnical Specifications Table3.5-5Action4~ChannelR-14Aalsocontinuously collected samplesforparticulate monitoring, asrequiredbyTable3.5-5Action5andTable4.12-2ItemE.Thecommonsamplepumpwasrestarted atapproximately 1544EDST.E.METHODOFDISCOVERY:
| | NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AHD RECORDS HANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION |
| Thiseventwasimmediately apparentduetoMainControlBoardalarmsandindications intheControlRoomwhenpowerfromCircuit751waslost.TheseincludedMainControlBoardAnnunciator E-14(LOSSBINSTR.BUS)andtheindicating lightsforbus14andbus18supplybreakers.
| | ~WASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR 05000244 g5 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--006--REVI SION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)7 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions: |
| NRCFORH366A(5-92)
| | o All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.o The"A" Emergency D/G operated as designed by automatically starting and supplying emergency power to safeguards buses 14 and 18.Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the"B" train safeguards buses;subsequently Circuit 767 was lined up to also supply power to the"A" train safeguards buses as permitted by plant technical specifications. |
| NRCFORH366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOHBNO.3150.0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATEO BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORHATION COLLECTION REOUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOHHEHTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORHATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC205550001ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104),
| | o Radiation monitor channels R-10B, R-13, and R-14 were temporarily lost.Their redundant monitor (R-14A)remained operable during this event, providing radioactive effluent monitoring for plant ventilation. |
| OFFICEOFHANAGEHEN'I ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUHBER(2)05000244YEARLERNUHBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBERREVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)5OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)F.OPERATORACTION:Following theundervoltage condition onbuses14and18,the"A"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedandreenergized thesebuses.TheControlRoomoperators performed theappropriate actionstoverifythatthe"A"Emergency D/Gwasoperating
| | Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS'ffsite power was restored to safeguards buses 14 and 18 from Circuit 767, and the"A" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.The common sample pump for R-10B, R-13 and R-14 was restarted. |
| : properly, safeguards buses14and18wereenergized, andInstrument Bus"B"wasenergized.
| | B.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: |
| WhenInstrument Bus"B"wasreenergized, RodControlgenerated anautomatic signaltomovecontrolrodsout.TheControlRoomoperatornotedthisrodmotionandtranferred RodControltomanual.Whentheautomatic signalstabilized, rodsweretransferred backtoautomatic (atapproximately 1535EDST).Letdownlineflowandpressurewereoscillating, andthedemandsignalfortheletdownpressurecontrolvalve(PCV-135) wascyclinginphasewiththeseoscillations.
| | Options for offsite power configuration to the plant will be reevaluated, to optimize reliability during adverse weather conditions. |
| PCV-135wasplacedinmanualtostabilize theletdownlineparameters. | | NRC FORM 366A (5 92) |
| Subsequently, PCV-135wasreturnedtoautomatic operation afterletdownlineparameters werestabilized. | | NRC'ORH 366A (5.92)U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY HITH THIS IHFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 NRS.FORNARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, UASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERIJORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET NASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET HUHBER (2)05000244 YEAR 95 LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL HUNGER REVI SION NUHBER--006--00 PAGE (3)8 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS: |
| TheShiftSupervisor notifiedhighersupervision ofthelossofCircuit751,andcontacted EnergyOperations personnel todetermine theproblemwithCircuit751.TheControlRoomoperators restoredoffsitepower(fromCircuit767)tobuses14and18,stoppedthe"A"Emergency D/G,andrealigned itforautostandby.Subsequently, theShiftSupervisor notifiedtheNRCatapproximately 1754EDSTper10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii).G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES'll safeguards equipment functioned properly.
| | None B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs 91-002, 92-007, and 94-012 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None NRC FORH 366A (5-92)}} |
| The"A"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedduetotheundervoltage condition onbuses14and18,displayed propervoltageandfrequency, andreenergized safeguards buses14and18tosupplyemergency power.Runningcontainment recirculation fansonbus14trippedasdesigned, andweremanuallyrestarted asneededtorestorenormalcoolingtotheContainment. | |
| Runningservicewaterpumpsonbus18trippedasdesigned, andthepumpselectedforautostart startedwhenpowerwasrestoredtobus18.NRCFORH366A(5-92)
| |
| HRCFORM366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYIIITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDIHG BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MHBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHING'ION, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104),
| |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYHAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2)YEAR0500024495LERNUMBER(6)SEQUEHTIAL NUMBER--006--REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)6OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofHRCForm366A)(17)III.CAUSEOFEVENTA.IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theautomatic actuation ofthe"A"Emergency D/Gwasduetoundervoltage onsafeguards buses14and18.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:Theundervoltage onsafeguards buses14and18wasduetothelossofpowerfromCircuit751.C.ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlying causeofthelossofpowerfromCircuit751-wastrippingofprotective relaysforCircuit751duetoanelectrical surgefromalightning strikeonanoffsiteutilitypoleforCircuit751.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(C),ExternalCause.Thislossofpowerandsubsequent startofanEmergency D/GdoesnotmeettheNUMARC93-01,"Industry Guideline forMonitoring theEffectiveness ofMaintenance atNuclearPowerPlants",definition ofa"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".
| |
| IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)",inthatthestartingofthe"A"Emergency D/Gwasanautomatic actuation ofanESFsystem.HRCFORM366A(592) | |
| NRCFORH366A(5-92)U.S~NUCLEARREGULATORY COHMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISIHFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORHATION AHDRECORDSHANAGEMENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMHISSION
| |
| ~WASHIHGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3180-0104), | |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNUMBER(2)YEAR05000244g5LERNUMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--006--REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)7OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)Anassessment wasperformed considering boththesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions:
| |
| oAllreactorcontrolandprotection systemsperformed asdesigned.
| |
| oThe"A"Emergency D/Goperatedasdesignedbyautomatically startingandsupplying emergency powertosafeguards buses14and18.Circuit767remainedinoperation supplying powertothe"B"trainsafeguards buses;subsequently Circuit767waslineduptoalsosupplypowertothe"A"trainsafeguards busesaspermitted byplanttechnical specifications.
| |
| oRadiation monitorchannelsR-10B,R-13,andR-14weretemporarily lost.Theirredundant monitor(R-14A)remainedoperableduringthisevent,providing radioactive effluentmonitoring forplantventilation.
| |
| Basedontheabove,itcanbeconcluded thatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTIONA.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS'ffsite powerwasrestoredtosafeguards buses14and18fromCircuit767,andthe"A"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby.ThecommonsamplepumpforR-10B,R-13andR-14wasrestarted.
| |
| B.ACTIONTAKENORPLANNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE: | |
| Optionsforoffsitepowerconfiguration totheplantwillbereevaluated, tooptimizereliability duringadverseweatherconditions.
| |
| NRCFORM366A(592)
| |
| NRC'ORH366A(5.92)U.S~NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSIOH LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOHBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDEHPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYHITHTHISIHFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:50.0NRS.FORNARDCOHHEHTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORHATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSION, UASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERIJORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104), | |
| OFFICEOFHANAGEHENT ANDBUDGETNASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETHUHBER(2)05000244YEAR95LERNUHBER(6)SEQUENTIAL HUNGERREVISIONNUHBER--006--00PAGE(3)8OF8TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:
| |
| NoneB.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:LERs91-002,92-007,and94-012weresimilareventswithsimilarrootcauses(startofanEmergency D/Gduetolossofoffsitepowerfromexternalcauses).C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:
| |
| NoneNRCFORH366A(5-92)}}
| |
LER 95-006-00:on 950630,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost Due to Offsite Lightning Strike & Resulted in Automatic Start of a Edg.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 to Stabilize Plant| ML17264A126 |
| Person / Time |
|---|
| Site: |
Ginna  |
|---|
| Issue date: |
07/31/1995 |
|---|
| From: |
ST MARTIN J T
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
|---|
| To: |
|
|---|
| Shared Package |
|---|
| ML17264A125 |
List: |
|---|
| References |
|---|
| LER-95-006, LER-95-6, NUDOCS 9508090112 |
| Download: ML17264A126 (8) |
|
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|---|
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LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr
ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996
LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed
ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr
ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr
ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr
ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr
ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr
1999-09-22
[Table view]
Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr
ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999
LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians
ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored
ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr
ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr
ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999
LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr
ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr
ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr
ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved
ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr
ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr
ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr
ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr
ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp
ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr
ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery
ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR
ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr
ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998
LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr
ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998
LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells
ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998
LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified
ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998
LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status
ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997
LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr
ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997
LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr
ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997
LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset
ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997
LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage
ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997
LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr
ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997
LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr
ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997
LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr
ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997
LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe
ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997
LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr
ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997
LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr
ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996
LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr
ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996
LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr
ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996
LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr
ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996
LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr
ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996
LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr
ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996
LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr
ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996
LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr
ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996
LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr
ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996
LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr
ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996
LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr
ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996
LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed
ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996
LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr
ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996
LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr
ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996
LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr
ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995
LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr
ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995
LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr
1999-09-22
[Table view]
Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17265A7601999-10-0505 October 1999
Part 21 Rept Re W2 Switch Supplied by W Drawn from Stock, Did Not Operate Properly After Being Installed on 990409. Switch Returned to W on 990514 for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis
ML17265A7621999-09-30030 September 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 991008 Ltr
ML17265A7531999-09-23023 September 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Corrective Action & Closeout of 10CFR21 Rept of Noncompliance Re Unacceptable Part for 30-4 Connector. Unacceptable Parts Removed from Stock & Scrapped
ML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999
LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr
ML17265A7471999-08-31031 August 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990909 Ltr
ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999
LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A7341999-07-31031 July 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990806 Ltr
ML17265A7291999-07-29029 July 1999
Interim Part 21 Rept Re safety-related DB-25 Breaker Mechanism Procured from W Did Not Pas Degradatin Checks When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed Into BUS15/03A.Holes Did Not line-up & Tripper Pan Bent
ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999
LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians
ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999
LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored
ML17265A7131999-07-22022 July 1999
Special Rept:On 990407,radiation Monitor RM-14A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failed Communication Link from TSC to Plant Process Computer Sys.Communication Link Was re-established & RM-14A Was Declaed Operable on 990521
ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999
LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr
ML17265A7211999-07-19019 July 1999
ISI Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999) Third Period, Second Outage (1999) at Re Ginna Npp.
ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999
LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr
ML17265A7661999-06-30030 June 1999
1999 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior NRC Approval for Jan 1998 Through June 1999, Per 10CFR50.59.With 991020 Ltr
ML17265A7011999-06-30030 June 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990712 Ltr
ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999
LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr
ML17265A6761999-06-16016 June 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis
ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999
LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr
ML17265A6681999-05-31031 May 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990608 Ltr
ML17265A6651999-05-27027 May 1999
Interim Rept Re W2 Control Switch,Procured from W,Did Not Operate Satisfactorily When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed in Main Control Board for 1C2 Safety Injection Pump. Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001
ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999
LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr
ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999
LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved
ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999
LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr
ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested
ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999
LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr
ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999
LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed
ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG
ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr
ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999
Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001
ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999
Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp.
ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999
Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment
ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999
Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open
ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999
Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp.
ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr
ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999
LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr
ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999
LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr
ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999
LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp
ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999
Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation.
ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr
ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999
Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr
ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998
Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept.
ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998
Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation.
ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998
LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr
ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998
LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery
ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr
ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998
LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR
ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr
ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998
LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr
ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998
Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr
1999-09-30
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NRC FORM 366 (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORllARD COHMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION, WASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECI'3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.FAcILITY NAHE (1)R.E~Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)10F8 TITLE (4)Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Oue to Offsite Lightning Strike, Results in Automatic Start of>>A>>Emergency Diesel Generator EVENT DATE (5)MONI'H DAY YEAR 06 30 95 YEAR 95 LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--006--REVISION NUMBER 00 HONTH DAY 07 31 YEAR 95 REPORT DATE (7)FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUHBER FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)OPERATING MODE (9)PONER LEVEL (10)N 097 THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT 20.402(b)20.405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(1)(i i)20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a>(1)(v) 20.405(c)50.36(c>(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ri) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 50.73(s)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2>(x) 73.71(b)73.71(c)OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)TO THE REQUIREHE:ITS OF 10 CFR rit (Check one or more)(11)LICENSEE COHTACT FOR THIS LER (12)NAHE John T.St.Hartin-Technical Assistant TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Ares Code)(716)771-3641 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COHPONEHT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COHPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEH COMPOHENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS~EA CBL5 XOOO SUPPLEHEHTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, corrplete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DA'IE).X NO EXPEC'TED SUBHISSION DATE (15>MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)(16)On June 30, 1995, at approximately 1528 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state power, power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was lost, due to a lightning strike on an offsite utility pole for Circuit 751.This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12A and"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18.The"A" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)automatically started and reenergized buses 14 and 18 as per design.There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant and to verify that the"A" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 14 and 18.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V.B.NRC FORM 366 (5 92)9508090ii2 950731 PDR ADQCK 05000244 S PDR NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150 0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORNARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(XQISSION, IIASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AHD BUDGET NASHINGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)RE ED Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95--006--RE VIS IOH NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)20F8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 97%steady state reactor power with no major operational activities in progress.A thunderstorm was in progress in the vicinity of the plant.The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the normal"50%/50%" offsite power lineup: Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer) to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.
Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer) to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.
II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
o June 30, 1995, 1528 EDST: Event date and time.o June 30, 1995, 1528 EDST: Discovery date and time.June 30, 1995, 1528 EDST: Control Room operators verify the"A" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)operation and that safeguards buses 14 and 18 and Instrument Bus"B" are energized.
June 30, 1995, 1702 EDST: Safeguards buses 14 and 18 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"A" Emergency D/G.June 30, 1995, 1708 EDST: The"A" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.June 30, 1995, 1814 EDST: Circuit 751 declared operable.o July 2, 1995, 2343 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the normal n50%/50%" lineup.HRC FORM 366A (5-92)
NRC FORH 366A (5.92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISS ION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 YEAR 95 LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--006--REVISIOH NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)3 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)B.EVENT: On June 30, 1995, at approximately 1528 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state full power, the Control Room received numerous annunciator alarms, including Annunciator E-14 (LOSS B INSTR.BUS).The Control Room operators determined that Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was deenergized, and that"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12A.The"A" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 14 and 18.Buses 14 and 18 had been momentarily deenergized and 120 Volt AC Instrument Bus"B" (powered from bus 14)had also been momentarily deenergized.
The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load.They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant.They verified that the"A" Emergency D/G was operating properly and that safeguards buses 14 and 18 and Instrument Bus"B" were energized.
The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 12A displayed zero (0)voltage.The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted in undervoltage on safeguards buses 14 and 18, and the"A" Emergency D/G automatically started within ten (10)seconds as per design and reenergized these buses.When bus 14 was reenergized, Instrument Bus"B" was also automatically reenergized.
Energy Operations personnel were notified concerning the loss of Circuit 751.Personnel from the"Engineering, Operations, and Gas Services" department investigated field conditions and determined that a lightning strike caused the loss of power from Circuit 751, and determined the location of the lightning strike.The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.l (Restoration of Offsite Power)to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12A and 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18.The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BY to energize bus 12A from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 1557 EDST.At approximately 1702 EDST, safeguards buses 14 and 18 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"A" Emergency D/G.(Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 throughout the event.)NRC FORH 366A (5 92)
HRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AHD TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECt (3140-0104), OFFICE OF DC 20503.MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKEl'UHBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 95--006--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)4OF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additionaI copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)At approximately 1708 EDST, June 30, 1995, the"A" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.Circuit 751 was declared operable at approximately 1814 EDST, but was maintained as the plant's backup supply of offsite power rather than realigning the electrical system during continuing thunderstorm conditions.
C INOPERABLE STRUCTURES I COMPONENTS r OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: The momentary loss of power to buses 14 and 18 (at 1528 EDST)caused the trip of the common sample pump for radioactive effluent monitoring of plant ventilation by channels R-10B (iodine), R-13 (particulate), and R-14 (noble gas).Channel R-14A remained operable, providing monitoring for iodine and noble gases, as required by Technical Specifications Table 3.5-5 Action 4~Channel R-14A also continuously collected samples for particulate monitoring, as required by Table 3.5-5 Action 5 and Table 4.12-2 Item E.The common sample pump was restarted at approximately 1544 EDST.E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
This event was immediately apparent due to Main Control Board alarms and indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.These included Main Control Board Annunciator E-14 (LOSS B INSTR.BUS)and the indicating lights for bus 14 and bus 18 supply breakers.NRC FORH 366A (5-92)
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISS ION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150.0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REOUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555 0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHEN'I AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUHBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER REVI SION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)5OF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)F.OPERATOR ACTION: Following the undervoltage condition on buses 14 and 18, the"A" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the"A" Emergency D/G was operating properly, safeguards buses 14 and 18 were energized, and Instrument Bus"B" was energized.
When Instrument Bus"B" was reenergized, Rod Control generated an automatic signal to move control rods out.The Control Room operator noted this rod motion and tranferred Rod Control to manual.When the automatic signal stabilized, rods were transferred back to automatic (at approximately 1535 EDST).Letdown line flow and pressure were oscillating, and the demand signal for the letdown pressure control valve (PCV-135)was cycling in phase with these oscillations.
PCV-135 was placed in manual to stabilize the letdown line parameters.
Subsequently, PCV-135 was returned to automatic operation after letdown line parameters were stabilized.
The Shift Supervisor notified higher supervision of the loss of Circuit 751, and contacted Energy Operations personnel to determine the problem with Circuit 751.The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767)to buses 14 and 18, stopped the"A" Emergency D/G, and realigned it for auto standby.Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC at approximately 1754 EDST per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii).G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES'll safeguards equipment functioned properly.The"A" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 14 and 18, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 14 and 18 to supply emergency power.Running containment recirculation fans on bus 14 tripped as designed, and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment.
Running service water pumps on bus 18 tripped as designed, and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 18.NRC FORH 366A (5-92)
HRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY IIITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHING'ION, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY HAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUEHTIAL NUMBER--006--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)6OF8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)III.CAUSE OF EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The automatic actuation of the"A" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 14 and 18.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The undervoltage on safeguards buses 14 and 18 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751-was tripping of protective relays for Circuit 751 due to an electrical surge from a lightning strike on an offsite utility pole for Circuit 751.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C), External Cause.This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the"A" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.HRC FORM 366A (5 92)
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS IHFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORHATION AHD RECORDS HANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMHISSION
~WASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR 05000244 g5 LER NUMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER--006--REVI SION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)7 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
o All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.o The"A" Emergency D/G operated as designed by automatically starting and supplying emergency power to safeguards buses 14 and 18.Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the"B" train safeguards buses;subsequently Circuit 767 was lined up to also supply power to the"A" train safeguards buses as permitted by plant technical specifications.
o Radiation monitor channels R-10B, R-13, and R-14 were temporarily lost.Their redundant monitor (R-14A)remained operable during this event, providing radioactive effluent monitoring for plant ventilation.
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS'ffsite power was restored to safeguards buses 14 and 18 from Circuit 767, and the"A" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.The common sample pump for R-10B, R-13 and R-14 was restarted.
B.ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
Options for offsite power configuration to the plant will be reevaluated, to optimize reliability during adverse weather conditions.
NRC FORM 366A (5 92)
NRC'ORH 366A (5.92)U.S~NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY HITH THIS IHFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 NRS.FORNARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, UASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERIJORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET NASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET HUHBER (2)05000244 YEAR 95 LER NUHBER (6)SEQUENTIAL HUNGER REVI SION NUHBER--006--00 PAGE (3)8 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS:
None B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs91-002, 92-007, and 94-012 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None NRC FORH 366A (5-92)