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| {{#Wiki_filter:IpRIORITY 3.(ACCELERATED RZDSPROCESSING) | | {{#Wiki_filter:IpRIORITY 3.(ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSING) |
| REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9509070205 DOC.DATE: | | REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9509070205 DOC.DATE: 95/09/01 NOTARIZED: |
| 95/09/01NOTARIZED: | | NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 P AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T. |
| NODOCKETgFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244PAUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION STMARTIN,J.T.
| | Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C. |
| Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.MECREDY,R.C. | | Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION J OHNSON,A.R. |
| Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION JOHNSON,A.R. | |
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| ==SUBJECT:== | | ==SUBJECT:== |
| LER95-007-00:on 950803,lost powerfrom34.5kVoffsiteowerCircuit751duetooffsiteelectrical'torm, resulting nautomatic startofEDGB.Offsite powerrestored,EDG Bstopped&realigned
| | LER 95-007-00:on 950803,lost power from 34.5 kV offsite ower Circuit 751 due to offsite electrical'torm, resulting n automatic start of EDG B.Offsite power restored,EDG B stopped&realigned&Circuit 751 cleared.W/950901 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTRl ENCL 1 SIZE:!l TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.0 R NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). |
| &Circuit751cleared.W/950901 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRl ENCL1SIZE:!lTITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.0RNOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72). | | 05000244 T RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AE~O/SZD/~B |
| 05000244TRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-1PDINTERNAL:
| | ~ILE CENTER~Rim-B NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY.WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC POORE,W.NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 D,'M)N NOTE TO ALL"RZDS" RECIPIENTS: |
| AE~O/SZD/~B | | PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083) |
| ~ILECENTER~Rim-BNRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: | | TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION.LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 AND ROCHESTER GAS AND ElECTRTC CORPORATTON |
| LSTLOBBY.WARDNOACMURPHY,G.A NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL112211111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1FILE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACPOORE,W.NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1'1111111111111111221111D,'M)NNOTETOALL"RZDS"RECIPIENTS:
| | +89 EASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, M Y 14649.0001 AREA CODE 716 54'6-27N ROBERT C.MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor Operotions September 1, 1995 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R.Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 |
| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFN5D8(415-2083)
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| TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION
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| .LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED: | |
| LTTR26ENCL26 ANDROCHESTER GASANDElECTRTCCORPORATTON
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| +89EASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, MY14649.0001 AREACODE71654'6-27NROBERTC.MECREDYVicePresident NvcleorOperotions September 1,1995U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskAttn:AllenR.JohnsonPWRProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555 | |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| LER95-007,Lossof34.5KVOffsitePowerCircuit751,DuetoOffsiteElectrical Storm,ResultsinAutomatic Startof"B"Emergency DieselGenerator R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)",theattachedLicenseeEventReportLER95-007isherebysubmitted.
| | LER 95-007, Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of"B" Emergency Diesel Generator R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-007 is hereby submitted. |
| Thiseventhasinnowayaffectedthepublic'shealthandsafety.Verytrulyyours,RobertC.Mecredyxc:U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Mr.AllenR.Johnson(MailStop14B2)PWRProjectDirectorate I-1Washington, D.C.20555U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission RegionI475Allendale RoadKingofPrussia,PA19406U.S.NRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector t.(E<~950'9070205 9'50'st01 PDRADOCK05000244~gpssl)
| | This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr.Allen R.Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S.NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector t.(E<~950'9070205 9'50'st01 PDR ADOCK 05000244~gpss l) |
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| HRCFORM366(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY IXNHISSIOH APPROVEDBYNHO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)(Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)ESTIHATED BURDEHPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:50.0HRS.FOR'WARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION" PROJECT(31800104),OFFICEOFHAHAGEHEHT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FAGILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNNIBER(2)05000244PAGE(3)10F10TITLE(4)Lossof34.5KVOffsitePoMerCircuit751,DuetoOffsiteElectrical Storm,ResultsinAutomatic Startof<<B<<Emergency DieselGenerator EVEHTDATE(5)LERNUMBER(6)REPORTDATE(7)OTHERFACILITIES INVOLVED(S)HOHTHDAYYEARYEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTHNUMBERNUHBERDAYFACILITYHAHEYEARDOCKETNUMBER.08039595--007--000901FACILITYNAMEDOCKETHUMBEROPERATING H(NE(9)NTHISREPORTISSUBHITTED PURSUANTTOTHEREQUIREMENTS OF10CFR5.(Checkoneormore)(11)20.402(b) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20.405(c) 73.71(b)POWERLEVEL(10)09720405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(l)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50'3(a)(2)(iii)
| | HRC FORM 366 (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY IXNHISSIOH APPROVED BY N HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)ESTIHATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FOR'WARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION" PROJECT (3180 0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FAGILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NNIBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)10F 10 TITLE (4)Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite PoMer Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of<<B<<Emergency Diesel Generator EVEHT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (S)HOHTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH NUMBER NUHBER DAY FACILITY HAHE YEAR DOCKET NUMBER.08 03 95 95--007--00 09 01 FACILITY NAME DOCKET HUMBER OPERATING H(NE (9)N THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5.(Check one or more)(11)20.402(b)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20.405(c)73.71 (b)POWER LEVEL (10)097 20 405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(l)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50'3(a)(2)(iii) |
| LICENSEECONTACTFORTHISLER(12)50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(c)OTHER(SpecifyinAbstractbelowandinText,HRCForm366A)HAMEJohnT.St.Martin-Technical Assistant TELEPHONE NUMBER(includeAreaCode)(716)771-3641CNIPLETEONELINEFOREACHCOMPONENT FAILUREDESCRIBED INTHISREPORT(13)CAUSESYSTEHCOMPONENT EACBL5HANUFACTURER X000REPORTABLE TONPRDSN,CAUSESYSTEHCOHPOHENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONP)DSSUPPLEHENTAL REPORTEXPECTED(14)YES(Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBHISSION DATE).XHOEXPECTEDSUSHISSIOHDATE(15)MONTHDAYYEARABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typegrittenlines)(16)OnAugust3,1995,atapproximately 1526EDST,withthereactoratapproximately 97%steadystatepower,powerfromCircuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)waslost.Thisresultedindeenergization of4160Voltbus12Band"B"train480Voltsafeguards buses16and17.The"B"Emergency DieselGenerator (D/G)automatically started'nd reenergized buses16and17asperdesign.Therewasnochangeinreactorpowerorturbineload.Immediate corrective actionwastoperformtheappropriate actionsofAbnormalProcedure AP-ELEC.1 (Lossof12AAnd/Or12BBusses)tostabilize theplantandtoverifythatthe"B"Emergency D/Ghadstartedandreenergized buses16and17.ThecauseofthelossofpowerfromCircuit751wasdetermined tobeelectrical stormactivitythataffectedcircuitsatoffsiteStation204andtrippedthe"C"phaseinstantaneous overcurrent protective relayforCircuit751(atStation204),deenergizing thecircuit.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(C).HRCFORH366(5-92)
| | LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(c)OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, HRC Form 366A)HAME John T.St.Martin-Technical Assistant TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)(716)771-3641 CNIPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT EA CBL5 HANUFACTURER X000 REPORTABLE TO NPRDS N, CAUSE SYSTEH COHPOHENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NP)DS SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).X HO EXPECTED SUSHI SSI OH DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typegrit ten lines)(16)On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state power, power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was lost.This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12B and"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)automatically started'nd reenergized buses 16 and 17 as per design.There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant and to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 16 and 17.The cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was determined to be electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).HRC FORH 366 (5-92) |
| HRCFORN366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY C(NHISSIOH LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOIBHO-3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATEO BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0BR'ORWARD COHHEHTSREGARDING BURDENESTINATETOTHEINFORNATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY C(WNISSION
| | HRC FORN 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OIB HO-3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 BR'ORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTINATE TO THE INFORNATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(WNISSION |
| ~WASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150-0104), | | ~WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF NANAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTON DC 20503-FACILITY HAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NWBER (2)05000244 LER NIMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--007--REVISION HUNBER 00 PAGE (3)2 OF 10 TEXT (lf more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 97%steady state reactor power.The"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)had been removed from service earlier on August 3 to perform planned maintenance (and had been declared inoperable at 0422 EDST to perform this maintenance). |
| OFFICEOFNANAGENENT ANDBUDGETWASHIHGTON DC20503-FACILITYHAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNWBER(2)05000244LERNIMBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--007--REVISIONHUNBER00PAGE(3)2OF10TEXT(lfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofHRCForm366A)(17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANTCONDITIONS Theplantwasatapproximately 97%steadystatereactorpower.The"B"Emergency DieselGenerator (D/G)hadbeenremovedfromserviceearlieronAugust3toperformplannedmaintenance (andhadbeendeclaredinoperable at0422EDSTtoperformthismaintenance).
| | By mid-afternoon on August 3, the maintenance had been completed, but the"B" Emergency D/G was still considered inoperable, pending completion of post-maintenance testing.Due to weather conditions (a'hunderstorm was in progress in the vicinity of the plant), testing was being deferred until the thunderstorm passed.The Plant Manager recommended that the"B" Emergency D/G be aligned for auto standby (although still inoperable from an administrative viewpoint) to be an available source of power in the event of a loss of offsite power during the thunderstorm. |
| Bymid-afternoon onAugust3,themaintenance hadbeencompleted, butthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasstillconsidered inoperable, pendingcompletion ofpost-maintenance testing.Duetoweatherconditions (a'hunderstorm wasinprogressinthevicinityoftheplant),testingwasbeingdeferreduntilthethunderstorm passed.ThePlantManagerrecommended thatthe"B"Emergency D/Gbealignedforautostandby(although stillinoperable fromanadministrative viewpoint) tobeanavailable sourceofpowerintheeventofalossofoffsitepowerduringthethunderstorm.
| | Therefore, the"B" Emergency D/G was aligned for auto standby.The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the alternate"50%/50%" offsite power lineup.This configuration uses Circuit 767 (instead of Circuit 751)to supply power to the"A" train of safeguards equipment: |
| Therefore, the"B"Emergency D/Gwasalignedforautostandby.Theoffsitepowerconfiguration totheplantwasinthealternate "50%/50%"offsitepowerlineup.Thisconfiguration usesCircuit767(insteadofCircuit751)tosupplypowertothe"A"trainofsafeguards equipment: | | o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12AX, to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers. |
| oCircuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wassupplying powertothe"B"train480Voltsafeguards buses16and17through34.5KVto4160Volttransformer 12A(12Atransformer),
| | o Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12BY, to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers. |
| viaCircuitBreaker52/12AX,to4160Voltbus12B,andthroughthesafeguards bus4160Voltto480Volttransformers.
| | See the attached sketch of the offsite power distribution system.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES: |
| oCircuit767(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wassupplying powertothe"A"train480Voltsafeguards buses14and18through34.5KVto4160Volttransformer 12B(12Btransformer),
| | o August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Event date and time.August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Discovery date and time.HRC FORN 366A (5-92) |
| viaCircuitBreaker52/12BY,to4160Voltbus12A,andthroughthesafeguards bus4160Voltto480Volttransformers.
| | NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQQII SSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QIB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CONPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS~FORWARD CONNENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714)~U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSIOH |
| Seetheattachedsketchoftheoffsitepowerdistribution system.II.DESCRIPTION OFEVENTA.DATESANDAPPROXIMATE TIMESOFMAJOROCCURRENCES:
| | ~WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAKE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NIHIBER (2)05000244 LER NQIBER (6 SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 95--007--REVISION NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)30F10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Control Room operators verify the"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)operation and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 are energized. |
| oAugust3,1995,1526EDST:Eventdateandtime.August3,1995,1526EDST:Discovery dateandtime.HRCFORN366A(5-92)
| | August 3, 1995, 1628 EDST: Safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.August 3, 1995, 1635 EDST: The"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.o August 3, 1995, 1644 EDST: Circuit 751 was declared operable.August 7, 1995, 1228 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate"50%/50%" lineup.B.EVENT: On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state full power, the Control Room received numerous Main Control Board annunciator alarms.Among these alarms were L-20 (12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE), J-5 (Ill OR g12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH)i J 7 (480V MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP), J-9 (SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP), and J-32 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1B PANEL).The Control Room operators determined that the following events had occurred: o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was deenergized o"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12B (buses 16 and 17 had been momentarily deenergized) o The"B" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 16 and 17 The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load.They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant.They verified that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized. |
| NRCFORH366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY CQQIISSIOHLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYQIBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCONPLYWITHTHISINFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS~FORWARDCONNENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEIHFORHATION ANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714)~U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHNISSIOH
| | The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 12B displayed zero (0)voltage.NRC FORH 366A (5-92) |
| ~WASHINGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150.0104), | | NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQIIISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QIB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECT ION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD CQDIENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE I HFORHAT ION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, WASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104) |
| OFFICEOFHANAGEHENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAKE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNIHIBER(2)05000244LERNQIBER(6SEQUENTIAL NUHBER95--007--REVISIONNUHBER00PAGE(3)30F10TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofHRCForm366A)(17)August3,1995,1526EDST:ControlRoomoperators verifythe"B"Emergency DieselGenerator (D/G)operation andthatsafeguards buses16and17areenergized.
| | ~OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NWER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER NWBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER-007--REVISION NUNBER 00 PAGE (3)4 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted in undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17, and the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started within ten (10)seconds as per design and reenergized these buses.Energy Operations personnel also identified the loss of power from Circuit 751, and promptly notified Ginna Control Room operators of.the loss of power from Circuit 751, which appeared to be caused by an offsite lightning strike that affected Circuit 751.The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration of Offsite Power)to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12B and 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BX to energize bus 12B from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 1602 EDST.At approximately 1628 EDST, safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.(Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18, throughout the event.)At approximately 1635 EDST, August 3;1995, the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, pending performance of the post-maintenance testing.Energy Operations subsequently contacted the Control Room operators and confirmed that the loss of power from Circuit 751 was caused by electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.Relays had been reset at Station 204, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and declared operable at approximately 1644 EDST.Circuit 751 was not immediately |
| August3,1995,1628EDST:Safeguards buses16and17weretransferred toCircuit767fromthe"B"Emergency D/G.August3,1995,1635EDST:The"B"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby.oAugust3,1995,1644EDST:Circuit751wasdeclaredoperable.
| | 'lined up to supply plant loads, but was maintained as the plant's backup supply of offsite power rather than realigning the electrical system during the thunderstorm conditions. |
| August7,1995,1228EDST:Offsitepowerconfiguration wasrestoredtothealternate "50%/50%"lineup.B.EVENT:OnAugust3,1995,atapproximately 1526EDST,withthereactoratapproximately 97%steadystatefullpower,theControlRoomreceivednumerousMainControlBoardannunciator alarms.AmongthesealarmswereL-20(12AXFMROR12ABUSTROUBLE),
| | C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS'R SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None NRC FORH 366A (5-92) |
| J-5(IllORg12TRANSFORMER OUTOFSYNCH)iJ7(480VMAINORTIEBREAKERTRIP),J-9(SAFEGUARD BREAKERTRIP),andJ-32(EMERGENCY DIESELGEN1BPANEL).TheControlRoomoperators determined thatthefollowing eventshadoccurred: | | NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO BY QNI NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY MANE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQIBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)5OF 10 LER NIBIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER YEAR 00--007--ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50 0 HRS.FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MAHAGEMEHT BRANCH (MMBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, NASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERMORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET iJASHINGTON DC 20503.TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of MRC Form 366A)(17)D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: The thunderstorm conditions also affected some.telephone service.At approximately 1539 EDST, the Emergency Notification System (ENS)line for Ginna Station became inoperable. |
| oCircuit751(34.5KVoffsitepowersource)wasdeenergized o"B"train480Voltsafeguards buses16and17hadlosttheirpowersupplyfrom4160Voltbus12B(buses16and17hadbeenmomentarily deenergized) oThe"B"Emergency D/Ghadautomatically startedandwastiedtosafeguards buses16and17TheControlRoomoperators verifiedthatreactorcoolantsystemtemperature andpressurewerestable,andthattherewasnochangeinreactorpowerorturbineload.Theyperformed theappropriate actionsofAbnormalProcedure AP-ELEC.1 (Lossof12AAnd/Or12BBusses)tostabilize theplant.Theyverifiedthatthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasoperating andthatsafeguards buses16and17wereenergized.
| | The Shift Technical Advisor notified the NRC Operations Center and the USNRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector of the loss of the ENS at approximately 1544 EDST.(The ENS was subsequently restored to operable status at approximately 1401 EDST on August 4.)E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY: |
| TheControlRoomoperators observedthatCircuit751andbus12Bdisplayed zero(0)voltage.NRCFORH366A(5-92)
| | This event was immediately apparent due to numerous Main Control Board alarms and other indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.F.OPERATOR ACTION: Following'he undervoltage condition on buses'16 and 17, the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized. |
| NRCFORH366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY CQIIISSIOH LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYQIBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORHATIONCOLLECTIONREQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCQDIENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEIHFORHATIONANDRECORDSHANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSIOH, WASHIHGTOH, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3180-0104)
| | The Control Room operators manually restarted the"B" and"C" containment recirculation fans, which had tripped due to the loss of bus 16.The momentary loss of power to buses 16 and 17 caused the trip of the common sample pump for monitoring of the containment (CNMT)atmosphere by channels R-10A (iodine), R-11 (particulate) and R-12 (noble gas).The Control Room operator manually restarted the common sample pump at approximately 1535 EDST.The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767)to buses 16 and 17, stopped the"B" Emergency D/G, and realigned it for auto standby, prior to starting post-maintenance testing of the D/G.Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC at approximately 1748 EDST per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification. |
| ~OFFICEOFHANAGEHENT ANDBUDGETWASHIHGTOH DC20503.FACILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNWER(2)YEAR0500024495LERNWBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER-007--REVISIONNUNBER00PAGE(3)4OF10TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)ThelossofpowerfromCircuit751resultedinundervoltage onsafeguards buses16and17,andthe"B"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedwithinten(10)secondsasperdesignandreenergized thesebuses.EnergyOperations personnel alsoidentified thelossofpowerfromCircuit751,andpromptlynotifiedGinnaControlRoomoperators of.thelossofpowerfromCircuit751,whichappearedtobecausedbyanoffsitelightning strikethataffectedCircuit751.TheControlRoomoperators referredtoEquipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration ofOffsitePower)torestoreoffsitepowerto4160Voltbus12Band480Voltsafeguards buses16and17.TheControlRoomoperators closed4160Voltcircuitbreaker52/12BXtoenergizebus12BfromCircuit767,viathe12Btransformer, atapproximately 1602EDST.Atapproximately 1628EDST,safeguards buses16and17weretransferred toCircuit767fromthe"B"Emergency D/G.(Circuit767hadremainedinoperation, supplying "A"train480Voltsafeguards buses14and18,throughout theevent.)Atapproximately 1635EDST,August3;1995,the"B"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby,pendingperformance ofthepost-maintenance testing.EnergyOperations subsequently contacted theControlRoomoperators andconfirmed thatthelossofpowerfromCircuit751wascausedbyelectrical stormactivitythataffectedcircuitsatoffsiteStation204andtrippedthe"C"phaseinstantaneous overcurrent protective relayforCircuit751(atStation204),deenergizing thecircuit.RelayshadbeenresetatStation204,andCircuit751wasreenergized anddeclaredoperableatapproximately 1644EDST.Circuit751wasnotimmediately | | HRC FORM 366A (5-92) |
| 'lineduptosupplyplantloads,butwasmaintained astheplant'sbackupsupplyofoffsitepowerratherthanrealigning theelectrical systemduringthethunderstorm conditions. | | NRC FORH.366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS NANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH,'WASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY HAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NINBER (2)05000244 LER NIIIBER (6)S E DUE N T I A L NUHBER--007--REVISION HUNGER 00 PAGE (3)6 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES: |
| C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS'R SYSTEMSTHATCONTRIBUTED TOTHEEVENT:NoneNRCFORH366A(5-92) | | All safeguards equipment functioned properly.The"B" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 16 and 17 to supply emergency power.Running containment recirculation fans on bus 16 tripped as designed and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment. |
| NRCFORM366A(5-92)U.SNUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEOBYQNINO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYMANE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNQIBER(2)05000244PAGE(3)5OF10LERNIBIBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERYEAR00--007--ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYMITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:500HRS.FORMARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMAHAGEMEHT BRANCH(MMBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, NASHIHGTOH, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERMORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3180-0104),
| | The running service water, pump on bus 17 tripped as designed and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 17.III.CAUSE OF EVENT A., IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The automatic actuation of the"B" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing Circuit 751.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C),"External Cause".This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".HRC FORH 366A (5-92) |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETiJASHINGTON DC20503.TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofMRCForm366A)(17)D.OTHERSYSTEMSORSECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
| | NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(HHISSIOM LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY NITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORIIARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS NAMAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/ |
| Thethunderstorm conditions alsoaffectedsome.telephone service.Atapproximately 1539EDST,theEmergency Notification System(ENS)lineforGinnaStationbecameinoperable.
| | IIASHIMGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTOM DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET MINBER (2)05000244 LER MINBER (6 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95--007--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)7OF10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the"B" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions: |
| TheShiftTechnical AdvisornotifiedtheNRCOperations CenterandtheUSNRCGinnaSeniorResidentInspector ofthelossoftheENSatapproximately 1544EDST.(TheENSwassubsequently restoredtooperablestatusatapproximately 1401EDSTonAugust4.)E.METHODOFDISCOVERY:
| | There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the loss of Circuit 751 and start of the Emergency D/G because: All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.Although the maintenance work for the"B" Emergency D/G had been completed, the"B" Emergency D/G remained administratively inoperable. |
| Thiseventwasimmediately apparentduetonumerousMainControlBoardalarmsandotherindications intheControlRoomwhenpowerfromCircuit751waslost.F.OPERATORACTION:Following'he undervoltage condition onbuses'16and17,the"B"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedandreenergized thesebuses.TheControlRoomoperators performed theappropriate actionstoverifythatthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasoperating andsafeguards buses16and17wereenergized.
| | It was available for operation and subsequently functioned as designed to reenergize"B" train safeguards buses 16 and 17.Whi'le in this condition, the plant electrical power system (offsite power sources and the Emergency D/Gs)remained within the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)of Technical Specification (TS)3.7.2.2.b.l, which requires that the"A" Emergency D/G be demonstrated operable within'ne hour of the"B" Emergency D/G being inoperable and at least once per 24 hours thereafter. |
| TheControlRoomoperators manuallyrestarted the"B"and"C"containment recirculation fans,whichhadtrippedduetothelossofbus16.Themomentary lossofpowertobuses16and17causedthetripofthecommonsamplepumpformonitoring ofthecontainment (CNMT)atmosphere bychannelsR-10A(iodine),
| | The"A" Emergency D/G had been demonstrated operable within one hour of 0422 EDST on August 3, so no further actions were required by TS for the short time that, Circuit 751 was also inoperable on August 3;Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the"A" train safeguards buses;subsequently, Circuit 767 was lined up to supply power to the"B" train safeguards buses also, as permitted by TS.HRC FORM 366A (5-92) |
| R-11(particulate) andR-12(noblegas).TheControlRoomoperatormanuallyrestarted thecommonsamplepumpatapproximately 1535EDST.TheControlRoomoperators restoredoffsitepower(fromCircuit767)tobuses16and17,stoppedthe"B"Emergency D/G,andrealigned itforautostandby,priortostartingpost-maintenance testingoftheD/G.Subsequently, theShiftSupervisor notifiedtheNRCatapproximately 1748EDSTper10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii),non-emergency fourhournotification. | | NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQNI SSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORNARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/ |
| HRCFORM366A(5-92)
| | MASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQlBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NIIIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER-007-REVISIOH NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)8 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)o Radiation monitor channels R-10A, R-11, and R-12 were temporarily lost.The common sample pump was manually restarted within a few minutes, which is within the required action time of TS 3.1.5.1.2 to obtain a grab sample at least once every 24 hours.Based on.the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: o Offsite power was restored to safeguards buses 16 and 17 from Circuit 767, and the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, prior to the start of post-maintenance testing of the"B" Emergency D/G.o Circuit 751 was cleared for use by Energy Operations, protective relays for Circuit 751 (at Station 204)were reset by Energy Operations, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and restored to operable status.B.ACTION TAKEN OR PINNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: |
| NRCFORH.366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSIOH LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOHBHO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIHATED BURDENPERRESPOHSETOCOHPLYWITHTHISINFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORWARDCOHHENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEINFORHATIOH ANDRECORDSNANAGEHENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.HUCLEARREGULATORY COHHISSIOH,
| | As stated in LER 95-006, options for offsite power configuration to the plant will be reevaluated to optimize reliability during adverse weather conditions.(Refer to LER 95-006, Revision 0, Docket No.50-244.)The primary option currently being evaluated would use a n100%/0%" offsite power configuration as the preferred configuration, with Circuit 767 normally supplying power to both the"A" and"B" train safeguards buses.NRC FORM 366A (5-92) |
| 'WASHINGTON, OC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT(31500104),OFFICEOFHAHAGENENT ANDBUDGETWASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYHAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNINBER(2)05000244LERNIIIBER(6)SEDUENTIALNUHBER--007--REVISIONHUNGER00PAGE(3)6OF10TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)G.SAFETYSYSTEMRESPONSES: | | NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY llITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REGUEST: 50.0 MRS'ORHARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AHD REQ)RDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, lIASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERlSRK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET HWBER (2)05000244 95 LER MQIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER-007--REVISION HUMBER 00 PAGE (3)9OF10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS: |
| Allsafeguards equipment functioned properly.
| | None B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs 91-002, 92-007, 94-012, and 95-006 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None HRC'ORM 366A (5-92) |
| The"B"Emergency D/Gautomatically startedduetotheundervoltage condition onbuses16and17,displayed propervoltageandfrequency, andreenergized safeguards buses16and17tosupplyemergency power.Runningcontainment recirculation fansonbus16trippedasdesignedandweremanuallyrestarted asneededtorestorenormalcoolingtotheContainment. | | ~MRC FORM 366A (5.92)U.S.MUCI.EAR REGULATORY COWISSIOM APPROVED BY QGI HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQIBER (2)LER NLNBER (6)PAGE (3)10 OF 10 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER YEAR 05000244 g5 00--007--ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUESTS 50.0 FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TNE INFORMATION AllO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (liHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, llASNIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AMD TO THE PAPERUORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104) |
| Therunningservicewater,pumponbus17trippedasdesignedandthepumpselectedforautostart startedwhenpowerwasrestoredtobus17.III.CAUSEOFEVENTA.,IMMEDIATE CAUSE:Theautomatic actuation ofthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasduetoundervoltage onsafeguards buses16and17.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE:Theundervoltage onsafeguards buses16and17wasduetothelossofpowerfromCircuit751.C.ROOTCAUSE:Theunderlying causeofthelossofpowerfromCircuit751waselectrical stormactivitythataffectedcircuitsatoffsiteStation204andtrippedthe"C"phaseinstantaneous overcurrent protective relayforCircuit751(atStation204),deenergizing Circuit751.ThiseventisNUREG-1022 CauseCode(C),"External Cause".Thislossofpowerandsubsequent startofanEmergency D/GdoesnotmeettheNUMARC93-01,"Industry Guideline forMonitoring theEffectiveness ofMaintenance atNuclearPowerPlants",definition ofa"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".
| | I OFF ICE OF NAMAGENEHT AMD BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.TEXT (If more space is required, use additionaL copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)SI>>Ilail 14 C N$1$IN~QfON UW>>ICI>>>>1 St/>>ICI$1 aY ONS 1 Sll 41>>~IW SI.SCC~I>>~I CO>>I IO>>1$111 Sl/~$111 1\~Oil I St>>AN ICNCNONCO 14$>>.SIC~I CC~I CC>>CtlCIOCI 4>>~O&/$Sl/I SOS St/CCSO/S CPS>>/C St/14$ISO>>or/Oalto/Is 11$CSCOTS CCNCO OI/OU$14/ll I4 tCOON~Sl/41$1$$/IC 11St IC St/O/tltO/lt$1/441 SO/tC I CSS IC~IR St/ONS1 4/I 1 St/OI$14/IS~>>I 11$$NC$1/1I$14/I~11$$IC CI~ic>>11 I IO 10~CI, CI C~Ž~I>>IRN ICCICC~ICC>>COI C>>COCA I C>>Sl/OISI 1/I I~I~K St/O>>I I 1/I IC CCI~I IR INNC: OCS~SNCN IC>>ONC SSCIS t>>CC$1/~IS I I/I OS I~IC St/Ohl>>/ICC all>>l NO$1/Olt I tlttO I I IC St/NNCNC IC 1$1 IC (I)CORNO'$1/OI$11/SIC IC Ill IR~CCI OIS 11 St/CNS IC/l IC CC Nt AC (I)CCIN>>IICN C$1/41111/11~I~NC HRC FORM 366A (5-92)}} |
| HRCFORH366A(5-92)
| |
| NRCFORM366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY C(HHISSIOM LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOHBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPOHSETOCOMPLYNITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORIIARDCOMMENTSREGARDIHG BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSNAMAGEMENT BRANCH(HNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION/
| |
| IIASHIMGTOH, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150.0104), | |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETMASHINGTOM DC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETMINBER(2)05000244LERMINBER(6SEQUENTIAL NUMBER95--007--REVISIONNUMBER00PAGE(3)7OF10TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)IV.ANALYSISOFEVENT:Thiseventisreportable inaccordance with10CFR50.73,LicenseeEventReportSystem,item(a)(2)(iv),whichrequiresareportof,"Anyeventorcondition thatresultedinamanualorautomatic actuation ofanyengineered safetyfeature(ESF),including thereactorprotection system(RPS)",inthatthestartingofthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasanautomatic actuation ofanESFsystem.Anassessment wasperformed considering boththesafetyconsequences andimplications ofthiseventwiththefollowing resultsandconclusions:
| |
| Therewerenooperational orsafetyconsequences orimplications attributed tothelossofCircuit751andstartoftheEmergency D/Gbecause:Allreactorcontrolandprotection systemsperformed asdesigned.
| |
| Althoughthemaintenance workforthe"B"Emergency D/Ghadbeencompleted, the"B"Emergency D/Gremainedadministratively inoperable.
| |
| Itwasavailable foroperation andsubsequently functioned asdesignedtoreenergize "B"trainsafeguards buses16and17.Whi'leinthiscondition, theplantelectrical powersystem(offsitepowersourcesandtheEmergency D/Gs)remainedwithintherequirements oftheLimitingCondition forOperation (LCO)ofTechnical Specification (TS)3.7.2.2.b.l, whichrequiresthatthe"A"Emergency D/Gbedemonstrated operablewithin'ne hourofthe"B"Emergency D/Gbeinginoperable andatleastonceper24hoursthereafter.
| |
| The"A"Emergency D/Ghadbeendemonstrated operablewithinonehourof0422EDSTonAugust3,sonofurtheractionswererequiredbyTSfortheshorttimethat,Circuit751wasalsoinoperable onAugust3;Circuit767remainedinoperation supplying powertothe"A"trainsafeguards buses;subsequently, Circuit767waslineduptosupplypowertothe"B"trainsafeguards busesalso,aspermitted byTS.HRCFORM366A(5-92) | |
| NRCFORM366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY CQNISSIONLICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYMITHTHISINFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST:50.0HRS.FORNARDCOHHEHTSREGARDING BURDENESTIHATETOTHEIHFORHATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEHENT BRANCH(MNBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION/
| |
| MASHINGTOH, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3140-0104), | |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETMASHINGTON DC20503FACILITYNAHE(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNQlBER(2)05000244YEARLERNIIIBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER-007-REVISIOHNUHBER00PAGE(3)8OF10TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofHRCForm366A)(17)oRadiation monitorchannelsR-10A,R-11,andR-12weretemporarily lost.Thecommonsamplepumpwasmanuallyrestarted withinafewminutes,whichiswithintherequiredactiontimeofTS3.1.5.1.2 toobtainagrabsampleatleastonceevery24hours.Basedon.theabove,itcanbeconcluded thatthepublic'shealthandsafetywasassuredatalltimes.V.CORRECTIVE ACTIONA.ACTIONTAKENTORETURNAFFECTEDSYSTEMSTOPRE-EVENT NORMALSTATUS:oOffsitepowerwasrestoredtosafeguards buses16and17fromCircuit767,andthe"B"Emergency D/Gwasstoppedandrealigned forautostandby,priortothestartofpost-maintenance testingofthe"B"Emergency D/G.oCircuit751wasclearedforusebyEnergyOperations, protective relaysforCircuit751(atStation204)wereresetbyEnergyOperations, andCircuit751wasreenergized andrestoredtooperablestatus.B.ACTIONTAKENORPINNEDTOPREVENTRECURRENCE:
| |
| AsstatedinLER95-006,optionsforoffsitepowerconfiguration totheplantwillbereevaluated tooptimizereliability duringadverseweatherconditions.
| |
| (RefertoLER95-006,Revision0,DocketNo.50-244.)Theprimaryoptioncurrently beingevaluated wouldusean100%/0%"offsitepowerconfiguration asthepreferred configuration, withCircuit767normallysupplying powertoboththe"A"and"B"trainsafeguards buses.NRCFORM366A(5-92) | |
| NRCFORH366A(5-92)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION APPROVEDBYOMBNO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYllITHTHISINFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REGUEST:50.0MRS'ORHARD COMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTHEINFORMATION AHDREQ)RDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(MHBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, lIASHIHGTON, DC20555-0001 ANDTOTHEPAPERlSRK REDUCTION PROJECT(3180-0104),
| |
| OFFICEOFMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGETMASHINGTON DC20503.FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETHWBER(2)0500024495LERMQIBER(6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER-007--REVISIONHUMBER00PAGE(3)9OF10TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofHRCForm366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILEDCOMPONENTS:
| |
| NoneB.PREVIOUSLERsONSIMILAREVENTS:AsimilarLEReventhistorical searchwasconducted withthefollowing results:LERs91-002,92-007,94-012,and95-006weresimilareventswithsimilarrootcauses(startofanEmergency D/Gduetolossofoffsitepowerfromexternalcauses).C.SPECIALCOMMENTS:
| |
| NoneHRC'ORM366A(5-92)
| |
| ~MRCFORM366A(5.92)U.S.MUCI.EARREGULATORY COWISSIOM APPROVEDBYQGIHO.3150-0104 EXPIRES5/31/95LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITYNAME(1)R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantDOCKETNQIBER(2)LERNLNBER(6)PAGE(3)10OF10SEQUENTIAL NUMBERREVISIONNUMBERYEAR05000244g500--007--ESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPOHSETOCOMPLYMITHTHISINFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUESTS50.0FORMARDCOMMENTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATETOTNEINFORMATION AllORECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCH(liHBB7714),U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION, llASNIHGTOH, DC20555-0001 AMDTOTHEPAPERUORK REDUCTION PROJECT(3150.0104) | |
| IOFFICEOFNAMAGENEHT AMDBUDGETMASHINGTON DC20503.TEXT(Ifmorespaceisrequired, useadditionaL copiesofNRCForm366A)(17)SI>>Ilail14CN$1$IN~QfONUW>>ICI>>>>1St/>>ICI$1aYONS1Sll41>>~IWSI.SCC~I>>~ICO>>IIO>>1$111Sl/~$1111\~OilISt>>ANICNCNONCO 14$>>.SIC~ICC~ICC>>CtlCIOCI4>>~O&/$Sl/ISOSSt/CCSO/SCPS>>/CSt/14$ISO>>or/Oalto/Is11$CSCOTSCCNCOOI/OU$14/llI4tCOON~Sl/41$1$$/IC11StICSt/O/tltO/lt
| |
| $1/441SO/tCICSSIC~IRSt/ONS14/I1St/OI$14/IS~>>I11$$NC$1/1I$14/I~11$$ICCI~ic>>11IIO10~CI,CIC~Ž~I>>IRNICCICC~ICC>>COIC>>COCAIC>>Sl/OISI1/II~I~KSt/O>>II1/IICCCI~IIRINNC:OCS~SNCNIC>>ONCSSCISt>>CC$1/~ISII/IOSI~ICSt/Ohl>>/ICCall>>lNO$1/OltItlttOIIICSt/NNCNCIC1$1IC(I)CORNO'$1/OI$11/SICICIllIR~CCIOIS11St/CNSIC/lICCCNtAC(I)CCIN>>IICN C$1/41111/11~I~NCHRCFORM366A(5-92)}} | |
Similar Documents at Ginna |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A3671998-07-14014 July 1998 LER 98-002-00:on 971019,CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Actuating Function Was Not Operable.Caused by Mispositioned Switch.Revised Procedure CPI-MON-R37.W/980714 Ltr ML17265A1921998-03-11011 March 1998 LER 98-001-00:on 980209,discovered That Boraflex Degradation in SPF Was Greater than Was Assumed.Caused by Dissolution of Boron on Boraflex Matrix,Per 10CFR50.21.Removed Spent Fuel Assemblies from Selected Degraded Storage Rack Cells ML17265A1641998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-007-01:on 971117,reactor Engineer Recognized That Neutron Flux Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel Was Not in Tripped Condition as Required.Caused by Technical Inadequacies.Channel Defeat Will Be Identified ML17265A1601998-02-0606 February 1998 LER 97-006-01:on 971103,verification of B Concentration Was Not Performed Due to Misinterpretation of Event Sequence. Audible Count Rate Function Was Restored to Operable Status ML17264B1441997-12-17017 December 1997 LER 97-007-00:on 971117,NF Low Range Trip Circuitry for Channel N-44 Was Not Placed in Tripped Condition.Caused by Technical Inadequacies in Procedures.Implemented EWR 4862 to Resolve Design deficiency.W/971217 Ltr ML17264B1291997-12-0303 December 1997 LER 97-006-00:on 971103,NIS Audible Count Rate Function Was Inoperable.Caused by Misinterpretation of Event Sequence Due to Not Verifying Boron Concentration.B Verification Occurred Every 12 H Per ITS LCO Action 3.9.2.C.3.W/971203 Ltr ML17264B1271997-12-0101 December 1997 LER 97-005-00:on 971031,undetected Unblocking of SI Actuation Signal Occurred at Low Pressure Condition,Due to Faulty Bistable Which Resulted in Inadvertent SI Actuation Signal.Sias,Ci & CVI Signals Were Reset ML17264B1211997-11-24024 November 1997 LER 97-004-00:on 971024,radiation Monitor Alarm Were Noted Due to Higher than Normal Radioactive Gas Concentration Resulted in Cvi.New R-12 Alarm Setpoint Was Maintained for Duration of Refueling Outage ML17264B0461997-09-29029 September 1997 LER 97-003-01:on 970730,bistable Instrument Trip Setpoint Could Have Exceeded Allowable Value.Caused by Insufficient Existing Margin Between Trip Setpoint & Allowable Value. Held Switches in Tripped configuration.W/970929 Ltr ML17264B0111997-08-27027 August 1997 LER 97-003-00:on 970730,high Steam Flow Bistable Instrument Setpoint Plus Instrument Uncertainty Could Exceed Allowable Value in ITS Was Identified.Caused by Entry Into ITS LCO 3.0.3.Switches Placed in Tripped configuration.W/970827 Ltr ML17264A9941997-08-19019 August 1997 LER 97-002-00:on 970720,34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751 Was Lost.Caused by Automatic Actuation of B Emergency DG Due to Undervoltage on Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.Offsite Power Restored to Safeguards Buses 16 & 17.W/970819 Ltr ML17264A9911997-08-11011 August 1997 LER 96-009-02:on 960723,determined That Leak Rate Outside Containment Was Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Isolated Leak & Cut Out & Replaced Leaking Pipe ML17264A8271997-03-0303 March 1997 LER 97-001-00:on 970131,discovered Service Water Temp Was Less than Specified Value.Caused by non-representative Method of Monitoring.Increased Water Temp in Screenhouse Bay to Greater than 35 Degrees F.W/970303 Ltr ML17264A8071997-01-22022 January 1997 LER 96-015-00:on 961223,discovered Thermally Induced Overpressure Transient Could Occur.Caused by Thermal Expansion of Fluid During Design Basis Accident Condition. Installed Relief Valve on Affected line.W/970122 Ltr ML17264A7471996-11-27027 November 1996 LER 96-013-00:on 961029,circuit Breakers Closed While in Mode 3 & Resulted in Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Personnel Error.Circuit Breakers for MOV-878B & MOV-878D Were re-opened.W/961127 Ltr ML17264A6051996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-012-00:on 960820,feedwater Transient Occurred,Due to Closure of Feedwater Regulating Valve,Causing Lo Lo Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip.Sgs Were Restored & Missing Screw in 1/P-476 Was replaced.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A6061996-09-19019 September 1996 LER 96-009-01:on 960723,leakage Outside Containment Occurred,Due to Weld Defect,Resulting in Leak Rate Greater than Program Limits.Source of Leakage Isolated from RWST by Freeze Seal,Allowing Exit from ITS LCO 3.0.3.W/960919 Ltr ML17264A5911996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-011-00:on 960807,improper Configuration of Circuit Breaker Occurred,Due to Undetected Internal Interference, Resulting in Automatic Start of Both Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Running AFW Pumps Were secured.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5921996-09-0505 September 1996 LER 96-010-00:on 960806,latching of Main Turbine While in Mode 4 Occurred,Due to Defective Procedure,Resulting in Automatic Start of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.Caused by Defective Maint Procedure.Procedure revised.W/960905 Ltr ML17264A5891996-08-22022 August 1996 LER 96-009-00:on 960723,determined Leak on Piping Sys Outside Containment Greater than Program Limit.Caused by Weld Defect.Pipe & Socket Welds Were Cut Out & Replaced. W/960822 Ltr ML17264A5781996-08-0606 August 1996 LER 96-008-00:on 960707,main Feedwater Pump Breakers Opened. Caused by Change in Seal Water Differential Pressure Occurred During Sys Realignment.Afw Flow Controlled as Desired to Maintain S/G level.W/960806 Ltr ML17264A5561996-07-12012 July 1996 LER 96-007-00:on 960612,CR Operators Identified Control Rods Misaligned & Not Moving in Proper Sequence.Caused by Faulty Firing Circuit Card in Rod Control Sys.Faulty Firing Circuit Card in 1BD Power Cabinet replaced.W/960712 Ltr ML17264A5421996-06-20020 June 1996 LER 96-006-00:on 960521,discovered Containment Penetration Not in Required Status.Caused by Personnel Error.Installed Flange Inside Containment Penetration 2.W/960620 Ltr ML17264A5411996-06-17017 June 1996 LER 96-005-00:on 960516,PORC Determined Deficient Procedures Do Not Meet SRs for Testing safety-related Logic Circuits. Caused by Inadequancies in Individual Testing Procedures. Procedures Re Improved TSs revised.W/960617 Ltr ML17264A5051996-05-17017 May 1996 LER 96-003-01:on 960308,identified That Both Pressurizer PORVs Inoperable Concurrently Due to Disconnection of Flex Hose to Both PORV Actuators to Install air-sets for Benchset & Limit Switch Activities.Hpes Completed ML17264A4481996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-003-00:on 960308,both Pressurizer Relief Valves Inoperable.Hpes Evaluation Is Being Conducted to Determined Cause of Event.C/As:Both PORVs restored.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4471996-04-0808 April 1996 LER 96-002-00:on 960307,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump.C/As: Thermography performed.W/960408 Ltr ML17264A4101996-03-18018 March 1996 LER 96-001-00:on 950504,inservice Test Not Performed During Refueling Outage.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Surveillance Frequency.Valve Test Performed & Disassembled. W/960318 Ltr ML17264A2971995-12-14014 December 1995 LER 95-009-00:on 950817,surveillance Was Not Performed Due to Improper Application of TS Requirements Resulting in TS Violation.Testing of MOV-515 Was Performed on 951115.W/ 951214 Ltr ML17264A1711995-09-25025 September 1995 LER 95-008-00:on 950825,secondary Transient Occurred.Caused by Loss of B Condenser Circulating Water Pump That Resulted in Manual Rt.Returned S/G Levels to Normal Operating levels.W/950925 Ltr 1999-09-22
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML17265A7601999-10-0505 October 1999 Part 21 Rept Re W2 Switch Supplied by W Drawn from Stock, Did Not Operate Properly After Being Installed on 990409. Switch Returned to W on 990514 for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A7621999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 991008 Ltr ML17265A7531999-09-23023 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Corrective Action & Closeout of 10CFR21 Rept of Noncompliance Re Unacceptable Part for 30-4 Connector. Unacceptable Parts Removed from Stock & Scrapped ML17265A7541999-09-22022 September 1999 LER 99-011-00:on 990823,small Tears Were Discovered in Flexible Duct Work Connector at Inlet of CR HVAC Sys Return Air Fan (AKF08).Caused by in-leakage Greater than That Assumed.Implemented Temporary Mod 99-029.With 990922 Ltr ML17265A7471999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990909 Ltr ML17265A7431999-08-24024 August 1999 LER 99-004-01:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Chevron Separator Vanes Were Installed Backwards.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg.Moisture Separator Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A7341999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990806 Ltr ML17265A7291999-07-29029 July 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re safety-related DB-25 Breaker Mechanism Procured from W Did Not Pas Degradatin Checks When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed Into BUS15/03A.Holes Did Not line-up & Tripper Pan Bent ML17265A7181999-07-23023 July 1999 LER 99-007-01:on 990423,reactor Trip Occurred Due to Instrument & Control Technicians Inadvertently Pulling Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Channel.Setpoint Adjustments Were Completed by Different Crew of Technicians ML17265A7081999-07-22022 July 1999 LER 98-003-02:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Was Noted Due to Invalid Causes.Caused by Various Degraded Components in CR RM Sys.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored ML17265A7131999-07-22022 July 1999 Special Rept:On 990407,radiation Monitor RM-14A Was Declared Inoperable.Caused by Failed Communication Link from TSC to Plant Process Computer Sys.Communication Link Was re-established & RM-14A Was Declaed Operable on 990521 ML17265A7031999-07-19019 July 1999 LER 99-S01-00:on 990617,determined That Temporary Unescorted Access Had Been Granted to Contractor Employee.Caused by Incomplete Info Re Circumstances of Individual Military Separation.Individual Access Was Revoked.With 990719 Ltr ML17265A7211999-07-19019 July 1999 ISI Rept for Third Interval (1990-1999) Third Period, Second Outage (1999) at Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A7021999-07-15015 July 1999 LER 99-010-00:on 990615,ventilation Isolation of Auxiliary Bldg Occurred When Auxiliary Bldg Gas Radiation Monitor R-14 Reached High Alarm Setpoint.Cr Operators Rest Auxiliary Bldg Ventilation Isolation Signal.With 990715 Ltr ML17265A7661999-06-30030 June 1999 1999 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted Without Prior NRC Approval for Jan 1998 Through June 1999, Per 10CFR50.59.With 991020 Ltr ML17265A7011999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Re Ginna Npp.With 990712 Ltr ML17265A6851999-06-21021 June 1999 LER 99-001-01:on 990222,deficiencies in NSSS Vendor steam- Line Brake Mass & Energy Release Analysis Results in Plant Being Outside Design Bases Occurred.Caused by Deficiencies in W.Temporary Administrative Replaced.With 990621 Ltr ML17265A6761999-06-16016 June 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Defects & noncompliances,10CFR21(d)(3)(ii), Which Requires Written Notification to NRC on Identification of Defect or Failure to Comply. Relays Were Returned to Eaton for Evaluation & Root Cause Analysis ML17265A6661999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-009-00:on 990503,instrumentation Declared Inoperable in Multiple Channels Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts. Caused by Unanticipated High Frequency AC Voltage Ripple. Entered TS LCO 3.0.3.With 990602 Ltr ML17265A6681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990608 Ltr ML17265A6651999-05-27027 May 1999 Interim Rept Re W2 Control Switch,Procured from W,Did Not Operate Satisfactorily When Drawn from Stock to Be Installed in Main Control Board for 1C2 Safety Injection Pump. Estimated That Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17309A6541999-05-27027 May 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990427,overtemperature Delta T Reactor Trip Occurred Due to Faulted Bistable During Calibr of Redundant Channel.Plant Was Stabilized in Mode 3 & Faulted Bistable Was Subsequently Replaced.With 990527 Ltr ML17265A6631999-05-24024 May 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990423,technicians Inadvertently Pulled Fuses from Wrong Nuclear Instrument Cahnnel,Causing Reactor Trip,Due to High Range Flux Trip.Caused by Personnel Error. Labeling Scheme Improved ML17265A6601999-05-21021 May 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990421,start of turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Was Noted.Caused by MOV Being Left in Open Position.Closed Manual Isolation Valve to Secure Steam to Pump.With 990521 Ltr ML17265A6591999-05-17017 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Relay Deficiency Detected During pre-installation Testing.Caused by Incorrectly Wired Relay Coil.Relays Were Returned to Eaton Corp for Investigation. Relays Were Repaired & Retested ML17265A6441999-05-13013 May 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990413,undervoltage Signal of Safeguards Bus During Testing Resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg. Caused by Personnel Error.Blown Fuse Was Replaced & Offsite Power Was Restored to Safeguards Bus 17.With 990513 Ltr ML17265A6431999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990412,discovered That Containment Recirculation Fan Moisture Separator Vanes Were Incorrectly Installed,Per 10CFR21.Caused by Improper Assembly by Mfg. Subject Vanes Were Dismantled & Correctly re-installed ML17265A6381999-05-0707 May 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Replacement Turbocharger Exhaust Turbine Side Drain Port Not Functioning as Design Intended.Caused by Manufacturing Deficiency.Turbocharger Was Reaasembled & Reinstalled on B EDG ML17265A6391999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990510 Ltr ML17265A6361999-04-23023 April 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Power Supply That Did Not Work Properly When Drawn from Stock & Installed in -25 Vdc Slot.Power Supply Will Be Sent to Vendor to Perform Failure Mode Assessment.Evaluation Will Be Completed by 991001 ML17265A6301999-04-18018 April 1999 Rev 1 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6251999-04-15015 April 1999 Special Rept:On 990309,halon Systems Were Removed from Svc & Fire Door F502 Was Blocked Open.Caused by Mods Being Made to CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys.Continuous Fire Watch Was Established with Backup Fire Suppression Equipment ML17265A6551999-04-0909 April 1999 Initial Part 21 Rept Re Mfg Deficiency in Replacement Turbocharger for B EDG Supplied by Coltec Industries. Deficiency Consisted of Missing Drain Port in Intermediate Casing.Required Oil Drain Port Machined Open ML17265A6291999-03-31031 March 1999 Rev 0 to Cycle 28 COLR for Re Ginna Npp. ML17265A6241999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Ginna Station.With 990409 Ltr ML17265A6141999-03-31031 March 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990301,two Main Steam non-return Check Valves Were Declared Inoperable Due to Exceedance of Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Changes in Methodology & Matls.Packing Gland Torque Will Be Adjusted.With 990331 Ltr ML17265A6131999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990227,discovered That Surveillance Had Not Been Performed at Frequency,Per Ts.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure O-6.13 Will Be Evaluated for Enhancement Documentation of Completion of ITS Srs.With 990329 Ltr ML17265A6061999-03-24024 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990222,plant Was Noted Outside Design Basis.Caused by Deficiencies in NSSS Vendor Slb Mass & Energy Release.Placed Temporary Administrative Restriction 40 Degrees F Max on Screenhouse Bay Temp ML17265A5661999-03-0101 March 1999 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A5961999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990310 Ltr ML17265A5371999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 990205 Ltr ML17265A5951998-12-31031 December 1998 Rg&E 1998 Annual Rept. ML17265A5001998-12-21021 December 1998 Rev 26 to QA Program for Station Operation. ML17265A4951998-12-21021 December 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 981120,loss of 34.5 Kv Offsite Power Circuit 751,resulted in Automatic Start of B Edg.Caused by Faulted Cable Splice.Performed Appropriate Actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1.With 981221 Ltr ML17265A4931998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 971030,determined That Improperly Performed Surveillance Resulted in Condition Prohibited by Ts.Caused by Procedure non-adherence.Appropriate Calibr Procedures Were Properly Performed with 24 H of Condition Discovery ML17265A4761998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981210 Ltr ML17265A4691998-11-25025 November 1998 LER 98-003-01:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Systems (Creats) Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Creats Actuation Signal Was Reset & Normal Ventilation Was Restored to CR ML17265A4531998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981110 Ltr ML17265A4271998-10-0505 October 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980904,actuations of CR Emergency Air Treatment Sys Occurred.Caused by Radon build-up During Temp Inversion.Air Samples Were Taken & Determined That Source of Radiation Was Naturally Occurring Radon.With 981005 Ltr ML17265A4291998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Re Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.With 981009 Ltr 1999-09-30
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IpRIORITY 3.(ACCELERATED RZDS PROCESSING)
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9509070205 DOC.DATE: 95/09/01 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET g FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G 05000244 P AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ST MARTIN,J.T.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C.
Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION J OHNSON,A.R.
SUBJECT:
LER 95-007-00:on 950803,lost power from 34.5 kV offsite ower Circuit 751 due to offsite electrical'torm, resulting n automatic start of EDG B.Offsite power restored,EDG B stopped&realigned&Circuit 751 cleared.W/950901 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTRl ENCL 1 SIZE:!l TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.0 R NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).
05000244 T RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD INTERNAL: AE~O/SZD/~B
~ILE CENTER~Rim-B NRR/DISP/PIPB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SPSB/B RES/DSIR/EIB EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY.WARD NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME JOHNSON,A AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DSSA/SPLB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN1 FILE 01 LITCO BRYCE,J H NOAC POORE,W.NUDOCS FULL TXT COPIES LTTR ENCL 1'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 D,'M)N NOTE TO ALL"RZDS" RECIPIENTS:
PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM OWFN 5D8 (415-2083)
TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION.LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26 AND ROCHESTER GAS AND ElECTRTC CORPORATTON
+89 EASTAVENUE, ROCHESTER, M Y 14649.0001 AREA CODE 716 54'6-27N ROBERT C.MECREDY Vice President Nvcleor Operotions September 1, 1995 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Allen R.Johnson PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555
Subject:
LER 95-007, Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite Power Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of"B" Emergency Diesel Generator R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", the attached Licensee Event Report LER 95-007 is hereby submitted.
This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.Very truly yours, Robert C.Mecredy xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr.Allen R.Johnson (Mail Stop 14B2)PWR Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C.20555 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S.NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector t.(E<~950'9070205 9'50'st01 PDR ADOCK 05000244~gpss l)
HRC FORM 366 (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY IXNHISSIOH APPROVED BY N HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)ESTIHATED BURDEH PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FOR'WARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION" PROJECT (3180 0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGEHEHT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FAGILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NNIBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)10F 10 TITLE (4)Loss of 34.5 KV Offsite PoMer Circuit 751, Due to Offsite Electrical Storm, Results in Automatic Start of<<B<<Emergency Diesel Generator EVEHT DATE (5)LER NUMBER (6)REPORT DATE (7)OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (S)HOHTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH NUMBER NUHBER DAY FACILITY HAHE YEAR DOCKET NUMBER.08 03 95 95--007--00 09 01 FACILITY NAME DOCKET HUMBER OPERATING H(NE (9)N THIS REPORT IS SUBHITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5.(Check one or more)(11)20.402(b)50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20.405(c)73.71 (b)POWER LEVEL (10)097 20 405(a)(1)(i)20.405(a)(l)(ii) 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50'3(a)(2)(iii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(x) 73.71(c)OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, HRC Form 366A)HAME John T.St.Martin-Technical Assistant TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code)(716)771-3641 CNIPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEH COMPONENT EA CBL5 HANUFACTURER X000 REPORTABLE TO NPRDS N, CAUSE SYSTEH COHPOHENT HANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NP)DS SUPPLEHENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBHISSION DATE).X HO EXPECTED SUSHI SSI OH DATE (15)MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typegrit ten lines)(16)On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state power, power from Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was lost.This resulted in deenergization of 4160 Volt bus 12B and"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)automatically started'nd reenergized buses 16 and 17 as per design.There was no change in reactor power or turbine load.Immediate corrective action was to perform the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant and to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G had started and reenergized buses 16 and 17.The cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was determined to be electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C).HRC FORH 366 (5-92)
HRC FORN 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(NHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OIB HO-3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATEO BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 BR'ORWARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTINATE TO THE INFORNATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(WNISSION
~WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF NANAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTON DC 20503-FACILITY HAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NWBER (2)05000244 LER NIMBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER--007--REVISION HUNBER 00 PAGE (3)2 OF 10 TEXT (lf more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)I.PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 97%steady state reactor power.The"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)had been removed from service earlier on August 3 to perform planned maintenance (and had been declared inoperable at 0422 EDST to perform this maintenance).
By mid-afternoon on August 3, the maintenance had been completed, but the"B" Emergency D/G was still considered inoperable, pending completion of post-maintenance testing.Due to weather conditions (a'hunderstorm was in progress in the vicinity of the plant), testing was being deferred until the thunderstorm passed.The Plant Manager recommended that the"B" Emergency D/G be aligned for auto standby (although still inoperable from an administrative viewpoint) to be an available source of power in the event of a loss of offsite power during the thunderstorm.
Therefore, the"B" Emergency D/G was aligned for auto standby.The offsite power configuration to the plant was in the alternate"50%/50%" offsite power lineup.This configuration uses Circuit 767 (instead of Circuit 751)to supply power to the"A" train of safeguards equipment:
o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12A (12A transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12AX, to 4160 Volt bus 12B, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.
o Circuit 767 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was supplying power to the"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18 through 34.5 KV to 4160 Volt transformer 12B (12B transformer), via Circuit Breaker 52/12BY, to 4160 Volt bus 12A, and through the safeguards bus 4160 Volt to 480 Volt transformers.
See the attached sketch of the offsite power distribution system.II.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES OF MAJOR OCCURRENCES:
o August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Event date and time.August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Discovery date and time.HRC FORN 366A (5-92)
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQQII SSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QIB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO CONPLY WITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS~FORWARD CONNENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714)~U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHNISSIOH
~WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAKE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NIHIBER (2)05000244 LER NQIBER (6 SEQUENTIAL NUHBER 95--007--REVISION NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)30F10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)August 3, 1995, 1526 EDST: Control Room operators verify the"B" Emergency Diesel Generator (D/G)operation and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 are energized.
August 3, 1995, 1628 EDST: Safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.August 3, 1995, 1635 EDST: The"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby.o August 3, 1995, 1644 EDST: Circuit 751 was declared operable.August 7, 1995, 1228 EDST: Offsite power configuration was restored to the alternate"50%/50%" lineup.B.EVENT: On August 3, 1995, at approximately 1526 EDST, with the reactor at approximately 97%steady state full power, the Control Room received numerous Main Control Board annunciator alarms.Among these alarms were L-20 (12A XFMR OR 12A BUS TROUBLE), J-5 (Ill OR g12 TRANSFORMER OUT OF SYNCH)i J 7 (480V MAIN OR TIE BREAKER TRIP), J-9 (SAFEGUARD BREAKER TRIP), and J-32 (EMERGENCY DIESEL GEN 1B PANEL).The Control Room operators determined that the following events had occurred: o Circuit 751 (34.5 KV offsite power source)was deenergized o"B" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17 had lost their power supply from 4160 Volt bus 12B (buses 16 and 17 had been momentarily deenergized) o The"B" Emergency D/G had automatically started and was tied to safeguards buses 16 and 17 The Control Room operators verified that reactor coolant system temperature and pressure were stable, and that there was no change in reactor power or turbine load.They performed the appropriate actions of Abnormal Procedure AP-ELEC.1 (Loss of 12A And/Or 12B Busses)to stabilize the plant.They verified that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and that safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.
The Control Room operators observed that Circuit 751 and bus 12B displayed zero (0)voltage.NRC FORH 366A (5-92)
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQIIISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY QIB NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHAT ION COLLECT ION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD CQDIENTS REGARDING BURDEN EST IHATE TO THE I HFORHAT ION AND RECORDS HANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH, WASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104)
~OFFICE OF HANAGEHENT AND BUDGET WASHIHGTOH DC 20503.FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NWER (2)YEAR 05000244 95 LER NWBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER-007--REVISION NUNBER 00 PAGE (3)4 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)The loss of power from Circuit 751 resulted in undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17, and the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started within ten (10)seconds as per design and reenergized these buses.Energy Operations personnel also identified the loss of power from Circuit 751, and promptly notified Ginna Control Room operators of.the loss of power from Circuit 751, which appeared to be caused by an offsite lightning strike that affected Circuit 751.The Control Room operators referred to Equipment Restoration procedure ER-ELEC.1 (Restoration of Offsite Power)to restore offsite power to 4160 Volt bus 12B and 480 Volt safeguards buses 16 and 17.The Control Room operators closed 4160 Volt circuit breaker 52/12BX to energize bus 12B from Circuit 767, via the 12B transformer, at approximately 1602 EDST.At approximately 1628 EDST, safeguards buses 16 and 17 were transferred to Circuit 767 from the"B" Emergency D/G.(Circuit 767 had remained in operation, supplying"A" train 480 Volt safeguards buses 14 and 18, throughout the event.)At approximately 1635 EDST, August 3;1995, the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, pending performance of the post-maintenance testing.Energy Operations subsequently contacted the Control Room operators and confirmed that the loss of power from Circuit 751 was caused by electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing the circuit.Relays had been reset at Station 204, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and declared operable at approximately 1644 EDST.Circuit 751 was not immediately
'lined up to supply plant loads, but was maintained as the plant's backup supply of offsite power rather than realigning the electrical system during the thunderstorm conditions.
C.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS'R SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None NRC FORH 366A (5-92)
NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO BY QNI NO.3150-0104 EXP I RES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY MANE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQIBER (2)05000244 PAGE (3)5OF 10 LER NIBIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER YEAR 00--007--ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50 0 HRS.FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MAHAGEMEHT BRANCH (MMBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, NASHIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERMORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET iJASHINGTON DC 20503.TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of MRC Form 366A)(17)D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: The thunderstorm conditions also affected some.telephone service.At approximately 1539 EDST, the Emergency Notification System (ENS)line for Ginna Station became inoperable.
The Shift Technical Advisor notified the NRC Operations Center and the USNRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector of the loss of the ENS at approximately 1544 EDST.(The ENS was subsequently restored to operable status at approximately 1401 EDST on August 4.)E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
This event was immediately apparent due to numerous Main Control Board alarms and other indications in the Control Room when power from Circuit 751 was lost.F.OPERATOR ACTION: Following'he undervoltage condition on buses'16 and 17, the"B" Emergency D/G automatically started and reenergized these buses.The Control Room operators performed the appropriate actions to verify that the"B" Emergency D/G was operating and safeguards buses 16 and 17 were energized.
The Control Room operators manually restarted the"B" and"C" containment recirculation fans, which had tripped due to the loss of bus 16.The momentary loss of power to buses 16 and 17 caused the trip of the common sample pump for monitoring of the containment (CNMT)atmosphere by channels R-10A (iodine), R-11 (particulate) and R-12 (noble gas).The Control Room operator manually restarted the common sample pump at approximately 1535 EDST.The Control Room operators restored offsite power (from Circuit 767)to buses 16 and 17, stopped the"B" Emergency D/G, and realigned it for auto standby, prior to starting post-maintenance testing of the D/G.Subsequently, the Shift Supervisor notified the NRC at approximately 1748 EDST per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(ii), non-emergency four hour notification.
HRC FORM 366A (5-92)
NRC FORH.366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIHATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COHPLY WITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORWARD COHHENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE INFORHATIOH AND RECORDS NANAGEHENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.HUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSIOH,'WASHINGTON, OC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF HAHAGENENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY HAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NINBER (2)05000244 LER NIIIBER (6)S E DUE N T I A L NUHBER--007--REVISION HUNGER 00 PAGE (3)6 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
All safeguards equipment functioned properly.The"B" Emergency D/G automatically started due to the undervoltage condition on buses 16 and 17, displayed proper voltage and frequency, and reenergized safeguards buses 16 and 17 to supply emergency power.Running containment recirculation fans on bus 16 tripped as designed and were manually restarted as needed to restore normal cooling to the Containment.
The running service water, pump on bus 17 tripped as designed and the pump selected for autostart started when power was restored to bus 17.III.CAUSE OF EVENT A., IMMEDIATE CAUSE: The automatic actuation of the"B" Emergency D/G was due to undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17.B.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE: The undervoltage on safeguards buses 16 and 17 was due to the loss of power from Circuit 751.C.ROOT CAUSE: The underlying cause of the loss of power from Circuit 751 was electrical storm activity that affected circuits at offsite Station 204 and tripped the"C" phase instantaneous overcurrent protective relay for Circuit 751 (at Station 204), deenergizing Circuit 751.This event is NUREG-1022 Cause Code (C),"External Cause".This loss of power and subsequent start of an Emergency D/G does not meet the NUMARC 93-01,"Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants", definition of a"Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure".HRC FORH 366A (5-92)
NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY C(HHISSIOM LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OHB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY NITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORIIARD COMMENTS REGARDIHG BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS NAMAGEMENT BRANCH (HNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/
IIASHIMGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTOM DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET MINBER (2)05000244 LER MINBER (6 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 95--007--REVISION NUMBER 00 PAGE (3)7OF10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT: This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv), which requires a report of,"Any event or condition that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature (ESF), including the reactor protection system (RPS)", in that the starting of the"B" Emergency D/G was an automatic actuation of an ESF system.An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
There were no operational or safety consequences or implications attributed to the loss of Circuit 751 and start of the Emergency D/G because: All reactor control and protection systems performed as designed.Although the maintenance work for the"B" Emergency D/G had been completed, the"B" Emergency D/G remained administratively inoperable.
It was available for operation and subsequently functioned as designed to reenergize"B" train safeguards buses 16 and 17.Whi'le in this condition, the plant electrical power system (offsite power sources and the Emergency D/Gs)remained within the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)of Technical Specification (TS)3.7.2.2.b.l, which requires that the"A" Emergency D/G be demonstrated operable within'ne hour of the"B" Emergency D/G being inoperable and at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> thereafter.
The"A" Emergency D/G had been demonstrated operable within one hour of 0422 EDST on August 3, so no further actions were required by TS for the short time that, Circuit 751 was also inoperable on August 3;Circuit 767 remained in operation supplying power to the"A" train safeguards buses;subsequently, Circuit 767 was lined up to supply power to the"B" train safeguards buses also, as permitted by TS.HRC FORM 366A (5-92)
NRC FORM 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY CQNI SSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORHATION COLLECTIOH REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.FORNARD COHHEHTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIHATE TO THE IHFORHATION AND RECORDS MANAGEHENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION/
MASHINGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERNORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3140-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503 FACILITY NAHE (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQlBER (2)05000244 YEAR LER NIIIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUHBER-007-REVISIOH NUHBER 00 PAGE (3)8 OF 10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)o Radiation monitor channels R-10A, R-11, and R-12 were temporarily lost.The common sample pump was manually restarted within a few minutes, which is within the required action time of TS 3.1.5.1.2 to obtain a grab sample at least once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.Based on.the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety was assured at all times.V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A.ACTION TAKEN TO RETURN AFFECTED SYSTEMS TO PRE-EVENT NORMAL STATUS: o Offsite power was restored to safeguards buses 16 and 17 from Circuit 767, and the"B" Emergency D/G was stopped and realigned for auto standby, prior to the start of post-maintenance testing of the"B" Emergency D/G.o Circuit 751 was cleared for use by Energy Operations, protective relays for Circuit 751 (at Station 204)were reset by Energy Operations, and Circuit 751 was reenergized and restored to operable status.B.ACTION TAKEN OR PINNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
As stated in LER 95-006, options for offsite power configuration to the plant will be reevaluated to optimize reliability during adverse weather conditions.(Refer to LER 95-006, Revision 0, Docket No.50-244.)The primary option currently being evaluated would use a n100%/0%" offsite power configuration as the preferred configuration, with Circuit 767 normally supplying power to both the"A" and"B" train safeguards buses.NRC FORM 366A (5-92)
NRC FORH 366A (5-92)U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED BY OMB NO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY llITH THIS INFORHATIOH COLLECTIOH REGUEST: 50.0 MRS'ORHARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AHD REQ)RDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, lIASHIHGTON, DC 20555-0001 AND TO THE PAPERlSRK REDUCTION PROJECT (3180-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET MASHINGTON DC 20503.FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET HWBER (2)05000244 95 LER MQIBER (6)SEQUENTIAL NUMBER-007--REVISION HUMBER 00 PAGE (3)9OF10 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of HRC Form 366A)(17)VI.ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS:
None B.PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: LERs91-002, 92-007,94-012, and 95-006 were similar events with similar root causes (start of an Emergency D/G due to loss of offsite power from external causes).C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None HRC'ORM 366A (5-92)
~MRC FORM 366A (5.92)U.S.MUCI.EAR REGULATORY COWISSIOM APPROVED BY QGI HO.3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant DOCKET NQIBER (2)LER NLNBER (6)PAGE (3)10 OF 10 SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER YEAR 05000244 g5 00--007--ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPOHSE TO COMPLY MITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTIOH REQUESTS 50.0 FORMARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO TNE INFORMATION AllO RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (liHBB 7714), U.S.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, llASNIHGTOH, DC 20555-0001 AMD TO THE PAPERUORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150.0104)
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