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{{#Wiki_filter:pgg-r~~rYWASHINGTON
{{#Wiki_filter:pg g-r~~r Y WASHINGTON
PUBLICPOWERSUPPLYSYSTEMP.O.Box968~Richla>>rl.
PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~Richla>>rl.
i4>a.'i>i>>q>lo>>
i 4>a.'i>i>>q>lo>>
99352-0968
99352-0968
April19,1999G02-99-074
April 19, 1999 G02-99-074
pgpfc)1l'0DocketNo.50-397U.S.NuclearRegulatory
pg p fc)1l'0 Docket No.50-397 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Commission
Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,
Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
DC20555Gentlemen:
Subject: WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21, RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION
Subject:WNP-2,OPERATING
REPORT 50-397/99-01
LICENSENPF-21,RESPONSETONRCINSPECTION
REPORT50-397/99-01
Reference:
Reference:
LetterdatedMarch19,1999,GMGood(NRC)toJVParrish(SupplySystem),"NRCInspection
Letter dated March 19, 1999, GM Good (NRC)to JV Parrish (Supply System),"NRC Inspection
Report50-397/99-01"
Report 50-397/99-01" In the reference the NRC Staff requested that the Supply System provide an evaluation
Inthereference
of our provisions
theNRCStaffrequested
to maintain an adequate level of security.As requested in the reference, this response does not contain safeguards
thattheSupplySystemprovideanevaluation
ofourprovisions
tomaintainanadequatelevelofsecurity.
Asrequested
inthereference,
thisresponsedoesnotcontainsafeguards
information.
information.
TheStaffwasconcerned
The Staff was concerned that the practice of relocating
thatthepracticeofrelocating
armed personnel may invalidate
armedpersonnel
the Supply System's respon'se to the design basis threat of radiological
mayinvalidate
sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a).Also, the Staff noted a difference
theSupplySystem'srespon'se
between the number of armed personnel described in the physical security plan and the number used during the recent Operational
tothedesignbasisthreatofradiological
sabotageasstatedin10CFR73.1(a).Also,theStaffnotedadifference
betweenthenumberofarmedpersonnel
described
inthephysicalsecurityplanandthenumberusedduringtherecentOperational
Safeguards
Safeguards
ResponseEvaluation
Response Evaluation (OSRE).Thus, the Staff questions the Supply System's ability to respond to a design basis threat with the number of armed personnel presently specified in the WNP-2 physical security plan.The Staff did acknowledge
(OSRE).Thus,theStaffquestions
in the reference that subsequent
theSupplySystem'sabilitytorespondtoadesignbasisthreatwiththenumberofarmedpersonnel
to the recent OSRE the Supply System has maintained
presently
an appropriate
specified
number of on-duty armed security personnel inside the protected area.The Supply System has reviewed the Staff's concerns and has determined
intheWNP-2physicalsecurityplan.TheStaffdidacknowledge
that provisions
inthereference
are presently in place to maintain an adequate level of security at WNP-2.Regarding the practice of relocating
thatsubsequent
armed personnel, our compensatory
totherecentOSREtheSupplySystemhasmaintained
measure guidelines
anappropriate
have been changed for specific environmental
numberofon-dutyarmedsecuritypersonnel
insidetheprotected
area.TheSupplySystemhasreviewedtheStaff'sconcernsandhasdetermined
thatprovisions
arepresently
inplacetomaintainanadequatelevelofsecurityatWNP-2.Regarding
thepracticeofrelocating
armedpersonnel,
ourcompensatory
measureguidelines
havebeenchangedforspecificenvironmental
conditions
conditions
sothatfixedcompensatory
so that fixed compensatory
measurepositions
measure positions are no longer required.Regarding our response to a design basis threat with the number of armed personnel specified in our physical security plan, the Supply System has used the consulting
arenolongerrequired.
services of Nuclear Security Services Corporation (NSSC)to review and validate our defense strategy.We have concluded that WNP-2 maintains an appropriate
Regarding
level of security (as presently defined in our physical security plan)to defend against the design basis threat of radiological
ourresponsetoadesignbasisthreatwiththenumberofarmedpersonnel
sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a).Our conclusions
specified
are based, in part, on the following:  
inourphysicalsecurityplan,theSupplySystemhasusedtheconsulting
servicesofNuclearSecurityServicesCorporation
(NSSC)toreviewandvalidateourdefensestrategy.
Wehaveconcluded
thatWNP-2maintains
anappropriate
levelofsecurity(aspresently
definedinourphysicalsecurityplan)todefendagainstthedesignbasisthreatofradiological
sabotageasstatedin10CFR73.1(a).Ourconclusions
arebased,inpart,onthefollowing:  
   
   
,Page2RESPONSETONRCINSPECTION
, Page2 RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION
REPORT99-01~Thenumberofarmedresponsepersonnel
REPORT 99-01~The number of armed response personnel and their locations are adequate to defend against the design basis threat.~The posture of the WNP-2 defensive strategy provides for defense-in-depth
andtheirlocations
and a high probability
areadequatetodefendagainstthedesignbasisthreat.~ThepostureoftheWNP-2defensive
of interdiction, neutralization
strategyprovidesfordefense-in-depth
and survival.~The defensive positions are not predictable
andahighprobability
or exploitable
ofinterdiction,
due to their physical nature and manning requirements.
neutralization
~Armed response personnel now continually
andsurvival.
maintain a defensive posture through validated response times to plant target sets and weapons deployment.
~Thedefensive
This was accomplished, in part, because of changes in the compensatory
positions
measure guidelines
arenotpredictable
as discussed above.~Armed response personnel carry appropriate
orexploitable
response equipment and use appropriate
duetotheirphysicalnatureandmanningrequirements.
defensive cover/positions..
~Armedresponsepersonnel
In summary, the Supply System has a defensive strategy in place to defend against the design basis threat using the number of security forces specified in our physical security plan.Should you have any questions or desire additional
nowcontinually
maintainadefensive
posturethroughvalidated
responsetimestoplanttargetsetsandweaponsdeployment.
Thiswasaccomplished,
inpart,becauseofchangesinthecompensatory
measureguidelines
asdiscussed
above.~Armedresponsepersonnel
carryappropriate
responseequipment
anduseappropriate
defensive
cover/positions..
Insummary,theSupplySystemhasadefensive
strategyinplacetodefendagainstthedesignbasisthreatusingthenumberofsecurityforcesspecified
inourphysicalsecurityplan.Shouldyouhaveanyquestions
ordesireadditional
information
information
regarding
regarding this matter, please call DW Martin at (509)377-8628 or PJ Inserra at (509)377-4147.R.L.Webring Vice President, Operations
thismatter,pleasecallDWMartinat(509)377-8628orPJInserraat(509)377-4147.
R.L.WebringVicePresident,
Operations
Support/PIO
Support/PIO
MailDropPE08REBcc:PPfMerschoff
Mail Drop PE08 REB cc: PPf Merschoff-NRC RIV JS Cushing-NRR NRC Sr.Resident Inspector-927N DL Williams-BPA/399 PD Robinson-Winston&Strawn I
-NRCRIVJSCushing-NRRNRCSr.ResidentInspector
-927NDLWilliams-BPA/399PDRobinson-Winston&StrawnI
   
   
Washington
Washington
PublicPowerSupplySystem-3-DISTRIBUTION
Public Power Supply System-3-DISTRIBUTION
w/cooflicensee's
w/co of licensee's
letterdatedAril191999:DMB(IE04)RegionalAdministrator
letter dated A ril 19 1999: DMB (IE04)Regional Administrator
WNP-2ResidentInspector
WNP-2 Resident Inspector DRP Director DRS-PSB DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)MIS System RIV File Action Item 99-8-0059 (Goines)DOCUMENT NAME: R:QWN2tWN901AK.TWD.WPD
DRPDirectorDRS-PSBDRSDirectorBranchChief(DRP/E)SeniorProjectInspector
To receive co of document, indicate In box: "C"=Co without enclosures"E"~Co with enclosures"N"=No co RIV:PSB E TW Dexter:nh ffl 05/10/99 C:DRS'tPSB
(DRP/E)MISSystemRIVFileActionItem99-8-0059
6MGood 05//99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
(Goines)DOCUMENTNAME:R:QWN2tWN901AK.TWD.WPD
Toreceivecoofdocument,
indicateInbox:"C"=Cowithoutenclosures
"E"~Cowithenclosures
"N"=NocoRIV:PSBETWDexter:nh
ffl05/10/99C:DRS'tPSB
6MGood05//99OFFICIALRECORDCOPY
}}
}}

Revision as of 10:52, 6 July 2018

Responds to NRC 990319 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-397/99-01.Corrective Actions:Provisions Are Presently in Place to Maintain Adequate Level of Security
ML17292B642
Person / Time
Site: Columbia Energy Northwest icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/1999
From: WEBRING R L
WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-397-99-01, 50-397-99-1, GO2-99-074, GO2-99-74, NUDOCS 9904270144
Download: ML17292B642 (5)


See also: IR 05000397/1999001

Text

pg g-r~~r Y WASHINGTON

PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM P.O.Box 968~Richla>>rl.

i 4>a.'i>i>>q>lo>>

99352-0968

April 19, 1999 G02-99-074

pg p fc)1l'0 Docket No.50-397 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject: WNP-2, OPERATING LICENSE NPF-21, RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION

REPORT 50-397/99-01

Reference:

Letter dated March 19, 1999, GM Good (NRC)to JV Parrish (Supply System),"NRC Inspection

Report 50-397/99-01" In the reference the NRC Staff requested that the Supply System provide an evaluation

of our provisions

to maintain an adequate level of security.As requested in the reference, this response does not contain safeguards

information.

The Staff was concerned that the practice of relocating

armed personnel may invalidate

the Supply System's respon'se to the design basis threat of radiological

sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a).Also, the Staff noted a difference

between the number of armed personnel described in the physical security plan and the number used during the recent Operational

Safeguards

Response Evaluation (OSRE).Thus, the Staff questions the Supply System's ability to respond to a design basis threat with the number of armed personnel presently specified in the WNP-2 physical security plan.The Staff did acknowledge

in the reference that subsequent

to the recent OSRE the Supply System has maintained

an appropriate

number of on-duty armed security personnel inside the protected area.The Supply System has reviewed the Staff's concerns and has determined

that provisions

are presently in place to maintain an adequate level of security at WNP-2.Regarding the practice of relocating

armed personnel, our compensatory

measure guidelines

have been changed for specific environmental

conditions

so that fixed compensatory

measure positions are no longer required.Regarding our response to a design basis threat with the number of armed personnel specified in our physical security plan, the Supply System has used the consulting

services of Nuclear Security Services Corporation (NSSC)to review and validate our defense strategy.We have concluded that WNP-2 maintains an appropriate

level of security (as presently defined in our physical security plan)to defend against the design basis threat of radiological

sabotage as stated in 10 CFR 73.1(a).Our conclusions

are based, in part, on the following:

, Page2 RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION

REPORT 99-01~The number of armed response personnel and their locations are adequate to defend against the design basis threat.~The posture of the WNP-2 defensive strategy provides for defense-in-depth

and a high probability

of interdiction, neutralization

and survival.~The defensive positions are not predictable

or exploitable

due to their physical nature and manning requirements.

~Armed response personnel now continually

maintain a defensive posture through validated response times to plant target sets and weapons deployment.

This was accomplished, in part, because of changes in the compensatory

measure guidelines

as discussed above.~Armed response personnel carry appropriate

response equipment and use appropriate

defensive cover/positions..

In summary, the Supply System has a defensive strategy in place to defend against the design basis threat using the number of security forces specified in our physical security plan.Should you have any questions or desire additional

information

regarding this matter, please call DW Martin at (509)377-8628 or PJ Inserra at (509)377-4147.R.L.Webring Vice President, Operations

Support/PIO

Mail Drop PE08 REB cc: PPf Merschoff-NRC RIV JS Cushing-NRR NRC Sr.Resident Inspector-927N DL Williams-BPA/399 PD Robinson-Winston&Strawn I

Washington

Public Power Supply System-3-DISTRIBUTION

w/co of licensee's

letter dated A ril 19 1999: DMB (IE04)Regional Administrator

WNP-2 Resident Inspector DRP Director DRS-PSB DRS Director Branch Chief (DRP/E)Senior Project Inspector (DRP/E)MIS System RIV File Action Item 99-8-0059 (Goines)DOCUMENT NAME: R:QWN2tWN901AK.TWD.WPD

To receive co of document, indicate In box: "C"=Co without enclosures"E"~Co with enclosures"N"=No co RIV:PSB E TW Dexter:nh ffl 05/10/99 C:DRS'tPSB

6MGood 05//99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY