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{{#Wiki_filter:AttachmentAMakethefollowingchangesintheTechnicalSpecification.Removepage3.11-2Insertpage3.11-28401250293840ii8PDR*DOCK05000244PPDR  
{{#Wiki_filter:Attachment AMakethefollowing changesintheTechnical Specification.
~~3.11.23.11.33.11.4e.Charcoaladsorbersshallbeinstalled'ntheventilationsystemexhaustfromthespentfuelstoragepitareaandshallbeoperable.Radiationlevelsinthespentfuelstorageareashallbemonitoredcontinuously.tThetrolleyoftheauxiliarybuildingcraneshallneverbestationedorpermittedtopassoverstoragerackscontainingspentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperatureshallbelimitedto150'F.Basis:Charcoaladsorberswillreducesignificantlytheconsequencesofarefuelingaccidentwhichconsidersthecladfailureofasingleirradiatedfuelassembly.Therefore,charcoaladsorbersshouldbeemployedwheneverirradiatedfuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilationsystemshouldbeoperatinganddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiatedfuel,isfromtheoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperatingfloorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughthe3~112AmendmentNo.21,P4,P5Proposed AppendixBInordertoremovetherestrictionagainstthehandlingofaspentfuelshippingcaskbytheauxiliarybuildingcrane,theproposedmodificationwouldsatisfytherequirementsfordefiningthecranetobesinglefailureproofinaccordancewithNUREG-0554.AccordingtoNUREG-0612,beingabletomovealoadinasinglefailureproofmodeobviatestheneedtoanalyzethecaskdropaccident.The40tonauxiliarybuildingcranehasbeenreanalyzedforamaximumcriticalload(MCL)of30.5tonscharacterizedasaspentfuel*shippingcaskwitharedundantyoke.In=brief,therequiredmodificationincludesthefollowing:1.Replacementofthemainhoistgearbox.2.Replacementofmainhoistdrumwithanewdrumwitha24"pitchdiameter.Thisistoaccommodatethelargerropediameter(3/4")andallowareaonbothendsofthedrumforadiscbrakesystemandanoverspeeddevice.3.Providingamainhoistreevingsystemwithdualropesanda10:1safetyfactor.Thissystemincludesnewhoistrope,hookblock,headblockandequalizerbar.4.TheadditionofaYoungstowntypepowerlimitswitchtobackuptheexistinggeartypecontrollimitswitch.Thisprovidesprotectionagainsttwoblockingforthemainhoist.5.Additionofanoverspeeddevicetomonitordrumspeed.6.Theadditionofcircuitrytopreventbridgeandtrolleytravelwhilethemainhoistisoperating.Thisisforhang-upprotection.7.Theadditionofstructureunderthedrumtopreventitfromdroppingifthedrumshaftfails.8.Providingabrakingsystemapplieddirectlytothedrumwithanoverspeedswitch...Thispreventslossofload.atthedrumifthedrumshaftoranypartofthehoistdrivefails.9..Additionofoverloadsensingdevicetomotorcircuitstoprotecthoistingsystemfromoverloadonloadhangup.10.Additionofafloatingrailclamponthebridgeandtrolleyrailstoholdthemduringaseismicoccurrence.*
Removepage3.11-2Insertpage3.11-28401250293 840ii8PDR*DOCK05000244PPDR  
ll.Installathreephaselimitswitchthatintheeventofonelegofthethreephasepowersupplyde-energizingthebrakesystemwillbeengagedandallmovementoftheloadandhoistsystemwillstop.AnalysishasshownthatthemodifiedcranewillbeabletoholdtheMCIduringnormaloperationandduringtheoccurrenceofasafeshutdownearthquake.Thefollowingtestingwillbecompleted:1.Materialtestinginaccordancewithsection2.4,NUREG-0554.2.Allweldjointswhosefailurecouldresultinthedropofacriticalloadwillbenondestructivelyexamined(Section2.6).3.Apost-modificationtestprogramthatmeetsthegeneralrequirementsofSection8ofNUREG-0554.Sincetheauxiliarybuildingcranewillbesingle-failureproof,nosinglefailurecanresultinafuelcaskdrop.Thereforeafuelcaskdropdoesnotneedtobeanalyzed.WhiletheproposedmodificationwillsatisfytherequirementsofNUREG-0612whilemovingloadsinthesinglefailureproofmode,itmaynot.bepossibletomoveallloadsatalltimesinthismanner.RG6Zwillcontinuetoanalyzeloadsthat,cannotbemovedinasinglefailureproofmodeonacasebycasebasistosatisfytherequirementofNUREG-0612bysomecombinationofloaddropanalysis,loadheightrestrictionsandloadpath.  
~~3.11.23.11.33.11.4e.Charcoaladsorbers shallbeinstalled'n theventilation systemexhaustfromthespentfuelstoragepitareaandshallbeoperable.
~\AttachmentCInaccordancewith10CFR50.91thischangetotheTechnicalSpecificationshasbeenevaluatedagainstthreecriteriatodetermineiftheoperationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwould:l.involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviously'evaluated;or2.createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;or3.involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Asoutlinedbelow,RochesterGas&Electricsubmitsthattheissuesassociatedwiththisamendmentrequestareoutsidethecriteriaof10CFR50.91,andtherefore,anosignificanthazardsfindingiswarranted.ilAttachmentBdiscussesthemodificationtobemadetotheauxiliarybuildingcrane.Theadditionoftheseredundantsafetyfeatureswillpreventthelossofcontrolofaloadshouldthesinglefailureofanycranecomponentoccur.Thereforeanosignificanthazardsfindingiswarrantedforthefollowingreasons:Theprobabilityofaloaddropisdecreased.2.Thepossibilityofacreated.differentkindofaccidentisnot3.ThereisanincreaseinthemarginofsafetyforthemovementofanyloadequaltoorlessthantheMCI.
Radiation levelsinthespentfuelstorageareashallbemonitored continuously.
tThetrolleyoftheauxiliary buildingcraneshallneverbestationed orpermitted topassoverstoragerackscontaining spentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperature shallbelimitedto150'F.Basis:Charcoaladsorbers willreducesignificantly theconsequences ofarefueling accidentwhichconsiders thecladfailureofasingleirradiated fuelassembly.
Therefore, charcoaladsorbers shouldbeemployedwheneverirradiated fuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilation systemshouldbeoperating anddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.
Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiated fuel,isfromtheoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperating floorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughthe3~112Amendment No.21,P4,P5Proposed AppendixBInordertoremovetherestriction againstthehandlingofaspentfuelshippingcaskbytheauxiliary buildingcrane,theproposedmodification wouldsatisfytherequirements fordefiningthecranetobesinglefailureproofinaccordance withNUREG-0554.
According toNUREG-0612, beingabletomovealoadinasinglefailureproofmodeobviatestheneedtoanalyzethecaskdropaccident.
The40tonauxiliary buildingcranehasbeenreanalyzed foramaximumcriticalload(MCL)of30.5tonscharacterized asaspentfuel*shipping caskwitharedundant yoke.In=brief, therequiredmodification includesthefollowing:
1.Replacement ofthemainhoistgearbox.2.Replacement ofmainhoistdrumwithanewdrumwitha24"pitchdiameter.
Thisistoaccommodate thelargerropediameter(3/4")andallowareaonbothendsofthedrumforadiscbrakesystemandanoverspeed device.3.Providing amainhoistreevingsystemwithdualropesanda10:1safetyfactor.Thissystemincludesnewhoistrope,hookblock,headblockandequalizer bar.4.TheadditionofaYoungstown typepowerlimitswitchtobackuptheexistinggeartypecontrollimitswitch.Thisprovidesprotection againsttwoblockingforthemainhoist.5.Additionofanoverspeed devicetomonitordrumspeed.6.Theadditionofcircuitry topreventbridgeandtrolleytravelwhilethemainhoistisoperating.
Thisisforhang-upprotection.
7.Theadditionofstructure underthedrumtopreventitfromdroppingifthedrumshaftfails.8.Providing abrakingsystemapplieddirectlytothedrumwithanoverspeed switch...This preventslossofload.atthedrumifthedrumshaftoranypartofthehoistdrivefails.9..Addition ofoverloadsensingdevicetomotorcircuitstoprotecthoistingsystemfromoverloadonloadhangup.10.Additionofafloatingrailclamponthebridgeandtrolleyrailstoholdthemduringaseismicoccurrence.
* ll.Installathreephaselimitswitchthatintheeventofonelegofthethreephasepowersupplyde-energizing thebrakesystemwillbeengagedandallmovementoftheloadandhoistsystemwillstop.AnalysishasshownthatthemodifiedcranewillbeabletoholdtheMCIduringnormaloperation andduringtheoccurrence ofasafeshutdownearthquake.
Thefollowing testingwillbecompleted:
1.Materialtestinginaccordance withsection2.4,NUREG-0554.
2.Allweldjointswhosefailurecouldresultinthedropofacriticalloadwillbenondestructively examined(Section2.6).3.Apost-modification testprogramthatmeetsthegeneralrequirements ofSection8ofNUREG-0554.
Sincetheauxiliary buildingcranewillbesingle-failure proof,nosinglefailurecanresultinafuelcaskdrop.Therefore afuelcaskdropdoesnotneedtobeanalyzed.
Whiletheproposedmodification willsatisfytherequirements ofNUREG-0612 whilemovingloadsinthesinglefailureproofmode,itmaynot.bepossibletomoveallloadsatalltimesinthismanner.RG6Zwillcontinuetoanalyzeloadsthat,cannotbemovedinasinglefailureproofmodeonacasebycasebasistosatisfytherequirement ofNUREG-0612 bysomecombination ofloaddropanalysis, loadheightrestrictions andloadpath.  
~\Attachment CInaccordance with10CFR50.91thischangetotheTechnical Specifications hasbeenevaluated againstthreecriteriatodetermine iftheoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment would:l.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously
'evaluated; or2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Asoutlinedbelow,Rochester Gas&Electricsubmitsthattheissuesassociated withthisamendment requestareoutsidethecriteriaof10CFR50.91,andtherefore, anosignificant hazardsfindingiswarranted.
ilAttachment Bdiscusses themodification tobemadetotheauxiliary buildingcrane.Theadditionoftheseredundant safetyfeatureswillpreventthelossofcontrolofaloadshouldthesinglefailureofanycranecomponent occur.Therefore anosignificant hazardsfindingiswarranted forthefollowing reasons:Theprobability ofaloaddropisdecreased.
2.Thepossibility ofacreated.different kindofaccidentisnot3.ThereisanincreaseinthemarginofsafetyforthemovementofanyloadequaltoorlessthantheMCI.
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Revision as of 13:57, 29 June 2018

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Deleting Restriction on Movement of Spent Fuel Shipping Casks W/Auxiliary Bldg Crane
ML17255A630
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/18/1984
From:
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17255A628 List:
References
NUDOCS 8401250293
Download: ML17255A630 (6)


Text

Attachment AMakethefollowing changesintheTechnical Specification.

Removepage3.11-2Insertpage3.11-28401250293 840ii8PDR*DOCK05000244PPDR

~~3.11.23.11.33.11.4e.Charcoaladsorbers shallbeinstalled'n theventilation systemexhaustfromthespentfuelstoragepitareaandshallbeoperable.

Radiation levelsinthespentfuelstorageareashallbemonitored continuously.

tThetrolleyoftheauxiliary buildingcraneshallneverbestationed orpermitted topassoverstoragerackscontaining spentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperature shallbelimitedto150'F.Basis:Charcoaladsorbers willreducesignificantly theconsequences ofarefueling accidentwhichconsiders thecladfailureofasingleirradiated fuelassembly.

Therefore, charcoaladsorbers shouldbeemployedwheneverirradiated fuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilation systemshouldbeoperating anddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.

Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiated fuel,isfromtheoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperating floorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughthe3~112Amendment No.21,P4,P5Proposed AppendixBInordertoremovetherestriction againstthehandlingofaspentfuelshippingcaskbytheauxiliary buildingcrane,theproposedmodification wouldsatisfytherequirements fordefiningthecranetobesinglefailureproofinaccordance withNUREG-0554.

According toNUREG-0612, beingabletomovealoadinasinglefailureproofmodeobviatestheneedtoanalyzethecaskdropaccident.

The40tonauxiliary buildingcranehasbeenreanalyzed foramaximumcriticalload(MCL)of30.5tonscharacterized asaspentfuel*shipping caskwitharedundant yoke.In=brief, therequiredmodification includesthefollowing:

1.Replacement ofthemainhoistgearbox.2.Replacement ofmainhoistdrumwithanewdrumwitha24"pitchdiameter.

Thisistoaccommodate thelargerropediameter(3/4")andallowareaonbothendsofthedrumforadiscbrakesystemandanoverspeed device.3.Providing amainhoistreevingsystemwithdualropesanda10:1safetyfactor.Thissystemincludesnewhoistrope,hookblock,headblockandequalizer bar.4.TheadditionofaYoungstown typepowerlimitswitchtobackuptheexistinggeartypecontrollimitswitch.Thisprovidesprotection againsttwoblockingforthemainhoist.5.Additionofanoverspeed devicetomonitordrumspeed.6.Theadditionofcircuitry topreventbridgeandtrolleytravelwhilethemainhoistisoperating.

Thisisforhang-upprotection.

7.Theadditionofstructure underthedrumtopreventitfromdroppingifthedrumshaftfails.8.Providing abrakingsystemapplieddirectlytothedrumwithanoverspeed switch...This preventslossofload.atthedrumifthedrumshaftoranypartofthehoistdrivefails.9..Addition ofoverloadsensingdevicetomotorcircuitstoprotecthoistingsystemfromoverloadonloadhangup.10.Additionofafloatingrailclamponthebridgeandtrolleyrailstoholdthemduringaseismicoccurrence.

  • ll.Installathreephaselimitswitchthatintheeventofonelegofthethreephasepowersupplyde-energizing thebrakesystemwillbeengagedandallmovementoftheloadandhoistsystemwillstop.AnalysishasshownthatthemodifiedcranewillbeabletoholdtheMCIduringnormaloperation andduringtheoccurrence ofasafeshutdownearthquake.

Thefollowing testingwillbecompleted:

1.Materialtestinginaccordance withsection2.4,NUREG-0554.

2.Allweldjointswhosefailurecouldresultinthedropofacriticalloadwillbenondestructively examined(Section2.6).3.Apost-modification testprogramthatmeetsthegeneralrequirements ofSection8ofNUREG-0554.

Sincetheauxiliary buildingcranewillbesingle-failure proof,nosinglefailurecanresultinafuelcaskdrop.Therefore afuelcaskdropdoesnotneedtobeanalyzed.

Whiletheproposedmodification willsatisfytherequirements ofNUREG-0612 whilemovingloadsinthesinglefailureproofmode,itmaynot.bepossibletomoveallloadsatalltimesinthismanner.RG6Zwillcontinuetoanalyzeloadsthat,cannotbemovedinasinglefailureproofmodeonacasebycasebasistosatisfytherequirement ofNUREG-0612 bysomecombination ofloaddropanalysis, loadheightrestrictions andloadpath.

~\Attachment CInaccordance with10CFR50.91thischangetotheTechnical Specifications hasbeenevaluated againstthreecriteriatodetermine iftheoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment would:l.involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously

'evaluated; or2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Asoutlinedbelow,Rochester Gas&Electricsubmitsthattheissuesassociated withthisamendment requestareoutsidethecriteriaof10CFR50.91,andtherefore, anosignificant hazardsfindingiswarranted.

ilAttachment Bdiscusses themodification tobemadetotheauxiliary buildingcrane.Theadditionoftheseredundant safetyfeatureswillpreventthelossofcontrolofaloadshouldthesinglefailureofanycranecomponent occur.Therefore anosignificant hazardsfindingiswarranted forthefollowing reasons:Theprobability ofaloaddropisdecreased.

2.Thepossibility ofacreated.different kindofaccidentisnot3.ThereisanincreaseinthemarginofsafetyforthemovementofanyloadequaltoorlessthantheMCI.

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