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{{#Wiki_filter:AttachmentA1.MakethefollowingchangesintheTechnicalSpecifications.RemoveInsertpages3.11-2through3.11-33.11-5pages3.11-2through3.11-3r8401250301840ii8PDRADOCK05000244PDRj
{{#Wiki_filter:Attachment A1.Makethefollowing changesintheTechnical Specifications.
~C'!~iJl'14 e.Charcoaladsorbersshallbeinstalledintheventilationsystemexhaustfromthespentfuel3.11.2storagepitareaandshallbeoperable.Radiationlevelsinthespentfuelstorageareashall3.11.3bemonitoredcontinuously.Thetrolleyoftheauxiliarybuildingcraneshall3.11.43.11.5neverbestationedorpermittedtopassoverstoragerackscontainingspentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperatureshallbelimitedto150F.Thespentfuelshippingcaskshallnotbecarriedbytheauxiliarybuildingcrane,pendingtheevaluationofthespentfuelcaskdropaccidentandthecranedesignbyRGGEandNRCreviewandapproval.Basis:Charcoaladsorberswillreducesignificantlytheconsequencesofarefuelingaccidentwhichconsidersthecladfailureofasingleirradiatedfuelassembly.Therefore,charcoaladsorbersshouldbeemployedwheneverirradiatedfuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilationsystemshouldbeoperatinganddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiatedfuel,isfromI'theoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperatingfloorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughtheadsorbers,andoutthroughtheventilationsystemexhausttothefacilityvent.Operationofamainauxiliarybuilding3.11-2AmendmentNo.,4,6proposed exhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilationsystemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedto*thefacilityvent.OperationofamainauxiliarybuildingexhaustfanassuresthatairdischargedintothemainventilationsystemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischargedtothefacilityvent.Operationoftheexhaustfanforthespentfuelstoragepitareacausesairmovementontheoperatingfloortobetowardsthepit.Pioperoperationofthefansandsettingofdamperswouldresultinanegativepre'ssureontheoperatingfloorwhichwillcauseairleakagetobeintothebuilding.Thus,theoverallairflowisfromthelocationoflowactivity(outsidethebuilding)totheareaofhighestactivity(spentfuelstoragepit).Theexhaustairflowwouldbethrougharoughingfilterandcharcoalbeforebeingdischargedfromthefacility.Theroughingfilterprotectstheadsorberfrombecomingfouledwithdirt;theadsorberremovesiodine,theisotopeofhighestradiologicalsignificance,resultingfromafuelhandlingaccident.Theeffectivenessofcharcoalfoiremovingiodineisassuredbyhavingahighthroughputandahighremovalefficiency.Thethroughputisattainedbyoperationoftheexhaustfans.Thehighremovalefficiencyisattainedbyminimizingtheamountofiodinethatbypassesthecharcoalandhavingcharcoalwithahighpotenti;alfor'removingtheiodinethat'doespassthroughthecharcoal.3~113AmendmentNo.P1,P6Proposed AttachmentBIn1976,RochesterGas&ElectricreplacedtheoriginalR.E.Ginnaspentfuelstorageracks,increasingthestoragecapacityofthepoolbydecreasingthecenter-to-centerspacingofthestoragelocations.Inevaluatingtheradiologicalconsequencesofmissiles,RG&Eproposedaspentfuelstoragepatternwherebytheprobabilityofamissileimpactonspentfuelthathaddecayedlessthan60dayswasnotincreased.Therefore,thedensityoffissionproductinventorymaintainedinanylocalareawaslessthanthatwhichhadbeenstoredintheoriginalstorageracks.ThiswasacceptedbytheNRCandtherequiredstoragepatternwasincorporatedintotheTechnicalSpecifications(Reference1).Becauseofanticipatedrequirementsuponthestoragecapacityoftheracks,RG&ErequestedU.S.Tool&Die(USTD)toperformananalysisoftheeffectofaverticalandhorizontalimpactofthemissilewiththegreatestpotentialfordamagetotherackandcontainedfuelassemblies(attached).Designvaluesfortornado.windspeedandmissilecharacteristicswerethoseestablishedin'-.theNRCreviewofSystematicEvaluationProgram(SEP)TopicsIII-2,WindandTornadoLoadings,andIII-4.A,TornadoMissiles(Ref.4and5).Thismissileischaracterizedasa1490lb.woodpole,35ft.inlengthwithadiameterof13.5inches.USTDassumedatornadowindvelocityof132mphandaccountedforthedrageffectsofthepoolwaterabovetheracksusingReference3.Theresultsofthisanalysisindicatedthatverticaldefor-mationwouldbenogreaterthan1.40inchesandtherewouldbenodeformationfromahorizontalimpact.Thislimiteddeformationdoesnotchangeappreciablyforhighertornadowindspeeds.Additionalmarginsareavailabletoaccommodatehighertornadowindspeeds.Forexample,calculationsperformedassumingatornadowindspeedof200mphyieldaverticaldeformationof1.8inchesandatworstasmallamountoflocalizedplasticdeformationforahorizontalimpact.Theseresultsareconservativeforthefollowingreasons:1.Theenergyabsorbedbythepoleisneglected.Itislikelythat.uponimpactthepole,would,split,.alongthegrainreducingthefractionoftotalenergyabsorbedbytherack.2.Itisassumedthatthemissileentersthewateratanorientationexposingtheminimumcrosssectionalareaperpendiculartothedirectionoftravel.Foraverticalimpactinthe132mphcase,achangeinthemissileorientationofonly5'oulddecreasethekineticenergyonimpactfrom79,000ft./lb.toapproximately12,000ft./lb.Similarreductionswouldoccurathigherwindspeedsalso.
RemoveInsertpages3.11-2through3.11-33.11-5pages3.11-2through3.11-3r8401250301 840ii8PDRADOCK05000244PDRj
3.Forahorizontalimpact,theincreaseinthedistancethatthemissilemusttravelthroughwaterrelativetoaverticalimpactwasneglected.InOctober1981,theNRCcompletedanevaluationoftheconsequencesofapostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontain-ment(Reference2).In'thisevaluationthestaffcalculatedtheoffsitedoseconsequencesassumingdamagetoalltherodsofonefuelassemblyoccurring100hoursaftershutdown,and100%oftheactivityreleasedfromthepoolwasreleasedtotheatmosphere.TheresultingcalculateddoseattheEABwas96rem.4.3ThisanalysisusedaX/Qvalueof4.8x10sec/mcorres-pondingtoaprobabilitylevelof.5%.TheRG&EsubmittalofJune30,1981forSEPTopicII-2.Cdeterminedthat5thedirectiondependentX/Qat.a5%probabilitylevelis6x10sec/m.Thisvalueisstillveryconservativeandmoreappropriategiventhehighwindsandexcellentdispersionassociatedwithtornadoconditions.Ifthe5%X/Qvaluewasused,thedoseatthe(Exclusion5Areaboundary)EABwouldbereducedbyafactorof8(6x10/4.4x10)resultinginavalueof12remfordamagetoallrodsof=.onefuelassembly100hoursaftershutdown.Theworstpositionforimpactofamissilewouldbecenteredonafuelstoragelocationwhere,becauseofthe13.5inchmissileradiuscomparedtoadiagonaldimensionoftheboxof11.9inches,thecornersoffourotherfuelstoragelocationswouldbedamaged.Becauseofthelimiteddeformationofthestoragebox,itisdifficulttopostulatedamagebeyondtheequivalentofoneassembly.However,evenassumingthatall5fuelassemblieswereseverelydamaged,andthatallfuelassembliescouldbemovedtothespentfuelpoolwithin100hours,andthatall5fuelassemblieswerepeakpowerassemblies,theupperboundonthedoseattheEABwouldbe5x12or60rem.Thisresultiswellwithintheguide-linesof10CFR100(300rem)andislessthanwhattheNRCpreviouslyconsideredacceptableandapprovedforGinnaforthepostulatedfuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment.Thereforeitisacceptabletodeletetherestrictiononstorageofrecentlydischargedfuelinthespentfuelpool.
~C'!~iJl'14 e.Charcoaladsorbers shallbeinstalled intheventilation systemexhaustfromthespentfuel3.11.2storagepitareaandshallbeoperable.
References1.Letter,A.Schwencer,USNRCtoL.D.White,RGSE,November15,1976.2.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield,USNRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,October7,1981.3.D.R.Miller,W.A.Williams,"TornadoProtectionfortheSpentFuelStoragePool,"GeneralElectricAPED-5696,November1968.4.5.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield,USNRCtoJ.E.Maier,RG&E,August22,1983.NUREG-0821,SupplementNo.1,IntegratedPlantSafetyAssessment,SystematicEvaluationProgram,August1983.3}}
Radiation levelsinthespentfuelstorageareashall3.11.3bemonitored continuously.
Thetrolleyoftheauxiliary buildingcraneshall3.11.43.11.5neverbestationed orpermitted topassoverstoragerackscontaining spentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperature shallbelimitedto150F.Thespentfuelshippingcaskshallnotbecarriedbytheauxiliary buildingcrane,pendingtheevaluation ofthespentfuelcaskdropaccidentandthecranedesignbyRGGEandNRCreviewandapproval.
Basis:Charcoaladsorbers willreducesignificantly theconsequences ofarefueling accidentwhichconsiders thecladfailureofasingleirradiated fuelassembly.
Therefore, charcoaladsorbers shouldbeemployedwheneverirradiated fuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilation systemshouldbeoperating anddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.
Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiated fuel,isfromI'theoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperating floorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughtheadsorbers, andoutthroughtheventilation systemexhausttothefacilityvent.Operation ofamainauxiliary building3.11-2Amendment No.,4,6proposed exhaustfanassuresthatairdischarged intothemainventilation systemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischarged to*thefacilityvent.Operation ofamainauxiliary buildingexhaustfanassuresthatairdischarged intothemainventilation systemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischarged tothefacilityvent.Operation oftheexhaustfanforthespentfuelstoragepitareacausesairmovementontheoperating floortobetowardsthepit.Pioperoperation ofthefansandsettingofdamperswouldresultinanegativepre'ssure ontheoperating floorwhichwillcauseairleakagetobeintothebuilding.
Thus,theoverallairflowisfromthelocationoflowactivity(outsidethebuilding) totheareaofhighestactivity(spentfuelstoragepit).Theexhaustairflowwouldbethrougharoughingfilterandcharcoalbeforebeingdischarged fromthefacility.
Theroughingfilterprotectstheadsorberfrombecomingfouledwithdirt;theadsorberremovesiodine,theisotopeofhighestradiological significance, resulting fromafuelhandlingaccident.
Theeffectiveness ofcharcoalfoiremovingiodineisassuredbyhavingahighthroughput andahighremovalefficiency.
Thethroughput isattainedbyoperation oftheexhaustfans.Thehighremovalefficiency isattainedbyminimizing theamountofiodinethatbypassesthecharcoalandhavingcharcoalwithahighpotenti;al for'removing theiodinethat'doespassthroughthecharcoal.
3~113Amendment No.P1,P6Proposed Attachment BIn1976,Rochester Gas&ElectricreplacedtheoriginalR.E.Ginnaspentfuelstorageracks,increasing thestoragecapacityofthepoolbydecreasing thecenter-to-center spacingofthestoragelocations.
Inevaluating theradiological consequences ofmissiles, RG&Eproposedaspentfuelstoragepatternwherebytheprobability ofamissileimpactonspentfuelthathaddecayedlessthan60dayswasnotincreased.
Therefore, thedensityoffissionproductinventory maintained inanylocalareawaslessthanthatwhichhadbeenstoredintheoriginalstorageracks.ThiswasacceptedbytheNRCandtherequiredstoragepatternwasincorporated intotheTechnical Specifications (Reference 1).Becauseofanticipated requirements uponthestoragecapacityoftheracks,RG&Erequested U.S.Tool&Die(USTD)toperformananalysisoftheeffectofaverticalandhorizontal impactofthemissilewiththegreatestpotential fordamagetotherackandcontained fuelassemblies (attached).
Designvaluesfortornado.windspeedandmissilecharacteristics werethoseestablished in'-.theNRCreviewofSystematic Evaluation Program(SEP)TopicsIII-2,WindandTornadoLoadings, andIII-4.A,TornadoMissiles(Ref.4and5).Thismissileischaracterized asa1490lb.woodpole,35ft.inlengthwithadiameterof13.5inches.USTDassumedatornadowindvelocityof132mphandaccounted forthedrageffectsofthepoolwaterabovetheracksusingReference 3.Theresultsofthisanalysisindicated thatverticaldefor-mationwouldbenogreaterthan1.40inchesandtherewouldbenodeformation fromahorizontal impact.Thislimiteddeformation doesnotchangeappreciably forhighertornadowindspeeds.Additional marginsareavailable toaccommodate highertornadowindspeeds.Forexample,calculations performed assumingatornadowindspeedof200mphyieldaverticaldeformation of1.8inchesandatworstasmallamountoflocalized plasticdeformation forahorizontal impact.Theseresultsareconservative forthefollowing reasons:1.Theenergyabsorbedbythepoleisneglected.
Itislikelythat.uponimpactthepole,would,split,.along thegrainreducingthefractionoftotalenergyabsorbedbytherack.2.Itisassumedthatthemissileentersthewateratanorientation exposingtheminimumcrosssectional areaperpendicular tothedirection oftravel.Foraverticalimpactinthe132mphcase,achangeinthemissileorientation ofonly5'oulddecreasethekineticenergyonimpactfrom79,000ft./lb.toapproximately 12,000ft./lb.Similarreductions wouldoccurathigherwindspeedsalso.
3.Forahorizontal impact,theincreaseinthedistancethatthemissilemusttravelthroughwaterrelativetoaverticalimpactwasneglected.
InOctober1981,theNRCcompleted anevaluation oftheconsequences ofapostulated fuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontain-ment(Reference 2).In'thisevaluation thestaffcalculated theoffsitedoseconsequences assumingdamagetoalltherodsofonefuelassemblyoccurring 100hoursaftershutdown, and100%oftheactivityreleasedfromthepoolwasreleasedtotheatmosphere.
Theresulting calculated doseattheEABwas96rem.4.3ThisanalysisusedaX/Qvalueof4.8x10sec/mcorres-pondingtoaprobability levelof.5%.TheRG&Esubmittal ofJune30,1981forSEPTopicII-2.Cdetermined that5thedirection dependent X/Qat.a5%probability levelis6x10sec/m.Thisvalueisstillveryconservative andmoreappropriate giventhehighwindsandexcellent dispersion associated withtornadoconditions.
Ifthe5%X/Qvaluewasused,thedoseatthe(Exclusion5 Areaboundary)
EABwouldbereducedbyafactorof8(6x10/4.4x10)resulting inavalueof12remfordamagetoallrodsof=.onefuelassembly100hoursaftershutdown.
Theworstpositionforimpactofamissilewouldbecenteredonafuelstoragelocationwhere,becauseofthe13.5inchmissileradiuscomparedtoadiagonaldimension oftheboxof11.9inches,thecornersoffourotherfuelstoragelocations wouldbedamaged.Becauseofthelimiteddeformation ofthestoragebox,itisdifficult topostulate damagebeyondtheequivalent ofoneassembly.
However,evenassumingthatall5fuelassemblies wereseverelydamaged,andthatallfuelassemblies couldbemovedtothespentfuelpoolwithin100hours,andthatall5fuelassemblies werepeakpowerassemblies, theupperboundonthedoseattheEABwouldbe5x12or60rem.Thisresultiswellwithintheguide-linesof10CFR100(300rem)andislessthanwhattheNRCpreviously considered acceptable andapprovedforGinnaforthepostulated fuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment.
Therefore itisacceptable todeletetherestriction onstorageofrecentlydischarged fuelinthespentfuelpool.
References 1.Letter,A.Schwencer, USNRCtoL.D.White,RGSE,November15,1976.2.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield, USNRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,October7,1981.3.D.R.Miller,W.A.Williams, "TornadoProtection fortheSpentFuelStoragePool,"GeneralElectricAPED-5696, November1968.4.5.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield, USNRCtoJ.E.Maier,RG&E,August22,1983.NUREG-0821, Supplement No.1,Integrated PlantSafetyAssessment, Systematic Evaluation Program,August1983.3}}

Revision as of 13:57, 29 June 2018

Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Spacing of Recently Discharged Fuel in Spent Fuel Storage Racks
ML17255A636
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Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/18/1984
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ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
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Text

Attachment A1.Makethefollowing changesintheTechnical Specifications.

RemoveInsertpages3.11-2through3.11-33.11-5pages3.11-2through3.11-3r8401250301 840ii8PDRADOCK05000244PDRj

~C'!~iJl'14 e.Charcoaladsorbers shallbeinstalled intheventilation systemexhaustfromthespentfuel3.11.2storagepitareaandshallbeoperable.

Radiation levelsinthespentfuelstorageareashall3.11.3bemonitored continuously.

Thetrolleyoftheauxiliary buildingcraneshall3.11.43.11.5neverbestationed orpermitted topassoverstoragerackscontaining spentfuel.Thespentfuelpooltemperature shallbelimitedto150F.Thespentfuelshippingcaskshallnotbecarriedbytheauxiliary buildingcrane,pendingtheevaluation ofthespentfuelcaskdropaccidentandthecranedesignbyRGGEandNRCreviewandapproval.

Basis:Charcoaladsorbers willreducesignificantly theconsequences ofarefueling accidentwhichconsiders thecladfailureofasingleirradiated fuelassembly.

Therefore, charcoaladsorbers shouldbeemployedwheneverirradiated fuelisbeinghandled.Thisrequiresthattheventilation systemshouldbeoperating anddrawingairthroughtheadsorbers.

Thedesiredairflowpath,whenhandlingirradiated fuel,isfromI'theoutsideofthebuildingintotheoperating floorarea,towardthespentfuelstoragepit,intotheareaexhaustducts,throughtheadsorbers, andoutthroughtheventilation systemexhausttothefacilityvent.Operation ofamainauxiliary building3.11-2Amendment No.,4,6proposed exhaustfanassuresthatairdischarged intothemainventilation systemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischarged to*thefacilityvent.Operation ofamainauxiliary buildingexhaustfanassuresthatairdischarged intothemainventilation systemexhaustductwillgothroughaHEPAandbedischarged tothefacilityvent.Operation oftheexhaustfanforthespentfuelstoragepitareacausesairmovementontheoperating floortobetowardsthepit.Pioperoperation ofthefansandsettingofdamperswouldresultinanegativepre'ssure ontheoperating floorwhichwillcauseairleakagetobeintothebuilding.

Thus,theoverallairflowisfromthelocationoflowactivity(outsidethebuilding) totheareaofhighestactivity(spentfuelstoragepit).Theexhaustairflowwouldbethrougharoughingfilterandcharcoalbeforebeingdischarged fromthefacility.

Theroughingfilterprotectstheadsorberfrombecomingfouledwithdirt;theadsorberremovesiodine,theisotopeofhighestradiological significance, resulting fromafuelhandlingaccident.

Theeffectiveness ofcharcoalfoiremovingiodineisassuredbyhavingahighthroughput andahighremovalefficiency.

Thethroughput isattainedbyoperation oftheexhaustfans.Thehighremovalefficiency isattainedbyminimizing theamountofiodinethatbypassesthecharcoalandhavingcharcoalwithahighpotenti;al for'removing theiodinethat'doespassthroughthecharcoal.

3~113Amendment No.P1,P6Proposed Attachment BIn1976,Rochester Gas&ElectricreplacedtheoriginalR.E.Ginnaspentfuelstorageracks,increasing thestoragecapacityofthepoolbydecreasing thecenter-to-center spacingofthestoragelocations.

Inevaluating theradiological consequences ofmissiles, RG&Eproposedaspentfuelstoragepatternwherebytheprobability ofamissileimpactonspentfuelthathaddecayedlessthan60dayswasnotincreased.

Therefore, thedensityoffissionproductinventory maintained inanylocalareawaslessthanthatwhichhadbeenstoredintheoriginalstorageracks.ThiswasacceptedbytheNRCandtherequiredstoragepatternwasincorporated intotheTechnical Specifications (Reference 1).Becauseofanticipated requirements uponthestoragecapacityoftheracks,RG&Erequested U.S.Tool&Die(USTD)toperformananalysisoftheeffectofaverticalandhorizontal impactofthemissilewiththegreatestpotential fordamagetotherackandcontained fuelassemblies (attached).

Designvaluesfortornado.windspeedandmissilecharacteristics werethoseestablished in'-.theNRCreviewofSystematic Evaluation Program(SEP)TopicsIII-2,WindandTornadoLoadings, andIII-4.A,TornadoMissiles(Ref.4and5).Thismissileischaracterized asa1490lb.woodpole,35ft.inlengthwithadiameterof13.5inches.USTDassumedatornadowindvelocityof132mphandaccounted forthedrageffectsofthepoolwaterabovetheracksusingReference 3.Theresultsofthisanalysisindicated thatverticaldefor-mationwouldbenogreaterthan1.40inchesandtherewouldbenodeformation fromahorizontal impact.Thislimiteddeformation doesnotchangeappreciably forhighertornadowindspeeds.Additional marginsareavailable toaccommodate highertornadowindspeeds.Forexample,calculations performed assumingatornadowindspeedof200mphyieldaverticaldeformation of1.8inchesandatworstasmallamountoflocalized plasticdeformation forahorizontal impact.Theseresultsareconservative forthefollowing reasons:1.Theenergyabsorbedbythepoleisneglected.

Itislikelythat.uponimpactthepole,would,split,.along thegrainreducingthefractionoftotalenergyabsorbedbytherack.2.Itisassumedthatthemissileentersthewateratanorientation exposingtheminimumcrosssectional areaperpendicular tothedirection oftravel.Foraverticalimpactinthe132mphcase,achangeinthemissileorientation ofonly5'oulddecreasethekineticenergyonimpactfrom79,000ft./lb.toapproximately 12,000ft./lb.Similarreductions wouldoccurathigherwindspeedsalso.

3.Forahorizontal impact,theincreaseinthedistancethatthemissilemusttravelthroughwaterrelativetoaverticalimpactwasneglected.

InOctober1981,theNRCcompleted anevaluation oftheconsequences ofapostulated fuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontain-ment(Reference 2).In'thisevaluation thestaffcalculated theoffsitedoseconsequences assumingdamagetoalltherodsofonefuelassemblyoccurring 100hoursaftershutdown, and100%oftheactivityreleasedfromthepoolwasreleasedtotheatmosphere.

Theresulting calculated doseattheEABwas96rem.4.3ThisanalysisusedaX/Qvalueof4.8x10sec/mcorres-pondingtoaprobability levelof.5%.TheRG&Esubmittal ofJune30,1981forSEPTopicII-2.Cdetermined that5thedirection dependent X/Qat.a5%probability levelis6x10sec/m.Thisvalueisstillveryconservative andmoreappropriate giventhehighwindsandexcellent dispersion associated withtornadoconditions.

Ifthe5%X/Qvaluewasused,thedoseatthe(Exclusion5 Areaboundary)

EABwouldbereducedbyafactorof8(6x10/4.4x10)resulting inavalueof12remfordamagetoallrodsof=.onefuelassembly100hoursaftershutdown.

Theworstpositionforimpactofamissilewouldbecenteredonafuelstoragelocationwhere,becauseofthe13.5inchmissileradiuscomparedtoadiagonaldimension oftheboxof11.9inches,thecornersoffourotherfuelstoragelocations wouldbedamaged.Becauseofthelimiteddeformation ofthestoragebox,itisdifficult topostulate damagebeyondtheequivalent ofoneassembly.

However,evenassumingthatall5fuelassemblies wereseverelydamaged,andthatallfuelassemblies couldbemovedtothespentfuelpoolwithin100hours,andthatall5fuelassemblies werepeakpowerassemblies, theupperboundonthedoseattheEABwouldbe5x12or60rem.Thisresultiswellwithintheguide-linesof10CFR100(300rem)andislessthanwhattheNRCpreviously considered acceptable andapprovedforGinnaforthepostulated fuelhandlingaccidentinsidecontainment.

Therefore itisacceptable todeletetherestriction onstorageofrecentlydischarged fuelinthespentfuelpool.

References 1.Letter,A.Schwencer, USNRCtoL.D.White,RGSE,November15,1976.2.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield, USNRC,toJ.E.Maier,RG&E,October7,1981.3.D.R.Miller,W.A.Williams, "TornadoProtection fortheSpentFuelStoragePool,"GeneralElectricAPED-5696, November1968.4.5.Letter,D.M.Crutchfield, USNRCtoJ.E.Maier,RG&E,August22,1983.NUREG-0821, Supplement No.1,Integrated PlantSafetyAssessment, Systematic Evaluation Program,August1983.3

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