ML17265A298

1998 Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted W/O Prior Approval for Aug 1996 Through Dec 1997 Under Provisions of 10CFR50.59.

ML17265A298
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/31/1997
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
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ML17265A297	List: ML17265A296 ML17265A298
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NUDOCS 9805280213
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1998REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGES,TESTS,ANDEXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1996THROUGHDECEMBER1997UNDERTHEPROVISIONS OF10CFR50.59R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTDOCKET-NO.50-244ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION DATEDMAY21,1998'P8052802i3 9'80521PDRADQCK05000244RPDR SEV-105718MONTHFUELCYCLEForeconomical operation ofan18MonthFuelCyclecorepeakingfactorsneededtobeincreased.

Thisrequiresreanalysis ofseveraloftheUFSARChapter15transients.

Sincethetransients werebeingreanalyzed andthesteamgeneiators arebeingreplaceditisappropriate toincludethecharacteristics ofthenewsteamgenerators intheanalysis.

Sincethenewsteamgenerators (RSGs)producehighersteampressureoperation atareducedTavgwouldbeeconomically beneficial.

Therefore, thechangesbeingincorporated intothe18MonthFuelCycleare:~increased corepeakingfactors~incorporation oftheRSGs~TavgwindowThisevaluation waspreviously submitted withthe199610CFR50.59(b)submittal andisbeingrevisedtoincludethefollowing:

AnalysisandStandardReviewPlansupportanupperlimitof10.5pHoncontainment sprayvs.theWestinghouse guideline of10.0pH.Thehigherlimitwouldallowwideningtherangeonsodiumhydroxide concentration.

Increased peakingfactors,Tavgwindow,andcharacteristics oftheBWISGdonotaffecttheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction.

Theyareassumptions usedincalculating theconsequences ofanaccident.

TheTavgwindowwouldallowoperation ataTavgofupto15'FlowerthanthecurrentTavg.Thissmallreduction inTavgdoesnotaffecttheprobability ofanaccident.

Thechangesassociated withthisevaluation havebeenincorporated intothecalculation ofaccidentormalfunction consequences.

Theconsequences meettherequiredacceptance

criteria, thustheconsequences areacceptable.

TheStandardReviewPlanupperpHlimitof10.5resultsinanacceptable probability ofequipment malfunction orfailure.Therefore, replacing theWestinghouse guideline of10.0withtheStandardReviewPlanvalueof10.5isconsistent withtheprobability ofmalfunction orfailuretoacceptable StandardReviewPlanvalues.Anincreaseintheprobability ofmalfunction orfailureonlyresultswhenthe10.5pHvalueisexceeded.

Thenatureofthechangesaddressed bythissafetyevaluation cannotcauseanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated.

Thechangesonlyeffecttheconsequences.

Thechangesaddressed bythissafetyevaluation donotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification becausetheanalysisoftheaccidentconsequences meettherequiredacceptance criteria.

Sinceallacceptance criterion aremetthereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafety.

SEV-1065USEOFMAINFEEDWATER PUMPBREAKERTESTPOSITIONFORIMPROVEDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TABLE3.3.2-1FUNCTION6.FImprovedTechnical Specification (ITS)Table3.3.2-1,Function6.frequiresthatthemotor-driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW)pumpsbecapableofbeingstartedduringMODES1and2uponopeningofbothmainfeedwater (MFW)pumpbreakers.

However,duringMODE2,neitherMFWpumpistypically inserviceuntilapproximately 4%,RTP.Therefore, thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation (SEV)istoevaluatetheuseoftheMFWpumpbreakertestpositionasasufficient meanstomeettherequirements ofITSTable3.3.2-1,Function6.funderconditions whenMFWisnotinservice.ThisSEVwillalsoserveasthebasisforanITSbaseschangetoreflecttheuseoftheMFWpumpbreakertestposition.

Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

TheMFWpumpbreakerpositiononlyimpactstheactuation oftheMDAFWpumpsandthemainfeedwater pumpdischarge valves(MFPDVs).

Thisequipment isonlyusedforaccidentmitigation purposes; therefore, thereisnoincreaseintheprobability ofapreviously analyzedaccident.

Also,'forbothsetsofequipment, ithasbeendemonstrated thattheaccidentanalyses(i.e.,SGTRandMFWandmainsteamlinebreaks)arenotadversely impacted.

Assuch,thereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanaccident.

TheuseoftheMFWpumpbreakerinthetestpositiondoesnotinvolveachangetotheparameters withinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperatedorinthesetpoints whichinitiateprotective ormitigative actions.Thereisalsononewequipment beingpermanently installed asthebreakertestpositioncurrently existsandhasbeenpreviously utilized.

Theuseofthetemporary jumpersdoesnothaveadetrimental impactonthemannerinwhichplantequipment operatesorrespondstoananalyzedevent.Assuch,nonewfailuremodesarebeingintroduced.

Inaddition, thechangedoesnotalterassumptions madeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensing basis.Therefore, thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Themarginofsafetyisdefinedbythedifference betweenthelimitsbasedontruedesignandqualification ofplantequipment (i.e.,pointofequipment failurewithoutanyconservatism applied)andthelimitsimposedbyanalysisorNRCregulations.

Thepointatwhichprotective ormitigative actionsareinitiated mustensurethattheanalytical orNRCimposedlimitisnotexceededandthusreducethespecified marginofsafety.TheproposeduseoftheMFWpumpbreakerinthetestpositioninordertomeetITSTable3.3.2-1,Function6.frequirements doesnotimpactthesefactors.Therearenoequipment performance parameter changesassociated withthischange.Nosetpoints areaffected, andnochangeisbeingproposedintheplantoperational limitsasaresultofthischange.Therefore, thischangedoesnotinvolveareduction inthemarginofsafety.

SEV-1072REPLACEMENT OFMOTORVALVEOPERATORS FORVALVES852AAND852BThisevaluation addresses upgradeofthemotorsforthecoredelugemotoroperatedvalves852Aand852B.Specifically:

1)Replacement ofbreaker52/852AatMCCCposition7J.2)Replacement ofbreaker52/852BatMCCDposition7J..3)Replacement ofthecurrentenvironmentally qualified motorsforvalves852Aand852B(460V,60ft-lbs,1800rpm)withnewenvironmentally qualified motorsratedfor460V,60ft-lbs,3600rpm.4)Replacement ofallexistinginterconnecting 10gaugecablefromtheMCCtothevalvemotorwithnew2gaugecable.Allnewcableandsplicesincontainment areenvironmentally qualified.

5)Therevisedcableroutingwillutilizecontainment penetrations AE-6andCE-20inlieuofthecurrentpenetrations AE-3andCE-23.6)Changingoftheexistinggearsonthevalveoperators toincreasethegearratiofromthecurrent27.2:1to60.15:1.Willtheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanyaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbeincreased?

Thechangesevaluated heredonotincreasetheprobability offailureofanyequipment important tosafety.Bymaintaining thedesignbasisofallsystemsthepotential consequences'f accidents evaluated intheUFSARareunchanged.

Willthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecreated?Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofanysystemfailurethatcouldinitiateanaccident, andtherefore thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheUFSARcannotbecreatedasaresultofthischange.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification bereduced?TheproposedchangesdonotaffectthebasisofanyTechnical Specification.

Therefore themarginofsafetyisnotreduced.

00 SEV-1073MDAFWDISCHARGE VALVESThepurposeofthissafetyevaluation (SEV)isasfollows:Determine ifmanualactionsareadequatetomeetmotor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW)requirements withreactorpower~5%(i.e.,inMODES2and3).Specifically, thisSEVdocuments theacceptability ofmanuallyopeningandthrottling MOVs4007and4008duringMODEs2and3.b.Determine ifsettingtheflowcontrollogicfor4007and4008priortoMODE1isacceptable sincesteamgenerator (SG)pressures aredifferent betweenlowpowerandfullpowerconditions.

Determine ifdelayingAFWflowinjection intotheSGsfor10minutesduringadesignbasisaccidentortransient inMODE1isacceptable.

Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

TheAFWSystemisonlyusedtomitigatetheconsequences ofanaccident, andassuch,theproposeduseof4007and4008doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccident.

Allaccidents andtransients whichcredittheuseofAFWhavebeenreviewedtodetermine thattheexistingUFSARanalysesremainbounding.

Therefore, thereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanyanalyzedaccident.

Theproposeduseof4007and4008willnotaddanynewequipment toGinnaStationanddoesnotresultinanychangestoinstalled controlcircuitry.

Thereisnoalteration totheparameters

'ithinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperatedorinthesetpoints whichinitiateprotective ormitigative actions.Thechangesdonothaveadetrimental impactonthemannerinwhichplantequipment operatesorrespondstoananalyzedevent.Assuch,nonewfailuremodesarebeingintroduced.

Inaddition, thechangedoesnotalterassumptions madeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensing basis.Therefore, thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Themarginofsafetyisdefinedbythedifference betweenlimitsbasedontruedesignandqualification ofplantequipment (i.e.,pointofequipment failurewithoutanyconservatism applied)andthelimitsimposedbyanalysisorNRCregulations.

Thepointatwhichprotective ormitigative actionsareinitiated mustensurethattheanalytical orNRCimposedlimitisnotexceededandthusreducethespecified marginofsafety.TheproposeduseoftheAFWdischarge valvesdoesnotimpactthesefactors.Therearenoequipment performance parameter changesassociated withthisSEV.Nosetpoints areaffected, andnochangeisbeingproposedintheplantoperational limitsasaresultofthischange.Therefore, thischangedoesnotinvolveareduction inthemarginofsafety.

0 SEV-1074THROTTLING OFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMVALVES4011AND4012Thisevaluation addresses positioning oftheauxiliary feedwater systemvalves4011and4012inathrottled (lessthanfullopen)position.

Thepurposeofthischangeistoprovideadditional hydraulic resistance inthemotordrivenauxiliary feedwater pumpdeliverylinestolowerthepressuredropacrosstheflowcontrolvalves4007,4008whichwillimprovetheflowcontrolcharacteristics ofthesevalves.Thethrottlepositionwillbedetermined asfollows:Athotzeropowerconditions (Sgpressure=1005psig)amotordrivenauxiliary feedwater pumpwillbestarted.2)Bymanualoperation oftheassociated motoroperatedflowcontrolvalve(4007or4008)andthemanualglobevalve(4011or4012)aflowof240gpmwillbeestablished withtheassociated MOV(4007or4008)inthefullopenposition.

3)Theassociated manualvalvewillbesecuredinthisposition.

Willtheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanyaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbeincreased?

Thechangesevaluated heredonotincreasetheprobability offailureofanyequipment important tosafety.Bymaintaining thedesignbasisofallsystemsthepotential consequences ofaccidents evaluated intheUFSARareunchanged.

Willthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecreated?Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofanysystemfailurethatcouldinitiateanaccidentinthatthedesignrequirements continuetobemetandtherefore thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheUFSARcannotbecreatedasaresultofthischange.WillthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification bereduced?TheproposedchangesdonotaffectthebasisofanyTechnical Specification.

Therefore themarginofsafetyisnotreduced.

SEV-1075REPOSITIONING VALVES880BAND880CTheSafetyInjection Accumulators arelosinglevelthroughreliefvalve887tothePressurizer ReliefTankatarateof.07GPM.Thisrequirestheaccumulators tobefilled.two timesadaytomaintaintherequiredTechnical Specification minimumlevel.Nonintrusive methodstoseatthereliefvalveand/orAOV's839A,839B,840Aand840Bhavebeenunsuccessful.

Replacement ofthereliefvalvewouldrequiretheplanttobeincoldshutdow'n sincethevalveislocatedinsidethemissilewalladjacenttothepressurizer andisunisolatable fromtheSafetyInjection system.Thisproposedchangewouldclosethenormallylockedopen880Band880Cvalvestoisolatethereliefvalvefromtheaccumulators, thusremovingtheoverpressure protection capacityfortheclass1501pipingbetweenthetestlineAOV'sandthe880valves.Thischangeisbeingimplemented toreduceunnecessary startsandruntimeoftheSafetyInjection Pumpswhicharerequiredtofilltheaccumulators.

Thischangewastemporary innatureuntilanappropriate timewhenRV887couldberepairedorreplaced.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthe'UFSAR arenotincreased bythischangebecauseoperation anddesignoftheSafetyInjection systemhasnotchanged.Thetestlineisnormallyisolatedduringoperation andisnotcreditedduringsafetyinjection.

Thevalvesaremanualandhavenoautomatic actionsandarenotmanipulated orrelieduponbyoperations foranyevents.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbythischangebecausethischangedoesnotchangedesignoroperation oftheSafetyInjection system.Thedesignpressurecapability oftheportionofpipingwhichcouldbeexposedtoRCSpressurehasbeenshowntobeadequate.

Thereliefcapability oftheSafetyInjection discharge pipingandtestlinedownstream ofvalves880Band880Cisstillpreserved byRV887and,hence,noneweventiscreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification isnotchangedbytherepositioning ofthesevalvesbecausealltechnical specifications requirements arestillsatisfied.

SEV-1076SAFETYINJECTION PUMPTESTINGWITHSITESTLINEOPENThepurposeofthissafetyevaluation istodetermine theeffectonhighheadsafetyinjection flowduringtheperiodictestingphaseduringwhichthe3/4-inchSItestlinesareintheopenposition.

Duringnormalplantoperation, thetestlinesareclosed,i.e.valves879,879C,and884areclosed.TheSItestlinesaredepictedonPAID33013-1262, Sheets1and2.TSR96-122wasinitiated todetermine theeffectonflowdeliverytotheRCSbythehighheadsafetyinjection systemduringaccidentconditions.

EachSItraincontainsa3/4-inchtestlineinsidethecontainment boundarythatbranchesfromthemain4-inchSIinjection line,arethenheaderedtogether, passthroughthreemanualvalves,andultimately tiebacktothenormalpumpmini-flowrecirculation system's2-inchlinethatleadstotheRWST.Thenormalsystemconfiguration isnotbeingchanged,sinceSItestlineswillcontinuetobeclosedduringoperation otherthanperiodictesting.DuringperiodictestingoftheSIpumps,thetestlinemanualvalvesareopenedinordertoincreasetheflowoftheSIpumpto150gpm.ThatvaluewaschosenbyRGEcEinordertoattempttominimizethepotential foragerelateddegradation ofthepumpsduringtheirtesting.Thepumpvendorrecommended aflowof1/3ofBEP(bestefficiency point)flowforcontinuous operation, whichwouldcorrespond to150gpm.Althoughthetestingcertainly doesnotconstitute continuous operation, itwaschosenasaconservative value,andthesystemcouldaccommodate thatflowbyopeningthetestline.Thenormalrecirculation systemwasdesignedtoprovidearecirculation flownearbutnottoexceed100gpm,andcurrently providesintheorderof90gpm,usingafixedorifice.(Themaximumvaluewasestablished inordertoensuretherequiredSIdeliverytotheRCSduringdesignbasisaccidents).

Openingthetestlineandthrottling theflowthroughthetestlineusingvalve884enablesarecirculated flowrateof150gpmtobeachievedduringtesting.OpeningtheSItestlineduringperiodictestingprovidesanadditional bypassfortheotherSItrainsshouldtheyreceiveastartsignal,sincethetestlineforeachofthetwoSIinjection linesareheaderedtogetherandarenotindependent.

Therefore, adesignbasisaccidentoccurring duringtheperiodictestingofanSIpump,effectively causesaplantconfiguration thatallowsmorebypassflowfromeachoftheotherSIpumps,toberecirculated thanwaspreviously assumed,andnotbeavailable forsafetyinjection duringtheevent.Thecurrentaccidentanalyses, however,allowedadditional marginon-SIdelivery, andthisevaluation willdemonstrate thatthedeliveryrequirements arestillacceptable withtheSItestlineopen.Theprobability ofoccurrence orconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased bytheoperation oftheSItestlineopenduringtestingoftheSIpumpsorsystem.Consequences arenotincreased, becausetwoSIpumpsarestillavailable andoperableduringapostulated eventiftheeventweretooccurduringatestingevolution.

Thisisconsistent withthenumberofpumpsassumedavailable intheaccidentanalysis.

DuringtestingwithasinglepumpoutofserviceandtheSItestlineopentotheredundant train,anothersinglefailureisnotrequiredtobeassumed.The e

openSItestlinewouldprovideaflowpath'fortheothertwoSIpumpsinthatsituation.

TheeffectsoftheopenSItestlineontheflowdelivered totheRCSduringsuchaconfiguration hasbeendetermined tobestillboundedbythevaluestabulated intheCOLRforMSLB.ForSBLOCAeventsithasbeendetermined thatthetotaldelivered flowtotheRCSisonly3.3gallonsoutof842.2gallonslessthanthevolumesassumedtobedelivered intheaccidentanalysis.

Thisamount(0.4%)wouldresultinanindistinquisable changeinthepeakcladtemperature fortheworstcaseSBLOCA.Sincetheanalyzed'PCT wasdetermined tobe1308.Fascomparedto.the10CFR50.46criteriaof2200'F,consequences arenotincreased.

Thesecaseswerebaseduponaassumed5%SIpumpdegradation and,therefore, a5%degradation maybeutilizedasthepumptestlimitduringPTtestingwiththeSItestlineopen.Probability isnotincreased, becausetheSItestlineisassociated withsystemwhichperforms'anaccidentmitigation function.

Thepressureboundarycapability ofthetestlineisnotbeingaltered,therefore, thesafetyfunctionofthetestlineisnotaffected.

Itshouldbenotedthattheprobability ofoccurrence oftheTypeIeventssuchasSBLOCAandMSLBisintheorderof7x10'/year.

Operation withthetestlineopenoccursduringquarterly pumptestsoneachofthreepumpsforaconservatively estimated durationof2hourspertest.Othersystemtestingthroughout theyearconservatively mayaccountforadditional runtimewiththetestlineopen.'Alltogether, theplantoperatesconservatively intheorderof50hoursoutofan8000houryearwiththetestlineopen,thusreducingtheprobability ofoccurrence byafactorof0.006.Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARisnotcreatedbytheperformance ofSIpumporsystemtestingwiththeSItestlineopen.Thetestlineisdesignedtoperformitsfunctionduringtestingwiththeplantatpower.Thepressureimposedonthetestlinesystemisnotchanged.Theadditional recirculated flowrateasaresultofthetestlinebeingopenhasbeenevaluated onthecapability oftheSIsystemtodelivertherequiredvolumeofwaterduringthetimefollowing apostulated transient toprovidecorecooling,maintainpeakcladtemperature withinlimits,maintaincoreresponsewithinlimits,andmaintaincontainment pressurewithinlimits.Thepositionofthevalvesinthetestlinearenotbeingalteredduringplantoperation whentheSIpumpsarenotbeingtested,i.e.theywillremainintheclosedposition.

Therefore, thereisnonewtypeofaccidentcreated.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedwhileinaconfiguration withtheSItestlineopenduringSIpumporsystemtests.TheTechnical Specification basisdoesnotincludethespecificflowdeliveryrequiredbythesafetyinjection system,however,theflowrateisanassumption inthetransient analyses.

Thetransient analysesassumea5%degradedpumpperformance, andtheresulting delivered volumeperunittime(aftersubtracting thenormalrecirculation flow)isutilizedintheanalyses.

Theflowrates assumedaretabulated intheCOLR.Thesevalueswerederivedutilizing theKypipecomputermodelfortheECCS,therefore, theeffectsonsystemflowrateprovidedinthissafetyevaluation areconsistent withtheCOLRandaccidentanalysismethodology.

TheUFSARsection6.3.5.2identifies avalueof1356psigtotaldeveloped pressure(differential betweendischarge andsuctionpressure) astheacceptable limitofperformance oftheSIpumpsat150gpm.Thatvaluewasbasedonthecalculations referenced inanearlierTechnical Specification Amendment (No.33),andwasbaseduponapumpperformance thatwasassumedtobedegraded3%.The 0e existingaccidentanalysesassume5%degradation plusadditional margin.Ithasbeenshownthatanassumed5%degradation, including theeffectsofanopenSItestline,canstillmeetthedeliveryrequirements forMSLBandwouldproduceaninsignificant changeintheanalysesforSBLOCA.Therefore, section6.3.5.2oftheUFSARmaybeupdatedthroughthenormalUFSARupdateprocesstoreflecttheresultsofthisevaluation onthepumpperformance limit.Sincetheeffectoftheincreased bypassflowisstillboundedbytheexistinganalyses, thereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafety.

SEV-1077USEOFHYDROPUMPONSAFETYINJECTION PUMPDISCHARGE LINEINMODES1-4DuetovalveleakagewithintheSafetyInjection (SI)System,theaccumulators areexperiencing leakageproblemsrequiring themtobefrequently filledinordertomeettechnical specification limitsforvolumeandlevel.Theaccumulators arenormallyfilledviaSIPumpB.orC.However,topreventthepotential fordegradation oftheSIpumpsandmotorsfromfrequentstartsandstops,andtoallowforanalternative meanstofilltheaccumulators, a10gpmhydropumpwillbetemporarily installed onthedischarge linefromSIPumpBinordertofilltheleakingaccumulators.

Theaccumulator rangeoflevelis'between 50%and82%perLCO3.5.1ofTechnical Specifications.

Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation (SEV)istodocumenttheacceptance ofinstalling andusingthishydropumpinMODES1,2,3,and4.Specifically, thefollowing willbetemporarily performed:

a.Apositivedisplacement hydropumppoweredfromanon-safety relatedsourcewithasafetyclass2checkvalvelocateddownstream ofthepumpwillbeinstalled ontheSIPumpBdischarge line;andb.,Aredundant manualisolation valvewithtubingwillbeinstalled ontheSIpumpssuctionlinefromtheRWSTtoprovideasuctionsourceforthepump.Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theaffectedsystemsareonlyusedforaccidentmitigation purposes; therefore, thereisnoincreaseintheprobability ofapreviously analyzedaccident.

Also,bothContainment andSafetyInjection Systemshavebeendemonstrated toremainoperableandcapableofperforming theirrequiredsafetyfunction.

Assuch,thereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanaccident.

Theuseofthehydropumpdoesnotinvolveachangetotheparameters withinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperatedorinthesetpoints whichinitiateprotective ormitigative actions.Thereisalsononewequipment beingpermanently installed sincethehydropumpwillnormallyremainisolatedfromtheSISystemwhennotinuseandisbeinginstalled asatemporary modification.

Theuseofthehydropumponatemporary basisdoesnothaveadetrimental impactonthemannerinwhichplantequipment operatesorrespondstoananalyzedevent.Assuch,nonewfailuremodesarebeingintroduced.

Inaddition, thechangedoesnotalterassumptions madeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensing basis.Therefore, thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Themarginofsafetyisdefinedbythedifference betweenthelimitsbasedontruedesignandqualification ofplantequipment (i.e.,pointofequipment failurewithoutanyconservatism applied)andthelimitsimposedbyanalysisorNRCregulations.

Thepointatwhichprotective ormitigative actionsareinitiated mustensurethattheanalytical orNRCimposedlimitisnotexceededandthusreducethespecified marginofsafety.Theproposeduseofthehydropump10 doesnotimpactthesefactors.Therearenoequipment performance parameter changesassociated withthischange.Nosetpoints areaffected, andnochangeisbeingproposedintheplantoperational limitsasaresultofthischange.Therefore, thischangedoesnotinvolveareduction inthemarginofsafety.11

SEV-1080SURFACEMOUNTEDPUSHBUTTONS ONDBBREAKERCUBICLESThissafetyevaluation reviewsthemodification ofinstalling surfacemountedpush-button switchesonDBbreakercubicledoorsfor480Vbuses13,15,14,16,17and18.Theexistingpush-button switchesprotrudeintothebreakercubiclecausingmechanical interference withtheamptectors mountedontheDBbreakers.

Themodification istoinstallasurfacemountedenclosure withpush-button switches(switchassembly).

Thepush-button switchesprovidelocalcloseandtripcapabilities fortheDBbreaker.Installing surfacemountedswitchassemblies willmaintainthisoperational feature.Thismodification hasbeenpreviously analyzedbyEWR4225SafetyAnalysis, butonlyfor'uses17and18.Thisanalysiswillcoverbuses13,15,14,16,17and18.Thismodification doesnotintroduce anynewcomponent interactions orfailuremodes.Aftercompletion ofthischangethebreakerswillfunctionexactlyasbeforethemodification.

Itcantherefore beconcluded theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Thepossibility forintroducing anaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportisnotcreatedbecause:aftercompletion oftheproposedmodification theDBbreakerswillfunctioninthesamemannerasbeforethechange,nonewcomponent/functions/interactions arebeingaddedorexistinginterfaces removedthefunctions, andmethodsofaccomplishing thosefunctions ofthestandbyauxiliary feedwater systemremainunchanged Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforthestandbyauxiliary feedwater systemisnotreducedbecausetherearenospecific.

technical specifications associated withtheDBbreakerlocalcloseandtrippush-buttons.

TheStandbyAuxiliary Feedwater Pumpshavetechnical specification operability, requirements.

Thoserequirements areunchanged bythismodification.

12 0

SEV-1081REPLACEMENT OFGINNAMAINTRANSFORMER Thechangeassessedbythissafetyevaluation involvesreplacing theexistingMainTransformer withthespare,currently storedatstation13A.Thischangeinvolvesmodification ofnon-nuclearsafetyequipment thathasinteraction withequipment important tosafety.Thereplacement transformer isthefunctional equivalent oftheold.Thedetailsofthetechnical differences arebeyondthelevelofdetaildescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thetransformer changeoutissignificant, inthattheactivities associated withperforming thechangecouldaffectequipment important tosafety.Thepurposeofthissafetyanalysisistoexaminetheintegrated effectsassociated with'hemodification.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARarenotincreased bythisproposedchange.Thischangeinvolvescomponents inthepowergeneration portionoftheoffsitepowersystem.Themaintransformer isnotcreditedasanemergency powersupplytoequipment important tosafety.Safetyrelatedcomponents necessary tomaintainsafeshutdown(acondition alreadyachieved) willremainoperablewithpoweravailable fromtheEDGsorindependent offsitesources.Thisisnodifferent thentheconditions established duringanormaloutageandiswithintheparameters established bytheSAR.Management oftheloadtransferpathsandpreservation ofalternative shutdownfeatureswillensurethatadroppedloadwillnotcausethelossofasafeshutdownfunction.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.'Becausetheplantisinshutdownwhenthechangesoccuritisnotpossibletocreateanewtypeofaccident.

PMalfunctions affecting shutdowncoolingorlossofcoolantaccidents arethedominatecontributors tofueldamagewhenshutdown.

Theeffectedequipment usedtomanagetheseissueswillhavepositivecontrolandpoweravailable throughtheEDGsorthefunctionwillbepreserved byapreviously evaluated alternative methods.Theequipment associated withthischangeisnotutilizedasthebasisforanymarginsofsafetydefinedintechnical specifications.

13 I0e SEV-1082SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMLOWERSUCTIONThepurposeofthisevaluation istoallowuseofthespentfuelpoolcoolingsystem(SFPCS)lowersuctiontapwhennecessary whileoperating onthe"A"SFPCtrain.Forexample,whenmaintenance needstobeperformed ontheskimmerSFPlevelmustbelowered.Whenthisoccurs,theuppersuctionwillbeabovethewaterlevel.However,thePAIDstatesthatthelowersuctionvalve(Valve782)shallbelockedclosedperprocedure if"A"SFPCHxisinservice.Areviewofoldoperating procedures indicated thatthepreferred operating line-upwasusingtheuppersuctionwiththelowersuctionclosed.Thelowersuctioncouldbeusedifnecessary butwasnotpreferred.

In1985thelowersuction(Valve782)wasgivenlockedstatus.LaterduringtheP&IDupgradeprojectthenotewasplacedonthePAID:Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theuseofthelowersuctionwiththerestriction ontheamount-of leveldecreaseallowsforgreatermargintosuctionuncoveryandensuresthatheatuptimeonlossofcoolingismaintained withincurrentbasislimit.Theproposeduseofthelowersuctiondoesnotaddanynewequipment anddoesnotresultinanychangestoinstalled controlcircuitry.

Therearenoalteration toparameters withinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperating (poolleveldiscussed above)orinthesetpoints whichinitiateprotective ormitigative actions.Therefore, usingthelowersuctiondoesnotcreatethe'ossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedbecausewiththelimitation onSFPleveldecreaseassuresthattheSFPheatuptimeisgreaterthanthecurrentdesignbasisvalue.Alsothebulkpooltemperature limitof150'Fisstillmet.14 SEV-1084REVERSALOFPOWERANDCONTROLCIRCUITSFORPRESSURIZER PORVBLOCKVALVESMOV515AND516Actionreport96-1009identified acondition wherebythepressurizer poweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)andtheirassociated blockvalvescouldbealignedsuchthatasingledirectcurrent(DC)powersystemfailurewoulddegradetheabilitytomitigateasteamgenerator tuberupture.TheproposedchangereviewedbythissafetyanalysisconsistsofswappingthepowerandcontrolcablingforMOVs515and516.Completion ofthischangewillestablish aPORV/Block valvecontrolconfiguration whichcannotberenderedinoperable tocompleteitsrequiredopenfunctionfromasingleDCpowerfailure.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARarenotincreased bythisproposedchange.Thischangebringstheplantintoconformance withtheaccidentanalysis(singlefailureresistant withrespecttoPORVoperation andmalfunction).

Becausethechangeaddressed bytheproposedmodification doesnotinfluence thefrequency ofSGtuberupturesitcannotchangetheprobability ofoccurrence oftheevent.Theproposedmodification doesnotaffecttheactuation circuitry ofthePORVshenceitwillnotchangetheprobability ofaspuriousvalveactuation.

Theproposedchangecreatesnonewequipment interactions nordoesitremovetheabilitytoaccomplish anyoftheequipment functions detailedorassumedintheSAR.Aftercompletion ofthechangethePORV/Block valveswillfunctionasassumedinthesafetyanalysisreport.Theproposedchangedoesnotaddanynewequipment nordoesitchangetheexistingequipment functions.

Thischangeresultsinconformance withtheassumptions detailedintheSARandcannotcauseanincreaseintheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theequipment affectedbytheproposedchangeisinvolvedinaccidentandtransient mitigation.

Therearenofailuremodeswhichcanbeconsidered precursors toanaccidentnorarethereanymalfunctions whicharedifferent thanthosepreviously evaluated.

Aftercompletion oftheproposedmodification theaffectedequipment willfunctionasdescribed inthetechnical specification basis.Becausetheequipment associated withthischangewillfunctionexactlyasrequiredinthetechnical specifications nomarginsforsafetywillbereduced.15 SEV-1086REMOVALOFSERVICEWATERREMOTECONTROLSWITCHESFROMCONTROLCIRCUITSActionReport96-1125identifies thepotential forahighenergylinebreak(HELB)intheIntermediate Building(including thosebreaksintheTurbineBuildingneartheIntermediate Buildingblockwall)tofailallDCcontrolpowertotheServiceWater(SW)pumps.Specifically, localcontrolswitchesandpushbuttonsforallfourSWpumpsarelocatedontheturbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumpshieldwallneartheIntermediate Buildingnorthblockwall.Theconduitssupplying thesedevicesarerunthroughcabletrayslocatednearthesameblockwall.Ifamainsteamormainfeedwater linebreakweretooccurintheIntermediate orTurbineBuildings, thesubjectblockwallisexpectedtocollapseasadirectresultofthe,HELBpotentially impacting theswitches, pushbuttons,andassociated wiring.ThisinturncouldfailallDCcontrolpowertotheSWpumpssuchthatfollowing acoincident lossofoffsitepower(LOOP),noSWflowwouldbeautomatically startedtoprovidenecessary coolingwatertothedieselgenerators (DGs).PCR96-121proposestoresolvethisconcernbyremovinguseofthecontrolswitchesandpushbuttonslocatedintheIntermediate Buildingbyperforming splicesinthecabletunnelthatwillbypasstheswitchcircuitry.

Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveanincreaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Thischangeremovesthepotential needforoperatoractiontolocallystarttheSWpumpsintheScreenhouse following aHELBintheIntermediate orTurbineBuildings.

TheuseofthecontrolswitchesandpushbuttonsintheIntermediate Buildingisnotassumedinanyaccidentanalysis.

Therefore, thereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanevent.TheSWpumpsareonlyusedforaccidentmitigation purposes; therefore, thereisnoincreaseintheprobability ofapreviously analyzedaccident.

Theproposedchangewillnotaddanynewequipment toGinnaStation;however,currently in'stalled switchesandpushbuttonswillberemovedfromtheSWpumpDCcontrolpowerlogic.Thechangesdonothaveadetrimental impactonthemannerinwhichplantequipment operatesorrespondstoananalyzedevent.Assuch,nonewfailuremodesarebeingintroduced.

Thereisnoalteration totheparameters withinwhichtheplantisnormallyoperatedorinthesetpoints whichinitiateprotective ormitigative actions.Currentprocedural guidancetostarttheSWpumpsbyoperatoractionintheScreenhouse asaresultofafireinthecontrolroomisunchanged.

Inaddition, thechangedoesnotalterassumptions madeinthesafetyanalysisandlicensing basis.Therefore, thechangedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Themarginofsafetyis'define'd bythedifference betweenlimitsbasedontruedesignandqualification ofplantequipment (i.e.,pointofequipment failurewithoutanyconservatism 16

applied)andthelimitsimposedbyanalysisorNRCregulations.

Thepointatwhichprotective ormitigative actionsareinitiated mustensurethattheanalytical orNRCimposedlimitisnotexceededand,thusreducethespecified marginofsafety.TheproposedremovaloftheIntermediate BuildingSWcontrolswitchesandpushbuttonsfromthepumpDCcontrollogicdoesnotimpactthesefactors.Therearenoequipment performance parameter changesassociated withthisSEV.Nosetpoints areaffected, andnochangeisbeingproposedintheplantoperational limitsasaresultofthischange.Therefore, thischangedoesnotinvolveareduction inthemarginofsafety.17 00 SEV-1087ISOLATION OFCONTAINMENT CHARCOALFILTERDOUSINGSYSTEMReviewofNRCGenericletter96-06hasshownthepossibility thatasectionoftheContainment CharcoalFilterDousingSystemcouldexperience athermally inducedoverpressure transient.

Atemporary changeconsisting ofclosingmanualvalves2860and2865,andpartially orfullyopeningoneofthedousingMOVs(i.e.875Aor875Bor876Aor876B)willisolateandventtheContainment CharcoalFilterDousingsystem.TheContainment Spraysystemflowpathremainsthesame.Thecurrentconfiguration oftheContainment CharcoalFilterDousingsystemhasallfourMOV'sclosedwiththeirbreakerslockedopen.ThemotorsfortheseMOV'sarenotEQqualified andaretherefore notexpected, norcredited, tobeoperableinapostaccidentscenario.

Thisreconfiguration isconsistent withtheUFSAR,whichspecifies manualactionstoinitiatecharcoalfilterdousingintheeventofafire.Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisinthatthefunctionorcondition ofthecontainment spraysystemisnotbeingaffected.

TheContainment CharcoalfilterDousingsystemisnotcreditedinanyGinnaaccidentanalysis.

Thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportinthatthefunctionorthecondition ofthesubsystem isnotaffected.

ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification inthattheTechnical Specifications donotaddresstheContainment CharcoalFilterDousingsubsystem andthefunctionoftheContainment Spraysystemisnotaffected.

18

SEV-1088CONTAINMENT SPRAYCHARCOALFILTERDELUGELINETHERMALRELIEFVALVEDuringthereviewofNRCGenericLetter96-06,itwasdiscovered thattheContainment Spray(CS)CharcoalFilterDelugelinebetweencheckvalves866A&,866B(2"line)waspotentially susceptible toanoverstresscondition duetothethermalexpansion oftrappedfluidduringaccidentconditions.

Thethermaloverpressurization transient ispostulated tooccurduringtheinjection phaseofadesignbasisaccident(LOCAorMSLB)whencontainment temperature momentarily increases toapproximately 286'F.Theimmediate corrective actionwastoisolateandventthissectionoftheline(Reference SEV-1087).

ThisSEVevaluates thelongtermflix,whichistoinstallapressurereliefvalveonthisline,allowingtheheadertobeunisolated.

Thisreliefvalveissizedfortherelatively lowflowrateassociated withthegradualheat-upofthisline(maximumflowcapacityis10gpmat500psig).Thetotalvolumerequiredtoberelievedduringthetransient islessthan1.5gallons.ThereliefvalvewillrelievetotheContainment, whichisconsistent withthenormaldischarge locationoftheCSsystem.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARarenotincreased bytheproposedmodification sincetheCSsystemdoesnotinitiateanaccidentortransient, andtheCSsystemwillstilldelivertherequiredflowtotheringheaderwiththenewreliefvalveinstalled.

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification sincethefailureofthereliefvalvetore-closeisboundedbytheexistingassumptions intheaccidentanalyses(i.e.lossofacontainment spraypump).ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedbytheproposedmodification, sincetheproposedmodification doesnotadversely affecttheassumedcapabilities ofanyaccidentmitigating systems.19 SEV-1089INSTALLATION OFTHERMALRELIEFVALVESONVARIOUSCONTAINMENT PENETRATION LINESINRESPONSETONRCLETTERGL96-06TheNRChasissuedGenericLetterGL96-06concerning apossibility forathermally inducedoverpressurization duetoLOCAorMSLBconditions.

Thethermaloverpressurization transient ispostulated tooccurduringthedesignbasisaccidents whencontainment pressureandtemperature momentarily increases toapproximately 60psigand286'F.Areviewofthepipingpenetrating andinsidecontainment identified thefollowing linesaslineswhichmaybesubjected tooverpressurization:

Penetration 324.PrimaryWaterTreatment, Line2"-125-.1 (betweenvalves8418&,8422)Penetration 307.FireProtection, Line4"-FS-125-11 (betweenvalves9227&9232,9233,9234,9235,9236,9237)Penetration 121.ReactorCoolantPressurizer (PRTfillline),Line2"-CH-151 (betweenvalves508&548)Inordertoprotecttheabovelistedpipes,itisproposedtoinstallreliefvalvesontheselinesinsidethecontainment.

Thereliefvalveswillbeinstalled utilizing existingtestconnections downstream oftherootvalves8421,9230and568.Therootvalveswillbenormallylockedopen.Eachthermalreliefassemblywillbelocateddownstream ofthecontainment isolation valves(checkvalves) oneachpenetration lineandwillbesizedfortherelatively lowflowrateassociated withheat-upoftheselines.Thelineswherethereliefassemblies areattachedarenotrequiredtomitigatethepostulated LOCAorMSLBevents.Theinstalled reliefvalveswillmaintainpipestresseswithintheEWR2512,revision5,"GinnaSeismicUpgradeProgram"stressallowable limits.Thevalve'scrackingpressureissetequaltothedesignpressure.

Thereliefvalvesareinstalled pertheoriginalconstruction codeforGinna(ASAB31.1-1955).

tTheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillbenotincreased bytheproposedmodification sincethemodifications areonnormallyisolatedlinesandtherefore cannotinitiateaaccidentortransient.

Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification sincethismodification isdesignedtolimitlocalpipingsystemsstresses.

Therefore theonlyeffectisadecreased probability ofpiperupture.ThemarginofsafetydefinedasthebasisofanyTechnical Specification isnotreduced,sincenoTechnical Specifications areaffectedbytheproposedmodification.

20 SEV-1090TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASESCHANGEFORSCREENHOUSE BAYLOWERTEMPERATURE LIMITThepurposeofthissafetyevaluation istoaddresschangingtheTechnical Specification BasesforLCO3.7.8;specifically, theminimumscreenhouse'bay operability requirements willbechangedfrom"Temperature

)35'F..."to"Temperature

)32'F..."inaccordance withthesensitivity analysisthathasbeenperformed.

Thischangeisbeingmadetobettercorrelate thelake(i.e.,ultimateheatsink)environmental conditions withplantoperations.

Implementation ofthischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentorthemalfunction ofequipment aspreviously evaluated inthatthechangedoesnotimpactthecapability tomeettheaccidentanalysisnordoesitintroduce anyeffectsthatcouldincreasetheprobability ofanaccident.

Inaddition, thereduction inthetemperature doesnotadversely impacttheabilityofanyequipment toperformtheirintendedsafetyfunction.

Theconsequences meettherequiredacceptance

criteria, thustheconsequences areacceptable.

Thischangedoesnotintroduce thepossibility ofanaccidentorequipment malfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated inthatthechangeaffectsonlytheparametric valueusedbycurrentanalyses.

ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisfortheTechnical Specifications inthattheslightimpactuponPCTdoesnotresultinaPCTabovethecriteriabasis.Sinceallacceptance criteriaaremetthereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafety.21 SEV-1091SAFETYINJECTION TORCSCOLDLEGSDURINGPROCEDURE AP-RHR.2AsaresultofGenericLetter88-17,theWestinghouse Ownersgroupissuedaguideline toprovidetheactionsnecessary formaintaining corecoolingandprotecting thereactorcoreintheeventthatRHRcoolingislostduringlowloopconditions.

RG&Eprocedure AP-RHR.2isbasedonthisguideline withappropriate allowances madeforGinna'sspecificplantdesign.ArevisiontotheWOGguideline wasissuedon06/06/96whichcontained minorchangesinrecoverymethodology andincorporated previously transmitted changestotheguideline toaddresssurgelinefloodingissues.4Themajorchangeassociated withthisprocedure revisionincorporates theuseofcoldleginjection asanalternative fortheoperatortorestorelooplevelpriortorestarting theRHRpumps.Previously therewerethreesequential optionsfortheoperatortofollow:GravityfillfromtheRWSTtotheRHRhotlegsuctionconnection, chargingtothecoldlegs,andsafetyinjection totheRCShotlegs.Theproposedchangewouldinsertanoptionofsafetyinjection totheRCScoldlegs.Thisoptionwouldbeemployedifthegravityfillandchargingmethodsarenotsuccessful (aslongascoreboilingisnotoccurring) andwouldbecomethethirdinaseriesoffourmethodsofeventmitigation.

ThesequenceofRCSlevelrestoration isexplicitly described intheGinnaUFSARandhencerequiresawrittensafetyevaluation toaddressthepertinent safetyissues.Asecondchangeistheupdatingofthespecified RHRflowratewhensweepingairoutoftheRHRlinesafterflowrestoration.

Previously thiswasspecified asgreaterthan1200GPM.Thiswillbechangedtobetween1200and1400GPM.Thiswaspreviously evaluated bythesafetyreviewforPCN97-3547(procedure 0-2.3.1).

Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisinthatappropriate methodsofrestoring coolantlevelaremaintained.

Theuseofacontinuous actionsteptoproceeddirectlytohotleginjection ifcoreboilingisimminentorinprogressensuresthattheadditionofanextrasteptothemitigation sequencedoesnotdelayhotleginjection whenitiswarranted.

Theproposedchangeisassociated withmitigation ofaneventandcanneithercreatenorincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety.Thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportbecausetheadditionofanotherpossibleflowpathtotheRCSprovidestheoperatorwithmoreoptionstorestorelevel.Appropriate procedural guidancehasbeenemployedtoisolatethisflowpathshouldhotleginjection bedetermined tobenecessary.

ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical 22 00 Specification sinceitmaintains thefunctionofrestoring RHRcoolingasquicklyaspossibleshoulditbelostatlowlooplevelconditions.

23 0e SEV-1092THERMALOVERPRESSURIZATION OFCONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS 205206A207AThepurposeofthisevaluation istoprovideprotection forcontainment penetrations P205,P206a,andP207afromapotential forthermally inducedoverpressurization.

ThischangeisbeingmadeinresponsetoissuesraisedinresponsetoNRCGenericLetterGL96-06wherebycertaincontainment penetrations maybesubjecttoisolatedwatersolidconditions withnoreliefpathavailable intheeventofdesignbasisaccidentcontainment environment.

Aspartofthisresponse, thefollowing lineswerefoundtobesubjecttothepossibility ofwatersolidconditions duringpossibledesignbasisaccidentscenarios:

~Penetration P205:RCSloopBhotlegsamplingthroughvalve955Penetration P206a:RCSloopAhotlegsamplingthroughvalve953~Penetration P207a:Pressurizer steamspacesamplingthroughvalve951Inordertoprotectthepenetration pipingfromoverpressurization, abypasslinewillbeinstalled aroundvalves955,953,and951withacheckvalvetopreventflowinthedirection ofthesamplesink.Thecheckvalvewillallowforbackflowtotheprimarysystemfromthesampleside(penetration portionside)oftheabovevalvesshouldpressureonthesamplesideexceedprimarysystempressure.

Duringnormaloperation, thecheckvalvewillbeseatedbyprimarysystempressure.

Thecheckvalveswillhaverequisite isolation capability installed toprovideforinservice testing.Toensureproperseatingofthecheckvalves,samplingprocedures mustallowfordepressurizing thesamplesidepipinguponcompletion ofsamplingactivities.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated insafetyanalysisreportwillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification inthatthechangeprovidesadditional assurance offunctional responseduringaccidentconditions.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification inthatthechangeprovidesadditional assurance orfunctional capability.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedinthatnoTechnical Specifications areaffectedbytheproposedchange.24

SEV-1093REMOVALOFTHEPRESSURIZER LOWPRESSURELEAD/LAGMODULETheGinnaplantwasoriginally designedtobeabletowithstand a50%loadreduction withoutareactortripprovidedautomatic steamdumpandrodcontrolarefunctioning.

Recenttestingontheplantsimulator indicates thatalargeloadchangemayresultinalowpressurizer pressurereactortrip,duetoalead/lagcircuitinthepressureinputtothisfunction.

Thislead/lagfunctionisnotmodeledintheoriginaldesign.Therefore, itisproposedtoremovethelead/lagmodulefromthelowpressurereactortripcircuit.Thelowpressurizer pressuretripfunctionasstatedintheUSFARandTechnical Specifications wouldremainunaffected.

Removalofthelead/lagcircuitwouldbeperformed byremovingthepowersupplywiringforthelead/lagmodule,removingthemodule,andremovingthetestpointconnections.

Theinputcableforthelead/lagunitcouldthenbeconnected totheinputofthelowpressuretripsetpointmodule.Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisinthatthefunctionorcondition ofthepressurizer lowpressurereactortripsetpointisnotbeingaffected.

Thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportinthattherequiredfunctionorthecondition oftheotherchannelsubsystems arenotaffected.

JThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification inthatthelead/lagcompensation forthepressureinputtothelowpressurizer pressurereactortripchannelisnotcreditedinanyaccidentortransient analysis.

Thefunctions ofthepressurizer pressurechannelssetpoint, controlorotherprotective logicremainunaffected.

25

,/

SEV-1094REPLACEMENT OFRTDINPUTMODULESINTHEREACTORPROTECTION RACKSTheelectronic components usedtogeneratetheT,,and~TsignalsintheReactorProtection System(RPS)aregoingtobechangedtoreplacetheagingloopmoduleswhichhavenoavailable replacements.

ThiswillrequiretheremovaloffiveFoxboroH-linemoduleswhichwillbereplacedwithsixmodulesmanufactured by'NUS.Thenewmodulearrangement willconsistoffourResistance-to-Current (R/I)converters, andtwoTimeDomainModules(allsafetygradeanalogdevices).

ThefourR/Iconvertors willbeusedfortheconversion ofHotlegandColdlegtemperatures intheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS),andtheTimeDomainModuleswillbeusedtocondition theRCStemperature inputsintoT;and~Tsignals.Oneadditional functionoftheTimeDomainModuleswillbetoprovidetherequiredlagtimeassociated with,thetemperature signal;Theinsertion ofinstrument looplagtimeprovidesacompensating factorfortheextremely fastresponding loopRTDswithrespecttotherestoftheinstrument loop.Thelagtimefactorwaspartoftheoriginalinstrument loopresponsecalculation forboththeT,,and~Tsignals.ThesignaloutputsoftheTimeDomainModuleswillbeidentical totheoutputsoftheexistingmodulesbeingremoved,including lagtime,andtherefore willhaveno'mpactonthefunctionoftheloopdownstream ofthenewmodules.Aftercompletion ofthisproposedchangetheinstrument loopwillbecapableofbeingre-configured tofunctionaccounting fortheeffectsofafailedRTD.Thissafetyevaluation doesnotanalyzetheuseofanyconfiguration otherthantheuseoftwoT-hotand.twoT-coldRTDinputs.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased bythisproposedmodification.

Thechangedoesnotintroduce anynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedinstrument loopnordoesitfunctionally modifytheloop(including delaytimes,setpoints anduncertainties) orassociated RPSandcontrolsystemsinanyway.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotcreateanynewequipment interactions.

Becausetherearenochangesinloopfailuremodesandeffects(notethatthereplacement equipment isalsoanalog)andnonewequipment interactions areadded,thechangecannotleadtoanewtypeofmalfunction.

Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedbythisproposedmodification.

TheOverpower andOvertemperature setpoints, theprocessbywhichtheyaregenerated, andthetotalRPSdelaytimeareallunaffected bythechange.26 e

SEV-1095BLOWDOWNJETSHIELDREMOVALINTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGTheprimarypurposeofthissafetyevaluation istodocumenttheanalysisoftheeffectsofremovingtheSteamGenerator Blowdownsystemvalves5737and5738stemmissilerestraints andassociated steamjetimpingement shieldsintheintermediate building.

Theworkassociated withthisevaluation wasperformed underTechnical StaffRequest(TSR)94-058"Blowdown JetShieldRemoval"whichprovidedsupporttoEngineering WorkRequest4324C,"SteamGenerator BlowdownSystem,Phase3".Theremovalofthedevicesreceivedatechnical evaluation fortheTSRbuttheevaluation wasnotincorporated intotheEWRsafetyevaluation nordidtheTSRinvokeanindependent safetyevaluation.

Thisdeficiency wasidentified inActionReport97-0756.Thesecondary purposeofthisevaluation istoprovidedocumentation ofthebasisfordetermining whythechangeunderevaluation didnotaffecttheoperability ofthesystemswhichwereaffordedprotection bytheshieldsandrestraints.

Theremovalofthejetshieldsandvalvestemrestraints doesnotincreasetheprobability ofablowdownlinefailure.Theshieldsprotectequipment againsttheeffectsofabreaktheydonotpreventabreakfromoccurring.

Thestemrestraints preventthevalvestemsfrombecomingmissileswhichcouldaffectotherequipment shouldafailureoccur,againtheydonotpreventablowdownfailure.Theconsequences ofablowdownfailureareboundby.theconsequences ofsteamandfeedwater linebreaksintheintermediate building.

Thechangesassociated withthisreviewdonotimpacttheequipment usedtoachievesafeshutdownfollowing theoccurrence oftheboundinglinebreaks.Itisconcluded thattheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Safeshutdownfollowing high-energy linebreaks(HELB)intheintermediate buildingisevaluated intheSAR.Noequipment utilizedtomitigateanintermediate buildingHELBisaffectedbytheremovalofthemissileshield.Removalofthemissileshielddoesnotexposeanyequipment notpreviously evaluated towithstand theeffectsofaHELBtoanewhazard.Thenuclearandradiological effectsofbreaksinintermediate buildinghighenergylinesareindependent ofthejetshields,providing safeshutdowncanbeachieved.

Becausesafeshutdowncanbeachievedwithouttheequipment theshieldsprotect,itisdetermined thatthepossibility ofaaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethatanyevaluated intheSARisnotcreated.Equipment utilizedasjetforceandmissileprotection againsttheeffectsofHELBsisnotdescribed intechnical specification.

Theequipment associated withthischangeisnotutilizedasthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Accordingly, themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedbythischange.

SEV-1096AANDBBATTERYROOMAIRCONDITIONING UNITREPLACEMENT Thescopeofthismodification istoreplacetheexisting"A"&"B"BatteryRoomACunitwithalargerACunit.Thechangesrequiredwhengoingfromtheexisting5tonunittoa7.5tonunitrequireaSafetyEvaluation duetothechangesinairflowandthechangesinthepowersupplyconfiguration.

Thisupgradewillrequireductworkchanges,servicewaterpipingchangesandelectrical powerandcontrolchangestosupportthenewequipment

.Thedesignoftheproposedmodifications isaddressed inPCR96-084.Theplantconfiguration description intheUFSARSection9.4.9.3specifically liststheairflowfancapacityoftheexistingACunitat2000cfm.ThenewACunithasaminimumairflowcapacityof2400cfmandamaximumof3600cfm.TheexistingBatteryRoomcoolingunitelectrical supplyisfromtheEmergency FloodingDistribution PanelA,ACPDPCB07, whichissuppliedbymotorcontrolcenter(MCC)K,position1D.Thereplacement coolingunitwillbefeddirectlyfromMCCK,position1K.Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport(SAR),isnotincreased asaresultofthismodification.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisunrelated tothechangesproposedinthismodification.

'heequipment thismodification affectshasnofailuremodesthancanleadtotheinitiation, orpreventthemitigation of,anaccident.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyarenotchangedasaresultofthismodification.

Becausethismodification doesnotmakeanyfunctional changes,orintroduce anynewpreviously unanalyzed hazards,theconsequences associated withanyaccidentormalfunction areaspreviously analyzed.

Theproposedmodification doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSAR.Thechangesmadeforthismodification arenotfunctional changes.Becausethismodification doesnotintroduce anynewfailuremodestoexistingplantsafetyequipment, itisnotpossibleforittocreateanewtypeofaccidentormalfunction.

Theequipment associated withthisproposedchangeisnotdetailedintechnical specifications orbases.ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedasaresultofthisproposedchange.28 e

SEV-1097VALVE866BREPLACEMENT Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation istoevaluatethechangesmadeunderGinnaEmergency Maintenance Procedure EM-503,Revision0inMarch1985duringthe1985annualrefueling outage.Thechangeswillbeevaluated withrespecttotheoriginalsafetyconsiderations oftheplantdesignbasisandwilldetermine ifNRCapprovalisrequired(i.e.,ifthemodification involvesanunreviewed safetyquestionoraffectstheplantTechnical Specifications).

EWR4121"866BReplacement" wasapprovedon3-8-85andwasintendedtobeanengineering modification projectgoverning thischange.ThevalvewasactuallyreplacedunderaplantEmergency Maintenance Procedure (EM-503)beforeanyformalengineering projectdesigninputdocuments (DesignCriteriaorSafetyAnalysis) werepreparedtocontrolthedesignprocess.Subsequently, EWR4121wasusedtoanalyzethepipingandsupportchangesassociated withthereplacement checkvalve866B.ThisEWRprojectanalyzedthoseitemsandfoundthemacceptable.

Themodification consisted ofremovaloftheoriginal866Bvalve,a'2"Rockwellcheckvalve,anditsreplacement withanew2"Kerotestcheckvalve.Thevalvesweresimilar(stainless steelmaterials, y-typedesign,1500-lb.pressureclass,socketweldends).Theonlysignificant differences werethatthenewKerotestvalvewasalmost20%heavierandusedasoft-seat (EPT)material.

ThefactthatthenewKerotestvalveusedasoft-seat (EPT)material, whichhasafiniteradiation resistance, preventsitfrombeingautomatically judgedasequivalent totheRockwellvalveitreplaced.

Theincreaseinvalveweightrequiredpipingandsupportreanalysis.

Thismodification doesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.Themodification involvesreplacement ofpipingpressure-boundary itemswithqualified, functionally-equivalent items.Thismodification doesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.Themodification involvesreplacement ofpipingpressure-boundary itemswithqualified, functionally-equivalent items,andisindependent ofaccidentmitigation features.

Thismodification doesnotincreasetheprobability ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheSAR.Themodification involvesreplacement ofpipingpressure-boundary itemswithqualified, functionally-equivalent items.Thismodification doesnotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheSAR.Themodification involvesreplacement ofpipingpressure-boundary itemswithqualified, functionally-equivalent items.29

'e Thismodification doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanaccidentofatypedifferent fromanypreviously evaluated intheSAR.Themodification involvesreplacement ofpipingpressure-boundaryitemswithqualified, functionally-equivalent items,andisindependent ofaccidentmitigation features.

Thismodification doesnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofatypedifferent fromanypreviously evaluated intheSAR.Themodification involvesreplacement ofpipingpressure-boundary itemswithqualified, functionally-equivalent items.Thismodifications willnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasesforanytechnical specifications.

Themodification doesnotaffectanyautomatic actuation signalsortheoperability ofanyofthecomponents

involved, norwillthefunctions thatthosecomponents currently performbealtered.30 SEV-1099PRESSURIZER SAFETYVALVELVDTPOWERSUPPLYUFSARCORRECTION Thepurposeofthisreviewistoexaminetheconsequences ofmodifying theReg.Guide1.97"PostAccidentMonitoring Variable",

tablecontained intheUFSAR.Includedinthetablearedetailsofthepowersuppliesofthemonitoring devices.Onevariable, itemnumber59,pressurizer safetyvalveposition, liststhepowersupplyasbeingfrominstrument buslA.Thisisincorrect, theirsupplyisfromanon-vital source,Bus13viaACPDPCB01.

Theproposedchangeisnotacorrection ofatypographical errorbecausetheR.G.-1.97 safety.evaluation issuedbytheNuclearRegulatory Commission wasbasedonanRGB'ransmittal

.whichdetailedthepowersupplyincorrectly.

Thedocumentation errorwasintroduced bylistingthepowersupply.to theterminaldecksofthecabinetthedevicesare,locatedin(containment isolation resetpanel)asthevalvepositionpowersupply.Infact,thepanelcontainstwoseparatepowersources,onefortheCNMTisolation monitoring andresetandoneforthepanel"convenience" outlets.Thepositionindicators aresuppliedfromthelattersource.Itisimportant tonotethattheoriginaldesignoftheindicators specified thembeingpoweredfromthenon-safety source.Thechangereflectstheasdesignedandinstalled configuration.

Theuseofreliablepowerversessafetygradepowerreflectsthedevicesroleasoneofseveralindications available tomonitorthestatusofthereactorcoolantpressure.

boundary.

Themomentary lossofthesafetyvalvepositionindication canbetolerated, therefore thedevicesdonotneedbatterybackup.Itshouldbenotedthatthe,Reg.Guidedoesnotrequireasafetyrelatedpowersourceforavariableofthistype.Thechangeunderreviewdoesnoteffectthefunctionofanyequipment directlyusedinthemitigation ofaccidents ortransients.

Becausethechangeisnotafunctional changeandbecausetheequipment associated withthechangecontinues tooperateasdesigned, theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Thepressurizer safetyvalvepositionindication powersupplyhasnofunctional interaction withthesafetyvalves.Anypowersupplyofthecorrectvoltage,regardless ofitssource,isconditioned bytheLVDTinstrument loop.Theinstrument loopanditsindependence fromthesafetyvalvesarenotaffectedbythechange.Thepressurizer safetyvalveindications arenotpartofthebasisforanytechnical specification.

Consequently, themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreduced.31 SEV-1101ALIGNMENT OFMOV857A857B857CDURINGSUMPRECIRCULATION INES-1.3Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation istosupportaprocedure changePCN97-4341toES-1.3,TransfertoColdLegRecirculation.

Thischangeisproposedasanimprovement totheprocedure.

RHRflowischeckedandthrottled asnecessary tolessthan1500gpmduringtheinjection phasealignment (RWST>>28%level),whereastheNPSHanalysisestablished theflowlimitbasedonthesumprecirculation systemalignment.

BasedontheresultsoftheKypipeHydraulic ModelfortheECCS,thesystemflowratewhencomparing thesetwoalignments

'variesenoughsothatadditional systemthrottling maybenecessary following therealignment forhighheadsafetyinjection following thecompletion ofStep11ofES-1.3.Given1),theflowinstrument uncertainties forFI-626,FI-931A,andFI-931Bthatmustbeaccounted for,2)thecurrentES-1.3requirement toopenallthree857valves,and3)acalculated levelof0.34feetlesswaterabovethefloorofcontainment ascomparedtothatassumedinthepreviousanalysis, anenhancement totheprocedure isrecommended thatwillprovideadditional NPSHmarginsuchthatadditional throttling intherecirculation phasewouldbeunnecessary.

Theprocedure shouldbechangedsothatifonlyoneRHRpumpisoperating, onlytheassociated valve(s)inthattrain,MOV-857AandMOV-857C(TrainA)orMOV-857B(TrainB),shouldbeopened.UseofthecurrentES-1.3procedure withonesuctionpathisolated, onepumprunning,andbothinjection linesopenresultsinthesystemperformance beinglessthanoptimalbutstilloperable.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased, becausethechangeinvolvesequipment usedinthemitigation ofanaccident, namelytheabilitytoprovidelongtermsumprecirculation usinghighheadpumps,andtheuseofcontainment sprayforcontainment pressurecontrolintheunlikelycondition wherecontainment pressureexceeded37psigduringrecirculation.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARarenotincreased, becausetheproposedchangestillrequirestheopeningofonetrainofhighheadflowpaththrougheither857Bor857Aand857C.Openingeitheroftheselinesexposesthoselinesandportionoftheauxiliary buildingbasementtoradioactivity assumingfueldamageaspostulated.

Therefore, thereisnochangeintheconsequences.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased, becausetheSARassumesonlyonetrainisavailable postLOCA,duringthesumprecirculation phase(Table6.3-9ofUFSAR).Theprocedure isbeingmodifiedtoinstructoperators toopenonlyonetrainthroughthe857valves,intheeventonlyoneRHRtrainisoperating.

Sincecreditisonlytakenforasingletrainofhighheadflowpath'erRHRpump,thereisnoeffectonanymalfunctions previously evaluated.

The857valvesleftclosedprocedurally wouldstillbeavailable forlateruseintheeventthiswasdesired.AfailureofoneoftheflowpathscombinedwithafailureoftheoppositeRHRpumpwouldnotbeconsistent withtheplantdesignbasis.32 0

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased, becausetheintegrity ofthevalvesagainstexternalleakageisnotbeingchanged.Failureofbothpathsisnotconsistent withtheplantdesignbasis.IfpumpAisoperating andtheflowpaththrough857AandCwereblocked,flowcouldstillbedelivered totheSIsystemthrough857B.Conversely, ifpumpBwereoperating andthe857Bvalvefailedtoopen,flowwouldbeprevented frompassingthrough857AandCtotheSIsystemduetotheplacement ofcheckvalve697A.InthiscasetheflowpathwouldbeprovidedfrompumpAthrough857Aand857C.Thesesetofcircumstances arealsonotconsistent withtheplantdesignbasis.IThepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated,becausenonewequipment orcontrolsarebeingaddedormodified.

Thechangeisaprocedural onethatdoesnotaffectthecapability ofthesystemtodeliverflowforhighheadsafetyinjection.

Thereisnochangetoanyeventsormalfunctions intheinjection phasesincethevalvesremainclosedduringthatduration.

Therearenopredetermined deliveryflowrates established forrecirculation phaselongtermcooling.Thechange,ineffect,hasazeroneteffectontheflowratedelivered, becausekeepingonetrainthroughthe857valvesclosedwithoneRHRpumpoperating resultsinthesameamountofflowdelivered aspreviously

analyzed, sincethrottling wasdictatedineithercase.Thechangeprovidesasubstantial improvement intheNPSHmarginfortheApumpoperation, becausetheflowwillbereducedduetoelimination ofthe"looparound"effectwhenall857valvesareopened.TheBRHRhadmoreNPSHmarginthantheARHRpump,whenallthree857valveswereopened,sinceminimumflowrecirculation flowwouldexistthroughbothtrainswhentheBRHRpumpwasoperating.

Following thisproposedchange,thiseffectwillnolongerexist,andtheNPSHmarginofbothRHRpumpswillbeessentially thesame.Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethenevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated,becauseonlyprocedural stepsarebeingchangedandthevalveswillbeoperatedasbefore.Therearenochangestocontrols, andnochangesinexternalorinternalconditions placedonthevalvesexists.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreduced,becausenochangesarebeingmadetothefunctions ofthevalves,andeachflowpathisstillbeingcalledupontoserveitsassociated trainofRHR.33

SEV-1102PCN97-4346SAFETYEVALUATION ThisSafetyEvaluation describes proposedchangestotestprocedure PT-60.4.Thisprocedure isusedtotesttheperformance oftheADieselGenerator LubeOilandJacketWaterCoolerscoincident withthemonthlyADieselGenerator rundoneunderPT-12.1.ThefoulingintheDieselGenerator Aheatexchangers isdetermined analytically fromPT-60.4'estmeasurements usingawelldeveloped methodology.

Theuncertainty inthedetermination offoulingisstronglydependent ontheservicewatertemperature difference acrossthecoolers.Inordertoreducetheuncertainty inthefouling,theservicewaterwillbethrottled toapproximately 250gpm.PCN¹97-4346addsstepstoPT-60.4tounlockandthrottleglobevalve4671duringtestingoftheDieselGenerator Acoolers.DieselGenerator AwillbedeclaredINOPERABLE forthedurationoftimethatvalve4671isunlockedandthrottled.

PCN¹97-4346addsaprecaution toPT-60.4tohaveanobservercontinually monitorthelubricating oilandjacketwateroutlettemperatures fromDieselGenerator A,andrecordthevaluesonaten-minute frequency, whenevertheengineisrunningandtheservicewateristhrottled.

Intheeventthatthejacketwatertemperature risesabovethealarmsetpointof182'Forthelubricating oiltemperature risesabovethealarmsetpointof195'F,theHCOisinformedandtestpersonnel immediately openvalve4671.Testpersonnel alsoimmediately openvalve4671iftheHCOreceivesahigh-temperature alarmontheMCB.AllotherproposedchangestoPT-60.4areinconsequential.

Theyinvolveinstallation ofadditional non-intrusive instrumentation (surface-mounted RTDs)andchangestothefrequency anddurationatwhichdataistaken.Thesechangesareintendedtofurtherimprovetheaccuracyofthetests.Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.DieselGenerator A,althoughINOPERABLE, isexpectedtofunctionnormally, andcanbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusbyopeningandlockingvalve4671.InadditiontothenormalMCBalarm,DieselGenerator Awillbecontinually monitored locallytoverifythatthelubeoilandjacketwatertemperatures donotexceedthealarmsetpointvalues.Intheeventthattemperatures reachalarmsetpoints, testpersonnel willtakeimmediate actiontoopenvalve4671.Therefore, theprobability offailureofDieselGenerator A'isnohigherthanitisduringtheregularmonthlyPT-12.1Surveillance Test.Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSAR.Accidentanalysesalreadyassumethelossofadiesel34 generator.

Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSAR.Theproposedchangesinvolveminormodifications toatestthatisroutinely carriedout.Themostsevereoccurrence wouldbethetrippingofDieselGenerator Atopreventitfromoverheating.

Contingent actionsstemmingfromadieselgenerator triparealreadycovered.Theproposedchangesdonotincreasethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethenevaluated previously intheSAR.TheDieselGenerator Alubeoilandjacketwatertemperatures willnotbeallowedtoriseabovethecurrently established alarmsetpoints.

Ithasbeenestablished bythevendorthattheseareacceptable operating temperatures forthedieselengines.Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreduced,sincenoTechnical Specifications areviolated.

35 e

SEV-1103VACUUMFILLOFTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMIndustrywideuseofthevacuumfillmethodofincreasing thereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)levelfrommidlooptothenarrowrangeonthepressurizer istobeevaluated.

Thisprocedure istobeusedduringmode5priortoandduringthefinalRCSloopfillprocess.Itwillbeinstalled onlyduringthisprocessandwillberemovedwhenRCSrefilliscomplete.

Thedurationoftheequipment beingincontainment shouldbelessthan48hours.Thevacuumfillprocesswillbeincorporated intoprocedures 0-2.3.1and0-1B.ThepresentmethodofRCSsystemfillrequiresalongandcomplicated ventprocedure.

Thismodification willallowavacuumtodrawnontheRCSwhenatmidloopinordertoallowtheRCStobefilledwithouttheneedforventing.Thevacuumoperation willconsistofavacuumpumpconnected via2inchdiametervacuumratedhosestotwomanifolds.

Themanifolds willbelocatedonthepressurizer relieftank(PRT)levelcolumnareaandthereactorheadventarea.ThePRTwillbedrainedandthepressurizer PORVandBlockvalveswillbeopentoallowthePRTtobeconnected totheRCS.Thepressurizer ventmanifoldwillsupplythevacuumtapsforreactorvessellevelsightglass andRCSlooplevelinstrumentation.

Oncevacuumisattained(approx24to25inchesofHg),theRCSwillbefilled.AstheRCSisfilled,levelindicators areisolatedandremovedfromservice.WhentheRCSlevelis)64inchesbut(84inchesthefillwillbestopped.TheRCSwillnolongerbeinareducedinventory condition.

0-2.3.1cannowbeclosedoutandalllowlooplevelrestrictions arelifted.Procedure 0-1Bwillnowcontinuethefillandpressurize theRCS.Oncethepressurizer levelisat80%thefillprocesswillbestoppedandvacuumwillbebroken.Alltemporary modification equipment, hosesandcomponents willberemovedfromcontainment priortoleavingmode5()200f).Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedure willmaintainpositivecontrolovertheRCSventsandthelowtemperature overpressure system(LTOP)alignment.

Theprocedure maintains controloverallequipment thatcaninjectintotheRCSandincreaseitspressure.

ThisassuresRCSboundaryprotection atlowtemperatures, therefore theinitialconditions andprobability ofoccurrence foranyaccidentanalysispreviously evaluated intheUFSARisnotincreased.

TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedure maintains controlofreactorcoolantboron,density,oroperating temperature.

Theprocedure monitorsthedilutionandborationpathstotheRCS.Thevacuumprocesswillnotinfluence coolantboronconcentration, therefore theinitialconditions andprobability ofoccurrence foranyaccidentanalysisforreactivity insertion in II~e chapters15.4.4.2.2 or'15.4.4.2.6 havenotchangedandarevalid.TheRCSvacuumventandfillevolution doesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously described intheUFSAR.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedure willmaintainpositivecontrolovertheRCSventsandthelowtemperature overpressure system(LTOP)alignment.

Theprocedure maintains controloverallequipment thatcaninjectintotheRCSandincreaseitspressure.

ThisassuresRCSboundaryprotection atlowtemperatures perchapter5.2.2.Therefore theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously described intheUFSARhavenotchangedandarevalid.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedure maintains controlofreactorcoolantboron,density,oroperating temperature.

Theprocedure monitorsthedilutionandborationpathstotheRCS.Thevacuumprocesswillnotinfluence coolantboronconcentration, therefore theinitialconditions andconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously.

described intheUFSARforreactivity insertion inchapters15.4.4.2.2 or15.4.4.2.6 havenotchangedandarevalid.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARisnotincreased.

Thewallthickness ofthepressurizer, steamgenerators andU-tubes,reactorcoolantpumpsandassociated components exposedtothevacuumissufficient tomaintaintheintegrity ofthesystemsduringvacuumventing,andafterthefillprocessiscomplete.

Theintegrity ofthereactorcoolantpumpsealsisassuredbymaintaining apositivepressureatthenumber1sealinletarea.Thepressurizer relieftankisdesignedtowithstand afullvacuum.Thetankisequippedwithaninternalsupportfortherupturedisktopreventthedamagetothedisk.Therefore theintegrity oftheRCSremainsunchanged andtheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

Thecontainment isolation systemwillremainunaffected bythischange.Thesystemwillstillbeabletoachievecontainment closurewithintheallowed2hourtimeperiodofgenericletter88-17,andbecapableofpreventing aradiation releasewithin10CFR100limits.Therefore theabilitytoisolatecontainment duringreducedRCSinventory operations remainsunchanged andtheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

TheRHR,charging, andsafetyinjection systemswillallbelinedupandcontrolled perOperations procedure 0-2.3.1"Draining andOp'crating atReducedInventory intheReactorCoolantSystem".Therefore theabilitytorecoverfromalossofRHRcoolingduringreducedRCSinventory operations remainsunchanged andtheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisin'areducedinventory condition willnotchange.TheNPSHavailable fortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired, therefore thecapability ofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnot37 beadversely affected.

TheWCAP-11916 wasreviewedtoverifythatoperating inmidloopwiththeRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidate itsanalysis.

Theanalysesforvortexformation weremostsensitive tofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosity ofthefluidassecondary affects.Noneoftheseparameters areaffectedbytheRCSbeingunderavacuum.Theanalysistherefore remainsvalid.Thereisnoincreaseintheprobability ofoccurrence ofanmalfunction previously evaluated intheUFSAR.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARhasnotincreased.

Thewallthickness ofthepressurizer, steamgenerators andU-tubes,reactorcoolantpumpsandassociated components exposedtothevacuumissufficient tomaintaintheintegrity ofthesystemsduringvacuumventing,andafterthefillprocessiscomplete.

Theintegrity ofthereactorcoolantpumpsealsisassuredbymaintaining apositivepressureatthenumber1sealinletarea.Thepressurizer relieftankisdesignedtowithstand afullvacuum.Thetankisequippedwithaninternalsupportfortherupturedisktopreventthedamagetothedisk.Therefore theintegrity oftheRCSremainsunchanged andtheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

Thecontainment isolation systemwillremainunaffected bythischange.Thesystemwillstillbeabletoachievecontainment closurewithintheallowed2hourtimeperiodofgenericletter88-17,andbecapableofpreventing aradiation releasewithin10CFR100limits.Therefore theabilitytoisolatecontainment duringreducedRCSinventory operations remainsunchanged andtheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

TheRHR,charging, andsafetyinjection systemswillallbelinedupandcontrolled perOperations procedure 0-2.3.1"Draining andOperating atReducedInventory intheReactorCoolantSystem".Therefore theabilitytorecoverfromalossofRHRcoolingduringreducedRCSinventory operations remainsunchanged andtheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisinareducedinventory condition willnotchange.TheNPSHavailable fortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired, therefore thecapability ofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnotbeadversely affected.

TheWCAP-11916 (section2.5)wasreviewedtoverifythatoperating inmidloop'withtheRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidate itsanalysis.

Theanalysesforvortexformation weremostsensitive tofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosity ofthefluidassecondary affects.Noneoftheseparameters areaffectedbytheRCSbeingundera'vacuum.

Theanalysistherefore remainsvalid.Thereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSAR.38 TheRHR,charging, andsafetyinjection systemswillallbelinedupandcontrolled perOperations procedure 0-2.3.1"Draining andOperating atReducedInventory intheReactorCoolantSystem".Thisprocedure implements RGEcE'sresponsetogenericletter88-17concerns.

TheRCSismaintained inananalyzedcondition perWCAP11916.TheRCSandmitigating systemsarelinedupandoperating perestablished procedures.

Therefore thissystem'onfiguration and-procedure doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSAR.TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisinareducedinventory condition willnotchange.TheNPSHavailable fortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired,.therefore thecapability ofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnotbeadversely affected.

TheWCAP-11916 wasreviewedtoverifythatoperating inmidloopwiththeRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidate itsanalysis.

Theanalysesforvortexformation weremostsensitive tofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosity ofthefluidassecondary affects.Noneoftheseparameters areaffectedbytheRCSbeingunderavacuum.Theanalysisremainsvalid.Therefore RHRpumpoperation whentheRCSisundervacuumconditions doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSAR.Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARisnotcreated.Withthesteamgenerator intactandthepressurizer manwayinstalled, thecriteriaismetfortheRCSintactconfiguration.

Thisconfiguration wasanalyzedandisoneoftheconfigurations thatWCAP-11916 andGenericLetter88-17reviews.Therefore, thepossibility ofamalfunction oftheRCSboundaryofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARisnotcreated.RCSpressureandtemperature limitsasstatedinthePressureTemperature LimitsReport(PTLR)arenotexceeded.

Theshutdownrequirements andPORVoperability limitsfortheRCSaremaintained.

Therefore, thepossibility ofamalfunction oftheRCSboundaryofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARisnotcreated.ThischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

Withthesteamgenerator intactandthepressurizer manwayinstalled, thecriteriaismetfortheRCSintactconfiguration.

Thisconfiguration wasanalyzedandisoneoftheconfigurations thatWCAP11916andGenericLetter88-17reviews.Thisevolution occurswellbeyondthe120hoursaftershutdownanalysisandtemperature isfarbelowthe140'fstartingtemperature asevaluated intheWCAP11916analysis.

Thisconfiguration doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedTechnical Specification 3.4.8and3.4.12.AKYPIPEanalysis(notedon"Expeditious Actions"responsetotheNRC,datedJanuary4,1997)oftheRHRsystemverifiedthatthegravityfeedmethodwouldplaceapproximately 700039 gallonsofwaterintheRCSifinitiated within16minutesoftheeventandassuminganintact,unventedRCS,thatwouldpressurize according totheWCAP11916fig.3.3.1-1.Thiswasbasedonthedecayheatloadat48hoursaftershutdown.

Thevacuumfillevolution istakingplaceatgreaterthan300hoursaftershutdown, theestimated timetosaturation isapproximately 27minutesandthereisadditional timeneededtobuilduppressureintheRCS.TheopenPORV'sandhavingonesteamgenerator filledwillfurtherdelaytheincreaseinRCSpressure.

Therefore additional timeisavailable fortheoperators toincreaseRCSlevelusinggravityfeed.Apressureofapproximately 42psiawasfoundtostopgravityfeedflowfromtheRWST.Thefinalrecoveryactionofrestarting RHRwouldoccurafterlevelisincreased.

Performing theRCSvacuumventandfillundertheseconditions does.notreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification.

Inaddition, SIflowpaths tothehotandcoldlegsandchargingflowpaths tothecoldlegwillbeavailable byprocedure intheeventgravityfeedcapability islost.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocessdoesnot"requireachangetoGinnaTechnical Specifications.

RCSpressureandtemperature limitsasstatedinthePressureTemperature LimitsReport(PTLR)arenotexceeded.

Theshutdownrequirements andPORVoperability limitsfortheRCSaremaintained.

ThemarginofsafetyforthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryasdefinedbytheASMEcodeforwallthickness, stresslimits,integrity ofsystemsandcomponents ismaintained.

40 00 SEV-1104PCN97-4347SAFETYEVALUATION ThisSafetyEvaluation describes proposedchangestotestprocedure PT-60.5.Thisprocedure isusedtotesttheperformance oftheDieselGenerator BLubeOilandJacketWatercoolerscoincident withthemonthlyDieselGenerator BrundoneunderPT-12.2.ThefoulingintheDieselGenerator Bheatexchangers isdetermined analytically fromPT-60.5testmeasurements usingawelldeveloped methodology.

'Theuncertainty inthedetermination offoulingisstronglydependent ontheservicewatertemperature difference acrossthecoolers.Inordertoreducetheuncertainty inthefouling,theservicewaterwillbe.throttled toapproximately 250gpm.PCN¹97-4347addsstepstoPT-60.5tounlockandthrottleglobevalve4672duringtestingoftheDieselGenerator Bcoolers.DieselGenerator BwillbedeclaredINOPERABLE forthedurationoftimethatvalve4672isunlockedandthrottled.

PCN¹97-4347addsaprecaution toPT-60.5tohaveanobservercontinually monitorthelubricating oilandjacketwateroutlettemperatures fromDieselGenerator B,andrecordthevaluesonaten-minute frequency, whenevertheengineisrunningandtheservicewateristhrottled.

Intheeventthatthejacketwatertemperature risesabovethealarmsetpointof182'Forthelubricating oiltemperature risesabovethealarmsetpointof195'F,theHCOisinformedandtestpersonnel immediately openvalve4672.Testpersonnel alsoimmediately openvalve4672iftheHCOreceivesahigh-temperature alarmontheMCB.Allother,proposedchangestoPT-60.5areinconsequential.

Theyinvolveinstallation ofadditional non-intrusive instrumentation (surface-mounted RTDs)andchangestothefrequency anddurationatwhichdataistaken.Thesechangesareintendedtofurtherimprovetheaccuracyofthetests.Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.DieselGenerator B,althoughINOPERABLE, isexpectedtofunctionnormally, andcanbereturnedtoOPERABLEstatusbyopeningandlockingvalve4672.InadditiontothenormalMCBalarm,DieselGenerator Bwillbecontinually monitored locallytoverifythatthelubeoilandjacketwatertemperatures donotexceedthealarmsetpointvalues.Intheeventthattemperatures reachalarmsetpoints, testpersonnel willtakeimmediate actiontoopenvalve4672.Therefore, theprobability offailureofDieselGenerator BisnohigherthanitisduringtheregularmonthlyPT-12.2Surveillance Test.Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSAR.Accidentanalysesalreadyassumethelossofadiesel41 0

generator.

Theproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSAR.Jheproposedchangesinvolveminormodifications toatestthatisroutinely carriedout.Themostsevereoccurrence wouldbethetrippingofDieselGenerator Btopreventitfromoverheating.

Contingent actionsstemmingfromadieselgenerator triparealreadycovered.Theproposedchangesdonotincreasethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethenevaluated previously intheSAR.TheDieselGenerator Blubeoilandjacketwatertemperatures willnotbeallowedtoriseabovethecurrently established alarmsetpoints.

Ithasbeenestablished bythevendorthattheseareacceptable operating temperatures forthedieselengines.Themarginof'safety asdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreduced,sincenoTechnical Specifications areviolated.

42 0

SEV-1105VACUUMAFFECTSONRCSINSTRUMENTATION DURINGVACUUMVENTANDFILLTheeffectsofhavingavacuumontheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)instrumentation duringtheRCSvacuumventandfillevolution aretobeevaluated.

Theinstrumentation willbeexposedtoRCStemperatures of90-100'F.

Thepressurewillrangefromatmospheric to25inchesofHgvacuumor2.42psia.TheRCSloopwillbeinitially atthemidlooplevel.Thislevelis10inchesusinglocallevelindication andisatthe246'0"elevation.

Thetimedurationoftheexposuretovacuumislessthan6hours.OncetheRCSlevelisinthe50%-80%narrow'angeinthepressurizer thevacuumwillberemovedandthesystemwillbereturnedtonormaloperational pressures.

ImpactoftheRCSVacuumVentandFillprocedure onsystemperformance isevaluated inSEV-1103.

Thischangedoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedure willmaintainpositivecontrolovertheRCSventsandthelowtemperature overpressure system(LTOP)alignment.

Theprocedure maintains controloverallequipment thatcaninjectintotheRCSandincreaseitspressure.

ThisassuresRCSboundaryprotection andRCSinstrument operability atlowtemperatures perUFSARchapter5.2.2.TheRCSinstrument systemwillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifyRCSparameters.

Therefore theinitialconditions andprobability ofoccurrence foranyaccidentanalysispreviously evaluated intheUFSARhavenotchanged.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedure maintains controlofreactorcoolantboron,density,andoperating temperature.

Theprocedure monitorsthedilutionandborationpathstotheRCS.TheRCSinstrument systemwillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifyRCSparameters.

Thevacuumprocesswillnotinfluence coolantboronconcentration, therefore theinitialconditions andprobability ofoccurrence foranyaccidentforreactivity insertion inUFSARchapters15.4.4.2.2 or15.4.4.2.6 havenotchangedandarevalid.TheRCSvacuumventandfillevolution doesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously described intheUFSAR.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedure willmaintainpositivecontrolovertheRCSventsandthelowtemperature overpressure system(LTOP)alignment.

Theprocedure maintains controloverallequipment thatcaninjectintotheRCSandincreaseitspressure.

ThisassuresRCSboundaryprotection atlowtemperatures perUFSARchapter5.2.2.TheRCSinstrument systemwillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifyRCSparameters.

Therefore theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously described intheUFSARhavenotchangedandarevalid.TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocedure maintains controlofreactorcoolantboron,density,43 0

andoperating temperature.

Theprocedure monitorsthedilutionandborationpathstotheRCS.TheRCSinstrument systemwillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifyRCSparameters.

Thevacuumprocesswillnotinfluence coolantboronconcentration, therefore theinitialconditions andconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously described intheUFSARforreactivity insertion inchapters15.4.4.2.2 or15.4.4.2.6 haveno'tchangedandarevalid.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARisnotincreased.

Thewallthickness oftheRCSprocessinstrumentation andsensinglinesandassociated components exposedtothevacuumissufficient tomaintaintheintegrity ofthesystemsduringvacuumventing,andafterthefillprocessiscomplete.

Theintegrity ofthereactorcoolantpumpsealinstrumentation isassuredbymaintaining apositivepressureatthenumberonesealinletarea.Thepressurizer relieftankinstrumentation isdesignedtowithstand afullvacuum.Thetankisequippedwithaninternalsupportfortherupturedisktopreventthedamagetothedisk.Therefore theintegrity oftheRCSinstrumentation remainsunchanged andtheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

Thecontainment isolation systemanditsassociated instrumentation willremainunaffected bythischange.Thesystemwillstillbeabletoachievecontainment closurewithintheallowed2hourtimeperiodofgenericletter88-17,andbecapableofpreventing aradiation releasewithin10CFR100limits.Therefore, theabilitytoisolatecontainment duringreducedRCSinventory operations remainsunchanged andtheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

TheRHR,charging, andsafetyinjection systemswillallbelinedupandcontrolled perOperations procedure 0-2.3.1"Draining andOperating atReducedInventory intheReactorCoolantSystem".TheRCSandRHRinstrument systemswillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifytheirparameters.

Therefore theabilitytorecoverfromalossofRHRcoolingduringreducedRCSinventory operations remainsunchanged andtheprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisinareducedinventory condition willnotchange.TheNPSHavailable fortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired, therefore thecapability ofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnotbeadversely affected.

WCAP-11916 wasreviewedtoverifythatoperating inmidloopwiththeRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidate itsanalysis.

Theanalysesforvortexformation:were mostsensitive tofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosity ofthefluidassecondary affects.TheRCSandRHRinstrument systemswillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifytheirparameters.

Noneoftheseparameters areaffectedbytheRCSbeingunderavacuum.Theanalysistherefore remainsvalid.Thereisnoincreaseintheprobability ofoccurrence ofanmalfunction previously evaluated intheUFSAR.44 e

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARhasnotincreased.

Thewallthickness oftheRCSprocessinstrumentation andsensinglinesandassociated components exposedtothevacuumissufficient tomaintaintheintegrity ofthesystemsduringvacuumventing,andafterthefillprocessiscomplete.

Theintegrity ofthereactorcoolantpumpsealinstrumentation isa'ssuredbymaintaining apositivepressureatthenumberonesealinletarea.Thepressurizer relieftankinstrumentation isdesignedtowithstand afullvacuum.The'ankisequippedwithaninternalsupportfortherupturedisktopreventthedamagetothedisk.Therefore theintegrity oftheRCSremainsunchanged andtheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

Thecontainment isolation systemanditsassociated instrumentation willremainunaffected bythischange.Thesystemwillstillbeabletoachievecontainment closurewithintheallowed2hourtimeperiodofgenericletter88-17,andbecapableofpreventing aradiation releasewithin10CFR100limits.Therefore, theabilitytoisolatecontainment duringreducedRCSinventory operations remainsunchanged andtheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

TheRHR,charging, andsafetyinjection systemswillallbelinedupandcontrolled perOperations procedure 0-2.3.1"Draining andOperating atReducedInventory intheReactorCoolantSystem".TheRCSandRHRinstrument systemswillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifytheirparameters.

Therefore theabilitytorecoverfromalossofRHRcoolingduringreducedRCSinventory operations remainsunchanged andtheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased.

TheabilityoftheResidualHeatRemovalsystemtoprovideforcorecoolingwhentheRCSisinareducedinventory condition willnotchange.TheNPSHavailable fortheRHRpumpsisgreaterthanrequired, therefore thecapability.

ofRHRsystemtoprovidecorecoolingwillnotbeadversely affected.

TheWCAP-11916 (section2.5)wasreviewedtoverifythatoperating inmidloopwiththeRCSatavacuumdidnotinvalidate itsanalysis.

Theanalysesforvortexformation weremostsensitive tofluidvelocitywiththedensityandviscosity ofthefluidassecondary affects.TheRCSandRHRinstrument systemswillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifytheirparameters.

Noneoftheseparameters areaffectedbytheRCSbeingunderavacuum.Theanalysistherefore remainsvalid.Thereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Thischangedoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated

,previously intheUFSAR.TheRHR,charging, andsafetyinjection systemswillallbelinedupandcontrolled perOperations procedure 0-2.3.1"Draining andOperating atReducedInventory intheReactor45 CoolantSystem".Thisprocedure implements RGAE'sresponsetogenericletter88-17concerns.

TheRCSismaintained inananalyzedcondition perWCAP11916.TheRCSandmitigating systemsarelinedupandoperating perestablished procedures.

Therefore thissystemconfiguration andprocedure doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheUFSAR.Thepossibility.

ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARisnotcreated.Withthesteamgenerator intactandthepressurizer manwayinstalled, thecriteriaismetfortheRCSintactconfiguration.

Thisconfiguration wasanalyzedandfoundacceptable inWCAP-11916.Therefore, thepossibility ofamalfunction oftheRCSboundaryofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARisnotcreated.RCSpressureandtemperature limitsasstatedinthePressureTemperature LimitsReport(PTLR)arenotexceeded.

Theshutdownrequirements andPORVoperability limitsfortheRCSaremaintained.

Therefore, thepossibility ofamalfunction oftheRCSboundaryofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARisnotcreated.Thischangedoesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical Specification, Withthesteamgenerator intactandthepressurizer manwayinstalled, thecriteriaismetfortheRCSintactconfiguration.

TheRCSandRHRinstrument systemswillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifytheirparameters.

Thisconfiguration wasanalyzedandfoundacceptable inWCAP11916.Thisconfiguration doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinTechnical Specifications.

TheRCSvacuumventandfillprocessdoesnotrequireachangetoGinnaTechnical Specifications.

RCSpressureandtemperature limitsasstatedinthePressureTemperature LimitsReport(PTLR)arenotexceeded.

TheRCSandRHRinstrument systemswillcontinuetoaccurately monitoranddisplaytheprocessvariables neededtoverifytheirparameters.

Theshutdownrequirements andPORVoperability limitsfortheRCSaremaintained.

ThemarginofsafetyforthereactorcoolantpressureboundaryasdefinedbytheASMEcodeforwallthickness, stresslimits,integrity ofsystemsandcomponents ismaintained.

46

SEV-1106COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLES DISPLAYREPLACEMENT TheCoreExitThermocouple (CETM)Monitorsareobsoleteandrequirereplacement.

ThemonitorsareanintegralpartofthesafetyrelatedCETsystem.Requiredasapostaccidentmonitoring system,theunitsfunctiontocalculate anddisplaycoreexittemperatures, deviations

.ofindividual pointsfromaverage,andprovidedeviation andtemperature alarms..Thereplacement unitscontainprogrammable microprocessors.

TheCETMunit'sdesignandconfiguration isdifferent thantheexistingdisplaymodules.Accordingly, theymustbeevaluated toensurethattheyarenotsusceptible tofailuremodesoreffectswhichcouldleadtoanunreviewed safetyquestion.

Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation istoprovidearecorddemonstrating whereallthecriticalattributes associated withthedigitalupgradeareanalyzed, anddocumenting theresultsofthoseanalysiswithrespecttodetermining ifthemodification canbeimplemented withoutpriorNRCapproval.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Theproposedchangehasnofunctional inter-relations withequipment directlyutilizedinaccidentmitigation.

Themodification willnotchangetheabilityoftheplantoperators tomonitorcoreexittemperatures oranyoftherelatedpostaccidentandsafetyparameter displays.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARwillnotbeincreased bythisproposedmodification.

Aspreviously stated,theCETMsdonothaveanydirectinteraction withplantprocessorcontrolequipment norcantheyintroduce afailurewhichwouldprecludethefunctioning ofanyprocessorcontrolequipment.

Aftercompletion ofthechangetheCETsystemwillprovideplantstaffwiththeidentical information setastheexistingunits.Becausetheplantoperators willhavethesameinformation availability therewillbenoreduction intheirabilitytomanagetheconsequences ofanaccident.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotestablish anynewfunctional relationships withplantequipment.

Becausenonewequipment inter-actions arecreated(norexistingonesremoved)theproposedchangecannotincreasetheprobability ofamalfunction.

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Theproposedchangecreatesnonewfunctional inter-actions andnonewequipment failuremodesormechanisms.

Becausetheproposedchangeisfunctionally like-for-like,thechangehasnoeffectontheconsequences ofanyequipment malfunction.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangecreatesnonewfunctional inter-actions withexistingplantequipment nordoesitintroduce anynewfailuremodesormechanisms whichcouldleadto47 reactorcoredamageorfissionproductreleaseThepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofa.different typethenevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduce anynewequipment inter-actions orfailuremodesormechanisms.

Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedbythisproposedmodification.

TheproposedchangewillnotaltertheCETsystemresponseordegradesystemaccuracy.

Otherthanproviding fortheaforementioned displayfunctions, theCET'sarenotutilizedinthebasesforanytechnical specifications.

48 SEV-1107EVALUATION OFMODE4ECCSCONFIGURATIONS Duringnormalplantcooldowns theRHRsystemcanbealignedtotheRCSwhentemperature is350degreesorlower.ShouldashutdownlossofcoolantaccidentoccurduringtheRCStemperature spanbetween350andapproximately 280degrees,(theactuallowertemperature isafunctionofRWSTtemperature andlevel),thedepressurization couldcauseflashingintheRHRsuctionpipingduetolossofRCSpressureandthussubcooling.

Thiscouldcausethepumpstomalfunction whenthesuctionistransferred totheRWST.Thiscondition canresultinwaterhammerandthepotential degradation ofRHRdeliveryuntilsuchtimeastheRHRsuctionpipingtemperature/pressure profilereturnstosub-saturated conditions.

Procedures AP-RHR.1, "LossofRHR"andAP-RCS.4, "Shutdown LOCA",provideplantoperators withguidancetomitigatetheeventwhenaleakisindicated.

However,thecurrentshutdownLOCAprocedure doesnotutilizeallthepossibleplantconfigurations thatcouldbemadeavailable tomitigatethisevent.Thepurposeoftheevaluation istoexaminethesafetyimpactofmodifying plantprocedures andtheECCStechnical specification basestoallowre-alignment oftheECCSsystemwhenenteringmode4suchthattheoptimumECCSequipment setisavailable foruse.Theneedforthisstemsfromthepotential forRHRsuctionpipingflashingiftheRHRsuctionistransferred totheRWSTwhenthetemperature oftheliquidisabove280degreesF.Thisistemperature associated withsaturated conditions oftheRWSTtemperature andpressure.,

lessinstrument uncertainty oftheRHRsuctiontemperature indication.

TheproposedchangeconsistsofmakingtheAandBhotlegSIinjection pathsavailable forusebelowanRCStemperature of350degreesF-Mode4.Havinghotleginjection available giveseachSIpumptwoinjections paths,thusensuringadeliverypathevenifthebreaklocationis.inanRCSloopSIinjection nozzle.Safetyinjection fromtheRWSTtothehotlegsisonemethodalreadyanalyzedforlossofRHRduringRCSreducedinventory operations.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofaaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased bythisproposedchange.Theproposedchangehasnoaffectonprobability ofaccidents previously evaluated at-power, becauseitdoesnotmodifytheat-powerSIvalveconfiguration.

Theproposedchangedoesnotalteranysystemconfigurations orequipment functions asdescribed intheSARorcreditedintheaccidentanalysis.

Additionally, thechangeunderreviewhasnofailuremodesoreffectswhichcanleadtoashutdownLOCAoralossofshutdowncooling.Theconsequence's ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARarenotincreased bythisproposedchange.Thechangeunderreviewdoesnotalteranysystemconfigurations orequipment lineupsduringplantmodeswhenSIiscreditedintheaccidentanalysis.

Becausetheproposedchangedoesnotalterequipment functionoravailability itcannothaveanegativeeffectontheconsequences ofanaccident.

49

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Thechangeunderreviewdoesnotaffectanyat-powersystemconfigurations andthuscannotincreasetheprobability ofat-powerequipment malfunctions.

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important ofsafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased bytheproposedchange.Thechangeunderreviewdoesnotaffectanyat-powersystemconfigurations andisunrelated toanypotential equipment malfunction.

Becausethechangedoesnotaffecttheconfiguration oftheequipment whenitiscreditedforaccidentmitigation theproposedchangecannotincreasetheconsequences ofat-powerequipment malfunctions.

Thepossibility ofaaccidentofadiffer'ent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Thechangeunderreviewdoesnotaltertheplantconfiguration duringplantmodeswhenSIiscreditedforaccidentmitigation.

Additionally, theproposedchangehasnofailuremodeswhichactasprecursors toanaccident.

Becausethechangehasnoaffectonplantequipment availability andnofailuremodeswhichpreventcorecooling,thechangecannotcreateanewtypeofaccident.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotaddanynewfunctional inter-actions nordoesitremoveanyexistingones'.Becausetheproposedchangedoesnotalterequipment designorfunctionitcannotintroduce thepossibility ofanewtypeofmalfunction.

CThebasisforthemarginofsafetyasdefinedinanytechnical specification isnotreducedbythisproposedchange.Thischangewillnotresultinanydegradation intheabilityoftheECCStoperformitsintendedsafetyfunctions andthuscannotreducethemarginsofsafetyassociated withthecorecoolingsystems.OnetrainofECCSasdefinedintheproposedbasisfortheTechnical Specifications B3.5.3consistsofonetrainofSIanditssubsystem, including hotandcoldleginjection paths.TheneedforECCSutilizing theRHRanditssubsystem canbedelayeduntilswitchover tosumpBrecirculation.

Atthetimesumprecirculation wouldcommence, theRHRsuctionpipingwillhavecooledsufficiently belowthesaturation temperature suchthatthepotential forawaterhammernolongerexists.ThechangeunderreviewdoesnotaffecttheECCSat-powerconfiguration.

Accordingly, theproposedchangehasnoaffectontheabilityoftheECCStomitigation thedesignbasisaccidentset.MakingtheSIhotleginjection pathavailable foruseduringMODE4operations whiledelayingtheinitiation ofECCSusingtheRHRsubsystem untilsumprecirculation enhancestheabilitytocopewithaMode4LOCA.Thisproposedchangedoesnotresultinanunreviewed safetyquestion.

50 SEV-1108CYCLE27RELOADCycle27consistsof41newfuelassemblies fromfeedregions29A,29B,29C,and29D.Thissafetyevaluation isvalidforanend-of-cycle 26burnupof15,200to16,200MWD/MTUandCycle27burnupnottoexceed16,517MWD/MTUwithoutadditional analysis.

Thefuelassemblies forCycle27aremechanically thesameasthecycle26fuelassemblies exceptforthefollowing.

1.Theuseofannularpelletsintheaxialblankets, 2.Areduction inbackfillpressureinIFBArodsto100psig,3.Groovedtopandbottomfuelrodendplugs,4.3-tabinconelgrids,5.Newtopnozzlespringpackdesign.TheCycle27reloadwillnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment becausethereloadcoredoesnoteffectaccidentinitiators orequipment operation.

Thereloadcoredoesnotcauseapipetobreakorequipment tomalfunction.

Therefore, thereloadcorecannotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentofmalfunction..

Thefueldesignchangesatisfyexistingdesigncriteria; therefore, theprobability offailuredoesnotincrease.

TheCycle27reloaddoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction becausethecorecharacteristics areboundedbyparameters assumedintheaccidentanalysis.

Whendeviations occurredreanalysis wasperformed toshowtheacceptance criteriawasstillsatisfied.

Thefuelassemblychangesdonotdegradefuelperformances.

Theresulting changesarestillwithinacceptable ranges.TheCycle27reloadandfuelassemblychangesdonotcauseanewtypemalfunction oraccidentbecausethecoreparameters areboundedbythoseassumedinaccidentanalysisanddesignparameters arestillwithintheassumedranges.Sincetheassumptions inthesafetyandaccidentanalysisincluding thoserelatedtothecoredesignareboundingfortheCycle27reloadtheconclusions intheGinnaUFSARremainappropriate andtheregulated acceptance criteriafortheaccidentanalysishasnotbeenviolatedthereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafety.Thegapreopening criteriaandthe17%metalwastageLOCAcriteriaaremetforCycle27throughmid-cycle.

Therefore, thereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafetyduringthisperiod.Operation beyondmid-cycle willrequirearevisedevaluation.

51 SEV-1109NEWPROCEDURE PT-60.3A"CONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION FANCOOLERPERFORMANCE TEST"SAFETYEVALUATION ThisSafetyEvaluation describes newprocedure PT-60.3A.

Thisprocedure wasdeveloped toprovideasimplified alternative toprocedure PT-60.3.Simplification wasdesiredtoreducethenumberofpeopleandamountofequipment thatwouldberequiredincontainment tofacilitate at-powertesting.Thenewprocedure onlyprovidesinformation necessary todetermine thefoulingoftheContainment Recirculation FanCoolers(CRFC).ItDOESNOTtesttheCRFCmotorcoolers.Theactionsintheprocedure thathavepotential safety-significance include:1.Throttling theservicewaterflowtoeachCRFCdownto-300gpmfromtheusualvalueof-1200gpm.ThisisonlydonetooneCRFCatatime,andtheCRFCisdeclaredinoperable.

2.Isolation ofservicewaterflowtothefanmotorcooleroftheCRFCbeingtested.Again,theCRFCisdeclaredinoperable whenthemotorcoolerflowisisolated.

3,Installation andremoval'ofintrusive testinstrumentation (differential pressurecells).Thiswillperiodically causethecontrolroomoperators togetlowflowalarmsonFIA-2033, FIA-2034, FIA-2035, andFIA-2036.

Theoperators areinformedbeforethesemanipulations aredone.4.Positioning andrepositioning ofA-3.3Containment Isolation Boundaries.

PT-60.3Adoesnotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSAR.PT-60.3Adoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofanaccident'reviously evaluated intheSARsincetheinoperable durationofanyCRFCismuchlessthantheLCO3.6.6allowedtimeof7days.PT-60.3Adoesnotincreasetheconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARsincetheinoperable durationofanyCRFCismuchlessthantheLCO3.6.6allowedtimeof7days.PT-60.3Adoesnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSAR.Theprocedure involvesmanipulation ofservicewatersystemvalvesinthesupplytoaninoperable CRFC,entryintotheenclosure oftheinoperable CRFC,andinstallation oftestequipment only.PT-60.3Adoesnotincreasethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyof52 adifferent typethanevaluated previously intheSAR.Theprocedure involvesmanipulation ofservicewatersystemvalvesinthesupplytoaninoperable CRFC,entryintotheenclosure oftheinoperable CRFC,andinstallation oftestequipment only.Nootherequipment ismanipulated orexpectedtomalfunction asaresultofthisprocedure.

Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreduced,sincenoTechnical Specifications areviolated.

53 SEV-1110TSCBATTERYCHARGERASANACCEPTABLE DCELECTRICAL SOURCEWHILEINMODE5AND6Thisevaluation addresses aproposedrevisiontotheBasesforTechnical Specifications section3.8.5,"DCSources-MODES5and6",toincludetheuseoftheTechnical SupportCenter's(TSC)DCbatterychargerasanacceptable sourceofDCpower.Thenon-Class 1ETSCDCsystemisdesignedtotieintoeitherClass1EDCtrainusingmanualswitches.

BytyingtheTSCbatterychargertooneofthevitalDCtrains,theassociated Class1Ebatteryandchargersmayberemovedfromservice.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

TheTSCbatterychargerasasecondDCsourcewillbeusedduringMODES5and6.Therearethreetypesofevaluated eventsintheseMODES;borondilutionandfuelhandlingaccidents andlossofshutdowncooling.TheuseoftheTSCbatterychargerwillnotchangetheabilityoftheplantoperators tomonitorborondilutionorfuelmovementactivities andhasnofailuremodeswhichactasaprecursor toanyeventortransient.

Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased bythisproposedchange.TheTSCbatterychargerexceedsthecapability ofeitherClass1Ebatterycharger.AfailureintheTSCbatterysystemwhenconnected toaClass1EDCsystemwillnotcauseafailureintheredundant Class1EDCsystemandhasnoimpactontheabilitytomanagetheassociated shutdownevents.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

FailureoftheTSCbatterychargerorothercomponents intheTSCDCsystemresultsonlyinthelossoffunctionoftheequipment suppliedfromtheconnected Class1EDCwhichisaddressed intheSAR.ATSCfailurewillnotcausetheClasslEDCsystemequipment tomalfunction.-

Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Theproposedchangeutilizesexistingequipment anddoesnotcreateadditional functional interactions ornewequipment failuremodesormechanisms.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangecreatesnonewfunctional interactions withexistingplantequipment nordoesitintroduce newfailuremodesormechanisms whichcouldleadtoreactorcoredamageorfissionproductrelease.Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethenevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotintroduce anynewequipment interactions orfailuremodesormechanisms.

Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedbythis54 proposedmodification.

TheproposedchangeaffectsonlythesecondDCsourceduringMODES5and6.AfaultintheTSCbatterysystemwhenusingtheTSCchargerasasecondDCsourcewillnotpropagate intotheredundant Class1BDCsystem.55 SEV-1111FUELASSEMBLYREPAIRPROCEDURE RF-73Inordertorepair(reconstitute) selectedfuelassemblies thepreferred technique istoremovethetopnozzlewhichallowsaccesstothefuelpins.Thisdiffersfrompastmethodsofreconstitution whichinvolvedturningthefuelassemblyupsidedownandremovingthebottomnozzle.Theremovable topnozzlehasbeenincorporated intoGinnafueldesignsanditisdesirable toutilizethismethodofreconstitution.

Fuelreconstitution isaccomplished byremovingdefective rodsandreplacing themwith"dummy"stainless steelrods.Theacceptability ofusingareconstituted fuelassemblyinthereactorisnotcoveredbythissafetyevaluation asthatwillbecoveredbyarevisiontothereloadsafetyevaluation.

Thisevaluation coverstheprocessofreconstitution only.Thegeneralprocessforreconstitution isasfollows:Onceafuelassemblyhasbeenidentified asaleakerandthedefective pin(s)identified byaUTinspection thefuelassemblyistransported tothenewfuelelevator.

Thenewfuelelevatorwillbeoutfitted withaspecialreconstitution basketthatiscompatible withthereconstitution tooling.Oncethefuelassemblyhasbeenplacedintheelevatortheelevatorwillberaisedtoaheightwherethetopnozzlelocktubescanberemoved.Thiselevation isapproximately 9feetbelowthewatersurface.Thelocktubesandtopnozzlearethenremovedandthefuelassemblyloweredtotherackelevation.

Nextthedefective fuelpinsareremovedandplacedintheexistingfailedfuelstoragecontainer.

Dummyrod(s)areinsertedinthelocation(s) previously occupiedbythedefective pinsandthefuelassemblyraisedagaintothe9footelevation andthetopnozzleandlocktubesarereinstalled.

Theassemblyisthenloweredandtransferred toitsdesiredlocation.

TheGinnaUFSARstatesthatthenewfuelelevatorisusedfornewfuelonly.Sincethisprocedure willdeviatefromthatdescription thissafetyevaluation isbeingpreparedtodescribetheadditional useoftheelevatorforfuelrepairactivities.

Sincetheassemblytobereconstituted iscontained insystemsdesignedtohandleitsassociated geometryandweighttheprobability ofafuelhandlingaccidentoranyotheraccidentinSARisnotincreased.

Sincethefuelassemblywillbetheonlyassemblyintransitorbeingworkedonduringreconstitution activities theconsequences ofafuelhandlingaccidentremainboundedbytheevaluated accident.

Theprobability ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyisnotincreased becausemultiplelayersofadministrative andphysicalcontrolsareinplacetomaintainsufficient waterlevelabovethefuelassemblyatalltimes.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyarenotincreased becausesufficient controlshavebeenputinplacetoprecludeoverexposure ofplantpersonnel aswell56 asthepublicfromreconstitution activities.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSARhasnotbeencreatedbecausethenewfuelelevatorhassufficient controlsinplacetopreventtheinadvertent withdrawal ofaspentfuelassemblyfromthewater.Anypossiblebreakageofasinglefuelrodduringthereconstitution processisboundedbythefuelhandlingaccidentanalysiswhichassumesallrodsinasingleassemblyarefailed.Theuseofthenewfuelelevatorwillnotcreatethepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetybecausetheadjustedelevatorstopwillbetestedpriortoplacingaspentfuelassemblyintoit.Sincetheelevatorisdesignedfortheweightandgeometryofthecomponent thatisbeinginsertedintoitthischangedoesnotcreatethepossibility ofitsmalfunction.

Sincefuelhandling, waterlevel,boronconcentration specifications areallmaintained withintheirTechnical Specification limitsthisprocedure doesnotdecreasethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforspentfuelpooltechnical specifications.

57 0

SEV-1112ACTIONREPORT97-1846DISPOSITION OFMAINSTEAMLINEAANDBCRACKREPAIRATPENETRATION 401AND402AsaresultofnewISIinspection methodsforintegralattachments topiping/components, crackswerediscovered inthegussetweldsofMainSteam(MS)penetrations 401and402insidecontainment.

Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation istoreviewtherootcauseandcorrective actiontakenasaresultofthecracksanddetermine iftheaffectedsystemsareoperable.

Therootcauseofthecrackswasfoundtobeduetopoorweldjointdesign,referredtoasateejoint,whichcausedhighresidualstressesintheheataffectedzoneoftheweld.Heavypresenceofoxidesisevidencethatthecrackshaveexistedforalongtime,possiblyfromoriginalconstruction initiation.

Crackinginteejointsisawellknowphenomena (Lamellar tearing)whichwasidentified inthelate1960sforlargesectionstructural members.Theliterature reviewedshowscracksstartingfromtheweldtoeandpropagating downintothebasemetalalongtheheataffectedzone.Basedonthereport,furthercracksshouldnotdevelopsincetheinitiating causewastheweldingstresses, notserviceinducedstresses(fatigue).

Allcrackswerefoundattheoutertoeoftheweld.Therepairprocessremovedgussetswhichwerelocatedadjacent-to thecrackedweldtoallowaccesstothepipewallfordefectremoval.Crackswerenotfoundinanyoftheareabetweentheoutertoesofthetwofilletweldsoneithersideofthethreegussetwhichwereremoved.Thecrackswereexcavated downto"defectfree"basemetalandthenreweldedtorestoretherequiredpipewall.Allrepairsweredoneinaccordance withtheoriginalplantconstruction code.Themaximumcrackdepthwasfoundtobelessthan5/8"inallcasesandstartedattheweldtoeonthepipe.Theremovedgussetswerenotre-installed overtherepairedpipeareaperPCR97-089,.sincetheywerenotrequiredtomeetthedesignbasisloads.TheFeedwater (FW)systemwasfoundtohavethesamepenetration designastheMSexceptwiththinnermembersandsmallerfilletwelds.Theinspections didnotrevealanycracks.Areviewwasalsodoneoftheremainder oftheMSandFWsystemforotherpotential teejointconfigurations whichhavethepotential forcracks.Nootherattachments werefoundwhichwerehighlyrestrained andhadweldsizeslargeenoughtogeneratehighresidualstresses.

Athirdreviewwasdoneoftheremainder oftheplantpipingsystemsandtheresultsshowedthatthesystemsdidnothavealargeenoughpipewallthickness orattachment weldstocreatethehighresidualstresses.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheUFSARarenotincreased bytheproposedrepairsincethecapability oftheMSlinepenetrations toresistdesignloadshasnotbeenreducedbeyondwhatwasoriginally assumed.Thepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanevaluated previously intheUFSARwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedrepair.Sincetherepairmeetstheoriginalcode58 requirements anddesignbasis,andwillnotchangethefunctionofthepenetrations, nonewtypesofaccidents ormalfunctions wouldbeintroduced.

Themarginofsafety,asdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification, isnotreducedbytheproposedrepairsinceitmeetstheoriginaldesignbasisandcodes.59 0

SEV-1113TAVGDEFEATSWITCHINDEFEATPOSITIONTOPREVENTUNWANTEDRODMOTIONINAUTOInordertopreventthedownwardswingsfromchannel2'sTavgsignalfromcausingunwantedrodmotionwhentheRodControlSystemisinAuto(whichisbeingcausedbythecurrentcoreconfiguration/temperature streaming),

theTavgDefeatswitchT/401AwillbeplacedintheDefeatpositionsothatChannel2'sTavgsignalwillbeprevented fromgoingtoTM-4010(AverageTavg).WhentheTavgdefeatswitchisplacedinthedefeatposition, itpreventstheselectedTavgsignalfrombeingusedinthedevelopment ofAverageTavg.TheAverageTavgsignalisstillproducedusingTavgsignalsfrombothloops,withtheonlyexception beingthatchannel1'sTavgsignalisdoubledsothattheaverageisstillaresultoffourinputvalues.TheAverageTavgsignalisusedinnonSafetyRelatedcontrolsystemssuchasRodControl,SteamDump,Pressurizer LevelControlandFeedWaterIsolation.

TheRodControlandPressurizer LevelcontrolshouldbeinmanualwhentheTavgdefeatswitchisplacedinoroutofDefeat,thiswillpreventanyperturbations duetominorchangesinAverageTavg.TheTavgdefeatswitcheswillbecontrolled byOperations withtheuseofOperatorAidtagsbeingplacedonbothswitches.

ThiswillensurethatT/401AisplacedintheNormalpositionpriortoperforming testingthatrequirestheuseoftheTavgDefeatforthe"A"and"B"loops.ThetagwillalsoensurethatT/401ATavgDefeatswitchisreturnedtodefeatpositionforchannel2aftermaintenance.

Theprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Thechangedoesnotintroduce anynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedTavginstrument loopnordoesitfunctionally modifythelooporassociated RPSandcontrolsystemsinanywaynotoriginally designedfor.Theconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased bythisproposedchange.Thechangedoesnotintroduce anynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedTavginstrument loopnordoesitfunctionally modifythelooporassociated RPSandcontrolsystemsinanywaynotoriginally designedfor.Theprobability ofoccurrence ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Thechangedoesnotintroduce anynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedTavginstrument loopnordoesitfunctionally modifythelooporassociated RPSandcontrolsystemsinanywaynotoriginally designedfor.Theconsequences ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSARisnotincreased.

Thechangedoesnotintroduce anynewfailuremodesoreffectsintotheaffectedTavginstrument loopnordoesitfunctionally modifythelooporassociated RPSandcontrolsystemsinanywaynotoriginally designedfor.60 Thepossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotcreateanynewequipment interactions.

Thepossibility ofamalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyofadifferent typethenevaluated previously intheSARisnotcreated.Theproposedchangedoesnotcreateanynewequipment interactions.

Themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanytechnical specification isnotreducedbythisproposedswitchposition.

TheOverpower andOvertemperature setpoints, theprocessbywhichtheyaregenerated, andthetotalRPSdelaytimeareallunaffected bythechange.

10CFR50.59 SAFETYREVIEWFORACTIONREPORT96-1200NOLONGERREUIRINGSPARECHARGINGPUMPBREAKERFORPIPEBREAKOUTSIDE'CONTAINMENT IPSARSECTION4.14NRCcorrespondence toRG8'cEdated4/21/83,INTEGRATED PLANTSAFETYASSESSMENT REPORT(IPSAR)SECTION4.14PIPEBREAKOUTSIDECONTAINMENT, requiredtheimplementation ofadministrative controlsfortheinstallation ofasparechargingpumpbreakerandcableforpostulated steamheatinglinebreaksintheAuxiliary building.

RG&Ehassinceperformed anenvironmental evaluation oftheinstalled chargingpumpbreakersanddetermined thattheyareenvironmentally qualified (EQPackage49),therefore thereisnorequirement tomaintainasparebreakerandadministrative controlsforitsinstallation.

Administrative controlswillremaininplaceforthecablereplacement.

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10CFR50.59 SAFETYREVIEWFORCHANGETOFREUENCYOFPERIODICVENDORCONTACTSFORVENDORMANUALPROGRAMRG&E'scorrespondence totheNRCdated2/2/93,ResponsetoGenericLetter90-03,statedourcommitment toperformperiodicvendorcontactsonafrequency ofbiennially (everytwoyears).Astheresultofprocessimprovements intheVendorManualProgram,RG8cEwillberevisingourcommitment andutilizing athreeyearvendorrecontact cycle.Industryexperience hasshownthatthroughtheimplementation ofavigorousrecontact process,athreeyearrecontact cycleistheoptimumperiodforperformance frombothatechnical andeconomicperspective, andinmanyinstances ismoretechnically effective thanrecontacts attighterintervals.

GenericLetter90-03providedclarification ofthevendorinterface forsafety-relatedcomponents anddidnotspecifically stipulate arecontact frequency.

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