ML17309A452

Annual Rept of Facility Changes,Tests & Experiments Conducted W/O Prior Commission Approval, Covering Aug 1989 to Jul 1990. W/901217 Ltr

ML17309A452
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/31/1990
From:	MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9101020002
Download: ML17309A452 (902)

Text

>ACQELERATED DIS.RIBUTIONDEMONSTRATION SYSTEMREGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSIONNBR:9101020002 DOC.DATE:

90/07/31NOTARIZED:

NODOCKETFACIL:50-244 RobertEmmetGinnaNuclearPlant,Unit1,Rochester G05000244AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION MECREDY,R.C.

Rochester Gas&ElectricCorp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION R

SUBJECT:

"AnnualReptofFacilityChanges,Tests&Experiments IConducted W/0PriorCommission Approval,"

coveringAug1989toJul1990."W/901217ltr.DDISTRIBUTION CODE:IE47DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR ENCLSIZE:TITLE:50.59AnnUalReportofChanges,Testsorxperiments MadeW/outApprovNOTES:License Expdateinaccordance with10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

05000244~ARECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3LAJOHNSON,A INTERNAL:

AEOD/DOALHFBllREGFILE02EXTERNAL:

NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL101011111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-3PDAEOD/DSP/TPABNRR/DOEA/OEAB11 RGN1FILE01NSICCOPIESLTTRENCL5511111111DDDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMPl-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR15ENCL13DD a-~.ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION

~89EASTAVENUE,ROCHESTER N.Y.14649-0001 ROBERTCMECREDYVicePresident GinnaNuclearProduction TELEPHONE AREACODETie646'2700December17,1990U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555

Subject:

AnnualReportofFacilityChanges,Tests,andExperiments Conducted WithoutPriorCommission ApprovalR.E.Gi.nnaNuclearPowerPlantDocketNo.50-244Gentlemen:

Thesubjectreporti.sherebysubmitted asrequiredby10CFR50.59(b).

Enclosedaretheoriginalandonecopyofthereportcontaining descriptions andsummaries ofthesafetyevaluations conducted insupportofchangestothefacilityandprocedures described i.ntheUFSARandspeci.altests,fromAugust1989throughJuly1990.Verytrulyyours,RES/jdwEnc.RobertC.MecredyVicePresident, GinnaNuclearProduction xc:USNRCRegionIOfficeUSNRCResidentXnspector 9101020002 900731PDRADOCK05000244RPDR1 1990REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGESgTESTSANDEXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1989THROUGHJULY1990SECTIONASECTIONBSECTIONCSECTIONDSECTIONESECTIONFCOMPLETED ENGINEERING WORKREQUESTS(EWR)ANDTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTS(TSR)COMPLETED STATIONMODIFICATIONS (SM)TECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUA-TIONS(TSEE)TEMPORARY BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES'HIELDING'ND FLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESPROCEDURE CHANGESCOMPLETED SPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTS R.E.GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTDOCKETNO.'50-244ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION DATEDDECEMBER,1990CLOSLOZOOOp/

SECTIONA-COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORKREQUESTS(EWRs)ANDTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTS(TSRs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofmodifications inthefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreport,andasummaryofthesafetyevaluation forthosechanges,pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.59(b).

Thebasisforinclusion of'anEWRorTSRinthissectionisclosureofthecompleted modification packageintheDocumentControlDepartment.

EWR-1483STEAMGENERATOR SNUBBERREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFSZXOFTHEEIGHTHYDRAULIC SNUBBERPERSTEAMGENERATOR.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION0TOCORRECTTHEFOLLOWING:

1)TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS2)ADDADDITIONAL REFERENCE

-ANSIB31~13)PIPINGANALYSISANDPRIMARYEQUIPMENT SUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATED PERTABLES1,2&3(ATTACHMENTS TOD.C.)ANDNOTINACCORDANCE WITHEWR-2512.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:1~2~3~4~5~POSTULATED PIPINGFAILUREINFLUIDSYSTEMSINSIDECONTAINMENT.

DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEM.DECREASEZNREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATE.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.

INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASMAJORANDMINORFIRES'LOODS'TORMS'R EARTHQUAKES'HE INSTALLATION OFMECHANICAL BUMPERSWILLNOTCHANGETHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENTONTHEFUNCTIONANDDESIGNREQUIREMENTS OFEXISTINGSTEAMGENERATOR RINGGIRDER,REACTORCOOLANTLOOPS'AIN STEAMLINES'EEDWATER ANDSECONDARY SHIELDWALL.'ZHZSMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES, NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORTHEFOLLOWING EVENTS:1~2~3~4~5.6~7~LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWFEEDWATER SYSTEMPIPEBREAKSRCSFLOWCOASTDOWN ACCIDENTS STEAMGENERATOR TUBERUPTUREPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREMAJORANDMINORFIRESFLOODS/STORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES THISMODIFICATION NEITHEREFFECTSNORZSEFFECTEDBYANYFLOODORSTORMPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED.

THEMATERIALS UTILIZEDINTHISMODIFICATION WILLMEETAPPENDIXiiRitREQUIREMENTS BASEDUPON10CFR50APPENDIXRANDENGINEERING PROCEDURE ANDWILLNOTINCREASEATTHEPROBABILITY OFMAJORORMINORFIRE.MODIFICATION OFADDITIONOFSUPPORTSWILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCE ORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENT ORSYSTEM.

BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

1)STRUCTURES iSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATZONSi ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT'ONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESi SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-1832A CIRCUITSEPARATIONS ANALYSISELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLIMPROVETHEELECTRICAL SEPARATION BETWEENREDUNDANT SAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON2/27/85ITEMNUMBER6.1.0-85-021-001.

THECHANGESTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAFORREVISION2AREDESCRIBED BELOW:SECTION1~1.3SECTIONDESCRIPTION ADDEDTOSPECIALNOTE).iiDCFUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS AREDELETEDFROMREVISION2OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIA.

DCFUSECOORDINATION ZSZNTHESCOPEOFEWR3341."DELETEDFUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

DESCRIPTION 2DELETEDANALYSIS51(FUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS).

2.1.4DELETEDANALYSIS:

113REQUIREMENTS)

.(FUSECOORDINATION 16.1~216.2.1DELETEDFUSETYPEREQUIREMENT.

THISISZNTHESCOPE.OFEWR3341.DELETEDFUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

SECTIONDESCRIPTION 16.2.2DELETEDFUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDSEISMICEVENTS.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONAREUNCHANGED'HE ADEQUACIES OFSTRUCTURESJ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDED'FORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREUNCHANGED.

EWR-1832B FIRESIGNALING SYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLUPGRADETHEFIRESIGNALING SYSTEM.REVISION6OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON12-12-84ITEMNUMBER6.1.0-84-144-003.

THECHANGESTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAFORREVISION7AREDESCRIBED BELOW:SECTION11.42223'26.2'3DESCRIPTION ADD>>INSTALLING ULAPPROVEDRELEASEMODULESFORTHEHALONSYSTEMSINTHERELAYANDCOMPUTER(MUX)ROOMSWILLBEACCOMPLISHED UNDEREWR4064CHANGE>>ENGINEER>>

TO>>ENGINEERING ADD:>>ANUMBEROFELECTRICAL MODULESWILLBECHANGEDOUTUNDEREWR4064TOFACILITATE MAINTENANCE.

THISISNECESSITATED BYTHEFACTTHATCERTAINELECTRICAL MODULESWEREFURTHERDEVELOPED BYGAMEWELLAFTERTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEINITIAL-DESIGN MODULES.MODULESOFCURRENT-DESIGN WEREUSEDWHENNEEDEDFORMAINTENANCE REPLACEMENT RESULTING INAMIXTUREOFOLDANDNEWMODULEDESIGNS.THISZNTURNCREATEDAMAINTENANCE PROBLEM,SINCETHELATESTWIRINGDIAGRAMZSNOTAPPLICABLE TOOLDERMODULES"~CHANGE>>ALOW>>TO<<ALLOW

'1 AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARETHEFIRESANALYZEDING.A.Z.REPORT41936ANDTHESEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONAREUNCHANGED'HE ADEQUACIES'F STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREUNCHANGED.

EWR-2606POSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEMIMPLEMENTATION THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THISDESIGNMODIFICATION.

ASARESULTOFTHEINABILITY ATTHREEMILEISLANDTORAPIDLYOBTAINREACTORCOOLANTSAMPLESTOASCERTAIN THEEXTENTOFCOREDAMAGE,THENRCISREQUIRING THATALLLICENSEES EVALUATEANDiIFREQUIREDi UPGRADETHEIRPLANTSTOENABLEACQUISITION OFAPPROPRIATE EXPEDITIOUS SAMPLESAFTERANACCIDENT.

ABILITYTOASSESSTHECONDITIONS OFTHECOREEARLYINANACCIDENTCANRESULTINTAKINGREMEDIALACTIONSWHICHCOULDLIMITOREVENPRECLUDECOREDAMAGETHESAMPLINGSYSTEMATGINNAHASBEENEVALUATED TOBEMARGINALLY ADEQUATEFORPOST-ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ANDCONSEQUENTLY REMEDIALMODIFICATIONS AREPLANNED.ANEWPOSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEM(PASS)WILLBEINSTALLED WHICHWILLENABLETHESTATIONTOOBTAINANDANALYZEREACTORCOOLANT,,

CONTAINMENT AIR,ANDCONTAINMENT SUMPSAMPLESWITHIN3HOURSOFTHEDECISIONTOSAMPLERSTHEPASSWILLALSOENABLESAMPLINGOFTHESESTREAMSDURINGNORMALOPERATION.

IN-L1NECHEMICALZNSTRUMENTATZON WILLBEPROVIDEDINANEWLIQUIDANDGASSAMPLEPANEL(LGSP)WHICHWILLREMOTELYDETERMINE IMPORTANT CHEMICALPARAMETERS OFREACTORCOOLANT,CONTAINMENT AIR,ANDCONTAINMENT SUMP.THELGSPWILLENABLEACQUISITION OFDILUTEDANDUNDILUTED GRABSAMPLESOFBOTHREACTORCOOLANTANDCONTAINMENT AZRFORZOPZCANALYSISINTHEEXISTING,COUNTING LAB.THELGSPWILLBECONTROLLED FROMANEWELECTRICCONTROLPANEL(ECP)ANDINSTRUMENT PANEL(IP)TOBELOCATEDINTHEHOTSHOP.REMOTELYOPERATEDVALVESANDINSTRUMENTS EXTERNALTOTHELGSPWILLALSOBECONTROLLED FROMTHEECP.THELGSPWILLBELOCATEDONTHE253'>>ELEVATION OFTHECONTROLLED PORTIONOFTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

FL THEPASSISDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFNUREG0578ANDNUREG0737(SECTIONZI.B.3).FURTHERMORE, THEPASSINSTALLATION ATGZNNAISTOHAVEADEQUATEPROVISIONS TOALLOWCOMPLIANCE WITHTHECONTAINMENT SUMPSAMPLING'H ANDOXYGENANALYSISREQUIREMENTS NOWINVOKEDBYREGULATORY GUIDE1'7(REV.2)DATEDDECEMBER1980'AMPLELINESASSOCIATED WITHTHEPASSWILLBEINSTALLED ZNSUCHAMANNERTHATTHEPOSTACCIDENTDOSECRITERIAWILLBEMETFORSAMPLINGANDACCESSTOVITALAREAS.THENECESSARY MODIFICATIONS ARESHOWNSCHEMATICALLY ONTHEATTACHEDFIGURE1.THEGENERALAEGVQTGEMENT OFEQUIPMENT ISSHOWNONFIGURE2.STEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSAMPLELINESFROMCONTAINMENT PENETRATZONS 206AND207TOTHEEXISTINGSAMPLEROOMARETOBEREROUTED(FORALARACONSIDERATIONS)

USINGTHESAMEDESIGNCRITERIADISCUSSED HEREIN.THESETWOLINESAREBEINGREROUTEDTOREDUCEOPERATOREXPOSUREFORROUTINESAMPLINGANDARENOTREQUIREDASAPARTOFNUREG-0737 ORREG.GUIDE1.97(REV.2).AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70ANDTHEGINNASTATIONFSAR.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:(1)EARTHQUAKE AND(2)RADIOACTIVE RELEASEFROMASUBSYSTEM ORCOMPONENT ALLEQUIPMENTANDPIPINGSUPPORTSINTHECONTAINMENTgAUXILIARY ANDINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGS ARESEISMICCATEGORYZ.THEIRDESIGNWILLASSUREOTHEREQUIPMENT WILLNOTBESTRUCTURALLY DAMAGEDASARESULTOFFAILUREDURINGANEARTHQUAKE.

THECONSEQUENCES OFANEARTHQUAKE ARENOTCHANGEDASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICA'TION.

FAILUREOFANYPASSCOMPONENT AFTERANACCIDENTSHALLNOTRESULTIN10CFRPART100DOSESTOBEEXCEEDEDANDONTHISBASISTHESYSTEMZSCLASSIFIED ASNON-SAFETY RELATED.THISHASBEENCONFIRMED BYANALYSIS.

INTHEEVENTOFALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTTHENEWPASSWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOOBTAINANDANALYZEREACTORCOOLANT,CONTAINMENT AIR,ANDCONTAINMENT SUMPSAMPLES.THEPASSWILLHAVEPROVISIONS TOBEPRESSURIZED WITHNITROGENORAIRPRIORTOPOSTACCIDENTOPERATION TOASSURELEAKTIGHTNESS.

THEMAJORSYSTEMVALVESANDINSTRUMENTS ARECONTAINED ZNANENCLOSED, SEALEDPANELWHICHISCONNECTED TOACHARCOALFILTEREDSTATIONHVACSYSTEM.THUSCOMPONENT LEAKAGEWILLBEPREVENTED FROMUNCONTROLLED AREAS.

THEREFOREi THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HE ADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

~EWR-279REACTORLEVELMONITORING SYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEAREACTORVESSELLEVELMONITORING SYSTEM.THESYSTEMWILLCONSISTOFTWOREDUNDANT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURETRENDINGCHANNELS.

EACHCHANNELWILLDRIVEASEPARATEINDICATOR INTHEMAINCONTROLROOMSHOWINGREACTORVESSELLEVELTOTHEPLANTOPERATORS UNDERALLPLANTCONDITIONS.

REVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDREVISION1OFTHESAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONMARCH20,1985,PORCNUMBER6.1.0-85-037-002.

UNDERREVISION3OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDREVISION2OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, THEFOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS AREAFFECTED:

DESIGNCRXTERIASTEP4.1REVISEDFROM:THEATTACHMENT TOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMINCLUDING THERESTRICTING DEVICESHALLBEQUALITYGROUPA.REMAINING FLUIDSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS SHALLBEQUALITYGROUPB.TOREADTHEATTACHMENTS TOTHEGUIDETUBEANDTHEHEADVENTSYSTEMiINCLUDING THERESTRICTING DEVICE,SHALLBEQUALITYGROUPA.REMAINING FLUIDSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS SHALLBEQUALITYGROUPB.STEP5.1REVISEDFROM:THEATTACHMENT TOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMSHALLCONSISTOFARESTRICTING DEVICEANDSHALLBEASMECODECLASSl.CONSISTENT WITHREFERENCE 6.2.2.7THECOMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OFTHERESTRICTING DEVICESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2.THECOUPLINGTHATATTACHESTOTHEREACTORINSTRUMENTATION GUIDETUBESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2~TOREAD:THEATTACHMENTS TOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMANDGUIDETUBESHALLCONSISTOFARESTRICTING DEVICEANDSHALLBEASMECODECLASS1.CONSISTENT WITHREFERENCES 6.2.2.7THECOMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OFTHERESTRXCTING DEVICESHALLBEA'SMECODECLASS2.

STEP7.1REVISEDFROM:THESYSTEMMECHANICAL DESIGNCONDITIONS WILLBEOVERARANGEOF0TO3000PSI,AND50TO697F.THESYSTEMSHALLA/SOPROVIDEINVENTORY ZNDZCATXONS FORTEMPERATURE OQER697F,ASSUMINGSATURATED FLUIDCONDITIONS'P TO2200FgZNTHECORE.TOREAD:TH)SYSTEMMECHANICAL DESIGNCONDITIONS ARE0TO2500PSIGAND50TO680F.THEMOSTSEVEREACCIDENTCONDITION ZS3015PSZGAT697F.THESYSTEMSHALLA/SOPROVIDEINVENTORY INDICATIONS FORTEMPERATURE OVEQ697FgASSUMINGSATURATED FLUIDCONDITIONS gUPTO2200FgINTHECORE~STEP7~6HASBEENADDEDTHEADDITIONOFTHEATTACHMENT TOTHEGUIDETUBESHALLNOTCAUSETHEGUIDETUBETOEXCEEDWESTINGHOUSE ALLOWABLE LOADSFORTHEATTACHMENT TOTHEREACTORVESSELORSEALTABLE.STEP8.1REVISEDFROM:THEINSTRUMENT TUBINGSHALLBESUPPORTED SUCHTHATITREMAINSFUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING ANSSEEVENTASWELLASDURINGNORMALOPERATION.

TOREAD:THEINSTRUMENT TUBINGSHALLBESUPPORTED SUCHTHATITREMAINSFUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING ANSSEEVENTASWELLASDURINGNORMALOPERATION ANDALLPOSTULATED ACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

STEP8.3REVISEDFROM:THEMOSTSEVEREOPERATING CONDITIONS CONSXDERED FORTHECONNECTION TOTHEHEADVENTSYSTEMISTHECONTROLRODEJECTIONANDTHECORRESPONDING PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURE IS3015PSIGAND697F.TOREAD:THEMOSTSEVEREACCIDENTCONDITION CONSIDERED FORTHECONNECTIONS TOTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMXSTHECONTROLRODEJECTION.

THECORRESPONDING PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURE ARE3015PSIGAND697F.STEP10.1REVISEDFROM:3.)PRIMARYREACTORCOOLANTLOOP,INCLUDING THEREACTORVESSELHEADVENTSYSTEM.

TOREAD:3.)PRIMARYREACTORCOOLANTLOOP,INCLUDING THEREACTORVESSELHEADVENTSYSTEMANDTHEREACTORVESSELBOTTOMMOUNTEDINSTRUMENTATION.

STEP31.0REVISEDFROM:nNOTAPPLICABLE TOREAD:CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES FORATTACHMENT TOTHISGUIDETUBEWILLBEDEVELOPED THATENSURETHATNOFOREIGNMATERIALENTERTHEGUIDETUBE.ATTACHEDFIGURE1TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAHASBEENREVISEDSTATINGTHATINPUTSTOTHEFOXBORORACKARE3INSTEADOF4LINETHERMOCOUPLES.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION

.ARE:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,2)SEISMICEVENTSAND3)THESPECTRUMOFLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTS INSIDEOFCONTAINMENT.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4'OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-2846B BLOCKWALLMODIFICATION RESTRAINTS EUIPMENTINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGPROTECTION THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATIONS TOPROVIDEPROTECTION OFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER CHECKVALVES,AANDBMAINSTEAMISOLATION VALVE(MSZV)OPERATORS ANDAANDBMSZVSOLENOIDVALVES.\THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ZSTOPROVIDE1)UPGRADEDPROTECTION FORTHEAANDBMSIVOPERATORS ANDAIRSOLENOIDVALVESSUCHTHATMSIVCLOSUREISENSUREDFORSCENARIOS INVOLVING SSE(SAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE),

TORNADOMISSILES/WIND LOADSANDHELB(H1GHENERGYLINEBREAKS)OUTSIDECONTAINMENT i2)PROTECTION FORTHEiiAiiANDiiBAUXILIARY FEEDWATER CHECKVALVESFORSCENARIOS INVOLVING TORNADOWINDLOADSANDSSESEISMICEVENTS.

REVISION1TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWILLALLOWREMOVALOFVENTVALVE3516A.THISVALVE,ANDASSOCIATED PIPING'ILL BEREMOVEDFROMTHE"B"MSIVANDNOTREPLACED.

THESCOPEOFTHEPIPINGMODIFICATION WILLBETOPLACEAPLUGINTHEEXISTINGCOVERFORTHE"B"MSIV.PRE-PORCCOMMENTSAREADDRESSED ZNINTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE 13N1-RR-L2275 ANDWILLBEINCORPORATED INTOTHENEXTREVISION.

THESECHANGESINCLUDETYPOGRAPHICAL CORRECTIONS TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIA, PARAGRAPHS 1.2AND23.0.TOFURTHERCLARIFYTHETESTREQUIREMENTSi ASENTENCEWILLBEADDEDTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAPARAGRAPH 23.0STATING"INLIEUOFAHYDROSTATIC TEST,ALEAKCHECKMAYBEPERFORMED ATNORMALOPERATING CONDZTZONSit

~AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREEARTHQUAKESi PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDINGi TORNADOES'IRES'ND TORNADOMISSILES'LL PROPOSEDPROTECTIVE DEVICESARETOBEMOUNTEDASSEISMICCATEGORY.IINACCORDANCE WITHTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PROGRAM(SRP).REMOVABLE PANELSWILLBEUTILIZEDTOPROVIDEMAINTENANCE/TESTING ACCESSASREQUIRED.

PLACEMENT OFPASSIVEPROTECTIVE DEVICESAROUNDTHEMSIVOPERATORS/SOLENOID VALVESAND"B"AFWCHECKVALVESENSURESFUNCTIONAL OPERATION DURINGANDFOLLOWING HELBSCENARIOS OUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

FIRESYSTEMSANDFIREBARRIERSDISCUSSED INTHEUFSARARECOVEREDUNDERPLANTADMINISTRATIVE

CONTROLS, ENSURINGTHATDEGRADATION OFPROTECTION/DETECTION FEATURESNECESSARY TOCOMPLYWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRWILLNOTOCCUR.TORNADOLOADSiSUCHASDIRECTWINDiDIFFERENTZAL PRESSUREiANDTORNADOMISSILESHAVEBEENINCORPORATED INTHEUFSARUNDER'SEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANDANALYSIS.

THUSiTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES iNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SSEANDTORNADOEVENTS.2)OPERATION DURINGAHELBSCENARIOOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

3)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP),ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCXDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3072RCP1SEALLEAKOFFTHISEWR(ENGXNEERZNG WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLINSTALLCHECKVALVESONTHENUMBERONESEALLEAKOFFLINESFROMTHEREACTORCOOLANTPUMPS(RCP)AANDB.THENEWCHECKVALVESWILLBEASMEN-STAMPED SEISMICALLY QUALIFIED.

THENEWCHECKVALVESWILLBELOCATEDINCONTAINMENT INSIDETHERCPSHIELDWALLS.THEMODIFIEDPIPESYSTEM,INCLUDING

SUPPORTS, WILLBESEISMICALLY QUALIFIED.

THISMODIFICATION ISSCHEDULED FORINSTALLATION DURINGTHE1987REFUELING OUTAGE.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONJUNE16,1986PORCNUMBER6.1.0-86-081-001.

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISXSTOINCLUDEREFERENCE TOTHEASMEZZICLASS2STANDARDS' REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODZFXCA-TIONARE1)PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREg2)INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'IRES'LOOD~

STORMOREARTHQUAKE~

AND3)LOSSOFAREACTORCOOLANT.PUMP.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE~

BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

10

EWR-3092BORICACIDPIPINGTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADEOFBORICACIDPIPINGFROMSCHEDULE10TOSCHEDULE40PIPE.INCLUDEDINTHISMODIFICATION ISTHERE-ROUTING OFTHEPIPETOAVOIDHIGHRADIATION AREAS'NSTALLATION OFANEWHEATTRACINGSYSTEM,UPGRADING OFPIPESUPPORTSANDADDITIONOFAONEINCH(ln)ISOLATION VALVEZNTHEMOV825A/BBYPASSLINEAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.REVISION0IDENTIFIED THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ASFIRE~SEISMIC'OSS OFOFFSZTEPOWERSCVCSCONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS'TEAM LINEBREAKANDLOCA.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50~APPENDIXRJORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURING'ANDFOLLOWING THISMODIFICATION.

SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSIS.

PIPINGANDPIPESUPPORTANALYSESSHALL'EPERFORMED INACCORDANCE WITHEWR-2512DESIGNCRITERIAUSINGANSIB31.1ANDASMESECTIONZIZ.SUBSECTION NFASABASIS.STRUCTURAL WORKREQUIREDSHALLBEBASEDUPONTHEAISCCODE,EIGHTHEDITION.THEDESIGNANDOPERATING CONDITIONS TOWHICHTHEPIPINGSYSTEMSWILLBEANALYZEDAREDEFINEDINTHEOPERATING TRANSIENTS DOCUMENTGENERATED FOREWR2512.SYSTEMTHERMALANALYSESSHALLEVALUATETHENORMAL100%POWERCONDITION, ASWELLASOTHERABNORMALOPERATING TRANSIENT CONDITIONS.

THELOADINGCOMBINATIONS ANDSTRESSLIMITSOFTHEEWR2512DESIGNCRITERIASHALLBEMETFORALLNORMALANDACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

ALLMODIFICATIONS ORADDITIONS TOTHEEXISTINGPIPINGORPIPESUPPORTSWILLBEREQUIREDTOINTERFACE WITHTHEEXISTINGPIPE,PIPESUPPORTS, AND/ORSTRUCTURES ANDSHALLNOTDEGRADETHEABILITYOFTHESEITEMSTOFUNCTIONACCORDING TOTHEIRORIGINALDESIGNREQUIREMENTS.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEPLANTSYSTEMSONALOSSOFOFFSZTEPOWER.THEHEATTRACECIRCUITSSHALLNOTDEGRADETHEPLANTNORMALOREMERGENCY POWERDISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.REDUNDANT POWERTRAINSSHALLBEMAINTAINED ANDSTRUCTURES ANDELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WITHINTHESCOPEOFTHISWORKSHALLREMAINFUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING ASAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE (SSE).THEHEATTRACINGSYSTEMSHALLBESUPPLIEDWITHPOWERFROMTHEEMERGENCY DIESELGENERATORS FOLLOWING ALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER.THEEFFECTOFTHENEWSYSTEMONTHEDIESELGENERATOR LOADSSHALLBEEVALUATED.

THEMODIFICATION PERFORMED SHALLNOTINHIBITTHEAFFECTEDSYSTEMSFROMPERFORMING THEIRFUNCTIONS DURINGALLNORMALANDPOSTULATED ACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

THEBORICACIDSYSTEMSHALLBEOPERABLEDURINGALLNORMAL'ESIGN TRANSIENTS UPSETANDFAULTEDCONDITIONS.

THEBORICACIDPIPINGCHANGESSHALLNOTAFFECT,THECONTROLOFANYPLANTSYSTEM.INREVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIATHESOLUBILITY TEMPERATURE LIMITFOR12-13WEIGHTPERCENTBORICACIDSOLUTIONISREVISEDFROM140FTO145FTOCOMPLYWITHTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ANDADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLSESTABLISHED ATGINNASTATION.THUSgTHISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)2)3)FIREPROTECTION FEATURESEQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMICANDTORNADOEVENTS.EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING ALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER,STEAMBREAKORLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT(LOCA).BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3199VITALBATTERYLOADFLOWMONITORTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEDESIGNMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOMONITORCURRENTMAGNITUDES ANDDIRECTION OFBOTHSAFEGUARDS D.C.BATTERYSYSTEMSASWELLASTHETECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTER(TSC)BATTERY.THESYSTEMWILLCONSISTOFTHENECESSARY EQUIPMENT TODISPLAYTHE.DIRECTION ANDMAGNITUDE OFCURRENTGOINGINTOOROUTOFEACHBATTERY.THESYSTEMWILLALSOBECAPABLEOFANNUNCIATING ABNORMALBATTERYCONDITIONS ANDLOSSOFCONTINUITY OFBATTERYCIRCUITS'HE IMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION WILLSATISFYTHEREQUIREMENTS OFSEPTOPICVIII-3.B.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISADDITIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,AND(2)SEISMICEVENT.ITHASgTHEREFORE JBEENDETERMINED THAT'THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT

.CONDZTZONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

12

EWR-3272SASPPCSCOMPUTERSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFASAFETYASSESSMENT SYSTEM(SAS)ANDTHEREPLACEMENT OFTHEP-250PLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).DEDICATED CRTsANDLINEPRINTERSWILLBECONNECTED TOTHESASANDPPCSCPUs.THESASSYSTEMISDESIGNEDTOPROVIDEANINTEGRATED DISPLAYOFCRITICALPLANTSAFETYP2QV&IETERS ANDPERFORMREFERENCE DIAGNOSTICS DURINGEMERGENCIES.

THE(SAS)SYSTEMWILLPROVIDETHEOPERATORS INTHECONTROLROOM,ANDPERSONNEL INTHETSC~THEEOFANDTHEENGINEERING CENTERWITH1)ANINDICATION OFTHESAFETYSTATUSOFTHEPLANT,2)ACCIDENTDIAGNOSTIC DISPLAYS'ND 3)POSTACCIDENTMONITORING'HE NEWPPCSWILLINITIALLY PERFORMTHESAMEFUNCTIONS THATTHEP-250PRESENTLY PERFORMS.

REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON5/23/84'ORC NUMBER6.1.0-84-082-002.

UNDERREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA, PARAGRAPH 3.2FIRSTSENTENCESTATING,"THEREMAINING EQUIPMENT" HASBEENCHANGEDTOREADitTHEEQUIPMENT ASSOCIATEDn.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES')SEISMICEVENTSBASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3296A STRUCTURAL UPGRADEPROGRAMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEGZNNASTATIONSTRUCTURAL UPGRADEPROGRAMWHICHISINRESPONSETOTHESYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM(SEP)BEGUNBYTHEUSNRCIN1977.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOUPGRADETHOSEMEMBERS,CONNECTIONS ANDANCHORAGES FOUNDTOBEOVERSTRESSED WHENSUBJECTED TOTHEDESIGNLOADSSETFORTHZNTHEVARIOUSSEPTOPICS.13

REVISION0TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSISCOVEREDMODIFICATIONS INCLUDEDZNTHESEPTOPICSLOCATEDINTHEAUXILIARY

BUILDING, CONTROLBUILDING, INTERMEDIATE

BUILDING, TURBINEBUILDINGS ANDTHEFACADESTRUCTURE REVISION1OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS:

1.ADDRESSES THEDESIGNANDINSTALLATION'F BACKDRAFT DAMPERSREQUIREDONLYZNTHEAUXILIARY BUILDING.

THESEDAMPERSgWHENINSTALLED'ILL ELIMZNATEg THEEFFECTSOFTHEDIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES ASSOCIATED WITHTHEDESIGNBASISTORNADOS2.INCORPORATES CHANGESIN,FORMATANDCONTENTOFVARIOUSSUB-SECTIONS OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGGUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:WINDAND=TORNADOLOADING,FIRESANDTHESAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE (SEISMICEVENTS).THEDESIGNFORWINDANDTORNADOLOADINGSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSIS.

MODIFICATIONS TOSTRUCTURAL MEMBERSANDATTACHMENTS WILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATION OFEXISTINGSTRUCTURES ORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT LOCATEDWITHINTHESESTRUCTURES.

THEINCLUSION OFBACKDRAFT DAMPERSUNDERTHISMODIFICATION INSURESTHATTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGWILLNOTBEADVERSELY AFFECTEDBYTORNADOWINDS.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRgORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEMODIFICATIONS.

THUS,THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASETHECONSEQUENCES, NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SSE,WINDANDTORNADOEVENTS2)FIREPROTECTION FEATURESBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANAL-YSISPLANT(SRP)gITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVEN-TIONOFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

14

EWR-3595CONTROLROOMHAB1TABILITY THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHECONTROLROOMHABITABILITY SYSTEM.INORDER,TOIMPROVERELIABILITY ANDMAINTAINABILITY OFTHERADIATION ANDTOXICGASMONITORSEWR-3595PHASEBWASESTABLISHED.

REVISION5OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES THEFOLLOWING CHANGESFROMREVIEWOFDCANDSAREVISION4PREVIOUSLY NOTPORCAPPROVED.,

MODIFICATIONS APPLICABLE TOEWR-3595PHASEBAREASFOLLOWS:1)REPLACE2EXISTINGTOXICGASSAMPLEPUMPSWITHTWOPUMPS,EACHWITH1004CAPACITY.

ONEPUMPWILLBEINOPERATING MODE,THEOTHERWILLBEINSTANDBYMODE.THREEPOSITIONTOXICGASSAMPLEPUMPSWITCHSHALLALSOBEINSTALLED.

2)REPLACEEXISTINGRADIATION MONITORFLOWSWITCH.3)ADDITIONOFCONTROLROOMDAMPERSMANUALACTUATION SWITCHATTHEHVACPANEL.4)ADDITIONOFRADIATIONfAMMONIAgANDCHLORINELOWSAMPLEAIRFLOWSIGNALSFORCONTROLROOMDAMPERSISOLATION ANDINDICATION TOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTER.

5)REPLACEEXISTINGCHLORINEFLOWMETERWITHONETHATHASCFM.UNITINDICATION.

6)INSTALLCLEARPOLYCARBONATE "LEXAN"COVERFORCHECKINGPARTICULATE MONITORPAPERONTHERADIATION MONITORCABINET.7)REPLACERADIATION MONITORPUMPMOTORFUSEWITHAMOTORSTARTER.THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFANACCIDENTEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHEUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT(UFSAR)ISNOTINCREASED.

THEREZSNOREDUCTION INSYSTEMRELIABILITY ORPERFORMANCE.

THECONTROLROOMTOXICGASANDRADIATION MONITORSWILLREMAINWITHINREMAINWITHINTHEIRDESIGNLIMITSANDWILLHAVENOIMPACTONPLANTABILITYTOWITHSTAND FIRE.THECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHEUFSARARENOTINCREASED.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTIMPACTORINCREASETHECALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOSETOTHEGENERALPUBLICFORANYEVENTEVALUATED INTHEUFSAR.THEFUNCTIONANDCAPABIL1TY OFTHETOXICGASANDRADIATION MONITORSREMAINTHESAME,ANDNOFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSAREAFFECTED.

15

'I THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFAMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY.

EVALUATED ZNTHEUFSARISNOTINCREASED.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHEPERFORMANCE OFANYSYSTEMFUNCTIONS~

ANDINFACT~UPGRADESTHEINSTRUMENTATZON ANDCONTROLOFTHEMONITORS.

THECONSEQUENCES OFAMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHEUFSARARENOTINCREASED.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTIMPACTORINCREASETHECALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOESTOTHEGENERALPUBLICFORANYEVENTEVALUATED INTHEUFSAR.THEFUNCTIONANDCAPABILITY OFTHEMONITORSTODETECTANDALARM/ISOLATION REMAINSTHESAMEgANDNOFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSAREAFFECTED.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTOFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHEUFSARISNOTCREATED.NOOTHERSYSTEMSAREAFFECTED, NORANYNEWFAILUREMODEINDUCED.THEPOSSIBILITY OFADIFFERENT TYPEOFMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYTHANANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHEUFSARISNOTCREATED.THEADDITIONOFTHESWITCHES, REMOTEINDICATION, ANDCLEARLEXANCOVERDOESNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHESUBJECTSYSTEM.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDZNTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ZSNOTREDUCED.THEFUNCTIONS ANDPERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OFTHEMONITORS(EDG~~DETECTION~

ZSOLATIONSg ETC.)REMAINUNCHANGED.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3645AGINNASTATIONGROUNDWATERLEVELSTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES ANANALYSESOFBELOWGRADESTRUCTURES ATGINNATOEVALUATETHEEFFECTSOFTHEINCREASED GROUNDWATERLEVEL(GWL).THISEWRCOVERSONLYTHEEVALUATION OFEFFECTSOFTHENEWDESIGNBASISGROUNDWATERLEVEL(DBGWL)ONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES BELOWGRADE.THENEWDBGWLISDEFINEDAS265.0FTMSL.THISEVALUATION COMPRISES APORTIONOFACONTINUING COMMITMENT TOTHEUSNRCRELATIVETOSEPTOPICZII-3.A,IIEFFECTS OFHIGHWATERLEVELONSTRUCTURES

-R.E.GZNNA".16

PRE-PORCCOMMENTSLISTEDBELOWWEREFORWARDED TOTHERESPON-SIBLEENGINEER(RE)VZALETTER13Nl-RR-L50391.

ANSWERSAREPROVIDEDFORCLARIFICATION (SEELETTER13Nl-RR-L1650).

Q.DOTHERESULTSOFTHISEVALUATION HAVEANYPOTENTIAL TOIMPACTANYASSUMPTIONS MADEINOURPASTANALYSISOFTHECONTAINMENT VESSELTENDONSORTHEIRROCKANCHORS?A.ENGINEERING REVIEWHASASCERTAINED THATEVALUATION OFGROUNDWATERLEVELWILLHAVENOPOTENTIAL TOIMPACTANYASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADECONCERNING CONTAINMENT VESSELTENDONSORROCKANCHORS.Q.1)2)THEUFSARISNOTREFERENCED INSECTION2.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIABUTISSPECIFICALLY CALLEDOUTZNPARAGRAPH 7AFETYANALYSISSTEP3.2DOESNOTADDRESSOPERATING BASISEARTHQUAKES (OBE'S).A.ENGINEERING

'WILLINCORPORATE THESECOMMENTSASCHANGESATTHENEXTREVISIONOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS' REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARAND,THEEVENTSREQUIRING

'ANALYSIS BYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISANALYSISAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASFZREgFLOODSJSTORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES, INCORPORATING BOTHOPERATING BASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES'HIS ANALYSISWILLNOTDEGRADEANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION SYSTEMSORCOMPONENTS'HEREFORE'LL EXISTINGFIREPROTECTZONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION WILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THISANALYSIS.

THEPRESENTDESIGNFORFLOODINGg'TORMSgOPERATING BASISEARTHQUAKE ANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE (SEISMICEVENTS)HASBEENANALYZED.UNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSES.

EVALUATION OFTHEEFFECTSOFINCREASED GROUNDWATERLEVELONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES BELOWGRADEWILLINSURETHATTHESESTRUCTURES AREADEQUATETORESISTLOADCOMBINATIONS REFERENCED INTHEDESIGNCRITERIA(BASEDUPONUSNRCSTANDARDREVIEWPLANGUIDELINES).

THUSgTHISANALYSISWILLNEITHERINCREASETHECONSEQUENCES gNORREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSINVOLVING:

1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING OBE~SSEgFLOODINGANDSTORMSgINCLUDINGTORNADOEVENTS~2)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES17

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARAND,THEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLNOTBEREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVEN-TIONOFACCXDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS WILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYTHISANALYSIS.

EWR-3698DIVERSETRIPMODIFICATION ONREACTORTRIPBREAKERSTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHMODIFIEDTHECONTROLCIRCUITRY ONTHESHUNTTRIPATTACHMENT (STA)TOTHEREACTORTRIPBREAKERS.

PRESENTLY, THE'STAISENERGIZED THROUGHTWOMANUALREACTORTRIPSWITCHES.

ONLYTHEUNDERVOLTAGE COXL(UVTA)AUTOMATICALLY CAUSESAREACTORTRIPWHENASCRAMISREQUIRED.

THEUVTAWOULDALSOCAUSEAREACTORTRIPONLOSSOFD.C.CONTROLPOWER.THISMODIFICATION ZSREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHUSNRC83-28.854OFTHISMODIFICATION HASBEENCOMPLETED UNDERTHEPREVIOUSREVISIONS.

THISPROJECTISSCHEDULED FORCOMPLETION DURXNGTHE1987OUTAGE.REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONFEBRUARY5,1986PORCNUMBER61.0-86-015-001.

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDE:A)NEWINDICATOR LIGHTTOVERIFYTHATTHESTAISOPERATIONAL.

(PARAGRAPH 7.3.1)B)NEWTRIPTESTREQUIREMENTS FORBOTHUVTAANDSTA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)ALLPOSTULATED ACCIDENTS REQUIRING AREACTORTRIP.2)LOSSOFD.C.CONTROLPOWER.3)NATURALEVENT/FIRE, ANDEARTHQUAKE.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASQHEREFORE~

BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

18 i4 EWR-3755PORVBLOCKVALVESREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFPRESSURIZER MOTOR-OPERATED BLOCKVALVES515AND516WITHNEWSEISMICALLY ANDENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED GATEVALVES.THEREPLACEMENT ZSREQUIREDBECAUSETHEEXZST1NGBLOCKVALVESEATRINGSAREAPPROACHING THEMAXIMUMALLOWABLE LIMITSFORREMACHINING.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29AND1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:1)INCREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEM.2)DECREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEM.3)DECREASEZNREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATE.4)REACTIVITY ANDPOWERDISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES.

5)INCREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.

6)DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.

7)INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASMAJORANDMINORFIRES~FLOODSJSTORMS'REARTHQUAKES'HE FOLLOWING ACCIDENTS APPLICABLE TOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:INCREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEMTHEFOLLOWING ACCIDENTS, APPLICABLE TOTHISEVENT,WEREANALYZED:

A)B)C)D)E)DECREASEINFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE INCREASEZNFEEDWATER FLOWEXCESSIVE LOADINCREASEINCIDENTZNADVERTANT OPENINGOFASTEAMGENERATOR RELIEF/S-AFETYVALVESPECTRUMOFSTEAMSYSTEMPIPINGFAILURESINSIDEANDOUTSIDEOFCONTAINMENT 2~DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEMTHEFOLLOWING ACCIDENTS, APPLICABLE TOTHISEVENT,WEREANALYZED:

A)B)C)D)E)F)G)STEAMPRESSUREREGULATOR MALFUNCTION ORFAILURETHATRESULTSINDECREASING STEAMFLOWLOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICAL LOADTURBINETRIPLOSSOFCONDENSER VACUUMLOSSOFOFFSZTEALTERNATING CURRENTPOWERTOTHESTATION'UXILIARIES LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWFEEDWATER SYSTEMPIPEBREAKS19

3.REACTIVITY ANDPOWERDISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES THEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTS iAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWEREANALYZED:

A)B)C)D)E)F)UNCONTROLLED RODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWAL FROMASUBCRITZCAL CONDITION UNCONTROLLED RODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWAL ATPOWERSTARTUPOFANINACTIVEREACTORCOOLANTPUMPCHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTION RUPTUREOFACONTROLRODDRIVEMECHANISM HOUSINGRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYDROP4.INCREASEZNREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY 5.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATETHEFOLLOWING ACCIDENTS gAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWERANALYZED:

A)FLOWCOASTDOWN ACCIDENTS B)LOCKEDROTORACCIDENTS 6.DECREASE.ZN REACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY THEFOLLOWING ACCIDENTS iAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWEREANALYZED:

A)ZNADVERTANT OPENINGOFAPRESSURIZER SAFETYORRELIEFVALVEB)PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADETHEDESIGN,CAPABILITY ORPERFORMANCE OFTHEEXISTINGPRESSURIZER RELIEFSYSTEMANDiTHEREFORE, THECONSEQUENCES OFTHEABOVEEVENTSWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION ANDTHEMATERIALS UTILIZEDWILLMEETAPPENDIXR10CFR50CRITERIAASDEFINEDINENGINEERING PROCEDURE QE-326.THEMODIFICATION NEITHERAFFECTS,NORZSAFFECTEDBYANYFLOODORSTORMPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED.

THEMODIFICATION ZSDECLAREDASHAVINGTOMEETSEISMICCATEGORY1CRITERIAOFUSNRC'REG.

GUIDE1.29ANDCONDITIONS SPECIFIED INTHEUFSARSECTION3.11.3TITLED"IDENTIFICATION OFLIMITINGENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS 20

BASEDUPONALLTHEABOVEANALYSES:

1)STRUCTURES pSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOF.THESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3768CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLINGTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADEOFTHEPENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEMTOENSURETHATTHEUNMONZTORED PATHFORAIRBORNERADIATION FROMTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGTOUNCONTROLLED AREASWILLBEELIMINATED.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATED COMMENTSTOREVISION0,ANDINCLUDEDINSTALLING NEWDUCTWORKTOANOUTSIDEAZRSOURCESABACKDRAFT DAMPEROROTHERMEANSOFBACKFLOWPREVENTION, TOPREVENTUNMONITORED RELEASESOFRADIOACTIVITY, CHANGESTOTHEEXISTINGPENETRATION COOLINGFANSYSTEMINLETAEGRNGEMENT BOXTOACCEPTTHENEWDUCTWORK, INSTALLING ANEWSTEAMHEATINGCOIL,INSTALLING

'ASSOCIATED STEAMSUPPLYANDSTEAMCONDENSATE RETURNPIPING,INSTALLING ANEWCONDENSATE DRAINPANANDPIPING,ANDINSTALLING NEWPNEUMATIC AND/ORELECTRICTEMPERATURE CONTROLDEVICESINTHEMODIFIEDSYSTEM.ZNADDITIONTOTHE'ESIGNWORKREQUIREDTOMODIFY"THEEXISTINGCONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEMANANALYSISWASPERFORMED TODETERMINE THEACTUALBULKCONCRETETEMPERATURES OFTHEPENETRATIONS WITHOUTTHEOPERATION OFTHECONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEM.BULKCONCRETETEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS HAVEBEENRELAXEDZNRECENTYEARSFROMTHEORIGINALDESIGNLIMITOF150oFTO200oFPERASMEBOILERANDPRESSUREVESSELCODE~SECTIONIII/DIVISION 2~1986EDITION.THEANALYSISDEMONSTRATES THATTHEBULKCONCRETETEMPERATURES DURINGTHEWORSTCASESCENARIOCOULDEXCEED200oFTHEREFORE THISSYSTEMWILLBEMAINTAINED OPERABLEABOVEAPRIMARYSYSTEMTEMPERATURE OF200F.21

REVISION2OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISUPDATESTHEREFERENCE SECTIONSOFBOTHTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISANDINCORPORATES 1)AVERIFICATION THATASTEAMCOILFAILURE(LOSSOFSTEAMHEATING)WILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTSYSTEMOPERATION DURINGCOLDWEATHERSAND2)APUSHTOTESTSWITCHONTHEEQUIPMENT HATCHTEMPERATURE ALARMPANELTOGIVEPOSITIVEASSESSMENT OFLAMPFUNCTIONDURINGOPERATION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREPIPINGFAILURESINFLUIDSYSTEMSOUTSIDECONTAINMENTgSEISMICEVENTSgFIRESJANDPLANTBUILDINGSECURITY~SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSES.

MODIFICATION OFTHEPENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEMREQUIRESSEISMICDESIGNFORSUPPORTSTOENSURETHATMODIFIEDPIPING/DUCTWORK WILLNOTCOLLAPSEDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATION OFEXISTINGSTRUCTURES ORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT LOCATEDWITHINTHEEXISTINGAUXILIARY BUILDINGSTRUCTURE ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRgORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THISMODIFICATION.

ABREAKZNTHEHOUSEHEATINGSTEAMLINETOBEINSTALLED UNDERTHISMODIFICATION (PIPEBREAKOUTSIDECONTAINMENT)

WILLNOTHAVEADVERSEEFFECTSONSAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANT.THETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPASSURESDELIVERYOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER TOTHESTEAMGENERATORS TOMAINTAINSAFESHUTDOWN.

INVENTORY FORTHEPRIMARYSYSTEMZSASSUREDVZACHARGINGPUMPSLOCATEDZNAROOMSEPARATED FROMTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGBYCONCRETEWALLSANDSEALEDFIREBARRIERS.

APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS WILLBEINSTALLED TOPRECLUDE.,

UNMONZTORED ACCESSTOTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGVZATHENEWINLETPENETRATION ZNACCORDANCE WITHGINNASTATIONSECURITYREQUIREMENTS.

THUS/THISMODZFICATIONNEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR!1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMICEVENTSINCLUDING PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

2)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES3)PLANTSECURITY22

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP),ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTZCZPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES gSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3817CATALYTIC OXYGENREMOVALSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEAMEANSOFREDUCINGOXYGENCONCENTRATIONS TOLESSTHAN100PPBINTHECONDENSATE STORAGESYSTEM.AWESTINGHOUSE CATALYTIC OXYGENREMOVALSYSTEM(CORS)HASBEENEVALUATED TOBETHEBESTMETHODAVAILABLE TOREDUCEDISSOLVED OXYGENTOACCEPTABLE LEVELS.THEPRINCIPLE ISTOMIXHYDROGENWITHTHECONDENSATE ANDREDUCETHEFREEOXYGENTOWATERTHROUGHEXPOSUREOFTHEMIXTURETOAMETALCATALYSTSURFACE.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONNOVEMBER6g1985PORCNUMBER6.1.0-85-114-002.

DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS, REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS, WERENOTPRESENTED TOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGN.CRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTS.ASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISIONl.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER ANDFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

23

EWR-4037CT-1TERMINALREPLACEMENT THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHEEXISTINGEBERLZNECT-1EFFLUENTMONITORCONTROLTERMINALS ATGZNNASTATIONWITHUPGRADED'>>BnVERSIONEQUIPMENT.

THEPURPOSEOFTHEnBnVERSIONUPGRADEZSTOIMPROVETHEOPERABILITY ANDRELIABILITY OFTHEEXISTINGCONTROLTERMINALS INTHECONTROLROOMANDTECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTER.ALSOPROPOSEDISTHEINSTALLATION OFAREPORTGENERATOR INTERFACE (RGZF)WHICHWOULDENABLETHECT-1ZNTHETSCTOCOMMUNICATE WITHTHENEWPLANTCOMPUTERPLANNEDFORINSTALLATION IN1986.IFTHECONTROLROOMOPERATORS HAVEACCESSTODATAFROMTHEEFFLUENTMONITORSVIATHEPLANTCOMPUTER, THECT-1ZNTHECONTROLROOMWOULDNOLONGERBEREQUIRED, ANDCOULDBEREMOVEDTODECREASESOMEOFTHECONGESTION ZNTHECONTROLROOMANDELIMINATE THENEEDFORDUPLICATING ATCT-1FORTHEGINNASIMULATOR PROJECT.ITISPROPOSEDTHATBOTHTHECONTROLROOMANDTHETSCCONTROLTERMINALS BEUPGRADEDWITHTHEnB"VERSIONEQUIPMENT ZN1985.WHENTHENEWPLANTCOMPUTERISOPERATIONAL, THERGIFWOULDBEINSTALLED BETWEENTHETSCCT-1ANDTHEPLANTCOMPUTERS ANDTHECONTROLROOMCT1WOULDBEREMOVED'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSISDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHE,SAFETYANALYSIS, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDADDITION.

EWR-4070NO.1AND2FEEDWATER HEATERREPLACEMENT THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFNUMBER1AND2FEEDWATER HEATER.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOSPECIFY,"PROCURE, ANDINSTALLNEWFEEDWATER HEATERTUBEBUNDLESANDSHELLMODIFICATIONS ATTHEFIRSTANDSECONDEXTRACTION POINTS.THEPRIMARYGOALISTOELIMINATE THECOPPERALLOYTUBES.STAINLESS STEELTUBESARERECOMMENDED.

REVISION1TOTHESAFETYAN/LYSISINCORPORATES ACHANGERESULTING FROMPRE-PORCCOMMENTOFREVISION0TOCLARIFYASTEPTOSTATETHATTHEPROBABILITY OFUNINTENDED OPENINGOFTHECONDENSATE BYPASSVALVEWILLNOTINCREASEDUETOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIREMENT TOLIMIT.TUBESZDE PRESSUREDROPTO45PSI.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHE24

GINNASTATIONUFSAR,THEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70'NDAlOCFR50.59 SAFETYEVALUATION.

THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREADECREASEZNFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE ANDALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOW.THEDECREASEZNFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE EVENTISANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASANACCIDENTAL OPENINGOFTHECONDENSATE BYPASSVALVE,WHICHRESULTEDINASUDDENREDUCTION INLETFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE TOTHESTEAMGENERATORS.

THISMODIFICATION HASNOBEARINGONCONDENSATE BYPASSVALVEOPERATION ORPLANTRESPONSETOTHISEVENT.AREDUCTION INFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE WHICHRESULTEDFROMALOSSOFONEFEEDWATER HEATERHASBEENANALYZEDINUFSAR.THEANALYSISSHOWEDTHATFORAFEEDWATER ENTHALPYDECREASECORRESPONDING TOTHELOSSOFONEFEEDWATER HEATERATFULLPOWERMINIMUMDNBRDOESNOTFALLBELOWTHELIMITVALUE.ATZEROPOWERTHERESULTSARELESSLIMITINGTHANTHOSEPRESENTED INUFSARSECTION15.4.1,UNCONTROLLED RODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWAL FROMASUBCRITICAL CONDITION.

THELOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWZSANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASADISRUPTION OFSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVALCAPABILITY.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFTHEDISRUPTION ASARESULTOFCONDENSATE LINEBREAKSINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTION ANDTESTINGOFNEWWELDS.THISMODIFICATION ISNON-SEISMIC SINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFE.SHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAINING SAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT ORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION BECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTS INSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

25

EWR-4075TSCHVACMODIFICATIONS THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHEGZNNASTATIONTSCHVACSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATION WILLCONSISTOF:1)ADDINGTWOCOMPUTERTYPEAIRCONDITIONING UNITSTOTHENEWSASCOMPUTERROOM,2)INSTALLING NEWZONECONTROLBOXES'ACH WITHZTSOWNTHERMOSTAT')

MODIFYING THECENTRALSYSTEMCONTROLSOTHATITWILLAUTOMATICALLY CHANGEOVERFROMHEATINGTOCOOLING/ANDBACK~AND4)INSTALLING AFLOWCONTROLLER TOASSURETHATTHEMAXIMUMDESIGNFLOWRATETHROUGHTHECHARCOALFILTERISNOTEXCEEDED.

REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORC.ON11/19/86PORCNUMBER6~1~0-86-135-002.

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2gOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDEINSTALLATION REFERENCE TOSPECIFICATION EE-29,EE-80ANDZEEE383.NAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODZFXCA-TIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'UCH ASFIRES~FLOODS,STORMSANDEARTHQUAKES'ASED UPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ITHASTHEREFORE, BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION'.

26

EWR-4118TOTALCHARGINGFLOWINDICATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION TOINSTALLTWOTRANSMITTERS FORREACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)SEALINJECTION FLOW.EWR4118WASWRITTENINRESPONSETOANUMBEROFHUMANENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HEDS)IDENTIFIED DURINGTHEDETAILEDCONTROLROOMDESIGNREVIEW.HEDS451AND471STATETHATINDICATION FORREACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)SEALINJECTION FLOWANDTOTALCHARGINGFLOWAREREQUIRED'EDS 84'5/309'10'ND 345ADDRESSTHEPROBLEMTHATTHECHARGINGFLOWCONTROLLER ZSLOCATEDONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB)gANDTHE'INDICATOR ZSONTHELEFTSECTIONWHICHISEIGHTTOTENFEET'AWAY.

THECOMBINATION OFTHESEHEDSRESULTEDZNANNRCCOMMITTMENT TOPROVIDEINDICA-TIONFORSEALINJECTION ANDADUPLICATE INDICATOR FORCHARGINGFLOWONTHEMIDDLESECTZONOFTHEMCBBYJUNE1988.THISPROJECTINVOLVESTHEINSTALLATION OFTWOTRANS-MITTERSFORRCP.SEALINJECTION FLOW(FT115AANDFT116A).THESETWOTRANSMITTERS WOULDBEINSTALLED ZNPARALLELWITHTHEEXISTINGRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWLOCALINDICATION (FT115ANDFT116).INDICATORS FORSEALINJECTION FLOWWILLBEINSTALLED ONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THETWOSEALINJECTION FLOWSWILLBEINPUTTOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).INADDITION, ADUPLICATE OFTHEEXISTINGCONTROLBOARDINDICATION FORCHARGINGFLOW(F0128)WILLBEINSTALLED ONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THERCPSEALZNJECTIONFLOWSgCOUPLEDWITHTHEEXZSTINGCONTROLBOARDINDICATION FORCHARGINGFLOW,WILLALLOWCONTROLROOMOPERATORS TODETERMINE TOTALSYSTEMINFLOW.THENEWINDICATORS FORSEALINJECTION FLOWANDCHARGINGFLOWWILLBELOCATEDBESIDEEACHOTHERONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THEDUPLICATE INDICATOR FORCHARGINGFLOWWILL,INADDITION, BELOCATEDABOVETHECONTROLLER FORCHARGINGFLOW.ANEWPSEUDOANALOGPOINTWILLBECREATEDONTHEPPCSTOCALCULATE TOTALCHARGINGFLOWBYCOMBINING CHARGINGFLOW,ANEXISTINGPPCSINPUT,WITHTHENEWRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWPOINTS.DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS, REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWERENOTPRESENTED TOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHE'DESIGN CRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISION0.27

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDINGTHISMODIFICATION ISLIMITEDTOWORKDOWNSTREAM OFTHEROOTVALVESFORTHERCPSEALINJECTION FLOW.SINCETHEROOTVALVESDEFINETHESAFETYCLASSBOUNDARY'HE EXISTINGRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWINSTRUMENTATION ZSDESIGNATED NOTSEISMICCATEGORYI'HEREMAINING WORKSFORTHISMODIFICATIONS WILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.29,REVISIONC.2.THIS'MODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEINSTALLATION OFEQUIPMENT INTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGS FIREAREAABBMZONEABBiANDTHECONTROLBUZLDINGi FIREAREACCZONESCRANDRRTHISMODIFICATION ALSOREQUIRESROUTINGCABLETHROUGHTHECABLETUNNELWHICHISFIREAREACT.AREVIEWWILLBEPERFORMED TOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR.ALLNEWWIRINGWILLBEQUALIFIED TOIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS'IRE BARRIERPENETRATIONS WILLBEREPAIREDORREPLACEDZNACCORDANCE WITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.

THEREFORE EXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.

THISMODIFICATIONS DOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL FORTHEFOLLOWING REASONS:THEAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS FORLOCALINDICATION OFRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWWILLBEMAINTAINED.

BTHEREISNOEFFECTONSEPARATION OFEXISTINGCIRCUITSiASSOCIATED

CIRCUITS, ORFIREAREABOUNDARIES ASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

A.THISMODIFICATION WILLINTERFACE WITHTHEEXISTING3/8INCHRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWSENSINGLINEINTHESAMEMANNERASDOESTHEEXISTINGLOCALINDICATORS.

THEREFORE THISMODIFIC-ATIONDOESNOTINTRODUCE ANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNING PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDEOFTHECONTAINMENT BUILDING.

ITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT.THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES iSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEEN.AFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

28

EWR-4142CONTROLBUILDINGEASTWALLMODIFICATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEREQUIREMENT OFTHEEASTWALLOFTHECONTROLBUILDING.

THEEASTWALLOFTHECONTROLBUILDINGMUSTBECAPABLEOFWITHSTANDING THELOADSASSOCIATED WITHA.132MPHTORNADO(DIRECTWINDAND~P=0.4PSI)ANDTWOTORNADOMISSILES.

THISMODIFICATION WILLgINEFFECTSUPGRADETHERELAYROOMEASTWALLASPARTOFTHESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEPROGRAMTOPROVIDETHENECESSARY ADDEDSTRENGTHREQUIREDTORESISTTHEIMPOSESLOADSOFSNOWgTORNADO(DIRECTAND~P)gTORNADOMISSILESAND2)PROVIDEAWATER-TIGHT BARRIERAGAINSTFLOODINGOFDEERCREEK.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION1DELETINGEXTRACONDUITFORFUTURECIRCUITS'DDING GROUNDING ANDDOORPOSITIONSWITCHESFORBOTHSECURITYANDFIREDOORS.'REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYSISINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREWINDJSNOQANDTORNADOLOADZNGSJ FLOODINGANDSEISMIC/FIRES'OSS OFA.C.POWERANDPLANTBUILDINGSECURITY.

THEDESIGNFORWIND~SNOWgTORNADOES ANDEXTERNALFLOODINGHASBEENEVALUATED ZNTHEUFSARANDWILLBEINACCORDANCE WITHCOMMITMENTS MADETOTHEUSNRCWHICHAREREFERENCED ZNSECTIONS2'g3'g3~4~1AND3'OFTHEUFSARSEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSIS.

MODIFICATION OFwTHISEXTERNALWALLOFTHERELAYROOMWILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATION OFEXISTINGSTRUCTURES ORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT LOCATEDWITHINTHEEXISTINGSTRUCTURES.

ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEMODIFICATIONS.

THEMODIFICATION AFFECTSONLYLOADINGOFNON-SAFETY RELATEDBUS15.SINCETHEREISNOCHANGEINTHESAFETY-RELATED BUSES,THEREISNOCHANGEINTHECONSEQUENCES OFALOSSOFA.C.POWER.THERELOCATION OFANEXISTINGEXTERIORSECURITYDOORTOTHEOUTSIDEOFTHENEWSTRUCTURE WILLMAINTAINTHELEVELOFPRESENTSECURITYFROMINTRUSION ATGZNNASTATION.1NTERIMMEASURESDURINGCONSTRUCTION WILLBEADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED TOPREVENTPOSSIBLEDEGRADATION OFSECURITYBARRIERS'9

THUSgTHISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SSE,FLOODINGANDTORNADOEVENTS2)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES3)PLANTSECURITYBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANAL-YSISPLAN,(SRP),

ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFTOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4176APPENDIXRDETECTION UPGRADETHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLINSTALLTHREE(3)NEWFIREDETECTION ZONESANDSUPERVISED BYTHEFIRESIGNALLING SYSTEM.THESEZONESARE:Z-36(SMOKE)INT.BLDG.SUB-BASEMENT FLOORS.Z-37(SMOKE)ZNT.BLDG.NORTHUPPERELEVATZONS.

Z-38(SMOKE)INT.BLDG'OUTH ALLELEVATIONS

~INCLUDEDINTHISMODIFICATION ISTHEMOUNTINGOFEQUIPMENT, ROUTINGANDMOUNTINGOFCONDUIT,ANDALLWIRINGASSOCIATED WITHTHENEWZONESANDMODIFICATIONS TOTHEEXISTINGFIRE~SZGNALLING SYSTEM.THISMODIFICATION ISREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEM,GZNNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTREVISION2.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARESEISMICANDFIRE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

30

EWR-422102~H2ANALYZERREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEDIRECTREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTING02/H2ANALYZERSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATION WILLREPLACETHEINACCURATE ANDUNRELIABLE EXISTING02/H2ANALYZERSYSTEMWITHANEWRELIABLEANDACCURATESYSTEM.REVISION1OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION0TOCORRECTTYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORSANDSUMMARYDESCRIPTION OFMODIFICATION BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIREDBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29,1~60g161'ND170'HEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.ALLEXISTINGANDNEWWIRING,CABLEgANDELECTRICAL COMPONENTS REQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION COMPLIESWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR.THISMODIFICATION HASBEENANALYZEDFORSEISMICEVENTSUNDERSECTIONC.2OFREG.GUIDE1.29.THEINSTALLATION WILLMAINTAINSTRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SUCHTHATSURROUNDING SAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT WILLNOTBEAFFECTED.

THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES, NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)MAJORORMINORFIRES2)SEISMICEVENTBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDUSNCREG.GUIDE1.29AND1.70,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

31

EWR-4235STATUSLIGHTMODIFICATION THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHCONSXSTSOFINSTALLING ADROPPINGRESISTORINEACHLIGHTASSEMBLYZNTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB).INCLUDEDWITHTHISMODIFICATION ISTHEREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTING35VOLTBULBSWITH30VOLTBULBS,ANDNEWINDXCATOR LIGHTLENSCAP.THISMODIFICATION WILLPROVIDEGREATERLIGHTOUTPUTINTHEBRIGHTANDDIMMODE,THEREBYELIMINATING THEPRESENTVISUALCONTRASTBETWEENBRIGHTANDDIMCONDITIONS.

THESESTATUSLIGHTSZNSUBJECT,PROVIDEAVISUALINDICATION OFSELECTEDVALVEPOSITIONS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARELOSSOFDCORACCONTROLPOWERSNATURALEVENTS/FIRE,ANDEARTHQUAKE.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

32

EWR-4269CANDDSTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPINTERLOCK THISENGINEERING WORKREQUESTADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION TOTHEPUMPINTERLOCK.

PRESENTLY, THEELECTRICAL AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMCONFIGURATION CONSISTSOFTWOMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS(MDAFWPlA AND1B)ANDTWOSTANDBYAUXILIARY PUMPS1AAND1BSUPPLYCONDENSATE WATERTOAANDBSTEAMGENERATORS RESPECTIVELY.

INTHEEVENTTHATEITHERONEORBOTHOFTHESEPUMPSAREINOPERABLE THESTANDBYPUMPSMAYBEUSEDTOPROVIDEANEMERGENCY SOURCEFORCOOLING.THESTANDBYPUMPS(CANDD)AREELECTRICALLY INTERLOCKED WITHPRIMARYPUMPS(AANDB).THEINTERLOCKS AREINTENDEDTOPREVENTTHESIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OFTHEPRIMARYPUMPSANDSTANDBYPUMPS'URING NORMALOPERATION THISCONFIGURATION SATISFIES THISDESIGNCRITERIA'OWEVERS WHENPRIMARYBREAKERSARERACKEDOUTINTOTHEHELDPOSITION(ORREMOVED)g THEINTERLOCKS AREALSOREMOVED,MAKINGTHESTANDBYBREAKERSINOPERABLE'HIS PROPOSEDMODIFICATION WILLELIMINATE THISCONDITION BYINSTALLING CELLSWITCHESINTHEPRIMARYBREAKERCOMPARTMENTS'HICH WILLCHANGESTATEWHENTHEBREAKERISRACKEDZNOROUT.THECELLSWITCHCONTACTSWILLBEWIREDZNPARALLELWITHTHEEXISTINGINTERLOCK CONTACTSANDWILLPERMITTHEPRIMARYBREAKERSTOBEREMOVEDFROMSERVICEFORMAINTENANCE ANDINSURETHATTHESTANDBYBREAKERSWILLBEOPERATIONAL.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFIC-ATIONARE:A)LOSSOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWB)NATURALEVENTS/FIRE, EARTHQUAKE.

THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHELOSSOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWDUETOTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEADDITIONOFACELLSWITCHWILLNOTEFFECTOPERABILITY OFTHEMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS.THESECELLSWITCHESSERVEASPERMZSSIVES TOTHESTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS,THEREFORE INTHEEVENTOFAFAILUREONLYTHESTARTINGOFTHESTANDBYPUMPSAREAFFECTED.

MANUFACTURER INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGPROCEDURES WILLBEPERFORMED ANDAPERIODICTESTINGPROGRAMWILLBEINITIATED TOASSUREPROPEROPERATION OFCELLSWITCHES, THEREBYREDUCINGTHEPROBABILITY OFFAILURETOSTARTSTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPSTOANACCEPTABLY LOWLEVEL.THEREFORE THISMODIFICATION WILLHAVEANEGLIGIBLE IMPACTUPONOPERABILITY OFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHEEFFECTOFASEISMIC'VENT ONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THECELLSWITCHESHAVEBEENQUALIFIED BYTHEMANUFACTURER, THEREFORE THECONSEQUENCES OFAFAILUREDUETOASEISMICEVENTAREMITIGATED.

33

THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHEEFFECTOFAFIREONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORTHISMODIFICATION ISREQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFIEEESTD.383-1984FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREZSNOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE VERIFICATION WILLSEPERFORMED TOENSURETHATTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTADVERSELY IMPACTEXISTINGAPPENDIXRCOMPLIANCE METHODS.THEREFORE gBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSISgITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

THE'PROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ANDTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFATYPEDIFFERENT FROMANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ZSNOTREDUCED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONS EWR-4281STEAMGENERATOR MANWAYSTUDTENSIONER THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION COVERINGTHEINSTALLATION OFSTEAMGENERATOR PRIMARYMANWAYSTUDSANDNUTS.INTHEPASTTHEPRIMARYMANWAYCOVERSHAVEBEENATTACHEDWITHBOLTSWHICHARETORQUEDTOOBTAINTHEPROPERGASKETSEATING.THISZSATIMECONSUMING ANDDIFFICULT TASKSINCEZTMUSTBEDONEINAHIGHRADIATION AREA.THISMODIFICATION CONSISTSOFREPLACING THEEXISTINGBOLTSANDNUTS.INSTEADOFTORQUINGTHENUTSTOINDUCETHEREQUIREDAXIALLOADS,DIRECTHYDRAULIC LOADSAREUSEDTOSTRETCHTHESTUDS'EVISION 0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONNOVEMBER'5g1986'ORCNUMBER6.1.0-86-125-001

'4

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISZSTOREVISEPARAGRAPHS 2.6.1AND2.6.2TOINCLUDENEWEG&GDRAWINGTITLES.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-

'TIONARESEISMICEVENTS'ECREASE INREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMINVENTORY ANDFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.0DOFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFOREJ BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVE'NOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4282CVRECIRCFANCONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELSTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHECVRECZRCFANCONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELS'HIS MODIFICATION ISFORREPLACEMENT OFEXISTINGOBSOLETEPRESSURETRANSMITTERS, SIGNALPROCESSORS ANDMAINCONTROLBOARDINDICATORS WITHINSTRUMENTS CAPABLEOFACCURATELY MONITORING WATERLEAKAGEWITHINCONTAINMENT.

THEEXISTINGTRANSMZTTERSJ POWERSUPPLIES'ZSTABLES ANDINDICATORS WILLBEREPLACEDTOPROVIDEMOREACCURATEANDRELIABLECONDENSATE LEVELINDICATION.

THESCALESZNTHEEXISTINGLEVELINDICATOR SHALLBEPLACEDINTHENEWLEVELINDICATORS WITHNOCHANGE.INTHEAPPEARANCE ONTHEMCB.NEWREFERENCE LEGTUBINGFROMTHETRANSMITTERS TOTHECONDENSATE COLLECTION STANDPIPES WILLBEINSTALLED.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE-(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT,(3)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING.

NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANTTHEREFORE'HE DESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODEMONSTRATE THATCONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS ISMAINTAINED.

35

THISMODIFICATION WILLBEREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASAPARTOFTHISMODIFIC-ATIONWILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.THEPRESSUREBOUNDARYPORTIONSOFTHECONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELINSTRUMENTATION ARENOTDESIGNATED SEISMICCATEGORYI.HOWEVER,ANYMODIFICATION TOTHISSYSTEMWHOSEFAILURECOULDCAUSEDAMAGETOSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT WILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.29,POSITIONC.2.THENEWTRANSMITTERS WILLINTERFACE WITHTHEEXISTINGCONDENSATE COLLECTOR STANDPIPES INTHESAMEMANNERASTHEEXISTINGTRANSMITTERS WITHTHEADDITIONOFTHEREFERENCE LEGTUBINGPENETRATION.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINTRODUCE ANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNING PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTINACHANGETOTHECOMMIT-MENTSMADEINTHEUFSAR,SECTIONS3.6.1.3.2.13 AND5.4.11.1.2.

THESECOMMITMENTS STATETHATCONDENSATE FLOWSFROMAPPROXIMATELY 1GPMTO30GPMARETOBEMEASUREDBYTHECONDENSATE MEASURING SYSTEM,USFARSECTION5.2.5.4.3.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATAHUMANFACTORSREVIEWOFTHISMODIFICATION BEPERFORMED PRIORTOISSUANCEOFDESIGNOUTPUTS,TOMINIMIZETHEPROBABILITY OFOPERATORERROR.THEITEMSABOVEENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.

THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

INACCORDANCE WITHTHEPROVISIONS OF10CFR50.59 THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTPRESENTANUNREVZEWED SAFETYQUESTIONFORTHEFOLLOWING REASONS:1.THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE, ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBEINCREASED.

36

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCE OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY.THIS.MODIFICATION WILLCOMPLYWITHTHEREQUIREMENTS OFUSNRCREGSGUIDE1.29POSITIONC.2TOINSUREANYFAILUREWILLNOTAFFECTSEISMICCATEGORYIEQUIPMENT.

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWWILLINSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.

2.THEPOSSIBILITY FORANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISZSNOTCREATED.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTADDTO~ORMODIFY~ANYEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,OREQUIPMENT WHOSEFAILUREXSADDRESSED INTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT.3~THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISNOTREDUCED.ASSTATEDABOVEgTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTAFFECTEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY.THEEFFECTOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLBETOINCREASETHERELXABZLITY OFONEOFTHEDIVERSEMEANSAVAILABLE FOROPERATORS TODETECTLEAKAGEINSIDECONTAINMENT.

EWR-4324STEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION ONSTEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEM.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOCONVERTTHESTEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEMTOAFLASHTANKBASEDPROCESS'HE PRIMARYGOALISTOIMPROVERELIABILITY BYMOVINGTHEXNHERENTTEMPERATURE CHANGESTOTHETANKANDPIPING.NEWPIPINGINSTALLED TOACCOMPLISH THISCONVERSION SHALLBERESIZEDTOREDUCETHEEROSION-CORROSION POTENTIAL.

REVISION3TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATE CHANGESTOREVISION2ASARESULTOFTHECOMMENTSFROMTHEREVIEWOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS.

THECHANGESAREOPERATIONAL CONCERNSANDCLARIFICATION.

AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREANINCREASEORDECREASEINSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVAL.ANINCREASEZNSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVALWOULDOCCURIFABLOWDOWNLINERUPTURED.

THISEVENTISENVELOPED INTHEUFSARBYEXAMINXNG THEINCREASEINFEEDWATER FLOWEVENTANDTHESPECTRUMOFSTEAMSYSTEMPIPINGFAILURES.

BOTHANALYZEDEVENTSAREFARMORESEVERTHANABLOWDOWNLINERUPTURE.37

ADECREASEZNSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVALWOULDOCCURIFBLOWDOWNWERESUDDENLYISOLATED.

THISEVENTZSSIMILARTOATURBINETRIP.THEUFSARDEFINESLOSSESTO50%ATFULLPOWERTOBEWITHINNORMALPLANTDESIGN.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIALIMITSBLOWDOWNCAPACITYTO7%ATFULLPOWER;THEREFORE, THESUDDENBLOWDOWNZSOLATXON EVENTANALYSISZSNOTCONSIDERED.

THISMODIFICATION ISNON-SEISMIC SINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGZNFIREAREASCONTAINING SAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT ORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION BECAUSEOFREQUIREMENT INSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

ANALYSISNECESSARY TOASSURECONTINUAL COMPLIANCE WITHlOCFR50gAPPENDIXRHASBEENREQUIRED'HEREFORE, THEPROBABILITY ANDCONSEQUENCES OFAFIREAFFECTING COLDSHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTAREUNCHANGED.

HIGHENERGYLINEPIPEBREAKSHAVEBEENCONSIDERED BYREQUIRING THATALLEQUIPMENT NECESSARY FORSAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTWILLBEPROTECTED CONSISTENT WITHREFERENCE 2.2.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4350MFWANDFWBYPASSVALVEINDICATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION TOINSTALLVALVEPOSITIONSENSORSFORTHEMAINFEEDWATER ANDFEEDWATER BYPASSVALVES(V4269gV4270gV4271gANDV4272)ANDASSOCIATED POSITIONINDICATION DISPLAYED ONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.THISEWRWASISSUEDASARESULTOFHUMANENGINEERING DIS-CREPANCYHED-65WHICHCITEDANEEDFORACTUALVALVEPOSITIONINDICATION ONTHEMCBRATHERTHANTHECONTROLLER DEMANDSIGNALINDICATION.

DUETOPREPORCCOMMENTSgREVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSXS, WERENOT.PRESENTED TOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISIONlOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISZSTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISION0.38

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE')MAJORANDMINORFIRES2)SEISMICEVENT3)INCREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEM4)DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEMNEWWIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION, WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT~THEREFORE gTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

REVIEWSAND/ORANALYSESTOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXRHAVEBEENREQUIRED.

SAFESHUTDOWNCAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALLPOSTULATED FIRES'HEREFORE'ILL NOTBEJEOPARDIZED ASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWINDICATORS INSTALLED PERTHISMODIFICATION BEMOUNTEDSOASNOTTODEGRADETHEINTEGRITY OFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB).THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD'SSEISMICQUALIFICATION.

THEADDITIONOFLDT'STOTHESTEMOFTHEMAINFEEDWATER ANDFEEDWATER BYPASSVALVESWILLNOTDEGRADETHEVALVE'SABILITYTOPERFORMITSINTENDEDFUNCTION.

SINCETHESEVALVESARENOTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGASEISMICEVENT,THEABILITYTOFUNCTIONDURINGASEISMICEVENTHASNOTBEENDEGRADED.

THEADDITIONOFMFWANDFWBYPASSVALVEINDICATION WILLAIDTHEOPERATORINMONITORING ANYINCREASEORDECREASEZNHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEMANDSHALLNOTAFFECTTHEVALVESOPERATING CHARACTERISTICS.

ZTHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

39 i0 EWR-4503TECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTERSUPPLEMENTAL UNINTERRUPTABLE POWESUPPLYTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFASECONDUNINTERRUPTABLE POWERSUPPLY(UPS)FORTHET.S.C.ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.ALSOEXISTINGELECTRICAL LOADSWILLBERE-DISTRIBUTED INORDERTOACHIEVEEVENBUSLOADING.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29AND1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODZF1CA-TIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.MODIFICATIONS REQUIREDBYTHEDESIGNCRITERIAWILLNOTDEGRADEFUNCTIONS ORPERFORMANCE OFANYSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'R COMPONENTS REQUIREDFORTHEPREVENTION ANDMITIGATION OFACCIDENTSORANYOTHERNONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES

~SYSTEMSgORCOMPONENTS.

THISMODIFICATION ANDTHEMATERIALS UTILIZEDWILLMEETAPPENDIXR10CFR50CRITERIA.

EVENTHOUGHTHISMODIFICATION INVOLVESEQUIPMENT WHICHISNOTIDENTIFIED ASSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT.

NEWEQUIPMENT WILLNOTBELOCATEDINANYAREATHATCONTAINSSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION ISDESIGNATED NON-SEISMIC.

MODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCE ORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENT ORSYSTEM.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

1)STRUCTURES gSYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHE.MITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

40

EWR-45544AAND4BFEEDWATER HEATERSREPLACEMENT THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OF4AAND4BHEATERS.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOSPECIFY~PROCUREgANDINSTALLNEWFEEDWATER HEATERSATTHEFOURTHEXTRACTION POINT.THEPRIMARYGOALISTOELIMINATE THECOPPERALLOYTUBES.STAINLESS STEELTUBESARERECOMMENDED.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESRESULTING FROMPRE-PORCCOMMENTSOFREVISION0TO:1)CLARIFYTHEPERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OFTHE75PSITUBESIDEPRESSUREDROP2)ADDADDITIONAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS INDESIGNCRITERIA3)CLARIFYREFERENCES ANDTESTREQUIREMENTS 4)ADDASMECODE5)ADDACCESSZBILITY~MAINTENANCE gREPAIRSANDINSERVICEINSPECTION REQUIREMENTS INDESIGNCRITERIAAREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREADECREASEINFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE, ANDALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOW.THEDECREASEZNFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE EVENTZSANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASANACCIDENTALOPENINGOFTHECONDENSATE BYPASSVALVEgWHICHRESULTEDINASUDDENREDUCTION ININLETFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE TOTHESTEAMGENERATORS.

THEMODIFICATION HASNOBEARINGONCONDENSATE BYPASSVALVEOPERATION ORPLANTRESPONSETOTHISEVENT.AREDUCTION INFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE WHICHRESULTEDFROMALOSSOFONEFEEDWATER HEATERHASBEENANALYZEDINUFSAR.THEANALYSZSSHOWEDTHATFORAFEEDWATER ENTHALPYDECREASECORRESPONDING TOTHELOSSOFONEFEEDWATER HEATERATFULLPOWERMZNZMUMDNBRDOESNOTFALLBELOWTHELIMITVALUE.ATZEROPOWERTHERESULTSARELESSLIMITINGTHANTHOSEPRESENTED INUFSARSECTION15.4.1,UNCONTROLLED RODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWAL FROMASUBCRITICAL CONDITION.

THELOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWZSANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASADISRUPTION OFSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVALCAPABILITY.

41

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHE'ROBABILITY OFTHEDISRUPTION ASARESULTOFCONDENSATE LINEBREAKSSINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTION ANDTESTINGOFNEWWELDS.THEPROBABILITY OFALOSSOFFEEDWATER THROUGHDEGRADATION OFHEATERTUBESISREDUCEDBYREMOVINGTHEEXISTINGERODEDCOPPERTUBING.THISMODIFICATION ZSNON-SEISMIC SINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAINING SAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT ORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION BECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTS INSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4638GENERATOR 1SURGECAPACITORS ANDNEUTRALTRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHENEUTRALTRANSFORMER ANDSURGECAPACITORS CONTAINING PCBs.THESECOMPONENTS WILLBEREPLACEDWITHSIMILARCOMPONENTS NOTCONTAINING PCBs.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGEFROMREVISION1TOSPECIFYINSTALLATION TESTSTOBEPERFORMED ONTHECOMPONENTS.

REVISION1DIDNOTSPECIFYTHETESTTOBEPERFORMED.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSAR'ANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRES'OXIC GASRELEASES'ND LOSSOFELECTRICAL LOAD.NONEWWIRINGORCABLEISREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THEREWILLBENOINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

REVIEWSAND/ORANALYSESTOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXRHAVEBEENREQUIRED'AFE SHUTDOWNCAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALLPOSTULATED FIRES'HEREFORE'ILL NOTBEJEOPARDIZED ASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THEPOTENTIAL FORALOSSOFELECTRICAL.

LOADEVENT.CAUSEDBYCAPACITOR FAILUREWILLNOTBEINCREASED.

42

THEREFORE gTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THE'ADEQUACY OFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS/ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDXNTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICA-TION.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.EWR-4651COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLE CABLESTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSING THEMODIFICATION OFTHECOREEXITTHERMOCOUPLE CABLESTOPROVIDEFORALARAANDPERSONNEL SAFETYCONCERNS.

EWR4651~COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLE (CET)CABLESgREQUESTSTHEPURCHASEANDINSTALLATION OFEXTENSION CABLESATTHEBOUNDARYOFTHEREACTORHEADANDREACTORCAVITYBRIDGECABLETRAYSATGINNASTATIONFORTHE1988REFUELING OUTAGE.QUICKCONNECTORS INSTALLED ONTHECETCABLESATTHISLOCATIONAREDETACHEDEACHYEARFORREFUELING TOPERMITLIFTINGTHEREACTORHEADFROMTHEREFUELING CAVITY.THECABLESINSTALLED IN1983,WHICHRUNFROMTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYDOWNTOTHETHERMOCOUPLES, FALLAPPROXIMATELY SIXFEETSHORTOFTHEBRIDGECABLETRAY.ASARESULT,THECETQUICKCONNECTORS HANGSEVERALFEETBELOWTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYANDPOSEACCESSIBILITY, ALARA',ANDSAFETYCONCERNS.

THEOBJECTIVE OFTHISEWRISTOPLACETHECETQUICKCONNECTORS FORREFUELING INTOTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYWHERETHEYCANBEACCESSEDCONVENIENTLY ANDSAFELY.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCOR-PORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION1TOCORRECTTHEPOSTINSTALL-ATIONTESTINGREQUIREMENTS FORSYSTEMVERXFICATXON.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.G-UIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES~(2)ASEISMICEVENT~(3)ALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.(LOCA)~43

NEWCETEXTENSION CABLEASSEMBLIES WILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE'HE DESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEASSEMBLIES MEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASAPARTOFTHZSMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTZNTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWCETEXTENSION CABLEASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDERTHISMODIFICATION BEQUALIFIED PERZEEE3441975'HEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION WILLREMAINFUNCTIONAL DURINGANDAFTERASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWCETEXTENSION CABLEASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDERTHISEWRBEQUALIFIED PERIEEE3231974ANDIEEE3831974FORFLAMEANDLOCALTHEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION SHALLREMAINFUNCTIONAL DURINGANDAFTERALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.

THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-4653STEAMGENERATOR WIDERANGELEVELINDICATION

'THISENGINEERING WORKREQUESTADDRESSES THEADDITIONOFSTEAMGENERATOR WIDERANGELEVELINDICATION ONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.THISMODIFICATION WILLINSTALLTWONEWVERTICALSCALEINDICATORS TODISPLAYSTEAMGENERATOR WIDERANGEWATERLEVELONTHEMCB.THEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERLR-460WILLBERETAINEDFORRECORDKEEPINGANDTOSERVEASABACKUPLEVELINDICATOR.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTALTERTHEAVAILABILITY OFTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRESAND(2)ASEISMICEVENT.NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHEMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,THEREFORE THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASE.OF FIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

44

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODEMONSTRATE THATCONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS ISMAINTAINED.

THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.THESTEAMGENERATOR (SG)WIDERANGEWATERLEVELINSTRUMENT-ATIONZSDESIGNATED SEISMICCATEGORY1.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESALLNEWSGWIDERANGELEVELINSTRUMENTATION BEQUALIFIED ANDINSTALLED PER'ZEEE-344-1975.

THEREFORE, ASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPAIRTHEPROPEROPERATION OFTHESGWIDERANGEWATERLEVELINSTRUMENTATZON.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESAHUMANFACTORSREVIEWOFTHISMODIFICATION BEPERFORMED PRIORTOISSUANCEOFDESIGNOUTPUTS,TOMINIMIZETHEPROBABILITY OFOPERATORERROR.THEITEMSABOVEENSURETHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.

THEACCURACYANDREADABILITY OFTHENEWINDICATORS AREASGOODORBETTERTHANTHEEXISTINGRECORDER.

THEREFORE, THEINDICATION UNCERTAINTY ZSASGOODORBETTERTHANTHEEXISTINGSYSTEM.THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OF.ACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

INACCORDANCE WITHTHEPROVISIONS OF10CFR50.59, THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVZEWED SAFETYQUESTIONBECAUSE:1)THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTZSNOTINCREASED.

THEINDICATORS ADDEDTOTHEMCBDONOTPROVIDEANYAUTOMATIC CONTROLFUNCTION.

THEYAREREDUNDANT TOTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS'UT PROVIDEAMOREREADABLEINDICATION TOTHEOPERATOR.

THESEINDICATORS ARESEISMICCLASS1EANDWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFFAILUREOFTHEMCBORADJACENTINDICATORS DUETOASEISMICEVENT.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWWILLDEMONSTRATE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.

45

2)THEPOSSIBILITY FORANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISISNOTCREATED.ASDISCUSSED ABOVEgTHESEINDICATORSAREINADDITIONTOTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS ANDARECLASSIFIED lE.THISADDITIONTOTHEMCBWILLNOTCREATETHEPOSSIBILITY OFAFAILURENOTPREVIOUSLY ANALYZED.

3)THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDZNTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISNOTREDUCED.THEADDEDINDICATORS PROVIDEAMORECLEARINDICATION ANDINCREASETHEABILITYOFTHEOPERATORTOMONITORWIDERANGELEVEL.THEMARGINOFSAFETYZSNOTAFFECTEDBY.THISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4656LOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDMODIFI'CATIONS PHASEIITHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATIONS TOTHEREACTORVESSELLOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTAND.THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESANADDITIONAL MODIFICATION TOTHELOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDSUBSEQUENT TOTHECHANGESDESCRIBED INTHEORIGINALSAFETYANALYSIS.

A.THISMODIFICATION MOVESTHEEASTERNSUPPORTCOLUMN1/2INCHOUTWARD(AWAYFORMTHECENTEROFTHESUPPORTSTAND)INORDERTOPROVIDEMORECLEARANCE FORTHELOWERINTERNALS.

THISISACCOMPLISHED BYADDINGONEADDITIONAL HALF-INCH THICKSPACERPLATEONTHEEASTSIDEOFTHENORTHANDSOUTHSUPPORTCOLUMNS.THESPACERPLATESWILLBEBETWEENTHESUPPORTCOLUMNSANDTHEUPPERANDLOWERCONNECTION SUPPORTRINGS.THISANALYSISREVIEWSUNDERWHATPLANTOPERATING CONDITION THELOWERINTERNALS STORAGEHARDWAREWILLBEINUSE'NDDETER-MINESWHATDESIGNBASISEVENTSARERELATEDTOTHEUSEOFTHEMODIFIEDHARDWARE.

THEFOLLOWING DESIGNBASISEVENTSARERELATEDTOTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION:

SEISMICEVENTSANDFIRES.THELOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDMAYBELEFTINPOSITIONONTHELOWERLEVELOFTHEREACTORCAVITY.THELOCATIONOFTHELOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDISNOTADZACENTTOANYSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEMORCOMPONENT.

THELOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTAND'SLOWCENTEROFGRAVITY,WIDEBASECOMBINEDWITHTHECOEFFICIENT OFFRICTIONARESUFFICIENT TOENSURETHATTHESTANDWILLREMAININPLACEDURINGBOTHTHEOPERATING BASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES.

46

THEMATERIALS TOBEUSEDZNTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION ZSSTAINLESS STEELWHICHZSNON-COMBUSTIBLES ITWILLNOTCHANGETHEFREQUENCY ORRESULTSOFANYFIRETHATZSPOSTULATED.

BASEDONTHEFOREGOING, THEMODIFICATIONS WILLCAUSENOCHANGESTOTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHE.LIFEOFTHESTATION.THEMODIFICATIONS WILLNOTCHANGETHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ORCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFSAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZN'HESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTCHANGED.THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEACHANGETOTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ANDISNOTANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION.

EWR-4670M-483ZNVERTERREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTINGMQ-483INVERTERWITHANEWQUALIFIED ONE.REVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRXTERIASTATESTHESOLIDSTATECONTROLS, INC.(SCX)INVERTERISPARTNO.EV12004/5ASOPPOSEDTOPART12004ASWELLASQUALIFYING IEEE383-1974ASTHESTANDARDUSEDFORBOTHTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS' REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:'1)2)3)4)SEISMICEVENTMAJORANDMINORFIRESINCREASE/DECREASE ZNHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEMPIPEBREAKSINSIDECONTAINMENT SECTION3.0AND9.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRETHATTHENEWMQ-483ZNVERTERBESEISMICALLY QUALIFIED TOGINNASPECIFICSEISMICRESPONSESPECTRA.ZNADDITION, ZTISREQUIREDTHATTHEINVERTERBE.MOUNTEDTOPREVENTSEISMICFAILURE.47

THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEREPLACEMENT OFEQUIPMENT ANDMAYINVOLVETHEINSTALLATION OFCABLEINTHERELAYROOMFIREAREA.ZFNEWCABLEZSTOBEINSTALLED' REVIEWWILLBEPERFORMED TOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR.WIRINGANDEQUIPMENT WILLBEINSTALLED INCOMPLIANCE WITHEE-29.ALLNEWCABLING,IFREQUIRED, WILLBEQUALIFIED TOIEEE383-1984FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS'IRE BARRIERPENETRATZONS WILLBEREPAIREDANDREPLACEDINACCORDANCE WITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES'OT DEGRADING EXISTINGSEALS.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL FORTHEFOLLOWING REASONS:A)THEMODIFICATION INVOLVESEQUIPMENT WHICHISNOTIDENTIFIED ASSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT INTABLE3-1OFTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

B)THEREISNOEFFECTONSEPARATION OFEXISTINGCIRCUITS/

ASSOCIATED

CIRCUITS, ORFIREAREABOUNDARIES ASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTEFFECTTHECAPABILITIES OFTHEALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEM.THERESHALLBENOEFFECTONEXISTINGPROCEDURES FOROBTAINING ANALTERNATE SAFESHUTDOWN~

THEREBYCOMPLYING WITH10CFR50APPENDIXR.INSTRUMENT LOOPP479MONITORSSTEAMGENERATOR PRESSURE.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTMODIFYTHEINSTRUMENT LOOP.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHEREPLACEMENT INVERTERADDSNONEWFAILUREMODESBEYONDTHOSEOFTHEEXISTINGINVERTER, THEINTEGRITY OFLOOPP479WILLBEUNAFFECTED BYTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, NONEWINSTRUMENT ERRORSORFAILURESWILLBEINTRODUCED THATCOULDLEADTOANINCREASEORDECREASEZNSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVAL.INSTRUMENT LOOPP950MONITORSCONTAINMENT PRESSURE.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTMODIFYTHEINSTRUMENT LOOP.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHEREPLACEMENT INVERTERADDSNONEWFAILUREMODESBEYONDTHOSEOFTHEEXISTINGINVERTERg THEINTEGRITY OFLOOPP950WILLBEUNAFFECTED BYTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, NONEWINSTRUMENT ERRORSORFAILURESWILLBEINTRODUCED THATCOULD'.LEAD TOAFALSEINDICATION OFCONTAINMENT PRESSUREDURINGAPIPEBREAK.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.

48 0

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHE'DEQUACY OFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMSJANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-4750CONTAINMENT FANS1B1DDAMPERSOLENOIDISOLATION FUSESTHISENGXNEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEADDITIONOFISOLATION FUSESTOTHELOOPENTRYDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITSFORCONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION FANS1BAND1D.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:1)2)3)4)SEISMICEVENTMAJORANDMINORFIRESPIPEBREAKSINSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENT BREAKINRCSPRESSUREBOUNDARYLINESTHATPENETRATE CONTAINMENT THENEWFUSEBLOCKSWILLBESEISMICALLY MOUNTEDANDTHEREFORE WILLENSUREASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTDEGRADETHEINTEGRITY OFBUS16UNIT13CORBUS14UNIT2CENCLOSURES ZNWHICHTHEFUSESAREMOUNTED.THEMODIFICATION ZSDESIGNEDTOCOMPLYWITH10CFRAPPENDIXRCRITERIAANDENGINEERING PROCEDURES.

THEREFORE, THEPROBABILITY OFAMAJORORMINORFIREWILLNOTBEINCREASED.

THEFOLLOWING DESIGNBASISEVENTS(DBE)WILLNOTAFFECTORBEAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

ANYDBETHATCAUSESALEAD-TO-LEAD SHORTINTHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITWILLCAUSETHEDAMPER'SOLENOID VALVECIRCUITFUSESTOFAIL.FUSECOORDINATION ASSURESTHATTHESEFUSESWILLFAILBEFORESHEMAINFANCONTROLFUSES.THEREFORE, LOSSOFFANS1BAND1DgDURINGANYDBEDUETOALEAD-TO-LEAD SHORTINTHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUIT,WILLNOTOCCUR.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

1)STRUCTURES

~SYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.49

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES@

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4754CABLERELOCATIONS THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADING OFSEVERALCIRCUITSPLICESINTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGANDRELOCATION OFCABLESABOVETHECONTAINMENT FLOODLEVEL.REVISION42ADDSAFIREPROTECTION REQUIREMENT.

CABLESANDSPLICESSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFZEEE383-1974.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZN,THEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)PIPEBREAKS,INSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENT THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANYNEWORRELOCATECONDUITBEMOUNTEDTOPREVENTSEISMICFAILURE.THEREFORE, INSTALLED CABLESHALLREMAINFUNCTIONAL AFTERASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEADDITIONOFNEWCABLEANDSPLICESINCONTAINMENT ANDZNTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALL,NEWCABLEANDSPLICESBEQUALIFIED TOIEEE-383-1974 FLAMEANDLOCAREQUIREMENTS.

FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONS WILLBEREPAIREDANDREPLACEDZNACCORDANCE WITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.

THEREFORE, EXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL SINCETHEREISNOAFFECTONSEPARATION OFEXISTINGCIRCUITS/

ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS'R FIREAREABOUNDARIES ASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE VERIFICATION BEPERFORMED.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITIES OFTHEALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEM.'URTHERMORE, NONEOFTHEEXISTINGPROCEDURES FOROBTAINING ANALTERNATIVE SAFE,SHUTDOWNWILLBEEFFECTEDTHISMODIFICATIONS THEREFORE/

COMPLIESWITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXR50

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWCABLEANDSPLICES,INSTALLED ASPARTOFTHECABLERELOCATIONS, SHALLNOTAFFECTINSTRUMENT LOOPINTEGRITY'HEREFORE, NONEWFAILUREMODESSHALLBEINTRODUCED INTOTHEINSTRUMENT LOOPS.THEDESIGNCRITERIACOLLECTIVELY REQUIRESALLCABLESTOBERELOCATED'O UTILIZEMATERIALANDCONFIGURATIONS APPROVEDUNDERlOCFR50.49'ND CALIBRATION OFEACHLOOP'OENSURETHATLOOPFUNCTIONZSNOTAFFECTED'HAT LOOPACCURACYBEADDRESSED, ANDVERIFIEDASACCEPTABLE, INTHESYSTEMZN>>TEGRATEDPACKAGES.

THEREFORE, LOOPACCURACYSHALLNOTBEDEGRADEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

ALLMATERIALANDCONFIGURATIONS UTILIZEDUNDERTHISMODIFICA-TIONSHALLBEAPPROVEDUNDER10CFR50.49.

THEREFORE, PIPEBREAKSINSIDEOROUTSIDECONTAINMENT~

THATCREATEALOCA,HELBgSLB~ETC'HALLNOTDEGRADETHEINTEGRITY OFSPLICESORCABLESUSEDINTHISMODIFICATION.

THEABOVEITEMSENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSISAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTU-LATED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR,THESTRUCTURAL REANALYSIS PLAN(SRP)ANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4761HIGHHEADRECIRCULATION EVALUATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEINTERCHANGING OFTHEPOWERANDCONTROLPOWERWIRINGOFMOVs857AAND857B.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATION AREFZREgSEISMIC'OCAL ANDLOSSOFPOWEREVENTS'HE FIRSTEVENTANALYZEDZSTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHEMODIFICATION TOBESEISMICCATEGORY1THEREFORE'HE MODIFICATION WILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHESYSTEMDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDZSTHEEFFECTOFAFIREZNTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION..

THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORMODIFICATION IS,REQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFIEEESTD'83-1974 FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

51.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAPROVIDESREQUIREMENTS TOPRESERVEANYSILZCONEFOAMFIRESTOPORSEALTHATMAYNEEDTOBEPENETRATED.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUXRESANAPPENDIXRREVIEW.THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTEXISTINGCOMPLIANCE METHODS.THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFALOCA.DURINGTHESUMPRECIRCULATION PHASEFOLLOWING ALOCA,IFHIGHHEADRECIRCULATION ISNECESSARY (INCURRENTPROCEDURES WHENRHRTOTALISLESSTHAN400GPM)gTHE857AgBgCVALVESMUSTBEOPENED.PRESENTPROCEDURE ES-1.3CALLSFORSTARTINGRHRPUMPSALIGNEDTOTHESUMPANDDISCHARGING TOTHEREACTORTHROUGHTHEMOV852AgBVALVESPRIORTOOPENING857A,B,CIFHIGHHEADRECIRCULATION ISREQUIRED.

SINGLEFAILURECRITERIAREQUIRESTHETIMINGOFTHEACTIVEFAILURETOOCCURATTHEBEGINNING OFTHEHIGHHEADRECIRCULATION PHASE.,AFAILUREOFD/G1APRIOROPENINGTHE857VALVESWOULDRESULTINBOTHTRAINSLEADINGTOTHESAFETYINJECTION/CONTAINMENT SPRAYPUMPSBEINGBLOCKEDANDPOTENTIAL LOSSOFCORECOOLING.THISISTHEPROBLEMWHICHWILLBECORRECTED THRUTHISMODIFICATION.

THEFOURTHEVENTANALYZEDZSTHEEFFECTOFALOSSOFPOWERONTHEOPERATIONS OFTHEVALVES.ASSTATEDINTHEPREVIOUSPARAGRAPH AFAILUREOFD/GlAPRIORTOOPENINGTHE857VALVESWOULDRESULTINBOTHTRAINSLEADINGTOTHESAFETYINJECTION/CONTAINMENT SPRAYPUMPSBEINGBLOCKEDANDPOTENTIAL LOSSOFCORECOOLING.THISWILLBECORRECTED BY'HISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS, ZTHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURES gSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ANDTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFATYPEDIFFERENT FROMANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINSOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ZSNOTREDUCED.52

EWR-4769SAFEGUARDS RACKSIRELAYSTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEREMOVALOFUNUSEDRELAYSFROMTHESAFEGUARDS RACKS.ALLBFDRELAYS,USEDFORSAFEGUARDS INITIATION LOCATEDINTHERELAYROOMSAFEGUARDS RACKS'REBEINGREPLACEDZNACCORDANCE WITHMAINTENANCE~

PROCEDURE M59IXTEENOFTHESERELAYSAREUNUSEDANDREPRESENT ANUNNECESSARY EXPOSURETOFAILUREFORTHESAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS.THEEIGHTUNUSEDRELAYCOILSINEACHTRAINARECONTROLLED BYTHESAMEFUSESCONTROLLING ALLTHEOTHEROPERATING SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS.THEREFORE, ACOILFAILUREINANYOFTHESEUNITSCOULDKEEPTHESAFETYINJECTION SEQUENCEFROMBEINGINITIATED.

THERELAYSBEINGREMOVEDSERVENOFUNCTIONAL PURPOSE.ONEOFTHETWOCOILLEADSFOR6OFTHESERELAYSWEREDISCONNECTED ASPARTOFEWR2950.THEREMAINING 10RELAYSHAVEALLUNUSEDCONTACTS.

COILWIRINGISACCOMPLISHED BYUSEOFJUMPERCONNECTIONS FROMCOILTOCOIL.SOMEOFTHESEWIRESCANBEREMOVEDWHILEPORTIONSOFOTHERSWILLBENEEDEDTOMAKEUPREMAINING CONNECTIONS.

AREVXEW..HASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ISFIRE.NEWWIRINGWILLBEREQUXREDFORTHISMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,ANDBECAUSEOFTHISPOTENTIALS THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESALLSUCHWIREMEETTHEZEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLCAUSENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEZNFIREPROPAGATION HAZARD.ASARESULT,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLBEUNCHANGED.

THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCE OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY'REVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLBEUNCHANGED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

INFACT,BECAUSEEQUIPMENT CONNECTED TOSAFETYINJECTION CIRCUITS(ALTHOUGH ITSERVESNOFUNCTIONAL PURPOSE)ISBEINGREMOVED,THEPROBABILITY OFMALFUNCTIONING OFTHESZCIRCUITRY ZSREDUCED.THEREFORE, THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION ISBEINGPERFORMED TOREMOVEEXCESSRELAYSFROMTHERELAYRACKSTHUSREMOVINGFROMTHECIRCUITSAPIECEOFEQUIPMENT THATCOULDMALFUNCTION.

53

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

~EWR-478TDAFPSTEAMADMISSION VALVESTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHREWXRESTHECONTROLCIRCUITTOSEALZNAROUNDTHECONTROLSWITCHSOTHATWHENTHECIRCUITISENERGIZETOOPENTHEVALVEWILLCONTINUETOOPENTOTHEFULLYOPENPOSITION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION (1)FIRESAND(2)SEISMICEVENTS'ND (3)LOSSOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEPOSSIBILITY ORIMPACTONTHELEVELOFFIREPROTECTION ANDALTERNATE SHUTDOWNCAPABILITIES, NORTHEFIREPROTECTION ANDALTERNATE SHUTDOWNLICENSECONDITIONS ANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

ADDITIONAL WIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEADDEDINTHISMODIFICATION, WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFXRELOADXNGOFTHEPLANT~THEREFORE'HE DESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHWIRINGANDCABLEMEETTHEXEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

CONSEQUENTLY, THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEIMPACTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNOFTHEMODIFICATION SHALLBESEISMICCATEGORY1INACCORDANCE WITHTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

.THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEIMPACTOFLOSSOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER.

THEDESIGNOFTHEMODIFICATION DOESNOTALTERTHEMANUALORAUTOMATIC OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OFTHEAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.REQUIRING THEVALVETOGOFULLOPENONCETHECIRCUITXSENERGIZED VS.HAVINGZTSTOPWHENTHESWITCHISRELEASEDMAKESMANUALANDAUTOMATIC ACTUATION SIMILAR.THISDOESNOTADVERSELY IMPACTTHESYSTEM.THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY XNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEMARGIN,OF'SAFETYASDEFINEDZNTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

54 t>>

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.EWR-4794SECURITYGATEREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFFIVE(5)EXISTINGSECURITYGATEOPERATORS ANDTHEOUTERCANTILEVER VEHICLEGATEATTHESHIPPINGANDRECEIVING BUILDINGWITHANOVERHEADSLIDEGATE.SUPPORTSWILLALSOBEADDEDTOEXISTINGGATESTOREDUCEVIBRATIONS.

THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOIMPROVESECURITYGATERELIABILITY ANDMAINTAINABILITY.

EXCESSIVE VIBRATION INTHESECURITYGATESHASCONTINUALLY BEENTHESOURCEOFPROBLEMSFORTHESECURITYINTRUSION DETECTORS.

DURINGHIGHWINDSTHEEXCESSSECURITYGATEVIBRATIONS TRIPTHESECURITYE-FIELD.THISRESULTSINTHENECESSITY FORSECURITYPERSONNEL TOPATROLTHEAREA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEONLYEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS,SPECIFICALLY NATURALEVENTSANDLOSSOFAC.FIREALLCABLEANDWIREORDEREDFORTHISMODIFICATION SHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFZEEE383-1974FLAMETEST,THUSMITIGATING ANYPOTENTIAL FORPROPAGATING AFIRE.EARTHQUAKE DURINGASEISMICEVENT,THESECURITYGATEMODIFICATION WILLHAVENOSAFETYFUNCTION, ANDNEEDNOTREMAINFUNCTIONAL.

LOSSOFACTHISMODIFICATION SHALLBEREVIEWEDSOASTOENSURETHEISOLATION OFCLASS1EANDNON-CLASS lESYSTEMS.THESECURITYGATESYSTEMSOURCEOFPOWERISFROMANON-SAFEGUARDS BUS,WITHASTANDBYPOWERSOURCEDEDICATED TOTHESECURITYSYSTEM.THEREFORE, THECLASSlEELECTRICAL SYSTEMZSNOTEFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR"ANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP),ZTHASBgENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES gSYSTEMSJANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

55

'U EWR-4798SOLENOIDUPGRADETHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFBLOCKINGDIODESONSELECTEDSOLENOIDVALVECOILSTOPROVIDEPROTECTION AGAINSTVOLTAGETRANSIENTS DUETOANINDUCTIVE KICKBACK.THEDIODESAREARETROFIT'ROVIDED'BY THEVALVEMANUFACTURERS VALCORgANDWXLLBEINSTALLED ACROSSTHESOLENOIDCOILSOFTHEMAINSTEAM ISOLATION ANDREACTORHEADVENTVALVES.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCLUDESTHEINSTALLATION OFDIODEASSEMBLIES ACROSSTHEHYDROGENMONITORING SYSTEMSOLENOIDSg V921gV922~V923ANDV924~AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAiTORANDMINORFIRES~(2)ASEISMICEVENT~(3)AMAINSTEAMLINEBREAK.CABLEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION COULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE, THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWRECTIFIER ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDERTHISMODIFICATION BEQUALIFIED PERIEEE344-1975'HEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION WILLREMAINFUNCTIONAL DURINGANDAFTERASEISMXCEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWRECTIFIER ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDERTHISEWRBEQUALIFIED PERIEEE3231974'HEREFORE THISMODIFICATION SHALLREMAINFUNCTIONAL DURINGANDAFTERAMAINSTEAMLINEBREAK.THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

56

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVZEWED SAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARgIT'HASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES

~SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4862NISTRIPBYPASSTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTING108%OVERPOWER TRIPFUNCTIONTESTRELAYPUSHBUTTON SWITCHESWITHMAINTAINABLE TYPESWITCHES.

MAINTAINABLE TYPESWITCHESARENECESSARY TOMAINTAINENERGIZATZON OFTHETESTRELAYSWHICHDEENERGIZE THEREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYSDURINGMAINTENANCE OFTHE108%OVERPOWER NISPOWERRANGECHANNELS.

DEENERGIZING EACHTRAIN'S108%OVERPOWER REACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYDURINGCHANNELMAINTENANCE PLACESTHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODEWHICHSATISFIES THEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNATECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THEEXISTINGREACTORTRIPRELAYLOGICOFTHE108%OVERPOWER NISPOWERRANGECHANNELSATGINNASTATIONCONSISTSOFTHEFOLLOWING:

EACHOFTHEFOUR108%OVERPOWER NISPOWERRANGECHANNELSHAVEATESTRELAYONEACHTRAINUTILIZEDFORDEENERGIZING THE108%OVERPOWER REACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYS.EXISTINGMOMENTARY TYPESWITCHES, LOCATEDZNTHERELAYLOGICTESTRACKS(RLTR1gRLTR2)INTHERELAYROOMpENERGIZETHETESTRELAYSWHICHDEENERGIZE THE108%OVERPOWER REACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYSPLACINGTHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODE.THEEXISTINGSWITCHESAREPANELMOUNT~SINGLEPOLE~MOMENTARY PUSHBUTTON TYPE.THEFOUREXISTINGMOMENTARY PUQHBUTTON TYPESWITCHESONEACHOFBOTHTRAINS(TOTALOFEIGHT)WILLBEREPLACEDBYMAINTAINABLE SELECTORTYPESWITCHES.

THISWILLALLOWTHE108%OVERPOWER TRIPFUNCTIONTESTRELAYTOREMAINENERGIZED ANDMAINTAINTHECHANNELINATRIPMODEDURINGMAINTENANCE.

57

'I AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT,(3)AREACTOROVERPOWER TRANSIENT (1084OVERPOWER REACTORTRIP).NONEWWIRINGgFIELDCABLEfOROTHERWISEFLA1&fABLE MATERIALS WILLBEADDEDTOTHEPLANTUNDERTHISMODIFICATION, THEREFORE/

NOINCREASEINFIRELOADINGZSIMPOSED.THENEWSELECTORSWITCHESAREDESIGNATED SEISMICCATEGORY1.THEREFORE' SEISMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPACTTHEPROPEROPERATION OFTHESWITCHES.

CHANGINGTHESUBJECTSWITCHESFROMMOMENTARY TOMAINTAINABLE DOESNOTAFFECTTHEOPERATION OFTHENZS1084OVERPOWER REACTORTRIPBECAUSEACTUATION OFTHESWITCHESWILLPLACETHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODETHEREFORE~

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTEFFECTTHENISRESPONSETOANOVERPOWER TRANSIENT.

THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES2)ASEiSMICEVENT3)AREACTOROVERPOWER TRANSIENT (1084OVERPOWER REACTORTRIP)ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4933SGPRESSURETUBINGRELOCATION THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES MODIFICATION OFTHE<<BnSTEAMGENERATOR PRESSURETRANSMITTER(S)

TUBINGANDSUPPORTS.

THEPURPOSEOFTHEMODIFICATION ISTOMITIGATETHEPOTENTIAL FORTHERECURRENCE OFFREEZINGSENSORLINESZNTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGINTHEFOLLOWING FASHION:1)REROUTING TUBINGFORSENSORLINESPT-479ANDPT-4832)THEANALYSISONNEWTUBEROUTING.3)PROVIDEINSULATION ZFDEEMEDNECESSARY TOENSURETHATTHETUBINGCONTENTSREMAINABOVE32oF4)PROVIDESEISMICRESTRAINT FORTHEAFFECTEDTUBING.58

THEFOLLOWING ARERESPONSES TOPRE-PORCCOMMENTSONEWR4933DESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISREVISION0.1.COMMENT:WHYNOTELIMINATE THEADDITIONOFTHEFOURVALVESET-UPANDJUSTREPLACETHETUBING.THETUBINGCANBEPRE-RUNANDTHENTHECONNECTIONS MADEINASHORTTIME.RESPONSE:

THEPROPOSEDDESIGNREQUIREDTHATTHEVALVESBEINSTALLED DURINGTHE1989SPRINGOUTAGEANDTHENPERFORMTHEREMAINING MODIFICATIONS POST-OUTAGE.

THEPRIMARYOBJECTIVE FORTHISAPPROACHATTHETIMEWASTOMAKEMODIFICATIONS TOTHE"SYSTEMWITHOUTRENDERING ANYTRAININOPERABLE.

BASEDONMYCONVERSATION WITHYOUON5/2/89,FILLINGANDVENTINGOFTHELINESANDRECALZBRATZON OFTHETRANSMITTERS WILLBEREQUIRED.

THISWILLCAUSEONELINEATATIMETOBEINOPERABLE.

ONTHEBASISTHATFILLING,VENTING,ANDRECALIBRATZON ZSREQUIREDITZSPRUDENTTOELIMINATE THEINSTALLATION OFTHEVALVES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAWILLBEREVISEDTOREFLECTTHISCHANGE.2.COMMENT:SHOULDINCLUDEINSERVZCE LEAKCHECKFORPORTIONSOFTUBINGWHXCHCANNOTBEHYDROED.RESPONSE:

THISOPTIONWILLBEINCLUDEDINTHEECNWHENTHEDRAWINGSAREISSUEDFORCONSTRUCTION.

3.COMMENT:ISTHEREAMXNIMUMSLOPEREQUIREMENT FORTUBINGINSTALLATION.

RESPONSE

YES.THISREQUIREMENT WILLBESPECIFIED ONTHECONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS.

4.COMMENT:WHATXSANAPPROPRIATE AIRSEAL.RESPONSE:

THEDETAILSOFANAPPROPRIATE AIRSEALWILLBEEVALUATED DURINGTHEDESIGNPROCESS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEDESIGNBASISEVENTSTODETERM1NE THOSE,RELATEDTOTHEMODIFICATION.

THEEVENTSASSOCIATED WITHTHISWORKARE:A)B)C)D)E)FIRESSEISMICEVENTSBELOWFREEZINGAMBIENTTEMPERATURE POSTULATED RUPTUREOFSTEAMORFEEDWATER LINESDIFFERENTIAL DISPLACEMENT OFCONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ANDINTERMEDIATE BUILDING59

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREBARRIERSORAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCE OFANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION EQUIPMENT.

ANYNEWMATERIALS USEDINELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS SHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFZEEE-383-1974, THUSMITIGATING THEPOTENTIAL FORPROPAGATING AFIRE.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXRiORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TOTHETUBINGANDCONTROLSYSTEMS.SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION PROGRAM.THEMODIFICATION ANDSUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATED, INREGARDTOASEISMICEVENT,TOCRITERIAIDENTICAL TOTHESEISMICUPGRADEPROGRAM.THISWILLENSURETHATANYMODIFICATIONS WILLBEDESIGNEDSOASTOEQUALORIMPROVETHESYSTEM'SCAPABILITY TOWITHSTAND ASEISMICEVENT.BASEDONTHEABOVEANALYSIS, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:A)B)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATION ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.lTHESTRUCTURES iSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ORPOSTULATED HIGHENERGYPIPEBREAKANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS ORPOSTULATED HIGHENERGYBREAKSCONTINUETOREMAINADEQUATE.

C)ALLINSTRUMENT SENSINGLINEPENETRATZONS SHALLBELOCATEDATAMINIMUMHEIGHTOFSEVENFEET(2.2METERS)ABOVEFLOORLEVEL,ORTHATROUTINGANDSUPPORTOFSENSINGLINESSHALLENSURETHATTHEFUNCTIONOFTHELINESISNOTAFFECTEDBYVIBRATION, ABNORMALHEATiCOLD,ORSTRESS.THUStTHISMODIFICATZONNEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES iNORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES2)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMICANDTORNADOEVENTS3)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING AHIGHENERGYLINEBREAK.60

\

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR,THESTRUCTURAL'E-ANALYSIS PLAN(SRP)ANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'T HASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-5053REPAIRHDPUMPBARRELLEATHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION ONTHEHEATERDRAINTANKPUMPBARRELLEAKREPAIR.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOINSTALLAPASSIVEVENTSYSTEMONTHEHEATERDRAINPUMPBARREL.THEVENTSSHALLPROVIDEACONTROLLED PATHFORSTEAMANDDEBRISTOESCAPEFROMTHEANNULARREGIONBETWEENEACHPUMPBARRELANDLINERATTHESAMETIMEPREVENTING SAFETYAND/OREROSIONPROBLEMS.

A"REVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ISALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOW.LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWCANOCCURFROMARUPTUREOFAPUMPBARRELDUETOTHEEROSIVEACTIONOFTHEVENTINGSTEAM.THEANALYZEDEVENTISFARMORESEVERETHANAPUMPBARRELRUPTURE.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFAPUMPBARRELRUPTURESINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTION OFTHEPUMPBARREL.THISMODIFICATION ISNON-SEISMIC SINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAINING SAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT ORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION BECAUSEOFREQUIREMENT ZNSECTION27'OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

ANALYSISNECESSARY TOASSURECONTINUAL COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50,APPENDIXRHASBEENREQUIRED.

THEREFORE, THEPROBABILITY ANDCONSEQUENCES OFAFIREAFFECTING COLDSHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTAREUNCHANGED.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHE.MITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOT'BEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

61

TSR88-07CCWCHECKVALVE743AINTERNALS REMOVALTHISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTADDRESSES CHANGESTOCCWCHECKVALVE743A.THISCHANGEINVOLVESREMOVINGCHECKVALVE743A'SINTERNALS TOALLOWCONCLUSIVE LEAKRATETESTINGOFCCWCHECKVALVE743.XNTHEORIGINALPLANTDESIGNVALVE743AWASUTILIZEDASTHECONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEFORTHECCWLINECOMINGFROMTHEEXCESSLETDOWNHEATEXCHANGER.

HOWEVER/DUETOLEAKAGEPROBLEMSWITHVALVE743AgCHECKVALVE743WASINSTALLED INSERIESWITH743ATOPERFORMTHECONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION.

CONSEQUENTLY'HECK VALVE743ANOLONGERPERFORMSANYSAFETYOROPERATIONAL FUNCTION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGZNNAPROCEDURE A-303.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)SEISMICEVENTS,(2)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT

BUILDING, ANDAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.THISMODIFICATION WILLBEDESIGNEDSUCHTHATITWILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITY OFCHECKVALVE743AORITSCONNECTED PIPINGANDSUPPORTSTOWITHSTAND ASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHEBODYPRESSUREBOUNDARYFUNCTIONING OFCHECKVALVE743ATHEREFORE THEASAB31.1PRESSUREDESIGNWILLREMAINVALID.CCWCHECKVALVE743WILLSTILLPROVIDETHECONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS DURINGAPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREORAMAINSTEAMLINERUPTURE.THUS~THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:'1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMIC.2)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING APIPEBREAKINSIDEOROUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

'BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/

'NDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

62

TSR89-05RHRSPENTFUELANDCVCSNON-REGENERATZVE HEATEXCHANGERS BOLTINGUPGRADETHISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTADDRESSES FLANGEBOLTINGUPGRADESFORTHERHRgSPENTFUELSANDNONREGENERATIVE HEATEXCHANGERS

~THESHELLSIDEINLETANDOUTLETFLANGESWEREORIGINALLY SUPPLIEDWITHSA-307GRADEBBOLTS.THESEBOLTSWILLBEREPLACEDWITHSA-193GRADEB7BOLTSFOLLOWING STANDARDRG&EBOLTINGPRACTICES.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGINNAPROCEDURE A-303.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)SEISMICEVENTS,(2)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT

BUILDING, (3)ANDAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.THENEWBOLTINGISOFTHESAME'PHYSICAL SIZEASTHEORIGINALBOLTINGANDTHECHEMICALANDPHYSICALPROPERTIES OFTHENEWMATERIALS SA193GRB7gISEQUALTOORGREATERTHANTHEOLDMATERIALSA307GRBETHEREFORE'HE NEWBOLTINGWILLPERFORMTOTHESAMECAPACITYASTHEOLDBOLTINGFOREACHOFTHEAPPLICABLE EVENTSLISTEDABOVE.THUS/THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES

~NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMIC.2)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING APIPEBREAKINSIDECONTAINMENT.

3)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING AMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZT-HASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

TSR89-09MAINFEEDWATER PUMPSUCTIONTRANSMITTER VALVEMANIFOLDTHISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUEST(TSR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHEISOLATION ANDEQUALZZATZON VALVESFORFT-2004ANDFT-2005(FEEDWATER PUMPSUCTIONFLOWTRANSMITTERS)

WITHMANIFOLDS.

ITWILLALSOREPLACETHEBLOWDOWNVALVESINTHESENSINGLINESWHICHARELEAKING.THENEWAEGVQTGEMENT WILLPROVIDETHESAMEFUNCTIONASTHEPREVIOUSONE.63

THEVALVES,ASSOCIATED WITHTHISMODIFICATION SERVETRANSMITTERS FT-2004ANDFT-2005.THESETRANSMITTERS PROVIDE:(1)ANINPUTTOFEEDWATER BYPASSVALVE3959gWHICHOPENSONLOWFEEDWATER NPSH.(2)ASIGNALTOFEEDWATER RECIRCULATION VALVES4147AND4148,WHICHOPENWHENFEEDWATER FLOWFALLSBELOW254FULLFLOWWITHOUTRECIRCULATION.

AFEEDWATER BYPASSVALVEMALFUNCTION ZSDISCUSSED ZNTHEFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE DECREASEACCIDENTSCENARIOOFSECTION15.1.1.1INTHEUFSAR.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASEORDECREASETHELIKELIHOOD OFSUCHANACCIDENTSINCETHEFUNCTIONOFTHEVALVESANDPIPINGASSOCIATED WITHTHETRANSMITTERS WILLNOTCHANGE.THUSgTHEINCORPORATION OFTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTANYOFTHEEVENTSLISTEDINTABLESIANDZZOFGZNNAPROCEDURE A-303,INCLUDING THEDESIGNBASISEVENTSOFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDITWILLNOTCHANGE:1)THEASSUMPTIONS OFANYSAFETYANALYSISINTHEUFSARANDITSSUPPLEMENTS.

2)THEPROBABILITY OFANOCCURRENCE OFANACCIDENT.

3)THECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENT.

BASEDUPONTHEEVALUATIONS INSECTION3.1ABOVE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONWILLBEUNCHANGED BYTHEINSTALLATION OFTHISMODIFICATION; AND,THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHE.PREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS WILLBEUNCHANGED BYTHEINSTALLATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONSINCE:A)THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED, ORgB)THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENT.ORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATED,ORgC)THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTINVOLVEACHANGEZNTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SINCENONEOFTHELIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION OFTHEFEEDANDCONDENSATE SYSTEMSWILLBEAFFECTED.

64

TSR89-29PRESSZZERLEVELTRANSMITTER MANIFOLDREPLACEMENT THISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTREVISIONWASTOCHANGETHEREFERENCE INTHEDESIGNCRITERIA'EVISION 0FROMTHE1986ASMECODEEDITIONTOTHE1983EDITXON.THISWILLBECONSISTENT WXTHTHEINSTALLATION ANDALSOBEINCONFORMANCE WITHASMESECTIONXIgARTICLEIWA7000@REPLACEMENTS' REVIEWWASPERFORMED OFALLTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:CHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTION PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESEISMICEVENTTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWMANIFOLDVALVEANDFITTINGSFORTHISMODIFICATION BESEISMICALLY SUPPORTED, THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWMANXFOLDVALVEANDTUBINGBESEISMICALLY MOUNTEDANDFURTHERMORE SECTIONS4AND5REQUIRETHENEWTUBINGTOBEASMECODECLASS2,QUALITYGROUPB.THEREFORE, THEPROBABILITY OFALOCAWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION.

THISISBASEDONTHEFOLLOWING:

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION BECAUSETHEINSTALLATION WILLMEETALLAPPLICABLE SEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION BECAUSETHEINSTALLATION WILLMEETALLAPPLICABLE SEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.

65 0

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION BECAUSETHEINSTALLATION WILLMEETALLAPPLICABLE SEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.

66

SECTIONB-COMPLETED STATIONMODIFICATIONS (SMs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofstationmodification procedures performed inthefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreport.Stationmodification procedures arewrittentocompleteaportionofanEngineering WorkRequest(EWR)orTechnical StaffRequest(TSR)identified bythesameparentnumber.StationModifications arereviewedbythePlantOperations ReviewCommittee toensurethatnounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesareinvolvedwiththeprocedure.

Thebasisforinclusion ofanSMinthissectionisclosureoftheSMwhereportionsoftheparentEWRorTSR,intheformofotherSMsorotherdocumentation, remaintobecompleted.

8 SM-87-01.1 SECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY MONITORING PANELSWCMPINTERNALWIRINGFOR7082ANALYZERS THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFCOMPONENTS ANDW1RINGZNTHENEWSWCMP.SM-87-01.2 COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEW,,PROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHENEWSWCMPANDASSOCIATED CIRCUITS.

SM-87-01.3 COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTWELVENEWCONDUCTIVITY CELLSANDTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHECOMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY MODIFICATION.

SM-89-08AMMONIUMHYDROXIDE SIGHTGLASS INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONi TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHEAMMONIUMHYDROXZ'DE TANKSZGHTGLASS.

SM-1594.6 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SEISMICSUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFSEISMICSUPPORTSREQUIREDFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLPIPING.SM-1594.7 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SERVICEWATERPIPINGANDASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFSERVICEWATERPIPINGANDASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION TOTHENEWSFPHEATEXCHANGER.

SM-1594.8 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-STAINLESS STEELANDASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION PIPINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFSPENTFUELPOOLSTAINLESS STEELANDASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION PIPING.

SM-1594.8A INSTALLATION ANDOPERATION OFSTANDBYS.F-P.COOLINGSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, OPERATION, ANDDISASSEMBLY OFTHESTANDBYSK1DMOUNTEDSTF.P.COOLINGSYSTEM.FLOORPENETRATION INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFFLOORPENETRATIONS FORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.11 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-PUMPANDRADIATION MONITORINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION'OF PUMPANDRADIATION MONITORFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.14 SPENTFUEPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMELECTRICAL MODIFICATION ANDCOMPLETION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION COMPLETION ANDTURNOVEROFTHESPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGELECTRICAL MODIFICATION.

SM-2504.25 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUSTVALVEELECTRICAL

.INSTALLATION ATPENETRATION 132V7920-CONTAINMENT BUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL

.INSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUSTVALVEV7920ATPENETRATION P-132INSIDECONTAINMENT.

SM-2504.26 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUSTVALVESELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OUTSIDECONTAINMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHE,CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLYSYSTEMEXHAUSTVALVESCDV-1A'ANDCDV-1BOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

SM-2512.123 SMCUPGDEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFW-400"D"PUMPDISCHARGE

-STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION~

TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFSTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SUPPORTS'B" TRAININTHESAFWBUILDING.

SM-2512.124 SEISMCUPGRADEOFPIPESUP0S0ALYSZSLINESW-2200SERVICEWATERAUXLIARYBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROF'ODIFICATIONS TOSERVICEWATERSUPPORTSINTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGASSOCIATED WITHFEEDTOTHE"C"SAFWPUMPoSEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSIS LINESAFW-800STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROMCONTAINMENT PENETRATION 123TO"B"SGFEEDWATER LINETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFSAFWSUPPORTSINCONTAINMENT FROMPENETRATION 123TOTHE"B"FEEDWATER LINE.SM-2512.126 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTSANALYSISLINESAFW-900STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROMPENETRATION 119TO"A>>STEAMGENERATOR FEEDWATER LINETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTMODIFICATIONS TOTHESAFWLINEBETWEEN'ENETRATION 4119ANDTHE"A"S/GFEEDWATER LINE.SM-2512'31ISTTESTCONNECTIONS

-RCDTPUMPSUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEZNSTALLATZONi TESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONS FORVALVESMOV-1813A ANDMOV-1813B.

,SM-'2512.132 ISTTESTCONNECTIONS

-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DISCHARGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONS FORAUXILIARY FEEDWATER DISCHARGE CHECKVALVES4003'004'000C AND4000D.SM-2512.133 ZSITESTCONNECTIONS

-VALVEV-3506ANDV-3507BYPASSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONS FORVALVES3506AND3507BYPASSLOOPS(DOWNSTREAM OFV-3506AANDV-3507A)~

SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINECVC-200-"B"RCPSEALRETURNTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHESUPPORTMODIFICATIONS FOR"B"RCPSEALRETURNLINECONSISTING OFSUPPORTSCVU-131ANDCVU-XI'M-3319.48 CC-1BBREAKEREPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFBRKQG"RREPLACEMENT ATSPECIFIED POSITIONS ONMCC-1B.SM-3319.55 TESTINGOFBREAKERSATMCC-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTO1)DOCUMENTANAUXILIARY SWITCH'ESTi 2)VERIFYPROPERPHASEROTATIONS AND3)TOPERFORMAFUNCTIONAL TESTOFBREAKERSPLACEDATMCC-1B.SM-3319'8SETTINGADJUSTMENT ANDFUNCTONALTESTINGOFBREAKERSATMCC-HTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOPROVIDETHEDIRECTION TOADJUSTANDFUNCTIONALLY TESTBREAKERSATMCC-1H.SM-3319.59 UXLIARYSWITTESTINGORSELECTEDBREARSONMCC-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTODOCUMENTANAUXILIARY SWITCHTESTFORTHETURBINEROOMWALLEXHAUSTFANS1F,1Gg1H,AND1J.SM-3319A.2 BREAKERCHANGEOUT REMOVAL0MCC-1C1LAND1THEPURPOSEOF.THISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVAL, TOLHEATERCHANGEOUTS, ANDTRIPSETTINGADJUSTMENTS FORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC1Ci1LiAND1KSM-3319A.3 BREAKERCHANGEOUT REMOVALONMCC-1DAND1THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS, TOLHEATERCHANGEOUTS, ANDTRIPSETTINGADJUSTMENTS FORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC-1DAND1M.

SM-3319A.4 BREAKERCHANGEOUT REMOVALONMCC-1BlEAND1FTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS, HKATRIPUNITREPLACEMENTS'ND TRIPSETTINGADJUSTMENTS FORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC1Br1EiAND1F~SM-3319A.5 REPLACEMENT OFPOWERCABLESPEREWR-3319A THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEREPLACEMENT OFEXISTINGPOWERCABLESFORTHEBORICACIDEVAPORATOR PACKAGE,THEAUXILIARY BUILDINGLIGHTINGTRANSFORMER 1BgANDTHESERVICEBUILDINGKITCHENEQUIPMENT TRANSFORMER.

SM-3319A.6 BREAKERREMOVALONMCC-1GANDRESOLUTION OFSM-3319A.2 3319A.3AND3319A.4PUNCHLIST ITEMSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTZNGrANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERREMOVALSI TOLHEATERCHANGEOUTSi BREAKERHANDLEINSTALLATIONS'ND REMOVEDBREAKERCOVERPLATEINSTALLATIONS.

SM-3319A.8 BREAKERCHANGEOUT ATMCC-1FFORTHELAUNDR'IRCONDITIONER ANDTHEPASSWASTETANKEVACUATION COMPRESSOR THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEBREAKERCHANGEOUT ATMCC-1FFORTHELAUNDRYAIRCONDITIONER ANDTHEPASSWASTETANKEVACUATION COMPRESSOR.

FUSEINSTALLATION FORTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDrrArrANDrrBrrBATTERYVOLTMETERS THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFFUSESFORTHEMCBrrArrANDr'BBATTERYVOLTMETERS.

SM-3341.2 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTINGOFD.C.FUSESXSBFORLOCKOUTRELAY~8611ATHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEA2Y(15A)(XSB)125VDCFUSESWHICHFEEDTHEBUSllADIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUTRELAY86/llA.

SM-3341.3 PRE-OPERAT ONALTESTINGOFD.C.FUSESXSCFORLOCKOUTRELAY8611BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEA2Y(15A)(XSC)125VDCFUSESWHICHFEEDTHEBUSllBDIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUTRELAY86/11B;SM-3596'DGirAitPRESSUREINSTRUMENT PANELELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFJUNCTIONBOXESASSOCIATED WITHTHENEWDIESELGENERATOR "A"INSTRUMENT PANELiINCLUDING CONDUITANDCONDUITSUPPORTSBETWEENTHEJUNCTIONBOXESANDINSTRUMENT PANEL.ALSO,INCLUDESCABLEBETWEENNEWPRESSUREINSTRUMENTS ANDTHENEWTERMINALSTRIPSWITHINTHEJUNCTIONBOXES.SM-3596.4 DG"A"PRESSUREINSTRUMENT PANEL-ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFJUNCTIONBOXESASSOCIATED WITHTHENEWDIESELGENERATOR BINSTRUMENT PANELiINCLUDING CONDUITANDCONDUITSUPPORTSBETWEENTHEJUNCTIONBOXESANDINSTRUMENT PANEL.ALSO,INCLUDESCABLEBETWEENNEWPRESSUREINSTRUMENTS ANDTHENEWTERMINALSTRIPSWITHINTHEJUNCTIONBOXES.STANDBYAZLIARYFEEDWTERCONTROLCIRCUITRY ANDVALVEMOV-9746TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTO'ONTROL THETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWMOVCONTROLSWITCHRE-ARRANGEMENTS ANDTHEIRRESPECTIVE CONTROLANDINDICATION CIRCUITS.

THISINCLUDESMOVATSTESTINGOFMOV-9746ANDHYDROTESTINGOFNEWVALVEINSTALLATION.

SM-3692.4 STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWTERVVE-ELECTRICLMODIFICATIONS THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVERFORTESTINGOFCONDUIT,CONDUITSUPPORTS'ABLEi BREAKERJUMPERSANDREWORKOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDSWITCHESANDINDICATION.

SM-3692.5 SBAFWBUIDINGELECTRICAL SUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFELECTRICAL SUPPORTMODIFICATIONS INTHESTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDING.

SM-3692.6 STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FUNCTIONAL TESTINGOFCONTROLCIRCUITRY FORMOV-9746THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTINGOFMOV-9746LOCATEDZNTHESAFWBUILDING; CONTROLROOM(REAROFMCB)gAUXILIARY BUILDING(MCCAREAS)~HYDROTESTINGOFTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYZSCOMPLETE.

ADDITIONAL COPIESOFTHISPROCEDURE MAYBEPLACEDFORCOORDINATION ANDCONTROLPURPOSES.

SM-3797.8 MRPIRODDROPRELAYTIMEDELAYREMOVALITHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALOFTHETIMEDELAYDEVICESWHICHWEREPREVIOUSLY INSTALLED ONTHECONTROLRODDROPRELAYS,ANDTHESUBSE{}UENT TESTINGOFTHERELAYS'M-3797.9 MRPIDATACABINETFANINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFCOOLINGFANSONTHEMRPZDATACABINETINCONTAINMENT.

SM-3797.10 PIANNUNCIATOR MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFAMODIFICATION TOANNUNCIATOR C29FORMRPZFAILURE.SM-3797'11DATACABINETFANREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALANDTURNOVEROFCOOLINGFANSFORMRP1DATACABINETZNCONTAINMENT.

SM-3881.1 SIRECIRCULATION MODFCTONMECHANICAL INSTALLATIO REMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONS FORTHEMECHANICAL PORTIONOFTHESIRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION.

SM-3881.2 SIRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION

-ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION ANDREMOVALSMOV897898THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFELECTRICAL INSTALLATION ANDREMOVALSFORMOV897AND898.

SAFETYINJECZONFLOWMETERSF-924ANDI-925RESCALZNG THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFMETERSCALESFORFZ-924ANDFI-925ANDRECALZBRAT1ON OFSAFETYINJECTION FLOWTRANSMITTERS FT-924ANDFT-925'ESLGENERAORBUILDINGFODATIONINVESTIGATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTESTBORINGANDCORESAMPLINGINANDAROUNDTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDING.

SM-3990.2 GROUNDWATEREXPLORATION OFTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDING'IMPINGEMENT MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEEXPLORATION ANDEXCAVATION OFTHEDEWATERING PITSGENERALLY BETWEENTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDINGANDLAKEONTARIO.THEGENERALPURPOSEOFTHISEXPLORATORY

.PHASEOFTHEOVERALLMODIFICATION ZSTOOBTAINSUFFICIENT PERTINENT DATAONTHESUBSURFACE GROUNDWATER.THISDATAWILLPROMULGATE NECESSARY ENGINEERING OUTPUTSFORMODIFICATION ERECTIONANDINSTALLATION.

SM-3991.2 SEISMICUPGRADEOFEXISTINGCONNECTIONS ANDANCHORAGES

-AUXILIARY BUILDINGSOUTHWALLTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTODIRECT/DOCUMENT STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS.

SM-4064.5 TURBIEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTION UPGRADEANDALARMOFFINDICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHECHANGEOUT OFTURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORS ANDSTPs.ALSOINCLUDEDISTHEINSTALLATION OFCONTROLROOMINDICATION OFALARMOFFSTATUS.SM-4064.6 TSCFIREDETECTION ANDSUPPRESSION SYSTEMUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOTHETSCFIREDETECTION ANDSUPPRESSION SYSTEMSPRIORTOFINALTERMZNATZONS ANDTESTING.

TURBINEBUIDINGSMOKEDETECTORZONEZ34MODIFICATIONS THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOTURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORZONEZ34-TOREMOVEDETECTORS FROMTHEGENERATOR FIELDVOLTAGEREGULATOR CABINETSSM-4218'LT-426TUBINGREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOPROVIDETHENECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FORTHEREMOVALOFTHEEXISTING3/8nTUBINGUSEDFORLT-426SEALEDREFERENCE LEG.SM-4230.1 TICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOSCRAMATWSMITIGATION ACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSACMODIFICATION INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOINSTALLAREACTORPROTECTION SYSTEMTHATWILLTRIPTHEMAINSTEAMTURBINEANDSTARTTHEFLOWOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFTERANATWSEVENT.SM-4230.2 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WIOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATION SYSTEMACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSCMODIFICATION TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOTESTAREACTORPROTECTION SYSTEMTHATWILLTRIPTHEMAINSTEAMTURBINEANDSTARTTHEFLOWOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFTERANATWSEVENT.THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOINSTALLTHEnAMSACTRIPPED"STATUSLIGHTONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD,WHILEPROGRAMMING ZNNEWARMINGSETPOINTS ANDMODIFYING THEFUNCTIONCURVEWHICHGENERATES THEVARIABLETIMEDELAYFORAMSAC.ZNADDITIONTOCHANGINGTHEDIGITALOUTPUTFORTHEPPCSFROMnAMSACACTUATED" TOnAMSACTRIPPEDn, BECOMINGADIRECTFUNCTIONOFTHERESETSTATUS.SM-4322.1STATIONSERVCTRANSFORMERS 3AND15COOLINGFANSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFCOOLINGFANSATSTATIONSERVICETRANSFORMERS 43.3AND415.SM-4230.3 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATION SYSTEMACTUATONCICUITRYAMSACTSTATUSMODIFCATION

SM-4324.3 ELECTRICAL NSTALLATION FORSTEAMGENERATOR BLOWOWNSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION FORSTEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEMMODIFICATION.

THISPROCEDURE ALLOWSPARTIALINSTALLATION PRIORTOPLANTOUTAGEANDISTOCOMPLETETHEREMAINING DURINGTHEPLANTOUTAGE.TESTINGOFTHEINSTALLATION WILLBEPERFORMED UNDERANOTHERPROCEDURE.

SM-4324.5 SEGENERATOR BLOWDOSYSTEODFICATIONFUNCTIOALTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE 1STOPERFORMFUNCTIONAL TESTINGOFTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OFS/GBLOWDOWNMODIFICATION.

SM-4347'MODIFICATION OFTHECONTROLROOMPLANTEVACUATION ALARMPLANTATTENTION ALARMANDPLANTFIREALARMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTROLROOMPLANTEVACUATION ALARM,PLANTATTENTION ALAI'NDPLANTFIREALARMMODIFICATIONS.

SM-4347.2 CONTROLROOMALARMSYSTEMTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITHTHECONTROLROOMALARMSYSTEMSANDTOCONDUCTACONTROLROOMALARMSURVEY.SM-4375.1 BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANICAL PORTIONOF'HEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLMODIFICATION.

SM-4375.2 BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLELECTRICAL MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROF.THEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLANDHEATTRACEMODIFICATION.

SM-4375.3 MECHANICAL ANDELECTRICAL TESTING-BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATION.

10

SM-4375.6 BORICACXDFLOWCONTROLMECHANICAL PHASE2MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANXCAL PORTIONOFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2MODIFICATION.

SM-4375'BORICACILOWCONTROLPHASE2ACCEPTANCE TESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORXCACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2MODIFICATION.

SM-4375.9 REPLACEMENT OFHEATTRACECIRCUITS40AND78THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION~

TESTING~ANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELF-REGULATING HEATTRACECABLEFORCONDUITS440AND478(BORICACIDBLENDERPIPING)gWHICHINCLUDESVALVESV354gV355gFCV110AgV109gANDFT110~SM-4525.2 GARSUPPYBUSDUCTFODTONSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTODIRECT/DOCUMENT INSTALLATION OFNEWBUSDUCTFOUNDATION.

SM-4525.3 GAPOWERSUPPLYO.CDB.FIREWALLFOUNDATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEGINNAPOWERSUPPLYO.C.B.FIREWALLFOUNDATION.

SM-4525.4 RACEWAYINSTALLAT ONFOROFFSITEPOWERRECONFXGURATION MODIFICTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFRACEWAYFORTHEOFFSZTEPOWERMODIFICATION.

THISPROCEDURE INCLUDESINSTALLATION OFANEWPIPESUPPORTFORTHEEXISTINGTRANSFORMER 12BDELUGESYSTEM.SM-4525.5 NEWGINNAPOWERSUPPLYBUSDUCTINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLINSTALLATION OFTHENEWGZNNAPOWERSUPPLYBUS.DUCT.

SM-4525.6 OFFSITEPOWERRECONFXGURATION:

.P.S.SWITCHGEARTRANSFORMER 2BGROUNDING THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOANCHORTHEP.P.S.SWITCHGEARg COMPLETEINTERNALWIRING'ND PERFORMELECTRICAL INSPECTION OFP.P.S.4160VSWITCHGEAR.

THISPROCEDURE ALSOCONTROLSTHEINSTALLATION OFTHETRANSFORMER 12BGROUNDING RESISTOR.

SM-4525'OFFSITEPOWERRECONFXGURATION:

CABLEINSTALLATION RELAYPANELS12AAND12BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFCABLESFORTHEOFFSZTEPOWERMODIFICATION ANDCOMPLETETHEINSTALLATION OFRELAYPANELS12AAND12B.SM-4525.8 OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:

MAINCONTROLBOARDSWITCHRELOCATION BUS12ABUS12BMODIFICATION ANDTESTING'HEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROF:A)B)C)D)SM-4525.9 52/11BCONTROLSW~SYNCHSWgANDZNDLITES52/11ACONTROLSW,SYNCHSW,ANDZND.LZTES12BBUSRELAYINGANDCIRCUITBREAKERS(86/12B,86B/12Bg52/BTBBJ52/16SSgAND52/17SS12A.BUSRELAYINGANDCIRCUITBREAKERS(86/12A,86B/12Ag52/BTAAt52/14SSg52/18SSAND52/AVP9A)OFFSITEPOWERRECONFZGURATION:

MAINCONTROLBOARDMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDRELOCATION OFSWITCHES, METERS,ANDRELAYSWHICHMONITORANDCONTROLTHE34.5KVAND4160VELECTRICSYSTEMS'M-4525.10 OFFSZTEPOWER'RECONFIGURATION:

SWITCHYARD MODIFICATION 4160VCUBICLEMODIFICATION 480VAND120VBREAKERXNSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHXSNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEMODIFICATION OFTHE34KVBUSANDASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, COMPLETEREMOVALSATTHE12BXFMRCABINET,COMPLETEMODIFICATION OF12AAND12B4160VCUBZCLES, ANDINSTALL480VAND120VBREAKERSFORTHEOFFSXTEPOWERMODIFICATION.

12

SM-4525'2OFFSITEPOWERBACKFEEDVIAUNTAUXILIARY TRANSFORMER THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOSUPPLYPOWERFROMTHE115KVGRIDTHROUGHTHEMAINANDUNITAUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS TOTHESTATIONAUXILIARIES, WHILETHESTATIONAUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS 412AAND412BAREMODIFIEDPEREWR4525.SM-4525.14 OFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION:

4KVAND34KVMCBMETERINGPRE-OPERATIONAL TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOTESTTHEMCB4KVAND34KVMETERING, MODIFIEDUNDEREWR-4525PERSM-4525.9.

'SM-452515OFFSITE0RESORATIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSERVZCE TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION ANDRESTOREOFFSITEPOWERVIASTATIONAUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 12B.SM-4526.2 DG"A"FUELOILSYSTEMELECTRICAL RECONSTRUCTION ANDREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHED/G"A"FUELOILSYSTEMINCLUDING INSTALLATION OFNEWEQUIPMENT ANDREMOVALOFOLDEQUIPMENT.

SM-4526'G"B"ELOILSYSTEMELECTRICAL RECONSTRUCT ONEMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION

'NDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHED/G"B"FUELOZLSYSTEMINCLUDING INSTALLATION OFNEWEQUIPMENT ANDREMOVALOFOLDEQUIPMENT.

SM-4526.8 DUPLEXSTRAINERINSTALTIONELECTRICAL PORTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHEDUPLEXSTRAINERS ZNTHEDIESELGENERATOR FUELOILSYSTEM.SM-4526.17 DIESELGENERATOR FUELOILSYSTEMDISCHARGE LINEPIPESUPPORTSUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTSONTHEDIESELGENERATOR FUELOZLSYSTEMDISCHARGE PIPING.13

SM-4530.1 ACFUSEDANDBREAKERSINTERMEDIATE BUZLDING'S ISCELLANEOUS DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOREPLACETHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDING'MISCELLANEOUS DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER ANDREMOVETHEELECTRICAL FEEDFROMMCC1F(UNIT4MM)TOMCC18(UNIT'D)~SM-4534.1

.REACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTOROILLEVELINDICATION SYSTEMUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHENEWREACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTOROILLEVELINDICATION SYSTEMFORTHEA&BREACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTORS.NOCOMPONENT INSTALLATION REQUIREDONRCPMOTORS.THEROSEMOUNT 710DUINSTRUMENT RACKISCOMMONTOBOTHREACTORCOOLANTPUMPS'M-4538.1 1BDIESELGENERATOR UPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHE1BDIESELGENERATOR UPGRADE.THISMODIFICATION

INCLUDES, REPLACEMENT OFATHROWOVERRELAY,THERMALOVERLOADRELAYS,REMOVALOFA51BURELAY,ANDREWIRINGOFTERMINALBOXESONTHE"A"AND"B"DIESELSKIDS.SM-4538.3 IINSTALLATION ANDTESTING0NEWAUXILIARY RELAY51VXCLAROSTAT 200OHMRESISTORANDSLIZNGLINKTERMINALS

.FORAIRSTARTVALVEASV-1ANDASV-2FORTHElADIESELGENERATOR THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALL'ATION'ESTINGS ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOTHE1ADIESELGENERATOR.

THESEMODIFICATIONS INCLUDEREPLACEMENT OFOVERCURRENT AUXILIARY RELAY51VX,INSTALLATION NEW200OHMRESISTORS SLIDINGLINKSTERMINALS FORAIRSTARTVALVES~ANDINSTALLATION OFANEWMOUNTINGPLATEFORRELAYSATR-A,ATR-B,ANDAFUSEBLOCK.THISPROCEDURE WILLALLOWWORKTOBEACCOMPLISHED INTHEFOLLOWING GENERALAREASOFTHEPLANT:1ADIESELGENERATOR.

SM-4553.1 ECORBINGSUPPOTUGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOSEISMICALLY UPGRADETHEREACTORBOTTOMMOUNTEDINSTRUMENTATION TUBINGSUPPORTBMI-3.14

FEEDPUMPOOMVENTILATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHENEWFEEDPUMPROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMCOMPONENTS'An RCSOTLEGRHRFLOWCOECTIONTHEPURPOSE'OFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHETESTINGASSOCIATED WITHFIELDDATAVERIFICATION OFTHEnAnRCSHOTLEGLOOPLEVELCORRECTION ASARESULTOFRHRFLOW.THISTESTISBEINGPERFORMED INCONJUNCTION WITHPROCEDURE 0-2~3~1.SM-4675.1 PnBnRECIRCULATION PIPINGTE-NSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOINSTALLTHE8INCHCHECKVALVEAND3INCHPIPINGTIE-INSTOTHEBRHRHXDISCHARGE LINE~SM-4675.2 RHRRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION MCBMODIFICATION THEPURPOSE.OFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEMAINCONTROLROOMWORKSCOPEOFEWR-4675,RHRRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION.

SM-4675'SYSTEMCLEANLINESS INSPECTION ANDHYDROSTATIC TESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONS FORPERFORMCLEANLINESS INSPECTIONS ANDAHYDROSTATIC TESTOFTHERHRRECIRCSYSTEMINSTALLED BYEWR-4675.

SM-4675.5 RHRPUMPtAtRECIRCULATION PIPINGTZEZNSANDBALANCEOFPIPINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHERHRARECIRCULATION PIPINGTIEINSgCOMMONTRENCHTIE-INS,ANDTHEREMAINDER OFTHERHRAANDBRECIRCULATION PIPINGANDSUPPORTS'M-4675.6 RHRPUMPttnANnBttRECIRCULATION INSTRUMENTATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFINSTRUMENTATZON ASSOCIATED WITHTHEAANDBRECIRCULATION PIPINGMODIFICATION.

15

SM-4675.7 RHRHXnAnOUTLETPIPESUPPORTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHERHRHXnAnOUTLETPIPESUPPORT.PPSUC0YDROSTATCTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEHYDROSTATIC TESTOFTHEINSTALLATION OFTHETI-680AND681THERMOWELLS

~SM-4675.9 RHRSYSTEMSHUTDOWNCOOLINGFULLFLOW'ESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHETESTINGOFTHERHRSYSTEMFULLFLOWTESTDURINGTHESHUTDOWNCOOLINGTEST.SM-4755.1 ISTTESTCONNECTIONS FORMOV-1813A B-nAnANDnBnRCDTPUMPSUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTODIRECT/DOCUMENT MODIFICATION RELOCATION OFVALVESV-1813C/E.

SM-4756.1 INSTALLATION OFMCBEXHAUSTFANSHROUDTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHESHROUDFORTHEMCBEXHAUSTFAN.SM-.4759.2 HIGHSTZGHTINGTOWERBASEPLATE GROUTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFHIGHMASTSECURITYLIGHTINGBASEPLATE GROUTINGANDJAMNUTSFORTHEEIGHTHIGHMASTLIGHTINGTOWERS'M-4764.1 FIRESERVICEWATERSYSTEMMODIFICATIONS RELOCATIONS ANDSPRINKLER SUPPLYTOSUPPORTTHECONTAMINATION STORAGEBUILDINGINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHERELOCATION INSTALLATION TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFFIRESERVICEHYDRANTSGATEVALVESANDSPRINKLER SUPPLYTOTHECONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDING.

16

SM-4764.3 CONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDING-DOORS29ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION TESTINGANDFLOODBARRIERTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWSECURITYDOORS-29ANDTHETESTXNGOFTHEFLOODBARRIERASSOCIATED WITHDOORS-29.SM-4764.4 ELECTRICAL POWERDISTRIBUTION ANDGROUNDGRIDINSTALLATION-CONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL POWERDISTRIBUTION ANDGROUNDING PORTIONOFTHECONTAMINATED STORAGEFACILITYMODIFICATION.

SM-4764.6 FIREPOTECTIONELECTRICAL XNSTALLATION ANDFUNCIONLTESTINGWITHINTHECONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLANDDOCUMENTTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHELOCALPREACTION FIREPROTECTION SYSTEMINTHECONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDING.

SM-4785.1 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER ELAYINBUS14UNDERVOLTAGE CABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYINTHEBUS14UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET.INSTALLATION ANDTESTIGOFNEWTOWOVERRELAYINBUS16UNDERVOLTAGE CABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYZNTHEBUS16UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET.1'M-4785.3 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYINBUS17UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROLCABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYINTHEBUS17UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROLCABINET.17 fI.I' Rl=.*INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYINBUS18UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROLCABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYINTHEBUS18UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROLCABINET.SM-4785.5 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR 1THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR 1A.SM-4785.6 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR 1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION~

TESTING~ANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR 1B.ESELFIREPPBATTERCHARGESUPPORTSTRUCTURES NSTALLATONMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEDIESELFIREPUMPBATTERYCHARGERSUPPORTSTRUCTURES.,

TDAFWPCHECKVALVEREPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREPLACEMENT, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPDISCHARGE CHECKVALVESV-4003ANDV-4004.SM-4933.1 T-478PT-479DPT-483SG"B"TUBINGREROUTEANDUGDETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION~

TESTING~ANDTURNOVEROFUPGRADEDSTEAMGENERATOR PT478/479/483 INSTRUMENTATZON TUBING'UPPORTS'ND BARRIERSZNTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDING(STEAMHEADERLEVEL)~SM-4937.1 REPLACEMENT OFHEATTRACECIRCUTS12&34THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATING HEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITS12AND34.18 k'

SM-4937.2 REPLACEMENT OFHEATTRACECIRCUIT29THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEZNSTALLATIONg TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATING HEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITS.29(BORICACIDBLENDERPIPING)gWHICHINCLUDESVALVESFCV110CgV364~FCV110B,ANDV365A..19

SECTIONC-COMPLETED TECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATIONS (TSEEs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofchangestothefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreportperformed astechnical evaluations.

Thesearetypically smallchangesthatdonotrequirethefullcontrolsofamodification.

Technical StaffEngineering Evaluations arereviewedbythePlantOperations ReviewCommittee toensurethatnounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesareinvolved.

Thebasisforinclusion ofaTSEEinthissectionispresentation tothePORC,closureoftheassociated TSR,andsubmittal totheDocumentControlDepartment.

Withinthetimeframeofthisreporttherewerenone.

SECTIOND-TEMPORARY BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION, STRUCTURE

FEATURES, SHIELDING, ANDFLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESThissectioncontainsdescriptions andsummaries ofsafetyevaluations oftemporary changespursuanttotherequirements ofloCFR50.'59(b).

CATEGORYREVIEWEDfAEVREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.t402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONPURPOSELIFTEDWIRElDDATeREQUEST¹:

-dAFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0LOCATION'AFETY EVALUATION REQUIRED:

PfYESPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)

TECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VVERIFIEPBY:E.REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

'E~NO~tOSKETCHAlTACHED.'(4ES PANO.~/9-l7DATe~~>>>REMOVALDATE8TIMeENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:iT~".1,lTAI,q'I"t'F~iiCECLIIJ'~

QAAttachadditional page(s)asnecessary ABlA2AyvETSS

10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation forliftingwireforThermocouple D07Theindications forTCD07areinconsistent withtheresponseofotherrelatedcoreparameters (i.e.incorefluxmap&nearbythermocouple indications).

Thermocouples areusedtosensecoreoutlettemperature, determine relativefuelassemblypowerandcompensate RVLIS.SinceTCD07isnotconsistent witheither,incoreorotherthermocouples jthasbeendeclaredinoperable.

Xthasbeendeletedfromprocessing inPPCS.Toremoveitfromtheaveraging circuitatthethermocouple panelrequiresliftingitslead.ThepanelwillthensenseanopenTCandremoveitfromaveraging.

WithTCD07.inoperable theminimumrequirement perTech.Specs.of4thermocouples perquadrantismet.TCD07is,notusedtocompensate RVLZS.Thefunctions ofthethermocouple systemasdesciibed inthe'fSARarefulfilled.

Therefore, neithertheprobability northeconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction evaluated intheUFSARisincreased.

Thepossibility ofanewaccidentormalfunction isnotcreated.ThemarginofsafetydefinedinTech.Specs.isnotreduced.

References:

Tech.Specs.3.5.3,UFSARSection7.7.4ffreyP.Wand11/30/89PORCApproval:

2

CATEGORY33.5REVIEWED'EFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402C'i~ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANOJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTION~t.'8DATEREQUEST¹:ill@A.LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0~DOTHER0&auNA4CurrErOOM L-ICC6'rKc-MME'ui dm>/WELOCATION-IV~)trI~88~~M~uWW~jrd~ryc-PURPOSE+~~AOg&PCggPQ~i"SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

0YES5NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALIATION DATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:SKETCHATTACHED:

0YESll/NODATE2-DATEREMOVALDATE8TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

I""tI"-)Ca7&lh/irllJi"I+TOEIt/IT'2ior.i~F.~0I2.8~ui=Mu~.Midi~8Ac.cevroN 0forj-QTKI'3'4T%Erut.r7d~d ddt.>Z4ddfarttiilIiZ.Wi/.i=~4IHlsPir2-ilies4vRvsor-rI'guul?)~

.~Q22'1iJui~~-grL."PWnJrvr.c.iLI+gir,irPilE

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CATEGORYA.ENCEPROCEDURE REVIEWEDJOBFOREMAN'~

~<<>~'+OLTEJUMPERWIRE0UFTEDWIRE0FUSESLLED0FUNCTIONOTHERPfSTATESBLOCK0g~,~cROCHESTER GASANDELECTRIQQ 4fg9PGINNASTATION(1FBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONAND98QPE$4CCNTROLQADISPOSITION.

SYRS.REQUESTS:

PURPOSEuIl.5~~LOCATIOSAFETYEVAIUATIONREQUIRED:

5YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

/-4'ECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:

INSTALLATION DATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSALLED:INSTALLED BYVERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(AS NECESSARY)

AHv~cl~C~oIo4v>d,~Xikru~4ICC/'SKETCHATTACHED:

0YESj4NOREMOVALDATE4TIMEcAENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY'hltrFv<</CmrotlAg<Cl~~gbl~~WC'C+LCmVic~A(+Evh-i4.+~m,/IIos'.45u)l~4~5~(~iCE'~A~>>'//vsi'//4~uZl~e+l'>>~II>N~K%<8il/>i<4~*r~~,V+Im~OO5/~itsm~v~~h~i~b,u~~.7~~~~v~I,J.PehMAttachaddItionat~ge(s) ysnecessaI)F

~i~Z~~~,~.8pi=5rtaC~(I~~w~~+Ao>42Aev2/66

CATEGORYREVIEWEDI.REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONtj('tFrBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN+NFLJOA36$JUMPERWIRE/LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONtJIRG"uQFi2oHDATEIX5-9'0REQUESTS:

~A'USESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERI(MRIQ2'ncDFINIAI Pau:ee~>leTEIJnea TN'.SFprII,~/0OcuTRoc.JkxozWOFg-3.)tJ6Cp8.'tr&V<0h)IAh3g.+Oh)rTtrpLOCATIO'Ito8scM&rReTGMTro&

7rE.VAP8c,SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

EfYESClNOSKETCHATTACHED:

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REMOVALDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 191eEBee.2/88

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CATEGORYREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'JUMPERWIRE0 FUNCTION'rTPURPOSE~4eDATE:B-2)-9OLIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0DSO~erXDREQUEST¹O-0STATESBLOCK0OTHERg76zASakrENUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:NTALLED:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

LOCATIOtII:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

IEIYES'NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATEaTIME3~~<ENTEREDINOFFICIAL~LOG' REMOVALDATE8TIME.333DATEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:SKETCHATTACHED:

~ES0NOP'cy'+A05POSlTlQN

-5YRS.Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary AE.IAEAev2/88

BypassofSafet}tunctionan4Purr!pe~~~

f<<rTempera!}'-Cold Recaz4er' incetheT-C'c!dwi!ornnorrr<ordcrforT1-450CTI451hasbeeniinrn1lab!e,itisdesirab!itoprovideaT-Coldrecorderforplnntshutdown.

Thiswi!1hen,":>>mpiishedbyinstalling a250Q.precision resistorinsrrirs>>iththr<<ontrolboard:indicator forT-Co!d!409044::~P'.Afni!ureoftheririw!y:ristn!!

rJtrmporary'ecorder crthetrmpnrarywirrrirwi!1rioteftrittheT-ColdsignalC'romT-409BorT-4108becausethetemporary wiririrrisinstalled dovnstream ofaO'Iisolation nmp!ifier (TY-4098-1 LTY-410B-l).'herefore, theinsta!lation ofthisrecorderwillnotincreasetheprobability ortheconsequence ofanace~dentpreviously evaluated

'iaChapter15oftheUFsAR.sinceafailureofthenevtemporary'ecorder oritswiringwillnoteffectexistingplantinstrumentation usedforsafetysystemcontrols, theprobability ofcreatinganaccidentnotpreviously evaluated inChapter15oftheUFShRvillnotbeincreased.

Sinceafailureofthisrecorderwillnotadversely effectRVLISinputfromT-Cold4098and410B,themarginofsafetyaedefinedinthebasisofan}'echnical Specification willnotbereduced.II7MavenT.hdams3/22/90 J

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASS.OFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONic.17WOa~IC~rP2-io8-)>enT-CccvoPURPOSE~i'dT~C~~9*::FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERl8IiE17di~Sc:drrL:LOCATION:

ISAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

~ES0NOPORCDATE(IF,REQUIRED)'

Z-P>TECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:

INSTALLATION DATE8TIME/ENTEREDINOFFICIALL~OG;NUMBEROFTAGSITAINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

REINOVALDATE5TIME:DATEDATEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:SKETCHATTACHED:

YES0NOJUIII4iV~gf+Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 4911$Rtv2/86

~~PYVissof.Snlet}lunctionandJumpers'OD~~

forTempcrar}

T-ColdRecorderSincethe1'-(nldwidernno~>n<.orderforTl-4~0CTI-451hasbeenunreliable, tttsdesirnhlr toprovidenT-Coldrecorderforplantshutdown.Thiswi1ll~~nccomp1ishe'.!kyinsta11inga250+,precision resistorinscr:n.:-.tththr.~~t:c1boardindicator forTCold!40'IBC4lt>P'I.failute0!thenewlyinstn1ledteml'<~mr yrecordercr'thetompornry iiringvi11noteflectthe".-~o'.')

signnlfromT-4098orT-410Bbecausethetemporaty wiring:sinstnlleddownstream ofaV/Iisolationnmplifier(TY-409B-1 LTY-4108-1)

.Therefore,.'.the installation ofthisrecorderwillnotincreasetheprobability, ortheconsequence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated inChapter"15oitheUFshR.Sinceafailureofthenevtemporary recorderoritswiringvillnoteffectexistingplantinstrumentation usedforsafetysystemcontrols, theprobability ofcreatinganaccidentnotpreviously evaluated inChapter15oftheVFSARvill.notbeincreased.

1Sinceafnilureotthisrecordervillnotadversely effectRVLISinputfromT-Cold409Band410B,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification willnotbereduced'.

@evenT!Adaas3/22/90

CATEGORVREVIEWEDt(I'dgjjIIg~+KAREN/El~CEDURE aUC:5890A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRIC(-ENI"~ij-'I:.;-,:,5:

GINNASTATIONBYPAS)Pf+F+gFUNCTIONANDJUMPEROI~~OL""~",:"(JOBFOREMAN'ATE:

REQUESTgf0l4'UMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE/FUSESPULLED0ISTATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATION:

rref/WDSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

PfYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

TECHNICAL MANAGER:nSHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATE&TIME55/(ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY}

REMOVALDATE&TIME~DATE:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:l~/&@i4'C~3'SO/PI>'7ZgSrVYrC3SKETCHATTACHED:

~YES0NOp(sy-@+@<M4/dikikA'ncchnq5'y

>.0$t)2loS'QaliamPsgi/AIMr~PrAttachadditional page(s}asnecessary a9i42Rtv.2/8S

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLIJOBFOREMAN'ATE REQUESTS.

0-2/FUSESPULLED04vJUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTION/8,rM~Mck78r'wtrvlp/

/aZSTATESBLOCK/iVa/7'~e4no'rfryOTHER+PURPOSEIuvol4u.wD~..~Q2i5r~a'oLOCATIONVr2rearOCSAFETYEVALUAT(ON REQUIRED:

MES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'

7-OTECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATEIITTIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:&luWh<VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

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/HAYES0NOCETR'IrU~L.Q.CtrlDISPOSITION

~5YRS.Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 46142RGY2IM

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'ATE'

• '~JUMPERWIRECI LIFTEDWIREQ FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0FUNCTION8PS~S'oS40arA>H/7dN/4~IS&4~/8'4~MA'P'k,PURPOSEEN7PkSpent.iAdA'PSJTITPLFrIDW57'f6)LOCATION:

Df40EMWowi7'AFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED8YES0NOPORCDATE(IF'REQUIRED)

-2>"HJTECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALlATION DATESTIME2O-ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:IUGhTr~YSKETCHATTACHED:

0YESSNODATEDATEREMOVALDATEaTIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY) c/W~IIt)e-zo-IS~JSSPCBA'l(J0;ZAttachadditianal page(s)asnecessary AS.iiERsvE/66

CATEGORYBYPCgy~NCEPROCEDURE A-tROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICI80GINNASTATIONRgr~...ASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANO~PZItOC}NTROL alV.,py~JOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIREDATEFUSESPULLED0C'TATESBLOCK0OTHER0REQUESTgC-8PURPOSELOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)

M-2o-TECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISO INSTALLATION o-42ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOGŽ~NUMBEROFTAGSINSINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY) o,~Icar.SKETCHAYIACHED:0YESII(INODATEDATEREMOVALDATEaTiME:

<>-O3ENTEREDINOFRCIAL~OG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VVERIFIEDBY:IVL(LL-orsorlr(c.

rC/4jI4iWuE.4CIIuV@rp(Attachadditional pags)asnecessary AE.(424',2/66

jgSGPytr4I/Ij{ENCE PROCEDURE A.t+ROCHESTER GASANDELEC~.630GINNASTATION~tBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANIIIF@P@KA'OGNTROL

~4REauEST>>:

>0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0DIC-=-zABC(IJOBFOREMAN'ATE I20JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0FUNCTIONIIIYIE.'A'.

~ELE("Z.'w~U"I'IiCEGCCPURPOSEPain'g=W'~Ig.lIIIAIAL~57~~~5er8-3hS3LOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

8YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED) 0-Z5'"$'nTECHNICAL MANAGER~SHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATE8TIME/aENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGTALLED:SKETCHATTACHED:

YESDATEREMOVALDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;(NUMBEROFTREMOINSTQLLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

Dcr7OREMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:E'4zCpronfnAVA',.~r8,.~r~iiz~~lsWr~f?08niAttachadditional page(s)asnecessary 49142ITev.2/88

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICIII,/GINNASTATIONSTPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUIHPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUNCTION8ERABIES4oIDATE:+/P'-$0REQUESTS0FUSESpULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0A4AMMEiffel~PURPOSEA)LIISrl~cCLOCATIOorIo<4ouWo~rTorSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

8YES0NOpORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'sr-4~acvsiTECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR.

INSTALLATION DATEaTIME~itr'NTERED INOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

SKETCHATIACHED:0YESIINO48wnx'lDATE>,-P'C<gREMOVALDATEKTIME:

t>-tX-Gca50ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;rNUMBEROFTAGSREMOVEDREMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:~v<.>>.;EI+I~'~~".'>~rL

<,.'C;.S Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 42142$4v.2/65

CATEGORYREVIEWED8'c'j/3.3.5UsiaNCEPROCEDURE 44AtROCHESTER GASANDELECTRIC+90GINNASTATIONEA(.g~rBYPAssoFsAFETYFUNCTloNANbgJQI+E It5%ITRQLJag~~JOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONDATEhatt)LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0C'.REQUESTS:

STATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

~>4'KETCHATTACHED:

0YES8NOTECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISO

.'?,i>(t6-C~k~DATEDATEINSTALLATION DATERTIMEgD52ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSLEINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

PhlF4rREMOVALDATE6TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIAL~QG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:lIC/VECLCdfsonhc.rC'~r~Icvd4CIIuVAttachadditional pags)asnecessary

-v-$)401~2Rev2/66

CATEGORY3.3.5REVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'P 4(JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONC/orJ>>:ri~.>>.rd.DATE:REQUEST>>~3~FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER%iC~ngcn'~T6vR~4.~l~~~/4q.d FURFOSEn~rnAOC-jofErhh>>,.n; fr~reLOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

PORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

TECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:

CAr,n.dIrvl@YES0NO6-=~oSKETCHATTACHED:

0YESIINODATE:C~.~h.9hINSTALLATION DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINTAD'NSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

REMOVALDATE&TIME:hENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGMOVE.REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:/'fs>Rlf~f~p,,~tA,rfPttJtyya+A>i',.'u~~>>OISPOStV~~>>PgAttachadditional page(s)asnecessary 49l~PA>>>>PTAS

BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLANNUNCIATOR C-10Annunciator C-10isdescribed intheUFSARasamethodofproviding indication oflowSWflowtothecontrolroomduringanaccident.

Awiringanomalyiscausingspuriousalarms.Withoutthisalarm,theoperatorwillnotknowifadequateSWflowexistsduringanaccident.

Bypullingthealarmcard,thecardwillbeprevented fromalarmingspuriously butindication ofSWflowwillbelost.Toensuresufficient SWflow,ifanSIsignalisreceived, operations personnel willverifylocallythatgreaterthan900gpmisavailable toeachfancooler.Thisrequirement willbepostedontheMCBandoncomingoperators willbeinformedduringturnover.

Duringnormaloperations, theflowis1000gpm.WhenanSIsignalisreceived, flowwouldgoupsosufficient flowshouldbeavailable.

Byverifying greaterthan900gpm,theassumptions oftheUFSARremainvalidandnounreviewed safetyquestionexists.Post,maintenance testingwillincludesufficient testingtoensurethealarmwilloperatewhenactuallowflowissensed.Ref.UFSAR6.2.1.1.1 a/8/ro

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCE PROCEDURE jA-1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'ATE: PoREQUESTS:

JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREBFUNCTIONi~7pJAT'uPURPOSEISCWFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0V-eaiu~c8coc.wg~AC-3LOCATION'AFETY EYALUATIQN REQUIRED; IrYEBpNpPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED) 4-lg-gTECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:

SKETCHATTACHED:

0YESNODATE+/~0DATE.g-I9-9OINSTALLATION DATE&TIME4I0ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:.VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

REMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary

~9\itRev.tlBB 0

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERERCEPRCCEDUREgq A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE/(FUSESPULLED0e~PreSTATESBLOCK0C.DATE7i~~REQUEST4:OTHER0PURPOSENcII70/~o+/~~/~r7g+~fkgzLOCATION'~

'~ZR~L~I-II~3,ZSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

gYES0NOSKETCHATIACHED:0YESPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'

7POTECHNICAL MANAGER@NOSHIFTSUPERVISO INSTALLATION DATESTIME-0ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSITALLED:INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

REMOVALDATE8TIME:DATE:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBYAttachadditional page(s)asnecessary I9lEtREF,g/8S

10CFR50.59 SAFETYEVALUATION forBypassofSafetyFunctionforThermocouple C-3Thecircuitforthermocouple C-3isinoperable.

Toensureerroneous readingsarenotgenerated, theleadsfromthisthermo-coupletothethermocouple panelwillbelifted.Thiswillpreventerroneous

,thermocouple readingsfrombeingincludedintheaveraging cal'culations inthethermocouple panel.Thefourthermocouples perquadrantrequiredbyTechSpecswillbemain-tainedandthermocouple C-3isnotusedbyRVLIS.'Basedonthisevaluation, theprobability andconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction notpreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotcreated.And,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofTechSpecswillnotbereduced.Therefore, thisbypassofsafetyfunctiondoesnotcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.

References:

UFSARSection4.4.5.4&Table7.7-3TechSpecsSection3.5.3&Table3.5-3Preparedby:Date:7-TC.SA

August1,1989SAFETYEVALUATION FORTEMPORARY STRUCTURE FEATUREAUTHORIZATION FORM89-180Thistemporary structure willbeplacedunderthereference legpipingtosupportthecondensate potandassociated tubing.Thereference legpipingwillbeliftedbyhandwhilemeasuring andrecording themaximumlift'orce.

Theliftwillgotcreateanysubstantial deflection oftherootvalveandwilltherefore notcreateanunexceptable stressontheweldsinthereference leg.Thereference legwillnotbeliftedpastthecondensates pot'soriginal'esignelevation.

Therefore, thistemporary structure willnotendangertheintegrity ofthereference legpiping.Thistemporary structure willberemoved'rior toleavingthehotshutdowncondition.

Thistemporary structure willnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentortheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Thistemporary structure willnoteffectthepressuretransmitter PT-429andtherefore willnoteffecttheresponseofsafetyinjection toanaccident.

Thisstructure willnoteffecttheintegrity ofthereference legandwillonlybeusedtosupportthestaticloadofthepipingwillremainintact.Thistemporary structure willnotcreateanaccidentofadifferent typethenthosespecified intheUFSAR.TheSafetyInjection Systemwillreactasdesignedtoanyaccidentaddressed intheUFSAR.Thistemporary structure willnotreduce'he marginofsafetyasdefinedinanytechnical specification basis.Thisstructure doesnotrenderanyplantsysteminoperable, norwillitdegradeanyoperating system.

8/11/89SCREENHOUSE NORTHOFMCC-1GPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-183Scaffolding isneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareanorthofMCC-1Gnotcoveredbypreviously approvedscaffolds 89-167and89-168.Becauseoftheproximity oftheserviceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsandMCC-1Gthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccept.theinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; based.onthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthis'proposed installation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedto'irefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

8/11/89SCREENHOUSE SOUTHWALLOVERDIESELFIREPUMPPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-184Scaffolding isneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareaovertheDieselFirePumpbetweentheareascoveredbypreviously approvedscaffolds 89-170and89-171.Becauseoftheproximity oftheserviceWaterPumpsandFireServiceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thedesignbasiseventsanalyzedinthe'SafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

.Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

September 6,1989AMAINSTEAMARV-3411REPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-190RepairworkonARV-3411willnecessitate aworkplatform, constructed ofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.ThesmalltubingfortheARVairoperatorwillbedisconnected duringthevalverepairpreparations.

Assuchtheplatformwillhavenopotential effectontheARVs,andthestructures willberestricted frommovementinthedirection ofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.

TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelatively lightscaffoldmaterials; however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporated astheisolation valve3507bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistence isprojected tobe2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincon)unction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbe;monitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.

f Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions.

intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,it,willbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

September 7,1989LAUNDRYEXHAUSTFANVIBRATION/EXPANSION RINGREPLACEMENT WORKPLATFORM89-191RepairisrequiredonductworkattheLaundryExhaustFan,locatedinthevicinityoftheAFeedwater Line.TheentriesfromtheMotorandTurbineAuxiliary Feedwater Pumpdischarges arenearby,andthereisahighdensityofsnubbersforthispipinginarea(5mechanical and1hydraulic).

Atemperature sensor(TE-2096) islocatedatthetopofthefeedwater linedownstream ofcheckvalve3003.Becauseoftheexistence oftheabovefeatureswithinthevicinityoftheproposedscaffold, scaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable

.asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythat.anorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseen inthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation in'hesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofNormalFeedwater LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliaries SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausethere,willbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated, intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

September 12,1989SIRECIRCFLOWORIFICEFE-916LEAKREPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-192Aworkplatformisrequiredtocorrectaleakcondition atSIrecircfloworificeFE-916,locatedbetweentheRefueling WaterTankand480vBus16.AlsowithinthevicinityareTemperature Indicator TI-917,andSIrecircMOVs897and898.TheMOVsarewithintheASMESeismicClass2boundaryasindicated onP&ID33013-1261 Containment Spray(SI).Theplatformistobeabout4ft.high,estimated tobeinexistence 2days.Becauseoffactorsgivenabovethescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

AUXILIARY

BUILDING, TOPSOUTHWALLWESTFROMCOLUMNLINE8aPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-1949/26/89AscaffoldisplannedforpaintingthesouthwallattheAuxiliary Buildingtoplevel,toextendfromtheDeconPittotheMonitorTanks.Becauseofthelargeareatobecovered,including theareaimmediately adjacenttobothComponent CoolingHeatExchangers, andtherelatively lengthyprojected durationofthescaffoldexistence, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering

'(M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable

-asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheZobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Inaddition, partoftheorientation shallstresstheimportance oftakingcarenottobumpanylivesmokedetectors.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer.

--Inaddition, theJobSupervisor shallnotifytheFireProtection groupduringinstallation toallowforconsultation onanypotential interferences withfiredetection/sprinkler provisions encountered.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbe,documented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationto,theguidelines shallbeconfirmedanddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction'nd teardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment'and tubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed soasnottointerfere withAuxiliary BuildingCraneuseduringfueltransfermechanism workplanned.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory RuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

S 1/16/90SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTSSWU-625,'WU 626'WU623'"ANDSWU624SCREENHOUSE BASEMENTWORKPLATFORMS 89-202InordertoperformthepipesupportupgradeworkneartheceilingfortheServiceWaterPumpdischarges, workplatforms areneeded,tobeconstructed ofwood,about3ft.abovethefloor.Theindividual pumpdischarges are14in.pipe,andtheheadersare20in.pipe,sufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagebytherelatively shortwoodenplatforms.

Nosafetyrelatedinstrumentation willbeaffectedbythisplatforminstallation.

Basedonthefactorsdescribed abovethedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstal,lation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Materialofconstruction willbelightenoughsothatitwillhavenoeffectonanycomponent intheeventofaseismicevent.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withtheproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEventTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTeqhnical Specifications becausethelightness oftheinstallation inrelationtothesturdiness ofthepipewillensurethattherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specifications bases.Theinstallation willnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipment intheeventofaseismicevent.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseofthesturdiness oftheadjacentpiping.Theinstallation ofthistemporary modification willnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becauseitdoesnotaffectanyTechnical Specification.

y 1/16/90SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTSSWU-636ANDSWU-638WORKPLATFORMS 89-203InordertoperformthepipesupportupgradeworkneartheceilingfortheServiceWaterPumpdischarge portioninthenortheast corneroftheroom,aworkplatformconstructed ofwoodwillbeneeded,about3ft.abovethefloor.Theindividual pumpdischarges are14in.pipe,andtheheadersare20in.pipe,sufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagebytherelatively shortwoodenplatforms.

Nosafetyrelatedinstrumentation willbeaffectedbythisplatforminstallation.

Basedonthefactorsdescribed abovethedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Materialofconstruction willbelightenoughsothatitwillhavenoeffectonanycomponent intheeventofaseismicevent.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withtheproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

ISeismicEventTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becausethelightness oftheinstallation inrelationtothesturdiness ofthepipewillensurethattherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specifications bases.Theinstallation willnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipment intheeventofaseismicevent.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseofthesturdiness oftheadjacentpiping.Theinstallation ofthistemporary modificationwillnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification because.itdoesnotaffectanyTechnical Specification.

1/17/90SCREENHOUSE PLANTBETTERMENT PAINTINGSCAFFOLDABOVETHEHOUSEHEATINGBOILER90-01Scaffolding isrequiredintheScreenhouse forcleaningandpaintingunderthePlantBetterment Project.Thispermit(90-01)isforaseismicscaffoldaboveandaroundthehouseheatingboiler.(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedservicewaterpumpslAand1B.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withthe.attached SeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towire'llplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedStationEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation shallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing.andmaintenance accesstotheScreenhouse allvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnot.resultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION INAUXILIARY BUILDINGSUB-BASEMENT FORMIDLOOPINSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-14Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout8feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontal polesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchorage pointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.

BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediate vicinityofthescaffold, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismic.Scaffold Guidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment),

incorporating thefeaturesdescribed above.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherecpxirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmationofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.

90-14Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, fireprotection systems,and'otating equipment inthearea.Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsyst'emsdiscussed inthe.basesofTechnical Specifications.

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION ZNAUXILIARY BUILDINGBASEMENTATWESTSTAIRFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATZON EWR-4892SCAFFOLDS 90-15InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheAuxiliary BuildingbasementascaffoldisneededneartheceilingabovetheSpentFuelPoolPumps.TheSFPcoolingsystemisnon-seismic safetyrelated(1)however,'eismicCategoryIitemsarewithintheimmediate

vicinity, givenbelow.AandBResidualHeatRemovalPumpCoolingUnits(2)AResidualHeatRemovalPumpDischarge Temperature TT-630(3)Otherinstruments intheareaforwhichcareshouldbetakentoavoiddisturbing areasfollows:Component CoolingReturnfromResidualHeatRemovalPumpsflowFI-651anditsassociated tubing.(4)AResidualHeatremovalPumpdischarge pressurePZC-629andPI-629Aandtheirassociated tubing.(3)Becauseoftheabovefactorsthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment to-thefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineer, shallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

90-15Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheAuxiliary Buildingsub-basement, allvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

90-15Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

NOTES:QualityAssurance ManualAppendixAQualityandSafetyRelatedListingandDiagramsSection2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingoutlinedinRG&EDrawing33013-1248 (portionattached).

2)UFSARSection9.4.9.1Engineered SafetyFeaturesEquipment Ventilation andCooling.3)UFSARFigure5.4-7ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(portionattached).

4)UFSARFigure9.2-4Sheet,1Component CoolingWaterSystem(portionattached).

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION INAUXILIARY BUILDINGINTERMEDIATE LEVELATWESTSTAIRFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-16InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheAuxiliary BuildingIntermediate Levelascaffoldisneededneartheceilingfromthestairwell northtoadjacenttotheContainment wall,overthewestendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.

StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater SystemContainment isolation MOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespacebetweentheheatexchanger andcontainment isverycongested withpiping,pipesupportstructures, regulators, valves,instruments, andleadshielding foraprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpipingfromtheheatexchanger.

Amajorportionoftheequipment hereisassociated withthewastegassystemsupporting theReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizer ReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.

ImmersedwithinthisspaceisoneoftheContainment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.Becauseofthelocationoftheabovediscussed SAFWContainment isolation MOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed asseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

90-16Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priorto,theplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andad)oining roomsinthearea.LockedareaaccesstotheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultiscontrolled byalockedgate.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnotallowanyeasieraccesstothisarea.Theaboveconstruction recpxirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasSteamGenerator TubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference, withaccessprovidedto.firefightingprovisions.

'I0 90-16Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION INCONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGROOMFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-17Inordertoinstallconduitandcableforthispro)ectintheControlRoomAirHandlingRoomascaffoldisneeded.Theequipment intheimmediate areais,forthemostpart,dedicated tocontinuing habitability fortheMainControlRoominthepost-accidentenvironment.

Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismic'caffold Guidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shall,beattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifit,isforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately prior,totheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained for.operations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

S.'t 90-17Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Decreasein.ReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnot,increasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunqtion ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications..

February13,1990PENETRATION SEALINSPECTION OVERCONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGUNITSCAFFOLD90-23Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsabovetheControlRoomAirHandlingUnit,ascaffoldisneeded.Theequipment intheimmediate areais,forthemostpart,dedicated tocontinuing habitability fortheMainControlRoominthepost-accident environment.

Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemanneras,described above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-23Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

tl February15,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION UNDERINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGNORTHCATWALKEWR-4530SCAFFOLD90-24Inordertoinstallconduitandcableunderthecatwalkaworkplatformneeded.Itwillbelocatedintheimmediate vicinityofcontainment penetrations forheatingsteamandtheILRTventtoroof.ItwillbedirectlyabovetheContainment CoolerUnitflowindicators whichareSeismicCategoryIinstruments.

Totheimmediate northareControlRodDrivePowerCabinets.

Becauseofthecloseinvolvement withtheSeismicCategoryIitemsthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecomplete.andseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Znthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse-,theseismiccapability.

ofthescaffoldinirelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented prior..toscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural

,Engineer shalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.

90-24Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpingcontainment isolation valves,theinstruments andcabinetsdescribed aboveandanyothersensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance

'shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofireSightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheS'afetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

7

90-24Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February16,1990ABATTERYROOMEASTWALLPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-26Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsontheABatteryRoomwalladjacenttotheABattery,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 9ft.fromthefloor.Itistobeofwoodenconstruction toeliminate thepotential forshortcircuiting thebattery.Itshallbeconstructed inaccordance withthe.attachedsketchsothatitwillbeidentical tothestructure providedasRequest86-56,whichwasdetermined tobeseismically acceptable (seeattached10/7/86S.K.Fergusonmemo).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheconstruction requirements givenbelow.Pre-planning andprefabrication forthescaffoldshallbedonesuchastoallowcompletion ofthestructure, apart.fromthedecking,inonedayofworkwithintheBatteryRoom.Asalternatives tothisthefollowing maybeobserved:

Theportioncompleted shallbeadequately restrained tomakeitseismicwithbracingandinterlocking andcontactwithadjacentstructural features.

Inlieuoftheabove,theBMainBatterySystemshallbemaintained

operable, withnonon-seismic temporary structures intheBBatteryRoom.Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbyaqualified individual.

Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttoorabovethebatteries duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Sufficient clearances aretobeprovidedforElectrician accesstothebattery.Priortouse,thestructure shallbeinspected bytheJobSupervisor toconfirmthatitsconstruction was.inaccordance withthesketch.Uponsuccessful confirmation theJobSupervisor shalldocumentthisconfirmation fortheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form,andsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

!

90-26Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveit,willnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusIAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhav'enointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

2/26/90ABATTERYROOMNORTHWEST CORNERPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR4941SCAFFOLD90-27Aworkplatformisneededtoinspect.penetration sealsinthenorthwest corneroftheABatteryRoomadjacenttotheABatteryCharger,tobeabout61/2ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistence ofthisscaffoldisestimated tobeamonth.Inconsideration ofanypossibility forinoperability ofDCelectricsystemequipment intheBBatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheABatterybankiscompleted; assuch,thatscaffold(90-26)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuiting thebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.

Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.

TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmationofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttothebatteries andother.DCelectricequipment duringconstruction, use,.andteardown'ofthescaffold.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation andpanelsinthearea.

90-27Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,.thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withany'xisting equipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

2/26/90ABATTERYROOMNORTHEAST CORNERPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR4941SCAFFOLD90-28Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetration sealsinthenortheast corneroftheABatteryRoomadjacenttotheABatteryDisconnect Switchestobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistence ofthisscaffoldisestimated tobeamonth.Inconsideration ofanypossibility forinoperability ofDCelectricsystemequipment intheBBatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheABatterybankiscompleted; assuch,thatscaffold(90-26)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuiting thebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.

Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.

TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifit.isforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttothebatteries andotherDCelectricequipment duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation andpanelsinthearea.'I

90-28Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposed.

installation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

V

03/08/90STANDBYSFPCOOLINGCOMPONENT MOUNTING90-40Ithasbeendecidedtoprovidemountings for,andtoinstallthestandbySFPPumpintheAuxiliary Buildingbasement, immedia-telyeastoftheRHRPumpCoolerUnits,bythecontainment wall,andtodolikewisewiththestandbySFPHeatExchanger onthetopfloorimmediately westoftheAComponent CoolingPump.Themountings aretobeofseismicdesignasprovidedforTemporary FluidSystemProvision Form88-27forEWR1594Banddiscussed inJ.JFerraro's April5,1989memoonreviewofthepumpmounting.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultina.changetotheassump-tionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featureitwillnot.haveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnot.involveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystems.inthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwill

90-40havenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

March8,1990TUBINGINSTALLATION INAUXILIARY BUILDINGSUB-BASEMENT FORMIDLOOPINSTRUMENTATION ENR-4892SCAFFOLD90-41Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout5feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontal polesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchorage pointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.

Assuchitmaybeintegrated withscaffold90-14'BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediate vicinityofthescaffold, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment),

incorporating thefeaturesdescribed above.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheXiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Znthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Zfitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.

90-41Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, fireprotection systems,androtatingequipment inthearea.Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantinventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

S0 03/29/90RHRPUMPSUCTIONMOV'S704A&BSCAFFOLDS 90-80Inordertoperformmaintenance onMOV's704AandBascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformabout10ft.fromthefloor.Themaintenance istobeperformed withallfuelremovedfromReactor.Thescaffoldinstallation istotakeplacepriortothistomaximizethetimeavailable forvalvemaintenance.

Becauseoftheneedforoperability oftheRHRSystemduringthisperiodthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines provided.

fromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobserved.

duringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, rotatingequipment andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation

'oesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverse.effectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed C

90-80intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent, of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

03/29/90RHRRETURNOUTSIDEMISSILEBARRIERMOV-720SCAFFOLD90-81Inordertoperformmaintenance onMOV-720ascaffoldisneededtoprovidedaworkplatformabout7ft.fromthefloor.Themaintenance istobeperformed withallfuelremovedfromtheReactor.Thescaffoldinstallation istotakeplacepriortothistomaximizethetimeavailable forvalvemaintenance.

Becauseoftheneedforoperability oftheRHRSystemduringthisperiodthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassigned'iaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyacgxalified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShift,Supervisor.

Ifit,isforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalvesandinstrumentation inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgiven-intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asa.seismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed 8

90-81IIintheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important, tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

April24,1990BMAINSTEAMARV-3410REPAIRWORKPLATFORM90-151Repair,workonARV-3411willnecessitate aworkplatform, constructed ofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.Assuchtheplatformwillhavenopotential effectontheARVs,andthestructures willberestricted frommovementinthedirection ofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.

TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelatively lightscaffoldmaterials; however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporated astheisolation valve3506bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistence isprojected tobeapproximately 11/2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.'Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted on'theguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.

90-151Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/10/90NaOHTANKROOMPENETRATION SEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-156Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsinthesoutheast corneroftheNaOHTankRoom,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 12ft.fromthefloor.InthislocationitwillbedirectlyovertheChargingPumpLeakoffCollection Systemandwillbeimmediately southeast ofthe2trainsofSprayAdditiveTankoutletvalves(HCV-836A andHCV-836B).Theleakoffcollection systemisindicated asnon-seismic onP&ID33013-1265 sheet2.Damagetotheleakofftankwhichcouldpresentpotential forreleasefromtheventheaderisboundedbyanalysisofruptureofaGasDecayTank.Becauseofthepotential effectonHCV-836AandHCV-836Bthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization, Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffolduse.byaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduring'erection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andad)oiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-156Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismic,feature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

May9,1990BBATTERYROOMWESTWALLPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-157Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsontheBBatteryRoomwalladjacenttotheBBattery,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 9ft.fromthefloor.Itistobeofwoodenconstruction toeliminate thepotential forshortcircuiting thebattery.Itshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedsketchsothatitwillbeidentical tothestructure providedasRequest86-56,whichwasdetermined tobeseismically acceptable (seeattached10/7/86S.K.Fergusonmemo).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheconstruction requirements givenbelow.Pre-planning andprefabrication forthescaffoldshallbedonesuchastoallowcompletion ofthestructure, apartfromthedecking,inonedayofworkwithintheBatteryRoom.Asalternatives tothisthefollowing maybeobserved:

Theportioncompleted shallbeadequately restrained tomakeitseismicwithbracingandinterlocking andcontactwithadjacentstructural features.

Inlieuoftheabove,theAMainBatterySystemshallbemaintained

operable, withnonon-seismic temporary structures intheABatteryRoom.Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbyaqualified individual.

Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttoorabovethebatteries duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Sufficient clearances aretobeprovidedforElectrician accesstothebattery.Priortouse,thestructure

.shallbeinspected bytheJobSupervisor toconfirmthatitsconstruction wasinaccordance withthesketch.Uponsuccessful confirmation theJobSupervisor shalldocumentthisconfirmation fortheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form,andsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

90-157Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,it.willremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/9/90BBATTERYROOMSOUTHWEST CORNERPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR4941SCAFFOLD90-158Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetration sealsinthesouthwest corneroftheBBatteryRoomad)acenttotheBBatterytobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistence ofthisscaffoldisestimated tobeamonth.Inconsideration ofanypossibility forinoperability ofDCelectricsystemequipment intheABatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincon)unction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheBBatterybankiscompleted; assuch,thatscaffold(90-157)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuiting thebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.

Thissub)ectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.

TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttothebatteries andotherDCelectricequipment duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation andpanelsinthearea.\

90-158Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferenceswithaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation, doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewill~benoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical

&pecif~cations.

2/26/90BBATTERYROOMNORTHENDPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR4941SCAFFOLD90-159Workplatforms areneededtoinspectpenetration sealsinthenorthendoftheBBatteryRoomadjacenttotheBBatteryChargerandBBatteryDisconnect Switchestobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistence ofthisscaffolding isestimated

.tobeamonth.Inconsideration ofanypossibility forinoperability ofDCelectricsystemequipment intheABatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering,.(M.B.

Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheBBatterybankiscompleted; assuch,thatscaffold(90-157)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuiting thebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.

Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.

TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmationofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttothebatteries andotherDCelectricequip'ment duringconstruction, use,'ndteardownofthescaffold.

90-159Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation andpanelsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccesses.described aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysis.Report,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasis'oranyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismic"'fd&ure, it.willbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

8

~May15,1990BUS16SOUTHPORTIONAREAPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-160Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsabovethesouthportionofBus16ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 15ft.fromthefloor.Inordertopreventanyinterference withactivities involving thealternate trainBus14andMCC-lC,itisplannedtoconstruct thescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.

Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincon)unction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance accesstoallelectrical panelsontheBus16andMCC-lD,toincludeclearance torackoutbreakers.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Cl 90-160Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalyses, givenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinsta'llation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

May15,1990BUS16NORTHENDAREAPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-161Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsabovethenorthendofBus16ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 15ft.fromthefloor.Inordertopreventanyinterference withactivities involving thealternate trainBus14andMCC-1C,itisplannedtoconstruct thescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.

Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerection, processshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Zfitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,"andmaintenance accesstoallelectrical panelsontheBus16andMCC-1D,toincludeclearance torackoutbreakers.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

i Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/16/90TURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPAREAPENETRATION SEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-162Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsatthenorthwallbytheTurbineAuxiliary Feedwater Pumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately 10ft.highadjacenttotheTurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Concurrent withthisaretwoothersitesofscaffolds forinspections inthevicinities oftheAandBMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Becauseoftheconcurrent activitywhichcouldpotentially affectbothtrainsofAuxiliary Feedwater Systemcomponents, construction, andteardownactivities shalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons on'Authorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements are'tobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation

-doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withany,equipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/16/90~BMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPAREAPENETRATION SEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-163Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsatthesouthwest corneroftheAuxiliary Feedwater Pumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately 17ft.highadjacenttotheBMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Concurrent withthisaretwoothersitesofscaffolds forinspections inthe-vicinities oftheAMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater PumpandtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Becauseoftheconcurrent activitywhichcouldpotentially affectbothtrainsofAuxiliary Feedwater Systemcomponents, construction, andteardownactivities shalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteat.atime.Inaddition, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance.

withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

to.wireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; based.onthese,thedeterminations called.forin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-163Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethe.possibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed in'thebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/16/90AHOUSEHEATINGBOILERFEEDPUMPAREAPENETRATION SEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-164Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsatthewestandnorthwallsoftheAuxiliary Feedwater Pumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately 20ft.highadjacenttotheAMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Concurrent withthis.aretwoothersitesofscaffolds forinspections inthevicinities oftheBMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater PumpandtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Becauseoftheconcurrent activitywhichcouldpotentially affectbothtrainsofAuxiliary Feedwater Systemcomponents, construction, andteardownactivities shalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea./heaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-164Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReport,whichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory, SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

6/11/90AANDBDIESELGENERATOR ROOMSEWR-3990OVEEGGWDCOVERREMOVALSCAFFOLDS 90-3.68Scaffolds areneededjustinsidetheDieselGenerator Roomoverheaddoorstoriseapproximately 10'romthefloor.Theworkisplannedtobedoneineachroomsimultaneously.

Becauseofthisthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguideline statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffolds shallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Anadditional requirement shallbethatthescaffolds aretobeerectedinoneDieselGenerator Roomatatime.Uponcompletion ofthefirstinstallation, priortobeginning erectionofthescaffoldinthesecondDieselGenerator Room,theConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead,shallconfirmanddocumenttheseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines.

Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframesandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofthisconfirmation priortoproceeding withtheinstallation inthesecondDieselGenerator Room.Aftersuchconfirmation, erectionofthesecondscaffoldmaybegin,accompanied bymonitoring, confirmation, notification anddocumentation aswiththefirstscaffold.

TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.

Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReportAs.aseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliaries Decreaseinheatremovalbythesecondary systemwithcoincident lossofon-siteandexternal(off-site)

A.C.powertothestationSteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureAnticipated transients withoutSCRAMwithalossofA.C.powerSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously

'evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

June21,1990AUXILIARY BUILDINGINTERMEDIATE LEVELWESTSTAIRWELL PENETRATION FIRESEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-173Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetration sealsneartheceilingfromthestairwell northtoadjacenttotheContainment wall,overthewestendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.

StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater SystemContainment isolation MOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespacebetweentheheatexchanger andcontainment isverycongested withpiping,pipesupportstructures, regulators, valves,instruments, andleadshielding foraprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpipingfromtheheatexchanger.

Amayorportionoftheequipment hereisassociated withthewastegassystemsupporting theReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizer ReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.

ImmersedwithinthisspaceisoneoftheContainment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.Becauseofthelocationoftheabovediscussed SAFWContainment isolation MOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed asseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.,Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincongunction withwooden'leats.

(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorization'Form 89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shall.beattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.

Al 90-173Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.LockedareaaccesstotheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultiscontrolled byalockedgate.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnotallowanyeasieraccesstothisarea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasSteamGenerator TubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences of'anaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

90-173Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlant.Technical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

July2,1990CONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGROOMNORTHWALLPENETRATION FIRESEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-177Inordertoperformfiresealsinspection intheControlRoomAirHandlingRoomascaffoldisneeded.Theequipment intheimmediate areais,forthemostpart,dedicated tocontinuing habitability fortheMainControlRoominthepost-accident environment.

Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplagemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement

.tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallso,notifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; based.onthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-177Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseas,aseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

7/11/90PRESSURIZER LIQUIDSAMPLECONTAINMENT ISOLATION AOV-966BLEAKREPAIRSCAFFOLD90-183AworkplatformisneededforrepairofthevalveinsidetheNuclearSampleSystemisolation valvehoodenclosure, tobeabout6ft.abovethefloor.Thisistoaccomodate workingwiththevalvebodyataboutwaistlevel.Withinthevicinityare,likethevalvetoberepaired, otherSeismicCategoryIContainment isolation valveswhicharedirectlyconnected withtheReactorCoolantSystemandtheSteamGenerator Blowdowns.

Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesashold,downbarsincon)unction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.'B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance access,toallvalves;andinstrumentation inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobe.observed; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-183Theinstallation doesnotresult'nachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptiureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureSeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavezointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebases'ofTechnical Specifications.

7/23/90SERVICEBUILDINGBASEMENTgPRIMARYWATERTREATMENT ROOMEASTWALLFIRESEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-186Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetration sealsontheeastwallbehindtheCondensate StorageTanks.Duetotheproximity ofthescaffoldtotheCST's,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed asseismic,Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedZobSupervisor, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines will.benecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardown, careshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

IS 90-186Theinstallation doesnotresultina-changetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofNormalFeedwater SeismicEventsRuptureofSteamPipeTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases;Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

.Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

,c~

RELAYROOMNORTHWALLWESTOFDOORTOTURBINEBUILDINGPENETRATION FIRESEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-188Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetration sealsintheRelayRoomontheNorthWall.ThescaffoldwillbelocatedneartheAMSACandEHPanels.Asaresult,itshallbeconstructed asseismic.AMSACitselfisnotaSafetyRelatedSystem.Theimportance oftheAMSACSystemandothermodifications thathavebeeninstalled inthiscabinetmakeitdesirable forthisscaffoldtobeseismic.Duringconstruction andtear-down, extracareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganypanelsorconduitinthearea.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsincon)unction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form..Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShift.Supervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

Inthisinstance, theStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, andupon,beingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesanemannerasdescribed above.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation, panels,andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important, tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeother.,thanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnot,reducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

'

July26,1989TEMPORARY OXYGENMONITORTEMPORARY FLUIDPROVISION REQUEST489-28AFFECTEDDRAWING:AFFECTEDPROCEDURES:

33013-1274, WasteDisposal-GasH2andN2andGasAnalyzer(WD)P&ID09lgS4~212'Pll13'Pll~6INSTRUCTIONS TOOPERATIONS:

TheHPprocedures referenced shallbeconducted bylabpersonnel; TECH.SPEC.REF:Sect.3.9.2.5,Table3.5-5,Table4'-5TheMSAGasAnalyzerisoutofserviceforoxygenmonitoring.

Inordertocontinuetomonitor02perTech.Spec.'requirements ofTable3.5-5attemporary connection willbeutilized.

Thetemporary monitorwilltieintotheGasDecayTanksample3/8in.tubingwithpolytubingconnected withtubingnuts.Thetemporary tubingwillbeoperatedbylabpersonnel atpressures suitableforthesampler;however,thetubingtobeusedismorethancapableofwithstanding fullGasDecayTankPressure.

TheoutletofthemonitoristobetiedtotheventheaderasdoesthepresentGasAnalyzer.

Pressurereduction fromGasDecayTankpressureisaccomplished ataninstalled reducerupstreamoftheGasAnalyzerandthetemporary connection.

Tubingassociated withthismodification isdesignated asnon-codeclass(ANSIB31.1)perRG&EDrawing33013-1273.

Itshallbeinstalled sothatsafetyrelatedequipment isnotpotentially affectedbyadesignbasisaccident(seismicevent).TheeventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withtheproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Radioactive GasWasteSystemFailureSeismicEventTheinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethefunctionofthesystemwillbemaintained, pressureretaining capability iswithindesignlimitsandthereisnopotential impacttosafetyrelatedequipment duringaseismicevent.Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysis.

Reportbecauseitcanbereadilyisolatedintheeventofa'failure andbecausetheoveral'1functionofthesystemisbeingmaintained.

I Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becausethe~~capability tomonitor02willberetained.

SAFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARY RADWASTDEMINERALIZER SYSTE1.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS1.2Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyaspectsofinstalling atemporary demineralizing systemforprocessing theexcessive liquidradwastefromthe1989outage.Theevaporator andrecyclesystemshavenotbeenabletoeffectively processtheaddedwasteduetoreducedcapacityoftheevaporator package.Asaresult,theon-sitestoragecapability isnearcapacityseverelylimitingoperation flexibility.

Thetemporary liquidwasteprocessing systemisafluidized transferdemineralization systemconsisting of5to6resinvessels,boosterpump,mechanical filter,dewatering pumpandprocesscontrolunit.Theentiresystemisinterconnected withflexiblereinforced non-collapsible butylrubberhosesdesignedfortemperatures between-20Fand180Fandpressurefrom0to300psig.Thesuppliedsystemisdesignedandoperatedinaccordance withthefollowing standards andoperating parameters.

a)b)c)d)e).f)g)h)Reg.Guide1.143ANSI55.2ANSI/ASHE 831.1ASMEB&PVCodeSectionVIII&IXPressure0-150psigTemperature 50-135F(Resinlimited)Flow15-200gpmHydrotestedto225psigI1~3Theshut-offheadoftheboosterpumpandthemonitortanktransferpumpis100and115psigrespectively.

Thisiswellbelowthedesignofallthetemporary systemcomponents.

Thetemporary systemwillreprocess wastefromtheWasteHoldupTankusingoneofmonitoring tanksasabatchtank.Theprocesscyclewillconsistofcyclingthewastefromthemonitoring tankthrutheresinbeds5to6timesuntiltheactivitylevelisacceptable fordischarge tothelake.Thespentresinwillthenbesluicedtoashippingcask.Thepipingarrangement willconsistofatemporary hoseconnected fromthedischarge ofthewasteevaporator feedpump.atvalve1762Atothedischarge ofthemonitoring tankpumpatvalve1279.Thishose.willbeusedtotransferradwastefromthewasteholduptankviatheevaporator feedpumptotheAorBmonitortank.Asecondhosewillthenbeconnected fromthedischarge ofthemonitoring tankpumpwithateeatvalve1279totheinletofthetemporary wasteprocessing system.Thishosewillbeusedtocycletheradwastefrom

themonitortanktothewasteprocessing systemviathemonitortankpump.Athirdhosewillbeconnected fromtheoutletofthewasteprocessing systemtotheAandBmonitortankreturnlineatvalve1291Aand/or1234depending onflowrequirements.

Thishosewillbeusedtocyclethewastebacktothemonitortanks.1.41~51~6Theentiretemporary systemwillbelocatedinthedrummingareaoftheAuxiliary Buildingoperating floorelv.271ft.Theallowable floorloadingforthisareais300lb/ft.Eachofthedemineralizer tankshasaminimumbasediameterof24inchesandweighs2,200lbs.full.Consequently, inordertoadheretothemaximumfloorloading,aminimumclearance of6inchesmustbemaintained aroundeachvessel.Thetemporary systemwillalsorequired440Vpower,serviceair,andDZwaterconnections.

Electrical powerwillbesuppliedwithatemporary cablefromthe440Vweldingoutletlocatedoutsidethedrummingstationonthetruckbaywall.TheDZwaterandserviceairwillbeconnected withflexiblerubberhosesfromconnections alreadyexistingwithinthedrummingarea.TheDZwaterandserviceairarerequiredforsluicingandvesselflushing.

TheDZwaterconnection alsoservesasabackupwatersourceforcoolingresinsifaleakinthesystemdevelopsduringprocessdowntime.

2.0REFERENCES

2.'1'G&ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSection15.7.22'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-1268 2'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-1270 3'SAFETYANALYSIS3'3'AAreviewhasbeenperformed ofalltheeventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationFSARandtheeventsrequiring analysisbyNRCRegulatory Guide1.70.Theonlyeventsrelatedtothistemporary modification arearadioactive liquidwastesystemfailureandaseismicevent.Thedrummingareaandmonitoring tankareasaredesignedsuchthatanypipingortankleakagewillbecollected throughthedrainagesystemintheAu'xiliary Buildingsumptobepumpedbackintotheliquidwastesystem.Thebuildingsumpandbasementvolumeissufficient toholdthefullvolumeofaCVCSliquidholduptank(33,000gallons)withoutoverflowing toareasoutsidethebuilding.

Thevolumeofa At 3'monitoring tankanddemineralizer tankis7,500gallonsand115gallonsrespectively.

Sinceeithertankislessthanthevolumeofaholduptank,thesumpstillhassufficient capacitytohandlethemonitortankordemineralizer tank.4inchdrainsarelocatedwithslopingfloorsinfrontofthedrummingareadoorwayandinthemonitoring tankarea.Intheeventtheprocesswaterislostfromthespentresinsinthedemineralizer tanks,theresinscanbecooledbythebackupDIwaterconnection.

Basedontheanalysispresented insection15.7.2fortheprimarywaterCVCSspentresinstoragetank,itwilltake4daysfordecayheattogenerateenoughheattoreachtheresin140Ftemperature limit.Thisisbasedona1%fuelfailure.Wastefromthewasteholduptankiscollected fromfloordrainsandisnotexpectedtocontainhighactivitylevels.HoweverAdmini-strativecontrolswillbeestablished toensureresintanksaremaintained withproperwaterlevelwhenconcentrated resinsaretobestoredformorethan24hours.3'Thedrummingareaisenclosedbyseismically designedwalls.Nosafetyrelatedequipment existswithinthewallsgfdrummingarea.Consequently, thedemineralizer systemwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedsystemsduringaseismiceventshoulditfail.Theflexiblehosesrunningoutsidethedrummingareawillberestrained andlocatedtopreventinterference withanysafetyrelatedequipment operation.

3.5Basedupontheevaluations insections3.1thru3.4above,themarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationwillremainunchanged bytheinstallation ofthistemporary modification; and,theadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheprevention ofaccidents andforthemitigation oftheconsequences ofaccidents willbeunchanged bytheinstallation ofthistemporary modification.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION" 4.1Theproposedtemporary modification doesnotinvolvean'unreviewed safetyquestionsince:a)theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbeincreased sincethewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviously considered, or;b)thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnot.becreatedsinceacceptedcodesandstandards arefollowed, or; r

c)themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedsincewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviously assumed.

March9,1990p/JLOSSOFDECAYHEATREMOVALEXPEDITIOUS ACTION-INTERIM"A"HOTLEGLEVELTRANSMITTER 90-03Genericletter88-17recommended expeditious actionsincluding installing twoindependent RCSwaterlevelindications withthecapability toprovidewaterlevelinformation toControlRoomoperators.

Onesuchprovision, apressuretransmitter (PT-432A) withindication attheMainControlBoardhasbeeninpermanent existence;

'however, asimilarprovision istobeinstalled priortoenteringthenextreducedreactorcoolantinventory operation.

Thiswillbeinstalled atatestconnection downstream oftheLoopAHotLegSampletapmanualrootvalve504,usingtubingofmaterialidentical tothepermanent installation forPT-432AintheBLoopSampletapexceptthat3/8"tubingmaybeusedinplaceof1/4".Thetubingisratedforpressuregreaterthan5,000psig.Atransmitter, similartoPT-432A,istobeinstalled, designated LIT-432Aatthetestpointdiscussed above,tobemountedsecurelytotheadjacentwalloronastandwhichwillbefabricated andinstalled suchastoinsureagainsttopplingbyuseofstruts,bumpersortie-downs.

Incaseofabreakinthe3/8"tubingtheleakagewillbeslow,andthelevelchangewillbemonitored ontheotherchannel.Thesignalcablewillbeinstalled underthecontrolsofprocedure A-1405installation andremovaloftemporary cables.Theexistingprocedure 0-2.3.1,DrainingtheReactorCoolantSystem,istoberevisedtoaddresstheindications tobemqnitored, including thesubjectprovision.

Regarding levelindication difference betweenmeasurement points,thedifference calculated fromWestinghouse ESBU/WOG-88-173 datedOctober14,1988willbeprovidedtooperators forguidance.

Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,the.determinations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnot'esultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseofthesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequatesupportsystemtoprovidedasdiscussed above,itwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonthesafety-related equipment inthevicinity, orresultinadecreaseinreactorcoolantinventory.

ThedesignbaseseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemissuchastoensuretherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.

90-03Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemtobeutilizedensuretherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafety-related equipment.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andthesupportsystemadequacy, asdescribed above,ensuretherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafetyrelatedequipment withinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becauseofthesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemwhichensureagainstanyadverseeffectonequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications..

3/20/90SAFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARY RADWASTEDEMINERALIZER SYSTEMINSTALLATION 90-041.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS1.1The.purposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyaspectsofinstalling atemporary demineralizing systemforprocessing theexcessive liquidradwastefromthe1989outage.Theevaporator andrecyclesystemshavenotbeenabletoeffectively processtheaddedwasteduetoreducedcapacityoftheevaporator package.Asaresult,theon-sitestoragecapability isnearcapacityseverelylimitingoperation flexibility.

1.2Thetemporary liquidwasteprocessing systemisafluidized transferdemineralization systemconsisting of5to6resinvessels,boosterpump,mechanical filter,dewatering pumpandprocesscontrolunit.Theentiresystemisinterconnected withflexiblereinforced non-collapsible butylrubberhosesdesignedfortemperatures between-20Fand180Fandpressurefrom0to300psig.Thesuppliedsystemisdesignedandoperatedinaccordance withthefollowing standards andoperating parameters.

.a)b)c)d)e)f)g)h)Reg.Guide1.143ANSI55.2ANSI/ASME B31.1ASMEB&PVCodeSectionVIII&IXPressure0-150psigTemperature 50-135F(Resinlimited)Flow15-200gpmHydrotestedto225psigTheshut-offheadoftheboosterpumpandthemonitortanktransferpumpis100and115psigrespectively.

Thisiswellbelowthedesignofallthetemporary systemcomponents.

Thetemporary systemwillprocesswastefromtheWasteHoldupTankusingoneofmonitoring tanksasabatchtank.Theprocesscyclewillconsistofcyclingthewastefromthemonitoring tankthrutheresinbeds5to6timesuntiltheactivitylevelisacceptable fordischarge tothelake.Thespentresinwillthenbesluicedtoashippingcask.Thepipingarrangement willconsistofatemporary hoseconnected fromthedischarge ofthewasteevaporator feedpumpatvalve1762Atothedischarge ofthemonitoring tankpumpatvalve1279.Thishosewillbeusedtotransferradwastefromthewasteholduptankviatheevaporator feedpumptotheAorBmonitortankorthetemporary demineralizer skid.Asecondhosewillthenbeconnected fromthedischarge ofthemonitoring tankpumpwithateeatvalve1279to.theinletofthetemporary wasteprocessing system.Thishosewillbeusedtocycletheradwastefromthemonitortanktothewasteprocessing systemviathemonitortankpump.Athirdhosewillbeconnected fromtheoutletofthewasteprocessing systemtotheAandBmonitortankreturnlineatvalve1291Aand/or1234depending onflowrequirements.

Thishosewillbeusedtocyclethewastebacktothemonitortanks.Theentiretemporary systemwillbelocatedinthedrummingareaoftheAux.Bldg.operating floorelv.271ft.Theallowable livefloorloadingforthisareais300lbs/ft2.Eachofthesixdemin.tankshasaminimumbasedia.of24in.andweighs2200lbs.full.Thetankswillbelocatedontopofthe4ft.wideby19ft.longby2.5ft.thickconcreteslabinthedrummingstation.Thereinforced slabwilldistribute thetankloadsovertheentireslabarea.Usingtheweightofsixtanksand200lbs.ofleadshielding pertank,thefloorloadingwillbeapprox.190lbs/ft2.fortheraisedslabarea.Theremaining equipment hasthefollowing weights:ProcessControlUnitSystemboosterpumps(2)9300/pump Filtervessels(3)9180/filter Dewatering pumpSluicepumpShielding 120/filter total20006005401001003603700lbs.,Becauseoftheequipments physicaldimensions, theirweightsmaybeconsidered distrubuted overthelower6ft.x19ft.floorarea.Thiswillproduceafloorloadingof32lbs/ft2.Allloadsarewithinthe300lbs/ft2loadinglimit.

1.51.6Thetemporary systemwillalsorequired440Vpower,serviceair,andDIwaterconnections.

Electrical powerwillbesuppliedwithatemporary cablefromthe440Vweldingoutletlocatedoutsidethedrummingstationonthetruckbaywall.TheDIwaterandserviceairwillbeconnected withflexiblerubberhosesfromconnections alreadyexistingwithinthedrummingarea.TheDIwaterandserviceairarerequiredforsluicingandvesselflushing.

TheDIwaterconnection alsoservesasabackupwatersourceforcoolingresinsifaleakinthesystemdevelopsduringprocessdowntime.

2.0REFERENCES

2.12'RG&ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSection15.7.2RG&EGinnaP&ID.33013-1268 2'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-1270 2'CHEM-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS,INC.,AproposaltoRochester GasandElectricforLiquidWasteProcessing attheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Section2.0,Technical Approach.

N-89-0020-P02, July19,19892.5GAIDwg.D-422-022 3.'0SAFETYANALYSIS3~1Areviewhasbeenperformed ofalltheeventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationFSARandtheeventsrequiring analysisbyNRCRegulatory Guide1.70.Theonlyeventsrelatedtothistemporary modification arearadioactive liquidwastesystemfailureandaseismicevent.3~2Thedrummingareaandmonitoring tankareasaredesignedsuchthatanypipingortankleakagewillbecollected throughthedrainagesystemintheAuxiliary Buildingsumptobepumpedbackintotheliquidwastesystem.Thebuildingsumpandbasementvolumeissufficient toholdthefullvolumeofaCVCSliquidholduptank(33,000gallons)withoutoverflowing toareasoutsidethebuilding.

Thevolumeofamonitoring tankanddemineralizer tankis7,500gallonsand115gallonsrespectively.

Sinceeithertankislessthanthevolumeofaholduptank,thesumpstillhassufficient capacitytohandlethemonitortankordemineralizer tank..4inchdrainsarelocatedwithslopingfloorsinfrontofthedrummingareadoorwayandinthemonitoring tankarea.

s.sIntheeventtheprocesswaterislostfromthespentresinsinthedemineralizer tanks,theresinscanbecooledbythebackupDIwaterconnection.

Basedontheanalysispresented insection15.7.2fortheprimarywaterCVCSspentresinstoragetank,itwilltake4daysfordecayheattogenerateenoughheattoreachtheresin140Ftemperature limit.Thisisbasedona1%fuelfailure.Wastefromthewasteholduptankiscollected fromfloordrainsandisnotexpectedtocontainhighactivitylevels.HoweverAdmini-strativecontrolswillbeestablished toensureresintanksaremaintained withproperwaterlevelwhenconcentrated resinsaretobestoredformorethan24hours.3.4Thedrummingareaisenclosedbyseismically designedwalls.Nosafetyrelatedequipment existswithinthewallsofdrummingarea.Consequently, thedemineralizer systemwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedsystemsduringaseismiceventshoulditfail.Theflexiblehosesrunningoutsidethedrummingareawillberestrained andlocatedtopreventinterference withanysafetyrelatedequipment operation.

3.5Basedupontheevaluations insections3.1thru3.4above,themarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationwillremainunchanged bytheinstallation ofthistemporary modification;and,theadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheprevention ofaccidents andforthemitigation oftheconsequences ofaccidents willbeunchanged bytheinstallation ofthistemporary modification.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION 4.1Theproposedtemporary modificationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionsince:a)theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbeincreased sincethewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviously considered, or;b)thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbecreatedsinceacceptedcodesandstandards arefollowed, or;c)themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnot'reducedsincewastetankvolumesare'lessthanpreviously assumed.

SECTIONE-PROCEDURE CHANGESThissectionistocontainadescription ofthechangestoprocedures asdescribed intheUFSARandasummaryofthesafetyevaluation pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.59(b).

Therewerenonewithinthistimeperiod.1

SECTIONF-COMPLETED SPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTS Thissectionistocontainadescription ofspecialtestsandexperiments performed inthefacility, pursuanttotherequire-mentsof10CFR50.59(b).

Withinthetimeframeofthisreport,thereweretwoconducted.

SAFETYANALYSISGINNASTATIONTEMPERATURE STRATIFICATION MONITORING TEMPORARY MODIFICATION REVISION1MAY12,1989PREPAREDBY:Electrical EngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:ReactorEngineerDateAPPROVEDBY:Manager,Technical Engineering Date "l,f RevisionStatusSheetPageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.SafetyAnalysisPageiiRevision1

SAFETYANALYSIS1.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS:

NRCBulletinNo.88-11,"Pressurizer SurgeLineThermalStratification",

requestsalladdressees toestablish andimplement aprogramtoconfirmpressurizer surgelineintegrity inviewoftheoccurrence ofthermalstratification, andrequiresthemtoinformthestaffoftheactionstakentoresolvethisissue.Pursuanttosatisfying therequirement andscheduleofBulletin88-11,Rochester GasandElectricCorporation isparticipating inaprogramforpartialresolution ofthisissuethroughtheWestinghouse Owner'sGroup(WOG).TheWOGprogramisdesignedtobenefitfromtheexperience gainedintheperformance ofseveralplant-specificanalysesonWestinghouse PWRsurgelines.Thesedetailedanalysesincludeddefinition ofrevisedthermaltransients (including stratification).

Theoverallanalytical approachusedinalloftheseanalyseshasbeenreviewedbytheNRCstaff.Asignificant amountofpressurizer surgelinethermalmonitoring datahasbeenobtainedinsupportoftheseplant-specific analyses.

Additional pressurizer surgelinethermalmonitoring andplantsystemdatacontinues tobemadeavailable withintheWOG,-resulting inasteadilyincreasing database.

Pressurizer surgelinetemperature stratificationdatawillbecollected atGinnaforinclusion intheWOGdatabase.

le2Thermalstratification andcyclingphenomena werealsodiscovered inauxiliary pipingconnected totheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Thesephenomena maycausepipecracksintheunisolable sectionsofauxiliary pipingsystems.USNRCissuedBulletin88-08andsubsequent supplements toaddressthisphenomena.

Asaresult,electricutilities arerequiredtoprovideresponsetotheNRCregarding thereviewandidentification ofauxiliary pipesectionsconnected totheRCSthatmaybesubjected tothermalstratification notconsidered inthedesignoftheplant.Westinghouse hasidentified threepipingsectionsthatmaybesubjected tothermalstratification.

Theseare:SafetyAnalysisPage3.Revision1Date~51289

a)charginglinetoLoopBhotlegbetweencheckvalve393andtheRCSnozzleb)alternate charginglinetoLoopAcoldlegbetweencheckvalve383AandtheRCSnozzle1.3c)auxiliary spraylinebetweencheckvalve297andthemainpressurizer spraylineThisanalysisaddresses theconsequences ofinstalling temporary thermocouples onthepressurizer surgeline,LoopBchargingline,LoopAalternate chargingline,andauxiliary sprayline.Thermocouple extension wireshallbetemporarily routedtoadataacquisition controller.

Thecontroller shallprovideadigitaloutputtoaremotepersonalcomputer.

Thedataoutputlineshallutilizetemporary cableandexistingsparecircuitstoexitcontainment.

1.4Inadditiontothethermocouples, fourtemporary displacement transducers aretobeinstalled onthepressurizer surgeline.Thetransducers willmonitorlinemovementduringheat-up,cool-down, andduringtemperature stratification conditions.

'~12~22.3REFERENCE DOCUMENTS:

GinnaStationProcedure, A-303,"Preparation, Review,andApprovalofSafetyAnalysisforMinorModifications orSpecialTests".GinnaStationProcedure, A-1405,"Installation andRemovalofTemporary Cables".GinnaStationprocedure, "A-1406,"ControlofTemporary Modifications".

2.4R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport.2.5USNRCRegulatory Guide1.70,StandardFormatandContentofSafetyAnalysisReportsforNuclearPowerPlants,LNREdition,Revision3,November1978.2.6AppendixRAlternative ShutdownSystem,"GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Revision4,January1987.SafetyAnalysisPage2Revision1Date5..:2.i89

'AI,"FireProtection Evaluation" ReportNo.1936,March1977.2.8Letter,EliasztoWrobel,"852-A&BLimitorque

-AluminumCovers",dated3/7/86.3.0SAFETYANALYSIS'.1 AreviewhasbeenmadeofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaFSARandtheeventsrequiring analysisbytheUSNRCRegulatory Guide1.70.Theeventsrelatedtothismodification are:3.1.13~1~23.1.31)seismicevent2)majorandminorfiresAlltemporary instrument cableinstalled shallberoutedtofollowtherespective linetobemonitored andthendropvertically tocontainment floorelevation 235'.Thetemporary cablewillthenberoutedalongthefloor,following theshieldwalltothefreestandingdataacquisition controller.

Noseismicimpactisanticipated sinceinstrument cableweightisnegligible comparedtopipe/insulation weight.Instrument cableroutedonthefloorandthefreestandingcontroller (approx.10"Hx12"Wx24"D)willnotaffectseismicstructures intheimmediate vicinity.

Thedataacquisition controller willbeplacedoutsideoftheshieldwallnearthelowerendofthepressurizer.

Temporary cableusedforthedatalinkshallfollowtheshieldwallatelevation 235',risetoelevation 253'iasouth-east stairs,andfollowtheshieldwalltoIncoreReference JunctionBox1B.Noseismicimpactisanticipated sincethiscablewillfollowafloor/stair routing.Cableseparation inIncoreReference JunctionBox1Bshallbemaintained.

Thetemporary datalinkcableshallbesplicedtosparecircuitA780.Cableandconductor insulation shallberestoredusingRaychemWCSFsleeves.ThesplicedcablesshallbedressedinIncoreBoxlBsothatdistancebetweenA780andIncoreThermocouple cablesismaximized.

SafetyAnalysisPage3Revision1Date~512/89

3.1.4Thistemporary modification willnotpropagate amajororminorfire.Cablesusedforthermocouples andthermocouple extensions areindividually sheathedinInconelOverbraid (thermocouples) orTinnedCopperOverbraid (extensions).

Noadditional fireloadingisanticipated bytheoverbraided cable.Temporary cableusedforthedatalinkisratedandqualified toIEEE-383flamerequirements asaminimum.Totalestimated containment fireloadingforthistemporary datalinkcableis200000BTUs.3.1.5Temporary cableusedforthedatalinkwillbesplicedtoexistingsparecableA779intheAirHandlingRoom.Routingisthroughafloorpenetration totheMux.Room.Totalfireloadingforthetemporary cableintheAirHandlingRoomisnegligible.

Totalfireloadingforthetemporary cableintheMux.Roomisestimated at2000BTUs.3~1.63~1.73~1.83.1.9Firebarrierpenetrations willberepairedandreplacedinaccordance withexistingplantprocedures.

Therefore existingsealswillnotbedegraded.

Thismodification doesnotaffectthesafeshutdownanalysisintheAppendixRsubmittal sincethereisnoeffectonseparation ofexistingcircuits, associated

circuits, orfireareaboundaries asanalyzedintheAppendixRsubmittal.

Thismodification willnoteffectthecapabilities oftheAlternative ShutdownSystem.Furthermore, noneoftheexistingprocedures forobtaining anAlternative SafeShutdownwillbeeffected.

Thismodification, therefore, complieswith10CFR50,AppendixR.Table6.1-3oftheGinnaUFSARgivestheAluminuminventory inContainment.

Thetotalexposedareais2197Ft.Thistemporary modification willaddatotalof10FtofexposedAluminum.

ThetotalweightofAluminuminequipment isestimated tobe40lbs.ThisincludesAluminumindata.acquisition equipment, displacement transducers, andpowersupply.The40additional poundsofaluminumaddedtocontainment willaddapproximately 800scfofhydrogenduringanaccident.

Thisamountofhydrogengeneration isnegligble comparedwith30,000scfoftotalhydrogenproduction duringanaccident.

(SeeReference 2.8)sSafetyAnalysisPage4Revision.1Date5+12@89

,Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

3.2.1Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4e0PRELIMINARY SAFETYEVALUATION:

4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4.24'Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent type"otherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

4'Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5RevisionDate51289

Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

3'.1Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4e0PRELIMINARY SAFETYEVALUATION:

4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4.24.3Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

4'Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1

Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

3.2'Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION 4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment importanttosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4.24.3Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent.

typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.4~4Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1Date5/12~89

3.2~1Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION:

4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4.2F4Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5RevisionDate5~1~289

PThismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

,Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesare-unchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

3~2~lTherefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4e0PRELIMINARY SAFETYEVALUATION:

4~lTheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4'4.3Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.AThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

4'Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1Date5~1289

fetyAnalysisFor.SpecialTest~~TSRINSpecialTostST-09.02ControlBuildingHeatGeneration RateOrigina3.

Rev.1Rev.2PreparedBy:NuclearEngineerICClsgpDateInitialDateInitialDateReviewedBy:.orEnneerInitialDateInitia'ate ApprovedBy:Technical ldanagerk9DateInitialDateInitialDate1.0ISco~eofAnalysisThepurposeofSpecialTetST-89.02istoobtaintheinformation necessary todetermine theheatgenerated invariousareasof.theControlBuildingduringnormaloperation.

Thisinformation willthenbeusedtoanalyzethethermalenvironment oftheControlBuildingduringDesignBasisA'ccident (DBA),stationblackout(SBO),andnormaloperating conditions.

1.2Theheatgeneration rateintheControlBuildingi"tobedetermined bymeasuring andrecording areawallandairtemperatures overaminimumtwenty-four (24)hourperiodtoadequate3.y accountforroomheatfluctuations.

1s3Thefollowing areasoftheControlBuildingaretob;to".ted:a.b.cd.e.ControlRoomRelayRoomComputerRoomBatteryRoom3.ABatteryRoom1B2.0Refesences ENR4529,"Ventilation SystemRequirements".

SafetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page1Revision

GinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,1989.2.2.1Section3.8.4.1.2, "DesignofSeismicCategoryIStructures ControlBuilding".

2.2.2Section3.10.2,"SeismicQualification ofElectrical Equipment andInstrumentation".

2.2.3Section3.11.3.5, "Identification ofLimitingEnvironmental Conditions

-ControlBuilding".

2.2.42.2.52.2.6Section6.4,"Habitability Systems".

Section9.4.3,"ControlRoomAreaVentilation System".Section9.4.9.2,"Engineered SafetyFeaturesVentilation Systems-RelayRoom".'.2.7 Section9.4.9.3,"Engineered SafetyFeaturesVentilation Systems-BatteryRooms".2.3GinnaStationTechnical Specifications, datedMay30,1989.SpecialTestProcedure ST-89.02, "ControlBuildingHeatGeneration RateTesting".

3.0SafetAnalsis3.13.2Areviewhasbeenperformed ofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationUFSAR.Thetopicsrelatedtothisspecialtestarefires,circuitseparation, andseismicevents.hThisspecialtestinvolvesplacingelectrical wire(usedasthermocouples),

temperature recorders, anddigitaltemperature readoutsinvariouslocations throughout theControlBuildingandTurbineBuilding(Section6ofReference 2.4).Thisequipment isinplaceonatemporary basisonly(approximately 24hourspereachofthefiveareas)andwillberemovedattheconclusion ofthespecialtest.3.3Atnotimewillanyequipment

'usedduringnormaloperation orpotentially requiredduringabnormaloremergency conditions beremovedfromservice.Allventilation systemsbeingtestedorbeingusedbythespecialtestarenon-safety-related (emergency ventilation systemsarenotaffectedbythetest).NoControlBuildingpenetrations areaffectedbythespecialtest.afetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page2Revision0 Cl

'heequipment isintheTurbineBuildingandControlBuildingonatemporary basisonly,isofminimaladditional fireloading,andwillberemovedattheconclusion ofthetest;therefore, therearenosignificant fire'loadingconcerns.

Also,theareassubjecttothetestareeitherpermanently staffedorfrequently walkeddownonanormalbasisbyoperations andsecuritypersonnel.

Inaddition, Section6ofReference 2.4requiresawalkdownofthetestequipment atleastoncepershifttoensurethatitisfunctioning properly.

Theseprecautions assistintheearlydetection ofanyfirehazardswhetherinducedbythespecialtestequipment ornot.3.5Atnotimewillanywiringberoutedthroughorovercabletrays,etc.allowingpotential circuitcross-connection (Section5.4ofReference 2').Therefore, circuitseparation willbemaintained throughout thedurationofthespecialtest.3.6Thisspecialtestincludestheuseofnon-seismic equipment (i.e.,thermocouples andtheirassociated leadwires)onseismic'structures (e.g.,ControlRoomwallsaridfloors).However,thethermocouples and,leadwiresarenotofsufficient weighttocauseconcernwithrespecttoloadingonseismicstructures.

Also,thethermocouples andleadwiresarebeingusedonatemporary basisandwillberemovedattheconclusion ofthetest.Section5.0ofReference 2.4alsorequiresthatthewiringbeplacedawayfromnormal/emergency pathwaysandworklocations.

NowiringwillbeplacedontheSeismicCategoryIControlRoomceiling.4.0.Preliminar SafetEvaluation 4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreased bytheproposedspecialtest.4.2Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedspecialtest.4.3ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotberedu'cedbytheproposedsp~".ialtest.4.4Theproposedspecialtestdoesnotinvolveanunrevi>".'ed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification chanel.SafetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page3Revis

AlloftheabovewerereviewedbythePORCcommittee withrespecttotheTechnical Specifications andthecommittee hasdetermined thatnoTechnical Specification changesorviolations wereinvolved.

Additionally, thesechangeswerereviewedincommittee todetermine iftheypresented anUnreviewed SafetyQuestionandthegeneralsummations ofthesereviewsareasfollows:1.Thesechangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence, ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyaspreviously evaluated intheUFSAR,because:Thesechangesweremadetoensurecontinued operability/availability ofplantequipment andwillnotresultinanyequipment beingoperatedoutsideofitsnormaloperating range.Thisresultsincontinued operability/avail abi1ityofequipment.

important tosafety,Thesechangesadditionally willnotresultinachangeofoperating characteristics ofequipment usedintransient:/accident mitigation whichprecludes anincreaseintheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccident.

Becausethesechangesensurecontinued availability ofplantequipment, thelimitsshownintheTechnical Specifications, andtheassumptions ofthesafetyanalysesoftheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcontinuetobemet.Asaresultthereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanypresently postulated accident.

2.Thesechangesdonotcreatethepossibility foranewordifferent kindofaccident, oramalfunction ofadifferent typefromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.because:Thesechangesdonotpresentnewfailuremechanisms outsideofthosepresently anticipated, andareboundedbytheeventscontained intheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.I3.Thesechangesdonotreducethemarginofsafetybecause:Presentmarginsascontained intheTechnical Specifications arevalid,andtheseprocedure changesaremadewithinthose~limits.Theseprocedure changeswillnotresultinviolating thebaselineassumptions madeforequipment, availability intheTechnical Specifications, andtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.

1990REPORTOFFACILITYCHANGESiTESTSANDEXPERIMENTS CONDUCTED WITHOUTPRIORAPPROVALFORAUGUST1989THROUGHJULY1990SECTIONASECTIONBSECTIONCSECTIONDSECTIONESECTIONFCOMPLETED ENGINEERING WORKREQUESTS(EWR)ANDTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTS(TSR)COMPLETED STATIONMODIFICATIONS (SM)TECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUA-TIONS(TSEE)TEMPORARY BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURESi SHIELDING'ND FLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESPROCEDURE CHANGESCOMPLETED SPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTS R.EDGINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTDOCKETNO.50-244ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION DATEDDECEMBER,1990

SECTIONA-COMPLETED ENGINEERING WORKREQUESTS(EWRs)ANDTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTS(TSRs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofmodifications inthefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreport,andasummaryofthesafetyevaluation forthosechanges,pursuantto,therequirements of10CFR50.59(b).

Thebasisforinclusion ofanEWRorTSRinthissectionisclosureofthecompleted modificationpackageintheDocumentControlDepartment.

EWR-1483STEAMGENERATOR SNUBBERREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFSIXOFTHEEIGHTHYDRAULIC SNUBBERPERSTEAMGENERATOR.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION0TOCORRECTTHEFOLLOWING:

1)TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS2)ADDADDITIONAL REFERENCE

-ANSIB31.13)PIPINGANALYSISANDPRIMARYEQUIPMENT SUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATED PERTABLESli263(ATTACHMENTS TODAC)ANDNOTINACCORDANCE WITHEWR-2512.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1'.70EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:2~3.4~5.POSTULATED PIPINGFAILUREINFLUIDSYSTEMSINSIDECONTAINMENT.

DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEM.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATE.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.

INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASMAJORANDMINORFIRES'LOODS'TORMS'R EARTHQUAKES'HE INSTALLATION OFMECHANICAL BUMPERSWILLNOTCHANGETHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENTONTHEFUNCTIONANDDESIGNREQUIREMENTS OFEXISTINGSTEAMGENERATOR RINGGIRDERiREACTORCOOLANTLOOPS,MAINSTEAMLINES,FEEDWATER ANDSECONDARY SHIELDWALL.THISDOES1~2.3~4~5.6.7~MODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES, NORITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORTHEFOLLOWING EVENTS:LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWFEEDWATER SYSTEMPIPEBREAKSRCSFLOWCOASTDOWN ACCIDENTS STEAMGENERATOR TUBERUPTUREPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREMAJORANDMINORFIRESFLOODSiSTORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES THISMODIFICATION NEITHEREFFECTSNORISEFFECTEDBYANYFLOODORSTORMPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED.

THEMATERIALS UTILIZEDINTHISMODIFICATION WILLMEETAPPENDIX"R"REQUIREMENTS BASEDUPON10CFR50APPENDIXRANDENGINEERING PROCEDURE ANDWILLNOTINCREASEATTHEPROBABILITY OFMAJORORMINORFIRE.MODIFICATION OFADDITIONOFSUPPORTSWILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCE ORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENT ORSYSTEM.

BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

1)STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-1832A CIRCUITSEPARATIONS ANALYSISELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLIMPROVETHEELECTRICAL SEPARATION BETWEENREDUNDANT SAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT.

REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON2/27/85ITEMNUMBER6.1.0-85-021-001.

THECHANGESTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAFORREVISION2AREDESCRIBED BELOW:SECTIONDESCRIPTION (ADDEDTOSPECIALNOTE).rrDCFUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS AREDELETEDFROMREVISION2OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIA.

DC'USECOORDINATION ISINTHESCOPEOFEWR3341rr1~1.3SECTIONDELETEDFUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

DESCRIPTION 2.1.22.1.4DELETEDANALYSIS51REQUIREMENTS).

DELETEDANALYSIS113REQUIREMENTS).

(FUSE(FUSECOORDINATION COORDINATION 16'.216.2'DELETEDFUSETYPEREQUIREMENT.

THISZSINTHESCOPEOFEWR3341.DELETEDFUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

SECTIONDESCRIPTION 16.2.2DELETEDFUSECOORDINATION REQUIREMENTS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDSEISMICEVENTS.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONAREUNCHANGED'HE ADEQUACIES OFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREUNCHANGED.

EWR-1832B FIRESIGNALING SYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLUPGRADETHEFIRESIGNALING SYSTEM.REVISION6OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON12-12-84ITEMNUMBER6.1.0-84-144-003.

THECHANGESTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAFORREVISION7AREDESCRIBED BELOW:SECTIONDESCRIPTION 11.4ADD:"INSTALLING ULAPPROVEDRELEASEMODULESFORTHEHALONSYSTEMSINTHERELAYANDCOMPUTER(MUX)ROOMSWILLBEACCOMPLISHED UNDEREWR4064".22.4.423.6263CHANGEt'ENGINEER" TO'tENGZNEERZNG ADD:"ANUMBEROFELECTRICAL MODULESWILLBECHANGEDOUTUNDEREWR4064TOFACILITATE MAINTENANCE.

THISISNECESSITATED BYTHEFACTTHATCERTAINELECTRICAL MODULESWEREFURTHERDEVELOPED BYGAMEWELLAFTERTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEINITIAL-DESIGN MODULES.MODULESOFCURRENT-DESIGN WEREUSEDWHENNEEDEDFORMAINTENANCE REPLACEMENT RESULTING INAMIXTUREOFOLDANDNEWMODULEDESIGNS.THISINTURNCREATEDAMAINTENANCE PROBLEMSSINCETHELATESTWIRINGDIAGRAMISNOTAPPLICABLE TOOLDERMODULES"~CHANGE"ALOW"TO"ALLOW".

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARETHEFIRESANALYZEDING.A.I.REPORT$1936ANDTHESEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONAREUNCHANGED'HE ADEQUACIES'F STRUCTURESi SYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFOR,THEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREUNCHANGED.

EWR-2606POSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEMIMPLEMENTATION THIS-EWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THISDESIGNMODIFICATION.

ASARESULTOFTHEINABILITY ATTHREEMILEISLANDTORAPIDLYOBTAINREACTORCOOLANTSAMPLESTOASCERTAIN THEEXTENTOFCOREDAMAGEiTHENRCISREQUIRING THATALLLICENSEES EVALUATEANDiIFREQUIREDi UPGRADETHEZRPLANTSTOENABLEACQUISITION OFAPPROPRIATE EXPEDITIOUS SAMPLESAFTERANACCIDENT.

ABILITYTOASSESSTHECONDITIONS OFTHECOREEARLYINANACCIDENTCANRESULTINTAKINGREMEDIALACTIONSWHICHCOULDLIMITOREVENPRECLUDECOREDAMAGE.THESAMPLINGSYSTEMATGINNAHASBEENEVALUATED TOBEMARGINALLY ADEQUATEFORPOST-ACCIDENT CONDITIONS ANDCONSEQUENTLY REMEDIALMODIFICATIONS AREPLANNED.ANEWPOSTACCIDENTSAMPLINGSYSTEM(PASS)WILLBEINSTALLED WHICHWILLENABLETHESTATIONTOOBTAINANDANALYZEREACTORCOOLANT'ONTAINMENT AIRiANDCONTAINMENT SUMPSAMPLESWITHIN3HOURSOFTHEDECISIONTOSAMPLE.THEPASSWILLALSOENABLESAMPLINGOFTHESESTREAMSDURINGNORMALOPERATION.

IN-LINECHEMICALINSTRUMENTATION WILLBEPROVIDEDINANEWLIQUIDANDGASSAMPLEPANEL(LGSP)WHICHWILLREMOTELYDETERMINE IMPORTANT CHEMICALPARAMETERS OFREACTORCOOLANT,CONTAINMENT AIR,ANDCONTAINMENT SUMP.THELGSPWILLENABLEACQUISITION OFDILUTEDANDUNDILUTED GRABSAMPLESOFBOTHREACTORCOOLANTANDCONTAINMENT AIRFORIOPICANALYSISINTHEEXISTINGCOUNTINGLAB.THELGSPWILLBECONTROLLED FROMANEWELECTRICCONTROLPANEL(ECP)ANDINSTRUMENT PANEL(IP)TOBELOCATEDINTHEHOTSHOP.REMOTELYOPERATEDVALVESANDINSTRUMENTS EXTERNALTOTHELGSPWILLALSOBECONTROLLED FROMTHEECP.THELGSPWILLBELOCATEDONTHE253'-6"ELEVATION OFTHECONTROLLED PORTIONOFTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

3' THEPASSISDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFNUREG0578ANDNUREG0737(SECTIONII.B.3).FURTHERMORE, THEPASSINSTALLATION ATGINNAISTOHAVEADEQUATEPROVISIONS TOALLOWCOMPLIANCE WITHTHECONTAINMENT SUMPSAMPLING, pHANDOXYGENANALYSISREQUIREMENTS NOWINVOKEDBYREGULATORY GUIDE1.97(REV.2)DATEDDECEMBER1980.SAMPLELINESASSOCIATED WITHTHEPASSWILLBEINSTALLED INSUCHAMANNERTHATTHEPOSTACCIDENTDOSECRITERIAWILLBEMETFORSAMPLINGANDACCESSTOVITALAREAS.THENECESSARY MODIFICATIONS ARESHOWNSCHEMATICALLY ONTHEATTACHEDFIGURE1.THEGENERALARRANGEMENT OFEQUIPMENT ISSHOWNONFIGURE2.STEAM.GENERATOR BLOWDOWNSAMPLELINESFROMCONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS 206AND207TOTHEEXISTINGSAMPLEROOMARETOBEREROUTED(FORALARACONSIDERATIONS)

USINGTHESAMEDESIGNCRITERIADISCUSSED HEREIN.THESETWOLINESAREBEINGREROUTEDTOREDUCEOPERATOREXPOSUREFORROUTINESAMPLINGANDARENOTREQUIREDASAPARTOFNUREG-0737 ORREG.GUIDE1.97(REV.2)~AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70ANDTHEGINNASTATIONFSAR.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:(1)EARTHQUAKE AND(2)RADIOACTIVE RELEASEFROMASUBSYSTEM ORCOMPONENT ALLEQUIPMENT ANDPIPINGSUPPORTSZNTHECONTAINMENT gAUXILIARY ANDINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGS ARESEISMICCATEGORYI.THEIRDESIGNWILLASSUREOTHEREQUIPMENT WILLNOTBESTRUCTURALLY DAMAGEDASARESULTOFFAILUREDURINGANEARTHQUAKE.

THECONSEQUENCES OFANEARTHQUAKE ARENOTCHANGEDASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.

FAILUREOFANYPASSCOMPONENT AFTERANACCIDENTSHALLNOTRESULTZN10CFRPART100DOSESTOBEEXCEEDEDANDONTHISBASISTHESYSTEMISCLASSIFIED ASNON-SAFETY RELATED.THISHASBEENCONFIRMED BYANALYSIS.

INTHEEVENTOFALOSS'FCOOLANTACCIDENTTHENEWPASSWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOOBTAINANDANALYZEREACTORCOOLANT,CONTAINMENT AIR,ANDCONTAINMENT SUMPSAMPLES.THEPASSWILLHAVEPROVISIONS TOBEPRESSURIZED WITHNITROGENORAIRPRIORTOPOSTACCIDENTOPERATION TOASSURELEAKTZGHTNESS.

THEMAZORSYSTEMVALVESANDINSTRUMENTS ARECONTAINED INANENCLOSED, SEALEDPANELWHICHISCONNECTED TOACHARCOALFILTEREDSTATIONHVACSYSTEM.THUSCOMPONENT LEAKAGEWILLBEPREVENTED FROMUNCONTROLLED AREAS.

THEREFORE iTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-2799REACTORLEVELMONITORING SYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEAREACTORVESSELLEVELMONITORING SYSTEM.THESYSTEMWILLCONSISTOFTWOREDUNDANT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURETRENDINGCHANNELS.

EACHCHANNELWILLDRIVEASEPARATEINDICATOR INTHEMAINCONTROLROOMSHOWINGREACTORVESSELLEVELTOTHEPLANTOPERATORS UNDERALLPLANTCONDITIONS.

REVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDREVISION1OFTHESAFETYANALYSISWEREPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONMARCH20i1985,PORCNUMBER6.1.0-85-037-002.

UNDERREVISION3OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDREVISION2OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'HE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS AREAFFECTEDDESIGNCRITERIASTEP4.1REVISEDFROM:THEATTACHMENT TOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMINCLUDING THERESTRICTING DEVICESHALLBEQUALITYGROUPA.REMAINING FLUIDSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS SHALLBEQUALITYGROUPB.TOREAD:THEATTACHMENTS TOTHEGUIDETUBEANDTHEHEADVENTSYSTEM,INCLUDINGTHERESTRICTINGDEVICEiSHALLBEQUALITYGROUPAREMAINING FLUIDSYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS SHALLBEQUALITYGROUPB.STEP5.1REVISEDFROM:THEATTACHMENT TOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMSHALLCONSISTOFARESTRICTING DEVICEANDSHALLBEASMECODECLASS1.CONSISTENT WITHREFERENCE 6.2.2.7THECOMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OFTHERESTRICTING DEVICESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2.THECOUPLINGTHATATTACHESTOTHEREACTORINSTRUMENTATION GUIDETUBESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2.TOREAD:THEATTACHMENTS TOTHEEXISTINGHEADVENTSYSTEMANDGUIDETUBESHALLCONSISTOFARESTRICTING DEVICEANDSHALLBEASMECODECLASS1.CONSISTENT WITHREFERENCES 6.2.2.7THECOMPONENTS DOWNSTREAM OFTHERESTRICTING DEVICESHALLBEASMECODECLASS2.

STEP7.1REVISEDFROM:THESYSTEMMECHANICAL DES/GNCONDITIONS WILLBEOVERARANGEOF0TO3000PSI,AND50TO697F.THESYSTEMSHALLA/SOPROVIDEINVENTORY INDICATIONS FORTEMPERATURE OgER697F,ASSUMINGSATURATED FLUIDCONDITIONS'P TO2200FiZNTHECORE.TOREAD:TH)SYSTEMMECHANICAL DESIGNCONDITIONS ARE0TO2500PSIGAND50TO680F.THEMOSTSEVEREACCIDENTCONDITION IS3015PSIGAT697F.THESYSTEMSHALLA%SOPROVIDEINVENTORY INDICATIONS FORTEMPERATURE OVEQ697F,ASSUMINGSATURATED FLUIDCONDITIONSi UPTO2200FiINTHECORES'TEP 7.6HASBEENADDEDTHEADDITIONOFTHEATTACHMENT TOTHEGUIDETUBESHALLNOTCAUSETHEGUIDETUBETOEXCEEDWESTINGHOUSE ALLOWABLE LOADSFORTHEATTACHMENT TOTHEREACTORVESSELORSEALTABLE.STEP8.1REVISEDFROM:THEINSTRUMENT TUBINGSHALLBESUPPORTED SUCHTHATITREMAINSFUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING ANSSEEVENTASWELLASDURINGNORMALOPERATION.

TOREAD:THEINSTRUMENT TUBINGSHALLBESUPPORTED SUCHTHATITREMAINSFUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING ANSSEEVENTASWELLASDURINGNORMALOPERATION ANDALLPOSTULATED ACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

STEP8.3REVISEDFROM:THEMOSTSEVEREOPERATING CONDITIONS CONSIDERED FORTHECONNECTION TOTHEHEADVENTSYSTEMISTHECONTROLRODEJECTIONANDTHECORRESPONDING PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURE IS3015PSIGAND697F.TOREAD'HEMOSTSEVEREACCIDENTCONDITION CONSIDERED FORTHECONNECTIONS TOTHEREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMISTHECONTROLRODEJECTION.

THECORRESPONDING PRESSUREANDTEMPERATURE ARE3015PSIGAND697F.STEP10.1REVISEDFROM:3'PRIMARYREACTORCOOLANTLOOP,INCLUDING THEREACTORVESSELHEADVENTSYSTEM.

TOREAD:3)PRIMARYREACTORCOOLANTLOOP~INCLUDINGTHEREACTORVESSELHEADVENTSYSTEMANDTHEREACTORVESSELBOTTOMMOUNTEDINSTRUMENTATION.

STEP31.0REVISEDFROM:nNOTAPPLICABLE'O READ:CONSTRUCTION PROCEDURES FORATTACHMENT TOTHISGUIDETUBEWILLBEDEVELOPED THATENSURETHATNOFOREIGNMATERIALENTERTHEGUIDETUBE.ATTACHEDFIGURE1TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAHASBEENREVISEDSTATINGTHATINPUTSTOTHEFOXBORORACKARE3INSTEADOF4LINETHERMOCOUPLES.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,2)SEISMICEVENT,AND3)THESPECTRUMOFLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENTS INSIDEOFCONTAINMENT.

BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ITHASTHEREFORE, BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'/

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEZMPLEMENTZON OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-2846B BLOCKWALLMODIFICATION RESTRAINTS EUIPMENTPROTECTION INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATIONS TOPROVIDEPROTECTION OFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER CHECKVALVES,AANDBMAINSTEAMISOLATION VALVE(MSIV)OPERATORS ANDAANDBMSIVSOLENOIDVALVES.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOPROVIDE1)UPGRADEDPROTECTION FORTHEAANDBMSZVOPERATORS ANDAZRSOLENOIDVALVESSUCHTHATMSZVCLOSUREZSENSUREDFORSCENARIOS INVOLVING SSE(SAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE),

TORNADOMISSILES/WIND LOADSANDHELB(HIGHENERGYLINEBREAKS)OUTSIDECONTAINMENT

~2)PROTECTION FORTHEitAiiAND<<B'UXILIARY FEEDWATER CHECKVALVESFORSCENARIOS INVOLVING TORNADOWINDLOADSANDSSESEISMICEVENTS.

REVISION1TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWILLALLOWREMOVALOFVENTVALVE3516A.THISVALVE,ANDASSOCIATED PIPINGiWILLBEREMOVEDFROMTHEBMSIVANDNOTREPLACED'HE SCOPEOFTHEPIPINGMODIFICATION WILLBETOPLACEAPLUGZNTHEEXISTINGCOVERFORTHE>>B"MSIVPRE-PORCCOMMENTSAREADDRESSED ININTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE 13N1-RR-L2275 ANDWILLBEINCORPORATED INTOTHENEXTREVISION.

THESECHANGESINCLUDETYPOGRAPHICAL CORRECTIONS TOTHEDESIGNCRITERIA, PARAGRAPHS 1.2AND23.0.TOFURTHERCLARIFYTHETESTREQUIREMENTSi ASENTENCEWILLBEADDEDTOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAPARAGRAPH 23.0STATING"ZNLIEUOFAHYDROSTATIC TEST,ALEAKCHECKMAYBEPERFORMED ATNORMALOPERATING CONDITIONS AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREEARTHQUAKESi PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING/

TORNADOES'IRESi ANDTORNADOMISSILES'LL PROPOSEDPROTECTIVE DEVICESARETOBEMOUNTEDASSEISMICCATEGORYIINACCORDANCE WITHTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSIS PROGRAM(SRP).REMOVABLE PANELSWILLBEUTILIZEDTOPROVIDEMAINTENANCE/TESTING ACCESSASREQUIRED.

PLACEMENT OFPASSIVEPROTECTIVE DEVICESAROUNDTHEMSXVOPERATORS/SOLENOID VALVESANDiiBttAFWCHECKVALVESENSURESFUNCTIONAL OPERATION DURINGANDFOLLOWING HELBSCENARIOS OUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

FIRESYSTEMSANDFIREBARRIERSDISCUSSED ZNTHEUFSARARECOVEREDUNDERPLANTADMINISTRATIVE

CONTROLS, ENSURINGTHATDEGRADATION OFPROTECTION/DETECTION FEATURESNECESSARY TOCOMPLYWITH10CFR50APPENDIXRWILLNOTOCCUR.TORNADOLOADSiSUCHASDIRECTWINDiDIFFERENTIAL PRESSUREiANDTORNADOMISSILESHAVEBEENINCORPORATED INTHEUFSARUNDERSEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANDANALYSIS.

THUSiTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES iNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SSEANDTORNADOEVENTS.2)OPERATION DURINGAHELBSCENARIOOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

3)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP)gITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESJ SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3072RCP1SEALLEAKOFFTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLINSTALLCHECKVALVESONTHENUMBERONESEALLEAKOFFLINESFROMTHEREACTORCOOLANTPUMPS(RCP)AANDB.THENEWCHECKVALVESWILLBEASMEN-STAMPED SEISMICALLY QUALXFIED.

THENEWCHECKVALVESWILLBELOCATEDINCONTAINMENT INSIDETHERCPSHIELDWALLS.THEMODIFIEDPIPESYSTEM,INCLUDING

SUPPORTS, WILLBESEISMICALLY QUALIFIED.

THIS,MODIFICATION ISSCHEDULED FORINSTALLATION DURINGTHE1987REFUELING OUTAGE.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONJUNE16,1986PORCNUMBER6~1~0-86-081-001.

THEPURPOSEOFREVISXON1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDEREFERENCE TOTHEASMEIIICLASS2STANDARDS' REVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE:')PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURE,2)INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'IRES'LOOD/

STORMOREARTHQUAKES AND3)LOSSOFAREACTORCOOLANTPUMP.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS~

ITHASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDXTIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

10

EWR-3092BORICACIDPIPINGTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADEOFBORICACIDPIPINGFROMSCHEDULE10TOSCHEDULE40PIPE.INCLUDEDINTHISMODIFICATION ZSTHERE-ROUTING OFTHEPIPETOAVOIDHIGHRADIATION AREAS'NSTALLATION OFANEWHEATTRACINGSYSTEMSUPGRADING OFPIPESUPPORTSANDADDITIONOFAONEINCH(1>>)ISOLATION VALVEINTHEMOV825A/BBYPASSLINEAREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.REVISION0IDENTIFIED THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ASFIREgSEISMIC'OSS OFOFFSITEPOWERSCVCSCONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTIONS'TEAM LINEBREAKANDLOCA.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRfORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THISMODIFICATION.

SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSIS.

PIPINGANDPIPESUPPORTANALYSESSHALLBEPERFORMED INACCORDANCE WITHEWR-2512DESIGNCRITERIAUSINGANSIB31.1ANDASMESECTIONIII.SUBSECTION NFASABASIS.STRUCTURAL WORKREQUIREDSHALLBEBASEDUPONTHEAISCCODE,EIGHTHEDITION.THEDESIGNANDOPERATING CONDITIONS TOWHICHTHEPIPINGSYSTEMSWILLBEANALYZEDAREDEFINEDZNTHEOPERATING TRANSIENTS DOCUMENTGENERATED FOREWR2512.SYSTEMTHERMALANALYSESSHALLEVALUATETHENORMAL100%POWERCONDITION, ASWELLASOTHERABNORMALOPERATING TRANSIENT CONDITIONS.

THELOADINGCOMBINATIONS ANDSTRESSLIMITSOFTHEEWR2512DESIGNCRITERIASHALLBEMETFORALLNORMALANDACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

ALLMODIFICATIONS ORADDITIONS TOTHEEXISTINGPIPINGORPIPESUPPORTSWILLBEREQUIREDTOINTERFACE WITHTHEEXISTINGPIPEgPIPESUPPORTS'ND/OR STRUCTURES ANDSHALLNOTDEGRADETHEABILITYOFTHESEITEMSTOFUNCTIONACCORDING TOTHEIRORIGINALDESIGNREQUIREMENTS.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEPLANTSYSTEMSONALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER.THEHEATTRACECIRCUITSSHALLNOTDEGRADETHEPLANTNORMALOREMERGENCY POWERDISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.REDUNDANT POWERTRAINSSHALLBEMAINTAINED ANDSTRUCTURES ANDELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT WITHINTHESCOPEOFTHISWORKSHALLREMAINFUNCTIONAL FOLLOWING ASAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE (SSE).THEHEATTRACINGSYSTEMSHALLBESUPPLIEDWITHPOWERFROMTHEEMERGENCY DIESELGENERATORS FOLLOWING ALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWER.THEEFFECTOFTHENEWSYSTEMONTHEDIESELGENERATOR LOADSSHALLBEEVALUATED.

THEMODIFICATION PERFORMED SHALLNOTINHIBITTHEAFFECTEDSYSTEMSFROMPERFORMING THEIRFUNCTIONS DURINGALLNORMALANDPOSTULATED ACCIDENTCONDITIONS.

THEBORICACIDSYSTEMSHALLBEOPERABLEDURINGALLNORMAL'ESIGN TRANSIENT/

UPSETANDFAULTEDCONDITIONS.

THEBORICACIDPIPINGCHANGESSHALLNOTAFFECTTHECONTROLOFANYPLANTSYSTEM.INREVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIATHESOLUBILITY TEMPERATURE LIMITFOR12-13WEIGHTPERCENTBORICACIDSOLUTIONISREVISEDFROM140oFTO145oFTOCOMPLYWITHTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ANDADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLSESTABLISHED ATGXNNASTATION.THUSgTHISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)2)3)FIREPROTECTION FEATURESEQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMICANDTORNADOEVENTS.EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING ALOSSOFOFFSITEPOWERSSTEAMBREAKORLOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT(LOCA).BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODXFICATION.

EWR-3199VITALBATTERYLOADFLOWMONITORTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEDESIGNMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEAMEANSTOMONITORCURRENTMAGNITUDES ANDDIRECTION OFBOTHSAFEGUARDS D.C.BATTERYSYSTEMSASWELLASTHETECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTER(TSC)BATTERY.THESYSTEMWILLCONSISTOFTHENECESSARY EQUIPMENT TODISPLAYTHEDIRECTION ANDMAGNITUDE OFCURRENTGOINGINTOOROUTOFEACHBATTERY.THESYSTEMWILLALSOBECAPABLEOFANNUNCIATING ABNORMALBATTERYCONDITIONS ANDLOSSOFCONTINUXTY OFBATTERYCIRCUITS.

THEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION WILLSATISFYTHEREQUIREMENTS OFSEPTOPICVIII-3.B.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISADDITIONARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES'ND(2)SEISMICEVENTSZTHASgTHEREFORE/

BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

12

EWR-3272SASPPCSCOMPUTERSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFASAFETYASSESSMENT SYSTEM(SAS)ANDTHEREPLACEMENT OFTHEP-250PLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).DEDICATED CRTsANDLINEPRINTERSWILLBECONNECTED TOTHESASANDPPCSCPUs.THESASSYSTEMISDESIGNEDTOPROVIDEANINTEGRATED DISPLAYOFCRITICALPLANTSAFETYPARAMETERS ANDPERFORMREFERENCE DIAGNOSTICS DURINGEMERGENCIES.

THE(SAS)SYSTEMWILLPROVIDETHEOPERATORS INTHECONTROLROOM,ANDPERSONNEL INTHETSC~THEEOFANDTHEENGXNEERING CENTERWITH1)ANINDICATION OFTHESAFETYSTATUSOFTHEPLANTg2)ACCIDENTDIAGNOSTIC DXSPLAYSg AND3)POSTACCIDENTMONITORXNG

~THENEWPPCSWILLINITIALLY PERFORMTHESAMEFUNCTIONS THATTHEP-250PRESENTLY PERFORMS.

REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRXTERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON5/23/84'ORC NUMBER6.1.0-84-082-002.

UNDERREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA, PARAGRAPH 3.2FIRSTSENTENCESTATING~i>THEREMAINING EQUIPMENT<<

HASBEENCHANGEDTOREAD"THEEQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATXON ARE1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,2)SEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE/

BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURXNGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OF'THISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3296A STRUCTURAL UPGRADEPROGRAMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEGINNASTATIONSTRUCTURAL UPGRADEPROGRAMWHICHISINRESPONSETOTHESYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM(SEP)BEGUNBYTHEUSNRCIN1977.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOUPGRADETHOSEMEMBERS,CONNECTIONS ANDANCHORAGES FOUNDTOBEOVERSTRESSED WHENSUBJECTED TO.THEDESIGNLOADSSETFORTHINTHEVARIOUSSEPTOPICS.13

REVISION0TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSISCOVEREDMODIFICATIONS INCLUDEDINTHESEPTOPICSLOCATEDZNTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGS CONTROLBUILDING~

INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGS TURBINEBUILDINGS ANDTHEFACADESTRUCTURE REVISION1OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS:

l.ADDRESSES THEDESIGNANDINSTALLATION OFBACKDRAFT DAMPERSREQUIREDONLYZNTHEAUXILIARY BUILDING.

THESEDAMPERSgWHENINSTALLED'ILL ELIMINATE~

THEEFFECTSOFTHEDIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES ASSOCIATED WITHTHEDESIGNBASISTORNADO.2.INCORPORATES CHANGESINFORMATANDCONTENTOFVARIOUSSUB-SECTIONS OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGGUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:WINDANDTORNADOLOADING,FIRESANDTHESAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE (SEISMICEVENTS).THEDESIGNFORWINDANDTORNADOLOADINGSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSIS.

MODIFICATIONS TOSTRUCTURAL MEMBERSANDATTACHMENTS WILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATION OFEXISTINGSTRUCTURES ORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT LOCATEDWITHINTHESESTRUCTURES.

THEINCLUSION OFBACKDRAFT DAMPERSUNDERTHISMODIFICATION INSURESTHATTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGWILLNOTBEADVERSELY AFFECTEDBYTORNADOWINDS.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEMODIFICATIONS.

THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASETHECONSEQUENCES

/NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SSE,WINDANDTORNADOEVENTS2)FIREPROTECTION FEATURESBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANAL-YSISPLANT(SRP)gITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

14

EWR-3595CONTROLROOMHABITABILITY THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHECONTROLROOMHABITABILITY SYSTEM.INORDER,TOIMPROVERELIABILITY ANDMAINTAINABILITY OFTHERADIATION ANDTOXICGASMONITORSEWR-3595PHASEBWASESTABLISHED.

REVISION5OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES THEFOLLOWING CHANGESFROMREVIEWOFDCANDSAREVISION4PREVIOUSLY NOTPORCAPPROVED.

MODIFICATIONS APPLICABLE TOEWR-3595PHASEBAREASFOLLOWS:1)REPLACE2EXISTINGTOXICGASSAMPLEPUMPSWITHTWOPUMPS'ACH WITH1004CAPACITY'NE PUMPWILLBEZNOPERATING MODE,THEOTHERWILLBEINSTANDBYMODE.THREEPOSITIONTOXICGASSAMPLEPUMPSWITCHSHALLALSOBEINSTALLED.

2)REPLACEEXISTINGRADIATION MONITORFLOWSWITCH.3)ADDITIONOFCONTROLROOM'DAMPERSMANUALACTUATION SWITCHATTHEHVACPANEL.4)ADDITIONOFRADIATION

~AMMONIA'ND CHLORINELOWSAMPLEAIRFLOWSIGNALSFORCONTROLROOMDAMPERSISOLATION ANDINDICATION TOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTER.

5)REPLACEEXISTINGCHLORINEFLOWMETERWITHONETHATHASCFMUNITINDICATION.

6)INSTALLCLEARPOLYCARBONATE "LEXAN>>COVERFORCHECKINGPARTICULATE MONITORPAPERONTHERADIATION MONITORCABINET.7)REPLACERADIATION MONITORPUMPMOTORFUSEWITHAMOTORSTARTER.THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFANACCIDENTEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHEUPDATEDFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT(UFSAR)ISNOTINCREASED.

THEREISNOREDUCTION INSYSTEMRELIABILITY ORPERFORMANCE.

THECONTROLROOMTOXICGASANDRADIATION MONITORSWILLREMAINWITHINREMAINWITHINTHEIRDESIGNLIMITSANDWILLHAVENOIMPACTONPLANTABILITYTOWITHSTAND FIRE.THECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHEUFSARARENOTINCREASED.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTIMPACTORINCREASETHECALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOSETOTHEGENERALPUBLICFORANYEVENTEVALUATED INTHEUFSAR.THEFUNCTIONANDCAPABILITY OFTHETOXICGASANDRADIATION MONITORSREMAINTHESAME,ANDNOFISSIONPRODUCTBARRIERSAREAFFECTED.

15

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE OFAMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHEUFSARISNOTINCREASED.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHEPERFORMANCE OFANYSYSTEMFUNCTIONS'ND INFACTgUPGRADESTHEINSTRUMENTATION ANDCONTROLOFTHEMONITORS.

THECONSEQUENCES OFAMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHEUFSARARENOTINCREASED.'HE MODIFICATION DOESNOTIMPACTORINCREASETHECALCULATED RADIOLOGICAL DOESTOTHEGENERALPUBLICFORANYEVENTEVALUATED INTHEUFSAR.THEFUNCTIONANDCAPABILITY OFTHEMONITORSTODETECTANDALARM/ISOLATION REMAINSTHESAMEgANDNOFISSIONPRODUCT=BARRIERS AREAFFECTED.

THE.POSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTOFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHEUFSARZSNOTCREATED.NOOTHERSYSTEMSAREAFFECTED'OR ANYNEWFAILUREMODEZNDUCED~THEPOSSIBILITY OFADIFFERENT TYPEOFMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYTHANANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHEUFSARISNOTCREATED.THEADDITIONOFTHESWITCHES, REMOTEINDICATION, ANDCLEARLEXANCOVERDOESNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHESUBJECTSYSTEM.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ZSNOTREDUCED.THEFUNCTIONS ANDPERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS OFTHEMONITORS(EDGagDETECTION'SOLATIONSg ETC.)REMAINUNCHANGED.

BASED-UPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURING-NORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED

'URINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3645A GZNNASTATIONGROUNDWATERLEVELSTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES ANANALYSISOFBELOWGRADESTRUCTURES ATGINNATOEVALUATETHEEFFECTSOFTHEINCREASED GROUNDWATERLEVEL(GWL).THISEWRCOVERSONLYTHEEVALUATION OFEFFECTSOFTHENEWDESIGNBASISGROUNDWATERLEVEL(DBGWL)ONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES BELOWGRADE.THENEWDBGWLISDEFINEDAS265.0FTMSL.THISEVALUATION COMPRISES APORTIONOFACONTINUING COMMITMENT TOTHEUSNRCRELATIVETOSEPTOPICIII-3.A,nEFFECTSOFHIGHWATERLEVELONSTRUCTURES

-R.E.GINNA16 i

PRE-PORCCOMMENTSLZSTEDBELOWWEREFORWARDED TOTHERESPON-SIBLEENGINEER(RE)VIALETTER13N1-RR-L50391

~ANSWERSAREPROVIDEDFORCLARIFICATION (SEELETTER13Nl-RR-L1650).

Q.DOTHERESULTSOFTHISEVALUATION HAVEANYPOTENTIAL TOIMPACTANYASSUMPTIONS MADEINOURPASTANALYSISOFTHECONTAINMENT VESSELTENDONSORTHEIRROCKANCHORS'.

ENGINEERING REVIEWHASASCERTAINED THATEVALUATION OFGROUNDWATERLEVELWILLHAVENOPOTENTIAL TOIMPACTANYASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADECONCERNING CONTAINMENT VESSELTENDONSORROCKANCHORS.Q.A.1)THEUFSARZSNOTREFERENCED INSECTION2.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIABUTISSPECIFICALLY CALLEDOUTINPARAGRAPH 7.4~2)SAFETYANALYSISSTEP3.2DOESNOTADDRESSOPERATING BASISEARTHQUAKES (OBE'S).ENGINEERING WILLINCORPORATE THESECOMMENTSASCHANGESATTHENEXTREVISIONOFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA/SAFETY ANALYSIS..

AREVIEW,HASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISANALYSISAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASFIREgFLOODS'TORMS'ND EARTHQUAKES'NCORPORATING BOTHOPERATING BASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES'HIS ANALYSISWILLNOTDEGRADEANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION SYSTEMSORCOMPONENTS'HEREFORE'LL EXISTINGFIREPROTECTIONFEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXRgORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION WILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THISANALYSIS.

THEPRESENTDESIGNFORFLOODING~STORMSgOPERATINGBASISEARTHQUAKE ANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKE (SEISMICEVENTS)HASBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSIS.

EVALUATION OFTHEEFFECTSOFINCREASED GROUNDWATERLEVELONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES BELOWGRADEWILLINSURETHATTHESESTRUCTURES AREADEQUATETORESISTLOADCOMBINATIONS REFERENCED ZNTHEDESIGNCRITERIA(BASEDUPONUSNRCSTANDARDREVIEWPLANGUIDELINES).

THUSgTHISANALYSISWILLNEITHERINCREASETHECONSEQUENCES gNORREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFORINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSINVOLVING:

1)EQUIPMENTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING OBEgSSE~FLOODINGANDSTORMSgZNCLUDINGTORNADOEVENTS~2)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES17

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFZCATZONSi ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLNOTBEREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESi SYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS WILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYTHISANALYSIS.

EWR-3698DIVERSETRIPMODIFICATION ONREACTORTRIPBREAKERSTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHMODIFIEDTHECONTROLCIRCUITRY ONTHESHUNTTRIPATTACHMENT (STA)TOTHEREACTORTRIPBREAKERS.

PRESENTLY, THESTAISENERGIZED THROUGHTWOMANUALREACTORTRIPSWITCHES.

ONLYTHEUNDERVOLTAGE COIL(UVTA)AUTOMATICALLY CAUSESAREACTORTRIPWHENASCRAMISREQUIRED.

THEUVTAWOULDALSOCAUSEAREACTORTRIPONLOSSOFD.C.CONTROLPOWER.THISMODIFICATION ISREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHUSNRC83-28.854OFTHISMODIFICATION HASBEENCOMPLETED UNDERTHEPREVIOUSREVISIONS.

THISPROJECTISSCHEDULED FORCOMPLETION DURINGTHE1987OUTAGE.REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONFEBRUARY5,1986PORCNUMBER6.1.0-86-015-001.

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDE:A)NEWINDICATOR LIGHTTOVERIFYTHATTHESTAISOPERATIONAL.

(PARAGRAPH 7.3.1)B)NEWTRIPTESTREQUIREMENTS FORBOTHUVTAANDSTA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)ALLPOSTULATED ACCIDENTS REQUIRING AREACTORTRIP.2)LOSSOFD.C.CONTROLPOWER.3)NATURALEVENT/FIREiANDEARTHQUAKE

~BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ZTHASTHEREFORE, BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURESi SYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

18 I4 EWR-3755PORVBLOCKVALVESREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFPRESSURIZER MOTOR-OPERATED BLOCKVALVES515AND516WITHNEWSEISMICALLY ANDENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED GATEVALVES.THEREPLACEMENT ISREQUIREDBECAUSETHEEXISTINGBLOCKVALVESEATRINGSAREAPPROACHING THEMAXIMUMALLOWABLE LIMITSFORREMACHINZNG.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29AND1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:1)2)3)4)5)6)7)INCREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEM.DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEM.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATE.REACTIVITY ANDPOWERDISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES.

INCREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.

DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY.

INTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTSSUCHASMAJORANDMINORFIRES,FLOODS,STORMS,OREARTHQUAKES.

THEFOLLOWING ACCIDENTS APPLICABLE TOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:INCREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEMTHEFOLLOWING ACCIDENTSgAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTgWEREANALYZED:

A)B)C)D)E)DECREASEINFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE INCREASEINFEEDWATER FLOWEXCESSIVE LOADINCREASEINCIDENTINADVERTANT OPENINGOFASTEAMGENERATOR RELIEF/S-AFETYVALVESPECTRUMOFSTEAMSYSTEMPIPINGFAILURESINSIDEANDOUTSIDEOFCONTAINMENT 2~DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYSECONDARY SYSTEMTHEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSgAPPLZCABLETOTHISEVENTgWEREANALYZED:

A)B)C)D)E)F)G)STEAMPRESSUREREGULATOR MALFUNCTION ORFAILURETHATRESULTSZNDECREASING STEAMFLOWLOSSOFEXTERNALELECTRICAL LOADTURBINETRIPLOSSOFCONDENSER VACUUMLOSSOFOFFSZTEALTERNATING CURRENTPOWERTOTHESTATIONAUXILIARIES LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWFEEDWATER SYSTEMPIPEBREAKS19

3.REACTIVITY ANDPOWERDISTRIBUTION ANOMALIES THEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSiAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWEREANALYZED:

A)B)C)D)E)F)UNCONTROLLED RODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWAL FROMASUBCRITICAL CONDITION UNCONTROLLED RODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWXTHDRAWAL ATPOWERSTARTUPOFANINACTIVEREACTORCOOLANTPUMPCHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTION RUPTUREOFACONTROLRODDRIVEMECHANISM HOUSINGRODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYDROP4.INCREASEINREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY 5.DECREASEINREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMFLOWRATETHEFOLLOWING ACCIDENTSiAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWERANALYZED:

A)FLOWCOASTDOWN ACCIDENTS B)LOCKEDROTORACCIDENTS 6.DECREASE.

INREACTORCOOLANTINVENTORY THEFOLLOWINGACCIDENTSiAPPLICABLETOTHISEVENTiWEREANALYZED:

A)INADVERTANT OPENINGOFAPRESSURIZER SAFETYORRELIEFVALVEB)PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADETHEDESIGN,CAPABILITY ORPERFORMANCE OFTHEEXISTINGPRESSURIZER RELIEFSYSTEMANDiTHEREFORE, THECONSEQUENCES OFTHEABOVEEVENTSWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION ANDTHEMATERIALS UTILIZEDWILLMEETAPPENDIXR10CFR50CRITERIAASDEFINEDINENGINEERING PROCEDURE QE-326.THEMODIFICATION NEXTHERAFFECTS,NORISAFFECTEDBYANYFLOODORSTORMPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED.

THEMODIFICATION ISDECLAREDASHAVINGTOMEET,SEISMICCATEGORY1CRITERIAOFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.29ANDCONDITIONS SPECIFIED INTHEUFSARSECTION3.11.3TITLED"IDENTIFICATION OFLIMITINGENVIRONMENTAL CONDXTIONS 20

$L BASEDUPONALLTHEABOVEANALYSES:

1)STRUCTURES gSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3768CONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLINGTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADEOFTHEPENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEMTOENSURETHATTHEUNMONITORED PATHFORAIRBORNERADIATION FROMTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGTOUNCONTROLLED AREASWILLBEELIMINATED.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATED COMMENTSTOREVISION0,ANDINCLUDEDINSTALLING NEWDUCTWORKTOANOUTSIDEAZRSOURCESABACKDRAFT DAMPEROROTHERMEANSOFBACKFLOWPREVENTION'O PREVENTUNMONITORED RELEASESOFRADIOACTIVITY, CHANGESTOTHEEXISTINGPENETRATION COOLINGFANSYSTEMINLETAEG&NGEMENT BOXTOACCEPTTHENEWDUCTWORK/

INSTALLING ANEWSTEAMHEATINGCOILSINSTALLING ASSOCIATED STEAMSUPPLYANDSTEAMCONDENSATE RETURNPIPING,INSTALLING ANEWCONDENSATE DRAINPANANDPIPING,ANDINSTALLING NEWPNEUMATIC AND/ORELECTRICTEMPERATURE CONTROLDEVICESINTHEMODIFIEDSYSTEM.INADDITIONTOTHEDESIGNWORKREQUIREDTOMODIFYTHEEXISTINGCONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEMANANALYSISWASPERFORMED TODETERMINE THEACTUALBULKCONCRETETEMPERATURES OFTHEPENETRATIONS WITHOUTTHEOPERATION OFTHECONTAINMENT PENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEM.BULKCONCRETETEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS HAVEBEENRELAXEDINRECENTYEARSFROMTHEORIGINALDESIGNLIMITOF150oFTO200oFPERASMEBOILERANDPRESSUREVESSELCODEX'ECTION III/DIVISION 2g1986EDITION.THEANALYSIS.DEMONSTRATES THATTHEBULKCONCRETETEMPERATURES DURINGTHEWORSTCASESCENARIOCOULDEXCEED200oFTHEREFORE THISSYSTEMWILLBEMAINTAINED OPERABLEABOVEAPRIMARYSYSTEMTEMPERATURE OF200oF21

REVISION2OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISUPDATESTHEREFERENCE SECTIONSOFBOTHTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISANDINCORPORATES 1)AVERIFICATION THATASTEAMCOILFAILURE(LOSSOFSTEAMHEATING)WILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTSYSTEMOPERATION DURINGCOLDWEATHER~AND2)APUSHTOTESTSWITCHONTHEEQUIPMENT HATCHTEMPERATURE ALARMPANELTOGIVEPOSITIVEASSESSMENT OFLAMPFUNCTIONDURINGOPERATION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREPIPINGFAILURESZNFLUIDSYSTEMSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT, SEISMICEVENTS'IRES'ND PLANTBUILDINGSECURITY'EISMIC EVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSIS.

MODIFICATION OFTHEPENETRATION COOLINGSYSTEMREQUIRESSEISMICDESIGNFORSUPPORTSTOENSURETHATMODIFIEDPIPING/DUCTWORK WILLNOTCOLLAPSEDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATION OFEXISTINGSTRUCTURES ORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT LOCATEDWITHINTHEEXISTINGAUXILIARY BUILDINGSTRUCTURE.

ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRJORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THISMODIFICATION.

ABREAKINTHEHOUSEHEATINGSTEAMLINETOBEINSTALLED UNDERTHISMODIFICATION (PIPEBREAKOUTSIDECONTAINMENT)

WILLNOTHAVEADVERSEEFFECTSONSAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANT.THETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPASSURESDELIVERYOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER TOTHESTEAMGENERATORS TOMAINTAINSAFESHUTDOWN.

INVENTORY FORTHEPRIMARYSYSTEMISASSUREDVIACHARGINGPUMPSLOCATEDINAROOMSEPARATED FROMTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGBYCONCRETEWALLSANDSEALEDFIREBARRIERS.

APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS WILLBEINSTALLED TOPRECLUDEUNMONITORED ACCESSTOTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGVIATHENEWINLETPENETRATION ZNACCORDANCE WITHGINNASTATIONSECURITYREQUIREMENTS.

THUSgTHISMODZFZCATI ONNEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES

/NORDOES.,ZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMICEVENTSINCLUDING PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

2)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES3)PLANTSECURITY22

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP)gITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'T HASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES/

SYSTEMS~ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-3817CATALYTIC OXYGENREMOVALSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLPROVIDEAMEANSOFREDUCINGOXYGENCONCENTRATIONS TOLESSTHAN100PPBINTHECONDENSATE STORAGESYSTEM.AWESTINGHOUSE CATALYTIC OXYGENREMOVALSYSTEM(CORS)HASBEENEVALUATED TOBETHEBESTMETHODAVAILABLE TOREDUCEDISSOLVED OXYGENTOACCEPTABLE LEVELS.THEPRINCIPLE ISTOMIXHYDROGENWITHTHECONDENSATE ANDREDUCETHEFREEOXYGENTOWATERTHROUGHEXPOSUREOFTHEMIXTURETOAMETALCATALYSTSURFACE.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONNOVEMBER6,1985PORCNUMBER6.1~0-85-114-002.

DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS, REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS, WERENOTPRESENTED TOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISIONl.,AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER ANDFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ITHASTHEREFORE, BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

23

EWR-4037CT-1TERMINALREPLACEMENT THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHEEXISTINGEBERLINECT-1EFFLUENTMONITORCONTROLTERMINALS ATGINNASTATIONWITHUPGRADED'rBr'ERSION EQUIPMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHErrBrrVERSIONUPGRADEISTOIMPROVETHEOPERABILITY ANDRELIABILITY OFTHEEXISTINGCONTROLTERMINALS INTHECONTROLROOMANDTECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTER.ALSOPROPOSEDZSTHEINSTALLATION OFAREPORTGENERATOR INTERFACE (RGIF)WHICHWOULDENABLETHECT-1INTHETSCTOCOMMUNICATE WITHTHENEWPLANTCOMPUTERPLANNEDFORINSTALLATION IN1986.IFTHECONTROLROOMOPERATORS HAVEACCESSTODATAFROMTHEEFFLUENTMONITORSVIATHEPLANTCOMPUTER, THECT-1INTHECONTROLROOMWOULDNOLONGERBEREQUZREDr ANDCOULDBEREMOVEDTODECREASESOMEOFTHECONGESTION INTHECONTROLROOMANDELIMINATE THENEEDFORDUPLICATING ATCT-1FORTHEGINNASIMULATOR PROJECT.ITISPROPOSEDTHATBOTHTHECONTROLROOMANDTHETSCCONTROLTERMINALS BEUPGRADEDWITHTHE>>B"VERSIONEQUIPMENT IN1985'HENTHENEWPLANTCOMPUTERISOPERATIONAL'HE RGIFWOULDBEINSTALLED BETWEENTHETSCCT-1ANDTHEPLANTCOMPUTER, ANDTHECONTROLROOMCT-1WOULDBEREMOVED.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSISDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDADDITION.

EWR-4070NO.1AND2FEEDWATER HEATERREPLACEMENT THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFNUMBER1AND2FEEDWATER HEATER.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATIONISTOSPECIFYgPROCURErANDINSTALLNEWFEEDWATER HEATERTUBEBUNDLESANDSHELLMODIFICATIONS ATTHEFIRSTANDSECONDEXTRACTION POINTS.THEPRIMARYGOALISTOELIMINATE THECOPPERALLOYTUBES.STAINLESS STEELTUBESARERECOMMENDED.

REVISION1TOTHESAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES ACHANGERESULTING FROMPRE-PORCCOMMENTOFREVISION0TOCLARIFYASTEPTOSTATETHATTHEPROBABILITY OFUNINTENDED OPENINGOFTHECONDENSATE BYPASSVALVEWILLNOTINCREASEDUETOTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIREMENT TOLIMITTUBESIDEPRESSUREDROPTO45PSI.AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHE24

GINNASTATIONUFSAR~THEEVENTSREQUIRXNGANALYSISBYUSNRCREG~GUIDE1~70gANDA1OCFR50~59SAFETYEVALUATION THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREADECREASEINFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE ANDALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOW.THEDECREASEZNFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE EVENTISANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASANACCIDENTAL OPENINGOFTHECONDENSATE BYPASSVALVE,WHICHRESULTEDINASUDDENREDUCTION INLETFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE TOTHESTEAMGENERATORS.

THISMODIFICATION HASNOBEARINGONCONDENSATE BYPASSVALVEOPERATION ORPLANTRESPONSETOTHISEVENT.AREDUCTION INFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE WHICHRESULTEDFROMALOSSOFONEFEEDWATER HEATERHASBEENANALYZEDINUFSAR.THEANALYSISSHOWEDTHATFORAFEEDWATER ENTHALPYDECREASECORRESPONDING TOTHELOSSOFONEFEEDWATER HEATERATFULLPOWERMINIMUMDNBRDOESNOTFALLBELOWTHELIMITVALUE.ATZEROPOWERTHERESULTSARELESSLIMITINGTHANTHOSEPRESENTED INUFSARSECTION15.4.1,UNCONTROLLED RODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWAL FROMASUBCRITICAL CONDITION.

THELOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWISANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASADISRUPTION OFSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVALCAPABILITY.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFTHEDISRUPTION ASARESULTOFCONDENSATE LINEBREAKSINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTION ANDTESTINGOFNEWWELDS.THISMODIFICATION ISNON-SEISMIC SINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEFXRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAINING SAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT ORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION BECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTS INSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

25

EWR-4075TSCHVACMODIFICATIONS THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHEGZNNASTATIONTSCHVACSYSTEM.THISMODIFICATION WILLCONSISTOF:1)ADDINGTWOCOMPUTERTYPEAIRCONDITIONING UNITSTOTHENEWSASCOMPUTERROOM,2)INSTALLING NEWZONECONTROLBOXES'ACH WITHZTSOWNTHERMOSTAT')

MODIFYING THECENTRALSYSTEMCONTROLSOTHATITWILLAUTOMATICALLY CHANGEOVERFROMHEATINGTOCOOLING'ND BACKSAND4)INSTALLING AFLOWCONTROLLER TOASSURETHATTHEMAXIMUMDESIGNFLOWRATETHROUGHTHECHARCOALFILTERZSNOTEXCEEDED.

REVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCON11/19/86PORCNUMBER6~1~0-86-135-002.

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION2,OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISZSTOINCLUDEINSTALLATION REFERENCE TOSPECIFICATION EE-29,EE-80ANDIEEE383.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONAREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS'UCH ASFIRES'LOODS, STORMSANDEARTHQUAKES'ASED UPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ZTHASTHEREFORE, BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

26

EWR-4118TOTALCHARGINGFLOWINDICATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION TOINSTALLTWOTRANSMITTERS FORREACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)SEALINJECTION FLOW.EWR4118WASWRITTENINRESPONSETOANUMBEROFHUMANENGINEERING DISCREPANCIES (HEDS)IDENTIFIED DURINGTHEDETAILEDCONTROLROOMDESIGNREVIEW.HEDS451AND471STATETHATINDICATION FORREACTORCOOLANTPUMP(RCP)SEALINJECTION FLOWANDTOTALCHARGINGFLOWAREREQUIRED'EDS 84'5'09'10'ND 345ADDRESSTHEPROBLEMTHATTHECHARGINGFLOWCONTROLLER ISLOCATEDONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB)gANDTHEINDICATOR ISONTHELEFTSECTIONWHICHZSEIGHTTOTENFEETAWAY.THECOMBINATION OFTHESEHEDSRESULTEDINANNRCCOMMZTTMENT TOPROVIDEINDICA-TIONFORSEALINJECTION ANDADUPLICATE INDICATOR FORCHARGINGFLOWONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCBBYJUNE1988.THISPROJECTINVOLVESTHEINSTALLATION OFTWOTRANS-MITTERSFORRCPSEALINJECTION FLOW(FT115AANDFT116A).THESETWOTRANSMITTERS WOULDBEINSTALLED INPARALLELWITHTHEEXISTINGRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWLOCALINDICATION (FT115ANDFT116).INDICATORS FORSEALINJECTION FLOWWILLBEINSTALLED ONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THETWOSEALINJECTION FLOWSWILLBEINPUTTOTHEPLANTPROCESSCOMPUTERSYSTEM(PPCS).INADDITION, ADUPLICATE OFTHEEXISTINGCONTROLBOARDINDICATION FORCHARGINGFLOW(F0128)WILLBEINSTALLED ONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB.THERCPSEALINJECTION FLOWS,COUPLEDWITHTHEEXISTINGCONTROLBOARDINDICATION FORCHARGINGFLOW,WILLALLOWCONTROLROOMOPERATORS TODETERMINE TOTALSYSTEMINFLOW.THENEWINDICATORS FORSEALINJECTION FLOWANDCHARGINGFLOWWILLBELOCATEDBESIDEEACHOTHERONTHEMIDDLESECTIONOFTHEMCB~THEDUPLICATE INDICATOR FORCHARGINGFLOWWZLLgINADDITION, BELOCATEDABOVETHECONTROLLER FORCHARGINGFLOW.ANEWPSEUDOANALOGPOINTWILLBECREATEDONTHEPPCSTOCALCULATE TOTALCHARGINGFLOWBYCOMBINING CHARGINGFLOW,ANEXISTINGPPCSINPUT,WITHTHENEWRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWPOINTS.DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS, REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWERENOTPRESENTED TOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISION0.27

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDINGTHISMODIFICATION ISLIMITEDTOWORKDOWNSTREAM OFTHEROOTVALVESFORTHERCPSEALINJECTION FLOW.SINCETHEROOTVALVESDEFINETHESAFETYCLASSBOUNDARYi THEEXISTINGRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWINSTRUMENTATION ISDESIGNATED NOTSEISMICCATEGORYI'HEREMAINING WORKiFORTHISMODIFICATIONS WILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.29,REVISIONC.2.THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEINSTALLATION OFEQUIPMENT INTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGS FIREAREAABBMZONEABBiANDTHECONTROLBUILDING, FIREAREA-CCZONESCRANDRR.THISMODIFICATION ALSOREQUIRESROUTINGCABLETHROUGHTHECABLETUNNELWHICHISFIREAREACT.AREVIEWWILLBEPERFORMED TOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50iAPPENDIXRALLNEWWIRINGWILLBEQUALIFIED TOIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONS WILLBEREPAIREDORREPLACEDINACCORDANCE WITHEXZSTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.

THEREFORE EXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.

THISMODIFICATIONS DOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL FORTHEFOLLOWING REASONS:A.THEAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS FORLOCALINDICATION OFRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWWILLBEMAINTAINED.

B.THEREISNOEFFECTONSEPARATION OFEXISTINGCIRCUITS, ASSOCIATED

CIRCUITS, ORFIREAREABOUNDARIES ASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

THISMODIFICATION WILLINTERFACE WITHTHEEXISTING3/8INCHRCPSEALINJECTION FLOWSENSINGLINEINTHESAMEMANNERASDOESTHEEXISTINGLOCALINDICATORS.

THEREFORE THISMODIFIC-ATIONDOESNOTINTRODUCE ANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNING PIPEBREAKSOUTSIDEOFTHECONTAINMENT BUILDING.

ZTHASBEENDETERMINED THAT'/HEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES iSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

28

EWR-4142CONTROLBUILDINGEASTWALLMODIFICATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEREQUIREMENT OFTHEEASTWALLOFTHECONTROLBUILDING.

THEEASTWALLOFTHECONTROLBUILDINGMUSTBECAPABLEOFWITHSTANDING THELOADSASSOCIATED WITHA132MPHTORNADO(DIRECTWINDAND~P=0.4PSZ)ANDTWOTORNADOMISSILES.

THISMODIFICATION WILLgINEFFECT~UPGRADETHERELAYROOMEASTWALLASPARTOFTHESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEPROGRAMTOPROVIDETHENECESSARY ADDEDSTRENGTHREQUIREDTORESISTTHEIMPOSESLOADSOFSNOW,TORNADO(DIRECTAND~P),TORNADOMISSILESAND2)PROVIDEAWATER-TIGHT BARRIERAGAINSTFLOODINGOFDEERCREEK.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION1DELETINGEXTRACONDUITFORFUTURECIRCUITS'DDING GROUNDING ANDDOORPOSITIONSWITCHESFORBOTHSECURITYANDFIREDOORS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYSISINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREWINDJSNOWANDTORNADOLOADINGS~

FLOODINGANDSEISMIC'IRES/

LOSSOFA.C.POWERANDPLANTBUILDINGSECURITY.

THEDESIGNFORWINDgSNOWgTORNADOES ANDEXTERNALFLOODINGHASBEENEVALUATED INTHEUFSARANDWILLBEINACCORDANCE WITHCOMMITMENTS MADETOTHEUSNRCWHICHAREREFERENCED ZNSECTIONS2'g3'~3'1AND3'OFTHEUFSARSEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION DESIGNANALYSIS.

MODIFICATION OFTHISEXTERNALWALLOFTHERELAYROOMWILLNOTALTEREITHERTHESEISMICQUALIFICATION OFEXISTINGSTRUCTURES ORSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT LOCATEDWITHINTHEEXISTINGSTRUCTURES.

ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING THESTRUCTURAL UPGRADEMODIFICATIONS.

THEMODIFICATION AFFECTSONLYLOADINGOFNON-SAFETY RELATEDBUS15.SINCETHEREZSNOCHANGEINTHESAFETY-RELATED BUSES,THEREISNOCHANGEINTHECONSEQUENCES OFALOSSOFA.C.POWER.THERELOCATION OFANEXISTINGEXTERIORSECURITYDOORTOTHEOUTSIDEOFTHENEWSTRUCTURE.

WILLMAINTAINTHELEVELOFPRESENTSECURITYFROMINTRUSION ATGINNASTATION.INTERIMMEASURESDURINGCONSTRUCTION WILLBEADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED TOPREVENTPOSSIBLEDEGRADATION OFSECURITYBARRIERS'9

THUS~THISMODIFZCATIONNEITHERINCREASESTHECONSEQUENCES

/NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SSE,FLOODINGANDTORNADOEVENTS2)FIRE"PROTECTION FEATURES3)PLANTSECURITYBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANAL-YSISPLAN(SRP),ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFTOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES/

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTIONOFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4176APPENDIXRDETECTION UPGRADETHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHWILLINSTALLTHREE(3)NEWFIREDETECTION ZONESANDSUPERVISED BYTHEFIRESIGNALLING SYSTEM.THESEZONESARE:Z-36(SMOKE)INT.BLDG.SUB-BASEMENT FLOORS.Z-37(SMOKE)INT.BLDG.NORTHUPPERELEVATZONS.

Z-38(SMOKE)ZNT.BLDG.SOUTHALLELEVATIONS

~INCLUDEDINTHISMODIFICATION ISTHEMOUNTINGOFEQUIPMENT, ROUTINGANDMOUNTINGOFCONDUIT,ANDALLWIRINGASSOCIATED WITHTHENEWZONESANDMODIFICATIONS TOTHEEXISTINGFIRESIGNALLING SYSTEM.THISMODIFICATION ZSREQUIREDTOCOMPLYWITHAPPENDIXRALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEM,GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANTREVISION2.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARESEISMICANDFIRE.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPH 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE~

BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

30

EWR-422102/H2ANALYZERREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEDIRECTREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTING02/H2ANALYZERSYSTEM'HIS MODIFICATION WILLREPLACETHEINACCURATE ANDUNRELIABLE EXISTING02/H2ANALYZERSYSTEMWITHANEWRELIABLEANDACCURATESYSTEM.REVISION1OFTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESFROMREVISION0TOCORRECTTYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORSANDSUMIG&YDESCRIPTION OFMODIFICATION BACKGROUND INFORMATION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIREDBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29,160'61'ND170'HEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.ALLEXISTINGANDNEWWIRING~CABLEgANDELECTRICALCOMPONENTS REQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION COMPLIESWITH10CFR50APPENDIXR.THISMODIFICATION HASBEENANALYZEDFORSEISMICEVENTSUNDERSECTIONC.2OFREG.GUIDE1.29'HEINSTALLATION WILLMAINTAINSTRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SUCHTHATSURROUNDING SAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT WILLNOTBEAFFECTED.

THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES, NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)MAJORORMINORFIRES2)SEISMICEVENTBASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDUSNCREG.GUIDE1~29AND1.70,ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMSJ ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

31

EWR-4235STATUSLIGHTMODIFICATION THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHCONSISTSOFINSTALLING ADROPPINGRESISTORINEACHLIGHTASSEMBLYINTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB).INCLUDEDWITHTHISMODIFICATION ISTHEREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTING35VOLTBULBSWITH30VOLTBULBS,ANDNEWINDICATOR LIGHTLENSCAP.THISMODIFICATION WILLPROVIDEGREATERLIGHTOUTPUTINTHEBRIGHTANDDIMMODE,THEREBYELIMINATING THEPRESENTVISUALCONTRASTBETWEENBRIGHTANDDIMCONDITIONS.

THESESTATUSLIGHTSINSUEUECT,PROVIDEAVISUALINDICATION OFSELECTEDVALVEPOSITIONS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANAL'YSIS BYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARELOSSOFDCORACCONTROLPOWER/NATURALEVENTS'IRE, ANDEARTHQUAKE.

BASED'PON THEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS, ZTHASTHEREFORE, BEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

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EWR-4269CANDDSTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPINTERLOCK THISENGINEERING WORKREQUESTADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION TOTHEPUMPINTERLOCK.

PRESENTLY, THEELECTRICAL AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMCONFIGURATION CONSISTSOFTWOMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS(MDAFWPlA AND1B)ANDTWOSTANDBYAUXILIARY PUMPSlAAND1BSUPPLYCONDENSATE WATERTOAANDBSTEAMGENERATORS RESPECTIVELY.

INTHEEVENTTHATEITHERONEORBOTHOFTHESEPUMPSAREINOPERABLE THESTANDBYPUMPSMAYBEUSEDTOPROVIDEANEMERGENCY SOURCEFORCOOLING.THESTANDBYPUMPS(CANDD)AREELECTRICALLY INTERLOCKED WITHPRIMARYPUMPS(AANDB).THEINTERLOCKS AREINTENDEDTOPREVENTTHESIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OFTHEPRIMARYPUMPSANDSTANDBYPUMPS.DURINGNORMALOPERATION THISCONFIGURATION SATISFIES THISDESIGNCRITERIA~

HOWEVERSWHENPRIMARYBREAKERSARERACKEDOUTINTOTHEHELDPOSITION(ORREMOVED),

THEINTERLOCKS AREALSOREMOVED,MAKINGTHESTANDBYBREAKERSINOPERABLE.

THISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION WILLELIMINATE THISCONDITION BYINSTALLING CELLSWITCHESINTHEPRIMARYBREAKERCOMPARTMENTS, WHICHWILLCHANGESTATEWHENTHEBREAKERISRACKEDINOROUT.THECELLSWITCHCONTACTSWILLBEWIREDINPARALLELWITHTHEEXISTINGINTERLOCK CONTACTSANDWILLPERMITTHEPRIMARYBREAKERSTOBEREMOVEDFROMSERVICEFORMAINTENANCE ANDINSURETHATTHESTANDBYBREAKERSWILLBEOPERATIONAL.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATINGTOTHISMODIFIC-ATIONARE:A)LOSSOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWB)NATURALEVENTS/FIRE, EARTHQUAKE.

THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHELOSSOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FLOWDUETOTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEADDITIONOFACELLSWITCHWILLNOTEFFECTOPERABILITY OFTHEMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS.THESECELLSWITCHESSERVEASPERMISSIVES TOTHESTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS'HEREFORE INTHEEVENTOFAFAILUREONLYTHESTARTINGOFTHESTANDBYPUMPSAREAFFECTED.

MANUFACTURER INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGPROCEDURES WILLBEPERFORMED ANDAPERIODICTESTINGPROGRAMWILLBEINITIATED TOASSUREPROPEROPERATION OFCELLSWITCHES, THEREBYREDUCINGTHEPROBABILITY OFFAILURETOSTARTSTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPSTOANACCEPTABLY LOWLEVEL.THEREFORE THISMODIFICATION WILLHAVEANEGLIGIBLE IMPACTUPONOPERABILITY OFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDWILLBETHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENTONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THECELLSWITCHESHAVEBEENQUALIFIED BYTHEMANUFACTURER, THEREFORE THECONSEQUENCES OFAFAILUREDUETOASEISMICEVENTAREMITIGATED.

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THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDWXLLBETHEEFFECTOFAFIREONTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORTHISMODIFICATION ISREQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFZEEESTD.383-1984FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEZNTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE VERIFICATION WILLBEPERFORMED TOENSURETHATTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTADVERSELY IMPACTEXISTINGAPPENDIXRCOMPLIANCE METHODS.THEREFORE JBASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSISgITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED'ANDB)THESTRUCTURES

/SYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFOR'HEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ANDTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFATYPEDIFFERENT FROMANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISNOTREDUCED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION.

1EWR-4281STEAMGENERATOR MANWAYSTUDTENSIONER THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION COVERINGTHEINSTALLATION OFSTEAMGENERATOR PRIMARYMANWAYSTUDSANDNUTS'NTHEPASTTHEPRIMARYMANWAYCOVERSHAVEBEENATTACHEDWITHBOLTSWHICHARETORQUEDTOOBTAINTHEPROPERGASKETSEATING.THISISATIMECONSUMING ANDDIFFICULT TASKSINCEZTMUSTBEDONEINAHIGHRADIATION AREA.THISMODIFICATION CONSISTSOFREPLACING THEEXISTINGBOLTSANDNUTS.INSTEADOFTORQUINGTHENUTSTOINDUCETHEREQUIREDAXIALLOADS~DIRECTHYDRAULIC LOADSAREUSEDTOSTRETCHTHESTUDS.REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRXTERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISWASPRESENTED ANDAPPROVEDBYPORCONNOVEMBER5~1986'ORCNUMBER6.1'.0-86-125-001.

34

THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOREVISEPARAGRAPHS 2.6.1AND2.6'TOINCLUDENEWEGE(GDRAWINGTITLES.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDIN-THEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARESEISMICEVENTS'ECREASE INREACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMINVENTORY ANDFIRES.BASEDUPONTHEANALYSESDESCRIBED UNDERPARAGRAPHS 3.1TO4.0DOFTHESAFETYANALYSIS'T HASTHEREFORE'EEN DETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4282CVRECZRCFANCONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELSTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION OFTHECVRECIRCFANCONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELS'HIS MODIFICATION ISFORREPLACEMENT OFEXISTINGOBSOLETEPRESSURETRANSMITTERS, SIGNALPROCESSORS ANDMAINCONTROLBOARDINDICATORS WITHINSTRUMENTS CAPABLEOFACCURATELY MONITORING WATERLEAKAGEWITHINCONTAINMENT.

THEEXISTINGTRANSMITTERS~

POWERSUPPLIES'ISTABLES ANDINDICATORS WILLBEREPLACEDTOPROVIDEMOREACCURATEANDRELIABLECONDENSATE LEVELINDICATION.

THESCALESINTHEEXISTINGLEVELINDICATOR SHALLBEPLACEDINTHENEWLEVELINDICATORS WITHNOCHANGEZNTHEAPPEARANCE ONTHEMCB.NEWREFERENCE LEGTUBINGFROMTHETRANSMITTERS TOTHECONDENSATE COLLECTION STANDPIPES WILLBEINSTALLED.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAZORANDMINORFIRES'2)ASEISMICEVENTS(3)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING.

NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT~THEREFORE'HE DESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODEMONSTRATE THATCONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS ISMAINTAINED.

35

THISMODIFICATION WILLBEREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASAPARTOFTHISMODIFIC-ATIONWILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.THEPRESSUREBOUNDARYPORTIONSOFTHECONDENSATE COLLECTOR LEVELINSTRUMENTATION ARENOTDESIGNATED SEISMICCATEGORYI.HOWEVERSANYMODIFICATION TOTHISSYSTEMWHOSEFAILURECOULDCAUSEDAMAGETOSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT WILLBEDESIGNEDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.29,POSITIONC.2.THENEWTRANSMITTERS WILLINTERFACE WITHTHEEXISTINGCONDENSATE COLLECTOR STANDPIPES INTHESAMEMANNERASTHEEXISTINGTRANSMITTERS WITHTHEADDITIONOFTHEREFERENCE LEGTUBINGPENETRATION.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINTRODUCE ANYNEWFAILUREMODESCONCERNING PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT BUILDING.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTINACHANGETOTHECOMMIT-MENTSMADEINTHEUFSAR~SECTIONS3~6~1~3~213AND5'1112~THESECOMMITMENTS STATETHATCONDENSATE FLOWSFROMAPPROXIMATELY 1GPMTO30GPMARETOBEMEASUREDBYTHECONDENSATE MEASURING SYSTEM,USFARSECTION5.2.5.4HEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATAHUMANFACTORSREVIEWOFTHISMODIFICATION BEPERFORMED PRIORTOISSUANCEOFDESIGNOUTPUTS'O MINIMIZETHEPROBABILITY OFOPERATORERRORTHEITEMSABOVEENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.

THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

INACCORDANCE WITHTHEPROVISIONS OF10CFR50.59 THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTPRESENTANUNREVZEWED SAFETYQUESTIONFORTHEFOLLOWING REASONS:1.THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE, ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBEINCREASED.

36

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCE OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY.THISMODIFICATION WILLCOMPLYWITHTHEREQUIREMENTS OFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.29POSITIONC.2TOINSUREANYFAILUREWILLNOTAFFECTSEISMICCATEGORYIEQUIPMENT.

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWWILLINSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.

2.THEPOSSIBILITY FORANACCXDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISISNOTCREATED.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTADDTOgORMODIFYgANYEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYgOREQUIPMENTWHOSEFAILUREISADDRESSED XNTHEFINALSAFETYANALYSISREPORT.3.THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISNOTREDUCED.ASSTATEDABOVEgTHISMODIFICATIONDOESNOTAFFECTEQUIPMENTIMPORTANT TOSAFETY.THEEFFECTOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLBETOINCREASETHERELIABILITY OFONEOFTHEDIVERSEMEANSAVAILABLE FOROPERATORS TODETECTLEAKAGEINSIDECONTAXNMENT.

EWR-4324STEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEMTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION ONSTEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEM.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOCONVERTTHESTEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEMTOAFLASHTANKBASEDPROCESS.THEPRIMARYGOALZSTOIMPROVERELIABZLXTY BYMOVINGTHEINHERENTTEMPERATURE CHANGESTOTHETANKANDPIPING.NEWPIPINGINSTALLED TOACCOMPLISH THISCONVERSION SHALLBERESIZEDTOREDUCETHEEROSION-CORROSION POTENTIAL.

REVISION3TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATE CHANGESTOREVISION2ASARESULTOFTHECOMMENTSFROMTHEREVIEWOFREVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS.

THECHANGESAREOPERATIONAL CONCERNSANDCLARIFICATION.

AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREANINCREASEORDECREASEINSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVAL.ANINCREASEINSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVALWOULDOCCURIFABLOWDOWNLINERUPTURED.

THISEVENTISENVELOPED INTHEUFSARBYEXAMINING THEINCREASEINFEEDWATER FLOWEVENTANDTHESPECTRUMOFSTEAMSYSTEMPIPINGFAILURES.

BOTHANALYZEDEVENTSAREFARMORESEVERTHANABLOWDOWNLINERUPTURE.37

ADECREASEINSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVALWOULDOCCURIFBLOWDOWNWERESUDDENLYISOLATED.

THISEVENTISSIMILARTOATURBINETRIP.THEUFSARDEFINESLOSSESTO50%ATFULLPOWERTOBEWITHINNORMALPLANTDESIGN.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIALIMITSBLOWDOWNCAPACITYTO7%ATFULLPOWER;THEREFORE, THESUDDENBLOWDOWNISOLATION EVENTANALYSISISNOTCONSIDERED.

THISMODIFICATION ISNON-SEISMIC SINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAINING SAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT ORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION BECAUSEOFREQUIREMENT INSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

ANALYSISNECESSARY TOASSURECONTINUAL COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50,APPENDIXRHASBEENREQUIRED.

THEREFORE, THEPROBABILITY ANDCONSEQUENCES OFAFIREAFFECTING COLDSHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTAREUNCHANGED.

HIGHENERGYLINEPIPEBREAKSHAVEBEENCONSIDERED BYREQUIRING THATALLEQUIPMENT NECESSARY FORSAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTWILLBEPROTECTED CONSISTENT WITHREFERENCE 2.2.4OFTHESAFETYANALYSIS.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4350MFWANDFWBYPASSVALVEINDICATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION TOINSTALLVALVEPOSITIONSENSORSFORTHEMAINFEEDWATER ANDFEEDWATER BYPASSVALVES(V4269iV4270iV4271iANDV4272)ANDASSOCIATED POSITIONINDICATION DISPLAYED ONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.THISEWRWASISSUEDASARESULTOFHUMANENGINEERING DIS-CREPANCYHED-65WHICHCITEDANEEDFORACTUALVALVEPOSITIONINDICATION ONTHEMCBRATHERTHANTHECONTROLLER DEMANDSIGNALINDICATION.

DUETOPRE-PORCCOMMENTS, REVISION0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS, WERENOTPRESENTED TOPORC.THEPURPOSEOFREVISION1OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISISTOINCLUDECOMMENTSASARESULTOFPRE-PORCOFREVISION0~38 i

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONARE:1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES2)SEISMICEVENT3)INCREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEM4)DECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEMNEWWIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION~

WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANTTHEREFORE

~THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODXFICATXON.

REVIEWSAND/ORANALYSESTOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXRHAVEBEENREQUIRED.

SAFESHUTDOWNCAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALLPOSTULATED FIRES~THEREFORE'ILL NOTBEJEOPARDIZED ASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWINDICATORS INSTALLED PERTHISMODIFICATION BEMOUNTEDSOASNOTTODEGRADETHEINTEGRITY OFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD(MCB).THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD,'SSEISMICQUALIFICATION.

THEADDITIONOFLDT'STOTHESTEMOFTHEMAINFEEDWATER ANDFEEDWATER BYPASSVALVESWILLNOTDEGRADETHEVALVE'SABILITYTOPERFORMITSINTENDEDFUNCTION.

SINCETHESEVALVESARENOTREQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURXNGASEISMICEVENT,THEABILITYTOFUNCTIONDURINGASEISMICEVENTHASNOTBEENDEGRADED.

THEADDITIONOFMFWANDFWBYPASSVALVEINDICATION WILLAIDTHEOPERATORZNMONITORING ANYINCREASEORDECREASEINHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEMANDSHALLNOTAFFECTTHEVALVESOPERATING CHARACTERISTICS.

ZTHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

39

EWR-4503TECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTERSUPPLEMENTAL UNZNTERRUPTABLE POWERSUPPLYTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFASECONDUNINTERRUPTABLE POWERSUPPLY(UPS)FORTHET.S.C.ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.ALSOEXISTINGELECTRICAL LOADSWILLBERE-DISTRIBUTED INORDERTOACHIEVEEVENBUSLOADING.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDES1.29AND1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICA-TIONAREMAJORANDMINORFIRESANDASEISMICEVENT.MODIFICATIONS REQUIREDBYTHEDESIGNCRITERIAWILLNOTDEGRADEFUNCTIONS ORPERFORMANCE OFANYSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'R COMPONENTS REQUIREDFORTHEPREVENTION ANDMITIGATION OFACCIDENTS ORANYOTHERNONSAFETYRELATEDSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'R COMPONENTS.

THISMODIFICATION ANDTHEMATERIALS UTILIZEDWILLMEETAPPENDIXR10CFR50CRITERIA.

EVENTHOUGHTHISMODIFICATION INVOLVESEQUIPMENT WHICHISNOTIDENTXFIED ASSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT.

NEWEQUIPMENT WILLNOTBELOCATEDINANYAREATHATCONTAINSSAFETYRELATEDEQUIPMENT THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION ISDESIGNATED NON-SEISMIC.

-MODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEPERFORMANCE ORFUNCTIONOFANYPLANTEQUIPMENT ORSYSTEM.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

1)STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMAL'OPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITXONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

40 i

EWR-45544AAND4BFEEDWATER HEATERSREPLACEMENT THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OF4AAND4BHEATERS.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOSPECIFY,PROCURE,ANDINSTALLNEWFEEDWATER HEATERSATTHEFOURTHEXTRACTION POINT.THEPRIMARYGOALISTOELIMINATE THECOPPERALLOYTUBES.STAINLESS STEELTUBESARERECOMMENDED.

REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGESRESULTING FROMPRE-PORCCOMMENTSOFREVISION0TO:1)CLARIFYTHEPERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS OFTHE75PSITUBESIDEPRESSUREDROP2)ADDADDITIONAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS INDESIGNCRITERIA3)CLARIFYREFERENCES ANDTESTREQUIREMENTS 4)ADDASMECODE5)ADDACCESSIBILITY IMAINTENANCE'I REPAIRIANDINSERVICE INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS INDESIGNCRITERIAAREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREADECREASEINFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE, ANDALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOW.THEDECREASEINFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE EVENTISANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASANACCIDENTAL OPENINGOFTHECONDENSATE BYPASSVALVE,WHICHRESULTEDINASUDDENREDUCTION ZNINLETFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE TOTHESTEAMGENERATORS.

THEMODIFICATION HASNOBEARINGONCONDENSATE BYPASSVALVEOPERATION ORPLANTRESPONSETOTHISEVENT.AREDUCTION INFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE WHICHRESULTEDFROMALOSSOFONEFEEDWATER HEATERHASBEENANALYZEDINUFSAR.THEANALYSISSHOWEDTHATFORAFEEDWATER ENTHALPYDECREASECORRESPONDING TOTHELOSSOFONEFEEDWATER HEATERATFULLPOWERMINIMUMDNBRDOESNOTFALLBELOWTHELXMITVALUE.ATZEROPOWERTHERESULTSARELESSLIMITINGTHANTHOSEPRESENTED ZN,UFSARSECTION15.4.1,UNCONTROLLED RODCLUSTERCONTROLASSEMBLYWITHDRAWAL FROMASUBCRITICAL CONDITION.

THELOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWISANALYZEDINTHEUFSARASADISRUPTION OFSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVALCAPABILITY.

41

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFTHEDISRUPTION ASARESULTOFCONDENSATE LINEBREAKSSINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTION ANDTESTINGOFNEWWELDS.THEPROBABILITY OFALOSSOFFEEDWATER THROUGHDEGRADATZON OFHEATERTUBESISREDUCEDBYREMOVINGTHEEXISTINGERODEDCOPPERTUBING.THISMODXFICATZON ISNON-SEISMIC SINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGINFIREAREASCONTAINING SAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT ORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION BECAUSEOFREQUIREMENTS ZNSECTION27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOF'"STRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4638GENERATOR 1SURGECAPACXTORS ANDNEUTRALTRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHENEUTRALTRANSFORMER ANDSURGECAPACITORS CONTAINING PCBs.THESECOMPONENTS WILLBEREPLACEDWITHSIMILARCOMPONENTS NOTCONTAINING PCBs.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRXTERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCORPORATES CHANGEFROMREVISION1TOSPECIFYINSTALLATION TESTSTOBEPERFORMED ONTHECOMPONENTS.

REVISION1DIDNOTSPECIFYTHETESTTOBEPERFORMED.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLTHEEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREMAJORANDMINORFIRES'OXIC GASRELEASES'ND LOSSOFELECTRICAL LOAD.NONEWWIRINGORCABLEISREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THEREWILLBENOINCREASEOFFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

REVIEWSAND/ORANALYSESTOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXRHAVEBEENREQUIRED.

SAFESHUTDOWNCAPABILITY FOLLOWING ALLPOSTULATED FIRES'HEREFORE'ILL NOTBEJEOPARDIZED ASARESULTOFTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THEPOTENTIAL FORALOSSOFELECTRICAL LOADEVENTCAUSEDBYCAPACITOR FAILUREWILLNOTBEINCREASED.

42

THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HE ADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICA-TION.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.EWR-4651COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLE CABLESTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSING THEMODIFICATION OFTHECOREEXITTHERMOCOUPLE CABLESTOPROVIDEFORALARAANDPERSONNEL SAFETYCONCERNS.

EWR4651~COREEXITTHERMOCOUPLE (CET)CABLESgREQUESTSTHEPURCHASEANDINSTALLATION OFEXTENSION CABLESATTHEBOUNDARYOFTHEREACTORHEADANDREACTORCAVITYBRIDGECABLETRAYSATGINNASTATIONFORTHE1988REFUELING OUTAGE.QUICKCONNECTORS INSTALLED ONTHECETCABLESATTHISLOCATIONAREDETACHEDEACHYEARFORREFUELING TOPERMITLIFTINGTHEREACTORHEADFROMTHEREFUELING CAVITY'HE CABLESINSTALLED ZN1983'HICH RUNFROMTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYDOWNTOTHETHERMOCOUPLES, FALLAPPROXIMATELY SIXFEETSHORTOFTHEBRIDGECABLETRAY.ASARESULT,THECETQUICKCONNECTORS HANGSEVERALFEETBELOWTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYANDPOSEACCESSIBILITY'LARAg ANDSAFETYCONCERNS.

THEOBJECTIVE OFTHISEWRZSTOPLACETHECETQUICKCONNECTORS FORREFUELING INTOTHEBRIDGECABLETRAYWHERETHEYCANBEACCESSEDCONVENIENTLY ANDSAFELY.REVISION2TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCOR-PORATESCHANGESFROMREVISION1TOCORRECTTHEPOSTINSTALL-ATIONTESTINGREQUIREMENTS FORSYSTEMVERIFICATION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALL,EVENTS ANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.G-UIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES~(2)ASEISMICEVENT~(3)ALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT(LOCA).43

NEWCETEXTENSION CABLEASSEMBLIES WILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE, THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEASSEMBLIES MEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLASKTESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASAPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTINTHE,DISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWCETEXTENSION CABLEASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDERTHISMODIFICATION BEQUALIFIED PERIEEE3441975'HEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION WILLREMAINFUNCTIONAL DURINGANDAFTERASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWCETEXTENSION CABLEASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDERTHISEWRBEQUALIFIED PERIEEE3231974ANDIEEE3831974FORFLAMEANDLOCALTHEREFOREJ THISMODIFICATION SHALLREMAINFUNCTIONAL DURINGANDAFTERALOSSOFCOOLANTACCIDENT.

THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HE ADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-4653STEAMGENERATOR WIDERANGELEVELINDICATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUESTADDRESSES THEADDITIONOFSTEAMGENERATOR WIDERANGELEVELINDICATION ONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARD.THIS-MODIFICATION WILLINSTALLTWONEWVERTICALSCALEINDICATORS TODISPLAYSTEAMGENERATOR WIDERANGEWATERLEVELONTHEMCB.THEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERLR-460WILLBERETAINEDFORRECORDKEEPINGANDTOSERVEASABACKUPLEVELINDICATOR.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTALTERTHEAVAILABILITY OFTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRESAND(2)ASEISMICEVENT.NEWWIRINGANDCABLEMAYBEREQUIREDFORTHEMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,THEREFORE THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEZEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHIS,THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

44

ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWSHALLBEPREPAREDTODEMONSTRATE THATCONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50APPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS ISMAINTAINED.

THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION

'ILLNOTRESULTINTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.THESTEAMGENERATOR (SG)WIDERANGEWATERLEVELINSTRUMENT-ATIONISDESIGNATED SEISMICCATEGORY1.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESALLNEWSGWIDERANGELEVELINSTRUMENTATION BEQUALIFIED ANDINSTALLED PERIEEE-344-1975.

THEREFORE, ASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPAIRTHEPROPEROPERATION OFTHESGWIDERANGEWATERLEVELINSTRUMENTATION.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESAHUMANFACTORSREVIEWOFTHISMODIFICATION BEPERFORMED PRIORTOISSUANCEOFDESIGNOUTPUTS'O MINIMIZETHEPROBABILITY OFOPERATORERRORTHEITEMSABOVEENSURETHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMZTSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.

THEACCURACYANDREADABILITY OFTHENEWINDICATORS AREASGOODORBETTERTHANTHEEXISTINGRECORDER.

THEREFORE, THEINDICATION UNCERTAINTY ISASGOODORBETTERTHANTHEEXISTINGSYSTEM.THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

INACCORDANCE WITHTHEPROVISIONS OF10CFR50.59, THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONBECAUSE:1)THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTISNOTINCREASED.

THEINDICATORS ADDEDTOTHEMCBDONOTPROVIDEANYAUTOMATIC CONTROLFUNCTION.

THEYAREREDUNDANT TOTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS,.

BUTPROVIDEAMOREREADABLEINDICATION TOTHEOPERATOR.

THESEINDICATORS ARESEISMICCLASS1EANDWILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFFAILUREOFTHEMCBORADJACENTINDICATORS DUETOASEISMICEVENT.ANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE REVIEWWILLDEMONSTRATE CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITHAPPENDIXRREQUIREMENTS.

45

2)THEPOSSIBILITY FORANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISISNOTCREATED.ASDISCUSSED ABOVEgTHESEINDICATORS AREINADDITIONTOTHEEXISTINGCHARTRECORDERS ANDARECLASSIFIED 1E.THISADDITIONTOTHEMCBWILLNOTCREATETHEPOSSIBILITY OFAFAILURENOTPREVIOUSLY ANALYZED.

3)THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISNOTREDUCED.THEADDEDINDICATORS PROVIDEAMORECLEARINDICATION ANDINCREASETHEABILITYOFTHEOPERATORTOMONITORWIDERANGELEVEL.THEMARGINOFSAFETYZSNOTAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4656LOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDMODIFICATIONS PHASEIITHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATIONS TOTHEREACTORVESSELLOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTAND.THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESANADDITIONAL MODIFICATION TOTHELOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDSUBSEQUENT TOTHECHANGESDESCRIBED INTHEORIGINALSAFETYANALYSIS.

A.THISMODIFICATION MOVESTHEEASTERNSUPPORTCOLUMN1/2INCHOUTWARD(AWAYFORMTHECENTEROFTHESUPPORTSTAND)ZNORDERTOPROVIDEMORECLEARANCE FORTHELOWERINTERNALS.

THISISACCOMPLISHED BYADDINGONEADDITIONAL HALF-INCH THICKSPACERPLATEONTHEEASTSIDEOFTHENORTHANDSOUTHSUPPORTCOLUMNS.THESPACERPLATESWILLBEBETWEENTHESUPPORTCOLUMNSANDTHEUPPERANDLOWERCONNECTION SUPPORTRINGS.THISANALYSISREVIEWSUNDERWHATPLANTOPERATING CONDITION THELOWERINTERNALS STORAGEHARDWAREWILLBEZNUSE'NDDETER-MINESWHATDESIGNBASISEVENTSARERELATEDTOTHEUSEOFTHEMODIFIEDHARDWARE.

THEFOLLOWING DESIGNBASISEVENTSARERELATEDTOTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION:

SEISMICEVENTSANDFIRES.THELOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDMAYBELEFTINPOSITIONONTHELOWERLEVELOFTHEREACTORCAVITY.THELOCATIONOFTHELOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDISNOTADJACENTTOANYSAFETYRELATEDSYSTEMORCOMPONENT.

THELOWERINTERNALS STORAGESTANDSLOWCENTEROFGRAVITY'IDE BASECOMBINEDWITHTHECOEFFICIENT OFFRICTIONARESUFFICIENT TOENSURETHATTHESTANDWILLREMAININPLACEDURINGBOTHTHEOPERATING BASISANDSAFESHUTDOWNEARTHQUAKES.

46

THEMATERIALS TOBEUSEDXNTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION ISSTAINLESS STEELWHICHISNON-COMBUSTIBLE.

XTWILLNOTCHANGETHEFREQUENCY ORRESULTSOFANYFIRETHATISPOSTULATED.

BASEDONTHEFOREGOING, THEMODIFICATIONS WILLCAUSENOCHANGESTOTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATION.THEMODIFICATIONSWZLLNOTCHANGETHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES

~SYSTEMSgORCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFSAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUA'TED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTCHANGED.THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEACHANGETOTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ANDISNOTANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION.

EWR-4670M-483INVERTERREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTINGMQ-483INVERTERWITHANEWQUALIFIED ONE.REVISION2OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIASTATESTHESOLIDSTATECONTROLS, ZNC.(SCI)ZNVERTERISPARTNO.EV12004/5ASOPPOSEDTOPART12004ASWELLASQUALIFYING IEEE383-1974ASTHESTANDARDUSEDFORBOTHTHEDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSIS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)2)3)4)SEISMICEVENTMAJORANDMINORFIRESINCREASE/DECREASE ZNHEATREMOVALBYTHESECONDARY SYSTEMPIPEBREAKSINSIDECONTAINMENT SECTION3.0AND9.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRETHATTHENEWMQ-483XNVERTERBESEISMICALLY QUALIFIED TOGINNASPECIFICSEISMICRESPONSESPECTRA.ZNADDITION, ITZSREQUIREDTHATTHEINVERTERBEMOUNTEDTOPREVENTSEISMICFAILURE.47

THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEREPLACEMENT OFEQUIPMENT ANDMAYINVOLVETHEINSTALLATION OFCABLEINTHERELAYROOMFIREAREA.IFNEWCABLEZSTOBEINSTALLED, AREVIEWWILLBEPERFORMED TOASSURECONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50iAPPENDIXR.WIRINGANDEQUIPMENT WILLBEINSTALLED INCOMPLIANCE WITHEE-29.ALLNEWCABLINGiIFREQUIREDiWILLBEQUALIFIED TOZEEE3831984FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONS WILLBEREPAIREDANDREPLACEDZNACCORDANCE WITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES, NOTDEGRADING EXISTINGSEALS.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL FORTHEFOLLOWING REASONS:A)THEMODIFICATION INVOLVESEQUIPMENT WHICHISNOTIDENTIFIED ASSAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT INTABLE3-1OFTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

B)THEREZSNOEFFECTONSEPARATION OFEXISTINGCIRCUITS, ASSOCIATED CZRCUITSi ORFIREAREABOUNDARIES ASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTEFFECTTHECAPABILITIES OFTHEALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEM.THERESHALLBENOEFFECTONEXISTINGPROCEDURES FOROBTAINING ANALTERNATE SAFESHUTDOWNi THEREBYCOMPLYING WITH10CFR50APPENDIXR.INSTRUMENT LOOPP479MONITORSSTEAMGENERATOR PRESSURE.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTMODIFYTHEINSTRUMENT LOOP.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHEREPLACEMENT ZNVERTERADDSNONEWFAILUREMODESBEYONDTHOSEOFTHEEXISTINGINVERTERi THEINTEGRITY OFLOOPP479WILLBEUNAFFECTED BYTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, NONEWINSTRUMENT ERRORSORFAILURESWILLBEINTRODUCED THATCOULDLEADTOANINCREASEORDECREASEINSECONDARY SYSTEMHEATREMOVAL.INSTRUMENT LOOPP950MONITORSCONTAINMENT PRESSURE.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTMODIFYTHEINSTRUMENT LOOP.SINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHEREPLACEMENT INVERTERADDSNONEWFAILUREMODESBEYONDTHOSEOFTHEEXISTINGINVERTER, THEINTEGRITY OFLOOPP950WILLBEUNAFFECTED BYTHISMODIFICATION THEREFOREi NONEWINSTRUMENT ERRORSORFAILURESWILLBEINTRODUCED THATCOULDLEADTOAFALSEINDICATION OFCONTAINMENT PRESSUREDURINGAPIPEBREAK.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSESAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTULATED.

48

/'

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGXNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONHAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

ITHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

EWR-4750CONTAINMENT FANS1B1DDAMPERSOLENOIDISOLATION FUSESTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEADDITIONOFISOLATION FUSESTOTHELOOPENTRYDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITSFORCONTAINMENT RECIRCULATION FANS1BAND1D.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.EVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREASFOLLOWS:1)2)3)4)SEISMICEVENTMAJORANDMINORFIRESPIPEBREAKSINSIDEANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENT BREAKINRCSPRESSUREBOUNDARYLINESTHATPENETRATE CONTAINMENT THENEWFUSEBLOCKSWILLBESEISMICALLY MOUNTEDANDTHEREFORE WILLENSUREASEISMICEVENTWILLNOTDEGRADETHEINTEGRITY OFBUS16UNIT13CORBUS14UNIT2CENCLOSURES INWHICHTHEFUSESAREMOUNTED.THEMODIFICATION ZSDESIGNEDTOCOMPLYWITH10CFRAPPENDIXRCRITERIAANDENGINEERING PROCEDURES.

THEREFORE, THEPROBABILITY OFAMAJORORMINORFIREWILLNOTBEINCREASED.

THEFOLLOWING DESIGNBASISEVENTS(DBE)WILLNOTAFFECTORBEAFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

ANYDBETHATCAUSESALEAD-TO-LEAD SHORTZNTHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITWILLCAUSETHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUITFUSESTOFAIL.FUSECOORDINATION ASSURESTHATTHESEFUSESWILLFAILBEFORETHEMAINFANCONTROLFUSES.THEREFORE, LOSSOFFANS1BAND1DgDURINGANYDBEDUETOALEAD-TO-LEAD SHORTINTHEDAMPERSOLENOIDVALVECIRCUIT,WILLNOTOCCUR.BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS:

1)STRUCTURES gSYSTEMSgANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS

.ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

2)MARGINOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATING ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.49 0

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS'T HASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES/

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4754CABLERELOCATIONS THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEUPGRADING OFSEVERALCIRCUITSPLICESINTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGANDRELOCATION OFCABLESABOVETHECONTAINMENT FLOODLEVEL.REVISIONg2ADDSAFIREPROTECTION REQUIREMENT.

CABLESANDSPLICESSHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFIEEE383-1974.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNAFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYTHEUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE:1)SEISMICEVENT2)MAJORANDMINORFIRES3)'PIPEBREAKS'NSIDE ANDOUTSIDECONTAINMENT THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANYNEWORRELOCATECONDUITBEMOUNTEDTOPREVENTSEISMICFAILURESTHEREFORE'NSTALLED CABLESHALLREMAINFUNCTIONAL AFTERASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATION INVOLVESTHEADDITIONOFNEWCABLEANDSPLICESINCONTAINMENT ANDINTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDING.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLNEWCABLEANDSPLICESBEQUALIFIED TOIEEE-383-1974 FLAMEANDLOCAREQUIREMENTS.

FIREBARRIERPENETRATIONS WILLBEREPAIREDANDREPLACEDZNACCORDANCE WITHEXISTINGPLANTPROCEDURES.

THEREFORE, EXISTINGSEALSWILLNOTBEDEGRADED.

THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTAFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNANALYSISINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL SINCETHEREISNOAFFECTONSEPARATION OFEXISTINGCIRCUITS~

ASSOCIATED

'CIRCUITS'R FIREAREABOUNDARIES ASANALYZEDINTHEAPPENDIXRSUBMITTAL.

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATANAPPENDIXRCONFORMANCE VERIFICATION BEPERFORMED.

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITIES OFTHEALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWNSYSTEM.FURTHERMORE, NONEOFTHEEXISTINGPROCEDURES FOROBTAINING ANALTERNATIVE SAFESHUTDOWNWILLBEEFFECTED'HIS MODIFICATIONS THEREFORE'OMPLZES WITH10CFR50,APPENDIXR.50 0

THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWCABLEANDSPLICES,INSTALLED ASPARTOFTHECABLERELOCATIONS, SHALLNOTAFFECTINSTRUMENT LOOPINTEGRITY.

THEREFORE, NONEWFAILUREMODESSHALLBEINTRODUCED INTOTHEINSTRUMENT LOOPS.THEDESIGNCRITERIACOLLECTIVELY REQUIRESALLCABLESTOBERELOCATED, TOUTILIZEMATERIALANDCONFIGURATIONS APPROVEDUNDER10CFR50.49; ANDCALIBRATION OFEACHLOOPTOENSURETHATLOOPFUNCTIONISNOTAFFECTED; THATLOOPACCURACYBEADDRESSED'ND VERIFIEDASACCEPTABLE'N THESYSTEMINTEGRATEDPACKAGES'HEREFORE~

LOOPACCURACYSHALLNOTBEDEGRADEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

ALLMATERIALANDCONFIGURATIONS UTILIZEDUNDERTHISMODIFICA-TIONSHALLBEAPPROVEDUNDER10CFR50~49'HEREFORE'IPE BREAKSINSIDEOROUTSIDECONTAINMENT/

THATCREATEALOCA~HELB/SLB~ETC'HALLNOTDEGRADETHEINTEGRITY OFSPLICESORCABLESUSEDINTHISMODIFICATION.

THEABOVEITEMSENSURETHATTHISMODIFICATION DOESNOTDEGRADETHECAPABILITY OFANYSAFETYSYSTEMTOPERFORMITSFUNCTION.

THEASSUMPTIONS ANDCONCLUSIONS OFEXISTINGANALYSISAREUNCHANGED.

NONEWTYPESOFEVENTSAREPOSTU-LATED.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARgTHESTRUCTURAL REANALYSISPLAN(SRP)ANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS~

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4761HIGHHEADRECIRCULATION EVALUATION THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEINTERCHANGING OFTHEPOWERANDCONTROLPOWERWIRINGOFMOVs857AAND857B.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATING-TOTHISMODIFICATION AREFIREgSEISMIC'OCAL ANDLOSSOFPOWEREVENTS.THEFIRSTEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHEMODIFICATION TOBESEISMICCATEGORY1THEREFORE'HE MODIFICATION WILLNOTADVERSELY AFFECTTHESYSTEMDURINGASEISMICEVENT.THESECONDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFAFIREINTHEPLANTDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

THECONTROLWIRINGUSEDFORMODIFICATION IS'EQUIREDTOMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFZEEESTD.383-1974FLAMETEST.THUSTHEREISNOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINTHEFIRELOADINGDUETOTHISMODIFICATION.

51

THEDESIGNCRITERIAPROVIDESREQUIREMENTS TOPRESERVEANYSILICONEFOAMFIRESTOPORSEALTHATMAYNEEDTOBEPENETRATED.

THEDESZGNCRITERIAREQUIRESANAPPENDIXRREVIEWTHEREFORE iTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTEXISTINGCOMPLIANCE METHODS.THETHIRDEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFALOCA.DURINGTHESUMPRECIRCULATION PHASEFOLLOWING ALOCA,IFHIGHHEADRECIRCULATION ISNECESSARY (INCURRENTPROCEDURES WHENRHRTOTALISLESSTHAN400GPM)iTHE857AiBiCVALVESMUSTBEOPENED.PRESENTPROCEDURE ES-1.3CALLSFORSTARTINGRHRPUMPSALIGNEDTOTHESUMPANDDISCHARGING TOTHEREACTORTHROUGHTHEMOV852A,BVALVESPRIORTOOPENING857A,B,CIFHIGHHEADRECIRCULATION ISREQUIRED.

SINGLEFAILURECRITERIAREQUIRESTHETIMINGOFTHEACTIVEFAILURETOOCCURATTHEBEGINNING OFTHEHIGHHEADRECIRCULATION PHASE.AFA1LUREOFD/G1APRIOROPENINGTHE857VALVESWOULDRESULTINBOTHTRAINSLEADINGTOTHESAFETYINJECTION/CONTAINMENT SPRAYPUMPSBEINGBLOCKEDANDPOTENTIAL LOSSOFCORECOOLING.THISZSTHEPROBLEMWHICHWILLBECORRECTED THRUTHISMODIFICATION.

THEFOURTHEVENTANALYZEDISTHEEFFECTOFALOSSOFPOWERONTHEOPERATIONS OFTHEVALVES.ASSTATEDINTHEPREVIOUSPARAGRAPH AFAILUREOFD/GlAPRIORTOOPENINGTHE857VALVESWOULDRESULTINBOTHTRAINSLEADINGTOTHESAFETYINJECTION/CONTAINMENT SPRAYPUMPSBEINGBLOCKEDANDPOTENTIAL LOSSOFCORECOOLING.THISWILLBECORRECTED BYTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE BASEDUPONTHEABOVEANALYSIS, ITHASBEENDETERMINED THAT:A)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCEDANDB)THESTRUCTURES iSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS AREADEQUATE.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ANDTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTARENOTINCREASED.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFATYPEDIFFERENT FROMANYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISHASNOTBEENCREATED.THEMARGINSOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ISNOTREDUCED.52

EWR-4769SAFEGUARDS RACKSIRELAYSTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEREMOVALOFUNUSEDRELAYSFROMTHESAFEGUARDS RACKS.ALLBFDRELAYS,USEDFORSAFEGUARDS INITIATION LOCATEDINTHERELAYROOMSAFEGUARDS RACKS,AREBEINGREPLACEDZNACCORDANCE WITHMAINTENANCE, PROCEDURE M-59.9.SIXTEENOFTHESERELAYSAREUNUSEDANDREPRESENT ANUNNECESSARY EXPOSURETOFAILUREFORTHESAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS.THEEIGHTUNUSEDRELAYCOILSINEACHTRAINARECONTROLLED BYTHESAMEFUSESCONTROLLING ALLTHEOTHEROPERATING SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS.THEREFORE, ACOILFAILUREINANYOFTHESEUNITSCOULDKEEPTHESAFETYINJECTION SEQUENCEFROMBEINGINITIATED.

THERELAYSBEINGREMOVEDSERVENOFUNCTIONAL PURPOSE.ONEOFTHETWOCOILLEADSFOR6OFTHESERELAYSWEREDISCONNECTED ASPARTOFEWR2950.THEREMAINING 10RELAYSHAVEALLUNUSEDCONTACTS.

COILWIRINGISACCOMPLISHED BYUSEOFJUMPERCONNECTIONS FROMCOILTOCOIL.SOMEOFTHESEWIRESCANBEREMOVEDWHILEPORTIONSOFOTHERSWILLBENEEDEDTOMAKEUPREMAINING CONNECTIONS.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ZSFIRE.NEWWIRINGWILLBEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT,ANDBECAUSEOFTHISPOTENTIALS THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESALLSUCHWIREMEETTHEIEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLCAUSENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEINFIREPROPAGATION HAZARD.IASARESULT,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTWILLBEUNCHANGED.

THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCE OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLBEUNCHANGED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

INFACT,BECAUSEEQUIPMENT CONNECTED TOSAFETYINJECTION CIRCUITS(ALTHOUGH ITSERVESNOFUNCTIONAL PURPOSE)ISBEINGREMOVED'HE PROBABILITY OFMALFUNCTIONING OFTHESICIRCUITRY ISREDUCED.THEREFORE, THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION ISBEINGPERFORMED TOREMOVEEXCESSRELAYSFROMTHERELAYRACKSTHUSREMOVINGFROMTHECIRCUITSAPIECEOFEQUIPMENT THATCOULDMALFUNCTION.

53

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

EWR-4789TDAFPSTEAMADMISSION VALVESTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFICATION WHICHREWIRESTHECONTROLCIRCUITTOSEALZNAROUNDTHECONTROLSWITCHSOTHATWHENTHECIRCUITISENERGIZETOOPENTHEVALVEWILLCONTINUETOOPENTOTHEFULLYOPENPOSITION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGINNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION (1)FIRESAND(2)SEISMICEVENTS,AND(3)LOSSOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEPOSSIBILITY ORIMPACTONTHELEVELOFFIREPROTECTION ANDALTERNATE SHUTDOWNCAPABILITIES, NORTHEFIREPROTECTION ANDALTERNATE SHUTDOWNLICENSECONDITIONS ANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

ADDITIONAL WIRINGANDCABLEWILLBEADDEDZNTHISMODIFICATIONS WHICHCOULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE,

'THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHWIRINGANDCABLEMEETTHEIEEE383-1974FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

CONSEQUENTLY, THEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEIMPACTOFASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNOFTHEMODIFICATION SHALLBESEISMICCATEGORY1INACCORDANCE WITHTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

THEMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEIMPACTOFLOSSOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER.

THEDESIGNOFTHEMODIFICATION DOESNOTALTERTHEMANUALORAUTOMATIC OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS OFTHEAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM.REQUIRING THEVALVETOGOFULLOPENONCETHECIRCUITISENERGIZED VS.HAVINGITSTOPWHENTHESWITCHISRELEASEDMAKESMANUALANDAUTOMATIC ACTUATION SIMILAR.THISDOESNOTADVERSELY IMPACTTHESYSTEM.THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENT.ORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHISPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

54 0

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.EWR-4794SECURITYGATEREPLACEMENT THISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFFIVE(5)EXISTINGSECURITYGATEOPERATORS ANDTHEOUTERCANTILEVER VEHICLEGATEATTHESHIPPINGANDRECEIVING BUILDINGWITHANOVERHEADSLIDEGATE.SUPPORTSWILLALSOBEADDEDTOEXISTINGGATESTOREDUCEVIBRATIONS.

THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ZSTOIMPROVESECURITYGATERELIABILITY ANDMAINTAINABILITY.

EXCESSIVE VIBRATION INTHESECURITYGATESHASCONTINUALLY BEENTHESOURCEOFPROBLEMSFORTHESECURITYINTRUSION DETECTORS.

DURINGHIGHWINDSTHEEXCESSSECURITYGATEVIBRATIONS TRIPTHESECURITYE-FIELD.THISRESULTSINTHENECESSITY FORSECURITYPERSONNEL TOPATROLTHEAREA.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEONLYEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION AREINTERNALANDEXTERNALEVENTS,SPECIFICALLY NATURALEVENTSANDLOSSOFAC~FIREALLCABLEANDWIREORDEREDFORTHISMODIFICATION SHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFIEEE383-1974FLAMETEST,THUSMITIGATING ANYPOTENTIAL FORPROPAGATING AFIRE.EARTHQUAKE DURINGASEISMICEVENT,THESECURITYGATEMODIFICATION WILLHAVENOSAFETYFUNCTION, ANDNEEDNOTREMAINFUNCTIONAL.

LOSSOFACTHISMODIFICATION SHALLBEREVIEWEDSOASTOENSURETHEISOLATION OFCLASS1EANDNON-CLASS 1ESYSTEMS.THESECURITYGATESYSTEMSOURCEOFPOWERISFROMANONSAFEGUARDS BUSgWITHASTANDBYPOWERSOURCEDEDICATED TOTHESECURITYSYSTEM.THEREFORE, THECLASS1EELECTRICAL SYSTEMISNOTEFFECTEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHESTRUCTURAL RE-ANALYSISPLAN(SRP)gZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

55

EWR-4798SOLENOIDUPGRADETHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEINSTALLATION OFBLOCKINGDIODESONSELECTEDSOLENOIDVALVECOILSTOPROVIDEPROTECTION AGAINSTVOLTAGETRANSIENTS DUETOANINDUCTIVE KICKBACK.THEDIODESAREARETROFITPROVIDEDBYTHEVALVEMANUFACTURERS VALCOR/ANDWILLBEINSTALLED ACROSSTHESOLENOIDCOILSOFTHEMAINSTEAM ISOLATION ANDREACTORHEADVENTVALVES.REVISION1TOTHISDESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISINCLUDESTHEINSTALLATION OFDIODEASSEMBLIES ACROSSTHEHYDROGENMONITORING SYSTEMSOLENOIDS~

V921gV922gV923ANDV924.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES,(2)ASEISMICEVENT,(3)AMAINSTEAMLINEBREAK.CABLEREQUIREDFORTHISMODIFICATION COULDADDTOTHEFIRELOADINGOFTHEPLANT.THEREFORE, THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATALLSUCHCABLEMEETTHEZEEE-383-1974 FLAMETESTREQUIREMENTS.

BECAUSEOFTHISTHEREWILLBENOSIGNIFICANT INCREASEOFFIRELOADINGCAUSEDBYTHISMODIFICATION.

THISMODIFICATION HASBEENREVIEWEDTOENSURETHATFAILUREOFANYELECTRICAL CABLEINSTALLED ASPARTOFTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTRESULTZNTHEDISABLING OFVITALEQUIPMENT NEEDEDTOSAFELYSHUTDOWNTHEPLANTDURINGPOSTULATED FIRES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATNEWRECTIFIER ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDERTHISMODIFICATION BEQUALIFIED PERIEEE344-1975'HEREFORE'HIS MODIFICATION WILLREMAINFUNCTIONAL DURINGANDAFTERASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWRECTIFIER ASSEMBLIES INSTALLED UNDERTHISEWRBEQUALIFIED PERIEEE323-1974, THEREFORE THISMODIFICATION SHALLREMAINFUNCTIONAL DURINGANDAFTERAMAINSTEAMLINEBREAK.THEREFORE gTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED'HE ADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

56

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORAMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION.

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONORREQUIREATECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSAR,ZTHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHEL1FEOFTHEPLANT'AVE NOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4862NZSTRIPBYPASSTHISENGINEERING WORKREQUEST(EWR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHEEXISTING1084OVERPOWER TRIPFUNCTIONTESTRELAYPUSHBUTTON SWITCHESWITHMAINTAINABLE TYPESWITCHES.

MAINTAINABLE TYPESWITCHESARENECESSARY TOMAINTAINENERGZZATION OFTHETESTRELAYSWHICHDEENERGIZE THEREACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYSDURINGMAINTENANCE OFTHE1084OVERPOWER NISPOWERRANGECHANNELS.

DEENERGIZING EACHTRAIN'S108OVERPOWER REACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYDURINGCHANNELMAINTENANCE PLACESTHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODEWHICHSATISFIES THEREQUIREMENTS OFGZNNATECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

THEEXISTINGREACTORTRIPRELAYLOGICOFTHE108%OVERPOWER NISPOWERRANGECHANNELSATGINNASTATIONCONSISTSOFTHEFOLLOWING:

EACHOFTHEFOUR1084OVERPOWER NISPOWERRANGECHANNELSHAVEATESTRELAYONEACHTRAINUTILIZEDFORDEENERGZZING THE108%OVERPOWER REACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYS.EXISTINGMOMENTARY TYPESWITCHES, LOCATEDZNTHERELAYLOGICTESTRACKS(RLTRlgRLTR2)INTHEREL'AYROOMgENERGIZETHETESTRELAYSWHICHDEENERGZZE THE1084OVERPOWER REACTORTRIPBISTABLERELAYSPLACINGTHECHANNELINTHETRIPMODE.THEEXISTINGSWITCHESAREPANELMOUNTSSINGLEPOLEgMOMENTARY PUSHBUTTON TYPE.THEFOUREXISTINGMOMENTARY PUSHBUTTON TYPESWITCHESONEACHOFBOTHTRAINS(TOTALOFEIGHT)WILLBEREPLACEDBYMAINTAINABLE SELECTORTYPESWITCHES.

THISWILLALLOWTHE1084OVERPOWER TRIPFUNCTIONTESTRELAYTOREMAINENERGIZED ANDMAINTAINTHECHANNELZNATRIPMODEDURINGMAINTENANCE.

57 i

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATION'UFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)MAJORANDMINORFIRES'2)ASEISMICEVENTS(3)AREACTOROVERPOWER TRANSIENT (108%OVERPOWER REACTORTRIP).NONEWWIRING,FIELDCABLE,OROTHERWISE FLAMMABLE MATERIALS WILLBEADDEDTOTHEPLANTUNDERTHISMODIFICATION, THEREFORE/

NOINCREASEINFIRELOADINGZSIMPOSED.THENEWSELECTORSWITCHESAREDESIGNATED SEISMICCATEGORY1.THEREFORE' SEISMICEVENTWILLNOTIMPACTTHEPROPEROPERATION OFTHESWITCHES.

CHANGINGTHESUBJECTSWITCHESFROMMOMENTARY TOMAINTAINABLE DOESNOTAFFECTTHEOPERATION OFTHENIS1084OVERPOWER REACTORTRIPBECAUSEACTUATION OFTHESWITCHESWILLPLACETHECHANNELZNTHETRIPMODE.THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTEFFECTTHENISRESPONSETOANOVERPOWER TRANSIENT.

THUS,THISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES/

NORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)2)3)MAJORANDMINORFIRESASEISMICEVENTAREACTOROVERPOWER TRANSIENT (108%OVERPOWER REACTORTRIP)ITHASBEENDETERMINED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENDETERMINED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS, ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-4933SGPRESSURETUBINGRELOCATION THISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES MODIFICATION OFTHEitBttSTEAMGENERATOR PRESSURETRANSMITTER(S)

TUBINGANDSUPPORTS.

THEPURPOSEOFTHEMODIFICATION ISTOMITIGATETHEPOTENTIAL FORTHERECURRENCE OFFREEZINGSENSORLINESZNTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGINTHEFOLLOWING FASHION:1)REROUTING TUBINGFORSENSORLINESPT-479ANDPT-4832)THEANALYSISONNEWTUBEROUTING.3)PROVIDEINSULATION IFDEEMEDNECESSARY TOENSURETHATTHETUBINGCONTENTSREMAINABOVE32F.4)PROVIDESEISMICRESTRAINT FORTHEAFFECTEDTUBING.58 10 THEFOLLOWING ARERESPONSES TOPRE-PORCCOMMENTSONEWR4933DESIGNCRITERIAANDSAFETYANALYSISREVISION0'.1.COMMENT:WHYNOTELIMINATE THEADDITIONOFTHEFOURVALVESET-UPANDJUSTREPLACETHETUBING.THETUBINGCANBEPRE-RUNANDTHENTHECONNECTIONS MADEINASHORTTIME.RESPONSE:

THEPROPOSEDDESIGNREQUIREDTHATTHEVALVESBEINSTALLED DURINGTHE1989SPRINGOUTAGEANDTHENPERFORMTHEREMAINING MODIFICATIONS POST-OUTAGE.

THEPRIMARYOBJECTIVE FORTHISAPPROACHATTHETIMEWASTOMAKEMODIFICATIONS TOTHESYSTEMWITHOUTRENDERING ANYTRAININOPERABLE.

BASEDONMYCONVERSATION WITHYOUON5/2/89'ILLING ANDVENTINGOFTHELINESANDRECALZBRATZON OFTHETRANSMITTERS WILLBEREQUIRED.

THISWILLCAUSEONELINEATATIMETOBEINOPERABLE.

ONTHEBASISTHATFILLING~VENTINGgANDRECALZBRATION ISREQUIREDITZSPRUDENTTOELIMINATE THEINSTALLATION OFTHEVALVES.THEDESIGNCRITERIAWILLBEREVISEDTOREFLECTTHISCHANGE.2.COMMENT:SHOULDINCLUDEINSERVICE LEAKCHECKFORPORTIONSOFTUBINGWHICHCANNOTBEHYDROED.RESPONSE:

THISOPTIONWILLBEINCLUDEDINTHEECNWHENTHEDRAWINGSAREISSUEDFORCONSTRUCTION.

3.COMMENT:ISTHEREAMINIMUMSLOPEREQUIREMENT FORTUBINGINSTALLATION.

RESPONSE

YES.THISREQUIREMENT WILLBESPECIFIED ONTHECONSTRUCTION DRAWINGS.

4.COMMENT:WHATISANAPPROPRIATE AIRSEAL.RESPONSE:

THEDETAILSOFANAPPROPRIATE AIRSEALWILLBEEVALUATED DURINGTHEDESIGNPROCESS.AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFTHEDESIGNBASISEVENTSTODETERMINE THOSERELATEDTOTHEMODIFICATION.

THEEVENTSASSOCIATED WITHTHISWORKARE:A)B)C)D)E)FIRESSEISMICEVENTSBELOWFREEZINGAMBIENTTEMPERATURE POSTULATED RUPTUREOFSTEAMORFEEDWATER LINESDIFFERENTIAL DISPLACEMENT OFCONTAINMENT STRUCTURE ANDINTERMEDIATE BUILDING59 0

THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTDEGRADEEXISTINGFZREBARRIERSORAFFECTTHEPERFORMANCE OFANYEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION EQUIPMENT.

ANYNEWMATERIALS USEDINELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS SHALLMEETTHEREQUIREMENTS OFIEEE-383-1974, THUSMITIGATING THEPOTENTIAL FORPROPAGATING AFIRE.ALLEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION FEATURESREQUIREDTOASSURECOMPLIANCE WITHlOCFR50APPENDIXR,ORTOMAINTAINEQUIVALENT LEVELSOFPROTECTION FROMFIRESWILLBEMAINTAINED DURINGANDFOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TOTHETUBINGANDCONTROLSYSTEMS.SEISMICEVENTSHAVEBEENANALYZEDUNDERTHESEPRE-EVALUATION PROGRAM.THEMODIFICATION ANDSUPPORTSWILLBEEVALUATED, INREGARDTOASEISMICEVENTiTOCRITERIAIDENTICAL TOTHESEISMICUPGRADEPROGRAM.THISWILLENSURETHATANYMODIFICATIONS WILLBEDESIGNEDSOASTOEQUALORIMPROVETHESYSTEM'SCAPABILITY TOWZTHSTAND ASEISMICEVENT.BASEDONTHEABOVEANALYSISiZTHASBEENDETERMINEDTHATA)THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATION ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONARENOTREDUCED.B)THESTRUCTURES iSYSTEMSiANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ORPOSTULATED HIGHENERGYPIPEBREAKANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS ORPOSTULATED HIGHENERGYBREAKSCONTINUETOREMAINADEQUATE.

C)ALLINSTRUMENT SENSINGLINEPENETRATIONS SHALLBELOCATEDATAMINIMUMHEIGHTOFSEVENFEET(2.2METERS)ABOVEFLOORLEVEL,ORTHATROUTINGANDSUPPORTOFSENSINGLINESSHALLENSURETHATTHEFUNCTIONOFTHELINESXSNOTAFFECTEDBYVIBRATIONS ABNORMALHEATiCOLD,ORSTRESS.THUS,THISMODXFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES/

NORDOESZTREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)FIREPROTECTION FEATURES2)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMICANDTORNADOEVENTS3)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING AHIGHENERGYLINEBREAK.60 0

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARgTHESTRUCTURAL REANALYSISPLAN(SRP)ANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ZTHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

EWR-5053REPAIRHDPUMPBARRELLEAKTHISEWR(ENGINEERING WORKREQUEST)ADDRESSES THEMODIFXCATION ONTHEHEATERDRAINTANKPUMPBARRELLEAKREPAIR.THEPURPOSEOFTHISMODIFICATION ISTOINSTALLAPASSIVEVENTSYSTEMONTHEHEATERDRAINPUMPBARREL.THEVENTSSHALLPROVIDEACONTROLLED PATHFORSTEAMANDDEBRXSTOESCAPEFROMTHEANNULARREGIONBETWEENEACHPUMPBARRELANDLINERATTHESAMETIMEPREVENTING SAFETYAND/OREROSIONPROBLEMS.

AREVIEWHASBEENPERFORMED OFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ISALOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOW.LOSSOFNORMALFEEDWATER FLOWCANOCCURFROMARUPTUREOFAPUMPBARRELDUETOTHEEROSIVEACTIONOFTHEVENTINGSTEAM.THEANALYZEDEVENTISFARMORESEVERETHANAPUMPBARRELRUPTURE.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASETHEPROBABILITY OFAPUMPBARRELRUPTURESINCETHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESPROPERINSPECTION OFTHEPUMPBARREL.THISMODIFICATION ISNON-SEISMIC SINCEITDOESNOTEFFECTTHESAFESHUTDOWNOFTHEREACTOR.THISMODIFICATION DOESNOTINCREASETHEFIRELOADINGZNFIREAREASCONTAINING SAFESHUTDOWNEQUIPMENT ORDEGRADEEXISTINGFIREPROTECTION BECAUSEOFREQUIREMENT INSECTXON27.0OFTHEDESIGNCRITERIA.

ANALYSISNECESSARY TOASSURECONTINUAL COMPLIANCE WITH10CFR50gAPPENDIXRHASBEENREQUIRED'HEREFORE, THEPROBABILITY ANDCONSEQUENCES OFAFIREAFFECTING COLDSHUTDOWNOFTHEPLANTAREUNCHANGED.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTHEREQUIREMENTS OFGINNASTATIONTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS,ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

61 0

TSRCCW88-07CHECKVALVE743AINTERNALS REMOVALTHISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTADDRESSES CHANGESTOCCWCHECKVALVE743A.THISCHANGEINVOLVESREMOVINGCHECKVALVE743A'S,INTERNALS TOALLOWCONCLUSIVE LEAKRATETESTINGOFCCWCHECKVALVE743.INTHEORIGINALPLANTDESIGNVALVE743AWASUTILIZEDASTHECONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVEFORTHECCWLINECOMINGFROMTHEEXCESSLETDOWNHEATEXCHANGER.

HOWEVERSDUETOLEAKAGEPROBLEMSWITHVALVE743AgCHECKVALVE743WASINSTALLED INSERIESWITH743ATOPERFORMTHECONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION.

CONSEQUENTLY, CHECKVALVE743ANOLONGERPERFORMSANYSAFETYOROPERATIONAL FUNCTION.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGZNNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGINNAPROCEDURE A-303.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)SEISMICEVENTS'2)

PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT

BUILDING, ANDAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.THISMODIFICATION WILLBEDESIGNEDSUCHTHATITWILLNOTAFFECTTHECAPABILITY OFCHECKVALVE743AORITSCONNECTED PIPINGANDSUPPORTSTOWITHSTAND ASEISMICEVENT.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTTHEBODYPRESSUREBOUNDARYFUNCTIONING OFCHECKVALVE743ATHEREFORE THEASAB31.1PRESSUREDESIGNWILLREMAINVALID.CCWCHECKVALVE743WILL'TILL PROVIDETHECONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTIONS DURINGAPRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTUREORAMAINSTEAMLINERUPTURE.THUSgTHISMODIFICATION NEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMIC.2)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTXONFOLLOWING APIPEBREAKINSIDEOROUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES'YSTEMS/

ANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

62

TSR89-05RHRSPENTFUELANDCVCSNON-REGENERATIVE HEATEXCHANGERS BOLTINGUPGRADETHISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTADDRESSES FLANGEBOLTINGUPGRADESFORTHERHRgSPENTFUELSANDNONREGENERATIVE HEATEXCHANGERS.

THESHELLSIDEINLETANDOUTLETFLANGESWEREORIGINALLY SUPPLIEDWITHSA-307GRADEBBOLTS.THESEBOLTSWILLBEREPLACEDWITHSA-193GRADEB7BOLTSFOLLOWING STANDARDRG&EBOLTINGPRACTICES.

AREVIEWHASBEENMADEOFALLEVENTSANALYZEDINTHEGINNASTATIONUFSARANDEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDGINNAPROCEDURE A-303.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHISMODIFICATION ARE(1)SEISMICEVENTS~(2)PIPEBREAKSINSIDETHECONTAINMENT

BUILDING, (3)ANDAMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.THENEWBOLTINGISOFTHESAMEPHYSICALSIZEASTHEORIGINALBOLTINGANDTHECHEMICALANDPHYSICALPROPERTIES OFTHENEWMATERIALS SA193GRB7gISEQUALTOORGREATERTHANTHEOLDMATERIALSA307GRB.THEREFORE, THENEWBOLTINGWILLPERFORMTOTHESAMECAPACITYASTHEOLDBOLTINGFOREACHOFTHEAPPLICABLE EVENTSLISTEDABOVE.THUSgTHISMODIFICATIONNEITHERINCREASES THECONSEQUENCES gNORDOESITREDUCETHEMARGINSOFSAFETYFOR:1)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONDURINGANDFOLLOWING SEISMIC.2)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING APIPEBREAKINSIDECONTAINMENT.

3)EQUIPMENT REQUIREDTOFUNCTIONFOLLOWING AMAINSTEAMPIPERUPTURE.BASEDUPONAREVIEWOFTHEUFSARANDTECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ITHASBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.ITHASALSOBEENCONCLUDED THATTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTEDBYTHEIMPLEMENTATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

TSR89-09MAINFEEDWATER PUMPSUCTIONTRANSMITTER VALVEMANIFOLDTHISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUEST(TSR)ADDRESSES THEREPLACEMENT OFTHEISOLATION ANDEQUALIZATION VALVESFORFT-2004ANDFT-2005(FEEDWATER PUMPSUCTIONFLOWTRANSMITTERS)

WITHMANIFOLDS.

ITWILLALSOREPLACETHEBLOWDOWNVALVESINTHESENSINGLINESWHICHARELEAKING.THENEWARRANGEMENT WILLPROVIDETHESAMEFUNCTIONASTHEPREVIOUSONE.63

THEVALVESTRANSMITTERS PROVIDE:ASSOCIATED WITHTHISMODIFICATION SERVEFT-2004ANDFT-2005.THESETRANSMITTERS (1)ANINPUTTOFEEDWATER BYPASSVALVE3959,WHICHOPENSONLOWFEEDWATER NPSH.(2)ASIGNALTOFEEDWATER RECIRCULATION VALVES4147AND4148,WHICHOPENWHENFEEDWATER FLOWFALLSBELOW25%'ULLFLOWWITHOUTRECIRCULATION.

AFEEDWATER BYPASSVALVEMALFUNCTION ISDISCUSSED INTHEFEEDWATER TEMPERATURE DECREASEACCIDENTSCENARIOOFSECTION15.1.1.1INTHEUFSAR.THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTINCREASEORDECREASETHELIKELIHOOD OFSUCHANACCIDENTSINCETHEFUNCTIONOFTHEVALVESANDPIPINGASSOCIATED WITHTHETRANSMITTERS WILLNOTCHANGE.THUS,THEINCORPORATION OFTHISMODIFICATION WILLNOTAFFECTANYOFTHEEVENTSLISTEDINTABLESIANDIZOFGINNAPROCEDURE A-303,INCLUDING THEDESIGNBASISEVENTSOFUSNRCREG.GUIDE1.70ANDITWILLNOTCHANGE:1)THEASSUMPTIONS OFANYSAFETYANALYSISINTHEUFSARANDITSSUPPLEMENTS.

2)THEPROBABILITY OFANOCCURRENCE OFANACCIDENT.

3)THECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENT.

BASEDUPONTHEEVALUATIONS INSECTION3.1ABOVE,THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHESTATIONWILLBEUNCHANGED BYTHEINSTALLATION OFTHISMODIFICATIONS ANDgTHEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES~

SYSTEMSANDCOMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS AND,FORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS WILLBEUNCHANGED BYTHEINSTALLATION OFTHISMODIFICATION.

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTIONSINCE:A)THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETYPREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED, ORgB)THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANY.EVALUATED PREVIOUSLY INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBECREATED'R C)THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTINVOLVEACHANGEZNTHETECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SINCENONEOFTHELIMITINGCONDITIONS FOROPERATION OFTHEFEEDANDCONDENSATE SYSTEMSWILLBEAFFECTED.

64 0

TSR89-29PRESSURIZER LEVELTRANSMITTER MANIFOLDREPLACEMENT THISTECHNICAL STAFFREQUESTREVISIONWASTOCHANGETHEREFERENCE INTHEDESIGNCRITERIA, REVISION0FROMTHE1986ASMECODEEDITIONTOTHE1983EDITION.THISWILLBECONSISTENT WITHTHEINSTALLATION ANDALSOBEINCONFORMANCE WITHASMESECTIONXIgARTICLEIWA7000/REPLACEMENTS' REVIEWWASPERFORMED OFALLTHEEVENTSANALYZEDZNTHEGZNNASTATIONFSARANDTHEEVENTSREQUIRING ANALYSISBYUSNRCREGULATORY GUIDE1.70.THEEVENTSRELATEDTOTHZSMODIFICATION ARE:CHEMICALANDVOLUMECONTROLSYSTEMMALFUNCTION PRIMARYSYSTEMPIPERUPTURESEISMXCEVENTTHEDESIGNCRITERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWMANIFOLDVALVEANDFITTINGSFORTHISMODIFICATION BESEISMICALLY SUPPORTED, THEREFORE, THISMODIFICATION WILLNOTBEAFFECTEDBYASEISMICEVENT.THEDESIGNCRXTERIAREQUIRESTHATTHENEWMANIFOLDVALVEANDTUBINGBESEISMICALLY MOUNTEDANDFURTHERMORE SECTIONS4AND5REQUIRETHENEWTUBINGTOBEASMECODECLASS2,QUALITYGROUPB.THEREFORE, THEPROBABILITY OFALOCAWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHISMODIFICATION.

THEREFORE, THEMARGINSOFSAFETYDURINGNORMALOPERATIONS ANDTRANSIENT CONDITIONS ANTICIPATED DURINGTHELIFEOFTHEPLANTHAVENOTBEENREDUCED.THEADEQUACYOFSTRUCTURES, SYSTEMS'ND COMPONENTS PROVIDEDFORTHEPREVENTION OFACCIDENTS ANDFORTHEMITIGATION OFTHECONSEQUENCES OFACCIDENTS HAVENOTBEENAFFECTED.

THEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION DOESNOTINVOLVEANUNREVIEWED SAFETYQUESTION.

THISISBASEDONTHEFOLLOWING:

THEPROBABILITY OFOCCURRENCE ORTHECONSEQUENCES OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFEQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TOSAFETY,PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED INTHESAFETYANALYSISREPORTWILLNOTBEINCREASED BYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION BECAUSETHEINSTALLATION WILLMEETALLAPPLICABLE SEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.

THEPOSSIBILITY OFANACCIDENTORMALFUNCTION OFADIFFERENT TYPETHANANYEVALUATED PREVIOUSLY ZNTHESAFETYANALYSISWILLNOTBECREATEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION BECAUSETHEINSTALLATION WILLMEETALLAPPLICABLE SEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.

65

THEMARGINOFSAFETYASDEFINEDINTHEBASISFORANYTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WILLNOTBEREDUCEDBYTHEPROPOSEDMODIFICATION BECAUSETHEINSTALLATION WILLMEETALLAPPLICABLE SEISMICANDASMECODEREQUIREMENTS.

66 0

SECTIONB-COMPLETED STATIONMODIFICATIONS (SMs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofstationmodification procedures performed inthefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreport.Stationmodification procedures arewrittentocompleteaportionofanEngineering WorkRequest(EWR)orTechnical StaffRequest(TSR)identified bythesameparentnumber.StationModifications arereviewedbythePlantOperations ReviewCommittee toensurethatnounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesareinvolvedwiththeprocedure.

Thebasisforinclusion ofanSMinthissectionisclosureoftheSMwhereportionsoftheparentEWRorTSR,intheformofotherSMsorotherdocumentation, remaintobecompleted.

SM-87-01.1 SECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY MONITORING PANELSWCMPINTERNALWIRINGFOR7082ANALYZERS THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFCOMPONENTS ANDWIRINGINTHENEWSWCMP.SM-87-01.2 COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHENEWSWCMPANDASSOCIATED CIRCUITS.

SM-87-01.3 COMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTWELVENEWCONDUCTIVITY CELLSANDTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHECOMPUTERIZED SECONDARY WATERCHEMISTRY MODIFICATION.

SM-89-08AMMONIUMHYDROXIDE SIGHTGLASS INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEZNSTALLATIONi TESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFTHEAMMONIUMHYDROXIDE TANKSZGHTGLASS.

SM-1594.6 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SEISMICSUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFSEISMICSUPPORTSREQUIREDFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLPIPING.SM-1594.7 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-SERVICEWATERPIPINGANDASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFSERVICEWATERPIPINGANDASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION TOTHENEWSFPHEATEXCHANGER.

SM-1594.8 ISPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-STAINLESS STEELANDASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION PIPINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFSPENTFUELPOOQSTAINLESS STEELANDASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION PIPING.

SM-1594.8A INSTALLATION ANDOPERATION OFSTANDBYS.F.P.COOLINGSYSTEMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS OPERATIONS ANDDISASSEMBLY OFTHESTANDBYSKIDMOUNTEDS.F.P.COOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.9A FLOORPENETRATION INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFFLOORPENETRATIONS FORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.11 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLING-PUMPANDRADIATION MONITORINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFPUMPANDRADIATION MONITORFORTHENEWSPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEM.SM-1594.14 SPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGSYSTEMELECTRICAL MODIFICATION ANDCOMPLETION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION COMPLETION ANDTURNOVEROFTHESPENTFUELPOOLCOOLINGELECTRICAL MODIFICATION.

SM-2504.25 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUSTVALVEELECTRICAL

.INSTALLATION ATPENETRATION 132V7920-CONTAINMENT BUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUSTVALVEV7920ATPENETRATION P-132INSIDECONTAINMENT.

SM-2504.26 CONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE EXHAUSTVALVESELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OUTSIDECONTAINMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTAINMENT MINI-PURGE SUPPLYSYSTEMEXHAUSTVALVESCDV-1AANDCDV-1BOUTSIDECONTAINMENT.

SM-2512.123 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINESAFW-400nD"PUMPDISCHARGE

-STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSAND,TURNOVER OFSTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER

SUPPORTS, "B"TRAININTHESAFWBUILDING.

SM-2512.124 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS'N ANALYSISLINESW-2200SERVICEWATERAUXILIARY BUILDING'HEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOSERVICEWATERSUPPORTSINTHEAUXILIARY BUILDINGASSOCIATED WITHFEEDTOTHE'tCttSAFWPUMP.SM-2512.125 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSIS LINESAFW-800STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROMCONTAINMENT PENETRATION 123TO"B"SGFEEDWATER LINETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFSAFWSUPPORTSZNCONTAINMENT FROMPENETRATION 123TOTHE"B"FEEDWATER LINE.SM-2512.126 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTSANALYSISLINESAFW-900STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FROMPENETRATION 119TO"A"STEAMGENERATOR FEEDWATER LINETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTMODIFICATIONS TOTHESAFWLINEBETWEENPENETRATION yll9ANDTHEnAttS/GFEEDWATER LINE.SM-2512.131 ISTTESTCONNECTIONS

-RCDTPUMPSUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONS FORVALVESMOV-1813A ANDMOV-1813B.

SM-2512.132 ISTTESTCONNECTIONS

-AUXILIARY FEEDWATER DISCHARGE THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONS FORAUXILIARY FEEDWATER DISCHARGE CHECKVALVES4003'004'000C AND4000D.SM-2512.133 ISITESTCONNECTIONS

-VALVEV-3506ANDV-3507BYPASSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE

-ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATZONi TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTESTCONNECTIONS FORVALVES3506AND3507BYPASSLOOPS(DOWNSTREAM OFV-3506AANDV-3507A)~

SM-2512.134 SEISMICUPGRADEOFPIPESUPPORTS-ANALYSISLINECVC200nBnRCPSEALRETURNTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHESUPPORTMODIFICATIONS FORnBnRCPSEALRETURNLINECONSISTING OFSUPPORTSCVU131ANDCVU-XI'M-3319

'8MCC-1BBREAKERREPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERREPLACEMENT ATSPECIFIED POSITIONS ONMCC-1B.SM-3319.55 TESTINGOFBREAKERSATMCC-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTO1)DOCUMENTANAUXILIARY SWITCHTEST,2)VERIFYPROPERPHASEROTATION, AND3)TOPERFORMAFUNCTIONAL TESTOFBREAKERSPLACEDATMCC-lB.SM-3319.58 SETTINGADJUSTMENT ANDFUNCTIONAL TESTINGOFBREAKERSATMCC-1HTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOPROVIDETHEDIRECTION TOAZkTUSTANDFUNCTIONALLY TESTBREAKERSATMCC-lH.SM-3319.59 AUXILIARY SWITCHTESTINGFORSELECTEDBREAKERSONMCC-1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTODOCUMENTANAUXILIARY SWITCHTESTFORTHETURBINEROOMWALLEXHAUSTFANS1FJ1Gg1H,AND1Z.SM-3319A.2 BREAKERCHANGEOUT REMOVALONMCC-1C1LAND1KTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS TOLHEATERCHANGEOUTS, ANDTRIPSETTINGAKhTUSTMENTS FORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC-lC,1L,AND1K.SM-3319A.3 BREAKERCHANGEOUT REMOVALONMCC-1DAND1MTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALS'OL HEATERCHANGEOUTS, ANDTRIPSETTINGAMUSTMENTS FORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC-1DAND1M.

SM-3319A.4 BREAKERCHANGEOUT REMOVALONMCC-1BlEAND1FTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGiANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERCHANGEOUTS/REMOVALSi HKATRIPUNITREPLACEMENTS, ANDTRIPSETTINGAMUSTMENTS FORVARIOUSUNITSONMCC-1B,1E,AND1F.SM-3319A.5 REPLACEMENT OFPOWERCABLESPEREWR-3319A THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEREPLACEMENT OFEXISTINGPOWERCABLESFORTHEBORICACIDEVAPORATOR PACKAGE,THEAUXILIARY BUILDINGLIGHTINGTRANSFORMER 1B,ANDTHESERVICEBUILDINGKITCHENEQUIPMENT TRANSFORMER.

SM-3319A.6 BREAKERREMOVALONMCC-1GANDRESOLUTION OFSM-3319A.23319A.3AND3319A.4PUNCHLIST ITEMSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONi TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFBREAKERREMOVALSi TOLHEATERCHANGEOUTS, BREAKERHANDLEINSTALLATIONS, ANDREMOVEDBREAKERCOVERPLATEINSTALLATIONS'M-3319A.8 BREAKERCHANGEOUT ATMCC-1FFORTHELAUNDRYAZR'CONDITIONER ANDTHEPASSWASTETANKEVACUATION COMPRESSOR THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHEBREAKERCHANGEOUT ATMCC-1FFORTHELAUNDRYAIRCONDITIONER ANDTHEPASSWASTETANKEVACUATION COMPRESSOR.

SM-3341.1 FUSEINSTALLATION FORTHE'MAINCONTROLBOARD"A"AND"B"BATTERYVOLTMETERS THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFFUSESFORTHEMCB>>AtiANDiiBnBATTERYVOLTMETERS.

SM-3341.2 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTINGOFD.C.FUSESXSBFORLOCKOUTRELAY86llATHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEA2Y(15A)(gSB)125VDCFUSESWHICHFEEDTHEBUS11ADIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUTRELAY86/llA.

SM-3341.3 PRE-OPERATIONAL TESTINGOFD.C.FUSESXSCFORLOCKOUTRELAY8611BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEA2Y(15A)(XSC)125VDCFUSESWHICHFEEDTHEBUS11BDIFFERENTIAL LOCKOUTRELAY86/11B.SM-3596.2 DG"AnPRESSUREINSTRUMENT PANEL-ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFJUNCTIONBOXESASSOCIATED WITHTHENEWDIESELGENERATOR nAnINSTRUMENT PANEL,INCLUDING CONDUITANDCONDUITSUPPORTSBETWEENTHEJUNCTIONBOXESANDINSTRUMENT PANEL.ALSO,INCLUDESCABLEBETWEENNEWPRESSUREINSTRUMENTS ANDTHENEWTERMINALSTRIPSWITHINTHEJUNCTIONBOXES.SM-3596.4 DG"AnPRESSUREINSTRUMENT PANEL-ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFJUNCTIONBOXESASSOCIATED WITHTHENEWDIESELGENERATOR nBnINSTRUMENT PANELSINCLUDING CONDUITANDCONDUITSUPPORTSBETWEENTHEJUNCTIONBOXESANDINSTRUMENT PANEL.ALSO,INCLUDESCABLEBETWEENNEWPRESSUREINSTRUMENTS ANDTHENEWTERMINALSTRIPSWITHINTHEJUNCTIONBOXES.SM-3692.2 STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER CONTROLCIRCUITRY ANDVALVEMOV-9746TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWMOVCONTROLSWITCHRE-AEQUNGEMENTS ANDTHEIRRESPECTIVE CONTROLANDINDICATION CIRCUITS.

THISINCLUDESMOVATSTESTINGOFMOV-9746ANDHYDROTESTINGOFNEWVALVEINSTALLATION.

SM-3692.4 STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER VALVE-ELECTRICAL MODIFICATIONS THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVERFORTESTINGOFCONDUIT,CONDUITSUPPORTS'ABLEg BREAKERJUMPERSANDREWORKOFTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDSWITCHESANDINDICATION.

SM-3692.5 SBAFWBUILDINGELECTRICAL SUPPORTSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFELECTRICAL SUPPORTMODIFICATIONS INTHESTANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER BUILDING.

SM-3692.6 STANDBYAUXILIARY FEEDWATER FUNCTIONAL TESTINGOFCONTROLCIRCUITRY FORMOV-9746THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEFUNCTIONAL TESTINGOFMOV-9746LOCATEDINTHESAFWBUILDING; CONTROLROOM(REAROFMCB)gAUXILIARY BUILDING(MCCAREAS).HYDROTESTINGOFTHEPRESSUREBOUNDARYISCOMPLETE.

ADDITIONAL COPIESOFTHISPROCEDURE MAYBEPLACEDFORCOORDINATION ANDCONTROLPURPOSES.

SM-3797.8 MRPIRODDROPRELAYTIMEDELAYREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALOFTHETIMEDELAYDEVICESWHICHWEREPREVIOUSLY INSTALLED ONTHECONTROLRODDROPRELAYS,ANDTHESUBSEQUENT TESTINGOFTHERELAYS'M-3797.9 MRPIDATACABINETFANINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFCOOLINGFANSONTHEMRPIDATACABINETINCONTAINMENT.

SM-3797.10 MRPIANNUNCIATOR MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFAMODIFICATION TOANNUNCIATOR C29FORMRPIFAILURE.SM-3797.11 MRP1DATACABINETFANREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREMOVALANDTURNOVEROFCOOLINGFANSFORMRP1DATACABINETZNCONTAINMENT.

SM-3881.1 SIRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION MECHANICAL INSTALLATION ANDREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONS FORTHEMECHANICAL PORTIONOFTHESIRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION.

SM-3881.2 SIRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION

-ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION ANDREMOVALSMOV897898THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFELECTRICAL INSTALLATION ANDREMOVALSFORMOV897AND898.

SM-3881.7 SAFETYINJECTION FLOWMETERSFI-924ANDFI-925RESCALING THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFMETERSCALESFORFI-924ANDFI-925ANDRECALIBRATZON OFSAFETYINJECTION FLOWTRANSMITTERS FT-924ANDFT-925.SM-3990.1 DIESELGENERATOR BUILDINGFOUNDATION INVESTIGATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTESTBORINGANDCORESAMPLINGINANDAROUNDTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDING.

SM-3990.2 GROUNDWATEREXPLORATION OFTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDINGIMPINGEMENT MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEEXPLORATION ANDEXCAVATION OFTHEDEWATERING PITSGENERALLY BETWEENTHEDIESELGENERATOR BUILDINGANDLAKEONTARIO.THEGENERALPURPOSEOFTHISEXPLORATORY PHASEOFTHEOVERALLMODIFICATION ISTOOBTAINSUFFICIENT PERTINENT DATAONTHESUBSURFACE GROUNDWATER.THISDATAWILLPROMULGATE NECESSARY ENGINEERING OUTPUTSFORMODIFICATION ERECTIONANDINSTALLATION.

SM-3991.2 SEISMICUPGRADEOFEXISTINGCONNECTIONS ANDANCHORAGES

-AUXILIARY BUILDINGSOUTHWALLTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTODIRECT/DOCUMENT STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS.

SM-4064.5 TURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTION UPGRADEANDALARMOFFINDICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHECHANGEOUT OFTURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORS ANDSTPs.ALSOINCLUDEDZSTHEINSTALLATION OFCONTROLROOMINDICATION OFALARMOFFSTATUS.SM-4064.6 TSCFIREDETECTION ANDSUPPRESSION SYSTEMUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOTHETSCFIREDETECTION ANDSUPPRESSION SYSTEMSPRIORTOFINALTERMINATIONS ANDTESTING.

SM-4064.9 TURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORZONE234MODIFICATIONS THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOTURBINEBUILDINGSMOKEDETECTORZONEZ34-TOREMOVEDETECTORS FROMTHEGENERATOR FIELDVOLTAGEREGULATOR CABINET.SM-4218.3 LT-426TUBINGREMOVALTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOPROVIDETHENECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS FORTHEREMOVALOFTHEEXISTING3/8nTUBINGUSEDFORLT-426SEALEDREFERENCE LEG.SM-4230.1 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATION ACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSACMODIFICATION INSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOINSTALLAREACTORPROTECTION SYSTEMTHATWILLTRIPTHEMAINSTEAMTURBINEANDSTARTTHEFLOWOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFTERANATWSEVENT.SM-4230.2 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATION SYSTEMACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSACMODIFICATION TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOTESTAREACTORPROTECTION SYSTEMTHATWILLTRIPTHEMAINSTEAMTURBINEANDSTARTTHEFLOWOFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER AFTERANATWSEVENT.SM-4230.3 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS WITHOUTSCRAMATWSMITIGATION SYSTEMACTUATION CIRCUITRY AMSACTRIPSTATUSMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOINSTALLTHEnAMSACTRIPPEDnSTATUSLIGHTONTHEMAINCONTROLBOARDSWHILEPROGRAMMING INNEWARMINGSETPOINTS ANDMODIFYING THEFUNCTIONCURVEWHICHGENERATES THEVARIABLETIMEDELAYFORAMSAC.ZNADDITIONTOCHANGINGTHEDIGITALOUTPUTFORTHEPPCSFROMnAMSACACTUATEDn TOnAMSACTRIPPEDni BECOMINGADIRECTFUNCTIONOFTHERESETSTATUS.SM-4322.1 STATIONSERVICETRANSFORMERS 13AND15COOLINGFANSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFCOOLINGFANSATSTATIONSERVICETRANSFORMERS 413ANDgl5.

SM-4324.3 ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION FORSTEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEMMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION FORSTEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEMMODIFICATION.

THISPROCEDURE ALLOWSPARTIALINSTALLATION PRIORTOPLANTOUTAGEANDISTOCOMPLETETHEREMAINING DURINGTHEPLANTOUTAGE.TESTINGOFTHEINSTALLATION WILLBEPERFORMED UNDERANOTHERPROCEDURE.

SM-4324.5 STEAMGENERATOR BLOWDOWNSYSTEMMODIFICATION FUNCTIONAL TESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOPERFORMFUNCTIONAL TESTINGOFTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION OFS/GBLOWDOWNMODIFICATION.

SM-4347.1 MODIFICATION OFTHECONTROLROOMPLANTEVACUATION ALARMPLANTATTENTION ALARMANDPLANTFIREALARMTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHECONTROLROOMPLANTEVACUATION ALARM,PLANTATTENTION ALARMANDPLANTFIREALARMMODIFICATIONS.

SM-4347.2 CONTROLROOMALARMSYSTEMTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEMODIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITHTHECONTROLROOMALARMSYSTEMSANDTOCONDUCTACONTROLROOMALARMSURVEY.SM-4375.1 BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANICAL PORTIONOF'HEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLMODIFICATION.

SM-4375.2 BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLELECTRICAL MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROF.THEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLANDHEATTRACEMODIFICATION.

SM-4375.3 MECHANICAL ANDELECTRICAL TESTING-BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPIPINGMODIFICATION.

10

SM-4375.6 BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLMECHANICAL PHASE2MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEMECHANICAL PORTIONOFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2MODIFICATION.

SM-4375.8 BORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2ACCEPTANCE TESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHETESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEBORICACIDFLOWCONTROLPHASE2MODIFICATION.

'SM-4375.9 REPLACEMENT OFHEATTRACECIRCUITS40AND78THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELF-REGULATING HEATTRACECABLEFORCONDUITS440AND578(BORICACIDBLENDERPIPING)~WHICHINCLUDESVALVESV354~V355gFCV110AgV109fANDFTl10~SM-4525.2 GINNAPOWERSUPPLYBUSDUCTFOUNDATIONS THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTODIRECT/DOCUMENT INSTALLATION OFNEWBUSDUCTFOUNDATION.

SM-4525.3 GINNAPOWERSUPPLYO.C.B.FIREWALLFOUNDATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEGINNAPOWERSUPPLYO.C.B.FIREWALLFOUNDATION.

SM-4525.4 RACEWAYINSTALLATION FOROFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFRACEWAYFORTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION.

THISPROCEDURE INCLUDESINSTALLATION OFANEWPIPESUPPORTFORTHEEXISTINGTRANSFORMER 12BDELUGESYSTEM.SM-4525.5 NEWGINNAPOWERSUPPLYBUSDUCTINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOF-THISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLINSTALLATION OFTHENEWGINNAPOWERSUPPLYBUS.DUCTS

SM-4525.6 OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:

P.P.S.SWITCHGEARTRANSFORMER 12BGROUNDING THEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOANCHORTHEP.P.S.SWITCHGEARg COMPLETEINTERNALWIRING~ANDPERFORMELECTRICAL INSPECTION OFP.P.S.4160VSWZTCHGEAR.

THISPROCEDURE ALSOCONTROLSTHEINSTALLATION OFTHETRANSFORMER 12BGROUNDING RESISTOR.

SM-4525.7 OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:

CABLEINSTALLATION RELAYPANELS12AAND12BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFCABLESFORTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION ANDCOMPLETETHEINSTALLATION OFRELAYPANELS12AAND12B.SM-4525.8 OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:

MAINCONTROLBOARDSWITCHRELOCATION BUS12ABUS12BMODIFICATION ANDTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROF:A)B)C)D)SM-4525.9 52/11BCONTROLSW,SYNCHSW,ANDIND.LITES52/11ACONTROLSW,SYNCHSW,ANDIND.LITES12BBUSRELAYINGANDCIRCUITBREAKERS(86/12Bg86B/12Bg52/BTBBg52/16SS~AND52/17SS12ABUSRELAYINGANDCIRCUITBREAKERS(86/12Ag86B/12Ag52/BTA-A, 52/14SS,52/18SSAND52/AVP-9A)

OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:

MAINCONTROLBOARDMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDRELOCATION OFSWITCHES'ETERS'ND RELAYSWHICHMONITORANDCONTROLTHE34.5KVAND4160VELECTRICSYSTEMS.SM-4525.10 OFFSITEPOWERRECONFIGURATION:

SWITCHYARD MODIFICATION 4160VCUBICLEMODIFICATION 480VAND120VBREAKERINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEMODIFICATION OFTHE34KVBUSANDASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT, COMPLETEREMOVALSATTHE12BXFMRCABINETSCOMPLETEMODIFICATION OF12AAND12B4160VCUBICLES, ANDINSTALL480VAND120VBREAKERSFORTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION.

12

SM-4525.12 OFFSITEPOWERBACKFEEDVIAUNITAUXILIARY TRANSFORMER THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOSUPPLYPOWERFROMTHE115KVGRIDTHROUGHTHEMAINANDUNITAUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS TOTHESTATIONAUXILIARIES, WHILETHESTATIONAUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS 012AAND012BAREMODIFIEDPEREWR4525.SM-4525.14 OFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION:

4KVAND34KVMCBMETERINGPRE-OPERATIONAL TESTINGTHEPURPOSE.OFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOTESTTHEMCB4KVAND34KVMETERING, MODIFIEDUNDEREWR-4525PERSM-4525M-4525.15 OFFSITEPOWERRESTORATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSERVICE TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEOFFSITEPOWERMODIFICATION ANDRESTOREOFFSITEPOWERVIASTATIONAUXILIARY TRANSFORMER 12B.SM-4526.2 DG<<AttFUELOILSYSTEMELECTRICAL RECONSTRUCTION ANDREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHED/G<<At'UELOZLSYSTEMINCLUDING INSTALLATION OFNEWEQUIPMENT ANDREMOVALOFOLDEQUIPMENT.

SM-4526.4 DG<<B<<FUELOILSYSTEMELECTRICAL RECONSTRUCTION ANDREMOVALSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHED/G<<B<<FUELOILSYSTEMINCLUDING INSTALLATION OFNEWEQUIPMENT ANDREMOVALOFOLDEQUIPMENT.

SM-4526.8 DUPLEXSTRAINERINSTALLATION ELECTRICAL PORTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHEDUPLEXSTRAINERS INTHEDIESELGENERATOR FUELOZLSYSTEM.SM-4526.17 DIESELGENERATOR FUELOILSYSTEMDISCHARGE LINEPIPESUPPORTSUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFPIPESUPPORTSONTHEDIESELGENERATOR FUELOILSYSTEMDISCHARGE PIPING.13

SM-4530.1 ACFUSEDANDBREAKERSINTERMEDIATE BUILDING'S MISCELLANEOUS DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER REPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOREPLACETHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDING'MISCELLANEOUS DISTRIBUTION TRANSFORMER ANDREMOVETHEELECTRICAL FEEDFROMMCC1F(UNIT4MM)TOMCC18(UNIT8D).SM-4534.1 REACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTOROILLEVELINDICATION SYSTEMUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHENEWREACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTOROILLEVELINDICATION SYSTEMFORTHEA6BREACTORCOOLANTPUMPMOTORS.NOCOMPONENT INSTALLATION REQUIREDONRCPMOTORS.THEROSEMOUNT 710DUINSTRUMENT RACKZSCOMMONTOBOTHREACTORCOOLANTPUMPS'M-4538.1 1BDIESELGENERATOR UPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHE1BDIESELGENERATOR UPGRADE.THISMODIFICATION INCLUDESREPLACEMENT OFATHROWOVERRELAY,THERMALOVERLOADRELAYS'EMOVAL OFA51BURELAYSANDREWIRINGOFTERMINALBOXESONTHE>>AnANDnBnDIESELSKIDSSM-4538.3 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWAUXILIARY RELAY51VXCLAROSTAT 200OHMRESISTORANDSLIDINGLINKTERMINALS FORAIRSTARTVALVEASV-1ANDASV-2FORTHE1ADIESELGENERATOR THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFMODIFICATIONS TOTHE1ADIESELGENERATOR.

THESEMODIFICATIONS INCLUDEREPLACEMENT OFOVER%JRRENTAUXILIARYRELAY51VXgINSTALLATION NEW200OHMRESISTORgSLIDINGLINKSTERMINALS FORAIRSTARTVALVESgANDINSTALLATION OFANEWMOUNTINGPLATEFORRELAYSATR-A,ATR-B,ANDAFUSEBLOCK.THISPROCEDURE WILLALLOWWORKTOBEACCOMPLISHED INTHEFOLLOWING GENERALAREASOFTHEPLANT:1ADIESELGENERATOR.

SM-4553.1 REACTORBMITUBINGSUPPORTUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOSEISMICALLY UPGRADETHEREACTORBOTTOMMOUNTEDINSTRUMENTATION TUBINGSUPPORTBMI-3.14

SM-4618.1 FEEDPUMPROOMVENTILATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHENEWFEEDPUMPROOMVENTILATION SYSTEMCOMPONENTS.

SM-4671.6 AnRCSHOTLEGRHRFLOWCORRECTION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGASSOCIATED WITHFIELDDATAVERIFICATION OFTHEnAnRCSHOTLEGLOOPLEVELCORRECTION ASARESULTOFRHRFLOW.THISTESTISBEINGPERFORMED INCONJUNCTION WITHPROCEDURE 0-2.F1'M-4675.1 RHRPUMPnBnRECIRCULATION PIPINGTIE-INSTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOINSTALLTHE8INCHCHECKVALVEAND3INCHPIPINGTIE-INSTOTHEBRHRHXDISCHARGE LINE~SM-4675.2 RHRRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION MCBMODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEW:PROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEMAINCONTROLROOMWORKSCOPEOFEWR-4675RHRRECIRCULATION MODIFICATION.

SM-4675.3 RHRSYSTEMCLEANLINESS INSPECTION ANDHYDROSTATIC TESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOPROVIDEINSTRUCTIONS FORPERFORMCLEANLINESS INSPECTIONS ANDAHYDROSTATIC TESTOFTHERHRRECIRCSYSTEMINSTALLED BYEWR-4675.

SM-4675.5 RHRPUMP'A'ECIRCULATION PIPINGTIE-INSANDBALANCEOFPIPINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHERHRARECIRCULATION PIPINGTIEINSgCOMMONTRENCHTZE-INSANDTHEREMAINDER OFTHERHRAANDBRECIRCULATION PIPINGANDSUPPORTS.

SM-4675.6 RHRPUMPnArrANDnBnRECIRCULATION INSTRUMENTATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFINSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITHTHEAANDBRECIRCULATION PIPINGMODIFICATION.

15 1

SM-4675.7 RHRHX"A"OUTLETPIPESUPPORTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHERHRHXtiAnOUTLETPIPESUPPORT.SM-4675.8 RHRPUMPSUCTIONHYDROSTATICTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEHYDROSTATIC TESTOFTHEINSTALLATION OFTHETI-680AND681THERMOWELLS.

SM-4675.9 RHRSYSTEMSHUTDOWNCOOLINGFULLFLOWTESTTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHETESTINGOFTHERHRSYSTEMFULLFLOWTESTDURINGTHESHUTDOWNCOOLINGTEST.SM-4755.1 ISTTESTCONNECTIONS FORMOV-1813A B-"A"AND"B"RCDTPUMPSUCTIONTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTODIRECT/DOCUMENT MODIFICATION RELOCATION OFVALVESV-1813C/E.

SM-4756.1 INSTALLATION OFMCBEXHAUSTFANSHROUDTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHESHROUDFORTHEMCBEXHAUSTFAN.SM-4759.2 HIGHMASTLIGHTINGTOWERBASEPLATE GROUTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHE.INSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFHIGHMASTSECURITYLIGHTINGBASEPLATE GROUTZNGANDJAMNUTSFORTHEEIGHTHIGHMASTLIGHTINGTOWERS.SM-4764.1 FIRESERVICEWATERSYSTEMMODIFICATIONS RELOCATIONS ANDSPRINKLER SUPPLYTOSUPPORTTHECONTAMINATION STORAGEBUILDINGINSTALLATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHERELOCATION INSTALLATION TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFFIRESERVICEHYDRANTSGATEVALVESANDSPRINKLER SUPPLYTOTHECONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDING.

16

'

SM-4764.3 CONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDING-DOORS29ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION TESTINGANDFLOODBARRIERTESTINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEELECTRICAL INSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWSECURITYDOORS-29ANDTHETESTINGOFTHEFLOODBARRIERASSOCIATED WITHDOORS-29.SM-4764.4 ELECTRICAL POWERDISTRIBUTION ANDGROUNDGRIDINSTALLATION-CONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION ANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL POWERDISTRIBUTION ANDGROUNDING PORTIONOFTHECONTAMINATED STORAGEFACILITYMODIFICATION.

SM-4764.6 FIREPROTECTION ELECTRICAL INSTALLATION ANDFUNCTIONAL TESTINGWITHINTHECONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDINGTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLANDDOCUMENTTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHEELECTRICAL PORTIONOFTHELOCALPREACTION FIREPROTECTION SYSTEMZNTHECONTAMINATED STORAGEBUILDING.

SM-4785.1'NSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYINBUS14UNDERVOLTAGE CABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYZNTHEBUS14UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET.SM-4785.2 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYINBUS16UNDERVOLTAGE CABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYINTHEBUS16UNDERVOLTAGE CABINET.SM-4785.3 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYINBUS17UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROLCABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYINTHEBUS17UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROLCABINET.17

~SM-4785o4INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYINBUS18UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROLCABINETTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYINTHEBUS18UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROLCABINET.SM-4785.5 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR 1ATHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGSANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR lA.SM-4785.6 INSTALLATION ANDTESTINGOFNEWTHROWOVER RELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR 1BTHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ZSTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION, TESTING,ANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWTHROWOVER RELAYANDLOSSOFD.C.VOLTAGEALARMFORDIESELGENERATOR 1B.SM-4809.1 DIESELFIREPUMPBATTERYCHARGERSUPPORTSTRUCTURES INSTALLATION MODIFICATION THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHEDIESELFIREPUMPBATTERYCHARGERSUPPORTSTRUCTURES'M-4931.1 TDAFWPCHECKVALVEREPLACEMENT THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEREPLACEMENTS TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHETURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPDISCHARGE CHECKVALVESV-4003ANDV-4004.SM-4933.1 PT-478PT-479ANDPT-483SG"B"TUBINGREROUTEANDUPGRADETHEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTING/ANDTURNOVEROFUPGRADEDSTEAMGENERATOR PT-478/479/483 INSTRUMENTATION TUBING,SUPPORTS/

ANDBARRIERSINTHEINTERMEDIATE BUILDING(STEAMHEADERLEVEL).SM-4937.1 REPLACEMENT OFHEATTRACECIRCUITS12&34THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATION OFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATING HEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITS12AND34.18

SM-4937.2 REPLACEMENT OFHEATTRACECIRCUIT29THEPURPOSEOFTHISNEWPROCEDURE ISTOCONTROLTHEINSTALLATIONS TESTINGANDTURNOVEROFTHENEWCHEMELEXSELFREGULATING HEATTRACECABLEFORCIRCUITS29(BORICACIDBLENDERPIPING)iWHICHINCLUDESVALVESFCV110CiV364iFCVllOB,ANDV365A..19

SECTIONC-COMPLETED TECHNICAL STAFFENGINEERING EVALUATIONS (TSEEs)Thissectioncontainsadescription ofchangestothefacilityasdescribed inthesafetyanalysisreportperformed astechnical evaluations.

Thesearetypically smallchangesthatdonotrequirethefullcontrolsofamodification.

Technical StaffEngineering Evaluations arereviewedbythePlantOperations ReviewCommittee toensurethatnounreviewed safetyquestions orTechnical Specification changesareinvolved.

Thebasisforinclusion ofaTSEEinthissectionispresentation tothePORC,closureoftheassociated TSR,andsubmittal totheDocumentControlDepartment.

Withinthetimeframeofthisreporttherewerenone.

SECTIOND-TEMPORARY BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTION, STRUCTURE FEATURES~

SHIELDING'ND FLUIDSYSTEMFEATURESThissectioncontainsdescriptions andsummaries ofsafetyevaluations oftemporary changespursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.59(b)~

0 CATEGORYREVIEWEDI>"4REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTiONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONDATE:LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0In/0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

PfYESPORCDATE(IFREQUiRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:~VVERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

~NOg4A'CPr-SKETCHATTACHED~ESPANO~!I-l1DATE:REMOVALDATE8TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:QjzrLrfI)Igl'4i.BiCUPJ~QAC'ttachadditional page(s)asnecessary 40TAN4evE/SS

10CFR50.59 SafetyEvaluation forliftingwireforThermocouple D074Theindications forTCD07axeinconsistent withtheresponseofotherrelatedcoreparameters (i.e.incorefluxmap&nearbythermocouple indications).

Thermocouples areusedtosensecoreoutlettemperature, determine relativefuelassemblypowerandcompensate RVLIS.SinceTCD07isnotconsistent witheitherincoreorotherthermocouples ithasbeendeclaredinoperable.

1thasbeendeletedfromprocessing inPPCS.Toremoveitfromtheaveraging circuitatthethermocouple panelrequiresliftingitslead.ThepanelwillthensenseanopenTCandremoveitfromaveraging.

WithTCD07inoperable theminimumrequirement perTech.Specs.of4thexmocouples pexquadrantismet.TCD07isnotusedtocompensate RVLIS.Thefunctions ofthethermocouple systemasdescribed inthe'fSARarefulfilled.

Therefore, neithertheprobability northeconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction evaluated intheUFSARisincreased.

'Thepossibility ofanewaccidentormalfunction isnotcreated.ThemarginofsafetydefinedinTech.Specs.isnotreduced.Refexences:

Tech.Specs.3.5.3,UFSARSection7.7.4ffreyP.Wand11/30/89PORCApproval:

2

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402jr~BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTION+~~DATE:REQUEST4':u~/1/A.LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0~CPOTHERCl/I/Nfl/I/C/

AGO/~OOurf rfDf-QM+W~5Wg~C&dMg/rr//'~dC, 4dAd&PTGPURPOSE0FMrOA&tgagE~iM~c-Qd/rtmXi4MCLOCATION'AFETY EVALUATION REQUIRED:

0YESINOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

TECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR 8-Md'afkcPmlfdOur4C-SKETCHATTACHED:

E3YESECHODATE:DATE:INSTALLATION DATE&TIME'ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALIEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY) 4'h/d"/@van)r-REMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:Df/E'2JDr/<1.R.Z%l2.8Cref/ET/Ih/'/Serr.~-2U~u~r=MJn.M/r'Z8'g.~O4OP.0MR8$2'4refilesdu<v17~V<Ic'lAIQ~JZ/L-~<+r>PP/julQ;7FTV5Of-ACRAfjAJAOV4WC~4I~~lV~E/P7rJrJrV't.C.oPROAJr~ulaLjXLJfry/C.HJfMAttachadditional page(s)asnecessary 49$42Rev.2/8S

CATEGORYENCEPROCEDURE REVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRIqj@

4j)90GINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDQQQPERRCNTROL QADISPOSIT(ON

-5YRS.qC(j,'JOBFOREMAR'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE0-0FUSESPLLED0REQUESTS:

STATESBLOCK0g~.~cOTHERPL.PURPOSEu//.Su~LOCATION:

skSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

gYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

/--oTECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:

INSTALLATION DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSALLED:INSTALLED BY'ERIFIED BY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

OkVId/l/galJ</0C/c-/ccMSKETCHATTACHED; 0YESgNODATE:DATEREMOVALDATE&TIMEc.III/i/ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY'~~dmStCC/C'%CaI0IrtAInCIu~.svKc~A/A~~C,+L~~~I~~/II4~k~/~mC/'egb+IIIIlos<.Mo+5Vl~4~5MCIEI~A~0//VIId//4~ODQI5rC~~~ll~5+~~~c5~si(/Aw~'r~,+lm~M/~~CA~u~hi.745'~I~9E+~~vuht~JM+hAttachadditional gyge(s)psnecessary

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDI.REFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONI/rpBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTlONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOEFOREMAN%CAFJOA3CSDATE.IJ590REQUEST¹:

9004JUMPERWIREJjfLIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCKC3OTHERQFUNCTIONIJIRELICPS'RIOWATCOIJNIM P¹u'e¹TOZ<>CuTMMTN-SKPqM7(0o~mOPP-alQrs~PURPosEwPovre/~oAcPong~o3-4Igg~Iq~/oaHod/7o+Pe.T/~~i//A/@urnQD<r~p.LOCATION:

SC.JOIAI8SE'l7)EM(RST¹~iroW 7KCRUELSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED IEYES0NOSKETCHATTACHED:

0YESNOPORCDATE{IFREQUIRED)'ECHNICAL MANAGER:.SHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW{ASNECESSARY)

DATE:DATE'EMOVAL DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:'ttachadditional page{s)asnecessary

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CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTION'JT~jva3iPURPOSETdePATE,g0)-OREQUEST¹:

O-0LIFTEDWIRE0FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERgADWO~eIr.FJ~iE.LOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

li8YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

~~4TECHNICAL MANAGEFtSHIFTSUPERVISOFL SKETCHATIACHED;~ES0NO-333-DATEINSTALLATION DATEaTIMEENTEREDINOFFICIAL~LOG' REMOVALDATE8TIME.ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY.REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

NTALLED:NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:PITPIR,Ij.'05POSlT(ON-5 VRS.Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary AE142Reu*2/88

BypassofSafet}t'unction and,Purr?ye~~~.

fcrTemporaty I-ColdReCOXCeX"

~~~I1S'.rr<<etheT-Cn?dwiderang~rr<<ordcrforTI-4504TI-451hasbeenunrc1table,it1sdesirablitoprovideaT<<ColdrecorderforI1~ntshutdown.

Thiswi1lh~~<<<<iimPlishedbyinstalling a250':c<<isionresistorinsharirartlrth~controlboard.'.indicator forT-cold(409B44?0P'A!nrlirr.eoftherrr~wlylns..i1!rJtemporary'ecorder" crthetemporary wirirrqwi11rrotef!rittireT-ColdsignalfromT"409BorT-4108becausethetemporary wirirrqisinstalled.

dovnstream ofaV'Iisolation amplifier (TY-409B-1 rTY-410B-1).

Therefore, theinstallation ofthisrecordervillnotincreasethe'probability ortheconsequence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated

'inChapter15oftheUFShR.Sinceafailureofthenevtemporary'ecorder oritswiringwillnoteffectexistingplantinstrumentation usedforsafetysystemcontrols, theprobability ofcreatinganaccidentnotpreviously evaluated inChapter15oftheUFSARvillnotbeincreased.

Sinceafailureofthisrecordervillnotadversely effectRVLISinputfromT-Cold4098and410B,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification villnotbe.reduced.

~P~c~~elevenT.Adams3/22/90

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCT)ONANDJUMPERCONTROLJUMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE0JOBFOREMAN'I@CA~9REQUEST4:FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHERK,CPrr57d/WSe'Br5PURPOSEToTwca'77T-/~8-r70/H~A~rip.T~C/-CpaLOCATION:

ISAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

~YES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

ZZTECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOFL INSTALLATION DATE&TIME/ENTEREDINOFFICIALL~OG;NUMBEROFTAGSITALED:IINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

SKETCHATTACHED:

YES0NODATE5-Z~DDATE:REMOVALDATE&TIME:~QdKENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:~wL~<<AL~J~QAIV-5y~Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 49142Aev.2/88

PYV'rssofSntetyfunctionnndJumperCgl)gg+'orTemporaty 7-ColdRecorderi*~SincetheT-(oldwidernngrrrr.orderforT1-460CTI-451hasbeenunreliable, itisdesirnblc toprovidenT-Coldrecorder.

forplantshutdovn.

Thisvi1l(i~nccomplis/ic,'.byinstalling a250Il,precision rcsistorinsar.rrviththecr>>tre~)boardindicator,"[or T-Coldf40'r844108).Afailure0!thenevlyirrstniledt~m)or'hiyrecordercr'thetemporary v)ri>>gvi}1noteffeettheI-Co!dsignalfromT-40QBorT-4108becausethetemporary viring'.siristnlled dovnstream pfatr/IiSOlatiOn nmplifier(TY-4098-1 6TY-4108-1)

.TherefOre,.'.the

',installation ofthisrecordervillnotincreasetheprobability.

ortheconsequence ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated inChapter"15oftheUFSAR.Sincenfailureofthenevtemporary recorderoritsviringvillnoteffectexistingplantinstruaentat'ion usedforsafetysystemcontrols, theprobability ofcreatingan'accident notpreviously evaluated inChapter15oftheUFSARvill,not.

beincreased.

Sinceafnilureofthisrecordervillnotadversely effectRVLIS'nput fromT-Cold4098and4108,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofanyTechnical Specification villnotbe.reduced.

~i~76evenT.Adams,3/22/90

CATEGORYREV>>EWEOREQUESTS:

JOBFOREMANDATE:I>>Kl'U>>gpj's>>

+KAREN)EtggCEOURE al'.:51%0A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRIC',t'~'t..>>

'QbGINNASTATIONBYPAssPfqlmI)F@PFUNCTloNANDJUMPER06N>>BURGLE

"~JUMPERWIREQFUNCTIONLIFTEDWIRE/FUSESPULLED0ISTATESBLOCK0OTHER0'URPOSEc,~~~"'(LOCATION:

rre//WDSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

PfYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

-gb0TECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR gFE>>~I3'g~/P/'7'72~SAT,3'~Ir3 SKETCHATTACHED:

~YES0NOE2>>~-wvlI8ELFcdABTvgtMEAE'.rtog 5&F>0,55&odp~lbDATE:INSTALLATION DATELTIME 5/ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY) roerrREMOVALGATEETIME7/0ENTEREOINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:l~lW/l~fWFnCi>>C2i~+J~Z/~Ps'C~Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary EOT42Rev.2/88

CATEGORYREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTfONANDJUMPERCONTROLrJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONHf/8.rm.Dr.'Ck'8mwaI/gpoFUSESPULLED0/jaZREQUEST¹'

-/STATESBLOCK/KI/oly~p~/~OroOTHER+(PURPOSE(7~t"ANOL/uvol4~uD~-.~02/5SKETCHATIACHED:gVYES0NOLOCATION:

4r2IeavuC~12P..2ISAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

MES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

4"7-QTECHNICAL MANAGEFI:

SHIFTSUPERVISOR INSTALLATION DATE&TIMEREMOVALDATE&TIMEDATE:DATE:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:~REVIEW(ASNECESSARY) 2bo~pENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:lPQP~4LI'~~k~~llCF%'R.~LX(:IDISPOSITION

-5YRS.Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 49r42Rev.2/8S

ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION GINNASTATION:JOB:DATE:MADEBY'AGEOF~E~(<nNW~p~4SgSm~oA)v<Io~~I4r~~~~IQStJPvm)d.8rr.'cn.any'nal~

oil/kc.in&/LIDc~g</c~rogoFM5A'v)K~~ppgrwpPngsooPWArM*ct\<c~u4.r.AA/AgcQnsAocrWilrkrngg/QPpo7PgI'+7'-Z(onn"Z5rSosI7).~vrl&~sMnsMv~vmalalsrnrCCCorC4r

.WnC~~re//lb'p~cVCgW~gorkiiPbVi&C7oonsvspris>g.(Srssrrnerrsil SPMfWein).Cirro/lrfrsr 8ppesosrSag>en&enes>>CiirnrervBeJrvJrirJJnirnrrreen~+~JI<kfrg CEbcdurrencc osorIaccrA~Z'n'vrcurcq c'~wrmk/rnWbFSW.Poo+mrsp~~willgyc'mmepr~*lryjvP//gf

~r"and+w4nccI/II>6caJ~rplqc.-~~gro$hbi/rpHAgcSC<so'<8 is-of~@YMCA.JuioIpc~oolrtx<o2>/tcr~gc./4c&r754$sicllcc5oof4w4ccrcLt&/~III><<lf C~<lmkcLrnWoft<.Mr~diup~picerr Ir~~u~~gc,go~~~A8oil!~n~A4.rrrcrc+I~Z svr4caO'Ilute.bi6cre~W~por+IJJah~rf~of<AfOSQton+(cqov~~drirIsrgc sncrSo4crr74worr~d69<rn4~J~4P<u+~I~/p+pH>~~b~S.Wyo~g~+myu~~~Aa.ni>server@(

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.12rrr~pice)In>,llnyvvsrvccng~+~gp+goiris&'V/iI~h+si$+ciAIVI

GINNASTATION:)OB:ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION DATE:MADEBY:49i69SPAaEOFp~~~~q~+~~pg/jsac5A/yv~pmi~f~JyZpjuly~~gyqACQ~g.jMl/~A49~4~+~/j~g.pc&4/Yp~+<<~~~//ra~h~~hg<<nA<<.Quasi~>>

4rgp5/g'w

~L~I\~s+Es5A)A'ACATEGORYREFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'ATE dJUMPERWIRECI LIFTEPWIRE+RUSESPULLEPCISTATESBLOCKO OTHEROFUNCTION>B'4~>4o54ocv<n~grya/4~a%%dd7PPJ./EAN~'URPOSE

&f7P4'PJc,grfLrtrcr8$

gszr/0WG37$V)LOCATION:

D40rAJWowIMgSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

8YESDNOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

"Zv"HJTECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:

INSTALLATION DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

IPgavrWxaV-SKETCHA%I'ACHED:

DYESECNODATE'0"DATEREMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG'UMBER OFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:CEM'RAAttachadditIonal page(s)asnecessary 49142ASV.E/N 0

CATEGORYREVIEWEDBYPCgyty~NCEPROCEDURE A-1ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICt~~0GINNASTATIONASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANhgggPZA'58iNTROL IPN~yJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONDATF'IFTED WIREFUSESPULLED0UrREQUEST¹:CSTATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)

M-ZO-SKETCHATI'ACHED; 0YESSNOTECHNICAL MANAGEFI:

SHIFTSUPERVISO

.,i~Yi:W<.

DATEDATEINSTALLATION DATE&TIME-CO-02ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

Iar"REMOVALDATE&TIME:3ENTEREDINOFFICIALWOG'UMBER OFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:vuLc-4/So/Ihc.u/AJS/(jIcue4rAttachadditional pags)asnecessary 491i2Rov.2/88

CATEGORYEVIEWEDJOBFOREMAN'~

DATE:I>0JUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED0FUNCTION<I~E'N'-TtTlICe.Gc'.c.PURPOSE2fWTAira=aMOr.-IE~iltirJAL~P@typg,-

3.51IENCEPRDCEDURE

<Vj'.tgg'OCHESTER GASANDELEC~,180GINNASTATIONBYPAssQFsAFETYFUNcTIQNAM@P@EACGNTRoLV-Syo~4REQUESTR:STATESBLOCK0OTHER0D/C~~=-zABCLOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

EYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

0Z5&TECHNICAL MANAGER:~SHIFTSUPERVISOR:

INSTALLATION DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGTALLED:INSTALLED BY:XVERIFIEDBY:SKETCHAlTACHEDDYESQNQX~+>+DATE:~2REMOVALDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;'UMBEROFTREMOVREMOVEDBY:IVERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

Oc(7rAv'A4/num~r'~~ZNWr~n4Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 49.142Rsv.2/88

CATEGORYREVIEWEDRFFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRIC5fGINNASTATIONBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0LIFTEDWIREFUNCTION5ERHI&$4eF'l.oIDATE;~/P'OREQUESTS:

FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHER0dr1Jr?QrALAN~PURPOSEh3LrISd~ccA'W4wKLOCATION:

SAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

RIES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)

S>rn'wcIsi.TECHNICAL MANAGER:(SHIFTSUPERVISOR.

rINSTALLATION DATE&TIME~j&OENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

/gj?ggyz~-/fECSKETCHATIACHED:0YESItNO08Ãe'PDATE:REMOVALDATE&TIME:lat3"0cI50ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:<~A',".~,<L, i'V;.SD~\Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 49.1l2Rev.2/8S

CATEGORYREVIEWEDNCEPROCEDURE JQf4A.tROCHESTER GASANDELEC'PICtl~0GINNASTATIONWggr~,.BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANREIIQIPI2Elt'~TROL ION-sy~'OBFOREMAN'ATE:

Gt0REQUEST4:CJUMPERWIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIREFUSESPULLED00'TATESBLOCK0OTHER0PURPOSELOCATIOSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

ES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

~>4'KETCHATTACHED:

0YESI2INOTECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISO

.-?.i~~t6.G~h.-DATE'+DATEREVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

Ia(INSTALIATION DATEItTIME-2>42ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINSLEINSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:/4/REMOVALDATE8TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIAL~DE;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:IVECLCT2f50ClhCcrm'zsoFr~IWAa//vWAttachadditional pags)asnecessary EQ-1E2Aev,2/8S (I

CATEGORYREVIEWED-3.3.5REFERENCE PROCEDURE A.1402ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATION9'pBYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTlONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'"

l'UMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRE0FUNCTIONC-/0~/I".<-io.wrAREQUEST¹:FUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0OTHEREf-~Cv-ngCATTivyltA/it//~4PURPOSE.r0A/c,n~t@ADC-I0/'eeiI/'nCC.rC8ItLOCATION:

~~(Wt'n,4rtMSAFETYEVALUATION REQUIRED:

gYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

6-=~oTECHNICAL MANAGER:SHIFTSUPERVISOR:

SKETCHATTACHES:

0YESItNO~F-1~:~k.9>-INSTALLATION DATE&TIMEENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSINTAD'NSTALLED BY:)VERIFIEDBY:REMOVALDATE&TIME:3'VS0-~ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGMOVE.REMOVEDBY:a&VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

ElE'jj;Aj,~DtSPOSIt)9PAttachadditional page(s)asnecessary SStirtTPaSS

BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLANNUNCIATOR C-10Annunciator C-10isdescribed intheUFSARasamethodofproviding indication oflowSWflowtothecontrolroomduringanaccident.

Awiringanomalyiscausingspuriousalarms.Withoutthisalarm,theoperatorwillnotknowifadequateSWflowexistsduringanaccident.

Bypullingthealarmcard,thecardwillbeprevented fromalarmingspuriously butindication ofSWflowwillbelost.Toensuresufficient SWflow,ifanSIsignalisreceived, operations personnel willverifylocallythatgreaterthan900gpmisavailable toeachfancooler.Thisrequirement willbepostedontheMCBandoncomingoperators willbeinformedduringturnover.

Duringnormaloperations, theflowis1000gpm.WhenanSIsignalisreceived, flowwouldgoupsosufficient flowshouldbeavailable.

Byverifying greaterthan900gpm,theassumptions oftheUFSARremainvalidandnounreviewed safetyquestionexists.Postmaintenance testingwillincludesufficient testingtoensurethealarmwilloperatewhenactuallowflowissensed.Ref.UFSAR6.2.1.1.1 c/z/go

"CATEGORYGAGREVIEWEDREFERENCE PROCEDURE A-1402$0REQUESTS:

ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONJOBFOREMAN'ATE BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJUMPERWIRE0LIFTEDWIRERFUNCTIONar2uPURPOSEFUSESPULLED0STATESBLOCK0VPZM/AC84OC.k'THER 0IS7LOCATION'AFETY EVAI.DATION REQUIRED:

)TYES0NOPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED)'

4lg0TECHNICAL MANAGERSHIFTSUPERVISOR:

INSTALLATION DATE&TIME4I0ENTEREDINOFFICIAL'OG; NUMBEROFTAGSINSTALLED:

INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:REMOVALDATE.6/0-0DATEg-Ig-PoDATE&TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:SKETCHATTACHED:

0YESjh(NOREVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

'Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 49.1A2Rev.2/SS

/PC<@NS.fSage/Evg/us*~5If"l55.f.SAPID6-'col~terdDu~pky.Cent-.I~bc~pLpk-3Clvculi+%&woe'M+6

+5rgo~~~guse~~M~crneovS~mcfc~~5'Le&<$5~~~iS~i~ro<ocr'o<~P6p~~'rflW/r~d,Wismr//Pcev~WArv~anu>4~~W~~cm~p4gngr'u~rn~~~~yr~Crc/4uJ<*rhea~~0CcnJf'O'~M, WG~w~~ocoerg45pep~~~d~y~i~+7~A5~os~i'lr6~~~~A.~t4k3is<.4v~gpKyL(~.~~I~ak(~~p~h~I~li~~Sup~~y4~~c-.c<~/yv-m~lPenc,h~prcVlovS~pChlglV+XW g~~gF'SAgacrlllwoPprob<<IAp0&~~caMH~m~l&>>cpm,nor./7mvlocsslyeblis.M~~c~'UF'5A4AaJlb~ss,4gr~kSpcs~,ll,hkeDF5APScc.g'.g.Z

.~gW~O<.7918c4+assech~5>~>4WM3.S-'5 0

CATEGORYREVIEWEDROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICGINNASTATIONREFERENCEPROCEDUREg A-1402BYPASSOFSAFETYFUNCTIONANDJUMPERCONTROLJOBFOREMAN'UMPER WIRE0FUNCTIONLIFTEDWIREj2fFUSESPULLED0e-~sicSTATESBLOCK0CDATE:7~~~REQUEST4:OTHER0PURPOSEAe/~OA./~~/Mr7g+7rrV/W'ILOCATION'~~

~~~ERt-"rr-4~I-II~3ZSAFETYEVALUATIONREQUIRED:

j8YES0NOSKETCHATTACHED:

0YESPORCDATE(IFREQUIRED):

-0TECHNICAL MANAGEFI:

@NOSHIFTSUPERVISO INSTALLATION DATE8TIME-0ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSITALLED:INSTALLED BY:VERIFIEDBY:DATEREMOVALDATE8TIME:ENTEREDINOFFICIALLOG;NUMBEROFTAGSREMOVED:REMOVEDBY:VERIFIEDBY:REVIEW(ASNECESSARY)

Attachadditional page(s)asnecessary 40142Rev,2/88

10CFR50.59 SAFETYEVALUATION forBypassofSafetyFunctionforThermocouple C-3Thecircuitforthermocouple C-3isinoperable.

Toensureerroneous readingsarenotgenerated, theleadsfromthisthermo-coupletothethermocouple panelwillbelifted.Thiswillpreventerroneous thermocouple readingsfrombeingincludedintheaveraging calculations inthethermocouple panel.Thefourthermocouples perquadrant.

requiredbyTechSpecswillbemain-tainedandthermocouple C-3isnotusedbyRVLIS.Basedonthisevaluation, theprobability andconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction previously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotbeincreased.

Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction notpreviously evaluated intheUFSARwillnotcreated.And,themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisofTechSpecswillnotbereduced.Therefore, thisbypassofsafetyfunctiondoesnotcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.

-

References:

UFSARSection4.4.5.4&Table7.7-3'TechSpecsSection3.5.3&Table3.5-3Preparedby:Date:7"TC.SA iW0 August1,1989SAFETYEVALUATION FORTEMPORARY STRUCTURE FEATUREAUTHORIZATION FORM89-180Thistemporary structure willbeplacedunderthereference legpipingtosupportthecondensate potandassociated tubing.Thereference legpipingwillbeliftedbyhandwhilemeasuring andrecording themaximumliftforce.Theliftwillnotcreateanysubstantial deflection oftherootvalveandwilltherefore notcreateanunexceptable stressontheweldsinthereference leg.Thereference legwillnotbeliftedpastthecondensates pot'soriginaldesignelevation.

Therefore, thistemporary structure willnotendangertheintegrity ofthereference legpiping.Thistemporary structure willberemovedpriortoleavingthehotshutdowncondition.

Thistemporary structure willnotincr'ease theprobability ofanaccidentortheconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSAR.Thistemporary structure willnoteffectthepressuretransmitter PT-429andtherefore willnot.effecttheresponseofsafetyinjection toanaccident.

Thisstructure willnoteffecttheintegrity ofthereference legandwillonlybeusedtosupportthestaticloadofthepipingwillremainintact.Thistemporary structure willnotcreateanaccidentofadifferent typethenthosespecified intheUFSAR.TheSafetyInjection Systemwillreactasdesignedtoanyaccident.

addressed intheUFSAR.Thistemporary structure willnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinanytechnical specification basis.Thisstructure doesnotrenderanyplantsysteminoperable, norwillitdegradeanyoperating system.

U0 SCREENHOUSE NORTHOFMCC-1GPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-1838/11/89Scaffolding isneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareanorthofMCC-1Gnotcoveredbypreviously approvedscaffolds 89-167and89-168.Becauseoftheproximity oftheserviceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsandMCC-1Gthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedon,these,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurr'ence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.,

SCREENHOUSE SOUTHWALLOVERDIESELFIREPUMPPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-1848/11/89Scaffolding isneededforceilingandwallpaintingintheareaovertheDieselFirePumpbetweentheareascoveredbypreviously approvedscaffolds 89-170and89-171.Becauseoftheproximity oftheserviceWaterPumpsandFireServiceWaterPumpsinbothtrainsthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplank'deckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassigned'LiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents i

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

AMAINSTEAMARV-3411REPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-190September 6,1989RepairworkonARV-3411willnecessitate aworkplatform/

constructed ofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.ThesmalltubingfortheARVairoperatorwillbedisconnected duringthevalverepairpreparations.

Assuchtheplatformwillhavenopotential effectontheARVs,andthestructures willberestricted frommovementinthedirection ofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.

TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelatively lightscaffoldmaterials; however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporated astheisolation valve3507bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistence isprojected tobe2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.

Theabove'construction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

September 7,1989LAUNDRYEXHAUSTFANVIBRATION/EXPANSION RINGREPLACEMENT WORKPLATFORM89-191RepairisrequiredonductworkattheLaundryExhaustFan,locatedinthevicinityoftheAFeedwater Line.TheentriesfromtheMotorandTurbineAuxiliary Feedwater Pumpdischarges arenearby,andthereisahighdensityofsnubbersforthispipinginarea(5mechanical and1hydraulic).

Atemperature sensor(TE-2096) islocatedatthetopofthefeedwater linedownstream ofcheckvalve3003.Becauseoftheexistence oftheabovefeatureswithinthevicinityoftheproposedscaffold, scaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofNormalFeedwater LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliaries SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

September 12,1989SIRECIRCFLOWORIFICEFE-916LEAKREPAIRWORKPLATFORM89-192eAworkplatformisrequiredtocorrectaleakcondition atSIrecircfloworificeFE-916,locatedbetweentheRefueling WaterTankand480vBus16.AlsowithinthevicinityareTemperature Indicator TI-917,andSIrecircMOVs897and898.TheMOVsarewithintheASMESeismicClass2boundaryasindicated onP&ID33013-1261 Containment Spray(SI).Theplatformistobeabout4ft.high,estimated tobeinexistence 2days.Becauseoffactorsgivenabovethescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation

'inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnot.haveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

'ecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismic'feature, itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

9/26/89AUXILIARY BUILDINGTOPSOUTHWALLWESTFROMCOLUMNLINE8aPLANTBETTERMENT PAINTSCAFFOLD89-194AscaffoldisplannedforpaintingthesouthwallattheAuxiliary Buildingtoplevel,toextendfromtheDeconPittotheMonitorTanks.Becauseofthelargeareatobecovered,including theareaimmediately adjacenttobothComponent CoolingHeatExchangers, andtherelatively lengthyprojected durationofthescaffoldexistence, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines

'rovidedfromStructural Engineering

'(M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Inaddition, partoftheorientation shallstresstheimportance oftakingcarenottobumpanylivesmokedetectors.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer.

Inaddition, theJobSupervisor shallnotifytheFireProtection groupduringinstallation toallowforconsultation onanypotential interferences withfiredetection/sprinkler provisions encountered.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheLiaisonEngineer.

Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheLiaisonEngineer.

Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipme'nt, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed soasnottointerfere withAuxiliary BuildingCraneuseduringfueltransfermechanism workplanned.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory RuptureofaSteamPipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

1/16/90SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTSSWU625gSWU626gSWU623g'NDSWU624SCREENHOUSE BASEMENTWORKPLATFORMS 89-202InordertoperformthepipesupportupgradeworkneartheceilingfortheServiceWaterPumpdischarges, workplatforms areneeded,tobeconstructed ofwood,about3ft.abovethefloor.Theindividual pumpdischarges are14in.pipe,andtheheadersare20in.pipe,sufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagebytherelatively shortwoodenplatforms.

Nosafetyrelatedinstrumentation willbeaffectedbythisplatforminstallation.

Basedonthefactorsdescribed abovethedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Materialofconstruction willbelightenoughsothatitwillhavenoeffectonanycomponent intheeventofaseismicevent.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withtheproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEventTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becausethelightness oftheinstallation inrelationtothesturdiness ofthepipewillensurethattherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specifications bases.Theinstallation willnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipment intheeventofaseismicevent.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseofthesturdiness oftheadjacentpiping.Theinstallation ofthistemporary modification willnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becauseitdoesnotaffectanyTechnical Specification.

1/16/90SERVICEWATERPIPESUPPORTSSWU-636ANDSWU-638WORKPLATFORMS 89-203InordertoperformthepipesupportupgradeworkneartheceilingfortheServiceWaterPumpdischarge portioninthenortheast corneroftheroom,aworkplatformconstructed ofwoodwillbeneeded,about.3ft.abovethefloor.Theindividual pumpdischarges are14in.pipe,andtheheadersare20in.pipe,sufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagebytherelatively shortwoodenplatforms.

Nosafetyrelatedinstrumentation willbeaffectedbythisplatforminstallation.

Basedonthefactorsdescribed abovethedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheSafetyAnalysisReport.Materialofconstruction willbelightenoughsothatitwillhavenoeffectonanycomponent intheeventofaseismicevent.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withtheproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEventTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becausethelightness oftheinstallation inrelationtothesturdiness ofthepipewillensurethattherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specifications bases.Theinstallation willnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedequipment intheeventofaseismicevent.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseofthesturdiness oftheadjacentpiping.Theinstallation ofthistemporary modification willnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becauseitdoesnotaffectanyTechnical Specification.

1/17/90SCREENHOUSE PLANTBETTERMENT PAINTINGSCAFFOLDABOVETHEHOUSEHEATINGBOILER90-01Scaffolding isrequiredintheScreenhouse forcleaningandpaintingunderthePlantBetterment Project.Thispermit(90-01),isforaseismicscaffoldaboveandaroundthehouseheatingboiler.(Ref.sketchattachedtopermit).Thislocationiswithin11/2timesitsheightofsafetyrelatedservicewaterpumpslAand1B.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towire'llplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.K.FitzsimmonsonAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedStationEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation shallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and'ponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershallaccepttheinstallation.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheScreenhouse allvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

ITheaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEvents

Therewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

Ih February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION INAUXILIARY BUILDINGSUB-BASEMENT FORMIDLOOPINSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-14Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout8feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontal polesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchorage pointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmoVement.

BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediate vicinityofthescaffold, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment),

incorporating thefeaturesdescribed above.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.

l/

90-14Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, fireprotection systems,androtatingequipment inthearea.Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedin'hePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

0 February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION INAUXILIARY BUILDINGBASEMENTATWESTSTAIRFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892SCAFFOLDS 90-15InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheAuxiliary BuildingbasementascaffoldisneededneartheceilingabovetheSpentFuelPoolPumps.TheSFPcoolingsystemisnon-seismic safetyrelated(1)however,SeismicCategoryIitemsarewithintheimmediate

vicinity, givenbelow.AandBResidualHeatRemovalPumpCoolingUnits(2)AResidualHeatRemovalPumpDischarge Temperature TT-630(3)Otherinstruments intheareaforwhichcareshouldbetakentoavoiddisturbing areasfollows:Component CoolingReturnfromResidualHeatRemovalPumpsflowFI-651anditsassociated tubing.(4)AResidualHeatremovalPumpdischarge pressurePIC-629andPI-629Aandtheirassociated tubing.(3)Becauseoftheabovefactorsthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.FitzsimmonsOctober31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shiftseismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

90-15Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, that.adeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstotheAuxiliary Buildingsub-basement, allvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveit,willnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

90-15Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseas'aseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment, orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

NOTES:1)QualityAssurance ManualAppendixAQualityandSafetyRelatedListingandDiagramsSection2.2.4SpentFuelPoolCoolingoutlinedinRG&EDrawing33013-1248 (portionattached).

2)UFSARSection9.4.9.1Engineered SafetyFeaturesEquipment Ventilation andCooling.3)UFSARFigure5.4-7ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(portionattached).

UFSARFigure9.2-4Sheet1Component CoolingWaterSystem(portionattached).

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION INAUXILIARY BUILDINGINTERMEDIATE LEVELATWESTSTAIRFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-16InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheAuxiliary BuildingIntermediate Levelascaffoldisneededneartheceilingfromthestairwell northtoadj'acent totheContainment wall,overthewestendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.

StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater SystemContainment isolation MOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespacebetweentheheatexchanger andcontainment isverycongested withpiping,pipesupportstructures, regulators, valves,instruments, andleadshielding foraprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpiping.fromtheheatexchanger.

Amajorportionoftheequipment hereisassociated withthewastegassystemsupporting theReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizer ReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.

ImmersedwithinthisspaceisoneoftheContainment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.Becauseofthelocationoftheabovediscussed SAFWContainment isolation MOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed asseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shall,beattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

0 Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.LockedareaaccesstotheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultiscontrolled byalockedgate.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnotallowanyeasieraccesstothisarea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.The-installation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReport.whichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

,Accidental Release-WasteGasSteamGenerator TubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

90-16Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccident.

ormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment.

orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February7,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION IN*CONTROL ROOMAIRHANDLINGROOMFORMID-LOOPINSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-17InordertoinstallconduitandcableforthisprojectintheControlRoomAirHandlingRoomascaffoldisneeded.Theequipment intheimmediate areais,forthemostpart,dedicated tocontinuing habitability fortheMainControlRoominthepost-accidentenvironment.

Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheend.ofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

90-17Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated wi;ththisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantinventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolve.achangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.~~~Theznstallatz.on doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February13,1990PENETRATION SEALINSPECTION OVERCONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGUNITSCAFFOLD90-23IInordertoinspectpenetration sealsabovetheControlRoomAirHandlingUnit,ascaffoldisneeded.Theequipment intheimmediate areais,forthemostpart,dedicated tocontinuing habitability fortheMainControlRoominthepost-accident environment.

Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtothe,originalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-23Theinstallation doesnotresultina,changetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February15,1990CONDUITANDCABLEINSTALLATION UNDERINTERMEDIATE BUILDINGNORTHCATWALKEWR-4530SCAFFOLD90-24Inordertoinstallconduitandcableunderthecatwalkaworkplatformneeded.Itwillbelocatedintheimmediate vicinityofcontainment penetrations forheatingsteamandtheILRTventtoroof.ItwillbedirectlyabovetheContainment CoolerUnitflowindicators whichareSeismicCategoryIinstruments.

Totheimmediate northareControlRodDrivePowerCabinets.

Becauseofthecloseinvolvement withtheSeismicCategoryIitemsthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherecpxirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerin'hisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.

90-24Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpingcontainment isolation valves,theinstruments andcabinetsdescribed aboveandanyothersensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheir'unctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasas'eismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent, of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment, orsystemsinthevicinity.

90-24Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

February16,1990ABATTERYROOMEASTWALLPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-26Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsontheABatteryRoomwalladjacenttotheABattery,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 9ft.fromthefloor.Itistobeofwoodenconstruction toeliminate thepotential forshortcircuiting thebattery.Itshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedsketchsothatitwillbeidentical tothestructure providedasRequest86-56,whichwasdetermined tobeseismically acceptable (seeattached10/7/86S.K.Fergusonmemo).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheconstruction requirements givenbelow.Pre-planning andprefabrication forthescaffoldshallbedonesuchastoallowcompletion ofthestructure, apartfromthedecking,inonedayofworkwithintheBatteryRoom.Asalternatives tothisthefollowing maybeobserved:

Theportioncompleted shallbeadequately restrained tomakeitseismicwithbracingandinterlocking andcontactwithadjacentstructural features.

Inlieuoftheabove,theBMainBatterySystemshallbemaintained

operable, withnonon-seismic temporary structures intheBBatteryRoom.Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbyaqualified individual.

Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttoorabovethebatteries duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Sufficient clearances aretobeprovidedforElectrician accesstothebattery.Priortouse,thestructure shallbeinspected bytheJobSupervisor toconfirmthatitsconstruction wasinaccordance withthesketch.Uponsuccessful confirmation theJobSupervisor shalldocument-thisconfirmationfortheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form,andsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

90-26Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhave.nointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

2/26/90ABATTERYROOMNORTHWEST CORNERPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR4941SCAFFOLD90-27Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetration sealsinthenorthwest corneroftheABatteryRoomadjacenttotheABatteryCharger,tobeabout61/2ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistence ofthisscaffoldisestimated tobeamonth.Inconsideration ofanypossibility forinoperability ofDCelectricsystemequipment intheBBatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismic'Scaffold Guidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheABatterybankiscompleted; assuch,thatscaffold(90-26)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuiting thebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.

Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.

TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhas,beenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shall,beobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttothebatteries andotherDCelectricequipment duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation andpanelsinthearea.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

2/26/90ABATTERYROOMNORTHEAST CORNERPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR4941SCAFFOLD90-28Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetration sealsinthenortheast corneroftheABatteryRoomadjacenttotheABatteryDisconnect Switchestobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistence ofthisscaffoldisestimated tobeamonth.Inconsideration ofanypossibility forinoperability ofDCelectricsystemequipment intheBBatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheABatterybankiscompleted; assuch,thatscaffold(90-26)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuiting thebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.

Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.

TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttothebatteries andotherDCelectricequipment duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation andpanelsinthearea.

90-28Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction of,equipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

03/08/90STANDBYSFPCOOLINGCOMPONENT MOUNTING90-40Ithasbeendecidedtoprovidemountings for,andtoinstallthestandbySFPPumpintheAuxiliary Buildingbasement, immedia-telyeastoftheRHRPumpCooler,Units,bythecontainment wall,andtodolikewisewiththestandbySFPHeatExchanger onthetopfloorimmediately westoftheAComponent CoolingPump.Themountings aretobeofseismicdesignasprovidedforTemporary FluidSystemProvision Form88-27forEWR1594Banddiscussed inJ.JFerraro's April5,1989memoonreviewofthepumpmounting.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultina,changetotheassump-tionsoftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featureitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification,

~~~~~~~~~~~~becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwill i

90-40havenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

March8,1990TUBINGINSTALLATION INAUXILIARY BUILDINGSUB-BASEMENT FORMIDLOOPINSTRUMENTATION EWR-4892SCAFFOLD90-41Ascaffoldisneededwithaworkplatformabout5feetfromthefloor.Thecornerpolesshallbeextendedtotheceilingandhorizontal polesshallbeextendedtoatleastonewallandotheranchorage pointsorbumpercontactpointsontheoppositesidetopreventmovement.

Assuchitmaybeintegrated withscaffold90-14.BecausebothtrainsofResidualHeatRemovalPumpsarewithintheimmediate vicinityofthescaffold, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment),

incorporating thefeaturesdescribed above.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored bytheConstruction EngineerandtheLiaisonEngineer.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Inthefinalstageofconstruction priortouse,theseismiccapability ofthescaffoldinrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebytheConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframeandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofconfirmation ofseismiccapability.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Thescaffoldshallnotbebuiltuntilimmediately priortotheplannedstartoftheconduitinstallation effort.

90-41Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, fireprotection systems,androtatingequipment inthearea.Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccident.

ormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

03/29/90RHRPUMPSUCTIONMOV'S704A6BSCAFFOLDS 90-80Inordertoperformmaintenance onMOV's704AandBascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformabout10ft.fromthefloor.Themaintenance istobeperformed withallfuelremovedfromReactor.Thescaffoldinstallation istotakeplacepriortothistomaximizethetimeavailable forvalvemaintenance.

Becauseoftheneedforoperability oftheRHRSystemduringthisperiodthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, rotatingequipment andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunct'ions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed

90-80intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

03/29/90RHRRETURNOUTSIDEMISSILEBARRIERMOV-720SCAFFOLD90-81Inordertoperformmaintenance onMOV-720ascaffoldisneededtoprovidedaworkplatformabout7ft.fromthefloor.Themaintenance istobeperformed withallfuelremovedfromtheReactor.Thescaffoldinstallation istotakeplacepriortothistomaximizethetimeavailable forvalvemaintenance.

Becauseoftheneedforoperability oftheRHRSystemduringthisperiodthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, that,adeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalvesandinstrumentation inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed

90-81intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolant:Inventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

0 April24,1990BMAINSTEAMARV-3410REPAIRWORKPLATFORM90-151Repair.workonARV-3411willnecessitate aworkplatform, constructed ofpolescaffoldandplankssuchastosurroundtheAMainSteamleadandthereliefvalveinletpiping,somewhatbelowtheARVinletflange.Assuchtheplatformwillhavenopotential effectontheARVs,andthestructures willberestricted frommovementinthedirection ofanyothersafetyrelatedequipment.

TheMainSteamleadsandthereliefpipingaresufficiently sturdytoprecludeanydamagefromtherelatively lightscaffoldmaterials; however,pipingofsmallerdiameterthanthescaffoldpolematerialisincorporated astheisolation valve3506bypass.Thedurationofscaffoldexistence isprojected tobeapproximately 11/2weeks.Becauseoftheabovefactors,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthori'zation Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.

90-151Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipeSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,it,willbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/10/90NaOHTANKROOMPENETRATION SEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-156Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsinthesoutheast corneroftheNaOHTankRoom,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 12ft.fromthefloor.InthislocationitwillbedirectlyovertheChargingPumpLeakoffCollection Systemandwillbeimmediately southeast ofthe2trainsofSprayAdditiveTankoutletvalves(HCV-836A andHCV-836B).Theleakoffcollection systemisindicated asnon-seismic onP&ID33013-1265 sheet2.Damagetotheleakofftankwhichcouldpresentpotential forreleasefromtheventheaderisboundedbyanalysisofruptureofaGasDecayTank.Becauseofthepotential effectonHCV-836AandHCV-836Bthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

'k0 90-156Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

May9,1990BBATTERYROOMWESTWALLPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-157Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsontheBBatteryRoomwalladjacenttotheBBattery,ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 9ft.fromthefloor.Itistobeofwoodenconstruction to,eliminate thepotential forshortcircuiting thebattery.Itshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedsketchsothatitwillbeidentical tothestructure providedasRequest86-56,whichwasdetermined tobeseismically acceptable (seeattached10/7/86S.K.Fergusonmemo).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheconstruction requirements givenbelow.Pre-planning andprefabrication forthescaffoldshallbedonesuchastoallowcompletion ofthestructure, apartfromthedecking,inonedayofworkwithintheBatteryRoom.Asalternatives tothisthefollowing maybeobserved:

Theportioncompleted shallbeadequately restrained tomakeitseismicwithbracingandinterlocking andcontactwithadjacentstructural features.-

Inlieuoftheabove,theAMainBatterySystemshallbemaintained

operable, withnonon-seismic temporary structures intheABatteryRoom.Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbyaqualified individual.

Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacent, toorabovethebatteries duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Sufficient clearances aretobeprovidedforElectrician accesstothebattery.Priortouse,thestructure shallbeinspected bytheJobSupervisor toconfirmthatitsco'nstruction wasin-accordance withthesketch.Uponsuccessful confirmation theJobSupervisor shalldocumentthisconfirmation fortheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form,andsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

90-157Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/9/90BBATTERYROOMSOUTHWEST CORNERPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR4941SCAFFOLD90-158Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectpenetration sealsinthesouthwest corneroftheBBatteryRoomadjacenttotheBBatterytobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistence ofthisscaffoldisestimated tobeamonth.Inconsideration ofanypossibility forinoperability ofDCelectricsystemequipment intheABatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheBBatterybankiscompleted; assuch,thatscaffold(90-157)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuiting thebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.

Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.

TheZobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Extremecaremust.beexercised inworkingadjacenttothebatteries andotherDCelectricequipment duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation andpanelsinthearea.

90-158Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specif~cations.

2/26/90BBATTERYROOMNORTHENDPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR4941SCAFFOLD90-159Workplatforms areneededtoinspectpenetration sealsinthenorthendoftheBBatteryRoomadjacenttotheBBatteryChargerandBBatteryDisconnect Switchestobeabout8ft.fromthefloor.Thedurationofexistence ofthisscaffolding isestimated tobeamonth.Inconsideration ofanypossibility forinoperability ofDCelectricsystemequipment intheABatteryRoomwithinthisfairlylengthydurationthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).ItshallnotbestarteduntilthewoodenscaffoldovertheBBatterybankiscompleted; assuch,thatscaffold(90-157)shallserveasabarriertopreventshortcircuiting thebatterywithmetalscaffoldmaterials.

Thissubjectscaffoldshallberemovedpriortoremovalofthewoodenscaffold.

TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopy,oftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,'risobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Extremecaremustbeexercised inworkingadjacenttothebatteries andotherDCelectricequipment duringconstruction, use,andteardownofthescaffold.

90-159Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance.

accesstoallinstrumentation andpanelsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.TheaffectsandmethodstocopewithlossofD.C.poweraregiveninthefollowing:

UFSARSection8.1.4.4Potential RiskofStationBlackoutUFSARSection8.3.2.1Description UFSARSection8.3.2.2AnalysisProcedure ER-ELEC.2 CrosstieTSCBatterytoAorBDCBusAlsoanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportassociated withthisproposedinstallation isthefollowing:

SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport.becauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismi6"fea6xre, itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesof'echnical Specifications.

May15,1990BUS16SOUTHPORTIONAREAPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-160Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsabovethesouthportionofBus16ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 15ft.fromthefloor.Inordertopreventanyinterference withactivities involving thealternate trainBus14andMCC-1C,itisplannedtoconstruct thescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.

Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towire'allplankdeckinginplace.may bereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmedanddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance accesstoallelectrical panelsontheBus16andMCC-lD,toincludeclearance torackoutbreakers.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-160Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,it,willremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

May15,1990BUS16NORTHENDAREAPENETRATION SEALINGINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-161,Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsabovethenorthendofBus16ascaffoldisneeded,toprovideaworkplatformapproximately 15ft.fromthefloor.Inordertopreventanyinterference withactivities involving thealternate trainBus14andMCC-lC,itisplannedtoconstruct thescaffoldasaseismicinstallation.

Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testing,andmaintenance accesstoallelectrical panelsontheBus16andMCC-lD,toincludeclearance torackoutbreakers.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

i0 Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences with'ccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thedesignbasis'vents analyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangetothePlantTechnical'pecifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnot.createthepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment, orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/16/90TURBINEDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPAREAPENETRATION SEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-162Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsatthenorthwallbytheTurbineAuxiliary Feedwater Pumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately 10ft.highadjacenttotheTurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Concurrent withthisaretwoothersitesofscaffolds forinspections inthevicinities oftheAandBMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pumps.Becauseoftheconcurrent activitywhichcouldpotentially affectbothtrainsofAuxiliary Feedwater Systemcomponents, construction, andteardownactivities shalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.FitzsimmonsonAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresult,inachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/16/90BMOTORDRIVENAUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPAREAPENETRATION SEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-163Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsatthesouthwest corneroftheAuxiliary Feedwater Pumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately 17ft.highadjacenttotheBMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Concurrent withthisaretwoothersitesofscaffolds forinspections inthevicinities oftheAMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater PumpandtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Becauseoftheconcurrent activitywhichcouldpotentially.

affectbothtrainsofAuxiliary Feedwater Systemcomponents, construction, andteardownactivities shalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines will.benecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

0 90-163Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface

.withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

-Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

5/16/90AHOUSEHEATINGBOILERFEEDPUMPAREAPENETRATION SEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-164Inordertoinspectpenetration sealsatthewestandnorthwallsoftheAuxiliary Feedwater Pumparea,ascaffoldisneededtoprovideaworkplatformapproximately 20ft.highadjacenttotheAMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Concurrent withthisaretwoothersitesofscaffolds forinspections inthevicinities oftheBMotorDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater PumpandtheTurbineDrivenAuxiliary Feedwater Pump.Becauseoftheconcurrent activitywhichcouldpotentially affectbothtrainsofAuxiliary Feedwater Systemcomponents, construction, andteardownactivities shalltakeplaceatonlyonesiteatatime.Inaddition, thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shall.verifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismic-capability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Clearance shallbemaintained.

foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

tA0 90-164Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Thedesignbasisevents'analyzed intheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamLineRuptureDecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important'o safetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

6/11/90AANDBDIESELGENERATOR ROOMSEWR-3990OVERHEADCOVERREMOVALSCAFFOLDS 90-3.68Scaffolds areneededjustinsidetheDieselGenerator Roomoverheaddoorstoriseapproximately 10'romthefloor.Theworkisplannedtobedoneineachroomsimultaneously.

Becauseofthisthescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguideline statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffolds shallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Anadditional requirement shallbethat,thescaffolds aretobeerectedinoneDieselGenerator Roomatatime.Uponcompletion ofthefirstinstallation, priortobeginning erectionofthescaffoldinthesecondDieselGenerator Room,theConstruction

Engineer, ortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead,shallconfirmand,documenttheseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines.

Thisconfirmation shallincludereviewofattributes suchasconfiguration ofthescaffoldframesandsecuringoftheplanks.Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallnotifytheShiftSupervisor ofthisconfirmation priortoproceeding withtheinstallation inthesecondDieselGenerator Room.Aftersuchconfirmation, erectionofthesecondscaffoldmaybegin,accompanied bymonitoring, confirmation, notificationanddocumentation aswiththefirstscaffold.

TheConstruction EngineerorLiaisonEngineershallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Duringconstruction, theend-of-shift seismicstatusshallbedocumented onanattachment tothefieldcopyoftheauthorization formbytheConstruction EngineerortheLiaisonEngineerinhisstead.Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, and,uponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.

Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetothefacilityorprocedures asdescribed inthe,SafetyAnalysisReportAsaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofallA.C.powertothestationauxiliaries Decreaseinheatremovalbythesecondary systemwithcoincident lossofon-siteandexternal(off-site)

A.C.powertothestationSteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureAnticipated transients withoutSCRAMwithalossofA.C.powerSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

AUXILIARY BUILDINGINTERMEDIATE LEVELWESTSTAIRWELL PENETRATION FIRESEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-173June21,1990Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetration sealsneartheceilingfromthestairwell northtoadjacenttotheContainment wall,overthewestendoftheSpentFuelPoolHeatExchanger.

StandbyAuxiliary Feedwater SystemContainment isolation MOVsarelocatedonthenorthsideoftheSFPHX.Thespacebetweentheheatexchanger andcontainment isverycongested withpiping,pipesupportstructures, regulators, valves,instruments, andleadshielding foraprocessmonitorintheservicewaterpipingfromtheheatexchanger.

Amajorportionoftheequipment, hereisassociated withthewastegassystemsupporting theReactorCoolantDrainTankandthePressurizer ReliefTank,bothofwhichareinContainment.

Immersedwithin-thisspaceisoneoftheContainment Mini-purge discharge isolation valves.Becauseofthelocationoftheabovediscussed SAFWContainment isolation MOVs,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed asseismicusingtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons.

October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed and,documented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffold'lanning stage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural

,Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation,,

anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.

90-173Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoining roomsinthearea.LockedareaaccesstotheSpentFuelPoolfiltervaultiscontrolled byalockedgate.Ensurethatthescaffolddoesnot,allowanyeasieraccesstothisarea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Accidental Release-WasteGasSteamGenerator TubeRuptureRuptureofaSteamPipePrimarySystemPipeRuptureSeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnot,increasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

90-173Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

!

July2,1990.CONTROLROOMAIRHANDLINGROOMNORTHWALLPENETRATION FIRESEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-177Inordertoperformfiresealsinspection intheControlRoomAirHandlingRoomascaffoldisneeded.Theequipment intheimmediate areais,forthemostpart,dedicated tocontinuing habitability fortheMainControlRoominthepost-accident environment.

Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

6.0 shallbeaugmented

withtherequirement thatthescaffoldshallbecompleteandseismictotheextentinstalled bytheendofeachshift.Theguidelines statement.

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperformingsuchconfirmationofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, andfirefightingprovisions.

Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-l77Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

7/11/90PRESSURIZER LIQUIDSAMPLECONTAINMENT ISOLATION AOV-966BLEAKREPAIRSCAFFOLD90-183AworkplatformisneededforrepairofthevalveinsidetheNuclearSampleSystemisolation valvehoodenclosure, tobeabout6ft.abovethefloor.Thisistoaccomodate workingwiththevalvebodyataboutwaistlevel.Withinthevicinityare,likethevalvetoberepaired, otherSeismicCategoryIContainment isolation valveswhicharedirectlyconnected withtheReactorCoolantSystemandtheSteamGenerator Blowdowns.

Becauseofthis,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment)

.Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines

.provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardowncareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,andinstrumentation inthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

90-183Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafety.Analysis Reportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SteamGenerator tuberuptureRuptiureofasteampipePrimarysystempiperuptureSeismicEventsTheinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafety-Analysis Report,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent.

of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

7/23/90SERVICEBUILDINGBASEMENT, PRIMARYWATERTREATMENT ROOMEASTWALLFIRESEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-186Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetration sealsontheeastwallbehindtheCondensate StorageTanks.Duetotheproximity ofthescaffoldtotheCST's,thescaffoldshallbeconstructed asseismic.TheScaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedJobSupervisor, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmedanddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form.Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

InthisinstancetheStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesamemannerasdescribed above.Duringconstruction andteardown, careshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganysensitive equipment andtubinginthevicinity.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallvalves,instrumentation, panels,rotatingequipment, firefightingprovisions, andadjoiningroomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.

Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

LossofNormalFeedwater SeismicEventsRuptureofSteamPipeTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovidedtofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation

'doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated inthe'afetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

RELAYROOMNORTHWALLWESTOFDOORTOTURB1NEBUILDINGPENETRATION FIRESEALINSPECTION EWR-4941SCAFFOLD90-188Aworkplatformisneededtoinspectfirebarrierpenetration sealsintheRelayRoomontheNorthWall.ThescaffoldwillbelocatedneartheAMSACandEHPanels.Asaresult,itshallbeconstructed asseismic.AMSACitselfisnotaSafetyRelatedSystem.Theimportance oftheAMSACSystemandothermodifications thathavebeeninstalled inthiscabinetmakeitdesirable forthisscaffoldtobeseismic.Duringconstruction andtear-down, extracareshouldbetakentopreventbumpinganypanelsorconduitinthearea.Thescaffoldshallbeconstructed inaccordance withtheattachedSeismicScaffoldGuidelines providedfromStructural Engineering (M.B.Fitzsimmons October31,1988memoattachment).

Theguidelines statement

4.0 requirement

towireallplankdeckinginplacemaybereplacedwiththealternative requirement tousescaffoldpolesasholddownbarsinconjunction withwoodencleats.(Acceptable asnotedperM.B.Fitzsimmons onAuthorization Form89-167).TheJobSupervisor shallverifythatanorientation sessionhasbeenconducted ontheguidelines provided.

Theerectionprocessshallbemonitored byanassignedLiaisonEngineer, anditsseismiccapability inrelationtotheguidelines shallbeconfirmed anddocumented priortoscaffoldusebyaqualified individual.

Suchdocumentation shallbeattachedtotheoriginalcopyoftheAuthorization Form..Thepersonperforming suchconfirmation ofseismiccapability shallsonotifytheShiftSupervisor.

Ifitisforeseeninthescaffoldplanningstage,orisobservedduringerection, thatadeviation fromtheguidelines willbenecessary, verbalguidancefromamemberofStructural Engineering shallbeobtained.

Inthisinstance, theStructural Engineershallreviewtheinstallation, anduponbeingsatisfied withitsseismiccapability, theStructural Engineershalldocumentacceptance oftheinstallation inthesanemannerasdescribed above.

Clearance shallbemaintained foroperations, testingandmaintenance accesstoallinstrumentation, panels,andadjoining roomsinthearea.Theaboveconstruction requirements aretobeobserved; basedonthese,thedeterminations calledforinlOCFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnotresultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysisgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.Asaseismically constructed featurewithnointerferences withaccessesdescribed aboveitwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonanyexistingplantprovisions intheimmediate vicinityintheirfunctions innormaloperation orintheirfunctions asdescribed intheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReport.ThedesignbasiseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

SeismicEventsTherewillbenoadverseeffectonfirefightingcapability becausetherewillbenointerference withaccessprovided, tofirefightingprovisions.

Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becauseasaseismicfeaturetherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.Theinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseoftheseismiccapability andaccessprovisions incorporated.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthanpreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReport,becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillremainindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyexistingequipment orsystemsinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification, becauseasaseismicfeature,itwillbeindependent of,andwillhavenointerface withanyequipment orsystemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

July26,1989TEMPORARY OXYGENMONITORTEMPORARY FLUIDPROVISION REQUEST589-28AFFECTEDDRAWING:AFFECTEDPROCEDURES:

33013-1274, WasteDisposal-GasH2and,N2andGasAnalyzer(WD)P&ID09l~S4~2~12'P11~13'P116INSTRUCTIONS TOOPERATIONS:

TheHPprocedures referenced shallbeconducted bylabpersonnel.

TECH.SPEC.REF:Sect.3.9.2.5,Table3.5-5,Table4'-5TheMSAGasAnalyzerisoutofserviceforoxygenmonitoring.

Inordertocontinuetomonitor02perTech.Spec.requirements ofTable3.5-5attemporary connection willbeutilized.

Thetemporary monitorwilltieintotheGasDecayTanksample3/8in.tubingwithpolytubingconnected withtubingnuts.Thetemporary tubingwillbeoperatedbylabpersonnel atpressures suitableforthesampler;however,thetubingtobeusedismorethancapableofwithstanding fullGasDecayTankPressure.

TheoutletofthemonitoristobetiedtotheventheaderasdoesthepresentGasAnalyzer.

Pressurereduction fromGasDecayTankpressureisaccomplished ataninstalled reducerupstreamoftheGasAnalyzerandthetemporary connection.

Tubingassociated withthismodificationisdesignated asnon-codeclass(ANSIB31.1)perRG&EDrawing33013-1273.

Itshallbeinstalled sothatsafetyrelatedequipment isnotpotentially affectedbyadesignbasisaccident(seismicevent).TheeventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withtheproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

Radioactive GasWasteSystemFailureSeismicEventTheinstallation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethefunctionofthesystemwillbemaintained, pressureretaining capability iswithindesignlimitsandthereisnopotential impacttosafetyrelatedequipment duringaseismicevent.Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseitcanbereadilyisolatedintheevent,ofafailureandbecausetheoverallfunctionofthesystemisbeingmaintained.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becausethe~~~~~capability tomonitor02willberetained.

S'AFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARY RADWASTDEMINERALIZER SYSTEM1~01~11.2SCOPEOFANALYSISThepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyaspectsofinstalling atemporary demineralizing systemforprocessing theexcessive liquidradwastefromthe1989outage.Theevaporator andrecyclesystemshavenotbeenabletoeffectively processtheaddedwasteduetoreducedcapacityoftheevaporator package.Asaresult,theon-sitestoragecapability isnearcapacityseverelylimitingoperation flexibility.

Thetemporary liquidwasteprocessing systemisafluidized transferdemineralization systemconsisting of5to6resinvessels,boosterpump,mechanical filter,dewatering pumpandprocesscontrolunit.Theentiresystemisinterconnected withflexiblereinforced non-collapsible butylrubberhosesdesignedfortemperatures between-20Fand180Fandpressurefrom0to300psig.Thesuppliedsystemisdesignedandoperatedinaccordance withthefollowing standards andoperating parameters.

a)b)c)d)e)f)g)h)Reg.Guide1.143ANSI55.2ANSI/ASME B31~1ASMEB&PVCodeSectionVIII&IXPressure0-150psigTemperature 50-135F(Resinlimited)Flow15-200gpmHydrotestedto225psig1~3Theshut-offheadoftheboosterpumpandthemonitortanktransferpumpis100and115psigrespectively.

Thisiswellbelowthedesignofallthetemporary systemcomponents.

Thetemporary systemwill~processwastefromtheWasteHoldupTankusingoneofmonitoring tanksasabatchtank.Theprocesscyclewillconsistofcyclingthewastefromthemonitoring tankthrutheresinbeds5to6timesuntiltheactivitylevelisacceptable fordischarge tothelake.Thespentresinwillthenbesluicedtoashippingcask.Thepipingarrangement willconsistofatemporary hoseconnected fromthedischarge ofthewasteevaporator feedpump.atvalve1762Atothedischarge ofthemonitoring tankpumpatvalve1279.Thishosewillbeusedtotransferradwastefromthewasteholduptankviatheevaporator feedpumptotheAorBmonitortank.Asecondhosewillthenbeconnected fromthedischarge ofthemonitoring tankpumpwithateeatvalve1279totheinletofthetemporary wasteprocessing system.Thishosewillbeusedtocycletheradwastefrom

themonit'ortanktothewasteprocessing systemviathemonitortankpump.Athirdhosewillbeconnected fromtheoutletofthewasteprocessing systemtotheAandBmonitortankreturnlineatvalve1291Aand/or1234depending onflowrequirements.

Thishosewillbeusedtocyclethewastebacktothemonitortanks.1~4Theentiretemporary systemwillbelocatedinthedrummingareaoftheAuxiliary Buildingoperating floorelv.271ft.Theallowable floorloadingfor'thisareais300lb/ftEachofthedemineralizer tankshasaminimumbasediameterof24inchesandweighs2,200lbs.full.Consequently, inordertoadheretothemaximumfloorloading,aminimumclearance of6inchesmustbemaintained aroundeachvessel.1~5Thetemporary systemwillalsorequired440Vpower,serviceair,andDIwaterconnections.

Electrical powerwillbesuppliedwithatemporary cablefromthe440Vweldingoutletlocatedoutsidethedrummingstationonthetruckbaywall.TheDIwaterandserviceairwillbeconnected withflexiblerubberhosesfromconnections alreadyexistingwithinthedrummingarea.1.6'heDIwaterandserviceairarerequiredforsluicingandvesselflushing.

TheDIwaterconnection alsoservesasabackupwater.sourceforcoolingresinsifaleakinthesystemdevelopsduringprocessdowntime.2'REFERENCES 2'2'RG&ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSection15.7.2RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-1268 2'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-1270 3'SAFETYANALYSIS3~1Areviewhasbeenperformed ofalltheeventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationFSARandtheeventsrequiring analysisbyNRCRegulatory Guide1.70.Theonlyeventsrelatedtothistemporary modification area.radioactive liquidwastesystemfailureandaseismicevent.3~2Thedrummingareaandmonitoring tankareasaredesignedsuchthatanypipingortankleakagewillbecollected throughthedrainagesystemintheAuxiliary Buildingsumptobepumpedbackintotheliquidwastesystem.ThebuildingsumpandbasementvolumeissufficienttoholdthefullvolumeofaCVCSliquidholduptank(33,000gallons)withoutoverflowing toareasoutsidethebuilding.

Thevolumeofa p

3'monitoring tankanddemineralizer tankis7,500gallonsand115gallonsrespectively.

Sinceeithertankislessthanthevolumeofaholduptank,thesumpstillhassufficient capacitytohandlethemonitortankordemineralizer tank.4inchdrainsarelocatedwithslopingfloorsinfrontofthedrummingareadoorwayandinthemonitoring tankarea.Intheeventtheprocesswaterislostfromthespentresinsinthedemineralizer tanks,theresinscanbecooledbythebackupDIwaterconnection.

Basedontheanalysispresented insection15.7.2fortheprimarywaterCVCSspentresinstoragetank,it.willtake4daysfordecayheattogenerateenoughheattoreachtheresin140Ftemperature limit.Thisisbasedona14fuelfailure.Wastefromthewasteholduptankiscollected fromfloordrainsandisnotexpectedtocontainhighactivitylevels.HoweverAdmini-strativecontrolswillbeestablished toensureresintanksaremaintained withproperwaterlevelwhenconcentrated resinsaretobestoredformorethan24hours.3~43.5Thedrummingareaisenclosedbyseismically designedwalls.Nosafetyrelatedequipment existswithinthewallsgfdrummingarea.Consequently, thedemineralizer system.willnotaffectsafetyrelatedsystemsduringaseismiceventshoulditfail.Theflexiblehosesrunningoutsidethedrummingareawillberestrained andlocatedtopreventinterference withanysafetyrelatedecplipment operation.

IBasedupontheevaluations insections3.1thru3.4above,themarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationwillremainunchanged bytheinstallation ofthistemporary modification; and,theadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheprevention ofaccidents andforthemitigation oftheconsequences ofaccidents willbeunchanged bytheinstallation ofthistemporary modification.

4.04.1PRELIMINARY SAFETYEVALUATION" LTheproposedtemporary modification doesnotinvolvean'unreviewed safetyquestionsince:a)theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important.

tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbeincreased sincethewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviously considered, or;b)thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbecreatedsinceacceptedcodesandstandards arefollowed, org

c)themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedsincewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviously assumed.

March9,1990ply'OSSOFDECAYHEATREMOVALEXPEDITIOUS ACTION--INTERIMnAnHOTLEGLEVELTRANSMITTER 90-03Genericletter88-17recommended expeditious actionsincluding installing twoindependent RCSwaterlevelindications withthecapability toprovidewaterlevelinformation toControlRoomoperators.

Onesuchprovision, apressure" transmitter (PT-432A) withindication attheMainControlBoardhasbeeninpermanent existence; however,asimilarprovision istobeinstalled priortoenteringthenextreducedreactorcoolantinventory operation.

Thiswillbeinstalled atatestconnection downstream oftheLoopAHotLegSampletapmanualrootvalve504,usingtubingofmaterialidentical tothepermanent installation forPT-432AintheBLoopSampletapexceptthat3/8"tubingmaybeusedinplaceof1/4".Thetubingisratedforpressuregreaterthan5,000psig.Atransmitter, similartoPT-432A,istobeinstalled, designated LIT-432Aatthetestpointdiscussed above,tobemountedsecurelytotheadjacentwalloronastandwhichwillbefabricated andinstalled suchastoinsureagainsttopplingbyuseofstruts,bumpersortie-downs.

Incaseofabreakinthe3/8"tubingtheleakagewillbeslow,andthelevelchangewillbemonitored ontheotherchannel.Thesignalcablewillbeinstalled underthecontrolsofprocedure A-1405installation andremovaloftemporary cables.Theexistingprocedure 0-2.3.1,DrainingtheReactorCoolantSystem,istoberevisedtoaddresstheindications tobemonitored, including thesubjectprovision.

Regarding levelindication difference betweenmeasurement points,thedifference calculated fromWestinghouse ESBU/WOG-88-173 datedOctober14,1988willbeprovidedtooperators forguidance.

Theaboveconstruction andoperational requirements aretobeobserved.

Basedonthese,the.determinations calledforin10CFR50.59 aregivenbelow.Theinstallation doesnot'esultinachangetotheassumptions oftheanalysesgivenintheSafetyAnalysisReportbecauseofthesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequatesupportsystemtoprovidedasdiscussed above,itwillnothaveanyadverseeffectonthesafety-related equipment inthevicinity, orresultinadecreaseinreactorcoolantinventory.

ThedesignbaseseventsanalyzedintheSafetyAnalysisReportwhichareassociated withthisproposedinstallation arethefollowing:

DecreaseinReactorCoolantInventory Theinstallation doesnotinvolveachangeinthePlantTechnical Specifications becausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemissuchastoensuretherewillbenoeffectonassumptions providedinthePlantTechnical Specification bases.

90-03The.installation doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemtobeutilizedensuretherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafety-related equipment.

Theinstallation doesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportbecausethesubstantial tubinginstallation andthesupportsystemadequacy, asdescribed above,ensuretherewillbenoadverseeffectonsafetyrelatedequipment withinthevicinity.

Theinstallation doesnotreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyPlantTechnical Specification becauseofthesubstantial tubinginstallation andtheadequacyofthesupportsystemwhichensureagainstanyadverseeffectonequipment or.systemsdiscussed inthebasesofTechnical Specifications.

3/20/90SAFETYANALYSISFORTEMPORARY RADWASTEDEMINERALIZER SYSTEMINSTALLATION 90-041.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS1.1Thepurposeofthisanalysisistoevaluatethesafetyaspectsofinstalling atemporary demineralizing systemforprocessing theexcessive liquidradwastefromth'e1989outage.Theevaporator andrecyclesystemshavenotbeenabletoeffectively processtheaddedwasteduetoreducedcapacityoftheevaporator package.Asaresult,theon-sitestoragecapability isnearcapacityseverelylimitingoperation flexibility.

1.2Thetemporary liquidwasteprocessing systemisafluidized transferdemineralization systemconsisting of5to6resinvessels,boosterpump,mechanical filter,dewatering pumpandprocesscontrolunit.Theentiresystemisinterconnected withflexiblereinforced non-collapsible butylrubberhosesdesignedfortemperatures between-20Fand180oFandpressurefrom0to300psig.Thesuppliedsystemisdesignedandoperatedinaccordance withthefollowing standards andoperating parameters.

a)b)c)d)e)f)g)h)Reg.Guide1.143ANSI55.2ANSI/ASME B31~1ASMEB&PVCodeSectionVIII&IXPressure0-150psigTemperature 50-135F(Resinlimited)Flow15-200gpmHydrotestedto225psigTheshut-offheadoftheboosterpumpandthemonitortanktransferpumpis100and115psigrespectively.

Thisiswellbelowthedesignofallthetemporary systemcomponents.

Thetemporary systemwillprocesswastefromtheWasteHoldupTankusingoneofmonitoring tanksasabatchtank.Theprocesscyclewillconsistofcyclingthewastefromthemonitoring tankthrutheresinbeds5to6timesuntilthe,activitylevelisacceptable fordischarge tothelake.Thespentresinwillthenbesluicedtoashippingcask.Thepipingarrangement willconsistofatemporary hoseconnected fromthedischarge ofthewasteevaporator feedpumpatvalve1762Atothedischarge ofthemonitoring tankpumpatvalve1279.Thishosewillbeusedtotransferradwastefromthewasteholduptankviatheevaporator feedpumptotheAorBmonitortankorthetemporary demineralizer skid.Asecondhosewillthenbeconnected fromthedischarge ofthemonitoring tankpumpwithateeatvalve1279totheinletofthetemporary wasteprocessing system.Thishosewillbeusedtocycletheradwastefromthemonitortanktothewasteprocessing systemviathemonitortankpump.Athirdhosewillbeconnected fromtheoutletofthewasteprocessing systemtotheAandBmonitortankreturnlineatvalve1291Aand/or1234depending onflowrequirements.

Thishosewillbeusedtocyclethewastebacktothemonitortanks.Theentiretemporary systemwillbelocatedinthedrummingareaoftheAux.Bldg.operating floorelv.271ft.Theallowable livefloorloadingforthisareais300lbs/ft2.Eachofthesixdemin.tankshasaminimumbasedia.of24in.andweighs2200lbs.full.Thetankswillbelocatedontopofthe4ft.wideby19ft.longby2.5ft.thickconcreteslabinthedrummingstation.Thereinforced slabwilldistribute thetankloadsovertheentireslabarea.Usingtheweightofsixtanksand200lbs.ofleadshielding pertank,thefloorloadingwillbeapprox.190lbs/ft2.fortheraisedslabarea.Theremaining equipment hasthefollowing weights:ProcessControlUnitSystemboosterpumps(2)9300/pump Filtervessels(3)9180/filter Dewatering pumpSluicepumpShielding 120/filter total20006005401001003603700lbs.Becauseoftheequipments physicaldimensions, theirweightsmaybeconsidered distrubuted overthelower6ft.x19ft.floorarea.Thiswillproduceafloorloadingof32lbs/ft2.Allloadsarewithinthe300lbs/ft2loadinglimit.

1.5Thetemporary systemwillalsorequired440Vpower,serviceair,andDIwaterconnections.

Electrical powerwillbesuppliedwithatemporary cablefromthe440Vweldingoutletlocatedoutsidethedrummingstationonthetruckbaywall.TheDIwaterandserviceairwillbeconnected withflexiblerubberhosesfromconnections alreadyexistingwithinthedrummingarea.1.6TheDIwaterandserviceairarerequiredforsluicingandvesselflushing.

TheDIwaterconnection alsoservesasabackupwatersourceforcoolingresinsifaleakinthesystemdevelopsduringprocessdowntime.

2.0REFERENCES

2.12'RG&ER.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportSection15.7.2RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-1268 2'RG&EGinnaP&ID33013-1270 CHEM-NUCLEAR SYSTEMS,INC.,AproposaltoRochester GasandElectricforLiquidWasteProcessing attheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Section2.0,Technical Approach.

N-89-0020-P02, July19,1989GAIDwg.D-422-022 3.0SAFETYANALYSIS3.1Areviewhasbeenperformed ofalltheeventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationFSARandtheeventsrequiring analysisbyNRCRegulatory Guide1.70.Theonlyeventsrelatedtothistemporary modification arearadioactive liquidwastesystemfailureandaseismicevent.3'Thedrummingareaandmonitoring tankareasaredesignedsuchthatanypipingortankleakagewillbecollected throughthedrainagesystemintheAuxiliary Buildingsumptobepumpedbackintotheliquidwastesystem.ThebuildingsumpandbasementvolumeissufficienttoholdthefullvolumeofaCVCSliquidholduptank(33,000gallons)withoutoverflowing toareasoutsidethebuilding.

Thevolumeofamonitoring tankanddemineralizer tankis7,500gallonsand115gallonsrespectively.

Sinceeithertankislessthanthevolumeofaholduptank,thesumpstillhassufficient capacitytohandlethemonitortankordemineralizer tank.4inchdrainsarelocatedwithslopingfloorsinfrontofthedrummingareadoorwayandinthemonitoring tankarea.

3.3Intheeventtheprocesswaterislostfromthespentresinsinthedemineralizer tanks,theresinscanbecooledbythebackupDIwaterconnection.

Basedontheanalysispresented insection15.7.2fortheprimarywaterCVCSspentresinstoragetank,itwilltake4daysfordecayheattogenerateenoughheattoreachtheresin140Ftemperature limit.Thisisbasedona14fuelfailure.Wastefromthewasteholduptankiscollected fromfloordrainsandisnotexpectedtocontainhighactivitylevels.HoweverAdmini-strativecontrolswillbeestablished toensureresintanksaremaintained withproperwaterlevelwhenconcentrated resinsaretobestoredformorethan24hours.3.4Thedrummingareaisenclosedbyseismically designedwalls.Nosafetyrelatedequipment existswithinthewallsofdrummingarea.Consequently, thedemineralizer systemwillnotaffectsafetyrelatedsystemsduringaseismiceventshoulditfail.Theflexiblehosesrunningoutsidethedrummingareawillberestrained andlocatedtopreventinterference withanysafetyrelatedequipment operation.

3.5Basedupontheevaluations insections3.1thru3.'4above,themarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationwillremainunchanged bytheinstallation ofthistemporary modification; and,theadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheprevention ofaccidents andforthemitigation oftheconsequences ofaccidents willbeunchanged bytheinstallation ofthistemporary modification.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION 4.1Theproposedtemporary modification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionsince:a)theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnot,beincreased sincethewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviously considered, or;b)thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethananyevaluated previously inthesafetyanalysisreportwillnotbecreatedsinceacceptedcodesandstandards arefollowed, or;c)themarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification isnotreducedsincewastetankvolumesarelessthanpreviously assumed.

SECTIONE-PROCEDURE CHANGESThissectionistocontainadescription ofthechangestoprocedures asdescribed intheUFSARandasummaryofthesafetyevaluation pursuanttotherecgxirements of10CFR50.59(b).

Therewerenonewithinthistimeperiod.

SECTIONF-COMPLETED SPECIALTESTS(ST)ANDEXPERIMENTS Thissectionistocontainadescription ofspecialtestsandexperiments performed inthefacility, pursuanttotherequire-mentsofl0CFR50.59(b).

Withinthetimeframeofthisreport,thereweretwoconducted.

SAFETYANALYSISGINNASTATIONTEMPERATURE STRATIFICATION MONITORING TEMPORARY MODIFICATION REVISION1MAY12,19890PREPAREDBY:Electrical EngineerDateREVIEWEDBY:ReactorEngineer5=~2.-DateAPPROVEDBY:Manager,Technical Engineering Date

RevisionStatusSheetPageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.SafetyAnalysisPageiiRevision1Date51289 0

SAFETYANALYSIS1.0SCOPEOFANALYSIS:

NRCBulletinNo.88-11,"Pressurizer SurgeLineThermalStratification",

requestsalladdressees toestablish andimplement aprogramtoconfirmpressurizer surgelineintegrity inviewoftheoccurrence ofthermalstratification, andrequiresthemtoinformthestaffoftheactionstakentoresolvethisissue.Pursuanttosatisfying therequirement andscheduleofBulletin88-11,Rochester GasandElectricCorporation isparticipating inaprogramforpartialresolution ofthisissuethroughtheWestinghouse Owner'sGroup(WOG).TheWOGprogramisdesignedtobenefitfromtheexperience gainedintheperformance ofseveralplant-specificanalysesonWestinghouse PWRsurgelines.Thesedetailedanalysesincludeddefinition ofrevisedthermaltransients (including stratification).

Theoverallanalytical approachusedinalloftheseanalyseshasbeenreviewedbytheNRCstaff.Asignificant amountofpressurizer surgelinethermalmonitoring datahasbeenobtainedinsupportoftheseplant-specific analyses.

Additional pressurizer surgelinethermalmonitoring andplantsystemdatacontinues tobemadeavailable withintheWOG,resulting inasteadilyincreasing database.

Pressurizer surgelinetemperature stratification datawillbecollected atGinnaforinclusion intheWOGdatabase.

1.2Thermalstratificationandcyclingphenomena werealsodiscovered inauxiliary pipingconnected totheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS).Thesephenomena maycausepipecracksintheunisolable sectionsofauxiliary pipingsystems.USNRCissuedBulletin88-08andsubsequent supplements toaddressthisphenomena.

Asaresult,electricutilities arerequiredtoprovideresponsetotheNRCregarding thereviewandidentification ofauxiliary pipesectionsconnected totheRCSthatmaybesubjected tothermalstratification notconsidered inthedesignoftheplant.Westinghouse hasidentified threepipingsectionsthatmaybesubjected tothermalstratification.

Theseare:SafetyAnalysisPage1Revision1Date51289

a)charginglinetoLoopBhotlegbetweencheckvalve393andtheRCSnozzleb)alternate charginglinetoLoopAcoldlegbetweencheckvalve383AandtheRCSnozzle1.3c)auxiliary spraylinebetweencheckvalve297andthemainpressurizer spraylineThisanalysisaddresses theconsequences ofinstalling temporary thermocouples onthepressurizer surgeline,LoopBchargingline,LoopAalternate chargingline,andauxiliary sprayline.Thermocouple extension wireshallbetemporarily routedtoadataacquisition controller.

Thecontroller shallprovideadigitaloutputtoaremotepersonalcomputer.

Thedataoutputlineshallutilizetemporary cableandexistingsparecircuitstoexitcontainment.

1.4Inadditiontothethermocouples, fourtemporary displacement transducers aretobeinstalled onthepressurizer surgeline.Thetransducers willmonitorlinemovementduringheat-up,cool-down, andduringtemperature stratification conditions.

2.02.12~22~3REFERENCE DOCUMENTS GinnaStationProcedure, A-303,"Preparation, Review,andApprovalofSafetyAnalysisforMinorModifications orSpecialTests".GinnaStationProcedure, A-1405,"Installation andRemovalofTemporary Cables".GinnaStationProcedure, "A-1406,"ControlofTemporary Modifications".

2.4R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantUpdatedSafetyAnalysisReport.2.5USNRCRegulatory Guide1.70,StandardFormatandContentofSafetyAnalysisReportsforNuclearPowerPlants,LWREdition,Revision3,November1978.2.6AppendixRAlternative ShutdownSystem,"GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Revision4,January1987.SafetyAnalysisPage2Revision1Date51289

GAI,"FireProtection Evaluation" ReportNo.1936,March1977.2.8Letter,EliasztoWrobel,"852-A&BLimitorque

-AluminumCovers",dated3/7/86.3.0SAFETYANALYSIS3.1AreviewhasbeenmadeofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaFSARandtheeventsrequiring analysisbytheUSNRCRegulatory Guide1.70.The'vents relatedtothismodification are:3.1.13.1.23.1.31)seismicevent,2)majorandminorfiresAlltemporary instrument cableinstalled shallberoutedtofollowtherespective linetobemonitored andthendropvertically tocontainment floorelevation 235'.Thetemporary cablewillthenberoutedalongthefloor,following theshieldwalltothefreestandingdataacquisition controller.

Noseismicimpactisanticipated sinceinstrument cableweightisnegligible comparedtopipe/insulation weight.Instrument cableroutedonthefloorandthefreestandingcontroller (approx.10"Hx12"Wx24"D)willnotaffectseismicstructures intheimmediate vicinity.

Thedataacquisition controller willbeplacedoutsideoftheshieldwallnearthelowerendofthepressurizer.

Temporary cableusedforthedatalinkshallfollowtheshieldwallatelevation 235',risetoelevation 253'iasouth-east stairs,andfollowtheshieldwalltoIncoreReference JunctionBox1B.Noseismicimpactisanticipated sincethiscablewillfollowafloor/stair routing.Cableseparation inIncoreReference JunctionBox1Bshallbemaintained.

Thetemporary datalinkcableshallbesplicedtosparecircuitA780.Cableandconductor insulation shallberestoredusingRaychemWCSFsleeves.ThesplicedcablesshallbedressedinIncoreBox1BsothatdistancebetweenA780andIncoreThermocouple cablesismaximized.

SafetyAnalysisPage3Revision1

Thistemporary modification willnotpropagate amajoror.minorfire.Cablesusedforthermocouples andthermocouple extensions areindividually sheathedinInconelOverbraid (thermocouples) orTinnedCopperOverbraid (extensions).

Noadditional fireloadingisanticipated bytheoverbraided cable.Temporary cableusedforthedatalinkisratedandqualified toIEEE-383flamerequirements asaminimum.Totalestimated containment fireloadingforthistemporary datalinkcableis200000BTUs.Temporary cableusedforthedata'inkwillbesplicedtoexistingsparecableA779intheAirHandlingRoom.Routingisthroughafloorpenetration totheMux.Room.Totalfireloadingforthetemporary cableintheAirHandlingRoomisnegligible.

Totalfireloadingforthetemporary cableintheMux.Roomisestimated at2000BTUs.Firebarrierpenetrations willberepairedandreplacedinaccordance withexistingplantprocedures.

Therefore existingsealswillnotbedegraded.

Thismodification doesnotaffectthesafeshutdownanalysisintheAppendixRsubmittal sincethereisnoeffectonseparation ofexistingcircuits, associated

circuits, orfireareaboundaries asanalyzedintheAppendixRsubmittal.

Thismodification willnoteffectthecapabilities oftheAlternative ShutdownSystem.Furthermore, noneoftheexistingprocedures forobtaining anAlternative SafeShutdownwillbeeffected.

Thismodification, therefore, complieswith10CFR50,AppendixR.Table6.1-3oftheGinnaUFSARgivestheAluminuminventory inContainment.

Thetotalexposedareais2197Ft.Thistemporary modification willaddatotalof10"FtofexposedAluminum..

ThetotalweightofAluminuminequipment isestimated tobe40lbs.ThisincludesAluminumindataacquisition equipment, displacement transducers, andpowersupply.The40additional poundsofaluminumaddedtocontainment willaddapproximately 800scfofhydrogenduringanaccident.

Thisamountofhydrogengeneration isnegligble comparedwith30,000scfoftotalhydrogenproduction duringanaccident.

(SeeReference 2.8)SafetyAnalysisPage4Revision1

3'.1.Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION:

4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4.24,4Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision10Date51289

Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

3.2.1Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION 4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4.2Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1i'

3~2~1Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION'

'Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4.24'Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1(

3~2~lThismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION:

4.lTheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction

'fequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.4~24'Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1(

Thismodification doesnotdegradethecapability ofanySafetySystemtoperformitsfunction.

Theassumptions andconclusions ofexistinganalysesareunchanged.

Nonewtypesofeventsarepostulated.

3.F1Therefore, ithasbeendetermined thatthemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations andtransient conditions anticipated duringthelifeofthestationhavenotbeenaffected.

Ithasalsobeendetermined thattheadequacyofstructures, systems,andcomponents providedfortheconsequences ofaccidents havenotbeenaffected.

4.0 PRELIMINARY

SAFETYEVALUATION:

4~lTheprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetywillnotbeincreased bytheproposedmodification.

4.2"Thepossibility ofanaccidentoramalfunction ofadifferent typeotherthananyevaluated previously willnotbecreatedbytheproposedmodification.

ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedmodification.

4'Theproposedmodification doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.SafetyAnalysisPage5Revision1

~fetyAnalysisFor,SpecialTest.RISpeci-1TostsT-09.02Contro1Bui1dingHeatGena=ation Rate'riginal Rev.1Rev.2NuclearEngineerDateInitialDateInitialDateReviewedBy:.orEnneerInitialDateInitia'ate ApprovedBy:Technical ManagerS9DateInitialDateInitialDate1.0Sco~sofAl'lBl~si8 ThepurposeofSpecialTestST-89.02istoobtaintheinformation necessary todetermine theheatgenerated invariousareasof.theControlBuildingduringnormaloperation.

Thisinformation willthenbeusedtoanalyzethethermalenvironment

,oftheControlBuildingduringDesignBasisAccident(DBA),stationblackout(SBO),andnormaloperating conditions.

1.2Theheatgeneration rateintheControlBuildingitobedetermined bymeasuring andrecording areawallandairtemperatures overaminimumtwenty-four (24)hourperiodtoadequately accountforroomheatfluctuations.

1.3Thefollowing areasoftheControlBuildingaretobete.ted:a~b.C.d.e.ControlRoomRelayRoomComputerRoomBatteryRoomIABatteryRoomlB2.0References 2.1EWR4529,"Ventilation SystemRequirements".

fetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page1.Revision 0

i GinnaStationUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,1989.2.2.1Section3.8.4.1.2, "DesignofSeismicCategoryIStructures-ControlBuilding".

2.2.2Section3.10.2,"SeismicQualification ofElectrical Equipment andInstrumentation".

2.2.3Section3.11.3.5, "Identification ofLimitingEnvironmental Conditions

-ControlBuilding".

2.2.42.2.5Section6.4,"Habitability Systems".

Section9.4.3,"Control.

RoomAreaVentilation System".2.2.6Section9.4.9.2,"Engineered SafetyFeaturesVentilation Systems-RelayRoom".2.2.7Section9.4.9.3,"Engineered SafetyFeaturesVentilation Systems-BatteryRooms".2.3GinnaStationTechnical Specifications, datedMay30,1989.SpecialTestProcedure ST-89.02, "ControlBuildingHeatGeneration RateTesting".

3.0SafetAnalsis3.1Areviewhasbeenperformed ofalleventsanalyzedintheGinnaStationUFSAR.Thetopicsrelatedtothisspecialtestarefires,circuitseparation, andseismicevents.3.23.3Thisspecialtestinvolvesplacingelectrical wire(usedasthermocouples),

temperature recorders, anddigitaltemperature readoutsinvariouslocations throughout theControlBuildingandTurbineBuilding(Section6ofReference 2.4).Thisequipment isinplaceonatemporary basisonly(approximately 24hourspereachofthefiveareas)andwillberemovedattheconclusion ofthespecialtest.Atnotimewillanyequipment usedduringnormaloperation orpotentially requiredduringabnormaloremergency conditions beremovedfromservice.Allventilation systemsbeingtestedorbeingusedbythespecialtestarenon-safety-related (emergency ventilation systemsarenotaffectedbythetest).NoControlBuildingpenetrations areaffectedbythespecialtest.fetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page2Revision0Date102389

.43.5Theequipment isintheTurbineBuildingandControlBuildingonatemporary basisonly,isofminimaladditional fireloading,andwillberemovedattheconclusion ofthetest;therefore, thereare'osignificant fireloadingconcerns.

Also,theareassubjecttothetestareeitherpermanently staffedorfrequently walkeddownonanormalbasisbyoperations andsecuritypersonnel.

lnaddition, Section6ofReference 2.4requiresawalkdownofthetestequipment atleastoncepershifttoensurethatitisfunctioning properly.

Theseprecautions assistintheearlydetection ofanyfirehazardswhetherinducedbythespecialtestequipment ornot.Atnotimewillanywiringberoutedthroughorovercabletrays,etc.allowingpotential circuitcross'-connection (Section5.4ofReference 2.4).Therefore, circuitseparation willbemaintained throughout thedurationofthespecialtest.3.6Thisspecialtestincludestheuseofnon-seismic equipment (i.e.,thermocouples andtheirassociated leadwires)onseismicstructures (e.g.,ControlRoomwallsandfloors).However,thethermocouples andleadwiresarenotofsufficient weighttocauseconcernwithrespecttoloadingonseismicstructures.

Also,thethermocouples andleadwiresarebeingusedonatemporary basisandwillberemovedattheconclusion ofthetest.Section5.0ofReference 2.4alsorequiresthatthewiringbeplacedawayfromnormal/emergency pathwaysandworklocations.

NowiringwillbeplacedontheSeismicCategoryIControlRoomceiling.4.0Preliminar SafetEvaluation 4.1Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafety,previously evaluated intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbeincreased bytheproposedspecialtest.4.2Thepossibility ofanaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent

'ypethananyevaluated previously intheSafetyAnalysisReportwillnotbecreatedbytheproposedspecialtest.4.3ThemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnical Specification willnotbereducedbytheproposedspecialtest.4.4Theproposedspecialtestdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionorrequireaTechnical Specification change.fetyAnalysisSpecialTestST-89.02Page3Revision0

AlloftheabovewerereviewedbythePORCcommittee withrespecttotheTechnica'l Specificationsandthecommittee hasdetermined thatnoTechnical Specification changesorviolations wereinvolved.

Additionally, thesechangeswerereviewedincommittee todetermine iftheypresented anUnreviewed SafetyQuestionandthegeneralsummations ofthesereviewsareasfollows:Thesechangesdonotincreasetheprobability ofoccurrence, ortheconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetyaspreviously evaluated intheUFSAR,because:Thesechangesweremadetoensurecontinued operability/availability ofplantequipment andwillnotresultinanyequipment beingoperatedoutsideofitsnormaloperating range.Thisresultsincontinued operability/availability ofequipment important tosafety.Thesechangesadditionally willnotresultinachangeofoperating characteristics ofequipment usedintransient/accident mitigation whichprecludes anincreaseintheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccident.

Becausethesechangesensurecontinued availability ofplantequipment, thelimitsshownintheTechnical Specifications, andtheassumptions ofthesafetyanalysesoftheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportcontinuetobemet.Asaresultthereisnoincreaseintheconsequences ofanypresently postulated accident.

2~3~Thesechangesdonotcreatethepossibility foranewordifferent kindofaccident, oramalfunction ofadifferent typefromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated intheUFSARbecause:Thesechangesdonotpresentnewfailuremechanisms outsideofthosepresently anticipated, andareboundedbytheeventscontained intheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,IThesechangesdonotreducethemarginofsafetybecause:Presentmarginsascontained intheTechnical Specifications arevalid,andtheseprocedure changesaremadewithinthoselimits.Theseprocedure changeswillnot,resultinviolating thebaselineassumptions madeforequipment availability intheTechnical Specifications, andtheUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport.