05000275/FIN-2010007-01: Difference between revisions
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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Less | | title = Less than Adequate Change Evaluation to the Facility as Described in the Final Safety Analysis Report Update | ||
| docket = 05000275, 05000323 | | docket = 05000275, 05000323 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000275/2010007 | | inspection report = IR 05000275/2010007 | ||
| Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for the licensee's failure to demonstrate that prior NRC approval was not required prior to making changes to the facility degraded voltage protection scheme as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report Update. In response to this violation, the licensee re-performed the corresponding safety analysis to demonstrate that the subject change to the facility degraded voltage protection scheme was consistent with General Design Criteria 17, "Electric Power Systems." The violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Notification 50306053. The failure of Pacific Gas and Electric to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of modifications to the offsite power protection scheme, in accordance with NEI 96 07, was a performance deficiency. The violation was more than minor because of a reasonable likelihood the change to the facility would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation. The violation screened as very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee did not adopt the requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was unsafe in order to disapprove the action, in that the Plant Safety Review Committee did not require that a 50.59 evaluation be performed to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed. | | description = The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for the licensee\'s failure to demonstrate that prior NRC approval was not required prior to making changes to the facility degraded voltage protection scheme as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report Update. In response to this violation, the licensee re-performed the corresponding safety analysis to demonstrate that the subject change to the facility degraded voltage protection scheme was consistent with General Design Criteria 17, \"Electric Power Systems.\" The violation is in the licensee\'s corrective action program as Notification 50306053. The failure of Pacific Gas and Electric to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation of modifications to the offsite power protection scheme, in accordance with NEI 96 07, was a performance deficiency. The violation was more than minor because of a reasonable likelihood the change to the facility would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation. The violation screened as very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee did not adopt the requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed rather than a requirement to demonstrate that the proposed action was unsafe in order to disapprove the action, in that the Plant Safety Review Committee did not require that a 50.59 evaluation be performed to demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:11, 29 May 2018
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000275/2010007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | T Farnholtz S Makor B Correll S Hedger R Kbpriva |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |