05000275/FIN-2010002-01

Finding

Title

Failure to Effectively Implement the Seismically-Induced Systems Interaction Program

Description

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, after Pacific Gas and Electric personnel failed to effectively implement the Seismically Induced System Interaction Program. The Seismic Interaction Program is part of the design basis mitigation strategy for a potential 7.5 magnitude Hosgri earthquake and is required by Procedure AD4.ID3, SISIP Housekeeping Activities. The inspectors identified three examples of transient equipment and materials improperly staged in seismically induced system interaction target areas. Pacific Gas and Electric had not analyzed the transient equipment to assess the risk to safety related components as required by plant procedures. Pacific Gas and Electric entered this finding into the corrective action program as Notification 50299740. The finding is more than minor because the failure to follow the Seismically Induced System Interaction Program is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone external events protection attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors concluded that the finding had very low safety significance because none of the examples of improperly staged equipment resulted in an actual loss of a system safety function or equipment required by technical specifications, or involve the loss or degradation of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event, and did not involve the total loss of any safety function that contributes to an external event initiated core damage accident sequence. The inspectors concluded this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensees past actions to address Seismically Induced System Interaction Program deficiencies were not effective [P.1.(d)]

01
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Report	IR 05000275/2010002 Section 1R04
Date counted	Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	NRC identified
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71111.04
Inspectors (proximate)	G Guerra M Brown M Peck G Miller
CCA	P.3, Resolution
INPO aspect	PI.3
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Finding - Diablo Canyon - IR 05000275/2010002

1(0)2(6)3(4)4(5)5(12)6(5)7(11)8(0)201(7)301(0)402(2)403(2)501(0)

IR 05000275/2010002: 1 2 3 4 5 6

Finding List (Diablo Canyon) @ 2010Q1

CCA Matrix: 2010Q1

	Q	CCA	Title
05000275/FIN-2009004-04	2009Q3	P.1 P.1(a)	Failure to Update the Final Safety Analysis Report Update with Current Accident Analysis
05000275/FIN-2009004-03	2009Q3	H.7	Failure to Follow Emergency Operating Procedures Following a Reactor Trip
05000275/FIN-2009004-02	2009Q3	P.5 P.2(a)	Failure to Perform Corrective Actions Resulted in an Unplanned Trip
05000275/FIN-2009004-01	2009Q3	P.2	Failure to Identify and Correct a Degraded Fire Barrier
05000275/FIN-2009008-01	2009Q3	H.7	Safe Shutdown Procedure Not Consistent With Safe Shutdown Analysis
05000275/FIN-2009005-04	2009Q4	P.1 P.1(a)	Less than Adequate Replacement Reactor Head Modification Design Control
05000275/FIN-2009005-01	2009Q4	H.4 H.9	Less Than Adequate Work Planning Resulted in the Release of Two Gas Decay Tanks
05000275/FIN-2009005-02	2009Q4	H.5	Failure to Properly Plan a Maintenance Activity
05000275/FIN-2009005-05	2009Q4	P.2	Less than Adequate Change Evaluation to the Facility as Described in the Final Safety Analysis Report Update
05000275/FIN-2009005-03	2009Q4	P.2	Inadequate 50.59 Evaluation for Steam Generator Tube Rupture Analysis
05000275/FIN-2010002-05	2010Q1	P.2	Failure to Submit a LERE for a Common-Cause Inoperability of Independent Trains or Channels
05000275/FIN-2010002-04	2010Q1	P.2	Less Than Adequate Evaluation Following a Failure of Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Trains
05000275/FIN-2010002-03	2010Q1		Failure to Report a Condition That Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function
05000275/FIN-2010002-02	2010Q1	P.2	Failure to Update the Final Safety Analysis Report with the Current Plant Design Bases
05000323/FIN-2009009-03	2010Q1	P.2	Failure to Evaluate a Change to the Facility as Described in the Final Safety Analysis Report Update Associated with the Addition of Manual Actions in the Safety Analysis
05000275/FIN-2010002-01	2010Q1	P.3	Failure to Effectively Implement the Seismically-Induced Systems Interaction Program
05000275/FIN-2010402-01	2010Q1		Security
05000275/FIN-2010402-02	2010Q1		Security
05000323/FIN-2009009-02	2010Q1	P.2 P.1(a)	Failure to Conduct an Adequate Post-Modification Test
05000323/FIN-2009009-01	2010Q1	P.2	Failure to Follow Design and Configuration Control Requirements

Self-Identified List (Diablo Canyon)

	Q	Title
05000275/FIN-2009403-01	2009Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000275/FIN-2009005-06	2009Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000275/FIN-2010002-06	2010Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Diablo Canyon Findings full list]

05000275/FIN-2010002-01

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