ML20236S982

Insp Rept 50-289/87-16 on 871020-23.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Full Participation Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Training Records for Emergency Response Organization.Response Actions Adequate

ML20236S982
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	11/16/1987
From:	Amato C, Fox E, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236S949	List: ML20236S947 ML20236S982
References
50-289-87-16, NUDOCS 8711300218
Download: ML20236S982 (5)

See also: IR 05000289/1987016

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

[ ' Report No.- 50-289/87-16 3

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Docket No. .50-289 )

License No. DPR-50 Priority -- Category C-

Licensee: GPU. Nuclear Corporation

l: Post Office Box 480

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Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191

Facility Name: Three Mile Island Unit 1

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Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania

Inspection Conducted: October 20-23, 1987

Inspectors: -ft L M / Ke M (s w / n/ /t /r 7

C. G. Amato, EPS, EPRPB, DRSS date

$.c A b P f%.la ( f.m) o r l /4 /*7

E. F. Fox., Sr. EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS date

NRC Team Members: K. Christopher, Region I

R. Conte, SRI, TMI-1

C.-Gordon, Region I

J. Jamison, Battelle PNL

D. Johnson, Region I

T. Tuccinardi, Region I

Approved by: //ca/h r64i M/ /,hd/ 7

W. J. Lazarus, Chief. Emergency 'date

Preparedness Section

Inspection Summary: Inspection on October 20-23, 1987 (Report No.50-289/87-16)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and

observation of the licensee's full-participation annual emergency preparedness

exercise conducted on October 20-23, 1987, inspection of the training records

for the Emergency Response Organization, and review of evaluation of the

.possible changes to the alternate communications system to ensure

communications with offsite agencies (see section 4.0 of Combined Inspection

Reports 50-289/87-14 and 50-320/87-06)).

Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's response actions for

this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and

safety of the public. All follow-up items were closed.

8711300218 371125

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' DETAILS

1.0 Persons Contacted

• D.H. Bedell, Manager, Public Information

, *A. K. Bhattacharyga, Nuclear Engineer, Commonwealth of. Pennsylvania

• G. Broughton, Director, Operations and Maintenance

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• J. J. Colitz, Director, Plant Engineering

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B.A. Good, Manager, Radiation Programs

! *G. Giangi, Corporate Manager, Emergency Preparedness, GPUNC

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H. Hukill, Vice President and Director, TMI-1-

• G. Simmonetti, Jr., Manager, TMI Emergency Preparedness

• C. Smyth, Licensing Manager.'TMI-1

• Indicates those present at the Exit Meeting.

The inspector also' interviewed and observed the activities of other

licensee personnel.

2.0 Emergency Exercise

The TMI-1 Generating Station unannounced full-participation exercise was

conducted on October 22, 1987, 5:00 p.'m. til 11:35 p.m.

a .~ Pre-exercise Activities

'The exercise' objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on July 13, 1987,

were reviewed and, following revision, determined to adequately test

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the licensee's Emergency Plan. On September 23, 1987, the licensee

submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and

evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations

with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the

. scope and content of the scenario. As'a result, minor revisions

were made to the scenario and supporting data provided by the

licensee. It was determined that the revised scenario would provide

for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Plan and

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provided the

opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas

previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.

NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on October 21, 1987, and

participated in the discussion of emergency response actions

expected during the scenario. Suggested NRC changes to the scenario

made by the licensee were discussed during the briefing. The

licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be

simulated and indicated in the scenario that controllers would

intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or

disruption of normal plant operations.

The exercise scenario included the following events:

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Low river water level;

Fire in Rad Waste Compactor area;

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Primary to secondary leakage;

Loss of offsite power;

Station Black-out;

Superheat conditions;

Accountability and evacuation;

Core uncovery and fuel damage;

• Release of radioactive material to the environment;

In-plant, onsite and offsite radiological monitoring;

Dispatch of teams from the Operations Support Center;

Emergency Classification i

Calculation of projected offsite dose equivalents and dose

commitment equivalents;

Development of Protective Action Recommendations.

b. Activities Observed

During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made

detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the

emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities,

and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of

the emergency response facilities. The following activities were

observed:

1. Recognition of initiating conditions, correlation of these with

Emergency Action Levels, selection and use of Emergency

Operation Procedures; and completion of notification to offsite

governmental authorities within the prescribed times;

2. Staffing and activation of Emergency Response Facilities

(ERFs);

3. Communication between and within ERFs;

4. Assessments of accident conditions;

5. Application of barrier breech analysis;

6. Development of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) and

communications of these to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;

7. Provisions for in-plant radiation protection;

8. Performance of offsite and in-plant radiological surveys;

9. Performance of technical support, repair and corrective

actions;

10. Assembly and accountability of personnel.

3.0 Exercise Observations

The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the j

emergency organization, activations of the emergency response facilities, j

and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency

response plan and implementing procedures. The team also noted the

following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that

were indicative of their ability to cope with the simulated emergency. j

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- Recognition of Initiating Conditions;

-- Accident Classification; '

- Communication with offsite authorities;

- Activation of Emergency Response Facilities * -

- Communication within and among Emergency Response Facilities; 1

- Onsite Corrective Actions; 1

- Use of Barrier Breech analysis; )

- Projection of dose equivalent; l

- Deployment of field teams;

- Interface with the Nuclear Engineer from the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania assigned to the Emergency Operations Facility;

- Command and Control;

- Development of Protective Action Recommendations and communication

of these in a timely manner to Pennsylvania. {

The NRC identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the

licensee for corrective action (the licensee conducted an adequate

self-critique of the exercise). These items will be evaluated during a I

subsequent inspection.

Engineers assigned to the Technical Support Center (TSC) did not

identify, track and anticipate trends, develop a composite of the

emergency situation and respond on a proactive basis. There were

indications of a lack of understanding of plant conditions.

(50-289/87-16-01) j

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Activation of the Parsippany Technical Functions Center (PTFC) was  ;

delayed one hour. The TSC Coordinator had a TSC staff member call a )

Parsippany staff member at home and ask that individual to staff the l

PTFC. (50-289/87-16-02)

4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items

Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of

records, Plans and Procedures and observations made by the NRC team

during the exercise the following items were acceptably demonstrated and

are closed.

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1. (Closed) IFI (50-289/86-20-01 and 50-320/86-14-01): The Emergency l

Director (ED) initially did not effectively utilize TSC personnel.  !

For example, the TSC was not requested to verify the leak rate source )

term calculations, or trend key plant systems. ]

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2. (Closed) IFI (50-289/86-10-02 and 50-320/86-14-02): Follow-up J

notifications to off-site agencies was slow. For example, a

significant increase in steam generator leak rate was not

transmitted until after a second request by the ED was made.

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3. (Closed) IFI (50-289/86-20-03 and 50-320/86-14-03): Continuous

accountability was not maintained in the OSC, and the design made

command and control difficult.

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'4. (Closed)IFI(50-289-20-04and50-320/86-14-04): Call-out and  !

mobilization of emergency response personnel off hours was not 4

demonstrated during this exercise due to a large portion of the

staff being onsite in support of the outage (Objective C.2).

5. (Closed) IFI (50-289-20-05 and 50-320/86-14-05): Additional

training is needed for proper call-in procedures by emergency

response personnel. Several personnel who called in gave garbled

messages and/or did not indicate appropriate arrival times (i.e., a

half hour arrival time and no clock reference time). Also, the

reliability of the code-a-phone during off-hours should be

re-evaluated.

5.0 Training

5.1 The inspector reviewed training records. About 300 TMI staff are

currently qualified for shift, initial and support Emergency

Response Organization positions.

6.0 Emergency Communications

Following the May and August temporary loss of primary emergency

communication capability to offsite locations and use of the alternate

system, the licensee undertook steps to explore means to upgrade the

alternate system. This study is currently on-going and results will be

subject to a future NRC inspection.

7.0 Licensee Critique

The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on

October 23, 1987, during which licensee controllers presented and

disc %d their observations of the exercise. The critique was

adeqete. Licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement which

the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken.

8.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique

Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met and evaluated

the licensee's critique. Subsequently, the NRC team met with licensee's

representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. The NRC Regional

Team Leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.

The licensee was informed that previously identified items were

adequately addressed and that no violations were observed. Although

there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team

determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the

licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their

Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that

would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of

the public.

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At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written

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information to the licensee.

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