ML20236S982
| ML20236S982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/16/1987 |
| From: | Amato C, Fox E, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236S949 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-289-87-16, NUDOCS 8711300218 | |
| Download: ML20236S982 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000289/1987016
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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' Report No.- 50-289/87-16
3
1
Docket No.
.50-289
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Category
C-
License No.
Priority
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Licensee: GPU. Nuclear Corporation
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Post Office Box 480
Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057-0191
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Facility Name: Three Mile Island Unit 1
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Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania
Inspection Conducted: October 20-23, 1987
Inspectors:
-ft L M / Ke M
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C. G. Amato, EPS, EPRPB, DRSS
date
$.c A b P f%.la ( f.m)
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E. F. Fox., Sr. EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS
date
NRC Team Members:
K. Christopher, Region I
R. Conte, SRI, TMI-1
C.-Gordon, Region I
J. Jamison, Battelle PNL
D. Johnson, Region I
T. Tuccinardi, Region I
Approved by:
//ca/h r64i M/
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W. J. Lazarus, Chief. Emergency
'date
Preparedness Section
Inspection Summary: Inspection on October 20-23, 1987 (Report No.50-289/87-16)
Areas Inspected:
Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and
observation of the licensee's full-participation annual emergency preparedness
exercise conducted on October 20-23, 1987, inspection of the training records
for the Emergency Response Organization, and review of evaluation of the
.possible changes to the alternate communications system to ensure
communications with offsite agencies (see section 4.0 of Combined Inspection
Reports 50-289/87-14 and 50-320/87-06)).
Results: No violations were identified. The licensee's response actions for
this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and
safety of the public. All follow-up items were closed.
8711300218 371125
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' DETAILS
1.0 Persons Contacted
- D.H. Bedell, Manager, Public Information
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- A. K. Bhattacharyga, Nuclear Engineer, Commonwealth of. Pennsylvania
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- G. Broughton, Director, Operations and Maintenance
- J. J. Colitz, Director, Plant Engineering
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B.A. Good, Manager, Radiation Programs
- G. Giangi, Corporate Manager, Emergency Preparedness, GPUNC
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H. Hukill, Vice President and Director, TMI-1-
- G. Simmonetti, Jr., Manager, TMI Emergency Preparedness
- C. Smyth, Licensing Manager.'TMI-1
- Indicates those present at the Exit Meeting.
The inspector also' interviewed and observed the activities of other
licensee personnel.
2.0 Emergency Exercise
The TMI-1 Generating Station unannounced full-participation exercise was
conducted on October 22, 1987, 5:00 p.'m. til 11:35 p.m.
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Pre-exercise Activities
'The exercise' objectives, submitted to NRC Region I on July 13, 1987,
were reviewed and, following revision, determined to adequately test
the licensee's Emergency Plan. On September 23, 1987, the licensee
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submitted the complete scenario package for NRC review and
evaluation.
Region I representatives had telephone conversations
with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the
. scope and content of the scenario. As'a result, minor revisions
were made to the scenario and supporting data provided by the
licensee.
It was determined that the revised scenario would provide
for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Plan and
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) and also provided the
opportunity for licensee personnel to demonstrate those areas
previously identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on October 21, 1987, and
participated in the discussion of emergency response actions
expected during the scenario.
Suggested NRC changes to the scenario
made by the licensee were discussed during the briefing. The
licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be
simulated and indicated in the scenario that controllers would
intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or
disruption of normal plant operations.
The exercise scenario included the following events:
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Low river water level;
Fire in Rad Waste Compactor area;
Primary to secondary leakage;
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Station Black-out;
Superheat conditions;
Accountability and evacuation;
Core uncovery and fuel damage;
Release of radioactive material to the environment;
In-plant, onsite and offsite radiological monitoring;
Dispatch of teams from the Operations Support Center;
Emergency Classification
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Calculation of projected offsite dose equivalents and dose
commitment equivalents;
Development of Protective Action Recommendations.
b.
Activities Observed
During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made
detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the
emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities,
and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of
the emergency response facilities.
The following activities were
observed:
1.
Recognition of initiating conditions, correlation of these with
Emergency Action Levels, selection and use of Emergency
Operation Procedures; and completion of notification to offsite
governmental authorities within the prescribed times;
2.
Staffing and activation of Emergency Response Facilities
(ERFs);
3.
Communication between and within ERFs;
4.
Assessments of accident conditions;
5.
Application of barrier breech analysis;
6.
Development of Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) and
communications of these to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;
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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection;
8.
Performance of offsite and in-plant radiological surveys;
9.
Performance of technical support, repair and corrective
actions;
10.
Assembly and accountability of personnel.
3.0 Exercise Observations
The NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and augmentation of the
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emergency organization, activations of the emergency response facilities,
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and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency
response plan and implementing procedures.
The team also noted the
following actions of the licensee's emergency response organization that
were indicative of their ability to cope with the simulated emergency.
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Recognition of Initiating Conditions;
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Accident Classification;
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Communication with offsite authorities;
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Activation of Emergency Response Facilities *
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Communication within and among Emergency Response Facilities;
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Onsite Corrective Actions;
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Use of Barrier Breech analysis;
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Projection of dose equivalent;
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Deployment of field teams;
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Interface with the Nuclear Engineer from the Commonwealth of
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Pennsylvania assigned to the Emergency Operations Facility;
Command and Control;
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Development of Protective Action Recommendations and communication
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of these in a timely manner to Pennsylvania.
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The NRC identified the following areas which need to be evaluated by the
licensee for corrective action (the licensee conducted an adequate
self-critique of the exercise).
These items will be evaluated during a
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subsequent inspection.
Engineers assigned to the Technical Support Center (TSC) did not
identify, track and anticipate trends, develop a composite of the
emergency situation and respond on a proactive basis. There were
indications of a lack of understanding of plant conditions.
(50-289/87-16-01)
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Activation of the Parsippany Technical Functions Center (PTFC) was
delayed one hour. The TSC Coordinator had a TSC staff member call a
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Parsippany staff member at home and ask that individual to staff the
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PTFC. (50-289/87-16-02)
4.0 Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Items
Based upon discussions with licensee representatives, examination of
records, Plans and Procedures and observations made by the NRC team
during the exercise the following items were acceptably demonstrated and
are closed.
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1.
(Closed) IFI (50-289/86-20-01 and 50-320/86-14-01):
The Emergency
Director (ED) initially did not effectively utilize TSC personnel.
For example, the TSC was not requested to verify the leak rate source
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term calculations, or trend key plant systems.
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2.
(Closed) IFI (50-289/86-10-02 and 50-320/86-14-02):
Follow-up
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notifications to off-site agencies was slow.
For example, a
significant increase in steam generator leak rate was not
transmitted until after a second request by the ED was made.
3.
(Closed) IFI (50-289/86-20-03 and 50-320/86-14-03):
Continuous
accountability was not maintained in the OSC, and the design made
command and control difficult.
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(Closed)IFI(50-289-20-04and50-320/86-14-04):
Call-out and
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mobilization of emergency response personnel off hours was not
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demonstrated during this exercise due to a large portion of the
staff being onsite in support of the outage (Objective C.2).
5.
(Closed) IFI (50-289-20-05 and 50-320/86-14-05):
Additional
training is needed for proper call-in procedures by emergency
response personnel.
Several personnel who called in gave garbled
messages and/or did not indicate appropriate arrival times (i.e., a
half hour arrival time and no clock reference time).
Also, the
reliability of the code-a-phone during off-hours should be
re-evaluated.
5.0 Training
5.1 The inspector reviewed training records. About 300 TMI staff are
currently qualified for shift, initial and support Emergency
Response Organization positions.
6.0 Emergency Communications
Following the May and August temporary loss of primary emergency
communication capability to offsite locations and use of the alternate
system, the licensee undertook steps to explore means to upgrade the
alternate system. This study is currently on-going and results will be
subject to a future NRC inspection.
7.0 Licensee Critique
The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on
October 23, 1987, during which licensee controllers presented and
disc %d their observations of the exercise. The critique was
adeqete. Licensee participants highlighted areas for improvement which
the licensee indicated would be evaluated and appropriate actions taken.
8.0 Exit Meeting and NRC Critique
Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met and evaluated
the licensee's critique.
Subsequently, the NRC team met with licensee's
representatives listed in Section 1 of this report.
The NRC Regional
Team Leader summarized the observations made during the exercise.
The licensee was informed that previously identified items were
adequately addressed and that no violations were observed. Although
there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team
determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the
licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their
Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner that
would provide adequate protective measures for the health and safety of
the public.
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At no time during this inspection did the inspectors provide any written
information to the licensee.
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