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| number = ML20064K621 | | number = ML20064K621 | ||
| issue date = 03/17/1981 | | issue date = 03/17/1981 | ||
| title = Fire Protection Evaluation Rept | | title = Fire Protection Evaluation Rept | ||
| author name = | | author name = | ||
| author affiliation = PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC | | author affiliation = PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC | ||
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=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:}} | {{#Wiki_filter:.. _ _- . _ - . . . -_ | ||
1 O | |||
Fire Protection | |||
: Evaluation Report O | |||
Limerick Generating Station Units 1 Et 2 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY O | |||
810 3 l'90 57k | |||
LGS FPER TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION e | |||
CHAPTER 2 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 Fire Protection Water Supply Systems 2.2 Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems 2.3 Pre-action Sprinker Systems 2.4 Deluge Systems 2.5 Water Spray for Charcoal Filters | |||
() 2.6 2.7 Wet Standpipes and Hose Stations Foam Extinguishing System 2.8 Low Pressure Carbon Dioxide System 2.9 Halon Extinguishing Systems 2.10 Portable Fire Extinguishers 2.11 Fire and Smoke Detection System CHAPTER 3 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION ASB 9.5-1 3.1 Detailed Comparison to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 3.2 Explanatory Notes CHAPTER 4 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL FIRE HA2ARDS | |||
() 4.1 Scope of Evaluation | |||
_i_ | |||
1 LGS FPER , | |||
4.2 Procedure CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE SAFE SHUTDOWN 5.1 Methodology 5.2 Description of Reactor Shutdown Methods 5.3 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Control Structure 5.4 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Unit 1 Reactor Enclosure 5.5 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Unit 2 Reactor Enclosure 5.6 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Diesel-Generator Enclosure 5.7 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Spray Pond Pump Structure 5.8 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Turbine Enclosure 5.9 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Radwaste Enclosure APPENDIX A TABLES A-1 Fire Protection Evaluation A-2 Heat of Combustion Values A-3 Insulation and Jacketing Materials Used for Electrical Cabling APPENDIX B FIGURES B-1 P&ID Legend and Symbols B-2 Fire Protection System P&ID | |||
-ii- | |||
I 1 | |||
l LGS FPER B-3 Fire Protection Water Supply Yard Piping B-4 General Floor Plan, El. 162'-0", | |||
177'-0", 180'-0" B-5 General Floor Plan, El. 191'-0", 195'-0", | |||
200'-0", 201-0" B-6 General Floor Plan, El. 217'-0" B-7 General Floor Plan, El. 237'-0", | |||
239'-0", 253'-0", 254'-0" B-8 General Floor Plan, El. 257'-0", 269'-0", | |||
283'-0", 289'-0", 300'-3" B-9 General Floor Plan, El. 302'-0", 304'-0", | |||
3'13'-0", 331'-0" B-10 General Floor Plan, El. 332'-0", 350'-0", | |||
352'-0" B-11 Spray Pond Pump Structure, El. 237'-0" B-12 Spray Pond Pump Structure, El. 251'-0", | |||
268'-0" O | |||
-lii- | |||
LGS FPER O CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On September 30, 1976, the Director of the Division of Project Management, of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, requested a re-evaluation of the fire protection program for the Limerick Generating Station. Atcached to that document was Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976". The following report was prepared in response to that request and discusses the fire protection program as it relates to nuclear safety ar.d addresses our conformance to Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1. | |||
It is the philosophy of Philadelphia Electric Co. (PECo) that fire protection be provided for all company facilities to minimize the effects of a fire. Therefore, proper fire protection was an original design objective for the Limerick Generating Station. Responsibility for the fire protection program is vested in PECo managerial personnel in the same manner | |||
,_ as other operating and design responsibilities. To support these responsibilities, PECo employs qualified fire protection | |||
(' personnel to ensure an adequate fire protection program is provided. | |||
Bechtel Power Corporation provided the fire protection engineers and consultants to develop the design concept, preparation of specifications, and selection of experienced fire protection contractors. Bechtel has designed the fire protection cystems for several operating nuclear plants and has a specialized staff that monitors the latest in fire protection methods. | |||
The term " fire protection system" refers to the integrated complex of components and equipment provided for detection and l suppression of fires. In addition to this system, the " fire protection program" includes the concepts of design and layout implemented to prevent or mitigate fires, administrative controls and procedures, and personnel training. The fire protection program uses a defense-in-depth approach aimed at preventing fires, minimizing the effect of any fires that occur, providing i appropriate fire detection and suppression equipment, and training personnel in fire prevention and fire fighting. | |||
The Limerick Generating Station has been evaluated with regard to l fire protection to verify that the total fire protection program provides reasonable assurance that a fire will not prevent the n | |||
(_,/ | |||
performance of necessary safe shutdown functions and will not cause an undue risk to the health and safety of the public. | |||
Chapter 2 of this report provides a general description of the l | |||
l 1-1 | |||
LGS FPER ftre detection and suppression systems provided for the Limerick Generating Station. Chapter 3 presents a point-by-point comparison of the LGS fire protection program with the guidelines set forth in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1. | |||
Chapter 4 provides an evaluation of the combustible loadings in the plant and the ability of specific fire barriers to withstand postulated fires. Chapter 5 provides an evaluation of the ability to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire in any fire area, to O | |||
O 1-2 | |||
LGS FPER CHAPTER 2 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION This section provides a description of the fire suppression and fire detection systems. The specific guidelines contained in Appendix A of Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 are addressed in Chapter 3. | |||
Figure B-1 shows the legend and symbols for P& ids. The P&ID for the fire protection system is shown in Figure B-2. | |||
2.1 FIRE PROTECTION WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS 2.1.1 Water Source The source of water for the fire protection system is two cooling tower basins which have a capacity of 7,200,000 gallons each, for a total capacity of 14,400,000 gallons. For a system pumping capacity of 5000 gpm, this allows continuous operation of both gQ fire pumps for 48 hours. If one cooling tower basin or supply | |||
\_/ line is not available, the remaining water source provides both fire pumps with a 24-hour supply of water. Water for the fire pumps is taken from either Unit 1 or Unit 2 cooling tower water basins through connections to the circulating water lines. Check valves are installed at the pump discharges to prevent water from one source from being pumped into the other source. | |||
2.1.2 Pumps There are two horizontal centrifugal-type fire pumps, eacit rated for 2500 gpm at 125 psig total head. The lead pump is electric motor-driven and the 100% capacity backup pump is diesel engine-driven. The pumps and their controllers are UL-listed. | |||
The fire water system is sufficient to maintain a pressure of 65 psig with a flow of 500 gpm at the highest elevation of each standpipe. When the fire pumps are not running, the standpipes are maintained full of water by a 2-inch connection to the service water system which is capable of replenishing 50 gpm for leakage. When a portion of the fire water system is activated, a low pressure switch set at 100 psig starts the motor-driven pump automatically. If the motor-driven pump fails to start, the diesel-driven pump starts upon a lower pressure signal setpoint of 95 psig. Both pumps are stopped manually. | |||
() The electric power for the motor-driven fire pump is taken from a load center that is supplied from the non-Class IE 13-kV O | |||
2-1 | |||
l l | |||
LGS FPER I 1 | |||
switchgear. The primary power source for the switchgear is the unit auxiliary transformer, and the secondary power source is the offsite power supplies. If the primary power source fails, the switchgear is automatically transferred to one of the two offsite power supplies. Switching from one offsite power supply to the other can be performed manually from the control room. | |||
The diesel oil supply tank for the diesel engine has a capacity of 550 gallons. This volume is sufficient to allow operation of the diesel engine for approximately 40 hours at full pump capacity. | |||
The fire pumps are located at one end of the circulating water pump structure north of.the power block. The motor-driven fire pump and its controls are in an area common with the circulating water pumps and are protected by hose reels and portable fire extinguishers. The diesel-driven fire pump and controls are in a separate compartment whose floor, ceiling, walls, and door are rated as 3-hour fire barriers. The diesel oil day tank is located in a curbed area within the diesel-dris'n fire pump compartment. This compartment is provided with an automatic sprinkler system. | |||
2.1.3 Yard Piping Fire protection water is distributed to the various areas of the h plant from a yard fire main loop which completely encircles the power block. The connections to the yard fire main loop from the two fire pumps located in the circulating water pump structure are spaced about 6 feet apart and are provided with valving so that either connection can be isolated while retaining 100% water supply capacity to the yard fire main. The routing of the yard fire main loop and its branch piping is shown on Figure A-3. | |||
The yard fire main loop consists of 12-inch cement-lined cast iron piping which is buried below the frost line. The west and east ends of the loop are cross-connected by piping which traverses the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine enclosures. Locked-open post indicator valves provide sectionalized control and isolation of portions of the fire main loop. There are 12 yard bydrants spaced at intervals of 250 to 300 feet along the fire main loop. | |||
Each hydrant is provided with a key-operated 6-inch gate valve with a curb box. Five hose cart houses are located in the yard area in the vicinity of the hydrants, each enclosing a hose cart which can be manually moved to any hydrant where it is needed. | |||
The system cf hydrants connected to the fire main loop is designed in accordance with NFPA 24. | |||
O 2-2 | |||
LGS FPER O | |||
V 2.2 WET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS Wet pipe sprinkler systems are provided to protect the following areas and equipment: | |||
: a. Turbine enclosure - feedwater pump lube oil reservoir compartments | |||
: b. Turbine enclosure - lube oil storage tanks and electro-hydraulic control power unit | |||
: c. Turbine enclosure - main turbine lube oil reservoir and lube oil centrifuge area | |||
: d. Turbine enclosure - main turbine condenser area | |||
: e. Turbine enclosure - main turbine moisture separator area | |||
: f. Reactor enclosure - electric cable penetration areas at elevations 253 and 283 feet | |||
: g. Radwaste enclosure compactor area | |||
() h. | |||
i. | |||
Lube oil storage enclosure Auxiliary boiler enclosure | |||
: j. Warehouse, machine shop, and construction shop | |||
: k. Circulating water pump structure - diesel fire pump compartment. | |||
: 1. Administration building - offices and engineering lab Each wet pipe sprinkler system consists of an outside screw and yoke (OS&Y) gate valve, an alarm check valve assembly, piping, and fusible element sprinkler heads. | |||
Wet pipe sprinkler system operation is initiated when ambient temperature rises to the melting point of fusible links on sealed sprinkler heads, thus causing the spray heads to open. The flow of water through alarm check valves energizes a flow switch which transmits the alarm condition to the fire protection panels in the control room. | |||
l l | |||
The wet pipe sprinkler system operation is terminated manually by shutting the OS&Y gate valve. | |||
2-3 | |||
LGS FPER 2.3 PRE-ACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEMS Pre-action sprinkler systems are provided to protect the following areas and equipment: | |||
: a. Reactor enclosure - HPCI pump compartment | |||
: b. Reactor enclosure - RCIC pump compartment | |||
: c. Standby diesel-generator compartments | |||
: d. Turbine enclosure - railroad access area | |||
: e. Turbine enclosure - generator equipment area | |||
: f. Turbine enclosure - under the turbine's appearance lagging and turbine bearing housings 1 through 9 | |||
: g. Turbine enclosure - reactor recirculation pump motor-generator set. | |||
Each pre-action sprinkler system is automatically actuated by a rate-compensated heat detector. The temperature sensor releases a tripping device to open the deluge valve, thus supplying water under pressure to the closed sprinkler heads. A rise in ambient temperature to the melting point of the fusible links on the sealed sprinkler heads causes the spruy heads to open, with subsequent water flow through those heads which have opened. | |||
Actuation of the temperature responsive device also initiates a local alarm, and registers an alarm condition on the fire protection panels in the control room. | |||
The dry-pipe system from the air check valve to the sprinkler heads is pressurized with instrument air. On loss of air pressure, a low pressure switch energizes a local alarm and registars an alarm condition in the control room. Both deluge valve operation and loss of pressure in the sprinkler system are separately annunciated in the control room. High or low air supply pressure downstream of the pressure regulator to the dry-pipe system is annunciated in the control room. | |||
2.4 DELUGE SYSTEMS Deluge systems are provided to protect the following areas and equipment: | |||
: a. Main transformers, auxiliary transformers, and safeguard transformers (all located outdoors) 2-4 l | |||
l | |||
LGS FPER O b. Generator hydrogen seal oil-unit | |||
: c. Main turbine lube oil reservcir and lube oil centrifuge. | |||
Operation of a deluge sprinkler system is initiated by a fixed temperature detector. This sensor detects a fixed high temperature and releases a tripping device to open the deluge valve, thus supplying water under pressure to the open spray heads. Actuation of the temperature responsive device also initiates a local alarm, and registers the alarm condition on the fire protection panels in the control room, independently of water flow in the system. Manual release of the deluge valve tripping device, or actuation by the local hand switch, also initiates local and remote alarms. | |||
2.5 WATER SPRAY FOR CHARCOAL FILTERS Charcoal filters in the ventilation systems of the plant are provided with water spray systems for fire protection. The water is supplied to the filters by means of a fixed piping system. | |||
An indicating gate valve is manually opened when a heat detector actuates a local alarm system and registers an alarm condition on O the fire protection panels in the control room. The operation is terminated manually by shutting the gate valve. | |||
. 2.6 WET STANDPIPES AND HOSE STATIONS Wet standpipes are designed for Class III service in accordance with NFPA 14. All areas in the power block are within reach of at least one effective hose stream. Each hose station has 100 feet of 1-1/2 inch woven, jacket-lined fire hose. Hose stations are located outside entrances to normally unoccupied areas, and outside both entrances of the control room. | |||
Adjustable fog and straight-stream nozzles are provided for all hose reels. | |||
2.7 FOAM EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM 1 | |||
A foam system is provided for the protection of the fuel oil transfer structure and two outdoor fuel oil storage tanks, and is designed in accordance with NFPA 11. The foam is educted from a foam solution tank by water from the main fire water header. | |||
Contacts are provided to annunciate operation of the system in O the control room. | |||
l 2-5 i | |||
3 LGS FPER The two storage tanks are each provided with a fixed foam maker at the tank. Foam making is initiated manually from a local station after a high temperature condition at one of the tanks has been alarmed locally and annunciated on the fire protection panels in the control room. Fire protection inside the fuel oil transfer structure is provided by a foam playpipe with hose rack. | |||
When the playpipe is removed from its holder, an electric switch located in the holder actuates a control valve to allow foam solution to enter the hose. A squeeze-type playpipe valve enables the operator to control the flow of foam. | |||
2.8 LOW PRESSURE CARBON DIOXIDE SYSTEM The low pressure CO, tystem is designed in accordance with NFPA 12. In addition to the total flooding CO, system provided for the cable spreading rooms, CO, fire protection is provided by CO, hose reels in the 13.2 kV switchgear compartment, outside both entrances to the control room, and along the north side of the turbine enclosure operating deck. | |||
The design discharge rate of the total flooding CD, system in the cable spreading room is based on reaching a 50% concentration within 7 minutes. The storage tank has sufficient capacity to maintain a 50% concentration in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable spreading rooms simultaneously for a period of 1 hour, while leaving a reserve in the tank for hose reel operation. | |||
The total flooding CO, system provided for the cable spreading room is actuated by heat detectors. A predischarge alarm sounds locally and in the control room. HVAC system penetrations into the area are sealed off by steam isolation dampers which close automatically when the CO, system is actuated. | |||
CO, hose reels are activated by removing a playpipe from its holder. An electric switch, located in the playpipe holder, actuates a control valve to allow CO, into the hose. A squeeze-type playpipe valve enables the operator to control the flow of the CO, discharge. | |||
2.9 HALON EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS , | |||
Two separate Halon extinguishing systems are provided in the auxiliary equipment room. One system serves the Unit 1 side of the room and the second system serves the Unit 2 side of the room. Each system discharges simultaneously into all floor sections in its respective half of the auxiliary equipment room. | |||
2-6 | |||
LGS FPER The flooring in'the auxiliary equipment room consists of 1-foot high floor sections resting on the concrete slab at elevation 283 feet. The floor sections are of all-steel construction and are used for the routing of cabling to and from the electrical equipment located in the room. This equipment includes the power generation control complex (PGCC) equipment, the plant computers, the remote shutdown panels, the Samac panels, a tone cabinet, an oscillograph,'and possibly three panels of vibration and loose i parts monitoring equipment. The PGCC for each unit consists of ten floor sections that are 8 feet wide and 20 feet'long, each of which has vertical panels mounted near the center of the floor section. A termination cabinet is located at the end of each PGCC floor section. Smoke and fire detectors are located in the termination cabinets. | |||
Each Halon extinguishing system consists of a pair of cylinders (pressurized with dry nitrogen) containing liquified Halon 1301 at ambient temperature, plus distribution piping, spray nozzles, a control panel, a manual actuation switch, heat detectors, and product-of-combustion (ionization) detectors. The product-of-combustion detectors actuate early warning alarms both locally and in the control room. The heat detectors actuate pre-discharge alarms followed by discharge of the Halon after a time delay. The Halon extinguishing systems are designed in O accordance with NFPA 12A. | |||
Each Halon system is designed to achieve a concentration of 20% | |||
by volume within the raised flooring that it serves, with a | |||
* concentration of 6% by volume being reached within 10 seconds ! | |||
after discharge begins. The first Halon cylinder is discharged autematically and has sufficient capacity to maintain the 20% | |||
concentration for 20 minutes. The remaining Halon cylinder, which is manually discharged, provides a 100% reserve capacity. | |||
2.10 PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS ' | |||
Portable fire extinguishers, using extinguishing agents compatible with the combustible material in the area in which they are located, are provided throughout the plant. ,, | |||
2.11 FIRE AND SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM ! | |||
The fire and smoke detection system is in compliance with NFPA 72A. The system also complies with the requirements of NFPA 72D for a Class B system with the following exceptions: | |||
() | |||
: a. No device is provided for permanently recording incoming signals with the date and time of receipt. | |||
o-2-7 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: b. Operation and supervision of the system is not the primary function of the operators. | |||
: c. In lieu of complete reliance on NFPA 72E, smoke and fire detector locations are established by a qualified fire protection engineer. | |||
Fire and smoke monitoring, detection, and alarm are accomplished by installing smoke detectors and/or heat-responsive detectors in areas where fire potencial exists. Fire and smoke detection systems for annunciaticn are separate from fire detection systems for actuation of fire extinguishing systems. | |||
The fire and smoke detection system is electrically supervised to detect circuit breaks, ground faults, and power failure. All fire or trouble alarms register on the audible-visual annunciator on the fire protection panels in the control room. | |||
O O | |||
2-8 i | |||
i LGS FPER - | |||
CHAPTER 3 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION ASB 9.5-1 The purpose of this chapter is to compare the fire protection provisions of Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Units 1 and 2 with the guidelines in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1. | |||
To identify areas of potential impact and to facilitate comparison, a matrix addressing each guideline of Appendix A and relating to the plant systems, equipment, and components, is included as Section 3.1. The matrix has extracted all suggested guidelines from Appendix A and given each an item number 1 through 210. Each item has condensed a particular guideline and makes reference to the page and paragraph in Appendix A where that guideline can be found. The general degree of conformance to the guideline is indicated in the " comparison" column, using codes defined as follows: | |||
C - indicates conformance to the guideline or O conformance to its intent. Substantiating statements are included as part of the matrix or the manner of conformance is discussed in Section 3.2. | |||
AC - indicates conformance to the guidelines by alternate means or methods. The manner of conformance is included in the matrix or discussed in Section 3.2. | |||
i i WC - | |||
indicates that design changes, means, or methods are planned in order to conform, or conform to the intent of the guideline. The planned design | |||
: changes, means, or methods and the manner of l conformance are discussed in Section 3.2. | |||
I NC - | |||
indicates that the plant is not in conformance and no design changes are planned. The basis for | |||
! non-conformance to the guideline is included in the | |||
: matrix or discussed in Section 3.2. | |||
l l NA - indicates that the guideline is not applicable to | |||
; Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2. | |||
! Substantiating statements are included as part of l the matrix in Section 3.1. | |||
( | |||
() In the " remarks" column, additional information is provided to explain or expand on the degree of conformance. Alternatively, 3-1 i | |||
LGS FPER reference may be made to Section 3.2 (or other sections in this report) for a more detailed discussicn. The item numbers in Section 3.2 correspond to those in Section 3.1. | |||
O O | |||
3-2 | |||
J LGS FPER v | |||
SECTION 3.1 DETA.TLED COf8PARISON TO l APPENDIX A OF BRANCH TECHNICAL POSIYION A9B 9. 5-1 ] | |||
APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPAPISON REMARKS N3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE Page Item l | |||
overall Pequirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Management responsibility for 1 A.1 WC See note 1 1. | |||
fire protect on program and delegation t authority. | |||
Qualification requirements for fire A.1 WC Qualified fire protection engineers of | |||
: 2. 1 the Bechtel Power Corporation provided i | |||
protection engineers. assistance in the development of the l design and equipment specification for the fire protection system. | |||
Training of the fire fighting and A.1 WC See note 1 | |||
: 3. 1 operating crew. | |||
Responsibilities of the fire pro- 1 A.1 WC See note 1 4. | |||
tection staff. | |||
2 A.2 C See Chapters 4 and 5 | |||
: 5. The fire protection program should be based on evaluation of potential fire hazards and the ef fect of postulated fires on safety-related systems and radioactivity releases. | |||
2 A.3 C All automatic fire suppression systems | |||
: 6. Backup fire suppression capability should be provided. are backed up by two methods of manual extinguishment (hose stations and oortable extinguishers) . | |||
Primary and backup fire suppression 2 A.4 C See Section 3. 2 7. | |||
capability should satisfy the single failure criterion. | |||
Ef f ects of lightning strikes should 3 A.4 C Lightning protection is provided per 8. | |||
be included in the fire protection NFPA No. 78. | |||
program. | |||
3- 3 | |||
LGS FPER C3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item | |||
: 9. Failure or inadvertent operation of 3 A.5 NC See Section 3.2 fire suppression systems should not incapacitate saf ety-related systems. | |||
: 10. Fire suppression systems 3 A.5 C Moderate-energy leakage cracks in fire that are pressurized during normal suppression system piping are analyzed plant operation should meet the in accordance with BTP APCSB 3-1. | |||
guidelines specified in BTP APCSB 3-1. | |||
: 11. The fire protection program for new 3 A.6 C The fire protection program for the fuel areas should be fully opera- new fuel area will be completed and tional before fuel is received at fully operational before fuel is the site. received at the site. | |||
: 12. The fire protection program should be 4 A.7 C The fire protection program for each fully operational prior to initial reactor unit will be completed and fuel loading. fully operational prior to initial fuel loading. | |||
: 13. Multiple reactor unit site fire 4 A.8 WC See Section 3.2 protection program. | |||
: 14. Simultaneous fires in more than one 4 A.9 C See Section 3. 2 reactor unit need not be postulated. | |||
Administrative t rocedures, cont rols, and Fire Brigade | |||
: 15. Provision of administrative 4 B.1 WC See note 1 procedures. | |||
: 16. Administrative measures for com- 5 B.2 WC See note 1 bustible material storage. | |||
: 17. Management control of normal and 5 B.3 WC See note 1 abnormal conditions and modifi-cation work to assure adequate fire protection. | |||
: 18. Ignition sources: procedure review 5 B.3.a WC See note 1 and approval, training and equip-ping, fire watch. | |||
: 19. Leak testing should use aerosol 6 B.3.b WC See note i techniques rather than open flames or combustion generated smoke. | |||
3- 4 O , | |||
O O | |||
O C LGS FPER O | |||
N3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item | |||
: 20. Combustible material usage: 6 B.3.c WP See note 1 control and minimization in safety-related areas. | |||
: 21. The plant should be self-sufficient 6 B.4 WC See note 1 with respect to fire fighting activities, and rely on public fire department only for backup. | |||
: 22. Fire brigades: organization, 7 B.5 WC See note 1 training, and equipping. | |||
: 23. Testing and maintenance of fire 7 B. S. a WC See note 1 protection program. | |||
: 24. Training of fire brigade; drills 8 B. S. b WC See note 1 I quarterly and with local fire department at least annually. | |||
: 25. Training of all shif t members: 8 B.S.c WC See note 1-coordination with and training of local fire department personnel. | |||
: 26. Standards for guidance: NFPA 27, 9 B.S.d WC See note 1 194, 196, 197, 601, and others. | |||
Quality Assurance Proqram | |||
: 27. QA programs of applicants and 10 C AC/WC See Section 3.2 contractors to assure proper control for the fire protection program for safety rela ted areas; program under manage-ment control of the QA organi-zation. | |||
General Guidelines for Plant Protection | |||
: 28. Plant layout should be arranged to 12 D.1.a.1 C Safety-related systems are located in isolate safety-related systems f rom fire areas separate from those unacceptable fire hazards. containing major fire hazards. | |||
3- 5 | |||
LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item | |||
: 29. Plant layout should be arranged to 12 D.1.a.2 NC See Section 3.2 separate redundant safety-related systems f rom each other. | |||
: 30. Identification of safety-related 13 D. I b C See Section 3. 2 systems and fire hazards. | |||
: 31. Cable spreading rooms should not 13 D.1.c C Cable spreading rooms are not shared be shared between multiple reactor between reator units, units. | |||
: 33. The cable spreading room should 13 D.1.c C Cable spreading room is separated from be separated f rom other areas of the other olant areas by 3-hour barriers. | |||
plant by 3-hour fire barriers. | |||
: 33. Redundant cabling in cable 13 D.1.c NC Cabling associated with redundant spreading room should be separated safety-related systems is routed in by 3-hour barriers. separate raceways which are separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. | |||
: 34. Interior wall and structural 13 D.1.d C See Section 3.2 components, thermal insulation, soundproofing, and radiation shielding materials should be noncombustible. | |||
: 35. Interior finishes should be noncom- 13 D.1.d C See Section 3. 2 bustible or listed by a testing laboratory for flame spread, smoke, and fuel contribution of 25 or less. | |||
: 36. Metal deck roof construction 13 D.1.e AC See Section 3.2 should be noncombustible or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Approval Guide. | |||
: 37. Suspended ceilings and supports 14 D.1.f C The suspended ceiling in the control should be noncombustible. room is of noncombustible construc-tion, consisting of mineral fiber panels resting on a metal grid system which is supported by steel wires. | |||
: 38. Concealed spaces should be devoid 14 D.1.f NC See Section 3.2 of csmbustibles. | |||
3- 6 9 9 9 | |||
O O LGS FPER O | |||
N3. APPEN3IX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item | |||
: 39. High voltage - high amperage trans- 14 D.1.g C All indoor transformers are air formers in buildings containing cooled, dry type, or cooled by non-safety-related systems should be combustible fluids. | |||
dry or cooled with noncombustible liquid. | |||
: 40. Protection of buildings containing 14 D.1.h C All outdoor oil-filled transformers safety-related systems from exposure are located more than 50 feet from or spill fires involving oil-filled any safety-related structure. | |||
transformer. | |||
: 41. Floor drains sized for expected 15 D'.1.1 C Adequate floor drainage is provided fire fighting water flow should be in all plant areas provided with provided f or areas with fixed fixed water fire suppression systems. | |||
suppression systems. | |||
: 42. Floor drains should be provided 15 D.1.i NC See Section 3.2 where needed to prevent fire hose water from causing unacceptable damage to equipment. | |||
: 43. Equipment should be mounted on 15 D.1.1 C Floor-mounted safety-related pedestals, or curbs should be components are raised above floor provided to contain and direct level either by the use of an extended water to floor drains. frame base or by mounting on a pedestal. | |||
: 44. Drains in areas containing com- 15 D.1.1 C See section 3.2 bustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of fire throughout the drain system, | |||
: 45. Water drainage from areas which 15 D.I.i C Potentially radioactive liquid wastes may contain radioactivity should are collected and monitored prior be sampled and analyzed before to discharge. | |||
discharge to environment. | |||
: 46. Floors, walls, and ceilings 15 D.1.j NC See Section 3.2 enclosing separate fire areas should have a minimum fire rating of 3 hours. | |||
: 47. Doors in barriers separating fire 15 D.1.j AC See Section 3.2 areas should be 3-hour rated. | |||
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: 48. Doors in barriers separating fire 15 D.1.j NC See Section 3.2 areas should be normally closed and locked, or provided with an-nunciation in the control room. | |||
: 49. Ventilation system penetrations in 16 D.1.j C Fire dampers or fire doors, compatible barriers separating fire areas with the fire barrier, are installed should be protected by a standard at all ventilation duct penetrations | |||
" fire door damper" where required. through fire barriers. | |||
Control of Combustibles | |||
: 50. Safety-related systems should be 16 D.2.a C To the maximum extent possible, separated from combustible materials significant concentrations of com-where possible and when not, special bustible materials are located protection should be provided to outside structures containing safety-prevent a fire from defeating the related components. In those cases safety system function, for which this is not possible, such as the standby diesel-generator fuel oil day tanks, special fire pro-tection consisting of automatic fire suppression systems and/or construc-tion capable of withstanding a fire is provided. | |||
: 51. Bulk gas storage (compressed or 16 D.2.b NC See Section 3.2 cryogenic) should not be permitted inside structures housing safety-related equipment. Flammable gases should be stored outdoors or in separate detached buildings. | |||
: 52. Ifigh pressure gas storage 17 D.2.b C High pressure gas storage cylinders containers should be located with are stored vertically. | |||
the long axis parallel to building walls. | |||
: 53. Use of compressed gases inside 17 D.2.b WC See Section 3. 2 buildings should be controlled. | |||
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: 54. Plastic material usage should be 17 D.2.c C See Section 3.2 minimized. Halogenated plastics such as PVC and neoprene should be used only when substitute non-combustible materials are not available. | |||
: 55. Storage of flammable liquids should 17 D.2.d C Liquid fuels are stored either in comply with NFPA 30. aboveground tanks that have been provided with suitable fire barriers or in underground tanks. | |||
Electrical Cable Construction t Cable Trays and Penetrations | |||
: 56. Only noncombustible materials 18 D.3.a C Aluminum cable trays are used. | |||
should be used for cable tray construction. | |||
: 57. Cable spreading rooms fire 18 D. 3. b - | |||
See items 138 through 151 protection guidelines. | |||
: 58. Automatic water sprinkler 18 D.3.c NC See Section 3. 2 systems should be provided for cable trays outside the cable spreading room. | |||
: 59. Cables should be designed to 18 D.3.c C Cable insulating systems include allow wetting down without proprietary jacketing materials electrical faulting. designed for wetting. | |||
: 60. Cable trays should have manua.i 18 D.3.c AC See Section 3.2 hoses and portable extinguishers provided as backup to automatic sprinklers. | |||
: 61. Safety-related equipment in 18 D.3.c C See Section 3.2 in vicir 'ty of cable trays should be protected from sprinkler system operation or malfunction. | |||
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: 63. Cable and cable tray penetration 18 D.3.d WC see Section 3. 2 of fire barriers should be sealed to give protection equivalent to that of the fire barrier. | |||
The design of fire barriers for cable trays should meet the require-ments of ASTM E-119. | |||
: 63. Fire breaks should be provided as 'd D.3.e C See Section 3. 2 deered necessary by fire hazards analysis. Flame or fire re-tardant coatings may be used as a fire break for grouped electri-cal cables. | |||
: 64. Electrical cable construction 19 D.3.f AC See Section 3.2 should pass the IEEE 383 flame test. | |||
: 65. To the extent practical, cable 19 D.3.g C See section 3.2 construction that does not give of f corrosive gases while burning should be used. | |||
: 66. Cable trays, raceways, 19 D.3.h C Electrical cable raceways are used conduit, trenches, or culverts oniv for cables, should be used only for cables. | |||
Miscellaneous storage should not be permitted, nor should piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases be installed in cable routing area. | |||
: 67. The design of cable tunnels, 19 D.3.1 AC Building ventilation cystems are culverts, and spreading rooms capable of being manually controlled should provide for automatic or to effect smoke removal in safety-manual smoke venting as required related areas with cable concen-to f acilitate manual fire fighting. trations. | |||
: 68. Cables in the control room should 19 D.3.j C Cables entering the control room be kept to the minimum necessary are essential to the operation of the number. All cables entering the control room and terminate within control room should terminate there. the control room. | |||
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: 69. Cables should not be installed in 19 D.3.j C See Section 3.2 trenches or culverts in the control room. | |||
ventilation | |||
: 70. Smoke and corrosive gases in 20 D.4.a AC See Section 3.2 specific fire areas - evaluation and control; discharge to outside. | |||
: 71. Ventilation systems exhausting 20 D. 4. b AC See Section 3. 2 smoke or corrosive gases should be evaluated to assure single failure or inadvertent operation does not violate controlled areas of the plant design. | |||
: 72. Power supply and cont /ols for 20 D.4.c. AC See Section 3. 2 ventilation systems sL)uld be run outside the fire asea served by the system. | |||
: 73. Fire suppression systens should 20 D.4.d AC See Section 3.2 be installed to protect charcoal j filters in accordance with Regulatory l Guide 1.52. | |||
: 74. Air intakes for ventilating systems 20 D.4.e C Air intakes serving areas which serving areas containing safety- contain safety-related systems related systems should be remote f rom are remote from exhaust and smoke exhaust and smoke outlets of other outlets of other fire areas. | |||
fire areas. | |||
: 75. Design and use of stairwells 21 D.4.f AC See Section 3.2 and elevators. | |||
: 76. Smoke and heat vents; minimum 21 D.4.g AC See Section 3. 2 ratios for natural convection and forced convection. | |||
: 77. Requirements for breathing 21 D.4.h WC See Section 3.2 apparatus for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel. | |||
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: 78. For total flooding gas extinguishing 22 D.4.i. C Initiation of the carbon dioxide total systems, area intake and exhaust flooding system for the cable spreading ventilation dampers should close upon room actuates pressure switches which initiation of gas flow, initiate isolation of the steam flooding dampers in the ventilation ducts penetra-ting the cable spreading room walls. | |||
Lighting and Communication | |||
: 79. Fixed emergency lighting should 22 D.5.a NC See Section 3.2 consist of sealed beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery power supplies. | |||
: 80. Sealed bea's battery-powered 23 D.5.h WC Portable lights will be provided. | |||
portable tand lights should be provided for emergency use. | |||
: 81. Fixed emergency communication 23 D.S.c NC See Section 3. 2 should use voice powered head sets at preselected stations. | |||
- 82. Fixed repeaters for portable 23 D.S.d NA See Section 3.2 radio communication units should be protected from fire damage. | |||
Fire Detection and Suppression Fire Detection | |||
: 83. Fire detection compliance with 23 F.1. a NC See Section 3. 2 NFPA 720. | |||
: 84. Fire detection system should 23 E.1.b C Fire and smoke detection signals give audible and visual alarm are annunciated audibly and and annunciation in the control room. visually at the fire protection panel in the control room. | |||
: 83. Local audible alarms should also 23 E.1. b AC Local annunciators near the cri- 3 sound at the location of the fire. tical hazards sound audible alarms. | |||
: 86. Fire alarms should be distinctive 23 E.1. c C Audible fire alarms are unique and unique. and distinct from other plant alarms. | |||
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: 87. Fire detection and actuation 23 E.1.d C See Section 3.2 systems should be connected to the plant emergency power supply. | |||
Fire Protection Water Supply Systems | |||
: 88. An underground yard fire main loop 23 E.2.a C The yard fire main has been should be installed furnish antici- installed in compliance with NFPA pated fire water requireA?nts; use No. 24. | |||
of NFPA 24. | |||
: 89. Lined steel or cast iron pipe should 24 E. 2. a C The yard fire main untilizes be used to reduce turberculation. cement-lined cast iron pipe. | |||
: 90. Means for treating and flushing of 24 E.2.a AC Water used for fire protection fire main should be provided. service meets the requirements of NFPA No. 22 and does not require treatment. Flushing of the fire main is possible by sectionalized control of the fire main loop. | |||
: 91. Approved visually indicating 24 E.2.a C Post indicator valves provide sectional control valves should be sectionalized control and isolation provided for isolation of fire of portions of the fire main loop. | |||
main portions during maintenance or repair without shutting off entire system. | |||
: 92. Fire main system piping separate 24 E. 2. a C The fire main loop is separate f rom from service or sanitary water service water and domestic water system piping. system piping. | |||
: 93. A common yard fire main loop may 24 E.2.b C A common fi re main loop is provided loop may serve multi-unit nuclear and cross-connected between units. | |||
power plant sites, if cross-connected between units. | |||
: 94. Redundant 100% capacity fire pumps. 25 E.2.c C Two UL-listed fire pumps are provided, each capable of supplying 100% of the fire water-system flow requirements. | |||
: 95. Fire pump connections to the yard 25 F.2.c AC See Section 3.2 fire main should be widely separated. | |||
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: 96. tach pump should have its own 25 E.2.c C Each fire pump is provided with dciver with independent power individual drive, power source, cupplies and control. and controls. | |||
: 97. At least one fire pump should be 25 E.2.c c One fire pump is diesel engine-driven. | |||
driven by non-electrical means, preferably diesel engine. | |||
: 98. Fire pumps and drivers should 25 E.2.c NC See Section 3.2 be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by 3-hour fire walls. | |||
: 99. Fire pump alarms indicating pump 25 E.2.c C Fire pump availability, running, running, driver availability, or and trouble alarms are annunciated failure to start should be in the control room. | |||
provided in the control room. | |||
100.- Fire pump installation should 25 E.2.c C The fire pump installation conforms conform-to NFPA 20 as a minimum. to the requirements of NFPA 20. | |||
101. Two separate reliable water supplies 25 E.2.d C Fire protection wtter is normally should be provided. supplied from two cooling tower basins. | |||
102. Requirements for tanks used to 25 E.2.d NA Tanks are not utilized for fire supply fire protection water. protection water supply. | |||
10 The fire water supply should 26 E.2.e C See Section 3.2 be based on the largest expected flow rate for a period of 2 hours (300,000 gallon minimum). | |||
104. Lakes or f resh water ponds 26 E.2.f NA Two cooling tower basins are of sufficient size may qualify as utilized for fire protection water sole source of water for fire supply. | |||
protection. | |||
105. If a common water supply is used 26 E.2.f NA The fire protection system and the for fire protection and ultimate ultimate heat sink do not use a heat sink, then fire water require- common water supply. | |||
ments should be included in total storage capacity, and failure of the fire protection system should not degrade the ultimate heat sink. | |||
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LGS FPER N3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item 106. Outside manual hose stations should 27 E.2.g AC Hydrants are spaced tetween 250 and be able to reach any location 300 feet apart along the fire main loop. | |||
approximately every 250 feet on yard mair) . | |||
107. Yard main laterals to hydrants 27 E.2.g C Each hydrant is provided with a key-should be controlled by a visually operated gate valve with a curb box. | |||
indicating or key operated (curb) valve. | |||
1G8. Hose houses should be equipped as 27 E.2.g AC See section 3.2 recommended in NFPA 24, and should be provided as needed, but at least every 1000 feet. | |||
109. Threads on hydrants, hose 27 E.2.g C The hose threads are compatible with couplings, and standpipe risers those of the local fire department. | |||
should be compatible with those used by local fire departments. | |||
Water sprinckler and nose standpipe systems 110. Each automatic sprinkler and 27 E. 3. a NC See Section 3. 2 manual hose station standpipe should have an independent con-nection to the yard main or to headers fed from each end. | |||
111. Each sprinkler and standpipe 28 E.3.a AC See Section 3.2 system should be equipped with OSSY gate valve, or other approved shutoff valve, and water flow alarm. | |||
112. Safety-related equipment 28 E.3.a AC See Section 3.2 should be protected from sprinkler discharge if such discharge could result in unacceptable damage to the equipmect. | |||
113. Fire water system valves should 28 E.3.b NC See Section 3. 2 be electrically supervised with indication in the control room and other locations as appropriate. | |||
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LGS FPER CO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMAR KS Page Item 114. Automatic sprinkler systems 28 E.3.c C Automatic sprinkler and deluge conform to appropriate NFPA systems comply with the appli-standard as a minimum. cable requirements of NFPA Nos. | |||
13 and 15. | |||
115. Recommendations for interior 28 E.3.d NC See section 3.2 manual hose installations. | |||
116. Location of hose stations based 29 E.3.d NC See Section 3.2 on whether an area is normally occupied or normally unoccupied; location of shutoff valves and pressure-reducing devices outside safety-related areas. | |||
117. Hose nozzle selection should be 30 E.3.e AC See Section 3. 2 based on the fire hazard analysiu; electrically safe nozzles should be provided in vicinity of electri-cal hazards. | |||
118. Foam fire suppression. 30 E.3.f AC See Section 3.2 Halon Suppression Systems 119. Recommendations f or Halon 31 E.4 C See Section 3.2 suppression systems. | |||
Carbon Dioxide suppression systems 120. Recommendations for carbon dioxide 31 E. 5 C See Section 3.2 suppression systems. | |||
Portable Extinguishers 121. Fire extinguishers shaald be provided 32 E.6 C Portable extinguishers compatible in accordance with NFPA 10. with the combustible material are provided in accordance with NFPA 10 and the requirements of OSHA. | |||
122. Dry chemical extinguishers should 32 F.6 WC Dry chemical extinguishers will be be installed wit h due consideration provided as required. | |||
of cleanup problems and possible adverse ef fects on equipment in area. | |||
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d O 3 3 LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas I | |||
Prima ry and Secondary Containment | |||
! 123. Fire protection requirements should 32 F.1. a C Fire hazards have been identified, as be provided on the basis of specific discussed in Chapter 4, and fire identified hazards. suppression systems have been provided J accordingly. The types and locations of suppression systems are identified in Table A-1 and Figures B-4 through B-12. | |||
124. Because of inaccessability of 33 F.1.a NC See Section 3.2 these areas, protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems. | |||
125. Operation of the fire protection 33 F.1. a C The fire protection system does not systems should not compromise integ- penetrate the primary containment rity of the containment or other boundary. Also see item 9. | |||
saf ety-related systems. | |||
126. Fire detection systems should alarm 33 F.1. a C Actuation of the early warning fire and annunciate in the control room, detection system, as well as actua-tion of any automatic fire suppression system, is annunciated on the fire protection panels in the control roem. | |||
Type and location of fire detectors used is indicated in Table A-1. | |||
127 A backup fire detection 33 F.1.a NC See Section 3.2 capability should be provided for the primary containment. | |||
128. Manual fire fighting capability 34 F.1.b AC See Section 3.2 should be permanently installed in containment. | |||
129. Independent self-contained 34 P.I.b WC See iten 77 i breathing apparatus should be provided near containment entrances. | |||
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LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item cantrol Raom 130. The control room should be separated 35 F.2 C See Section 3.2 f rom other areas of the plant by 3-hour fire barriers. | |||
131. Recommendations for manual fire 35 F.2 C See Section 3. 2 fighting capability. | |||
132. Fire detection in the control 36 F.2 AC See Section 3. 2 room. | |||
133. Breathing apparatus for control 36 F.2 WC See item 77 room operators should be readily available. | |||
134. All penetration seals should be 36 F.2 C All penetrations in the control room airtight. walls, floor, and ceiling will be sealed airtight. | |||
135. Control room ventilation 36 F.2 AC See Section 3.2 provisions; smoke detection, automatic isolation, and venting. | |||
136. Cables should not be located in 36 F.2 NC See items 38 and 69 ' | |||
concealed floor and ceiling spaces. | |||
137. All cables that enter the control 36 F. 2 C Cables entering the control room are room shall terminate in control roca essential to the operation of the control room and terminate within the control room. | |||
Cable spreading Poom 138. Use of automatic water or foam 37 F.3.a.1 AC See Section 3.2 extinguishing systems in the cable spreading room. | |||
139. Manual hoses and portable extin- 38 F. 3. a. 2 C Manual hose stations and portable guishers should be provided as extinguishers are located outside backup. both entrances to the cable spread-ing room. | |||
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O O O LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISCN REMARKS Page Item 140. Each cable spreading room should 33 F.3.a.3 NC All four divisions of safety-related have divisional cable separation. cabling are routed through the cable spreading room. The raceways thrcugh which the dif ferent divisions are routed are separated from each other in accor-dance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. | |||
141. The cable spreading room should 38 F.3.a.3 C The cable spreading rooms of the two be separated from other areas of reactor units are separated trom plant by a 3-hour rated fire wall. eacn other and from other plant areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers. | |||
142. Two remote and separate entrances 38 F.3.a.4 C Two remote and separate entrances to the cable spreading room should are provided for access to each be provided. cable spreading room. | |||
143. Aisle separation between tray 38 F. 3. a. S NC The minimum aisle separation between stacks should be 3 feet wide by 8 stacks is approximately 3 feet high. wide. The minimum clear headroom is approximtely 6-1/2 feet high. | |||
144. Divisional cable separation should 38 F. 3. b.1 C Safety-related cable divisions are meet the guidelines of Regulatory located in cable raceways that are Guide 1.75. separated f rom each other and from nonsafety-related raceways in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. | |||
145. Cabling should be covered with a 38 F.3.b.2 NC Although no cables are covered with suitable fire retardant coating. fire retardant coating, cable in-sulation systems used pass the IEEE-383 flame test. | |||
146. Automatic gas systems are acceptable 38 F. 3. L. 3 AC See item 138. | |||
for primary fire suppression if a fixed water system is used as backup 147. An auxiliary shutdown system with 39 F. 3. b. 4 C Even though the guidelines of Regulatory cabling independent of the cable Guide 1.75 are met, each reactor unit spreading room should be provided is provided with a remote shutdown if R.G. 1.75 guidelinas are not met. panel with cabling that is not routed through the cable spreading room. | |||
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LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISDN REMAR KS Pagg Item 148. For multiple reactor unit sites, 39 F.3 C F.ach reactor unit is served by a cable spreading rooms should separate cable spreading room, not be shared. | |||
149. The ventilation system to the 39 F.3 C In the event of actuation of the cable spreading rcom should be CO, system in the cable spreadiang designed to isolate the area room, ventilation ducts penetrating upon actuation of a gas extinguishing the boundaries of the room are auto-system. matica11y isolated by steam fiooding dampers. The dampers are actuated by pressure switches connected to the CO, distribution piping. | |||
150. Smoke venting of the cable spreading 39 F.3 NC Automatic smoke venting for areas room should be controlled automati- served by gas extinguishing systems cally by the fire detection or is not recommended and is not needed suppression system. in the cable spreading room. | |||
151. Capability for remote manual 39 F.3 AC See item 76 control of smoke venting should be provided. | |||
Plant Compjater Poom 152. Fire protection recommendations 39 F.4 NA The plant computer is not for safety-related computers. safety-related. | |||
Switchgear Rooms 153. Switchgear rooms should be 40 F.S NC The switchgear rooms at El. 239 separated f rom the remainder of the feet in the control structure are plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers separated from each other by to the extent practicable. 3-hour rated fire walls. These rooms and the one at El. 217 feet in the control structure are separated from thts remaining areas of the plant by 3-hour rated fire walls. *he floors and ceilings of the rooms are capable of 3-hour fire ratings with the exception of exposed structural steel supporting the slabs. | |||
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154. Automatic fire detection should 40 F.5 C Each emergency switchgear room is alarm locally and in the control room provided with heat and ionization smoke detectors with local and control room alarm and annunciation. | |||
155. Hose stations and portable fire 40 F.5 C CO, bose stations are provided in extinguishers should be readily the 13.2 kV switchgear room, and available. water hose stations are provided near the entrances to the 4 kV switchgear r m s. Portable fire extinguishers will be provided for use in both areas. | |||
156. Fire protection provisions for 40 F.6 C See Section 3.2. | |||
3 remote safety-related panels; fire | |||
! detection, combustible material control, and manual extinguishment. | |||
Station Battery Rooms | |||
, 157. Battery rooms should be 41 F.7 C See Section 3.2 separated from each other and other plant areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers. | |||
. 158. Ventilation should maintain 41 F.7 C See Section 3.2 hydrogen concentration below 2% | |||
by volume. | |||
159. Hose stations and portable 41 F.7 C Hase stations and portable extinguishers should be provided. extinguishers are located in the vicinity of the battery rooms to provide effective coverage , | |||
of these areas. | |||
Turbine Lubrication and control Oil Storage and Use Areas 160. A fire wall with a minimum rating 41 F.8 C Three-hour fire walls with Class A of 3 hours should separate all fire doors separate areas containing safety-related areas and equip- safety-related equipment from the ment from turbine oil systems. turbine oil systems. | |||
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LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item Diesel Generator Areas 161. Diesel ger.erators should be 42 F.9 AC The diesel-generators are separated separated from each other and from f rom each other and other parts of other plant areas by fire barriers the plant ty 3-hour fire walls having a minimum rating of 3 hours. with Class A fire doors. | |||
162. Automatic fire suppression such 42 F.9 C Rach diesel-generator room is as AFFF (f oam) or sprinklers 7 orovided with a pre-action sprinkler should be installed. system actuated by heat detectors. | |||
163. Automatic fire detection should 42 F.9 C Each diesel-generator is provided be provided to alarm locally and to with fire detectors which alarm alarm and annunciate in control room. locally and also annunciate in the control room. | |||
164. Drainage for fire fighting water 42 F.9 AC See Section 3.2 and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided. | |||
165. The day tank should be located in 42 F.9. a C Each day tank is located in a separate 3-hour rated enclotare separate 3-hour rated enclosure capable capable of containing the urtire of containing the entire tank capa-tank capacity. city of 800 gallons. | |||
166. The day tank enclosure should be 42 F. 9. a NC Each day tank is located in a totally ventilated to avoid accumulation of enclosed vault area. | |||
of oil fumes. | |||
167. The day tank tanclosure should 42 F.9.b C See Section 3. 2 be protected by automatic fire suppression. | |||
Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas 168. Recommended locations for diesel 42 F.10 C See Sec. don 3.2 fuel oil storage tanks. | |||
169. Diesel fuel oil tanks located 43 F.10 NA Diesel fuel oil tanks are buried. | |||
in separate buildings should be provided with automatic fire suppression. | |||
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LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item 170. Diesel fuel oil tanks should not be 43 F.10 C No safety-related equipment is located directly above or located above the buried tanks. | |||
below safety-related systems or equipment regardless of fire rating separation. | |||
Safety-Related Pumps 171. Separation of safety-related 44 F.11 C See Section 3.2 pumps by fire barriers; use of automatic sprinklers. | |||
172. Early warning fire detection 44 F.11 C Early warning fire detection is should be installed with alarm and provided in all areas housing annunciation locally and in the safety-related pumps. | |||
control room. | |||
173. Local hose stations and portable 44 F.11 NC Except for the spray pond pump extinguishers should also be structure, hose stations and provided. portable fire extinguishers are provided for use in all areas housing safety-related pumps. In consideration of the low combustible loading in the spray pond pump structure, portable extinguishers are deemed adequate to control and extinguish a fire at any pump. | |||
174. Equipment pedestals or curbs 44 F.11 C Safety-related equipment is and drains should be provided to mounted on pedestals or suitable remove and direct water away from framework. Drainage facilities are saf ety-related equipment. provided throughout the plant as required. | |||
17 5. Provisions should be made for 44 F.11 C See item 76 manual control of the ventilation system for smoke removal. | |||
New Pbel Area 176. Portable extinguishers should be 44 F.12 C A portable extinguisher is available located within this area. in the area immediately adjacent to the new fuel storage vault. | |||
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LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON - | |||
REMARKS Page Item 177. Hose stations should be located 44 F.12 C A hose station is located adjacent within hose reach of this area. to the new fuel storage vault. | |||
178. Automatic fire detection should 44 F.12 NC There is no fire detection provided alarm and annunciate in the control on the refueling floor level in the room and alarm locally. reactor enclosure. | |||
179. Combustibles should be limited 45 F.12 WC Combustibles will be controlled by to a minimum in the new fuel area. administrative procedures. See note 1. | |||
180. Storage area drainage capability 45 F.12 C See Section 3. 2 181. The storage configuration of new 45 F.12 C See Section 3.2 fuel should be such that critically is precluded for any water density that might occur during fire fighting. | |||
Spent Fuel Pool Area 18 2. Local hose stations and 45 F.13 C Hose stations and portable ex-portable extinguishers should be tinguishers are available at the provided. spent fuel storage pool. | |||
183. Automatic fire detection should 45 F.13 NC See item 178 be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally. | |||
Radwaste Enclosure 184. The radwaste enclosure should be 45 F.14 C The radwaste enclosure is separated separated from other areas of the from other parts of the plant by plant by fire barriers 1.aving at 3-hour fire barriers with Class A least 3-hour ratings. fire doors. | |||
185. Automatic sprinklers should be 45 P.14 C See Section 3. 2 used in areas where combustible materials are located. | |||
186. Automatic fire detection should be 45 F.14 AC See Section 3.2 provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. | |||
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c O LGS FPER O | |||
NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Pace Item 187. Ventilation systems should be 45 F.14 C The radwaste enclosure ventilation capable of being isolated during system is capable of being isolated. | |||
a fire. Fire dampers and doors restrict the spread of fire. | |||
188. Water should drain to liquid 45 F.14 C All drainage in the radwaste radwaste sumps. enclosure is to liquid radwaste sumps. | |||
Decontamination Areas 189. The decontamination areas should be 46 F.15 C see section 3.2 protected by automatic sprinklers if flammable liquids are stored. | |||
190. Automatic fire detection should be 46 F.15 NC No automatic fire detection is provided to annunciate and alarm provided for the decontamination locally. areas. | |||
191. The ventilation system should 46 F.15 C The ventilation systems for the be capable of being isolated. access control and radwaste enclosure decontamination rooms can be isolated. | |||
192. Hose stations and portable extin- 46 F.15 C Hose stations and portable extin-guishers should be provided. guishers are available for use in all decontamination areas. | |||
Safety-Related Water Tanks 193. Fire protection provisions for 46 F.16 NA The plant has no safety-related safety-related water tanks. water tanks. | |||
3-25 | |||
LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARES Page Item Coolino Towers 19 4. Cooling towers should be of non- 46 F.17 C The cooling towers are of noncombustible combustible construction, or construction except for the fill material, located so that a fire will not which is polyvinyl chloride. No safety-affect safety-related systems. related structures or systems are located near the cooling towers such that they could be af fected by a fire in the cooling towers. | |||
195. Cooling towers should be of 46 F.17 AC See Section 3.2 noncombustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply. | |||
Miscellaneous Areas 196. Miscellaneous areas (e. g. , record 47 F.18 C Warehouse, machine chop, record storage areas, shops, warehouses, storage, auxiliary boiler room, auxiliary boiler rooms) should be and other miscellaneous areas are located so that a fire in such separated from areas containing areas will not adversely affect safety-related systems by 3-hour any safety-related systems. rated fire barriers so that safe shutdown will not be jeopardized, 197. Fuel oil tanks for auxiliary 47 F.18 C No. 2 fuel oil and No. 6 fuel boilers should be buried, or oil for the auxiliary boilers is provided with dikes to contain the stored in aboveground outdoor entire tank contents. tanks which are provided with dikes large enough to contain the entire tank contents. | |||
Welding and Cuttino, Acetylene-Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems 198. Storage locations should be chosen 47 G.1 AC Compressed gas storage cylinders to permit fire protection by for welding are located outdoors. | |||
sprinkler systems. The requirements of NFPA No. 51 and 51B will be followed. | |||
3-26 O O O | |||
\ | |||
P 1 O | |||
/ k,j LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item 199. Local hose stations and portable 47 G.1 C A local hose station and portable extinguishers should be provided. extinguishers are available. | |||
200. The requirements of NFPA 51 and 47 G.1 KC See item 198 51B are applicable to these hazards. | |||
201. A permit system should be required 47 G.1 WC See note 1 for utilization of this equipment. | |||
Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange 20 2. Dry ion exchange resins should not 47 G.2 WC Storage areas will be remote from be near essential safety-related essential safety-related systems. | |||
systems. | |||
203. Dry unused resins should be 47 G.2 NC Local hose stations and portable protected by automatic wet pipe fire extinguishers are provided in sprinkler systems. the vicinity of storage areas for dry resins. | |||
20 4. Fire detection by smoke and heat 47 G.2 NC No fire detection is provided for detectors should alarm and annunciate dry resin storage areas. | |||
in the control room and alarm locally. | |||
20 5. Local hose stations and portable 47 G.2 C See item 203 extinguishers should be provided. | |||
206. Storage areas of dry resins 47 G.2 NC No curbs are provided, should have curbs and drains. | |||
Harardous Chemicals 207. Recommendations for storage of 48 G.3 WC See Section 3.2 hazardous chemicals. | |||
208. Materials that collect and contain 48 G.4 WC See note 1 radioactivity (e. g. , spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, HEPA filters) should be stored in closed metal tanks or containers located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles. | |||
3-27 | |||
[ | |||
LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item 209. These materials should be protected 48 G.4 WC See note 1 from exposure to fires in adjacent areas. | |||
310. Consideration should be given 48 G.4 C Provisions for accommodating decay to requirements for removal of heat are considered when selecting isotopic decay heat from entrained containers, radioactive materials. | |||
( a > Mainistrative controls and procedures concerning fire protection will be developed, during preparation of plant procedures. | |||
3-28 j | |||
LGS FPER 3.2 EXPLANATORY NOTES Item 7 Appendix A Guideline A single failure in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability. For example, redundant fire water pumps with independent power supplies and controls should be provided. | |||
LGS Design As described in Section 2.1.2, fire water is supplied by two redundant pumps, each of which is capable of providing the design fire protection system flowrate at the design pressure. Power for the motor-driven fire pump is provided from either of two independent offsite power sources. The controls for the diesel er.gine-driven fire pump are dc-operated and are powered from batteries which supply only the engine-driven fire pump. Therefore, no single failure of the power supplies can affect both fire pumps. By the use of sectional isolation valves, damaged portions of the yard fire main loop can be isolated without affecting the major portion l f-~x t | |||
() of the loop. The provision of hose reels and portable extinguishers for manual fire fighting precludes-the possibility of a single failure in an automatic fire suppression system from disabling all means of fire suppression for a given area. | |||
Item 9 Appendix A Guideline Failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system should not incapacitate safety-related systems or components. | |||
LGS Design Although it can be postulated that failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system may incapacitate safety-related systems or components, such failure or l inadvertent operation will not prevent safe shutdown from being achieved through the use of redundant safety-related systems. | |||
O 3-29 | |||
LGS FPER Item 13 O | |||
Appendix A Guideline On multiple-reactor sites where there are operating reactors and construction of remaining units is being completed, the fire protection program should provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards. The superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection. | |||
LGS Design Administrative procedures will be prepared to protect the operating Unit 1 from fire hazards associated with construction of Unit 2. Special precautions will be taken to prevent and control fire hazards. Use of open flames and welding or cutting equipment will be properly supervised. | |||
Construction of both the underground yard fire main and the fire water distribution piping inside both units of the plant will be completed prior to Unit 1 operati.on so that manual hose station coverage will be available in Unit 2 as well as Unit 1. Portable fire extinguishers will also be available in the Unit 2 portions of the plant during its construction. | |||
The construction site will be kept clean and orderly and contractors' sheds will be kept outside the confines of new construction. | |||
Item 14 Appendix A Guideline Simultaneous fires in more than one reactor need not be postulated, where separation requirements are met. A fire involving more than one reactor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units. | |||
LGS Design The fire protection program is based on the occurrence of a fire in only one reactor unit or one common area at a time. | |||
The unitized portions of the turbine enclosures and reactor enclosures are separated from each other and from common areas by 3-hour rated fire walls. The operating floor of the turbine enclosures and the refueling floor of the reactor enclosures are common areas which serve both units. The control structure and the radwaste enclosure are common areas which are separated from the adjacent reactor enclosures and turbine enclosures by 3-hour rated fire walls. The Unit 1 3-30 | |||
LGS FPER O and Unit 2 diesel-generator enclosures are separated from the adjacent portions of the reactor enclosures'by 3-hour rated fire walls. The spray pond pump' structure, which is located away from all other structures, is a common area and is separated into two halves by a 3-hour rated fire wall. | |||
Item 27 Appendix A Guideline Quality assurance (OA) programs of applicants and contractors should be developed and implemented to assure _that the requirements for design, procurement, installation, and testing and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety-related areas as defined in this Branch Position are satisfied. The program should be under the management control of the OA organization. | |||
LGS Design | |||
* The OA program described below will be under the management control of the PECo Engineering & Research Department GA organization during the construction phase. | |||
: 1. Desion Control and Procurement Document Control The design review performed to compare the_ Limerick design to the BTP guidelines provides assurance that necessary_ design features are included in appropriate design and procurement documents. | |||
Deviations from the design and procurement documents will be controlled by mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project. | |||
: 2. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawinas These requirements will be met during the construction phase through the use of a documented, final installation inspection and through implementation of a written pre-operational test. ; | |||
: 3. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and-Services Based upon the status of procurements and the identification of significant design or manufacturing features, certain fire protection equipment may be subject to shop inspection during manufacture. | |||
Receipt inspection at the construction site shall be O | |||
e performed. 1 3-31 i s : | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: 4. Inspection These requirements will be met through the use of a documented, final installation inspection and through implementation of a written preoperational test. | |||
: 5. Test and Test Control Documented preoperational test procedures including evaluation of results and followup action, if indicated, shall be employed to meet these requirements relative to the construction phase of the plant. | |||
: 6. Inspection, Test, and Operatina Status Installation inspections, as described in Item 4 above, shall be documented in such a manner as to indicate the acceptability of the item / activity inspected. Deficiencies shall be identified and corrected in accordance with mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project. | |||
Satisfactory completion of the preoperational test and release for operation shall be accomplished and documented in accordance with mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project. | |||
: 7. Nonconformino Items Nonconforming items shall be identified, controlled, and correcteo in accordance with the mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project. | |||
: 8. Corrective Action Conditions adverse to fire protection (such as failures, , | |||
malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, l and nonconformances) during the construction phase shall be reported and corrected in accordance with mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project. | |||
: 9. Records Records shall be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria described in Items 1 through 10 are being - | |||
met for activities affecting the fire protection program. l 9 | |||
3-32 J | |||
I LGS FPER O 10. Audits The activities described above are subject to audit. In addition, implementation of receipt inspections, final installation inspections, and pre-operational tests shall be subject to audit to conform with documented instructions, procedures, and drawings. | |||
Item 29 Appendix A Guideline Plant layouts should be arranged to: (2) Separate redundant safety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard. | |||
LGS Design In some cases, components of redundant safety-related systems are located in the same fire area. In each case, the potential for damage to both redundant systems from a single fire hazard has been evaluated, as described in Chapter 5. | |||
The capability to safely shut the plant down has been assured, based on consideration of physical separation O between the redundant systems, additional fire barriers provided between the systems, and combustible loading in the fire area. , | |||
Item 30 Appendix A Guideline In order to accomplish 1.(a) above, safety-related systems and fire hazards should be identified throughout the plant. | |||
l Therefore, a detailed fire hazard analysis should be made. | |||
The fire hazards analysis should be reviewed and updated as necessary. | |||
l i LGS Design As described in Chapter 4, an evaluation of the combustible materials present in the various areas of the plant has been performed. These combustible materials and their quantities are listed in Table A-1. The safety-related systems located in each fire area were identified as part of the safe shutdown analysis, described in Chapter 5. Table A-1 identifies which fire areas and fire zones contain safety-related components. l l | |||
O 3-33 | |||
LGS FPER Item 34 Appendix A Guideline Interior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials and soundproofing should be noncombustible. | |||
LGS Design Most interior walls are constructed of either reinforced concrete, or concrete masonry units. Limited use is made of walls constructed of metal studs with gypsum plaster on expanded metal lath. Structural components consist of structural steel or reinforced concrete. Thermal insulation materials are noncombustible. Soundproofing materials, if required, will be noncombustible. Radiation shielding consists of concrete, concrete masonry unit, or steel plates. | |||
Item 35 Appendix A Guideline Interior finishes should be noncombustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwritecs Laboratory, Inc, for flame spread, smoke, and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration (ASTM E-84 Test, " Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials"). | |||
LGS Design Areas containing systems or equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant are unfinished, or are finished with materials which are either noncombustible or are listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory for flame spread, smoke, and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration. | |||
Item 36 Appendix A Guideline Metal deck roof construction should be noncombustible (see the building materials directory of the Underwriters Laboratory, Inc) or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Approval Guide. | |||
( | |||
3-34 | |||
LGS FPER p | |||
V LGS Desian Metal roof deckings consist of manufactured fluted panels with rigid insulation and builtup roofing membrane with gravel. This is a Class A UL fire-resistive rated builtup roofing system. | |||
Item 38 Appendix A Guideline Concealed spaces should be devoid of combustibles. | |||
LGS Design Electrical cables (associated primarily with control room annunciators and control room lighting) are routed in cable tray, gutter, and conduit above the suspended ceiling in the control room. The cables in gutter and cable tray will be coated with a fire-retardant material to prevent the propagation of fire along the cables. In addition, fire detectors will be located above the suspended ceiling to provide early warning of fires occurring within that area. | |||
/~N Item 42 Appendix A Guideline r Drains should also be provided in other areas where hand hose lines may be used if such fire fighting water could cause unacceptable damage to equipment in the area. | |||
LGS Desion Most plant areas are provided with drainage facilities adequately sized to remove all the water discharged from a 1-1/2 inch hand hose line. Some areas which contain primarily electrical and electronic equipment are not provided with floor drains. For these latter areas, the doors which would be open to provide access for hand hose usage would also provide a flow path for fire protection water to drain to areas not containing safety-related components. | |||
Item 44 Appendix A Guideline Drains in areas containing combustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of the fire throughout t the drain system. | |||
3-35 | |||
LGS FPER LGS Desion Drains from the turbine oil systems discharge to an oil separator remotely separated from safety-related systems. | |||
Drains from each diesel-generator room are provided with traps prior to ccnnection into an oil separator receiver serving the diesel-generator rooms. The combination of traps ' | |||
and the separation effectively provides for the prevention of fire propagation through this drainage system. | |||
Item 46 Appendix A Guideline Floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of three hours. Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the barrier itself. | |||
LGS Desion The reactor enclosures, turbine enclosures (main portion), | |||
turbine auxiliary bays, diesel-generator enclosures, radwaste I enclosure, and administration building are separated from I each other by 3-hour rated fire walls. Walls internal to these structures (and also the spray pond pump structure) which serve as boundaries bbtween different fire areas are provided with fire ratings or construction details consistent with the fire hazard existing in each area. The locations of fire-rated walls are shown on Figures B-4 through B-12, and the walls surrounding each fire area are further described in the fire area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9. | |||
Concrete floor slabs in the control structure and reactor enclosures are provided with 3-hour rated seals for penetration openings in the slabs. The structural steel beams supporting the floor slabs at four elevations in the control structure (254, 269, 289 and 304 feet) have been fireproofed to provide a 3-hour rating for the complete floor assembly. The structural steel beams supporting floor slabs in other areas have not been fireproofed. The fire ratings of ficor slabs above and below each fire area are listed in the fire area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9. Those slabs which are shown as "3 hr*" are capable of being rated as 3-hour fire barriers, except for the lack of fireproofing on the structural steel beams supporting the slab. | |||
Fire barrier penetrations, including piping, conduits, and h cable trays, will be sealed with materials and methods 3-36 | |||
LGS FPER acceptable to American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), to provide a fire resistance rating consistent with the rating of the barrier. | |||
Item 47 Appendix A Guideline Door openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames, and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. | |||
IGS Design Door openings in rated fire barriers are provided with fire doors having ratings consistent with the barrier itself. | |||
With the exception of steamtight doors, access openings in 3-hour barriers are provided with Class A (3-hour) UL-labeled . | |||
doors and access openings in 2-hour barriers are provided l with Class B (1-1/2 hours) UL-labeled doors. Although not provided with UL labels, steamtight doors which will be designated as fire rated are certified by the manufacturer to conform to standards established for UL-labeled fire-rated doors. These steamtight doors are identified in the fire | |||
(''T . area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9 by a | |||
\/ double asterisk (**) following the indicated fire rating. | |||
4 Item 48 Appendix A Guideline Such doors should be normally closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room. | |||
LGS Design Fire-rated doors are either unlockable or are locked only in the entry direction as required by NFPA NO. 101, " Life Safety Code." Specified doors are locked in accordance with the security plan. Security doors alarm and annunciate in the control room. Fire doors which are not also security doors are generally not alarmed nor annunciated in the control room. | |||
All fire doors are normally closed or are equipped with either fusible links or magnetic door holders. Those doors used for communication between various areas of the plant are not locked. Doors to isolated areas, such as the diesel-generator rooms, and doors used for access control are normally locked. | |||
Os 3-37 | |||
LGS FPER Although locked doors provide no access for fire fighting nor O | |||
egress for personnel to escape a fire, certain fire doors are maintained locked because of access control. Doors which must be locked are equipped with door closers and panic hardware as required and specified by OSHA, NFPA No. 101, | |||
" Life Safety Coce," and local building codes. | |||
Item 51 l Appendix A Guideline Bulk gas storage (either compressed or cryogenic) should not be permitted inside structures housing safety-related equipment. Storage of flammable gas such as hydrogen, should be located outdoors or in separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety-related systems or equipment. | |||
LGS Design Compressed gases are stored either outdoors or in non-safety-related structures whenever possible. However, compressed gases with safety-related uses must be stored in safety-related structures. For this reason, compressed gas cylinders associated with the primary containment instrument gas system and containment combustible gas monitoring system W | |||
are located in the reactor enclosure. Compressed gas cylinders used for welding are stored in the construction shop (during periods of usage only) and the machine shop. | |||
Hydrogen used in cooling of the main generators is provided from hydrogen cylinders stored at an outdoor location that is separated from all structures. The compressed propane gas used for ignition of the auxiliary boilers is also stored i outdoors. The supply line penetrates only the auxiliary I boiler enclosure. | |||
Item 53 1 | |||
Appendix A Guideline Use of compressed gases (especially flammable and fuel gases) inside buildings snould be controlled. (Refer to NFPA 6, , | |||
" Industrial Fire Loss Prevention.") l LGS Design The usage of compressed gases for cutting and welding is limited to those activities authorized as to be outlined in the administrative procedures. ; | |||
The usage of compressed fuel gases for laboratory and shop h use is limited to a low pressure supply system for Bunsen 3-38 | |||
a LGS FPER burners in the radioactive chemistry laboratory in the radwaste enclosure and the instrument repair shop on the 269-foot level of the control structure. Compressed fuel gas cylinders and gas pressure-reducing stations are installed outside of the building at a location that does not expose nuclear safety-related structures, systems, and equipment to potential damage from fire at the storage location. | |||
Item 54 Appendix A Guideline The use of plastic materials should be minimized. In particular, halogenated plastics such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and neoprene should be used only when substitute noncombustible materials are not available. | |||
LGS Design The use of plastic materials within the plant has been minimized to the greatest extent practicable. However, alternatives to plastic or elastomeric materials for electrical cable insulating systems, with an optimum balance w of electrical, physical, and environmental characteristics, are not available. Cable insulation and jacketing materials are chosen for their fire-retardant and self-extinguishing prcperties, such that fuel contribution to a cable fire is minimized and propagation of a fire along cables is self-limiting in the absence of an external fire hazard. The types of electrical cable insulation and jacketing used in the plant are listed in Table A-3. | |||
Electrical components located throughout the plant, such as control panels, relay panels, motor control centers, and power distribution panels, contain relatively small amounts of plastic in the form of terminal blocks, relay cases, circuit breaker cases, and other small items. The use of plastic in these applications is necessary because of its electrically insulating properties. | |||
Plastic materials are also used for electrical conduit, but only when totally embedded within poured concrete walls and floor slabs. | |||
Item 58 Appendix A Guideline Automatic water sprinkler systems should be.provided for | |||
() cable trays outside the cable spreading room. | |||
3-39 | |||
LGS FPER LGS Design O | |||
Concentrations of cable trays near the primary containment electrical penetrations at elevations 253 and 283 feet are provided with automatic sprinkler systems. Automatic sprinkler systems are not provided for cable trays in other areas of the plant. | |||
Redundant cables outside the cable spreading room are routed with separation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. | |||
Cable tray arrangement and/or fire barriers are designed so that a fire cannot prevent redundant safety system components from performing their design safety functions. | |||
Item 60 Appendix A Guideline Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers should be provided as backup. | |||
LGS Design With the exception of those areas (identified in Item 58) in whicn automatic sprinkler systems are provided, manual hose stations and portable extinguishers serve as both the primary and backup means of fire suppression for cable trays outside the cable spreading room. | |||
Item 61 Appendix A Guideline Safety-related equipment in the vicinity of such cable trays, that does not itself require water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage from sprinkler water discharge, should be protected from sprinkler system operation or malfunction. | |||
LGS Design Sprinkler systems are providad in certain areas for protection of safety-related systems and equipment other than cable trays. In such areas, sprinkler system discharge is controlled to prevent unacceptable damage to adjacent equipment. | |||
Safety-related electrical equipment, such as motor control conters, located in areas protected by automatic water extinguishing systems will be protected against water. | |||
3-40 | |||
LGS FPER O Item 62 Appendix A Guideline Cable and cable tray penetration of fire barriers (vertical ' | |||
and horizontal) should be sealed to give protection at least equivalent to the fire barrier. The design of fire barriers for horizontal and vertical cable trays should, as a minimum, ' | |||
meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, " Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials," including the hose stream test. | |||
LGS Design Sealants for cable and cable tray penetrations of fire barriers are based on the use of materials and methods which l have undergone a test program. Such sealants are consistent with the recommendations of American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) and of ASTM E-119. | |||
Item 63 Appendix A Guideline i | |||
Fire breaks should be provided as deemed necessary by .ae fire hazards analysis. Flame or fire-retardant coatings may | |||
( be used as a fire break for grouped electrical cables to limit spread of fire in cable routings. (Possible cable derating owing to use of such coating materials must be considered during design.) | |||
LGS Desian f Vertical runs of cable trays are provided with fire breaks at ' | |||
solid floor and ceiling penetrations and at intermediate levels as necessary such that the height between fire breaks does not exceed 20 feet. Fire breaks are also provided for horizontal runs of cable trays at fire barrier penetrations. , | |||
Fire breaks in other tray installations will be provided as deemed necessary by a fire hazard analysis. | |||
Item 64 Appendix A Guideline Electrical cable constructions should as a minimum pass the current IEEE No. 383 flame test. (This does not imply that cables passing this test will not require additional fire protection). | |||
O 3-41 | |||
s LGS FPER LGS Design With the exception of cables associated with the lighting and communicaticn systems, electrical cable insulation and jacketir,q systems pass the IEEE No. 383 flame test. Cables associated with the lighting and communication systems are routed exclusively in conduit and are not routed together with cables associated with other plant systems. | |||
Itce 65 ' | |||
Appendix A Guideline To the extent practical, catle construction that does not giv,e'off corrosive *gase9-while burning should be used. | |||
i ' | |||
LGS Design The performance characteristics and verifying tests for cables purchased for this plant are specified in three separate technical'spacifications covering approximately 100 different cables with' voltage insulation ratings of 15 kV, 5 kV, and 600 V. | |||
Typical tasts required on cable insulation are: | |||
A. Physical Tests (Section 3.6 of IPCEA S-66-524 (Typicai)) | |||
: 1. Initfal | |||
: 2. After accelerated aging , | |||
: 3. Moisture absorption B. Electrical Tests (Section 3.7.2 of IPCEA S-66-524 (Typical)) | |||
C. Flame-Resisting Tests | |||
: 1. Prototype samples tested to Section 5.7.3 of Specification 8031-E-18 (Typical), | |||
" Philadelphia Electric Cable Tray Fire Test" The design considerations for cabling involve an optimized balance of electrical, physical, cnd environmental characteristics. Among the environmental prerequisites of the jacketing material are high flame retardance, radiation resistance, and capability to sucvive a postulated accident condition. Typical insulating material for the individual conductors consists of cross-linked polyethylene insulation with a Neopiene protective covering. Fire involvement of these jacketing materials will give off potentially corrosive gases. However, alternative materials which satisfy the | |||
\ | |||
3-42 | |||
LGS FPER primary design basis and do not release potentially corrosive gases were not available when purchase orders were placed for cables for this plant. It should be noted that these gases are not in themselves corrosive, but will form corrosive acids in the presence of substantial moisture or water. | |||
Due to lack of suitable alternative materials, the cable constructions used are considered to have reduced corrosive gas generation "to the extent practical". | |||
Item 69 Appendix A Guideline Cables should not be installed in floor trenches or culverts in the control room. | |||
LGS Design Although cables are not located in concealed floor spaces in the control room, cables are installed in the r aised floor sections in the auxiliary equipment room. Automati: fire detection systems and automatic halon suppression systems are provided in the floor sections in the auxiliary equipment O room. Removable floor plates permit access for manual fire fighting operations. | |||
Item 70 Appendix A Guideline The products of combustion that need to be removed from a specific fire area should be evaluated to determine how they will be controlled. Smoke and corrosive gases should generally be automatically discharged directly outside to a safe location. Smoke and gases containing radioactive materials should be monitored in the fire area to determine l | |||
if release to the environment is within the permissible limits of the plant Technical Specifications. | |||
LGS Desion The products of combustion from a fire in any area of the plant will be removed by the normal plant ventilating systems | |||
! and exhausted through the ventilation stacks above the | |||
! reactor roof. Radiation monitors are provided in the ventilation stacks to determine if the radioactive release to the environment is within the permissible limits of the plant Technical Specifications. | |||
\ | |||
() Exhaust from the control room is discharged directly to the | |||
-' rosphere by alignment of dampers. Exhaust from potentially 3-43 | |||
LGS FPER contaminated areas of the turbine enclosure and the control structure is diccharged through deep bed charcoal filters prior to release to the atmosphere, with a means provided to bypass the filters for direct discharge. Independent systems provide filtered exhaust from the radwaste enclosure and the reactor enclosure with discharge through ventilation stacks above the reactor enclosure roof. Standby fans in all systems may be manually started to augment the normal venting capability of the systems. | |||
Exhaust from the cable spreading room is through transfer grilles into the generator equipment area of the turbine enclosure. | |||
Item 71 Appendix A Guideline Any ventilation system designed to exhaust smoke or corrosive gases should be evaluated to assure that inadvertent operation or single failures will not violate the controlled areas of the plant design. This requirement includes containment functions for protection of the public and maintaining habitability for operations personnel. | |||
LGS Design No portion of the ventilation system is specifically dedicated to smoke removal except for'the purge mode of the control room ventilation system (see Items 168 and 169). The basic design of the overall plant ventilation system considers the effects of inadvertent operation and single failure. The fire dampers provided within the ventilation system affect only those portions isolated by the dampers with no adverse effects on the balance of the systems. | |||
Item 72 Appendix A Guideline The power supply and controls for mechanical ventilation systems should be run outside the fire area served by the system. | |||
LGS Design The power supply and controls for ventilation and smoke removal systems for safety-related areas are run and operated outside the area served by the system. These provisions assure that t'ae ventilation systems remain unimpaired and accessible for manual operation during a postulated fire event inside the area protected. h 3-44 | |||
LGS FPER O | |||
V Item 73 Appendix A Guideline Fire suppression systems should be installed to protect charcoal filters in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52, | |||
" Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Atmospheric Cleanup Air Filtration." | |||
LGS Design Manually-actuated sprinkler systems with water spray nozzles are provided as an integral component of the charcoal filters in the standby gas treatment system, the control room emergency ventilation system, the turbine enclosure equipment compartment exhaust system, the reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust system, and the radwaste enclosure tank vent exhaust system. | |||
Heat detectors monitor charcoal filter temperature and alarm in the control room on high temperature. . | |||
Item 75 Appendix A Guideline | |||
) | |||
Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire. Staircases should serve as escape routes and access routes for fire fighting. Fire exit routes should be clearly marked. Stairwells, elevators and chutes should be enclosed in masonry towers with minimum fire rating of three hours and automatic fire doors at least equal to the enclosure construction, at each opening into the building. | |||
Elevators should not be used during fire emergencies. | |||
LGS Design The reactor enclosures, turbine enclosures, and radwaste ; | |||
enclosure are each provided with at least two separated l stairwells, and the control structure is provided with its ) | |||
own stairwell. These stairwells are completely enclosed by fire-rated walls and are designed to provide escape routes and access routes for fire fighting. The control structure and the two reactor enclosures are each provided with an l elevator shaft adjacent to one of the stairwells. These j elevator shafts also have fire-rated walls. | |||
The walls of the stair towers and elevator shafts consist of g3 nominal 8-inch thick (solid grouted) concrete masonry units | |||
() and/or 6-inch thick reinforced concrete, equivalent to a 2-hour rated fire barrier. Although the walls of stair 3-45 | |||
LGS FPER towers and elevator shafts may be capable of qualifying for a O | |||
higher fire rating, the doors are B-labeled (1-1/2 hour), | |||
consistent with NFPA No. 80, for use in openings in two-hour enclosures of vertical communication within the building. | |||
The doors of the stair towers, being self-closing, will minimize any smoke infiltration during a fire. | |||
Item 76 Appendix A Guideline Smoke and heat vents may be useful in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms and diesel fuel oil storage areas and switchgear rooms. When natural-convection ventilation is used, a minimum ratio of 1 square foot of venting area per 200 square feet of floor area should be provided. If forced-convection ventilation is used, 300 cfm should be provided for every 200 square feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke control. | |||
LGS Desion The cable spreading rooms and switchgear rooms are not provided with smoke exhaust systems separate from the normal ventilation. Smoke exhaust capabilities for these areas are part of the general exhaust systeme. For the diesel fuel oil storage areas, sufficient ventilation air for smoke removal is provided by the diesel engine room exhaust system. | |||
The turbine enclosure is provided with smoke and heat vents in a ratio of 1 square feet of venting area to each 100 square feet of floor area. Smoke and heat removal for all other buildings is accomplished with the normal ventilation exhaust system at a minimum equivalent of 1 square feet of venting area to each 200 square feet of floor area, in accordance with ANI requirements. | |||
Item 77 ) | |||
Appendix A Guideline Self-contained breathing apparatus, using full face positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health - approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel, control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or operating life should be a minimum of one-half hour fbr the self-contained units. | |||
O 3-46 | |||
l l | |||
J 4 | |||
LGS FPER O At least two extra air bottles should be located onsite for l | |||
i each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged | |||
; to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are | |||
! used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants. | |||
i LGS Design Self-contained breathing apparatus will be available for use by control room personnel and fire brigade members. The breathing apparatus will have a minimum operating life of 4 hours for control room personnel and 1 hour for fire brigade members. | |||
, An onsite reserve air supply of six hours for'at least five persons will be provided in stored air bottles. Compressors, i if used, will be units approved for breathing air. | |||
Item 79 i | |||
-s Appendix A Guideline | |||
\' # Fixed emergency lighting should consist of sealed beam units | |||
! with individual 8-hour minimum battery power supplies. | |||
LGS Design The emergency lighting system consists of an ac subsystem and an ac/dc subsystem. .The emergency ac lighting is powered I from Class IE buses which automatically transfer to the standby diesel-generators upon loss of the normal power source. Emergency ac lighting is provided throughout the plant to maintain minimum lighting levels necessary for access and for emergency-related activities. All lighting in the spray pond pump structure (with the exception of the ac/dc lights at the exit doors) is associated with the emergency ac lighting system. | |||
The emergency ac/dc lighting is normally powered from the . | |||
Class 1E buses. In the event of loss of the Class IE ac source, an automatic transfer switch immediately transfers this lighting to the 125 V de non-Class IE station battery source. All emergency ac/dc lighting fixtures are of the incandescent type. Emergency ac/dc lighting is provided for the following areas: | |||
: a. Control room N, b. Auxiliary equipment room | |||
: c. Cable spreading room 3-47 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: d. Static inverter room O | |||
: e. 4kV switchgear compartment | |||
: f. 13kV switchgear compartment | |||
: g. Drywell | |||
: h. HPCI, RCIC, and RHR pump compartments (at exit doors only) | |||
: 1. Diesel-generator compartments | |||
: j. Spray pond pump structure (lights with individual battery packs, at exit doors only) | |||
: k. Stairways and access corridors. | |||
The cables for both emergency lighting subsystems are routed exclusively in conduit, most of which is embedded in concrete. The cables for the two subsystems are routed through separate fire areas so that a fire in any given fire area would not result in loss of both emergency lighting subsystems for a different safety-related fire area. | |||
Item 81 Appendix A Guideline Fixed emergency connunication should use voice powered head sets at preselected stations. | |||
LGS Desian Requirements for the reporting of fires and the direction of fire fighting efforts are considered in the design of the plant communication system. Fixed emergency communication equipment is located at every floor level of the plant at preselected stations but does not include voice powered head sets. | |||
Item 82 Appendix A Guideline Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from exposure fire damage. | |||
LGS Design Portable radio communication units will not be provided at the site. | |||
The use of portable radios has been known to energize or de-energize electrical equipment and components. This effect has been considered in light of the requirement that fire protection equipment should not adversely affect shutdown equipment. | |||
3-48 | |||
' LGS FPER C | |||
Item 83 Appendix A Guideline Fire detection systems should as a minimum comply with NFPA 72D, " Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems." | |||
LGS Design The fire and smoke detection system is in compliance with NFPA 72A. The system is electrically supervised to detect circuit breaks, ground faults, and power failure. | |||
The system also complies with the requirements of NFPA 72D for a Class B system with the following exceptions: | |||
: a. No device is provided for permanently recording incoming signals with date and time of receipt. | |||
: b. Operation and supervision of the system is not the primary function of the operators. | |||
: c. In lieu of complete reliance on NFPA 72E, smoke and O fire detector locations are established by a qualified fire protection engineer. | |||
Item 87 Appendix A Guideline Fire detection and actuation systems should be connected to the plant emergency power supply. | |||
i LGS Design | |||
' Several detection and actuation systems are utilized throughout the plant. | |||
i Power for the early warning fire and smoke detection systems is provided from a Class IE ac motor control center, which is powered from the standby diesel-generators in the event of loss of offsite power. | |||
The detection and actuation system for the total flooding carbon dioxide system is powered from Class IE ac motor control centers (for power) and from the Class IE dc power supply (for controls). The Class IE motor control centers are powered from the standby diesel-generators in the event of loss of offsite power. | |||
) | |||
3-49 | |||
LGS FPER The detection and actuation systems for deluge and pre-action sprinkler systems are connected to the Class IE dc power supply. | |||
Item 95 Appendix A Guideline The connection to the yard fire main loop from each fire pump should be widely separated, preferably located on opposite sides of the plant. | |||
LGS Design The connections to the yard fire main loop from each of the fire pumps are spaced about 10 feet apart. Since these connections are buried underground, they are protected from damage. The two connections are separated by a post indicator valve on the fire main loop and additional valves are provided and arranged so that either connection may be isolated while retaining 100% water supply capacity to the fire main loop. | |||
Item 98 Appendix A Guideline Pumps and drivers should be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by a minimum three-hour fire wall. | |||
LGS Design The two fire pumps are located at the west end of the circulating water pump structure, which is north of the power block. The electric motor-driven fire pump and controls are located in an area common with the circulating water pumps. | |||
The diesel engine-driven fire pump and controls are in a separate compartment that is provided with floor, walls, and ceiling that are rated as 3-hour fire barriers. The diesel oil day tank is located in a curbed area within the diesel engine-driven fire pump compartment. The door to the diesel engine-driven fire pump compartment is a Class A fire door and the compartment is protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. | |||
O 3-50 | |||
LGS FPER O | |||
O Item 103 Appendix A Guideline The firewater supply (total capacity and flow rate) should be calculated on the basis of the largest expected flow rate for a period of two hours, but not less than 300,000 gallons. | |||
This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 1000 gpm for manual hose streams plus the greater of: | |||
(1) all sprinkler heads open and flowing in the largest designed fire area; or (2) the largest open head deluge system (s) operating. | |||
LGS Design Fire protection water is supplied from the basins of the two cooling towers in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 circulating water systems. The total capacity of each cooling tower basin is 7,000,000 gallons. Each fire water pump takes suction from both cooling tower basins through connections to tbc 96-inch circulating water lines. | |||
The cooling tower basin storage capacity exceeds the | |||
(\_/') 370,000-gallon capacity required for two-hour operation of the turbine condenser compartment sprinkler system at i 2090 gpm plus 1000 gpm for hose streams. | |||
Item 108 Appendix A Guideline l | |||
A hose house, equipped with hose and combination nozzle, and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection", should be provided as needed but at least every 1000 feet. | |||
LGS Desian Hose cart houses are provided at 5 selected hydrants in the yard area at intervals of approximately 650 feet. Each hose cart will be equipped with the following fire fighting equipment: | |||
: a. 600 feet of 2-1/2" rubber lined hose | |||
: b. 400 feet of 1-1/2" rubber lined hose | |||
: c. One 30" playpipe | |||
: d. Two 1-1/2" adjustable spray nozzles | |||
: e. Two 1-1/2" ball shutoff O f. | |||
g. | |||
One One 2-1/2" adjustable fog nozzle 2-1/2" ball shutoff 3-51 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: h. One siamese connection (gated wye) | |||
O | |||
: i. 2-1/2" to 1-1/2" spanner wrench | |||
: j. One hydrant wrench | |||
: k. One fire axe Item 110 Appendix A Guideline Each automatic sprinkler system and manual hose station standpipe should have an independent connection to the plant underground wacer main. Headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply multiple sprinkler and standpipe systems. When provided, such headers are considered an extension of the yard main system. | |||
LGS Desian Because of the high number of sprinkler systems and manual hose stations in the plant, it is impractical to provide a separate connection to the yard fire main for each sprinkler system and manual hose station standpipe. Therefore, sprinkler systems and manual hose stations are fed from a number of headers, each serving a particular area of the plant. These headers may be connected to the yard fire main at one end or both ends. | |||
Item 111 Appendix A Guideline Each sprinkler and standpipe system should be equipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate valve, or other approved shutoff valve, and water flow alarm. | |||
LGS Design Each sprinkler and deluge system is provided with an OS&Y gate valve adjacent to the system's automatic control or alarm valve. Each sprinkler system is provided with local water flow alarms and control room annunciation. In the deluge and pre-action systems, the actuation of the heat responsive device initiates an alarm locally and in the control room. | |||
Water flow in the standpipe systems due to manual hose station usage is indicated by pump running annunciation with the absence of automatic system actuation annunciation. | |||
Individual standpipe flow alarms are not provided. | |||
Each connection of a fire water header to the yard fire main is provided with a post indicator valve to permit isolation 3-52 | |||
LGS FPER of the header. In many cases, branch connections to the headers are provided with approved shutoff valves so that groups of sprinkler systems and/or manual hose stations can be isolated without interrupting the supply to other sprinkler systems and manual hose stations connected to the same header. | |||
Item 112 Appendix A Guideline Safety-related equipment that does not itself require sprinkler water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage if wetted by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles. | |||
LGS Design Safety-related equipment not requiring sprinkler protection is provided with water shields and/or protected from unacceptable water damage by zoned discharge or directional 4 | |||
spray nozzles. | |||
Item 113 Appendix A Guideline All valves in the fire water systems should be electrically supervised. The electrical supervision signal should indicate in the control room and other appropriate command locations in the plant. (See NFPA 26, " Supervision of Valves.") | |||
LGS Design Other than the non-indicating gate valves with curb boxes controlling laterals to the fire hydrants, all valves in the yard fire loop and headers into the buildings are post indicator valves. The valves are locked in the open position using padlock-type locking devices. These valves are not equipped with supervisory (tamper) switches. | |||
All of the fire protection water control OS&Y valves directly controlling each wet pipe sprinkler system, pre-action sprinkler system, and water spray system are provided with electrically actuated supervisory (tamper) switches with annunciation in the control room. | |||
O x_- | |||
3-53 | |||
LGS FPER Item 115 O | |||
Appendix A Guideline Interior manual hose installation should be able to reach any location with at least one effective hose stream. To accomplish this, standpipes with hose connections, equipped with a maximum of 75 feet of 1-1/2 inch woven jacket-lined fire hose and suitable nozzles should be provided in all buildings, including containment, on all floors and should be spaced at not more than 100-foot intervals. Individual standpipes should be of at least 4-inch diameter for multiple hose connections and 2-1/2-inch diameter for single hose connections. These systems should follow the requirements of NFPA 14, " Standpipe and Hose Systems" for sizing, spacing and pipe support requirements. | |||
LGS Desion Readily accessible hose reels or cabinet-mounted racks are installed throughout the plant and are spaced to provide coverage by effective hose streams. No hose stations are located inside the primary containment. Hose stations are provided with a maximum of 100 feet of 1-1/2 inch woven jacket-lined fire hose equipped with adjustable fog and straight stream nozzles. | |||
Wet standpipes are not less than 3 inches in diameter for one or two hose connections and 4 inches in diameter for more than two hose connections. The standpipe and hose station installations are constructed in accordance with NFPA No. 14. | |||
Item 116 Appendix A Guideline Hose stations should be located outside entrances to normally unoccupied areas and inside normally occupied areas. | |||
Standpipes serving hose stations in areas housing safety-related equipment should have shutoff valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area. | |||
LGS Desion The only area of the plant which houses safety-related equipment and is considered to be normally occupied is the control room. Hose stations (both water and carbon dioxide) are located outside both entrances to the control room. | |||
In areas that are compartmentalized, hose stations are typically located outside the entrances to the compartments. | |||
In other areas, hose stations are located near stairwells. | |||
3-54 | |||
LGS FPER O Since the hose stations serving compartmentalized areas are located outside the compartments, shutoff valves in the i | |||
associated standpipes are also located outside the compartments. All headers supplying hose stations can be isolated near their connection to the yard fire main loop. | |||
Pressure-reducing devices are not used in the fire protecticn water supply system. | |||
( | |||
Item 117 Apoendix A Guideline The proper type of hose nozzles to be supplied in each area should be based on the fire hazard analysis. The usual combination spray / straight-stream nozzle may cause unacceptable mechanical damage (for example, the delicate electronic equipment in the control room) and be unsuitable. | |||
Electrically safe nozzles should be provided at locations where electrical equipment or cabling is located. | |||
LGS Design Combination-type nozzles will be installed on the wet l standpipe hose stations for flexibility. The fire brigade training will stress the proper use of combination nozzles on | |||
' (~')) | |||
\_ fires involving energized electrical equipment. Silice Class A combustibles may be present from time to time, and | |||
( | |||
. often require a straight stream for effective extinguishment, it is desirable to have adjustable nozzles with straight i stream capability provided at strategic locations rather than one specific nozzle type. | |||
Item 118 Appendix A Guideline Certain fires such as those involving flammable liquids respond well to foam suppression. Consideration should be given to use of any of the available foams for such l specialized protection application. These include the more | |||
! common chemical and mechanical low expansion foams, high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AFFF). | |||
LGS Design Flammable liquids used in the plant include fuel oils, lubricating oils, and solvents. The solvents used in maintenance operations are not stored inside buildings containing safety-related equipment. Buried tanks are used Os for diesel-generator fuel oil storage. Aboveground storage tanks are used for No. 2 and No. 6 fuel oil for the auxiliary 3-55 | |||
LGS FPER boiler, and are provided with mechanical foam extinguishing O | |||
systems. The fuel tank for the diesel-driven fire pump is surrounded by a concrete curb and is located inside the diesel fire pump enclosure. The tank and pump are protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. Other than integral systems, lubricating oil systems and storage facilities are protected by automatic sprinklers with portable dry chemical extinguishers and hose stations available for initial attack and backup. | |||
Flammable liquid fires are effectively controlled by water spray delivered by hose streams or automatic sprinklers. | |||
Although foam suppression is very effective for flammable liquid fires, NFPA 11B does not recommend its use on hot oil fires due to the possibility of frothing. | |||
Item 119 Appendix A Guideline The use of Halon fire extinguishing agents should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12A and 12B, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems - Halon 1301 and Halon 1211." Only UL or FM approved agents should be used. | |||
In addition to the guidelines of NFPA 12A and 12B, preventative maintenance and testing of the systems, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders should be done at least quarterly. | |||
Particular consideration should also be given to: | |||
(a) minimum required Halon concentration and soak time (b) toxicity of Halon (c) toxicity and corrosive characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon. | |||
LGS Design A total flooding Halon 1301 system is provided for the entire raised floor of the auxiliary equipment room at elevation 289 feet in the control structure. The system design and installation is in accordance with NFPA 12A. | |||
Administrative procedures will be established to provide for maintenance and testing of the system, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders, to be performed at least quarterly. | |||
3-56 | |||
LGS FPER O (a) The design concentration for the Halon 1301 system is ; | |||
20% with a 20 minute soak time. | |||
(b) The Halon 1301 system is provided only under the raised floor of the auxiliary equipment room, rather than in the entire room. Emergency procedures will require personnel to use self-contained breathing apparatus when entering the auxiliary equipment room following the discharge of Halon. | |||
(c) The Halon 1301 system is designed to achieve a concentration of 6% within the first 10 seconds after discharge begins. This concentration is sufficient to extinguish the flames, which will largely end the production of toxic gases as a result of the thermal decomposition of Halon. Thus, rapid extinguishment of the flames will prevent the production of a significant quantity of toxic gases. . | |||
Item 120 Appendix A Guideline The use of carbon dioxide extinguishing systems should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12, " Carbon O-s Dioxide Extinguishing Systems." | |||
Particular consideration should also be given to: | |||
(a) minimum required CO, concentration and soak time: | |||
(b) toxicity of CO,; | |||
(c) possibility of secondary thermal shock (cooling) damage; (d) offsetting requirements for venting during CO, injection to prevent overpressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent; (e) design requirements from overpressurization; and (f) possibility and probability of CO, systems being out of service because of personnel safety consideration. CO, systems are disarmed whenever people are present in an area so protected. Areas entered frequently (even though duration time for any visit is short) have often been found wtih CO, systems shut off. | |||
O 3-57 | |||
LGS FPER LGS Desian A low pressure, total flooding CO, system is provided for the cable spreading rooms. The system design and installation is in accordance with NFPA No. 12. | |||
(a) The design concentration for the CO, system is 50%, | |||
achieved within 7 minutes. | |||
(b) The protected space is normally unoccupied. The emergency procedures will require personnel to use breathing apparatus when entering the space following carbon dioxide discharge. | |||
(c) CO, discharge will be directed so as not to impinge directly on any cables. | |||
(d) Automatic initiation of the system closes the steam flooding dampers in the ventilation ducts which penetrate the cable spreading room walls. | |||
(e) Leakage around the doors leading into the cable spreading rooms will prevent overpressurization of the rooms due to the carbon dioxide discharge. | |||
(f) The electric power circuit for the CO, system is h supervised, and causes alarm registry in the control room when the circuit is interrupted. | |||
A supervised 1/4-inch ball valve is provided in the CO, system. This valve is provided with a limit switch which activates a local alarm and is annunciated in the control room. | |||
The audible predischarge alarm provides ample time for personnel to evacuate the area. Routine inspections and maintenance activities can be safely made in the cable spreading room area without disarming the system. The periodic inspection and testing of the ionization smoke detectors can be safely made, since the automatic actuation of the carbon dioxide system is initiated by thermal fire detectors. | |||
Additionally, local stations and controls are provided near , | |||
the CO, bulk storage unit to permit, under administrative procedures, the isolation of the CO, bulk storage unit by a - | |||
valve normally locked in the open position, and/or permit operation of the CO, total flooding system independent of automatic controls and, if necessary, without electric power. | |||
O 3-58 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
~ | |||
Item 124 Appendix A Guideline Because of the general inaccessability of these areas during normal plant operations, protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems. Automatic sprinklers should be installed for those hazards identified as requiring fixed suppression. | |||
LGS Design The secondary containment is accessible during all modes of normal plant operations. Therefore, fire suppression for most areas of the secondary containment is provided by manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers. Areas with significant concentrations of combustible materials have been provided with fixed suppression systems (the HPCI and RCIC pump compartments are provided with pre-action sprinkler systems, electrical penetration areas at elevations 253 and 283 feet are provided with wet pipe sprinkler systems, and charcoal filters are provided with water spray sy. stems). | |||
Fire suppression coverage for the primary containment is provided by manual hose stations and portable fire O | |||
extinguishers located outside the two entrances to the suppression chamber at elevation 217 feet and the two entrances to the drywell at elevation 253 feet. | |||
Item 127 | |||
! Appendix A Guideline A primary containment general area fire detection capability should be provided as backup for the above-described hazard detection. To accomplisa this, suitable smoke detection (e.g., visual obscuration, light scattering, and particle counting) should be installed in the air recirculation system ahead of any filters. | |||
LGS Design Fire detectors are not provided inside the primary containment. During reactor operation, the primary containment is inerted with nitrogen, and the oxygen concentration is maintained below 5% by volume. This inert atmosphere will prevent fires from )ccurring in the primary containment. Administrative procedures provide for fire watches when necessary during maintenance operations when the drywell has been de-inerted. | |||
3-59 | |||
LGS FPER Item 128 Appendix A Guideline In addition, manual fire fighting capability should be permanently installed in containment. Standpipes with hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers, should be installed at strategic locations throughout containment for any required manual fire fighting operations. | |||
Equivalent protection from portable systems should '2e provided if it is impractical to install standpipes with hose stations. | |||
LGS Desion There are no provisions for permanently installed fire suppression within the primary containment. Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are installed at locations throughout the secondary containment, including locations near the entrances to the primary containment. | |||
The extension of the standpipe system into the primary , | |||
containment is not recommended nor is the permanent installation of portable extinguishers. | |||
Item 130 l Appendix A Guideline l The control room is essential to safe reactor operation. It must be protected against disabling fire damage and should be separated from other areas of the plant by floors, walls, and roof having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hours. | |||
LGS Desion The walls, floor, and ceiling of the control room are rated as 3-hour fire barriers. The two entrances are provided with 3-hour rated doors, ventilation ducts entering the room are provided with 3-hour rated fire dampers, and all other penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated seals. | |||
The walls and ceilings separating the control room proper from its support facilities (such as office, shop, toilet, utility room, and instrument laboratory) are rated as 1-hour fire barriers. Ventilation ducts serving these support facilities are provided with 1-hour rated fire dampers, and the entrances to the individual rooms are provided with C-label (3/4 hour) doors. | |||
O 3-60 | |||
l l | |||
LGS FPER O Item 131 Appendix A Guideline Control room cabinets and consoles are subject to damage from two distinct fire hazards: | |||
(a) Fire originating within a cabinet or console; and (b) Exposure fire involving combustibles in the general room area. | |||
Manual fire fighting capability should be provided for both - | |||
hazards. Hose stations and portable water and Halon extinguishers should be located in the control room to eliminate the need for operators to leave the control room. | |||
An additional hose piping shutoff valve and pressure-reducing devices should be installed outside the control room. | |||
Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable. | |||
Nozzles that are compatible with the hazards and equipment in the control room should be provided for the manual hose r~N station. The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire V) fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety, and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement. | |||
LGS Design Portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are located in the control room. In addition, manual hose stations of both the carbon dioxide and water types are located outside both entrances to the control room. The water hoses are equipped with combination nozzles. No hose stations are located within the control room. | |||
Item 132 Appendix A Guideline Fire detection in the control room, cabinets, and consoles should be provided by smoke and heat detectors in each fire area. Alarm and annunciation should be provided in the control room. Fire alarms in other parts of the plant should also be alarmed and annunciated in the control room. | |||
O 3-61 | |||
LGS FPER LGS Design O , | |||
Fire detectors are not located inside the individual ~ cabinets and consoles in the control room. The control room panels are not gasketed and therefore are not airtight. Any smoke generated within the cabinets will leak out and be detected by the fire detectors in the control room. Twenty-three detectors are distributed throughout the control room to provide rapid detection of smoke originating in any panel. | |||
Actuation of any of these detec tors is annunciated on the fire protection panels in the control room. The indicator light on the detector itself will then identify the specific detector originating the alarm. | |||
Fire alarms from other areas in the plant are also annunciated on the fire protection panels in the control room. | |||
Item 135 Appendix A Guideline The control room ventilation intake should be provided with smoke detection capability to automatically alarm locally and isolate the control room ventilation system to protect operators by preventing smoke from entering the control room. | |||
Manually operated venting of the control room should be available so that opcrators have the option of venting for visibility. | |||
LGS Desion The control room ventilation intake is provided with smoke detection capability to automatically detect and alarm the presence of smoke. Upon receipt of the alarm, the control room ventilation system can be manually placed in the recirculation mode in order to isolate the control room from the outside. | |||
For purge operation of the control room ventilation system the outside supply air and exhaust air dampers are fully opened and the return air damper to the control room is closed. The control room purge system can be operated from both inside and outside the control room. | |||
The control room ventilation system is a safety-related system. Automatic actuation of the recirculation mode by means of a non-safety-related signal is not permitted based on the separation criterion applicable to safety-related equipment. | |||
3-62 | |||
F LGS FPER O Item 138 Appendix A Guideline The preferred acceptable methods are: | |||
: 1. Automatic water syn' ?m such as closed head sprinklers, open h .1 deluge, or open directional spray nozzles. De,-Je and open spray systems should have pcovisions for manual operation at a remote station; however, there should also be provisions to preclude inadvertent operation. | |||
Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting. Open head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned so that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability. The use of foam is acceptable, provided it is of a type capable of being delivered by a sprinkler or deluge system, such as an Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF). | |||
LGS Desian Automatic fire protection for the cable spreading room is provided by a total flooding carbon dioxide extinguishing system, in lieu of water or foam systems. The design of the carbon dioxide system is discussed in Section 2.8. | |||
In addition to the heat detectors provided for actuation of the carbon dioxide system, a separate group of fire detectors is located in the cable spreading room to provide early warning of an incipient fire. | |||
Item 156 Appendix A Guideline The general area housing remote safety-related panels should be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room. Combustible materials should be controlled and limited to those required for operation. Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be provided. | |||
O 3-63 , | |||
j | |||
LGS FPER LGS Desion All safety-related panels are located in the control room and auxiliary equipment room except for the containment hydrogen recombiner power cabinets and the containment combustible gas sample cabinets, which are located in the reactor exclosure. | |||
The remote shutdown panel is located in the auxiliary equipment room. Other safety-related instrumentation is located in open racks and not within enclosed panels. | |||
The safety-related panel areas in the auxiliary equipment room are provided with automatic smoke detectors with local alarm as well as annunciation in the control room. The auxiliary equipment room will be used for electrical equipment only and not for any other purpose. | |||
Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are available for general areas housing safety-related panels and racks. | |||
Item 157 | |||
. Appendix A Guideline Battery rooms should be protected against fire explosions. | |||
Battery rooms should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three hours inclusive of all oenetrations and openings. | |||
(See NFPA 69, " Standard on Explosion Prevention systems.") | |||
LGS Desian All battery rooms (both the safety-related battery rooms in the control structure and the non-safety-related battery rooms in the turbine enclosure) are individually enclosed by fire walls with minimum ratings of 3 hours. Ceilings above and floors below the battery rooms are capable of 3-hour fire ratings with the exception of exposed structural steel supporting the concrete slabs. | |||
Item 158 Appendix A Guideline Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol. % | |||
hydrogen concentration. | |||
LGS Design Ventilation air for the safety-related battery rooms is supplied by the safety-related OAV118 and 08V118 fan cabinets, and is exhausted by the nonsafety-related OAV124 3-64 | |||
LGS FPER O and OBV124 fan cabinets. Both sets of fans are 100% | |||
redundant and are controlled such that the standby fan will start running automatically if the lead fan fails. In the event of loss of flow through the battery room exhaust ducts, due either to fan stoppage or isolation damper closure, the battery room exhaust will automatically be recirculated to the suction of the OAV118 and OBV118 fan cabinets. The ventilation flow rate through the battery rooms provides 12 air changes per hour, which maintains hydrogen concentration far below 2% by volume. | |||
Ventilation air for the nonsafety-related battery rooms is provided by the turbine enclosure air supply and air exhaust systems, which are non-safety-related. A hydrogen monitor continuously samples the air in the battery rooms; high hydrogen concentration is annunciated in the control room. | |||
The low rate at which hydrogen builds up in the battery rooms provides ample time for the operators to take corrective action. | |||
Item 164 Appendix A Guideline | |||
~ | |||
/~' Drainage for fire fighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided. | |||
LGS Desian Each diesel-generator cell is provided with trapped and vented floor drains with adequate drainage capacity to cope with the maximum sprinkler water flow in each room. | |||
Each diesel-generator cell is provided with two exhaust fans, each capable of 40 air changes per hour for cooling and/or smoke removal. The ventilation system is controlled manually from a local control panel and is also started automatically by either high air temperature or a diesel engine start signal. | |||
Item 167 Appendix A Guideline The enclosure should be protected by automatic fire l | |||
suppression systems such as AFFF or sprinklers. | |||
LGS Desian The diesel oil day tank and the lube oil tank are installed within a 3-hour rated enclosure located inside each diesel-j generator room. A pre-action sprinkler system is provided | |||
' 3-65 i | |||
LGS FPER for the diesel-generator room and the day tank enclosure. | |||
Item 168 Appendix A Guideline Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1100 gallons should not be located inside the buildings containing safety-related equipment. They should be located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety-related equipment, or if located within 50 feet, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. Buried tanks are considered as meeting the three-hour fire resistance requirements. See NFPA 30, " Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code", for additional guidance. | |||
LGS Desion The plant has eight diesel fuel oil storage tanks, each with a capacity of 41,500 gallons. The tanks are buried underground away from buildings. | |||
Item 171 Appendix A Guideline Pump heuses and rooms housing safety-related pumps or other safety-related equipment should be separated from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least three-hour ratings. These rooms should be protected by automatic sprinkler protection unless a fire hazards analysis can demonstrate that a fire will not endanger other safety-related equipment required for safe plant s!.utdown. | |||
LGS Desion The safety-related pump compartments located at elevation 177 feet in the reactor enclosure are separated from each other and from other areas of the plant by 3-hour rated fire l | |||
walls. The spray pond pump structure is located remote from other plant structures, and the two divisions of pumps within the structure are separated by a 3-hour rated fire wall. | |||
The HPCI pump compartment and the RCIC pump compartment are protected by automatic pre-action sprinkler systems. Fires originating in other safety-related pump compartments would not endanger other safety-related equipment required for safe plant shutdown, as di'scussed in Section 5.0. | |||
O 3-66 | |||
e LGS FPER O Item 180 Aopendix A Guideline The storage area should be provided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water. | |||
LGS Desian A 4-inch floor drain serves to collect water on the refueling floor in the vicinity of the new fuel storage vault. A curb around the top of the vault prevents water on the refueling floor from draining into the vault. A 4-inch floor drain at the bottom of the new fuel storage vault prevents water from accumulating there. | |||
Item 181 Appendix A Guideline The storage configuration of new fuel should always be so maintained as to preclude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application. | |||
LGS Design The new fuel storage racks are designed to preclude the possibility of a fuel assembly being placed in an abnormal position that would increase the reactivity of the array. | |||
Based on criticality analyses performed by the fuel and storage rack vendor, the spray density ranges of fire fighting devices are well below the ranges which could result in new fuel criticality. In addition, a cover is provided over the top of the new fuel storage vault to prevent fire fighting water from inadvertently impinging on the fuel. | |||
Item 185 Appendix A Guideline Automatic sprinklers should be used in all areas where combustible materials are located. | |||
LGS Design An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is provided for the vaste drum storage area at elevation 217 feet in the radwaste enclosure. Hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided for fire suppression coverage of the remainder of the radwaste enclosure. | |||
3-67 | |||
s LGS FPER Item 186 Appendix A Guideline Automatic fire detection should be provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. | |||
LGS Desian Automatic fire detection is provided in limited areas of the radwaste enclosure, as shown in Table A-1. In consideration of the low combustible loading in the remaining areas of the radwaste enclosure, detection by personnel in the vicinity is deemed sufficient. | |||
Item 189 Appendix A Guideline The decontaml cation areas should be protected by automatic sprinklers if flammable liquids are stored. | |||
LGS Desian No flammable liquids are stored in decontamination areas. j Fire suppression coverage is provided by hose stations and l portable fire extinguishers. | |||
Item 195 Appendix A Guideline Cooling towers should be of noncombustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply. | |||
LGS Desion The cooling tower basins serve as a source of water for the fire protection system but not for any safety-related systems. The cooling towers are constructed entirely of i non-combustible material except for the splash bars and drift l eliminators, which are polyvinyl chloride, and the splash bar support grids, which are fire retardant polyester and fiberglass. The fill material is contained in a ring-shaped area around the periphery of each tower. The ring is separated into six cells by fire walls located at 600 intervals. A fire occurring in any one cell would have no effect on safety-related structures or systems, since such a fire would not affect the structural integrity of the cooling tower and the towers are located away from safety-related structures. This arrangement has been accepted by ANI for 3-68 | |||
LGS FPER O design of cooling towers with PVC and polyester fill material and without fire protection sprinklers. | |||
Item 207 Aprendix A Guideline Hazardous chemicals should be stored and protected in accordance with the recommendatons of NFPA 49, " Hazardous Chemicals Data." Chemicals storage areas should be well-ventilated and protected against flooding conditions since some chemicals may react with water to produce ignition. | |||
LGS Desian Hazardous chemicals are stored in areas that are remote from ' | |||
safety-related areas, are well ventilated, and are protected against flooding. The controls and precautions relative to hazardous chemicals to be commonly used in the plant will be set forth in the administrative procedures. | |||
Hazardous chemicals will be transported in the usual shipping containers, stored in suitable areas. Protection, g separation, and isolation criteria will be followed in s ,/ accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 49, " Hazardous Chemical Data." | |||
The ventilation system provided for the chemical storage ' . | |||
areas will assure that the toxicity level and potentially explosive gaseous mixtures in these areas meet the requirements of NFPA 49. | |||
Adequate drainage will be provided. | |||
O 3-69 | |||
m- .- | |||
LGS FPER CHAPTER 4 | |||
; EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL FIRE, HAZARDS 4.1 SCOPE OF EVALUATION , | |||
This chapter provides an evaluation of the potential for occurrence of fires within the plant and a summary of the capabilities of the existing fire pro,tection program. This evaluation was performed for all structures that contain | |||
- saf ety-related equipment or could af fect safety-related structures by virtue of the fire hazards present. | |||
A review of the plant wan'made to identify the combustible materials present, quantify the fire hazard in terms of combustible loading, andirelate the potential hazard to the capabilities of the< existing fire barriers and fire suppression systems. This informatio'n is presented in Table A-1 which lists the type andLquantity of combustible materials present in each fire zone, the corresponding combustible loading, and the availadility of detect-fon and suppression equipment. Figures B-4 through.B-12 show the'locaticas of the fire zones, fire barriers, 7 | |||
O and fire' suppressior. (coverage. | |||
4.2 PROCEDURE The evaluation of fire hazards was performed using a procedure i that is summarized by the following steps: | |||
: a. For identification purposes, the various st.ructures of the plant were divided into specific fire areas. A fire area is defined as that portion of a structure that is separated from other areas by boundaries (walls, floors, and ceilings) which are of a type of construction which is sufficient to prevent the spread of fire across the boundary, considering the combustible loading in the area. Many fire areas were further subdivided into fire zones to permit more precise identification of the locations of combustible materials, fire detection.and suppression systems,'and components associated with safety-related systems. The breakdown into fire zones was based on the locations of interior walls and slabs within each fire area.; Fire areas are identified by a unique number, and fire zones within the same fire area are identified by a subletter. The fire area and fire | |||
/~N zone designations arc listed in Table A-1 under b " Item No.". | |||
s 4-1 4 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: b. Each fire zone was surveyed to determine the type, quantity, and distribution of combustible materials present. | |||
: c. The combustible loading for each fire zone is determined based on the quantity of combustible materials present and the heat of combustion of each type of combustible material. The heat of combustion values used in this analysis are listed in Table A-2. The quantity of each type of combustible material (in Ib) is multiplied by the appropriate heat of combustion (in Btu /lb) to determine the heat release (in Btu) of each type of combustible material. The total heat release of all combustibles in the fire zone is then expressed in terms of the weight of equivalent wood by dividing by the heat of combustion of wood (8000 Btu /lb). To obtain the combustible loading (in Ib of equivalent wood per square foot of floor area) for each fire zone, the total heat release (in Ib of equivalent wood) is divided by the floor area of the fire zone. The combustible loading thus obtained is listed in Table A-1. | |||
: d. The next step was to determine the adequacy of the building components in limiting the propagation of an uncontrolled postulated fire. For this analysis the combustibles in an area were categorized from A-slight through E-severe in accordance with National Fire Protection Handbook, Fourteenth Edition, Table 6-8C. | |||
Battery cases were placed in the A-slight category. | |||
Charcoal and electrical cabling were both placed in the C-moderately severe category. All combustible liquids were placed in the E-severe category. In general, if the distribution of the combustible material in the area being considered was nonuniform, a more severe category was selected than would have been warranted by homogeneous material distribution. In analyzing fire zones that contained combustible liquids, it was assumed that the entire contents of the liquid reservoir in the particular zone was distributed uniformly over the floor area of the zone unless limited by curbs or other architectural features. It was then assumed that the liquid was ignited and burned at a rate of 4 mm/ min. | |||
This method of analysis represents a conservative approach since it will generate the maximum heat release rate and thus minimize the effectiveness of the plant fire brigade in reducing fire damage. | |||
National Fire Protection Handbook, Figure 6-8E was then | |||
, utilized to determine the expected duration of the fully l | |||
developed period of the fire. In certain cases where significant quantities of combustibles in different occupancy categories were present, interpolation between 4-2 | |||
LGS FPER time-temperature curves was used to yield a realistic expected duration. | |||
To establish the adequacy of fire area boundaries, an equivalent fire severity was then determined. The area under the time-temperature curve for each occupancy category was compared to the National Bureau of Standards Time-Temperature Curve. This normalization process yields an equivalent fire severity in minutes. | |||
For example, a fire loading of 4 psf in an A-slight area will have an expected duration of 96 minutes but an equivalent severity of 50 minutes. The same loading in a C-moderately severe area will have an expected duration of 34 minutes and equivalent severity of 22 minutes. | |||
The equivalent fire severity thus determined is listed in Table A-1. | |||
O O | |||
4-3 | |||
LGS FPER O CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE SAFE SHUTDOWN 5.1 METHODOLOGY This chapter provides an evaluation of the effects of postulated fires in each fire area on the ability of the operator to achieve a safe shutdown of the plant. Of the numerous possible combinations of equipment that could be used to effect a safe shutdown, two specific conbinations were selected for detailed study for the purposes of this evaluation. These two shutdown methods are described in Section 5.2. | |||
In performing the safe shutdown analysis, the two shutdown methods were examined to determine the minimum equipment, control, and power, requirements for operability of each method. | |||
The locations of the equipment itself and the cabling associated with the required equipment were identified with respect to the | |||
: various fire areas. | |||
l Each fire area was then examined to determine which components associated with the shutdown methods, if any, would be rendered l inoperable by the occurrence of a fire within the fire area. The results of the safe shutdown analysis are summarized in l | |||
~ections 5.3 through 5.9 for each fire area. | |||
l The following assumptions were used in performing the safe shutdown analysis: | |||
! a. No credit is taken for manual fire fighting efforts or the operation of automatic fire suppression systems. | |||
The fire is assumed to disable all equipment and i electrical cabling located in the fire area, unless the | |||
: fire hazard analysis demonstrates otherwise. An electrical cable tray fire is assumed not to propagate from one tray to another, provided that no combustible pathways exist between the trays, and the trays are physically separated by a sufficient distance considering the combustible loading in the area. | |||
: b. Plant accidents and severe natural phenomena are not colsidered to occur concurrently with the postulated fire. However, offsite power is assumed to be unavailable after the onset of the fire. | |||
! c. A single active component failure is not assumed to j occur concurrently with the fire. | |||
[} | |||
5-1 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: d. Credit is taken for reactor trip. Any fire affecting the reactor protection system or the control rod drive circuitry will not prevent the reactor from being tripped. A reactor trip can be performed manually (in the control room), automatically (by the RPS logic), or by tripping the RPS power supplies (in the auxiliary equipment room). | |||
: e. No credit is taken for proper operation or proper positioning of equipment which is not required to change its status during the course of the shutdown procedure (e.g., a motor-operated valve). If control or power cabling associated with such equipment is routed through a fire area under consideration, loss of operability and loss of function is assumed. This assumption provides a worst case analysis regarding spurious signals associated with cabling failures in a fire area. | |||
Those floor slabs identified by an asterisk following the indicated fire rating in the fire area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9 are discussed in Item 46 of Section 3.2. | |||
Those watertight and steamtight doors identified in Sections 5.3 through 5.9 by a double asterisk (**) following the indicated fire rating are discussed in Item 47 of Section 3.2. | |||
==5.2 DESCRIPTION== | |||
OF REACTOR SHUTDOWN METHODS The following sections provide descriptions of methods that can be used for reactor shutdown and cooldown from the control room, both with and without offsite power, and also from outside the control room using the remote shutdown panel. Each of these methods includes a system by which makeup water can be added to the reactor vessel, a system by which energy can be removed from the reactor vessel, and any support systems needed to accommodate energy removal to an ultimate heat sink or to return water to its supply source. | |||
Although the safe shutdown analysis for the various fire areas places primary emphasis on achievement of reactor shutdown using the methods described below, many alternative shutdown methods would be available. Use of safety-related and nonsafety-related l systems not addressed in the safe shutdown analysis, plus manual 1 operation of certain equipment and controls, would provide numerous combinations of systems with adequate capability to 3 safely shut the plant down. l l | |||
) | |||
h 5-2 | |||
l l | |||
LGS FPER O 5.2.1 Reactor Shutdown With Offsite Power After the turbine-generator has been tripped and all control rods inserted into the reactor core during the course of a normal shutdown and cooldown, reactor decay heat and sensible heat is removed by bypassing main steam to the condenser. Heat is removed from the condenser by the circulating water system and rejected to the atmosphere by the cooling tower. Makeup water is supplied to the reactor vessel by the condensate and feedwater system, taking suction on the condenser hotwell. When the reactor has been depressurized below a nominal 75 psig, the RHR system is initiated in the shutdown cooling mode of operat.;cn. | |||
In this mode, reactor water is circulated through the RHR neat exchangers, where it is cooled by the RHRSW system. Heat is rejected from the RHRSW system to the atmosphere by using either the cooling tower or the spray pond. The reactor vent valves are opened when reactor pressure reaches atmospheric. | |||
5.2.2 Reactor Shutdown Without Offsite Power For the purposes of this safe shutdown analysis, two methods of shutdown that are operable without offsite power were selected for detailed study. Shutdown method A requires Class IE power from Divisions 1 and 3 (both ac and de) in order to be operable. | |||
Shutdown method B requires Class IE power from Divisions 2 and 4 | |||
('')S (both ac and de) plus de power from either Division 1 or Division 3 in order to be operable. The two methods are described below. | |||
Method A After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the RCIC system is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber. The operation of the RCIC system also removes energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the RCIC turbine. During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption of the RCIC system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which open when reactor pressure reaches the valve setpoint. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the i RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. In order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure of 75 psig. This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, operation of the RCIC system is terminated and the RHR system is switched from the fi suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode. In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger 5-3 | |||
LGS FPER by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. | |||
The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the followings | |||
: a. Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only) | |||
: b. ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in addition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the compressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instrument gas system will provide the necessary gas. | |||
If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas supply line cannot be opened by its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.) | |||
: c. RCIC pump and associated valves | |||
: d. RHR heat exchanger "A" | |||
: e. RHR pump "A" and associated valves (The outboard isolation valve on the shutdown cooling return line is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 2 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 2 power is not available.) | |||
: f. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The outboard valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 2 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 2 power is not available.) | |||
: g. RHRSW pump "A" and associated valves (for Unit 1); | |||
RHRSW pump "C" and associated valves (for Unit 2) | |||
: h. ESW pump "A" and associated valves (for Unit 1); | |||
ESW pump "C" and associated valves (for Unit 2) | |||
: 1. RHR compartment unit cooler "A" | |||
: j. RCIC compartment unit cooler "A" | |||
: k. Spray pond pump structure fan "A" | |||
: 1. Diesel-generator enclosure fans "A", "C", "E", and "G" | |||
: m. Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder "A" | |||
: n. Standby diesel-generators "A" and "C" | |||
: o. Station batteries "A" and "C" 5-4 | |||
LGS FPER O Method B After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the HPCI system is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber. The operation of the HPCI system also removes energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the HPCI turbine. During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption of the HPCI system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which open when reactor pressure reaches the valve setpoint. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. In order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure of 75 psig. This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, the RHR system is switched from the suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode. Heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. | |||
The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. | |||
The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the following: | |||
: a. Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only) | |||
: b. ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in addition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the compressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instrument gas system will provide the necessary gas. | |||
j If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas | |||
; supply line cannot be opened by its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.) | |||
: c. HPCI pump and associated valves | |||
: d. RHR heat exchanger "B" | |||
: e. RHR pump "B" and associated valves l f. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The | |||
! inboard valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 1 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 1 power is not available.) | |||
: g. RHRSW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1); | |||
5-5 | |||
1 LGS FPER RHRSW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2) | |||
: h. ESW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1); | |||
ESW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2) | |||
: 1. RHR compartment unit cooler "B" | |||
: j. HPCI compartment unit cooler "A" | |||
: k. Spray pond pump structure fan "B" | |||
: 1. Diesel-generator enclosure fans "B", "D", "F", and "H". | |||
: m. Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder "B" | |||
: n. Standby' diesel-generators "B" and "D" | |||
: o. Station batteries "B" and "D" plus either the "A" or "C" batteries 5.2.3 Reactor Shutdown from Outside the Control Room In the unlikely event that the control room becomes uninhabitable, the plant can be shut down from the remote shutdown panel, located in the auxiliary equipment room. | |||
Transfer switches on the remote shutdown panel allow the operator to transfer control of the systems involved from the control room panels to the remote shutdown panel. Instrumentation and j controls for the following systems are provided on the remote t | |||
I shutdown panel: | |||
: a. RCIC | |||
: b. Main steam relief valves "A", "C", and "N" | |||
: c. RHR loor "A" | |||
: d. RHRSW loop "A" l | |||
: e. ESW loop "A" | |||
: f. Reactor vessel and containment monitoring 9 | |||
5-6 | |||
l i | |||
LGS FPER O 5.3 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - CONTROL STRUCTURE 5.3.1 Fire Area 1: Recombiner Compartments, Condensate Backwash Compartments, and Control Structure Water Chiller Areas (El. 180'-0" and 200'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-4 and B-5): | |||
Construction Ratino Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) | |||
E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part 3 hr I | |||
below El. 200'-0") | |||
S - Concrete masonry unit (part 3 hr above El. 200'-0", eastern l half) l S - Concrete masonry unit (part None above El. 200'-0", western half, contains two HVAC | |||
( | |||
O penetrations without fire dampers) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr j Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Steamtight door connecting to 1.5 hr** | |||
stairwell no. 7 Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 89 and 102 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Control structure water chillers OAK 112 and OBK112 (2) Control structure chilled water circulation pumps OAP162 and OBP162 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable trays. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
() (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
5-7 | |||
LGS FPER (1) Loss of control structure chilled water system loop A or loop B (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of either loop of the control structure chilled water system may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safety shut the plant down. | |||
Due to the provision of fire walls at El. 200'-0" within fire area 1, a postulated fire cannot affect both loops of the control structure chilled water system simultaneously. A 3-hour rated fire wall is located between the loop A and loop B control structure water chiller areas, and the north, south, and east walls of the loop B water chiller area are lh also fire rated. Therefore, at least one of the chilled water loops will remain available to provide cooling for the control structure in the event of a fire in this area. | |||
5.3.2 Fire Area 2: 13-kV Switchgear Area (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit - (part 3 hr adjacent to battery rooms) | |||
E- Reinforced concrete - (remainder) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit (part 3 hr adjacent to battery rooms) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no.[7) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
5-8 | |||
LGS FPER O Access: Door connecting to stairwell no. 7 1.5 hr Doors connecting to areas 3, 3 hr 4, 5, and 6 Steamtight doors connecting to areas 3 hr** | |||
94, 107, and 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets OAV118 and OBV118 and associated ventilation dampers . | |||
(2) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with ' | |||
the following Unit 1 components: | |||
: a. Class IE de motor control centers 10D201 (Div. 1), | |||
10D202 (Div. 2), and 10D203 (Div. 2) | |||
: b. Class IE dc distribution panels 1CD102 (Div. 3), | |||
IDD102 (Div. 4), 1AD501 (Div. 1), 1BD501 (Div. 2), | |||
1CD501 (Div. 3), and 1DD501 (Div. 4) | |||
: c. Class IE instrument ac transformers 10X106 (Div. 1), 10X107 (Div. 2), 10X108 (Div. 3), and 10X109, (Div. 4) . | |||
(3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following Unit 2 components: | |||
: a. Class IE de motor control centers 20D201 (Div. 1), | |||
20D202 (Div. 2), and 20D203 (Div. 2) | |||
: b. Class IE de distribution panels 2CD102 (Div. 3), | |||
O 2DD102 (Div. 4), 2AD501 (Div. 1), 2BD501 (Div. 2), | |||
2CD50t (Div. 3), and 2DD501 (-D i v . 4). | |||
(4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with HVAC dampers in the battery room exhaust ducts (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Unit 1 systems | |||
: a. Loss of Unit 1 Class IE de power supplied by motor control centers 10D201 (Div. 1), 10D202 (Div. 2), | |||
and 10D203 (Div. 2) | |||
: b. Loss of Unit 1 Class IE de power supplied by distribution panels 1CD102 (Div. 3), 1DD102 (Div. 4), IAD501 (Div. 1), IBD501 (Div. 2), ICD 501 | |||
() (Div. 3), and 1DD501 (Div. 4) 5-9 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: c. Loss of Unit 1 Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y101 (Div. 1), | |||
10Y102 (Div. 2), 10Y103 (Div. 3), and 10Y104 (Div. 4) | |||
: d. Loss of diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D | |||
: e. Loss of the Div. 3 and Div. 4 4-kV switchgear (2) Unit 2 systems | |||
: a. Loss of Unit 2 Class IE de power supplied by motor control centers 20D201 (Div. 1), 20D202 (Div. 2), | |||
and 20D203 (Div. 2) | |||
: b. Loss of Unit 2 Class IE dc power supplied by distribution panels 2CD102 (Div. 3), 2DD102 (Div. 4), 2AD501 (Div. 1), 2BD501 (Div. 2), 2CD501 (Div. 3), and 2DD501 (Div. 4) | |||
: c. Loss of Unit 2 Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 20Y102 (Div. 1), | |||
20Y102 (Div. 2), 20Y103 (Div. 3), and 20Y104 (Div. 4) | |||
: d. Loss of diesel-generators 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D h | |||
: e. Loss of the Div. 3 and Div. 4 4-kV switchgear (3) Loss of ventilation for the 4-kV switchgear compartments, Class IE battery rooms, and static inverter compartments (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
This fire area contains a number of conduits containing electrical cabling associated with shutdown methods A and B for Units 1 and 2. All portions of conduits located within this fire area which are associated with shutdown methods A or B will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent 5-10 | |||
LGS FPER O fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damcge affecting safe shutdown capability. | |||
This supplementary fire protection ensures that both of the shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safety shut the plant Gawn in the event of a fire. | |||
Loss of ventilation for the control structure areas listed in (d)(3) above could result in a long-term temperature increase in those areas, depending on the heat loads in the various compartments. In order to prevent temperatures from becoming excessive if the normal ventilation cannot be re-established in those areas, portable fans will be provided for use in maintaining airflow through the affected compartments. | |||
5.3.3 Fire Area 3: Unit 1 Class IE Battery Room (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 2 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 he i | |||
S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 2 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) , Class IE battery 1DD101 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Battery charger IDD103 (3) Fuse box 1DD105 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) | |||
Ci Loss of Class IE de power supplied by battery 1DD101 (Div. 4) 5-11 | |||
LGS FPER (2) Loss of diesel-generator ID and associated 4-kV switchgear (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detector, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade wil,1 be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the' ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described - | |||
in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. | |||
5.3.4 Fire Area 4: Unit 1 Class IE Battery Room (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 2 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE battery 1CD101 (Div. 3) | |||
(2) Battery charger 1CD103 (3) Fuse box ICD 105 5-12 | |||
LGS FPER O (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by battery 1CD101 (Div. 3) | |||
(2) Loss of diesel-generator 1C and associated 4-kV switchgear (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detector, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
5.3.5 Fire Area 5: Unit 2 Class IE Battery Room (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
O 5-13 | |||
LGS FPER Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 2 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE battery 2DD101 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Battery charger 2DD103 (3) Fuse box 2DD105 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by battery 2DD101 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Loss of diesel-generator 2D and associated 4-kV , | |||
switchgear ' | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detector, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safety shut Unit 1 down. | |||
O S-14 | |||
LGS FPER O With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
5.3.6 Fire Area 6: Unit 2 Class IE Battery Room (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 2 3 hr | |||
,/ (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
) | |||
(1) Class IE battery 2CD101 (Div. 3) | |||
(2) Battery charger 2CD103 (3) Fuse box 2CD105 (4) Rigid steel conduit containing cables associated with fan cabinet OBV118 outlet damper (HD-78-097B) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by battery 2CD101 (Div. 3) | |||
(2) Loss of diesel-generator 2C and associated 4-kV switchgear | |||
! (3) Loss of air flow through fan cabinet OBV118 (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
, gg The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual | |||
, g ,/ | |||
! annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the 5-15 I | |||
LGS FPER control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
5.3.7 Fire Area 7: Corridor (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 9, 11, 13, 3 hr 15, 17, and 19 Steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** | |||
areas 97 and 110 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following Unit 1 components: | |||
: a. Class IE instrument ac transformers 10X106 (Div. 1) and 10X108 (Div. 3) | |||
: b. Class IE load center transformers 10X201 (Div. 1), | |||
10X202 (Div. 2), and 10X203 (Div. 3) | |||
: c. Instrument rack 10C001 (core spray loop "A") | |||
: d. Instrument rack 10C018 (RHR loop "A" and RHRSW loop "A") | |||
5-16 | |||
LGS FPER O e. Instrument racks 10C075, 10C076, and 10C078 (RHR pumps "A", "B", and "D" discharge pressure) | |||
: f. Core spray pump 1BP206 | |||
: g. Core spray pump discharge pressure transmitters (PT-52-1N055C&G) | |||
: h. RHR flow transmitters (FT-51-1N015B,C&D and FT-51-1N052B,C&D) | |||
: 1. HPCI instrumentation | |||
: j. HPCI leakage detection system | |||
: k. RCIC instrumentation | |||
: 1. RCIC leakage detection system | |||
: m. Diesel-generator ID (2) Rigid steel conduit containing cables associated with power supply from Unit 1 Class IE instrument ac panel 10Y102 (Div. 2) to the following components: | |||
: a. RHR and coro spray vertical board 10C601 | |||
: b. RHR and core spray relay board 10C618 | |||
: c. HPCI vertical board 10C647 | |||
: d. HPCI relay board 10C620 | |||
: e. ESW and RHRSW vertical board OBC 667 | |||
: f. Spray pond pump structure HVAC control panel OBC 564 | |||
: g. MSIV leakage control system relay board 10C644 | |||
: h. SGTS area HVAC control panel 00C124 (3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following Unit 2 components: | |||
O a. Class IE instrument ac transformers 20X106 (Div. 1) and 20X108 (Div. 3) | |||
: b. Class IE load center transformers 20X201 (Div. 1), | |||
20X202 (Div. 2), and 20X203 (Div. 3) | |||
: c. Instrument rack 20C001 (core spray loop "A") | |||
: d. Instrument rack 20C018 (RHR loop "A" and RHRSW loop "A") | |||
: e. Instrument racks 20C075, 20C076, 20C077, and 20C078 (RHR pumps "A", "B", "C", and "D" discharge pressure) | |||
: f. Core spray pump 2BP206 | |||
: g. RCIC instrumentation | |||
: h. RCIC leakage detection system | |||
: 1. HPCI leakage detection system | |||
: j. Diesel-generator 2D (4) Rigid _ steel conduit containing cables associated with power supply from Unit 2 Class IE instrument ac panel 20Y102 (Div. 2) to the following components: | |||
: a. RHR and core spray vertical board 20C601 | |||
: b. RHR and core spray relay board 20C618 | |||
: c. HPCI vertical board 20C647 | |||
: d. HPCI relay board 20C620 | |||
: e. ESW and RHRSW vertical board OBC 677 | |||
: f. MSIV leakage control system relay board 20C644 (5) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with O the following common components: | |||
5-17 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: a. Control structure chilled water loop "A" components (water chiller 0AK112, chiller oil pump OAP168, chilled water circulation pump OAP162, and instrumentation) | |||
: b. Control structure battery room HVAC exhaust dampers | |||
: c. Emergency switchgear and battery room HVAC system components (fan cabinet OBV118, plus inlet and outlet dampers for fan cabinets 0AV118 and OBV118) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Unit 1 systems | |||
: a. Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B202 (Div. 2) | |||
: b. Loss of Class IE ac powet* supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y101 (Div. 1) and 10Y103 (Div. 3) | |||
: c. Loss of RCIC system | |||
: d. Loss of HPCI system | |||
: e. Loss of core spray injection capability through loops "A" and "B" | |||
: f. Loss of capability to use steam condensing mode of RHR loop "A" | |||
: g. Loss of RHR loop "B" | |||
: h. Loss of diesel-generator ID (2) Unit 2 systems | |||
: a. Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 20B201 (Div. 1) and 20B202 (Div. 2) | |||
: 6. Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 20Y101 (Div. 1) and 20Y103 (Div. 3) | |||
: c. Loss of RCIC system | |||
: d. Loss of HPCI system | |||
: e. Loss of core spray injection capability through loops "A" and "B" | |||
: f. Loss of capability to use steam condensing mode of RHR loop "A" | |||
: g. Loss of RHR loop "B" | |||
: h. Loss of diesel-generator 2D O | |||
5-18 | |||
LGS FPER O (3) Common systems | |||
: a. Loss of ESW loop "B" | |||
: b. Loss of RHRSW loop "B" | |||
: c. Loss of spray pond pump structure ventilation using fan cabinet OBV543 | |||
: d. Loss of control structure water chiller 0AK112 | |||
: e. Loss of ventilation to the 4-kV switchgear compartments, Class IE battery rooms, and static inverter compartments (e) Consequencee of fire with active fire supperssion: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the 7 smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
~ | |||
This fire area contains cable trays, conduits, and gutters containing electrical cabling associated with shutdown | |||
((_,')s methods A and B for Units 1 and 2. All portions of raceways located within this fire area which are associated with shutdown methods A or B will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting safe shutdown capability. | |||
This supplementary fire protection ensures that both of the shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire. | |||
Loss of ventilat. ion for the control structure areas listed in (3)e above coulC result in a long-term temperature increase in those areas, depending on the heat loads in the various compartments. In order to prevent temperatures from becoming excessive if the normal ventilation cannot be re-established in those areas, portable fans will be provided for use in maintaining airflow through the affected compartments. | |||
5.3.8 Fire Area 8: Unit 1 Class IE Battery Room (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area | |||
) (see Figure B-7): | |||
l 5-19 1 | |||
L | |||
LGS FPER Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Door connecting to area 9 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to 3 hr** | |||
area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE batteries 1B1D101 and 1B2D101 (Div. 2) | |||
(2) Battery chargers 1B1D103 and 1B2D103 (3) Fuse box IBD105 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Control structure battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system OAV124/OBV124) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator 1B and the Div. 2 4-kV switchgear (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by motor control centers 10D202 and 10D203 and power distribution panel 1BD102 (all Div. 2) | |||
(3) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans l l | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
1 5-20 l | |||
LGS FPER O (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. | |||
In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 1 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. | |||
5.3.9 Fire Area 9: Unit 1 Class IE Battery Room (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area ' | |||
(see Figure B-7): | |||
[} | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 3 hr and 8 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE batteries 1 AID 101 and 1A2D101 (Div. 1) | |||
(2) Battery chargers 1A1D103 and 1A2D103 (3) Fuse box 1AD105 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire, o | |||
5-21 | |||
LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based O | |||
on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator 1A and the Div. 1 4-kV switchgear (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by motor control center 10D201 (Div. 1) and power distribution panel 1AD102 (Div. 1) | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors which will cause an audible-visual l I | |||
annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 anwn. | |||
5.3.10 Fire Area 10: Unit 2 Class IE Battery Room (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr l E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr 5-22 | |||
l LGS FPER Access: Door connecting to area 11 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to 3 hr** | |||
area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE batteries 2B1D101 and 2B2D101 (Div. 2) | |||
(2) Battery chargers 2B1D103 and 2B2D103 (3) ruse box 2BD105 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Control structure battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system OAV124/OBV124) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in areas Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator 2B and the Div. 2 4-kV switchgear O (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by motor control centers 20D202 and 20D203 and power distribution panel 2BD102 (all Div. 2) | |||
(3) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. | |||
/r With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling | |||
( associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire 5-23 | |||
LGS FPER area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. | |||
5.3.11 Fire A'ea r 11: Unit 2 Class IE Battery Room (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 10 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE batteries 2A1D101 and 2A2D101 (Div. 1) | |||
(2) Battery chargers 2 AID 103 and 2A2D103 (3) Fuse box 2AD105 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator 2A and the Div. 1 4-kV switchgear (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by motor control center 20D201 (Div. 1) and power distribution panel 2AD102 (Div 1) | |||
O 5-24 | |||
LGS FPER O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the l control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
5.3.12 Fire Area 12: Unit 1 4-kV Switchgear Compartment Os (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Ratino l | |||
Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr l | |||
E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Door connecting to area 13 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to 3 hr** | |||
area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 10A117 (Div. 3) | |||
(2) Class IE de distribution panel 1CD102 (Div. 3) | |||
(3) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 10Y103 O (Div. 3) 5-25 | |||
- - - - - - ~, - - > | |||
LGS FPER (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with O | |||
the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC leakage detection system | |||
: b. Instrument rack 10C001 (core spray loop "A") | |||
: c. Instrument rack 10C018 (RHR loop "A" and RHRSW loop "A") | |||
: d. Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure) | |||
: e. ESW pump OAP548 | |||
: f. RHRSW loop "A" components (pump OAP506 and valves HV-12-017A and HV-12-034A) | |||
: g. Spray pond pump structure HVAC system components (fan cabinet OAV543, heating coil OAE701, and instrument ac power to control panel OAC564) | |||
: h. Unit 1 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system OAV124/OBV124) | |||
(5) Rigid steel conduit containing cables ascociated with power supply from Class IE dc distribution panel 1AD102 (Div. 1) to the following components: | |||
: a. RHR and core spray vertical board 10C601 | |||
: b. RHR and core spray relay board 10C617 | |||
: c. RCIC relay board 10C621 | |||
: d. ADS relay board 10C628 | |||
: e. RCIC vertical board 10C648 | |||
: f. RPS channel "A" vertical board 10C609 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed i | |||
, in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely l unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the I cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based ot: the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Unit 1 systems | |||
: a. Loss of 4-kV switchgear 10A117 (Div. 3) | |||
: b. Loss of Class IE de power supplied by de distribution panel 1CD102 (Div. 3) ! | |||
: c. Loss of Class IE'ac power supplied by instrument ac l distribution panel 10Y103 (Div. 3) l | |||
: d. Loss of RCIC system ' | |||
: e. Loss of RHR loop "A" | |||
: f. Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" | |||
: g. Loss of ADS valves (2) Common systems | |||
: a. Loss of ESW pump OAP548 | |||
: b. Loss of RHRSW pump OAP506 5-26 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
(~' | |||
N)' | |||
: c. Loss of spray pond pump structure fan cabinet OAV543 and associated components | |||
: d. Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 1, no equipment or cabling associated C) with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, with the exception of the electrical power supply to the ADS valves. | |||
The components / cabling involved in the power supply to the ADS valves are de distribution panel 1CD102 (Div. 3) and electrical cabling associated with de distribution panel 1ADIO2 (Div. 1). Power from either one of these two dc distribution panels is sufficient to operate the ADS valves. | |||
All portions of the raceways within this fire area that are associated with the power supply from panel 1AD102 to the ADS valves will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting shutdown method A. | |||
This supplementary fire protection ensures that shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. | |||
In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the i ductwork leading from the Unit 1 battery rooms to the battery 1 room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and , | |||
battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action I | |||
/'' will ensure the centinued ventilation of the battery rooms. | |||
V) 5-27 | |||
LGS FPER 5.3.13 Fire Area 13: Unit 1 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 12 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 10A115 (Div. 1) | |||
(2) Class IE dc distribution panel 1AD102 (Div. 1) | |||
(3) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 10Y101 (Div. 1) | |||
(4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Class IE load center transformer 10X203 (Div. 3) | |||
: b. Class IE instrument ac panel 10Y103 (Div. 3) | |||
: c. Control structure chilled water system components (water chiller OAK 112, chiller oil pump OAP162, chilled water circulation pump OAP168, and the Div. 3 instrument ac power supply to control panel 00C562) | |||
: d. Unit 1 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system OAV124/OBV124) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 10A115 (Div. 1) | |||
(2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by de distribution panel 1AD102 (Div. 1) 5-28 | |||
l LGS FPER | |||
. O (3) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 10B203 (Div. 3) | |||
(4) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y101 (Div. 1) and 10Y103 (Div. 3) | |||
(5) Loss of control structure water chiller OAK 112 and associated components (6) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual ~ | |||
annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described O- in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
! With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling asosociated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 1 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. | |||
5.3.14 Fire Area 14: Unit 1 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
O 5-29 | |||
LGS FPER Construction Rating O | |||
Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Door connecting to area 15 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to area 113 3 hr** | |||
(b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 10A118 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 10Y104 (Div. 4) | |||
(3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Unit 1 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system 0AV124/0BV124) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 10A118 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 10Y104 (Div. 4) | |||
(3) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
5-30 | |||
LGS FPER (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on.the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. .e. , _ | |||
With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain avilable to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 1 or 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAVi18 and OBV118). | |||
This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. | |||
5.3.15 Fire Area 15: Unit 1 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") | |||
() (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr. | |||
l l Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
l Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 14 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 10A116 (Div. 2) | |||
(2) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 10Y102 (Div. 2) | |||
(3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Class IE load center transformer 10X204 (Div. 4) | |||
: b. Unit I and 2 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan systems 0AV124/0BV124 and | |||
(, OAV118/0BV118) 5-31 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: c. Inlet and outlet dampers associated with emergency O | |||
switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 10A116 (Div. 2) | |||
(2) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 10Y102 (Div. 2) | |||
(3) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 10B204 (Div. 4) | |||
(4) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (5) Loss of ventilation for 4-kV switchgear compartments, Class IE battery rooms, and static inverter compartments (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
Loss of ventilation for the control structure areas listed in (d)5 above could result in a long-term temperature increase in those areas, depending on the heat loads in the various 5-32 | |||
LGS FPER O compartments. In order to prevent temperatures from becoming ; | |||
excessive if the normal ventilation cannot be re-established ) | |||
in those areas, portable fans will be provided for use in maintaining airflow through the affected compartments. | |||
5.3.16 Fire Area 16: Unit 2 4-kV Switchgear Compartment 1 (El. 239'-0") | |||
1 (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr I Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr l | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 17 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to area 113 3 hr** l | |||
(} | |||
(b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 20A118 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 20Y104 , | |||
(Div. 4) l (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components | |||
?.vcated in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 20A118 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 20Y104 (Div. 4) | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the | |||
,/ | |||
smoke detectors, which will cause an airdible-visual s | |||
annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the 5-33 | |||
LGS FPER control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 2. since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
5.3.17 Fire Area 17: Unit 2 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 16 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 20A116 (Div. 2) | |||
(2) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 20Y102 (Div. 2) | |||
(3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with Unit 2 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system 0AV124/0BV124) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely l | |||
5-34 | |||
i l | |||
LGS FPER O | |||
V unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 20A116 (Div. 2) | |||
(2) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 20Y102 (Div. 2) | |||
(3) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
() (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. | |||
5.3.18 Fire Area 18: Unit 2 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
O 5-35 | |||
LGS FPER Construction Rating O | |||
Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Door connecting to area 19 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to area 113 3 hr** | |||
(b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 20A117 (Div. 3) | |||
(2) Class IE de distribution panel 2CD102 (Div. 3) | |||
(3) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 20Y103 (Div. 3) | |||
(4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following Unit 2 components: | |||
: a. RCIC leakage detection system | |||
: b. Instrument rack 20C001 (core spray loop "A") | |||
: c. Instrument rack 20C018 (RHR loop "A" and RHRSW loop "A") | |||
: d. Instrument rack 20C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure) | |||
(5) Rigid steel conduit containing cables associated with power supply from Class IE de distribution panel 2AD102 (Div. 1) to the following components: | |||
: a. RHR and core spray vertical board 20C601 | |||
: b. RHR and core spray relay board 20C617 | |||
: c. RCIC relay board 20C621 | |||
: d. ADS relay board 20C628 | |||
: e. RCIC vertical board 20C648 | |||
: f. RPS channel "A" vertical board 20C609 (6) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following common components: | |||
: a. RHRSW pump OCP506 | |||
: b. Unit 2 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system 0AV124/OBV124) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
5-36 | |||
LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Unit 2 systems | |||
, a. Loss of 4-kV switchgear 20A117 (Div. 3) | |||
: b. Loss of Class IE de power supplied by de distribution panel 2CD102 (Div. 3) | |||
: c. Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 20Y103 (Div. 3) | |||
: d. Loss of RCIC system j e. Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" | |||
: f. Loss of RHR loop "A" (2) Common systems | |||
: a. Loss of RHRSW pump OCP506 | |||
: b. Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the | |||
/'') control room. Once the alarm has been received in the | |||
(_) control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in i (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. | |||
O 5-37 | |||
LGS FPER 5.3.19 Fire Area 19: Unit 2 4-kV Switchgear Compartment O | |||
(El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 18 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 20A115 (Div. 1) | |||
(2) Class IE de distribution panel 2AD102 (Div. 1) | |||
(3) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 20Y101 (Div. 1) | |||
(3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with I the following components: l | |||
: a. Class IE load center transformer 20X203 (Div. 3) | |||
: b. Class IE instrument ac panel 20Y103 (Div. 3) , | |||
: c. Unit 2 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers ' | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 20A115 (Div. 1) | |||
(2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by de distribution panel 2AD102 (Div. 1) | |||
(3) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac l distribution panel 20Y101 (Div. 1) l (4) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 20B203 (Div. 3) - | |||
(5) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 20Y103 (Div. 3) h 5-38 | |||
I l | |||
LGS FPER O (6) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection pahels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. | |||
With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire O area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. | |||
5.3.20 Fire Area 20: Unit 1 Static Inverter Compartment (El. 254'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 2 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr O | |||
1 Access: Two doors connecting to area 22 3 hr 5-39 | |||
LGS FPER (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) 125V de power distribution panels 1BD102 (Div. 2) and 1DD102 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 | |||
: b. Control structure chilled water loop "A" instrumentation (3) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC system valves (HV-49-1F026 and HV-50-1F005) | |||
: b. RHR loop "A" components (pump 1AP202 and instrumentation) | |||
: c. RHR loop "C" components (pump suction valve HV-51-1F004C and instrumentation) | |||
: d. Core spray loop "A" components (instrumentation and valves HV-52-1F031A and HV-52-1F001A&C) | |||
: e. RHRSW loop "A" components (pump OAP506 and valve HV-12-003A) | |||
: f. ESW loop "A" components (pump OAP548 and valves HV-11-015A, HV-11-041, HV-11-071, HV-11-121, and HV-11-123) | |||
: g. Standby liquid control system components (pump 1AP208 and outboard containment. isolation valve HV-48-1F006) | |||
: h. Containment hydrogen recombiner suction and discharge isolation valves (HV-57-161 and HV-57-162) | |||
: 1. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1A2V212,.1C1V212, 1C2V212, 1E1V212, 1E2V212, 1G1V212, and 1G2V212 | |||
: j. Drywell cooling water source select valves | |||
: k. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water containment isolation valves (HV-13-106 and HV-13-107) | |||
: 1. Diesel-generators 1A and 1C | |||
: m. Class IE load center transformers 10X201 (Div. 1) and 10X203 (Div. 3) | |||
: n. Instrument ac distribution panel 10Y201 (Div. 3) | |||
: o. Control structure water chiller OAK 112 | |||
: p. SGTS exhaust fan OAV109 | |||
: q. Control room return air fan OAV121 and associated inlet and outlet dampers (HD-78-059A&B and HD-78-060A&B) | |||
: r. Control room emergency fresh air supply system components (fan OAV127, duct heater OAE191, and dampers HD-78-002A and HD-78-009A) | |||
: s. Control structure HVAC system dampers (HD-78-018, HD-7B-019, and HD-78-056) | |||
(4) Cable trays containing cables associated with the power supply from Class IE instrument ac panel 10Y101 (Div. 1) to the following components: | |||
5-40 | |||
LGS FPER O a. RHR and core spray vertical board 10C601 | |||
: b. RHR and core spray relay board 10C617 | |||
: c. RCIC relay board 10C621 | |||
: d. RPS channel "A" vertical board 10C609 | |||
: e. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panel 1AC563 l | |||
: f. MSIV leakage control system relay board 10C645 l | |||
: g. Drywell unit cooler control panel 10C234 l | |||
: h. SGTS area HVAC control panel 00C124 l | |||
: i. Reactor enclosure recirculation system control- i panel 10C207 l (5) Cable trays containing cables associated with the power i supply from Class IE instrument ac panel 10Y103 (Div. 3) l to the following components: | |||
l a. RHR and core spray relay board 10C640 | |||
: b. Control structure HVAC control panel 00C101 i | |||
: c. Unit cooler control panel 1CC208 l | |||
: d. SGTS area HVAC control panel 00C124 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
; (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based | |||
! on the assumption that damage occurs to all components . | |||
located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
; (1) Reactor trip (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by distribution panels 1BD102 (Div. 2) and 1DD102 (Div. 4) | |||
(3) Loss of 4-kV switchgear in Divisions 2 and 4 | |||
: (4) Loss of diesel-generators 1A and 1C | |||
! (5) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B203 (Div. 3) | |||
(6) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 10Y201 (Div. 3) | |||
(7) Loss of RCIC system (8) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (9) Loss of RHR loop "A" (10) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump "C" (11) Loss of RHRSW loop "A" (12) Loss of ESW loop "A" ' | |||
(13) Loss of standby liquid control system (14) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 (15) Loss of drywell unit coolers 1AV212, 1CV212, 1EV212, and 1GV212 (16) Loss of cooling water to all drywell unit coolers (17) Loss of cooling water to reactor recirculation pumps O (18) Loss of the outboard portion of the MSIV leakage control system 5-41 | |||
LGS FPER (19) Loss of control structure water chiller OAK 112 (20) Loss of SGTS exhaust fan OAV109 (21) Loss of ventilation for the control room, auxiliary equipment room, and control structure fan room (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
This fire area contains two de distribution panels that are associated with shutdown method B, as well as several raceways containing electrical cabling associated with shutdown method A. All portions of the raceways within this fire area that are associated with shutdown method A.will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. | |||
This blanket will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting shutdown method A. | |||
This supplementary fire protection ensures that shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.3.21 Fire Area 21: Unit 2 Static Inverter Compartment (El. 254'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two doors connecting to area 23 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to area 113 3 hr** | |||
5-42 | |||
LGS FPER O (b) Major safciy-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) 125V de power distribution panels 2BD102 (Div. 2) and 2DD102 (Div. 4) | |||
(2) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Containment hydrogen recombiner 2BS403 | |||
: b. Control structure chilled water loop "B"' | |||
instrumentation (3) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "D" components (pump 2DP202 and instrumentation) | |||
: b. Core spray loop "B" components (instrumentation and valve HV-52-2F001D) | |||
: c. RHRSW loop "B" components (pump ODP506 and valve HV-12-003D) | |||
: d. ESW loop "B" components (pump ODP548 and valves) | |||
: e. Containment hydrogen recombiner suction and discharge isolation valves (HV-57-263 and HV-57-264) | |||
: f. Drywell unit cooler fans 2B2V212, 2D2V212, 2F2V212, and 2H2V212 | |||
: g. Diesel-generator 2D | |||
() h. Class IE load center transformer 20X204 (Div. 4) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based I on the assumption that damage occurs to all components l located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Reactor trip l | |||
(2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by distribution panels 2DB102 (Div. 2) and 2DD102 (Div. 4) | |||
(3) Loss of 4-kV switchgear in Divisions 2 and 4 (4) Loss of diesel-generator 2D (5) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 20B204 (Div. 4) | |||
(6) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "B" (7) Loss of RHRSW loop "B" i (8) Loss of ESW loop "B" (9) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 2BS403 (10) Loss of control structure chilled water pump OBP162 1 | |||
: O I | |||
5-43 | |||
LGS FPER (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
O The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
5.3.22 Fire Area 22: Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room (El. 254'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit (part) 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two doors connecting to area 20 3 hr ! | |||
Doors connecting to area 23 3 hr and stairwell no. 7 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: l l | |||
(1) Cabling for Div. 1, 2, 3, and 4 safeguard equipment (in cable tray, gutter, and conduit) | |||
(2) Cabling for Div. A1, A2, B1, and B2 of the reactor , | |||
protection system (in cable tray) l 5-44 | |||
LGS FPER O (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed i in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire-without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components i | |||
located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
l l | |||
The loss of all electrical cabling in this area would render l | |||
all Unit 1 systems inoperable from the control room. | |||
i (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. In the event that a postulated fire is not controlled by fire brigade response, heat detectors will actuate discharge of the automatic, total-flooding CO, system. HVAC system penetrations into the area will be s/ sealed off by steam isolation dampers which close l | |||
automatically when the CO, system is actuated. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area would have no effect on Unit 2, with the exception of common systems that are shared between Units 1 ' | |||
and 2. Shutdown methods A and B (as described in Section 5.2.2) would both remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
As noted in (d) above, a fire in this area would interfere with the control of Unit 1 systems from the control room. | |||
However, such a fire would not affect the remote shutdown panels, since cables associated with the remote shutdown panels are not routed through the cable spreading room. The remote shutdown panels (described in Section 5.2.3) provide controls for sufficient systems to enable the operator to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
As additional protection agcinst the effects of a postulated fire, all portions of raceways located within this fire area which are associated with shutdown methods A or B will be | |||
() covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. | |||
This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent fire 5-45 | |||
r LGS FPER barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will O | |||
not result in cable damage affecting the systems used for shutdown methods A or B. | |||
5.3.23 Fire Area 23: Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room (El. 254'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Ratino Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two doors connecting to area 21 3 hr l Door connecting to area 23 3 hr i (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Cabling for Div. 1, 2, 3, and 4 safeguard equipment (in cable tray, gutter, and conduit) | |||
(2) Cabling for Div. A1, A2, B1, and B2 of the reactor protection system (in cable tray) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
'd) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
The loss of all electrical cabling in this area would render all Unit 2 systems inoperable from the control room. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smcke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to 5-46 | |||
~ | |||
LGS FPER O | |||
U extinguish the fire. In the event that a postulated fire is not controlled by fire brigade response, heat detectors will actuate discharge of the automatic, total-flooding CO, system. HVAC system penetrations into the area will be sealed off by steam isolation dampers which close automatically when the CO, system is actuated. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area would have no effect on Unit 1, with the exception of common systems that are shared between Units 1 and 2. Shutdown methods A and B (as described in Section 5.2.2) would both remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. | |||
As noted in (d) above, a fire in this area would interfere with the control of Unit 2 systems from the control room. | |||
However, such a fire would not affect the remote shutdown panels, since cables associated with the remote shutdown panels are not routed through the cable spreading room. The remote shutdown panels (described in Section 5.2.3) provide controls and instrumentation for sufficient sytems to enable | |||
() the operator to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
As additional protection against the effects of a postulated fire, all portions of raceways located within this fire area which are associated with shutdown methods A or B will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. | |||
This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting the systems used for shutdown methods A or B. | |||
5.3.24 Fire Area 24: Control Room and Peripheral Rooms (El. 269'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8): | |||
Construction Ratina. | |||
Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell No. 7) | |||
N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr O adjacent to stairwell no. 7) 5-47 | |||
LGS FPER Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** | |||
area 114 (b) Safety-related components in fire area: | |||
Safety-related control panels as listed below are located in the control room. | |||
Unit 1 Panels 10C601 Residual heat removal (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
Core spray (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
MSIVs (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
Reactor pressure and level (Div. 1 & 2) | |||
Containment atmospheric control system (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 10C602 Reactor water cleanup (Div. 1& 2) | |||
Reactor recirculation system Reactor head vent valves Drywell floor and equipment drain sumps 10C603 Reactor control (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 10C614 NSSS temperature recorder and leak detection 10C626 Automatic depressurization system (Div. 1 & 3) | |||
MSIV leakage control (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
Containment combustible gas analyzer (Div. 3 & 4) , | |||
10C647 HPCI (Div. 2 & 4) 10C648 RCIC (Div. 1 & 3) 10C651 Feedwater, condensate, and turbine (Div. 1, 2. 3) 10C668 Feedwater (Div. 1) 10C669 Condensate (Div. 1) 10C681 Reactor enclosure HVAC (Div. 1 & 2) | |||
Control structure HVAC (Div. 1& 2) | |||
Spray pond pump structure HVAC (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 1AC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 1) h 5-48 | |||
r LGS FPER O IBC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 2) l l | |||
ICC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 3) 1DC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 4) 1AC696 Containment hydrogen recombiner package "A" (Div. 1) j 1BC696 Containment hydrogen recombiner package "B" (Div. 2) l Unit 2 Panels i | |||
20C601 Residual heat removal (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
Core spray (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
MSIVs (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
Reactor pressure and level (Div. 1 & 2) | |||
Containment atmospheric control system (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 20C602 Reactor water cleanup (Div. 1& 2) | |||
Reactor recirculation system Reactor head vent valves | |||
() 20C603 Drywell floor and equipment drain sumps Reactor control (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
:o 20C614 NSSS temperature recorder and leak detection 20C626 Automatic depressurization system (Div. 1& 3) | |||
MSIV leakage control (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) | |||
Containment combustible gas analyzer (Div. 3& 4) 20C647 HPCI (Div. 2& 4) 20C648 RCIC (Div. 1 & 3) 20C651 Feedwater, condensate, and turbine (Div. 1, 2, 3) 20C668 Feedwater (Div. 1) 20C669 Condensate (Div. 1) 20C681 Reactor enclosure HVAC (Div. 1& 2) | |||
Control structure HVAC (Div. 1 & 2) | |||
Spray pond pump structure HVAC (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 2AC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 1) 2BC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 2) 5-49 i | |||
LGS FPER 2CC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 3) | |||
O 2DC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 4) 2AC696 Containment hydrogen recombiner package "A" (Div. 1) 2BC696 Containment hydrogen recombiner packagd "B" (Div. 2) | |||
Common Panels CAC667 ESW and RHRSW (Div. 1) | |||
OBC 667 ESW and RHRSW (Div. 2) | |||
OCC667 ESW and RHRSW (Div. 3) | |||
ODC667 ESW and RHRSW (Div. 4) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray, gutter, or control panels. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
l The raceways and control panels in the control room have been designed to incorporate divisional separation in order to maintain the independence of redundant divisions of safety-related cables and electrical devices. Considering the absence of combustibles which could contribute to an exposure fire in this area, the separation is adequate to prevent a fire in one division of cabling from propagating and affecting a redundant division. Spurious actuation or shutdown of equipment may occur in the division in which the fire originates. Faulty. indications and annunciations may also occur in the affected division. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. The operator will then bring the plant fire brigade to manually extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
O 5-50 | |||
LGS FPER Q | |||
V (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area could affect either of the reactor units or, if common systems are involved, both units. However, since divisional separation of raceways and in-panel wiring will limit the fire to one division of cabling, no more than one of the two shutdown methods (methods A and B as described in Section 5.2.2) would be disabled. The other shQtdown method will remain ava,ilable to bring both reactor units to safe shutdown. | |||
In the event that the control room beccmes uninhabitable due to the effects of a fire, the operator can use the remote shutdown panels to adequately control the plant. In order to prevent a fire in the control room from adversely affecting the operability of the remote shutdown panels, the cables associated with these panels are not routed through the control room. The remote shutdown panels (described in Section 5.2.3) provide controls and instrumentation for sufficient systems to enable the operator to bring both reactor units to safe shutdown. | |||
5.3.25 Fire Area 25: Auxiliary Equipment Room (El. 289'-0") | |||
O (a) S uctural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) | |||
N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 7 Steamtight door connecting to area 3 hr** | |||
111 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
The safety-related components located in the auxiliary l 5 equipment room consist mainly of the power generation control complexes (PGCC) for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The PGCC for each l | |||
5-51 | |||
LGS FPER unit consists of vertical boards mounted on raised floor sections, with a termination cabinet located at one end of each floor section. The safety-related portions of the PGCC are identified in the following listing. The listing applies specifically to Unit 1, but the Unit 2 PGCC is identical. | |||
Floor Sect. & | |||
Term. Cabinet Vertical Board 10U791 & 10C617 RHR and core spray (Div. 1) 10C791 10C640 RHR and core spray (Div. 3) 10C621 RCIC 10C628 ADS (Div. 1) 10C631 ADS (Div. 3) 10U792 & 10C618 RHR and core spray (Div. 2) 10C792 10C641 RHR and core spray (Div. 4) 10C620 HPCI 10C613 Process instrumentation 10C644 MSIV leakage control system (Div. 2) 10U787 & 10C645 MSIV leakage control system (Div. 1) 10C787 10C608 Power range neutron monitoring 10U788 & 10C623 Outboard containment isolation ' | |||
10C788 valves j l | |||
Startup range neutron monitoring "A" 100789 & 10C606 10C787 10C609 RPS channel A 100790 & 10C633 Startup range neutron monitoring "B" 10C790 10C611 RPS channel B 10U793 & 10C622 Inboard containment isolation valves 10C793 10C612 Feedwater and reactor recirculation . | |||
instrumentation ! | |||
Also located in the auxiliary equipment room are the remote shutdown panels (10C201 and 20C201), which are not specifically associated with the PGCC. | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray, termination l cabinets, raised flooring, or vertical boards. (As discussed l in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely l unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
O I | |||
5-52 i | |||
LGS FPER O (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
The raceways, raised flooring, termination cabinets, and vertical boards in the auxiliary equipment room have been designed to incorporate divisional separation in order to maintain the independence of redundant divisions of safety-related cables and electrical devices. The only fire potential in this area is ignition of cable insulation due to electrical faulting. Since the majority of the cables in the area involve low voltage instrument and control circuits, overload protection is provided, and cable insulation is flame retardant, this potential source of fire is minimal. | |||
Particular attention has been given to minimizing the potential for fire and maximizing divisional separation in the power generation control complex (PGCC) and associated facilities. The PGCC and the computer facilities, both of which are located in the auxiliary equipment room, utilize raised flooring approximately 1 foot high. The raised flooring is divided into sections typically 8 feet wide and approximately 20 feet long; PGCC panels or computer equipment are mounted near the center of each floor section. The floor sections are of all-steel construction and are each divided into four longitudinal raceways and numerous lateral , | |||
raceways, each of whi'ch is totally enclosed and therefore O physically isolated from adjacent raceways. To minimize the possibility of occurrence of a fire, the cabling routed in , | |||
these raceways is provided with flame retardant insulation, and no other combustible material exists in the floor sections. In addition, the routing of power cabling through the floor section raceways is minimized; power cabling which cannot be eliminated from these raceways is routed in conduit or as armored cable. To prevent the spread of a postulated . | |||
fire between different divisions of raceways within a floor section or between adjacent floor sections, fire stops are provided at the ends of the longitudinal raceways, at the , | |||
! ends of those lateral raceways which do not have end caps, in the lateral raceways where cables run from a longitudinal to a lateral raceway, and at the raceway openings at the bottom of the vertical panels. These fire stops consist of l refractory material covered by silicone rubber. | |||
! The General Electric Company licensing topical report NEDO- | |||
; 10466-A, " Power Generation Control Complex Design Criteria and Safety Evaluation" (February 1979), describes the design | |||
! concepts for the construction of the PGCC components, their arrangement within the PGCC, and the routing of interpanel cabling. The report includes typical plant configurations which are conceptually applicable to the Limerick Generating Station. Additionally, a safety evaluation is provided which addresses NRC and industry safety guidelines and demonstrates / | |||
design compliance. | |||
5-53 l 4 | |||
- . - . - . , - - . , _ - - - ,_. - _ - - . - . - , ~ , _ . _ _ . - - . , - | |||
LGS FPER Considering the absence of combustibles which could contribute to an exposure fire in this area, the separation is adequate to prevent a fire in one division of cabling from propagating and affecting a redundant division. Spurious actuation or shutdown of equipment may occur in the division in which the fire originates. ' Faulty indications and annunciations may also occur in the affected division. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Smoke detectors are located inside each of the termination cabinets and floor sections in the auxiliary equipment room to provide early warning cf fires originating in these components. Additional fire detectors are located in the general area of the auxiliary equipment room, near the ceiling, to provide early warning of fires originating outside the termination cabinets and floor sections. | |||
Activation of any of the above smoke detectors will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received fa che control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. In the event that a fire in the floor sections is not extinguished by fire brigade response, heat detectors in the floor sections will activate the Halon extinguishing system. The Halon system is described in Section 2.9. | |||
Depending on the severity and rate of spread of a postulated fire, loss of the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area could affect either of the reactor units or, if common systems are involved, both units. However, since divisional separation of raceways and in-panel wiring will limit the fire to one division of cabling, no more than one of the two shutdown methods (methods A and 3 as described in Section 5.2.2) would be disabled. The other shutdown method will remain available to bring both reactor units to sale shutdown. | |||
5.3.26 Fire Area 27: Control Structure Fan Room (El. 304'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): | |||
O 5-54 | |||
LGS FPER O Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell noc. 7 and 8) | |||
N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 8) | |||
E- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 7 and 8 Two steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** | |||
area 99 Steamtight door connecting to area 112 3 hr** | |||
(b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y163 (Div. 3), which serves the following components: - | |||
: a. Diesel-generator enclosure HVAC control panel ICC563 | |||
: b. Unit cooler control panel 1CC208 | |||
: c. Control structure HVAC local panel 0AC101 | |||
: d. SGTS control panel OCC124 | |||
: e. Containment combustible gas analyzer package 10S206 | |||
: f. ESW control valve XC-11-053A (for control structure chiller "A") | |||
: g. Control structure chilled water control valves XC-90-042A, XC-90-043A, and XC-90-044A (2)* HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y164 (Div. 4), which serves the following components: | |||
: a. Diesel-generator enclosure HVAC control panel 1DC563 | |||
: b. Unit cooler control panel 1DC208 | |||
: c. Control structure HVAC local panel OBC 101 | |||
: d. SGTS control panel OCC124 | |||
: e. Containment combustible gas analyzer 10S205 | |||
: f. ESW control valve XC-11-053B (for control structure chiller "B" | |||
: g. Control structure chilled water control valves XC-90-042B, XC-90-043B, and XC-90-044B (3) Motor control center 00B131 (Div. 3), which serves the C' following components: | |||
: a. HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y163 5-55 l | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: b. Control room emergency supply air fan (OAV127) and intake heater (OAE191) . | |||
I c. Control room emergency air intake isolation valve l HV-78-020C | |||
: d. Control room air supply fan cabinet (OAV116) and heater (OAE192) e Control room return air fan OAV121 | |||
'. Auxiliary equipment room supply air fan cabinet (OAV114) and heater (0AE193) , | |||
: g. Auxiliary equipment room return air fan 0AV120 | |||
: h. Emergency switchgear and battery room supply air fan cabinet 0AV118 | |||
: i. Control structure chilled water pump (OAP162), oil pump (0AP168), pumpout compressor (OAK 114) | |||
(4) *dotor control center 00B132 (Div. 4), which serves the following components: | |||
: a. HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y164 | |||
: b. Control room emergency supply air fan (0BV127) and intake heater (0BE191) | |||
: c. Control room emergency air intake isolation valve HV-78-020D | |||
: d. Control room air supply fan cabinet (0BV116) and heater (0BE192) | |||
: e. Contorl room return air fan OBV121 | |||
: f. Auxiliary equipment room supply air fan cabinet (0BV114) and heater (OBE193) | |||
: g. Auxiliary equipment room return air fan OBV120 | |||
: h. Emergency switchgear and battery room supply air fan cabinet OBV118 | |||
: 1. Control structure chilled water pump (0BP162), oil pump (0BP168), and pumpout compressor (0BK114) | |||
(5) Control structure HVAC local panels 0AC101, OBC 101, OCC101, and ODC101 (6) Auxiliary equipment room supply air fan cabinets OAV114 and OBV114 (7) Control room supply air fan cabinets OAV116 and OBV116 (8) Auxiliary equipment room return air fans OAV120 and OBV120 (9) Control room return air fans OAV121 and OBV121 (10) Control room emergency fresh air supply fans and filter trains OAV127 and OBV127 (11) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. SGTS exhaust fan OAV109 | |||
: b. SGTS inlet heater OAE188 | |||
: c. SGTS compartment unit cooler OAV140 | |||
: d. SGTS access area unit cooler OAV141 | |||
: e. Reactor enclosure HVAC valve HV-76-167 (c) Postulated fire in areat Ignition of charcoal filters. O 5-56 | |||
l l | |||
LGS FPER O (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of containment combustible gas analyzer packages 10S205 and 10S206 (2) Loss of unit coolers for core spray pumps "C" and "D" and RHR pumps "C" and "D", which may affect the long-term operability of those pumps (3) Loss of ventilation for diesel-generator cells 1C and ID (4) Loss of SGTS system (5) Loss of ventilation for the following areas in the control structure | |||
: a. Battery rooms | |||
: b. 4-kV switchgear compartments | |||
: c. Static inverter compartments | |||
: d. Control room | |||
: e. Auxiliary equipment room | |||
: f. Control structure fan room | |||
: g. SGTS access area | |||
: h. SGTS filter compartments (6) Loss of ventilation exhaust from refueling floor (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. In the event of a fire in one of the control room emergency fresh air filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a, water spray system inside the filter plenum. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. | |||
This fire area contains two ac distribution panels that are associated with shutdown methods A and B for Unit 1. The two | |||
() panels are separated by a distance of approximately 70 feet, 5-57 | |||
LGS FPER ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not affect O more than one of the panels. | |||
The cables associated with the ac distribution panels are generally routed on opposite sides of the control structure, in order to maximize the separation between the two redundant divisions. At the south side of the control structure, where the separation between the two divisions of cabling is at a minimum, the cables are routed within about 12 feet of each other. Those portions of the raceways containing these cables which are located within 20 feet of the redundant raceways will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting more than one of the shutdown methods. | |||
This supplementary fire protection ensures that at least one of the shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. | |||
Loss of ventilation for the control structure areas listed in (d)(5) above could result in a long-term temperature increase in those areas, depending on the heat loads in the various compartments. Design changes will be implemented as necessary to prevent excessive temperatures from occurring. | |||
5.3.27 Fire Area 28: SGTS Filter Compartments and Access Area (El. 332'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-10): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall, also contains louver openings) | |||
N- Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 7 and 8) | |||
E- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr . | |||
adjacent to stairwell no. 8) | |||
E- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reit: forced concrete 3 hr W- Reintu.ced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) | |||
~ | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (roof slab) 3 hr* | |||
5-58 | |||
LGS FPER Access: Two doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 7 Door connecting to stairwell no. 8 1.5 hr Steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** | |||
areas 46 and 69 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) SGTS filters Train A: OAF 169, OAF 170, OAF 183 Train B: OBF169, OBF170, OBF183 (2) SGTS exhaust fans OAV109 and OBV109 (3) SGTS compartment exhaust fans 0AV131 and OBV131 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables, associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Refueling floor air supply valves (HV-76-117 and HV-76-118) | |||
: b. RERS inlet valves (HV-76-151 and HV-76-152) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of charcoal filters. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based O on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of standby gas treatment system (2) Loss of ventilation for the SGTS compartments and SGTS access area (3) Loss of ventilation supply to refueling floor (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
In the event of a fire in one of the standby gas treatment system filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system ; | |||
inside the filter plenum. j (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: l Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5-59 | |||
e l | |||
l LGS FPER I | |||
i i l THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O | |||
O 5-60 | |||
LGS FPER O 5.4 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - UNIT I REACTOR ENCLOSURE 5.4.1 Fire Area 29: Suppression Chamber (El. 181'-11") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-4, B-5, and B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: All around - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (primary containment wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (diaphragm None slab) | |||
Access: Two access hatches connecting to None area 44 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) | |||
O Primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies PSV-57-137A,B,C&D (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Since there are no combustible materials located in this area, no fire is postulated to occur. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
Not applicable (see item (c)). | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Not applicable (see item (c)). | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Not applicable (see item (c)). | |||
5.4.2 Fire Area 30: Drywell (El. 237'-11") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7, B-8, and B-9): | |||
O 5-61 | |||
1 LGS FPER Construction Rating O | |||
Walls: All around - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (primary containment wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (diaphragm None slab) | |||
Ceiling: Steel dome (drywell head) None Access: Equipment hatch connecting to None area 45 Equipment hatch with personnel None lock connecting to area 45 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Control rod drive mechanisms (total of 185) | |||
(2) Main steam isolation valves (inboard, one per steam line) | |||
(3) Main steam relief valves (total of 14) | |||
(4) Drywell unit coolers (total of 8) | |||
(5) Inboard containment isolation valves for HPCI steam supply line, RCIC steam supply line, RWCU letdown line, and RHR shutdown cooling suction line 1 g | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
(1) Leakage of lube oil from a recirculation pump motor onto the diaphragm slab, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(2) Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray or gutter. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
With two exceptions (cabling associated with the neutron monitoring system (NMS) and cabling associated with CRD position and temperature indication), electrical cabling in the drywell is routed in rigid steel conduit attached to either the drywell liner plate or to structural steel beams. The NMS and CRD cables terminate inside the RPV pedestal at the neutron monitoring assemblies and control rod drive mechanisms extending downward from the bottom head of the reactor vessel. The NMS and CRD cables are routed within the RPV pedestal in metal gutters. In the general drywell area outside the RPV pedestal, the NMS cables are routed in conduit whereas the CRD cables are routed in cable tray. Thus, the CRD cables are the only cables in the general drywell area that are not routed in conduit. Since the NMS and CRD cables are low-power instrumentation cables and are very 5-62 | |||
1 1 | |||
LGS FPER conservatively rated, no significant hazard of ignition ' | |||
of insulation and jacketing materials due to electrical ! | |||
faulting exists. In addition, the insulation and jacketing materials of these cables are fire-retardant so that burning cables will not propagate a flame and will self-extinguish once any source of ignition has been removed. Neither the NMS cables nor the CRD cables are needed for safe shutdown of the plant. | |||
Conduits containing cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B are not routed through the lower 17 feet of the drywell, with the exception of cabling to the inboard isolation valves for the HPCI and RCIC steam supply lines, which are located about 9 feet and 8 feet, respectively, above the diaphragm slab. Since the conduits containing cabling for the HPCI and RCIC steam supply line isolation valves are routed along the periphery of the drywell (attached to the liner plate), | |||
it is unlikely that this cabling would be affected by a fire involving lube oil leaked from one of the recirculation pump motors. Any leakage from these motors, rather than spreading across the diaphragm slab, would be collected by floor drains located beneath the recirculation pumps, and would drain into the drywell floor drain sump. The height above the diaphragm slab O' of conduits containing other cables associated with shutdown methods A or B precludes the possibility of damage to these cables from an oil fire. | |||
In summary, the limited quantities of combustible materials located within the drywell and the separation of safe shutdown conduits from each other and from the combustible materials ensures the availability of shutdown methods A and B in the event of a postulated fire in the drywell. | |||
The possibility of a fire in the drywell is limited to periods when the reactor is shut down. This is because the primary containment is inerted with nitrogen during reactor operation, so that the oxygen concentration is maintained below 5% by volume. This inert atmosphere will prevent fires from occurring in the primary containment. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in the drywell, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to El. 253 feet in the reactor enclosure. The fire brigade will enter the drywell through the O personnel airlock and will ensure extinguishment of the fire through the use of portable fire extinguishers or o | |||
5-63 | |||
LGS FPER hoses from hose reels located outside the entrances to the drywell. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
As discussed in item (d) above, a postulated fire in the drywell will not jeopardize the integrity of electrical cabling associated with either of the specified shutdown methods. Shutdown methods A and B (as described in Section 5.2.2) will both remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.3 Fire Area 31: Residual Heat Removal Compartment (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: NW - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) | |||
N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part 3 hr adjacent to area 75, part adjacent to unexcavated area) | |||
W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (ceiling contains None 115 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels leading to area 43) | |||
Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 32 and 39 Stear: tight doors (at El. 201 feet) 3 hr** | |||
connecting to areas 32 and 41 0 | |||
5-64 | |||
f LGS FPER O | |||
(b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) RHR pumps 1BP202 and IDP202 (2) RHR heat exchanger 1BE205 (3) RHR compartment unit coolers 1BV210, 1DV210, 1FV210, and 1HV210 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-044, HV-11-124, and HV-11-125) | |||
: b. HPCI compartment unit coolers | |||
: c. Containment hydrogen recombiner isolation valves (HV-57-163 and HV-57-164) | |||
: d. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water valves (HV-13-108, HV-13-109, HV-13-110, and HV-13-111) | |||
(5) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
l O | |||
O 5-64a | |||
LGS FPER O a. ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-044, HV-11-72, HV-11-073, HV-11-124, and HV-11-125) | |||
: b. HPCI valves (HV-55-1F028 and HV-56-1F025) | |||
: c. Containment hydrogen recombiner isolation valves (HV-57-163 and HV-57-164) | |||
: d. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water valves (HV-13-108, HV-13-109, HV-13-110, and HV-13-111) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from both RHR pump motors onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of RHR loop "B" (2) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump | |||
; "D" (3) Loss of HPCI compartment unit coolers, which may O (4) affect the long term availability of the HPCI system Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 (5) Loss of cooling water to both reactor recirculation pumps The existence of unrated metal panels in the ceiling of this fire area is acceptable because the low combustible loadings in the areas above and below the panels and the height of the panels above the floor (40 feet) preclude the possibility of fire propagating through the panels. | |||
Penetrations of piping and electrical raceway through the ceiling are provided with 3-hour rated seals. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
O 5-65 | |||
LGS FPER (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
O Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in , | |||
this fire area, this method will remain available to I safely shut the plant down. | |||
I 5.4.4 Fire Area 32: Residual Heat Removal Compartment (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr NW - Reinforced concrete 3 hr NE - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) | |||
E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part adjacent to area 75, part adjacent to unexcavated area) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (ceiling None contains 150 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels leading to area 43) | |||
Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 31 and 33 Steamtight doors (at El. 201 feet) 3 hr+c connecting to areas 31 and 42 (bi Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) RHR pumps IAP202 and 1CP202 (2) RHR heat exchanger 1AE205 (3) RHR compartment unit coolers 1AV210, 1CV210, 1EV210, and 1GV210 (4) Flow transmitters FT-11-011A, FT-11-011B, and FT-11-013A for ESW supply and return headers (5) ESW loop "A" valves (HV-11-041, HV-11-071, HV-11-121, and HV-11-123) | |||
(6) Rigid steel conduit containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC turbine exhaust containment isolation valve (HV-49-1F060) | |||
: b. Motor control center 10B217 5-66 | |||
LGS FPER O | |||
(7) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC turbine exhaust containment isolation | |||
! valve (HV-49-1F060) | |||
: b. Diesel-generator control board 1AC514 | |||
: c. Diesel-generator HVAC control panel 1AC563 | |||
: d. ESW supply and return valves for diesel-generator 1A (HV-11-131A, HV-11-132A, HV-11-133A, and HV-11-134A) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from both RHR pump motors onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(*) Loss of RHR loop "A" (2) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump | |||
,c, (3) | |||
O (4) | |||
(5) | |||
Loss of RCIC system Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (6) Loss of drywell unit cooler fans 1C2V212 and 1G2V212 (7) Loss of diesel-generator 1A The existence of unrated metal panels in the ceiling of this fire area is acceptable because the low combustible loadings in the areas above and below the panels and the height of the panels above the floor (40 feet) preclude the possibility of fire propagating through the panels. | |||
Penetrations of piping and electrical raceway through the ceiling are provided with 3-hour rated seals. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the i functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
5-67 | |||
1 LGS FPER (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
The ESW flow transmitters located in this area are part of a leak detection system and their loss will have no effect on the operability of the ESW system. Since no other equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safety shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.5 Fire Area 33: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Compartment (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
1 Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr NW - Reinforced concrete 3 hr NE - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) | |||
SE - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part 2 he adjacent to stairwell no. 3) | |||
S - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr exterior wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (ceiling None contains 25 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels leading to area 43) | |||
Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 32 and 34 Dcor connecting to stairwell no. 3 1.5 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) RCIC pump 10P203 (2) RCIC turbine 1GS212 (3) RCIC compartment unit coolers 1AV208 and 1BV208 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated l with the following components: | |||
l a. Instrument rack 10C018 (Div. 1 RHR and Div. 1 | |||
; RHRSW) | |||
: b. Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure) 5-68 | |||
LGS FPER O c. Instrument rack 10C077 (RHR pump "C" discharge pressure) | |||
: d. ESW loop "A" flow transmitters (FT-11-011A and FT-11-013A) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from RCIC turbine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of capability to use steam condensing mode of RHR loop "A" The existence of unrated metal panels in the ceiling of this fire area is acceptable because the low combustible loadings in the areas above and below the panels and the height of the panels above the floor (40 feet) preclude the possibility of fire propagating through the panels. | |||
('') | |||
\d Penetrations of piping and electrical raceway through the ceiling are provided with 3-hour rated seals. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke genereted by a fire in this area will activate l the smoke detet. ors, which will cause an audible-visual l | |||
annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the I pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. | |||
Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
O 5-69 | |||
l 1 | |||
LGS FPER 5.4.6 Fire Area 34: High Pressure Coolant Injection O | |||
Compartment (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) | |||
SE - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (ceiling None contains 160 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels leading to area 43) | |||
Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 33 and 40 (b) Major safety-related components in fire zone: | |||
(1) HPCI pump 10P204 (2) HPCI turbine 10S211 (3) HPCI compartment unit coolers 1AV209 and 1BV209 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from HPCI turbine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of HPCI system The existence of unrated metal panels in the ceiling of this fire area is acceptable because the low combustible loadings in the areas above and below the panels and the height of the panels above the floor (40 feet) preclude the possibility of fire propagating through the panels. | |||
Penetrations of piping and electrical raceway through the ceiling are provided with 3-hour rated seals. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: h 5-70 | |||
i LGS FPER The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of HPCI system operability may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.7 Fire Area 35: Core Spray Compartment (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) | |||
S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Watertight door connecting to area 40 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Core spray pump 1AP206 (2) Core spray compartment unit coolers 1AV211 and IEV211 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from core spray pump motor onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
5-71 | |||
l l 1 LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of core spray loop "A" operability may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.8 Fire Area 36: Core Spray Compartment (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr SE - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) | |||
S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Watertight door connecting to area 40 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Core spray pump 1CP206 (2) Core spray compartment unit coolers ICV 211 and 1GV211 5-72 | |||
LGS FPER (3) Junction box containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RHR pump 1CP202 | |||
: b. Instrument rack 10C077 (RHR pump "C" discharge pressure) l | |||
: c. RCIC leak detection temperature elements (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
l Leakage of lube oil from core spray pump motor onto the I floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (2) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump "C" (3) Loss of RCIC system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
l (f) Effect of 're on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.9 Fire Area 37: Core Spray Compartment (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
O 5-73 | |||
LGS FPER Construction Ratino Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr SW - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr l containment wall) l Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Watertight door connecting to area 39 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Core spray pump 1DP206 (2) Core spray compartment unit coolers 1DV211 and 1HV211 (3) Junction box containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RHR pump 1DP202 | |||
: b. HPCI leak detection system temperature elements (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from core spray pump motor onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent igniLion of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "B" (2) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump "D" (3) Loss of HPCI system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the l | |||
5-74 | |||
LGS FPER severity sad rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.10 Fire Area 38: Core Spray Compartment (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Watertight door connecting to area 39 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Core spray pump 1BP206 (2) Core spray compartment unit coolers 1BV211 and 1FV211 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from core spray pump motor onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed ' | |||
through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "B" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
5-75 | |||
LGS FPER The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke O | |||
detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of core spray loop "B" operability may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.11 Fire Area 39: Sump Room and Passageway (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 1) | |||
E - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr adjacent to unexcavated area) | |||
S - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr primary containment wall) | |||
W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 31, 37 and 38 Door connecting to stairwell no. 1 1.5 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Containment isolation valves (HV-52-127 and HV-52-128) for suppression pool cleanup pump suction line. | |||
(2) Instrument rack 10C076 (RHR pump "B" discharge pressure) | |||
(5) Instrument rack 10C078 (RHR pump "D" discharge pressure) 5-76 | |||
LGS FPER O (4) Junction box containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RHR pump 1BP202 | |||
: b. Core spray pump 1BP206 | |||
: c. HPCI leak detection system temperature elements | |||
: d. Instrument rack 10C014 (HPCI system) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray, (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all i components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
j (1) Loss of control of both containment isolation valves on the suppression pool cleanup pump suction | |||
! line i (2) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "B" iO (3) | |||
(4) | |||
Loss of RHR loop "B" Loss of HPCI system | |||
] (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received | |||
, in the control room, the plant fire brigade will~be i dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.12 Fire Area 40: Corridor (El. 177'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
5-77 | |||
LGS FPER Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4) | |||
N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 34, 35 and 36 Door connecting to stairwell no. 4 1.5 hr Elevator door 0.75 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) HPCI pump discharge flow transmitters (FT-55-1N008 and FT-55-1N051) | |||
(2) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RHR pump 1AP202 | |||
: b. Core spray pump 1AP206 | |||
: c. RCIC leak detection system temperature elements | |||
: d. RCIC system | |||
: e. Instrument rack 10C018 (Div. 1 RHR and Div. 1 RHRSW) | |||
: f. Instrument rack 10C077 (RHR pump "C" discharge pressure) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of HPCI system (2) Loss of RHR loop "A" (3) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" 5-78 | |||
i LGS FPER | |||
'O (4) Loss of RCIC system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
In order to prevent a fire in this area from affecting components associated with both of the specified shutdown methods, the junction boxes containing cables associated with components used for shutdown method A will be covered with a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
O 5.4.13 Fire Area 41: Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water Equipment Area (El. 201'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-5): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr i | |||
adjacent to stairwell no. 1) | |||
E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr | |||
, W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr | |||
! SW - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr | |||
! containment wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 1 Door connecting to area 31 3 hr l | |||
(b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
5-79 | |||
LGS FPER (1) Instrument rack 10C021 (Div. 2 RHR and Div. 2 RHRSW) | |||
(2) Suppression chamber pressure transmitter (PT-57-101) > | |||
(3) ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-044, HV-11-074, HV-11-124, HV-11-125, HV-11-126, HV-11-127 and HV-11-128) | |||
(4) HVAC unit cooler control panels 1BC208 and IDC208 (5) Motor control center 10B218, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "D" valves | |||
: b. RHR compartment unit coolers 1DV210 and 1HV210 | |||
: c. Core spray loop "B" valves | |||
: d. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1DV211 and 1HV211 | |||
: e. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068B) | |||
: f. Drywell unit cooler fans 1D2V212 and 1F2V212 | |||
: g. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 and associated valves (6) Junction box containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC leak detection system temperature elements | |||
: b. Core spray pump 1CP206 | |||
: c. RHR pump 1CP202 (7) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-072 and HV-11-073) | |||
: b. HPCI system valves (HV-55-1F028 and HV-56-1F025) | |||
: c. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1BV211 and IFV211 | |||
: d. Core spray pump suction valve (HV-5?-1F001B) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabli"- ) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire wi'S' t s tive fire suppression (based on the assumptijn ;sr iamage occurs to all components located in t..e at:, and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of core spray injection capability through loops "A" and "B" (3) Loss of capability to remove heat from RHR loop "B" j l 5-80 | |||
.' x i | |||
LGS FPER O (4) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pumps "C" and "D" | |||
; (5) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loops "A" and "B" (except diesel-generators) i (6) Loss of unit coolers for the HPCI compartment, RHR compartment B, and core spray compartments B and D Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 (7) | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
' The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke; detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
In order to prevent a fire in this area from affecting components associated with both of the specified | |||
< shutdown methods, the junction box containing cables ascociated with components used for shutdown method A O will be covered with a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber olanket. This blanket will provide a 1-hour aquivalent fire barrier, ensuring that shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.14 Fire Area 42: Safegeard System Access Area (El. 201'-0") | |||
(a) Structural cnd architectural design features of fire | |||
- area (see Figure B-5): | |||
C6nstruction Rating Walls: N .- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4) | |||
N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr SE - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) | |||
S - Reinforced concrete (part 2 he adjacent to stairwell no. 3) | |||
! S - Rainforced concrete (part) 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr 5 adjacent to stairwell no. 4) | |||
( Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
5-81 | |||
_ l | |||
LGS FPER Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Elevator door 0.75 hr Doors connectjng to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 3 and 4 Door connecting to area 32 3 hr Watertight door connecting 3 hr to area 75 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) HPCI valves HV-55-1F007 (pump discharge) and HV-55-1F008 (pump discharge recirculation to condensate storage tank) | |||
(2) RCIC valves HV-49-1F012 (pump discharge) and HV-49-1F022 (pump discharge recirculation to condensate storage tank) | |||
(3) Instrument rack 10C014 (HPCI) | |||
(4) HPCI level transmitters (LT-55-IN061B&F) and turbine exhaust pressure transmitters (PT IN055D&H) | |||
(5) Instrument rack 10C017 (RCIC) | |||
(6) RCIC turbine exhaust pressure transmitters (PT-50-1N055C&G) | |||
(7) Instrument rack 10C018 (Div. 1 RHR and Div. 1 RHRSW) | |||
(8) Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure) | |||
(9) Instrument rack 10C077 (RHR pump "C" discharge pressure) i (10) HVAC unit cooler control panels 1AC208 and 1CC208 , | |||
(11) Motor control center 10B217, which serves the I following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "C" valves | |||
: b. RHR compartment unit coolers ICV 210 and 1GV210 | |||
: c. Core spray pump suction valve (HV-52-1F001C) | |||
: d. Core spray compartment unit coolers ICV 211 and 1GV211 | |||
: e. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "A" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068A) | |||
: f. Drywell unit cooler fans 1C2V212 and 1G2V212 | |||
: g. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 and associated valves (12) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. HPCI system valves, flow transmitters, and level transmitters | |||
: b. RCIC system valves | |||
: c. ESW loop "A" flow transmitters (FT-11-011A and FT-11-013A) | |||
O 5-82 | |||
LGS FPER O (13) Junction oox containing cables associated with temperature elements for HPCI compartment unit coolers (14) Cable tray containing cables aF7DCiated with the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC components (barometric condenser vacuum pump 10P219, barometric condenser condensate pump 10P220, valves, and instrumentation) | |||
: b. R3R loop "A" minimum flow recirculation valve (HV-51-1F007A) | |||
: c. Core spray pump suction valve (HV-52-1F001A) | |||
: d. ESW loop "A" valves (HV-11-041, HV-11-071, HV-11-121, HV-11-123, and HV-11-106A&B) | |||
: e. RCIC compartment unit cooler 1AV208 | |||
: f. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1AV211 and 1EV211 | |||
: g. ESW supply and return valves to diesel-generator 1A (HV-11-131A, HV-11-132A, HV-11-133A, and HV-11-134A) | |||
: h. Diesel-generator control board 1AC514 (c) Postulated fire in Area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical s cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): _ | |||
(1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of HPCI system (3) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (4) Loss of RHR loop "A" minimum flow recirculation (5) Loss of capability to remove heat from RHR loop "A" (6) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump "C" | |||
(7) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loops "A" and "B" (except diesel-generators) | |||
(8) Loss of diesel-generator 1A (9) Loss of unit coolers for the RCIC compartment, RHR compartment A, and core spray compartments A and C (10) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
I) | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual 5-83 | |||
l LGS FPER I | |||
i annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Of the various safety-related systems that have components located in this fire area, only the HPCI system is associated with shutdown method B. Therefore, the remaining systems associated with shutdown method B can be used to shut the reactor down, and full shutdown capability will be retained if a system other than HPCI is available to depressurize the reactor. This depressurization function can be provided by manual actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS). When shutting down the reactor without the aid of either the RCIC system or the HPCI system, the ADS serves to permit the operation of a low pressure core cooling system, rather than just allowing initiation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system. With this scheme of operation, two RHR pumps will need to be operated simultaneously, in which case the following components must be available in addition to those listed under " Method B" in Section 5.2.2: | |||
(1) RHR pump "D" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "D" Since none of the above components (or their associated cabling) is located in this fire area, their availability in the event of a fire is assured. | |||
Safe shutdown of the plant using shutdown method B modified as described above would be accomplished in the following manner. After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the reactor is depressurized by manually controlling the valves of the automatic depressurization system. The opening of these valves allows reactor steam to be discharged to the suppression pool. Makeup water is supplied to the reactor vessel from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the LPCI mode after reactor pressure has decreased to a nominal 295 psig. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating a different loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below a nominal 75 psig, the RHR loop 5-84 | |||
LGS FPER O operating in the suppression pool cooling mode is switched to the shutdown cooling mode. In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. | |||
5.4.15 Fire Area 43: Safeguard System Isolation Valve Area (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (exterior None wall, contains 150 fta of unrated blowout panels) | |||
W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Interior boundary - Reinforced 3 hr concrete (primary containment wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains 450 fta None of unrated metal blowout panels from areas 31, 32, 33, and 34) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Two steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** | |||
area 44 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) HPCI steam line containment isolation valves (HV-55-1F003 and HV-55-1F100) | |||
(2) RCIC steam line containment isolation valves (HV-49-1F008 and HV-49-1F076) | |||
(3) RHR system valves: | |||
HV-51-1F008 (shutdown cooling suction containment isolation) | |||
HV-51-1F015A&B (shutdown cooling return containment isolation) | |||
HV-51-1F047A&B (heat exchanger inlet) | |||
HV-C-51-1F048A&B (heat exchanger bypass) | |||
HV-51-1F052A&B and HV-51-153 A&B (steam inlet shutoff) | |||
HV-51-1F023 (head spray containment k isolation) 5-85 | |||
LGS FPER (4) Containment atmospheric control system purge isolation valves (HV-57-121, HV-57-122, HV-57-123, HV-57-124, HV-57-125, HV-57-163, and HV-57-164) | |||
(5) Primary containment instrument gas system supply line containment isolation valve (HV-59-135) | |||
(6) HPCI system leakage detection temperature elements RCIC system leakage detection temperature elements (7) | |||
(8) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1B1V212, 1C1V212, 1D1V212, 1E1V212, 1F1V212, 1G1V212, and 1H1V212 | |||
: b. HPCI leak detection system temperature elements | |||
: c. HPCI turbine exhaust pressure transmitters (PT-56-1N055D&H) | |||
: d. RHR "A" and "C" flow transmitters | |||
: e. RCIC system components (steam line outboard containment isolation valve, instrument rack 10C017, and instrument rack 10C038) | |||
: f. DC power distribution panel 1DD501 (for diesel-generator 1D) | |||
(9) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. HPCI system components (turbine auxiliary oil pump, barometric condenser vacuum pump, valves, and other auxiliaries) | |||
: b. HPCI compartment unit coolers | |||
: c. ESW loop "B" valves | |||
: d. RHR loop "B" flow transmitters ! | |||
: e. RCIC turbine exhaust pressure transmitters I | |||
: f. Diesel-generator 1C (10) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. HPCI system components (turbine auxiliary oil pump 10P213, barometric condenser condensate pump 10P215, barometric condenser vacuum pump 10P216, valves, and instrumentation) | |||
: b. ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-042, HV-11-043, and HV-11-103A&B) l | |||
: c. HPCI compartment unit coolers 1AV209 and , | |||
1BV209 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
O 5-86 | |||
i LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of HPCI system (3) Loss of RHR loops "A" and "B" (4) Loss of RHR loop "C" minimum flow recirculation (5) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loop "B" (except diesel-generators) | |||
(6) Loss of diesel-generators 1C and ID (7) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 l | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
O'' (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
RHR loops A and B are both routed through this fire area and, as indicated in (b) above, several valves are located in these portions of the RHR piping. Physical separation between the two RHR loops is achieved by routing loop A through the west side of- the fire area and loop B through the east side of the fire area. The minimum separation between the valves in the two loops (or their associated cabling) within the fire area is 28 feet, which is sufficient to prevent any postulated fire from resulting in damage to both RHR loops. | |||
Also located in this fire area are components associated with the HPCI and RCIC systems. In the event of loss of both of these systems due to a fire in this area, manual actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) can be used to depressurize the reactor so that cooling water can be supplied to the reactor by the LPCI pumps. | |||
With this modification to the shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2, the shutdown procedure would be the same as the alternate shutdown procedure discussed in item (f) of Section 5.4.14 (fire area 42). When using this alternate procedure with shutdown method A, the | |||
(''\ following components are required in addition to those | |||
(_ ,/ items of equipment listed under " Method A" in Section 5.2.2: | |||
5-87 | |||
LGS FPER (1) RHR pump "C" and associated valves O | |||
(2) RHR compartment unit cooler "C" When using this alternate procedure with shutdown method B, the following components are required in addition to those items of equipment listed under | |||
" Method B" in Section 5.2.2: | |||
(1) RHR pump "D" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "D" The outboard isolation valve for the RHR shutdown cooling suction line is located in this fire area, and must be opened in order to initiate shutdown cooling regardless of which RHR loop is used. If the cabling to this valve is damaged by fire, the valve will be opened manually using the attached handwheel. Since the reactor can be maintained subcritical and adequately cooled in the hot shutdown mode without using the shutdown cooling mode of RHR, ample time is available for plant personnel to open the valve. | |||
Using the alternate shutdown procedures described above and in item (f) of Section 5.4.14, the capability to achieve safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire in fire area 43 is assured. | |||
5.4.16 Fire Area 44: Safeguard System Access Area (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 2 hr (parts adjacent to stairwell nos. 1 and 4) | |||
N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (part adjacent 2 hr to stairwell no. 1) | |||
E - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 3) | |||
S - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr exterior wall) | |||
W - Reinforced concrete (part adjacent 2 hr to stairwell nos. 3 and 4) | |||
W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Interior boundary (part) - 3 hr | |||
, Reinforced concrete and concrete i 5-88 | |||
r LGS FPER O masonry unit walls Interior boundary (part) - 3 hr Reinforced concrete (primary containment wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 1, 3, and 4 Two steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr ** | |||
area 43 Door connecting to area 76 3 hr Equipment airlock door None Elevator door 0.75 hr Suppression chamber access hatches None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Core spray full flow test recirculation valves (HV-52-1F015A&B) | |||
(2) Containment atmospheric control system purge line isolation valves (HV-57-103, HV-57-104, HV-57-105, and HV-57-162) | |||
C1 (3) RHR system valves: | |||
HV-51-125A&B (containment isolation for recirculation to supptession chamber) | |||
HV-51-1F027A&B (containment isolation for suppression chamber spray) | |||
HV-51-1F010A&B (loops C and D recirculation to suppression chamber) | |||
HV-51-1F024A&B (lcops A and B recirculation to suppression chamber) | |||
(4) Instrument racks 10C001 (core spray loop A) and 10C019 (core spray loop B) | |||
(5) Instrument racks 10C015, 10C025, 10C041, and '10C042 (main steam and reactor recirculation flow) | |||
(6) Instrument racks 10C016 and 10C036 (HPCI) | |||
(7) Instrument racks 10C035 and 10C038 (RCIC) | |||
(8) Instrument racks 10C006, 10C009, 10C010, and 10C022 (reactor recirculation system pressure and jet pump flow) | |||
(9) RHR flow transmitters (FT-51-1N015A,B,C&D and FT-51-1N052A,B,C&D) | |||
(10) Motor control center 10B211, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "A" valves | |||
: b. RHR compartment unit coolers 1AV210 and 1EV210 | |||
: c. Core spray loop "A" valves O d. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1AV211 and 1EV211 5-89 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: e. RHRSW inlet valve to RHR "A" heat exchanger O | |||
(HV-51-1F014A) | |||
: f. Reactor head spray inboard isolation valve (HV-51-1F022) | |||
: g. RHR shutdown cooling suction inboard isolation valve (HV-51-1F009) | |||
: h. RCIC compartment unit coolers 1AV208 and 1BV208 | |||
: 1. Reactor water cleanup inboard isolation valve (HV-44-1F001) | |||
: j. Main steam drain line inboard isolation valve (HV-41-1F016) | |||
: k. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1C1V212, IE1V212, and 1GIV212 (11) Motor control center 10B212, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "B" valves | |||
: b. RHR compartment unit coolers 1BV210 and 1FV210 | |||
: c. Core spray loop "B" valves | |||
: d. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1BV211 and 1FV211 | |||
: e. RHRSW inlet valve to RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F014B) | |||
: f. RHR shutdown cooling return isolation valve (HV-51-1F015A) | |||
: g. Reactor recirculation pump suction valve (HV-43-1F023B) | |||
: h. HPCI compartment unit coolers 1AV209 and IBV209 | |||
: 1. Drywell unit cooler fans 1B1V212, 1D1V212, 1F1V212, and 1H1V212 (12) Motor control center 10B215, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "A" valves | |||
: b. RCIC system valves | |||
: c. MSIV leakage control outboard system blowers and valves | |||
: d. Suppression pool cleanup pump suction isolation valve (HV-52-127) | |||
: e. Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147A) | |||
: f. Drywell floor drain and equipment drain containment isolation valves (HV-61-112 and HV-61-132) | |||
(13) Motor control center 10B216, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "B" valves | |||
: b. HPCI system valves | |||
: c. MSIV leakage control inboard system blower and valves | |||
: d. Suppression pool cleanup pump isolation valve l | |||
(HV-52-128) 5-90 | |||
r LGS FPER | |||
: e. Drywell pressure tap isolation valve | |||
< f. Suppression pool level tap isolation valves (HV-55-120 and HV-55-121) | |||
: g. Reactor head spray outboard isolation valve (HV-51-1F023) | |||
: h. RHR shutdown cooling suction outboard isolation valve (HV-51-1F008) | |||
: 1. RWCU outboard isolation valve (HV-44-1F004) | |||
: j. Main steam drain line outboard isolation valve (HV-41-1F019) | |||
(14) DC motor control center 10D201, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC system | |||
: b. Div. 1 RPS and UPS static inverter | |||
; (15) DC motor control center 10D202, which serves the i | |||
HPCI system (16) DC motor control center 10D203, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. HPCI system | |||
: b. Div. 2 RPS and UPS static inverter (17) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D | |||
: b. DC distribution panels 1AD501, 1BD501, 1CD501, O c. | |||
d. | |||
and 1DD501, which serve the diesel-generators Load center transformer 10X203 (Div. 3) | |||
Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1B1V212, 1C1V212, 1D1V212, 1E1V212, 1F1V212, 1G1V212, and 1H1V212 | |||
: e. Instrument rack 10C021 (Div. 2 RHR and Div. 2 RHRSW) | |||
: f. Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump A discharge pressure) | |||
! g. Instrument rack 10C076 (RHR pump B discharge pressure) | |||
: h. Instrument rack 10C078 (RHR pump D discharge pressure) | |||
: i. ESW loop "B" valves | |||
: j. ESW loop "A" flow transmitters (FT-11-011A and i FT-11-013A) | |||
: k. HPCI system components (flow transmitters and level transmitters) | |||
: 1. RCIC system components (steam line isolation valve, leak detection system, and instrument j | |||
i rack 10C017) | |||
: m. Instrument ac transformer 10X108 (Div. 3) 4 n. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valve | |||
: o. LPCI injection isolation valve (HV-51-1F017A) | |||
: p. RHR compartment unit coolers 1DV210 and 1HV210 0 | |||
V 5-91 | |||
LGS FPER (18) Junction boxes containing cabling associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and ID | |||
: b. DC distribution panels 1AD501, IBD501, and 1CD501, which serve the diesel-generators | |||
: c. ESW supply and return valves to diesel-generators IA and 1B (HV-11-131A&B, HV-11-132A&B, HV-11-133A&B, and HV-11-134A&B) | |||
: d. Motor control center 10B515 (serving diesel-generator 1A) | |||
: e. Diesel-generator HVAC control panel 1AC563 | |||
: f. RHR pump 1AP202 | |||
: g. Core spray pump 1AP206 | |||
: h. HPCI system components (valves, level switches, pressure transmitters, leak detection system, and instrument rack 10C014) | |||
: i. RCIC leakage detection system (19) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC system valves and instrumentation | |||
: b. HPCI system valves and instrumentation | |||
: c. Core spray loop "A" valves and instrumentation | |||
: d. Core spray loop "B" valves | |||
: e. RHR loop "A" valves and instrumentation | |||
: f. RHR loop "B" valves | |||
: g. RHR loop "C" valves | |||
: h. RHR loop 'D' valves and instrumentation | |||
: 1. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "A" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068A) | |||
: j. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068B) | |||
: k. ESW loop "A" valves | |||
: 1. ESW loop "B" valves | |||
: m. Diesel-generators 1A and 1B | |||
: n. Load center 10B201 (Div. 1) | |||
: o. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panel 1AC563 | |||
: p. Reactor protection system channel "A" vertical board 10C609 | |||
: q. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 and associated valves | |||
: r. Inlet valve to containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 (HV-57-163) | |||
: s. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A2V212, 1C2V212, 1D2V212, 1E2V212, IF2V212, and 1G2V212 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
lh 5-92 1 | |||
LGS FPER O (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Los" of RCIC system (2) Lost F HPCI system (3) Los' if core spray injection capability through | |||
: pm "A" and "B" (4) Loss of RHR loops "A" and "B" (5) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pumps "C" and "D" (6) Loss of capability to remove heat from RHR loops "A" and "B" (7) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loops "A" and "B" (except diesel-generators) | |||
(8) Loss of diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and ID (9) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B203 (Div. 3) | |||
(10) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 10Y202 (Div. 4) | |||
(11) Possible MSIV closure (12) Loss of containment hydrogen recombinerr 1AS403 and 1BS403 (13) Loss of drywell unit coolers 1AV212, ICV 212, O 1DV212, 1EV212, 1FV212, and 1GV212 (14) Loss of MSIV leakage control system (15) Loss of RWCU system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which wi.11 cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, lose of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
This fire area contains valves, motor control centers, instrument racks, and locally-mounted instrumentation associated with shutdown methods A and B. In general, the components associated'with shutdown method A are located in the western portion of the fire area, and the components associated with shutdown method B are located in the eastern portion of the fire area. The only exceptions to this generalization are the instrument O racks associated with the HPCI system (racks 10C016 and 10C036) and the RCIC system (racks 10C035 and 10C038). | |||
5-93 | |||
LGS FPER By using the alternate shutdown procedure discussed in item (f) of Section 5.4.14, operability of the HPCI and RCIC systems need not be relied upon. When using this alternate procedure with shutdown method A, the following components are required in addition to those components listed under " Method A" in Section 5.2.2: | |||
(1) RHR pump "C" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "C" When using this alternate procedure with shutdown method B, the following components are required in addition to those components listed under " Method B" in Section 5.2.2: | |||
(1) RHR pump "D" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "D" The electrical raceways in this fire area have been routed so that raceways associated with shutdown method A are located primarily in the western portion of the area, and raceways associated with shutdown method B are located primarily in the eastern portion of the area, thereby maximizing physical separation between the cables of the two shutdown methods. For those cases in which raceways associated with the two shutdown methods are separated by less than 20 feet, the raceways of both shutdown methods will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. For those cases in which electrical cabling associated with one shutdown method is separated from components associated with the other shutdown method by less than 20 feet, the cabling involved will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. These blankets will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier for a 2-inch thickness, and a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier for a 1-inch thickness, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in damage to cabling associated with more than one of the shutdown methods. | |||
The measures described above for physical separation and provision of fire barriers ensure that at least one of the two shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire. | |||
5.4.17 Fire Area 45: CRD Hydraulic Equipment Area and Neutron Monitoring System Area (El. 253'-0") | |||
O 5-94 | |||
l LGS FPER (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 1 and 4) | |||
N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 1) | |||
E - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part adjacent 2 hr to stairwell no. 3) | |||
S - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr exterior wall) | |||
W - Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. | |||
3 and 4) | |||
W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Interior boundary (part adjacent 3 hr to main steam tunnel) - Reinforced concrete Interior boundary (part) - Reinforced 3 hr concrete (primary containment wall) | |||
( | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 1, 3, and 4 Elevator door 0.75 hr Drywell access hatches None Watertight door connecting to 3 hr area 46 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Drywell chilled water system valves HV-87-122, HV-87-123, HV-87-128, and HV-87-129 (supply and return line containment isolation) | |||
(2) Control rod drive system master control station (3) Control rod drive system hydraulic control units (4) Containment combustible gas analyzer sample package 10S206 (5) Load center 10B203 (Div. 3) | |||
(6) MSIV leakage control system blowers 10K208, 1AK209, and 1EK209 (7) Instrument racks 10C004, 10C005, 10C026, and 10CO27 O (RPV instrumentation and LPCI injection valve AP transmitters) 5-95 l : | |||
1 | |||
LGS FPER (8) RHRSW radiation monitors 0AS578, 1CS579, and 1DS579 O | |||
(9) Motor control center 10B223, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. LPCI injection containment isolation valve (HV-51-1F017C) | |||
: b. RHR loop "C" minimum flow recirculation isolation valve (HV-51-105A) | |||
: c. RCIC system valves | |||
: d. Standby liquid control pump 1AP208 | |||
: e. Standby liquid control injection outboard isolation valve (HV-48-1F006) | |||
: f. Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147C) | |||
: g. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A2V212 and 1E2V212 | |||
: h. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water isolation valves (HV-13-106 and HV-13-107) | |||
(10) Motor control center 10B224, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. LPCI injection containment isolation valve (HV-51-1F017D) | |||
: b. RHR loop "D" minimum flow recirculation isolation valve (HV-51-105B) | |||
: c. HPCI system valves | |||
: d. Standby liquid control pump 1BP208 | |||
: e. Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147D) | |||
: f. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water source select valves (HV-13-108, HV-13-109, HV-13-110, and HV-13-111) | |||
: g. Drywell unit cooler fans 1B2V212 and 1H2V212 (11) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. HPCI system components (flow transmitters, level transmitters, and instrument rack 10C036) | |||
: b. RHR loop "A" components (LPCI injection isolation valve and flow transmitters) | |||
: c. Instrument rack 10C017 (RCIC) | |||
: d. Instrument rack 10C019 (core spray) | |||
: e. Instrument rack 10C021 (Div. 2 RHR and Div. 2 RHRSW) | |||
: f. Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure) | |||
: g. Instrument rack 10C076 (RHR pump "B" discharge pressure) | |||
: h. Motor control center 10B516 (Div. 2) | |||
: 1. Containment hydrogen recombiners 1AS403 and 1BS403 | |||
: j. ESW loop "A" flow transmitters (FT-11-011A and FT-11-013A) | |||
: k. ESW loop "B" flow transmitter (FT-11-011B) | |||
. 5-96 l | |||
LGS FPER O (12) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Load center transformer 10X204 (Div. 4) | |||
I b. Motor control centers 10B211 (Div. 1), 10B212 (Div. 2), 10B218 (Div. 4), 10B515 (Div. 1), | |||
10B516 (Div. 2), and 10B518 (Div. 4) | |||
: c. ESW supply and return valves for diesel-generators 1C and 1D I | |||
: d. Diesel-generator control boards 1CC514 and 1DC514 | |||
: e. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panels ICC563 and 1DC563 (13) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following cdmponents: | |||
: a. RCIC system valves and instrumentation | |||
: b. HPCI system valves and instrumentation | |||
: c. Core spray loop "A" valves and instrumentation | |||
: d. Core spray loop "B" valves and instrumentation | |||
: e. RHR loop "A" valves, instrumentation, and pump 1AP202 | |||
: f. RHR loop "B" valves and instrumentation | |||
: g. RHR loop "C" valves and instrumentation | |||
: h. RHR loop "D" valves and instrumentation | |||
: i. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "A" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068A) | |||
\ j. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068B) | |||
: k. RHRSW pump OAP506 | |||
: 1. ESW loop "A" valves and pump OAP548 | |||
: m. ESW loop "B" valves and pump ODP548 | |||
: n. Diesel-generators 1A, 13, 1C, and 1D | |||
: o. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panels 1AC563, ICC563, and 1DC563 | |||
: p. Load centers 10B201 (Div. 1), 10B202 (Div. 2), | |||
and 10B203 (Div. 3) | |||
: q. Reactor protection system channel "A" vertical board 10C609 and channel "B" vertical board 10C611 | |||
: r. Main steam relief valves (non-ADS) | |||
: s. ADS channel "A" and "C" solenoid pilot valves | |||
: t. Inboard MSIVs | |||
: u. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1A2V212, IB1V212, 1C1V212, 1C2V212, ID1V212, 1E1V212, 1E2V212, 1F1V212, 1G1V212, 1G2V212, and 1H1V212 | |||
: v. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 and associated valves | |||
: w. Inlet valve to containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 (HV-57-163) | |||
: x. Control structure water chiller OBK112 OP (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
5-97 | |||
LGS FPER Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As O | |||
discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical , | |||
cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire I source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of HPCI system (3) Loss of core spray injection capability through loops "A" and "B" (4) Loss of RHR loops "A" and "B" (5) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pumps "C" and "D" (6) Loss of capabili'y to remove heat from RHR loops "A" and "B" (7) Loss of ESW loops "A" and "B" (8) Loss of diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D (9) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 10B201 (Div. 1), 10B202 (Div. 2), 10B203 (Div. 3), | |||
and 10B204 (Div. 4) | |||
(10) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y101 (Div. 1) and 10Y102 (Div. 2) | |||
(11) Loss of capability to manually actuate the MSRVs, both ADS and non-ADS related (12) Possible closure of MSIVs (13) Loss of reactor pressure and reactor water level recorders "A" and "B" (14) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiners 1AS403 and 1BS403 (15) Loss of standby liquid control system (16) Loss of containment combustible gas sample cabinet 10S206 (17) Loss of MSIV leakage control system (18) Loss of RWCU system (19) Loss of cooling water supply to reactor recirculation pumps (20) Loss of all drywell unit coolers (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the fire is in the area of the drywell electrical penetrations, wet pipe sprinkler systems will provide automatic suppression of the fire. | |||
At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will 5-98 | |||
LGS FPER O open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
This fire area contains two instrumen.t racks, two motor control centers, and one load center that are associated with shutdown methods A and B. The minimum separation between those components associated with shutdown method A and those associated with shutdown method B is greater than 50 feet. | |||
The electrical raceways routed through this fire area carry cables for a number of components associated with shutdown methods A and B, in addition to cables for the components discussed in the preceding paragraph. For those cases in which raceways associated with the two shutdown methods are separated by_less than 20 feet, the raceways of both shutdown methods will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. For those cases in which electrical cabling associated with one O shutdown method is separated from components associated with the other shutdown method by less than-20 feet, the cabling involved will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. These blankets will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier for a 2-inch thickness, and a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier for a 1-inch thickness. | |||
The measures described above for physical separation and provision of fire barriers ensure that at least one of i | |||
the two shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section | |||
: 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire. | |||
j 5.4.18 Fire Area 46: Main Steam Tunnel (El. 253'-0") | |||
l (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7, B-8, B-9, and B-10): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (contains 3 hr 188 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels) | |||
E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr O- S-primary containment wall) | |||
Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr 5-99 | |||
LGS FPER W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (part at 3 hr* | |||
El. 295'-3") | |||
Reinforced concrete (part None at El. 365' roof slab) | |||
Access: Watertight door connecting to 3 hr area 45 Steamtight doors connecting to areas 3 hr** | |||
28 and 47 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Main steam line outboard containment isolation valves (HV-41-1F028 A,B,C&D) | |||
(2) Feedwater line outboard containment isolation valves (HV-41-1F022A&B and HV-41-1F074A&B) | |||
(3) Main steam drain line outboard containment isolation valve (HV-41-1F019) | |||
(4) MSIV-LCS outboard containment isolation valves (HV-40-1F001B,F,K&P and HV-40-1F002B,F,K&P) | |||
(5) RCIC injection valve (HV-49-1F013) | |||
(6) Steam line radiation sensors (RE-41-1N006A,B,C&D) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Possible closure of MSIVs (3) Loss of outboard portion of MSIV leakage control system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will shut the reactor down. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to elevations 253 and/or 283 feet in the reactor enclosure and will enter the main steam tunnel through doors at those elevations. | |||
The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or hoses from hose stations located outside the entrances to the main steam tunnel. | |||
5-100 | |||
LGS FPER O Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
l (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain avialble to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.19 Fire Area 47: RWCU Compartments, FPCC Compartment, and General Equipment Area (El. 283'-0" and 295'-3") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 1 and 4) | |||
N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr i | |||
E- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr | |||
- adjacent to stairwell no. 1) | |||
E- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr | |||
. S- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr l adjacent to stairwell no. 3) | |||
S- Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr exterior wall) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. | |||
3 and 4) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Interior boundary (east and west 3 hr i walls of area 46) - Reinforced l concrete , | |||
Interior boundary (primary 3 hr ' | |||
containment wall) - Reinforced j concrete l Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Doors connnecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 1, 3, and 4 Steamtight door connecting to 3 hr** | |||
area 46 Elevator door 0.75 hr l | |||
l 5-101 | |||
7 LGS FPER (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
O (1) Containment hydrogen recombiner packages 1AS403 and 1BS403 , | |||
(2) Standby liquid control system components: l Storage tank 10T204 ' | |||
Injection pumps 1AP208 and 1BP208 Explosive valves XV-48-1F004A&B (3) Core spray loop "A" injection valves (HV-52-1F004A and HV-52-1F005) | |||
(4) Core spray loop "B" injection valves (HV-52-1F004B, HV-52-1F037,'and HV-52-108) | |||
(5) RHR system valves: | |||
HV-51-1F017A,B,C&D (LPCI injection line containment isolation) | |||
HV-51-1F021A&B (drywell spray line containment isolation) | |||
HV-51-1F016A&B (drywell spray line shutoff) | |||
(6) HPCI system injection valve (HV-55-1F006) | |||
(7) RWCU supply line containment isolation valve (HV-44-1F004) | |||
(8) Containment atmospheric control system purge line containment isolation valves (HV-57-111, HV-57-113, HV-57-114, and HV-57-161) | |||
(9) Containment combustible gas analyzer sample cabinet 10S205 (10) Load center 10B204 (Div. 4) | |||
(11) HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y206 (Div. 1), | |||
which serves the following components: | |||
: a. Diesel-generator enclosure HVAC control panel IAC563 | |||
: b. Unit cooler control panel 1AC208 | |||
: c. Control structure HVAC loca.1 panel 0CC101 | |||
: d. SGTS control panel 0AC124 ! | |||
: e. RERS control panel 10C207 (12) HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y207 (Div. 2), | |||
which serves the following components: | |||
: a. Diesel-generator enclosure HVAC control panel 1BC563 | |||
: b. Unit cooler control panel 1BC208 | |||
: c. Control structure HVAC local panel OCC101 | |||
: d. SGTS control panel 0BC124 | |||
: e. RERS control panel 10C207 (13) Motor control center 10B213, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "A" valves | |||
: b. Core spray loop "A" valves | |||
: c. Feedwater startup recirculation valves (HV-41-109A&B) | |||
: d. Shutoff valves for main steam to miscellaneous steam-driven components (HV-01-108, HV-01-109, HV-01-111, and HV-01-150) 5-102 | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: e. 'Drywell chilled water source select valves | |||
, f. SGTS heater 0AE188 i | |||
: g. SGTS exhaust fan 0AV109 i (14) Motor control center 10B214, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. RHR loop "B" valves | |||
! b. Core spray loop "B" valves | |||
: c. MSIV leakage control inboard system pipe heaters and isolation valves | |||
: d. .Drywell cooling water containment isolation | |||
; valves | |||
: e. SGTS heater OBE1088 | |||
: f. SGTS exhaust fan OBV109 l' (15) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Motor control centers 10B212 (Div. 2), 10B515 (Div. 1), 10B516 (Div. 2), and 00B520 (Div. 2) | |||
: b. Core spray pump 1BP206 | |||
: c. Safeguard pump room unit cooler control panels 1CC208 and IDC208 | |||
: d. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panel ICC563 | |||
: e. Instrument rack 10C004 (RPV instrumentation and LPCI injection valve "A" AP transmitter) | |||
O f. | |||
g. | |||
Instrument rack 10C021 (Div. 2 RHR and Div. 2 RHRSW) | |||
Instrument rack 10C076 (RHR pump "B" discharge- | |||
; pressure) | |||
I h. HPCI system level transmitters (LT ; 1N062B&F) ' | |||
! i. Outboard main steam isolation valves | |||
: j. MSIV leakage control system valves (16) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Load center transformer 10X201 (Div. 1) | |||
: b. Motor control centers 00B131 (Div. 3) and 4 00B519 (Div. 1) | |||
I | |||
: c. Instrument rack 10C005 (RPV instrumentation 4 and LPCI injection valve "C" AP transmitter) | |||
: d. HPCI injection valve (HV-55-1F006) | |||
(17) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. RCIC system valves and instrumentation | |||
: b. HPCI system valves and instrumentation | |||
: c. Core spray pump suction valve (HV-52-1F001C) | |||
: d. Core spray loop "B" instrumentation | |||
: e. RHR loop "C" valves and instrumentation | |||
: f. RHR loop "D" valves and instrumentation | |||
: g. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "A" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068A) | |||
, O h. ESW loop "A" valves (HV-11-071 and HV-11-123) i 5-103 | |||
l i | |||
LGS FPER | |||
: i. ESW supply and return shutoff valves for O | |||
diesel-generator 1C (HV-11-131C, HV-11-132C, HV-11-133C, and HV-11-134C) | |||
: j. Diesel-generators 1C and ID | |||
: k. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panel 1DC563 | |||
: 1. ADS channel "A" and "C" solenoid pilot valves | |||
: m. Instrument ac transformer 10X108 (Div. 3) | |||
: n. Instrument ac distribution panel 10Y201 (Div. 3) | |||
: o. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A2V212, 1C2V212, 1E2V212, and 1G2V212 | |||
: p. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water isolation valves (HV-13-106 and HV-13-107) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of HPCI system (3) Loss of core spray injection capability through - | |||
loops "A" and "B" (4) Loss of RHR loops "A" and "B" (5) Loss of LPCI injection capability through loops "A" and "B" (6) Loss of RHRSW loops "A" and "B" (7) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loop "A" (except diesel-generators 1A, 1B, and ID) | |||
(8) Loss of ventilation for diesel-generator cells 1A and 1B (9) Loss of diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D (10) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B204 (Div. 4) | |||
(11) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y102 (Div, 2), 10Y103 (Div. 3), and 10Y201 (Div. 3) | |||
(12) Possible closure of outboard MSIVs (13) Loss of reactor pressure and reactor water level recorder "A' (14) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiners 1AS403 and 1BS403 (15) Loss of standby liquid control system 5-104 | |||
LGS FPER O (16) Loss of containment combustible gas sample cabinet 10S205 (17) Loss of MSIV leakage control system (18) Loss of RWCU system (19) Loss of standby gas treatment system (20) Loss of reactor enclosure recirculation system (21) Loss of cooling water supply to reactor recirculation pumps (22) Loss of cooling water to drywell unit coolers (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the fire is in the area of the drywell electrical penetrations, wet pipe sprinkler systems will provide automatic suppression of the fire. | |||
At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Valves, motor control centers, ac power distribution | |||
! panels, and a load center associated with shutdown methods A and B are located within this fire area. The electrical raceways routed through this area carry cables for a number of components which are associated with shutdown methods A or B and which are located in other fire areas. In general, the components and raceways associated with shutdown method A are located in the western portion of the fire area, and the components and raceways associated with shutdown method B are located in the eastern portion of the fire | |||
; area. However, there are several raceways associated l | |||
with shutdown method A that are routed through the i eastern portion of the fire area. The portions of these raceways that are located in the eastern portion of the fire area will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket, providing a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier. Ccbling associated with both channels of ADS solenoid pilot valves are routed through this fire area. Since the ADS valves are needed for both shutdown methods, at least one of the channels of ADS cabling must remain undamaged by a postulated fire. Therefore, | |||
, ,e g all raceways within this fire area that contain cables Q associated with the ADS valves will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of ceramic fiber blanket. | |||
5-105 | |||
LGS FPER The minimum separation between those components and O | |||
raceways associated with shutdown method A and those associated with shutdown method B, other than the raceways to be covered by ceramic fiber blankets, is approximately 26 feet. | |||
The measures described above for physical separation and provision of fire barriers ensure that at least one of the two shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire. | |||
5.4.20 Fire Area 48: RWCU Holding Pump Compartments, RERS Fan Area, and Corridors (El. 313'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent ':o stairwell no. 4) | |||
N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 3) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete (part, None i exterior wall) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4) | |||
Interior boundary - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (primary containment wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 3 and 4 Two doors connecting to area 49 3 hr Elevator door 0.75 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Reactor enclosure recirculation system fans (1AV213 and 1BV213) | |||
(2) Load center 10B201 (Div. 1) | |||
(3) Load center 10B202 (Div. 2) | |||
(4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Motor control center 00B132 (Div. 4) 5-106 | |||
LGS FPER O b. Safeguard pump room unit cooler' control panel IDC208 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs-to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B202 (Div. 2) | |||
(2) Loss of reactor enclosure recirculation system (3) Loss of core spray compartment unit coolers IDV211 and 1HV211, potentially affecting the long term availability of core spray pump 1DP206 (4) Loss of RHR compartment unit coolers IDV210 and 1HV210, potentially affecting the long term availability of RHR pump 1DP202 (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
The only components in this fire area that are associated with shutdown methods A and B are two load centers (10B201 and 10B202) and their associated transformers. The two load centers are separated by a distance of more than 35 feet. All cabling which is associated with these load centers and is needed for safe shutdown enters the load centers from below, and therefore is not exposed in this fire area. | |||
The separation between the two load centers is adequate to ensure that a postulated fire in this area will not cause damage to more than one of the load centers. | |||
O Therefore, at least one of the two shutdown methods (A 5-107 | |||
LGS FPER and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.21 Fire Area 49: Reactor Enclosure Lower Fan Room (El. 313'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall) | |||
S- Louvers open to outside None atmosphere (part) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete None Access: Two doors connecting to 3 he area 48 Emergency exit in ceiling None (6.25 ft2 opening) | |||
(b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of normal ventilation for Unit 1 portion of refueling floor (2) Loss of normal reactor enclosure supply ventilation O | |||
5-108 | |||
- 4 LGS FPER O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Once the control room operators have been notified that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of the ventilation functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.*A2 Fire Area 50: Reactor Enclosure Upper Fan Room and Equipment Compartment Exhaust Filter Rooms (F1. 331'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E ,- Reinforced concrete 3 hr | |||
. S;- Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 3) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete None Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: ' | |||
Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 3 Two doors connecting to area 51 3 hr Emergency exit in floor None (6.25 ft2 opening) | |||
(b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of charcoal filters. | |||
5-109 | |||
LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression O | |||
(based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of normal reactor enclosure exhaust ventilation (2) Loss of reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
In the event of a fire in one of the reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the affected ventilation system will be shut down and the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: g Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safety shut the plant shown. | |||
5.4.23 Fire Area 51: RERS Filter Compartments (El. 331-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) l l | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Access: Two doors connecting to area 50 3 hr O | |||
5-110 | |||
r LGS FPER (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Reactor enclosure recircualtion system filter assemblies (1AS297 and 1BS297) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in areas Ignition of charcoal filters. l (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression . | |||
(based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): | |||
(1) Loss of reactor enclosure recirculation system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
In the event of a fire in one of the reactor enclosure recirculation system filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to O extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. | |||
(f) Effect of tire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.24 Fire Area 75: Service Water Pipe Tunnel (El. 198'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire l area (see Figure B-5): | |||
1 Construction Ratino Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr I | |||
S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) i W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
l 5-111 l | |||
i LGS FPER Access: Watertight doors connecting 3 hr to areas 42 and 65 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) ESW discharge header isolation valves (HV-11-011A&B and HV-11-015A&B) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
The only components within this fire area that are associated with the shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 are valves HV-11-011A and HV-11-015B. | |||
The . two valves are located at opposite ends of the service water pipe tunnel and are separated by more than 200 feet. The conduits carrying cables associated with these valves are routed such that their minimum separation within the service water pipe tunnel is 100 feet. This degree of separation is sufficient to prevent any postulated fire from affecting the operability of both valves. Therefore, a fire could cause the loss of one ESW loop at most. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receipt of notification in the control room that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of any ESW valving may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
As discussed in (d) above, a fire in this area could cause the loss of no more than one ESW loop. Therefore, at least one of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.25 Fire Area 76: Refueling Holstway (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-6, B-7, B-8, and B-9): | |||
O 5-112 | |||
LGS FPER ! | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Concrete hatch plugs connecting None to area 78 Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 44 and 67 Railroad car airlock doors None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in areas Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling of any significance is located in this area, a fire will have no effect on plant systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receipt of notification in the control room that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.26 Fire Area 77: South Ventilation Exhaust Stack (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7, B-8, B-9, and B-10): | |||
O 5-113 | |||
s LGS FPER Construction Rating O | |||
Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Precast concrete panels None S- Precast concrete panels None W- Precast concrete panels None Floor: None (open to outside) | |||
Ceiling: None (open to outside) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 78 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components located in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in areas Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
Since nothing other than HVAC ductwork is located in this area, a fire will have no effect on plant systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receipt of notification in the control room that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.4.27 Fire Area 78: Refueling Area (El. 352'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-10): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. | |||
4 and 6) | |||
N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr 5-114 | |||
LGS FPER O adjacent to stairwell nos. 5 and 6) | |||
E- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 3 and 5) | |||
S- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 3 and 4) | |||
W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Doors to stairwell nos. 1.5 hr 3, 4, 5, and 6 Two doors to area 77 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Reactor enclosure crane (2) Refueling platforms for Units 1 and 2 (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Loss of reactor enclosure crane (2) Loss of refueling platforms for Units 1 and 2 (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receipt of notification in the control room that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling essociated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. i l | |||
O 5-115 | |||
i If>S FPER l | |||
1 | |||
) | |||
) | |||
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O 5-?l6 I | |||
LGS FPER O | |||
5.5 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - UNIT 2 REACTOR ENCI.OSURE This section will be submitted after the cable routing in the i Unit 2 reactor enclosure has been substantially completed. | |||
t I 2 | |||
l | |||
! I l | |||
1 (Pages 5-119 through 5-170 are reserved for later use.) l O | |||
i l. | |||
I 1 | |||
i l | |||
O l 5-117 l . - _ _ _ _ - - - __ - - - _ _ _ _ _ - . . _ . _ . _ _ _ - - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - . _ . . . . . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ . . . _ - - - . _ - _ | |||
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O 5-118 | |||
LGS FPER 5.6 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - DIESEL-GENERATOR ENCLOSURES 5.6.1 Fire Area 79: Diesel-Generator Cell 1A (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None | |||
() (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Diesel-generator IA and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-131A, HV-11-132A, HV-11-133A, and HV-11-134A) | |||
(3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 1AV512 and IEV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 1AC514 (5) DC distribution panel 1AD501 (serving diesel-generator 1A and auxiliaries) | |||
(6) Motor control center 10B515, which serves the following l components: | |||
i | |||
: a. Auxiliaries of diesel-generator 1A l | |||
: b. ESW loop "A" discharge valve (HV-11-011A) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
l (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator 1A (2) Loss of ESW loop "A" g (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
~I 5-171 | |||
LGS FPER The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of the components discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. . | |||
5.6.2 Fire Area 80: Diesel-Generator Cell IC (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Diesel-generator 1C and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-131C, HV-11-132C, HV-11-133C, and HV-11-134C) | |||
(3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 1CV512 and 1GV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 1CC514 (5) DC distribution panel 1CD501 (serving diesel-generator 1C and auxiliaries) | |||
(6) Motor control center 10B517, which serves auxiliaries of diesel-generator IC (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
5-172 | |||
LGS FPER O Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
Loss of diesel-generator IC. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of diesel-generator 1C operability may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
O Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.6.3 Fire Area 81: Diesel-Generator Cell IB (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Dies 1-generator 1B and auxiliaries 5-173 | |||
LGS FPER (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves O | |||
(HV-11-131B, HV-11-132B, HV-11-133B, and HV-11-134B) | |||
(3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 1BV512 and 1FV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 1BC514 (5) DC distribution panel 1BD501 (serving diesel-generator 1B and auxiliaries) | |||
(6) Motor control center 10B516, which serves auxiliaries of diesel-generator 1B (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
Loss of diesel-generator 1B. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler W | |||
system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of diesel-generator 1B operability may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.6.4 Fire Area 82: Diesel-Generator Cell 1D (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
O 5-174 s | |||
LGS FPER Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Diesel-generator ID and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-131D, HV-11-132D, HV-11-133D, and HV-11-134D) | |||
(3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 1DV512 and 1HV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board IDC514 (5) DC distribution panel IDD501 (serving diesel-generator 1D and auxiliaries) | |||
/~ T (6) Motor control center 10B518, which serves the following V components: | |||
: a. Auxiliaries of diesel-generator ID | |||
: b. ESW loop "B" discharge valve (HV-11-015B) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the dies 91 engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator ID (2) Loss of ESW loop "B" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is O extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread 5-175 | |||
LGS FPER of the fire, complete loss of the components discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.6.5 Fire Area 83: Diesel-Generator Cell 2A (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratino Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Diesel-generator 2A and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-231A, HV-11-232A, HV-11-233A, and HV-11-234A) | |||
, (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 2AV512 and 2EV512 l (4) Diesel-generator control board 2AC514 l (5) DC distribution panel 2AD501 (serving diesel-generator | |||
: 2A and auxiliaries) | |||
(6) Motor control center 20B515, which serves auxiliaries of diesel-generator 2A (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator 2A. h 5-176 | |||
i LGS FPER O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of diesel-generator 2A operability may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.6.6 Fire Area 84: Diesel-Generator Cell 2C (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area | |||
/ 'l (see Figure B-6): | |||
V Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Diesel-generator 2C and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-231C, HV-11-232C, HV-11-233C, and HV-11-234C) | |||
(3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 2CV512 and 2GV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 2CC514 (5) DC distribution panel 2CD501 (serving diesel-generator rg 2C and auxiliaries) | |||
\ ,) (6) Motor control center 20B517, which serves the following components: | |||
5-177 | |||
. , , _ _ _ _ - . . _m--. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . , _ . __ , _ - - - _ - .-- | |||
s LGS FPER O | |||
: a. Auxiliaries of diesel-generator 2C | |||
: b. ESW loop "A" discharge valve (HV-11-015A) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in areat Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator 2C (2) Loss of ESW loop "A" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of the components discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.6.7 Fire Area 85: Diesel-Generator Cell 2B (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
O 5-178 | |||
l LGS FPER Construction Ratino Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Diesel-generator 2B and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-231B, HV-11-232B, HV-11-233B, and HV-11-234B) | |||
(3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 2BV512 and 2FV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 2BC514 (5) DC distribution panel 2BD501 (serving diesel-generator 2B and auxiliaries) | |||
(~' (6) Motor control center 20B516, which serves the following components: | |||
: a. Auxiliaries of diesel-generator 2B | |||
: b. ESW loop "B" dischargo valve (HV-11-0115) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the Iloor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oi?. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Loss of diesel-generator 2B (2) Loss of ESW loop "B" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 212or, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is O' extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread | |||
. 5-179 | |||
LGS FPER of the fire, complete loss of the components discussed in (d) | |||
O above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.6.8 Fire Area 86: Diesel-Generator Cell 2D (El 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr g Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Diesel-generator 2D and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-231D, HV-11-232D, HV-11-233D, and HV-11-234D) | |||
(3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 2DV512 and 2HV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 2DC514 (5) DC distribution panel 2DD501 (serving diesel-generator 1 2D and auxiliaries) | |||
(6) Motor control center 20B518, which serves auxiliaries of diesel-generator 2D (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
Loss of diesel-generator 2D 5-180 . | |||
{ | |||
LGS FPER O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of diesel-generator 2D operability may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
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LGS FPER O | |||
5.7 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - SPRAY POND PUMP STRUCTURE 5.7.1 Fire Area 122: Spray Pond Pump Structure, Western Half (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-11 and B-12): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 123 3 hr O Door connecting to outside Roolup door connecting to outside None None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) ESW pumps OAP548 and OCP548 (2) RHRSW pumps OAP506 and OCP506 (3) Sluice gates HV-12-003A&C (4) RHRSW valves: | |||
HV-12-031A&C (winter bypass line) | |||
HV-12-032A&C (spray networks A and C) | |||
HV-12-034A (spray network cross-connection) | |||
HV-12-112 and HV-12-114 (inlet from the Unit I cooling tower) | |||
(5) Spray pond pump structure supply fans OAV543 and OCV543 (6) Motor control centers OOB519 (Div. 1) and OOB521 (Div. 3), which serve the following components: | |||
: a. ESW loop "A" valves | |||
: b. RHRSW loop "A" valves | |||
: c. Spray pond pump structure supply fan OAV543 and associated heaters and dampers | |||
: d. Spray pond pump structure supply fan OCV543 and associated heaters and dampers (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
O 5-183 | |||
LGS FPER Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Loss of ESW loop "A" (2) Loss of RHRSW loop "A" (3) Loss of all ventilation for western half of spray pond pump structure (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cauce an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.7.2 Fire Area 123: Spray Pond Pump Structure, Eastern Half (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-11 and B-12): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation None Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* | |||
Access: Door connecting to area'122 Door connecting to outside Roolup door connecting to outside 3 hr None () | |||
None 5-184 | |||
LGS FPER (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) ESW pumps OBP548 and ODP548 (2) RHRSW pumps OBP506 and ODP506 (3) Sluice gates HV-12-003B&D (4) RHRSW valves: | |||
HV-12-031B&D (winter bypass line) | |||
HV-12-032B&D (spray networks B and D) | |||
HV (spray network cross-connection) | |||
HV-12-212 and HV-12-214 (inlet from the Unit 2 cooling tower) | |||
(5) Spray pond pump structure supply fans OBV543 and ODV543 (6) Motor control centers OOB520 (Div. 2) and OOB522 (Div. 4), | |||
which serve the following components: | |||
: a. ESW loop "B" valves | |||
: b. RHRSW loop "B" valves | |||
: c. Spray pond pump structure supply fan OBV543 and associated heaters and dampers | |||
: d. Spray pond pump structure supply fan ODV543 and associated heaters and dampers (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely O' unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppreusion: | |||
(1) Loss of ESW loop "B" (2) Loss of RHRSW loop "B" _ | |||
(3) Loss of all ventilation for eastern half of spray pond pump structure (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire O area, plant this method will remain available to safely shut the down. | |||
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LGS FPER O 5.8 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - TURBINE ENCLOSURE 5.8.1 Fire Area 87: Condensate Pump Rocm (El. 189'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5 and B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (below elev. 217 feet) | |||
E - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 2 hr (above elev. 217 feet) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
() Access: Watertight door connecting to area 88 3 hr Two doors connecting to area 113 1.5 hr Removable metal panels connecting 2 hr to area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire O' brigads to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
5-187 | |||
LGS FPER (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
O Since no equipment or cabling associated with chutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.2 Fire Area 88: Main Condenser Area and Feedwater Heater Rooms (El. 200'-0" and 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5, B-6, and B-7): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (below elev. | |||
217 feet) | |||
N - | |||
Reinforced concrete None and precast concrete panels (exterior wall, above elev. 217 feet) | |||
E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (below elev. 217 feet; contains 25 fta og y | |||
unrated steel plate as separation from area 115) | |||
E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (above elev. | |||
217 feet) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (below elev. | |||
217 feet) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (between elev. 217 and 239 feet) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (above elev. 239 feet, contains 188 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr | |||
' (portion north of column line N) | |||
W - | |||
Concrete masonry unit' None (exterior wall above elev. 239 feet) 5-188 | |||
s s | |||
,q sa s | |||
{f | |||
> LGS FPER Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat (elev. 200 feet) | |||
Reinforced concrete (elev. None 239 feet; supported by structural | |||
, ,; steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete None | |||
,J ' | |||
Access: Watertight doors connecting to , | |||
3 hr areas 87 and 94 l C Three doors connecting to , 3 hr | |||
- area 89 Five doors connecting to 3 hr area 97 Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 95 and 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Main turbine stop valve position switches (2S-01-104A,B,C&D) | |||
(2) Turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches (PS-01-102A,B,C&D) | |||
(3) Main steam line area temperature detectors | |||
[ | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As 3 | |||
t discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical | |||
', cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire | |||
, source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) | |||
Possible reactor trip (2) MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. If the fire is in the main condenser area and the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler; system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the, fire, MSIV closure and reactor trip may s | |||
be avoided. ,, | |||
() (f) | |||
Effectoffire\onsafeshutdown: | |||
~? | |||
5-189 | |||
LGS FPER Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown O | |||
methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.3 Fire Area 89: Reactor Feedwater Pump Lube' Oil Areas, Control Rod Drive Water Pump Area, and Condensate Filter /Demineralizer Compartments (El. 200'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5 and B-6): | |||
Construction Ratino Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat (contains 76 ft2 grating opening connecting to area 115) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None 156 fta grating opening connecting to area 94) | |||
Access: Three doors connecting to 3 hr area 88 Door connecting to area 1 3 hr Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 30 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from the reactor feedwater pump lube oil reservoirs onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ig'ition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences (. f fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
O 5-190 | |||
LGS FPER l | |||
The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler systems will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. | |||
No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.4 Fire Area 90: Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Compartment (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
() Walls: N - | |||
Construction Reinforced concrete Rating 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr concrete masonry unit S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 113 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
() Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. | |||
discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical (As 1 | |||
5-191 1 | |||
LGS FPER cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire O | |||
source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.5 Fire Area 91: Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Compartment (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 he and concrete masonry unit W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 113 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None 5-192 | |||
LGS FPER O (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
i Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in.this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.6 Fire area 92: Mechanical Vacuum Pump Room (El. 217'-0") | |||
l (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 94 3 hr | |||
() (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
5-193 | |||
LGS FPER None O | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of e'.ectrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of'a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.7 Fire Area 93: Air Compressor Area, EHC Power Unit Area, and Turbine Lube Oil Storage Tank Area (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Constraction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) j E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr k' - | |||
Precast concrete None ! | |||
panels (exterior wall) l Floor: Reinfoced concrete foundation 3 hr mat I 1 | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 55 fta of steel plate and a 96 ft2 opening partially filled with grating) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 94 3 hr 5-194 | |||
LGS FPER Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 32 Rollup door to outside None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from the turbine lube oil storage tanks onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels | |||
~ in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads l | |||
(- ) in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. | |||
No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.8 Fire Area 94: Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine Compartments and Reactor Feedwater Pump Access Area (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratino Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry O S - | |||
unit Reinforced concrete 3 hr 5-195 | |||
LGS FPER (part) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None and concrete masonry unit (part adjacent to area 89; contains 8 HVAC duct pene-trations without fire dampers) | |||
S - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None 156 ft2 grating opening connecting to area 89) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 66 ft2 of steel plate) | |||
Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 92, 93, and 120 Steamtight door connecting 3hr** | |||
to area 2 Watertight door connecting 3 hr to area 88 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr i no. 30 : | |||
Rollup door to outside None ) | |||
Open stairwell leading up to None I area 95 l (b) Major safety-related components in fire areat None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
5-196 | |||
l l | |||
LGS FPER O Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) stiset of fire on safe shutdown: ! | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown ) | |||
methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will ) | |||
remain available to safely shut the plant down. I 5.8.9 Fire Area 95: MCC Room, TECW Equipment Area, and Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir and Centrifuge Area ' | |||
(El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architecutral design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): ! | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr | |||
\~' S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 55 fta of steel plate and a 96 fta opening partially filled with grating) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 78 fta of steel plate) | |||
Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 88 and 96 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 32 Open stairwell leading down None to area 94 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Main turbine first stage pressure transmitters O (PT-01-1N052A,B,C&D) 5-197 | |||
LGS FPER (2) Main steam line pressure transmitters O | |||
(PT-01-1N076A,B,C&D) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from the turbine lube oil reservoir onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Possible reactor trip (2) Possible MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. In addition, a compartment temperature of 2120F will cause actuation of the deluge systems located over the turbine lube oil reservoir and the turbine lube oil centrifuge. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip and MSIV closure may be avoided. | |||
(f) Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.10 Fire Area 96: Battery Room (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Ratino Walls: N - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) h 5-198 | |||
LGS FPER O, I Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 95 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke and heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke and heat detectors which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire N- brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.11 Fire Area 97: Equipment Hatch Corridor (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) | |||
S - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior p wall) | |||
W - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) 5-199 | |||
LGS FPER Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None O | |||
equipment hatch with 66 ft2 of steel plate) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Five doors connecting to 3 hr area 88 Steamtight door connecting 3 hr** | |||
to area 7 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 30 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the lgnition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) gg (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will restit from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.12 Fire Area 98: Reactor Recirculation Pump M-G Set Area and Feedwater Heater Rooms (El. 269'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8): | |||
O 5-200 | |||
LGS FPER O , Construction Ratino Walls: N - | |||
Concrete masonry 3 hr unit E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) | |||
S - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None two equipment hatches covered with steel plate, one of 75 ft2 and one of 110 ft*) | |||
Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 30 3 hr | |||
(~] | |||
\ms Door connecting to area 45 Two doors connecting to 3 hr area 114 Two rollup doors connecting 3 hr to area 114 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Main turbine stop valve position switches (ZS-01-104A,B,C&D) | |||
: b. Turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches (PS-01-102A,B,C&D) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from the recirculation pump M-G sets onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Possible reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
5-201 | |||
LGS FPER The smoke generated by a fire in,this area will activate O | |||
the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the fire is in the area of the recirculation pump M-G sets, the pre-action sprinkler system will provide automatic suppression of the fire. | |||
A rise in compartment temperature to 1900F will cause the deluge valve to open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. | |||
Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.13 Fire Area 99: Turbine Enclosure HVAC Area and Equipment Compartment Exhaust Filter Area (El. 302'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Concrete masonry 3 hr i unit l E - | |||
Reinforced concrete a hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) | |||
S - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior 1 wall) | |||
W - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None two equipment hatches covered with steel plate, one of 75 ft2 and one of 110 ftz) | |||
Ceiling: Metal deck, non-reinforced UL Class A concrete, and built-up roofing Access: Door connecting to stairwell no. 30 1 5. hr lh l | |||
5-202 | |||
LGS FPER O Two steamtight doors connecting 3 hr** | |||
to area 27 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of charcoal filters. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: l No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
In the event of a fire in one of tne turbine enclosure equipment compartment exhaust filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be s dispatched to extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. No effect on safety-related systems will result from a fire in this area. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.14 Fire Area 100: Condensate Pump' Room (El. 189'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5 and B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (below elev. 217 feet) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 2 hr O (above elev. 217 feet) l \ | |||
5-203 I | |||
- _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _.__J | |||
~ | |||
l l | |||
LGS FPER Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr O | |||
mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Watertight door connecting to 3 hr area 101 Two doors connecting to area 113 1.5 hr Removable metal panels connecting 2 hr to area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: g | |||
~ | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.15 Fire Area 101: Main Condenser Area and Feedwater Heater Rooms (El. 200'-0" and 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5, B-6, an6 B-7): | |||
O 5-204 | |||
r LGS FPER O Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (below elev. | |||
217 feet) | |||
N - | |||
Reinforced concrete None and precast concrete panels (exterior wall, above elev. 217 feet) | |||
E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (portion north of column line N) | |||
E - | |||
Concrete masonry unit None (exterior wall above elev. 239 feet) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (below elev. | |||
217 feet) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (between elev. 217 and 239 feet) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr O (above elev. 239 feet; contains 188 fta og unrated metal blowout panels) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (below elev. 217 feet; contains 25 fta og unrated steel plate as separation from area 115) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (above elev. | |||
i*7 feet) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat (elev. 200 feet) | |||
Reinforced concrete (elev. None 239 feet; supported by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete None Access: Watertight doors connecting 3 hr to areas 100 and 107 Three doors connecting to 3 hr 5-205 | |||
) | |||
LGS FPER area 102 O | |||
Five doors connecting to 3 hr area 110 Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 108 and 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
(1) Main turbine stop valve position switches (2S-01-204A,B,C&D) | |||
(2) Turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches (PS-01-202A,B,C&D) | |||
(3) Main steam line area temperature detectors (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Possible reactor trip (2) MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. If the fire is in the main condenser area and the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, MSIV closure and reactor trip m - | |||
be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling asscciated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.16 Fire Area 102: Reactor Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Areas, Control Rod Drive Water Pump Area, and Condensate Filter /Demineralizer Compartments (El. 200'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5 and B-6): | |||
ll 5-206 | |||
I l | |||
LGS FPER | |||
\ | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None 156 ft2 grating opening connecting to area 107) | |||
Access: Three doors connecting to 3 hr area 101 Two doors connecting to area 1 3 hr Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 31 Door connectir.g to area 115 None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area; Leakage of lube oil from the reactor feedwater pump lube oil reservoirs onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusibl.e link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler systems will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. | |||
No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
() (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
5-207 | |||
LGS FPER Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.17 Fire Area 103: Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Compartment (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concretre masonry unit S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 113 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
5-208 | |||
1 l | |||
l LGS FPER ) | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.18 Fire Area 104: Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Compartment (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structure and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit O' | |||
s Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 113 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire | |||
, source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
5-209 | |||
O LGS FPER Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in i this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire l brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown ) | |||
methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.19 Fire Area 105: Mechanical Vacuum Pump Room (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit S - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 107 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area; None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
5-210 | |||
LGS FPER (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.20 Fire Area 106: Air Compressor Area, EHC Power Unit Area, and Turbine Lube Oil Storage Tank Area (El. 217'-0") | |||
; (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratinc Walls: N - | |||
Precast concrete None O E - | |||
panels (exterior wall) | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 55 fta of steel plate and a 96 ft* | |||
opening partially filled with grating) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 107 3 hr Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 33 Rollup door to outside None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None O) | |||
(s, (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
5-211 | |||
LGS FPER Leakage of lube oil from the turbine lube oil storage O | |||
tanks onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which eill cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. | |||
No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will h remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.21 Fire Area 107: Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine Compartments and Reactor Feedwater Pump Access Area (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete None and concrete masonry unit (part adjacent to area 102; contains 8 HVAC duct pene-trations without W | |||
fire dampers) & | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr T and concrete masonry 5-212 i | |||
L. | |||
LGS FPER unit Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None 156 ft2 grating opening connecting to area 102) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None I | |||
equipment hatch with 66 fta of steel plate) | |||
Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 105, 106, and an entryway to the Unit 2 reactor | |||
/ enclosure Two doors connecting to the 3 hr administration complex Steamtight door connecting 3 hr** | |||
to area 2 Watertight door connecting 3 hr to area 101 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 31 Rollup door to outside None Open stairwell leading to None | |||
() (b) area 108 Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
l None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
i l Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
( Since no egoipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is 5-213 | |||
LGS FPER located in this fire area, both of these methods will O | |||
remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.22 Fire Area 108: MCC Room, TECW Equipment Area, and Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir and Centrifuge Area (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Ratino Walls: N - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior 5 wall) | |||
E - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 55 ft2 of steel plate and a 96 ft2 opening partially filled with grating) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 78 ft2 of steel plate) | |||
Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 101 and 109 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 33 Open stairwell leading down None to area 107 (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Main turbine first stage pressure transmitters (PT-01-2N052A,B,C&D) | |||
(2) Main steam line pressure transmitters (PT-01-2N076A,B,C&D) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Leakage of lube oil from the turbine lube oil reservoir onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
5-214 | |||
l l | |||
LGS FPER O (1) Possible reactor trip (2) Possible MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. In addition, a compartment temperature of 2120F will cause actuation of the deluge systems located over the turbine lube oil reservoir and the turbine lube oil centrifuge. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip and MSIV closure may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is | |||
() located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.23 Fire Area 109: Battery Room (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Consiruction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to area 108 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None 5-215 t ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - | |||
i LGS FPER O | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppryssion: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke and heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke and heat detectors which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.24 Fire Area 110: Equipment Hatch Corridot (El. 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - Reirforced concrete 3 hr E - Precast concrete None panels (exterior l | |||
wall) l S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) | |||
S - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr i | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None eqdipment hatch with 66 ft2 of steel plate) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members ' | |||
without fireproofing) | |||
S-216 | |||
) | |||
F t | |||
t i ff 4 | |||
LGS FFER O . | |||
Access: | |||
Five doors connecting to 3 hr area 101 4Steamtight door connecting to . 3 hr** | |||
-area 7 Loor connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 30 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in areas Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlit.ely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppress on; i (N Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methodv A or,B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is 3 located.intthis fire area, both of these methods will remain'available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.25 Fire Area 111: Reactor Recirculation Pump M-G | |||
' Set Area'and Feedwater Heater Rooms (El. 269'-0") | |||
I (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (ses Figure B-8): | |||
Construction Rating | |||
. Walls: N - | |||
Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) | |||
S - | |||
Precast concrete ' | |||
None 7-~)s | |||
( panels (part, exterior wall) , | |||
5-217 | |||
* N | |||
s LGS FPER W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr O | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None two equipment hatches covered with steel plate, one of 75 ft2 and one of 110 ft2) | |||
Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 31 Door connecting to administration 3 hr complex Two doors connecting to area 114 3 hr Two rollup doors connecting to 3 hr area 114 (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: a. Main turbine stop valve position switches (2S-01-204A,B,C&D) | |||
: b. Turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches (PS-01-202A,B,C&D) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in areat Leakage of lube oil from the recirculation pump H-G sets onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Possible reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the fire is in the area of the recirculation pump M-G sets, the pre-action sprinkler , | |||
system will provide automatic suppression of the fire. | |||
A rise in compartment temperature to 1900F will cause the deluge valve to open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. lh 5-218 | |||
r"'s LGS FPER Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.26 Fire Area 112: Turbine Enclosure HVAC Area and Equipment Compartment Exhaust Filter Area (El. 302'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Concrete masonry 3 hr unit E - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr | |||
(-x3 (part) y ,/ | |||
S - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior wall) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains nsne two equipment hatches covered with steel plate, one of 75 ft2 and one of 110 ft2) | |||
Ceiling: Metal deck, non-reinforced UL Class A concrete, and built-up roofing Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 31 Steamtight door connecting 3 hr** | |||
to area 27 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
() Ignition of charcoal filters. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
5-219 | |||
LGS FPER No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
In the event of a fire in one of the turbine enclosure equipment compartment exhaust filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. No effect on safety-related systems will result from a fire in this area. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.8.27 Fire Area 113: Railroad Access Area and Generator Equipment Area (El. 217'-0" and 239'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire arca (see Figures B-6 and B-7): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Retriforced concrete None and concrete masonry unit (exterior wall) | |||
E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (part) | |||
E - Concrete masonry 2 hr unit (part adjacent to area 100) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 he and concrete masonry unit W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (part) | |||
W - | |||
Concrete masonry 2 hr unit (part adjacent to area 87) | |||
Floor: Re'inforced concrete foundation 3 hr h mat 5-220 A | |||
LGS FPER % | |||
O Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains - None a 1960 fta hatchway partially filled with grating) | |||
Access: Two doors connection to area 87 1.5 hr and two doors connecting to area 100 Removable metal panels connecting 2 hr to areas 87 and 100 Door connecting to areas 88, 90, 3 hr 91, 101, 103, and 104 Steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** | |||
i to areas 2, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, and stairwell no. 7 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area Leakage of seal oil from the generator hydrogen seal oil units onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
i A rise in compartment temperature to 1400F will cause l the deluge valve to open and prime the pre-action l sprinkler system with water. At 1650F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. In addition, a compartment temperature of 2120F will cause actuation of the deluge systems located over the generator hydrogen seal oil units. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire ares, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5-221 | |||
LGS FPER 5.8.28 Fire Area 114: Turbine Operating Floor (El. 269'-0") | |||
O (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures 7-8 and 7-9): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Precast concrete Nene panels (exterior wall) | |||
E - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit W - | |||
Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) | |||
Floort Reinforced concrete (contains None a 1960 ft2 hatchway partially filled with grating, plus 14 equipment hatches covered with steel plate) | |||
Ceiling- Metal deck, non-reinforced UL Class A concrete, and built-up roofing Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 32 and 33 Two doors connecting to area 3 hr 98 and two doors connecting to area 111 Two rollup doors connecting 3 hr to area 98 and two rollup doors connecting to area 111 Two steamtight doors connecting 3 hr** | |||
to area 24 and one steam-tight door connecting to stairwell no. 7 (b) Major safety-related components located in fire area-(1) Main condenser pressure transmitters (PT-01-1N075A,B,C&D) | |||
(2) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components: | |||
: d. Main turbine first stage pressure transmitters (PT-01-1N052A,B,C&D) 5-222 | |||
( l | |||
() LGS FPER | |||
: b. Main steam line pressure transmitters 1 (PT-01-1N076A,B,C&D) | |||
(c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
(1) Possible reactor trip (2) Possible MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
The smoke and heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the early warning smoke and heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to | |||
(~' | |||
g extinguish the fire. If the fire occurs under the turbine's appearance lagging, the pre-action sprinkler system will provide automatic suppression of the fire. | |||
At 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip and MSIV closure may be avoided. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
O 5-223 | |||
IGS FPER O | |||
TIIIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK 1 | |||
0 l | |||
5-224 | |||
1 l | |||
O LGS FPER 5.9 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - RADWASTE ENCLOSURE 5.9.1 Fire Area 115: Radwaste Pipe Tunnel (El. 183'-0", | |||
187'-0", 191'-0", and 200'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-4 and B-5): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: East wall at column line 27.4 None between columns J and Ka - Concrete masonry unit (contains piping penetrations without 3-hour rated seals) | |||
West wall near column line 18, None approx. 19 feet north of column line N, between elev. 200 and 205 feet - | |||
Steel plate (25 fta) | |||
\s / East wall near column line 28, approx. None 19 feet north of column line N, between elev. 200 and 205 feet - Steel plate (25 fta) | |||
North wall at 7.5 feet north of None column line J, between columns 19.4 and 23, and between elev. 200 and 217 feet - Concrete masonry unit (contains 2 HVAC duct penetrations without fire dampers) | |||
All other walls - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit Floor: Below zone 115D between column None lines 19.4 and 26.6 - Reinforced concrete (supported by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Below all other portions of the fire 3 hr 4 area - Reinforced concrete foundation mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains 76 fta None O grating opening connecting to area 89) 5-225 | |||
LGS FPER Access: Door connecting to area 102 None Door connecting to area 118 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.9.2 Fire Area 116: Miscellaneous Radwaste Equipment Areas (El. 162'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch filled with 49 ft2 of steel plate) | |||
Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr 5-226 | |||
LGS FPER nos. 1 and 2 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated ' ire in area: | |||
(1) Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(2) Ignition of charcoal filters. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receivi2.g notification that a fire has occurred in this : | |||
I area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to | |||
[' extinguish the fire. In the event of a fire in the waste | |||
' tank vent exhaust filter, a heat detector inside the filter i | |||
plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register l- on the fire protection panels in the control. The fire | |||
; brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection l water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. No effect on safety-related systems will result from a fire in this area. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.9.3 Fire Area 117: Offgas Pipe Tunnel (El. 186'-0" and 187'-6") | |||
l | |||
! (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): | |||
lO 5-227 | |||
LGS FPER Construction Rating Walls: West wall adjoining fire area None 119 - Reinforced concrete (contains piping penetrations without fire rated seals) | |||
North wall adjoining fire area 119, None at 3 feet north of column line H - | |||
Reinforced concrete and concrete masonry unit (contains piping penetrations without fire rated seals) | |||
All other walls - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported by None structural steel members without fireproofing). | |||
Access: Concrete hatch plugs None g (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety -lated systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5-228 | |||
LGS FPER 5.9.4 Fire Area 118: Miscellaneous Radwaste Equipment Areas (El. 191'-0") | |||
l (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-5): | |||
! Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr i W - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (part adjacent to area 119; containc piping and electrical penetrations without fire-rated seals and HVAC duct penetrations without fire dampers) l Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch filled with 49 fta | |||
() Ceiling: | |||
of steel plate) | |||
Reinforced concrete (supported by None structural steel members without fireproofing) j Access: Door connecting to area 115 3 hr I Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 1 and 2 Door connecting to area 119 None | |||
( | |||
! (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
( | |||
l None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
A | |||
(_,) (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
5-229 | |||
LGS FPER Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.9.5 Fire Area 119: Offgas Equipment Areas (El. 195'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-5): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete None (contains piping and electrical penetrations without fire-rated seals and HVAC duct penetrations without fire dampers) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr , | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None in some areas by structural steel members without fire-proofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 1 Door connecting to area 118 None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
5-230 | |||
P LGS FPER Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: , | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems l | |||
will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
5.9.6 Fire Area 120: Radwaste Control Room, Laboratories, Laundry, Decontamination and Change Areas, Waste Drum Storage Room, and Cask Loading Area (El. 217'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): | |||
Construction Ratina Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall) | |||
! S - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr l adjacent to stairwell no. 1) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete (contains None piping penetrations without fire-rated seals) | |||
Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported by None structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported by None | |||
/'') structural steel members without | |||
(_ / fireproofing) 5-231 | |||
LGS FPER Access: Doors connecting to area 94 and 3 hr stairwell no. 4 Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 2 and 3 Two doors to outside None Rollup door to outside None Open stairwell leading up None to area 121 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
If a fire occurs in the fire zones which are provided with smoke or heat detectors, the smoke and heat generated by the fire will activate the detectors, causing an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. If a fire occurs in the waste drum storage room and the temperature in that area rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. Again, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. No effect on safety-related systems will result from a fire in this area. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
O 5-232 1 | |||
f) | |||
\_/ LGS FPER 5.9.7 Fire Area 121: Centrifuge Rooms, Solid Radwaste Equipment Rooms, Ventilation Filter Compartments, and Supply and Exhaust Fan Areas (El. 237'-0" and 257'-0") | |||
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7 and B-8): | |||
Construction Rating Walls: N - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - | |||
Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part, exterior wall) | |||
S - | |||
Reinforced concrete (part None adjacent to area 120 between elev. 237 and 257 feet; contains piping and electrical penetrations withcut fire-t rated seals) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete (part None adjacent to area 120 between elev. 237 and 257 feet; j | |||
contains piping penetrations without fire-rated seals) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall above elev. 257 feet containing louvered openings) | |||
W - | |||
Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Floor Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) i Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) | |||
Access: Door ccnnecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 2 Two doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 3 ' | |||
Open stairwell leading down to area None 120 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: | |||
None (c) Postulated fire in area: | |||
5-333 | |||
~ | |||
LGS FPER Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) | |||
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: | |||
No effect on safety-related systems. | |||
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: | |||
If a fire occurs in the fire tones which are provided with smoke detectors, the smoke generated by the fire will activate the detectors, causing an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. | |||
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: | |||
Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in h | |||
this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. | |||
O S-234 | |||
LGS FPER LEGEND FOR TABLE A-1 The information presented in each column of Table A-1 is explained as follows: | |||
Item No.: Identification code for fire areas and fire zones. Fire zones with identification codes beginning with the same number are located in the same fire area. | |||
Structure & Elev.: Location of the fire area or fire zone, by structure and elevation. Locations are shown on drawings B-4 through B-12. | |||
Space Designated: Description of compartments included within the fire area or fire zone. | |||
Safety-Related: Indicates whether or not the fire area or zone contains safety-related equipment or electrical cabling. | |||
Area: Floor area of the fire area or fire zone. | |||
7-s | |||
-- Class: Fire classification as defined in NFPA 10, Section 1.3. | |||
Quantity: . Quantity of combustible material located within the fire Area or zone, by weight for solids and by volume for liquids. | |||
Combustible Loading: Equivalent weight of all combustible material within a fire area or zone, in pounds of wood per square foot of floor area. | |||
Equivalent Severity: A normalization of standard time-temperature curves based on the combustible loading in a fire area or fire zone (as described in Section 4.2). | |||
Structural Fire Rating in hours based on the type of Resistance Rating: construction of each wall, floor, and ceiling that forms part of the boundary of a fire area or fire zone. (The ratings listed in this table apply to the major portion of the boundary on each side of a fire area or fire zone. In | |||
['') | |||
A ,/ | |||
those cases where the boundary on one side of a fire area consists of segments j | |||
with different types of construction, A-1 | |||
I 1 | |||
LGS FPER , | |||
small areas with lower fire ratings or zero fire ratings may exist. For a more detailed description of the ratings of the boundaries of the various fire areas, refer to the fire area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9). | |||
Detection Type of fire detectors and number of Capability: detectors provided in the fire area or zone. Unless indicated otherwise, all smoke detectors are of the ionization type. | |||
Suppression Type of fire suppression system and Capability: method of actuation in the fire area or zone. | |||
O O | |||
A-2 | |||
ITEM SAFETY- ARE *. | |||
NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RFLATED (sq ft) MA1 1A Control 160-0 Corridor 164 No F30 None IB Corridor 166 No 500 Cable ir 1C Recombiner room 154 No 670 None ID Recombiner room 155 No 670 None 1E Future recombiner room 153 No 670 None IF Future recombiner room 156 No 670 None 1G Backwash receiving tank room 163 No 680 Cable ir th Backwash receiving tank room 157 No 680 Cable ir 1J Backwash transfcr pump room 161 & 162 No 360 Cable in 1K Backwash transfer pump rooms 150 & 159 No 360 Cable in IL " | |||
200-0 Control structure chillers and chilled Yes 2200 Cable in water pump area 258 1H ' " | |||
Control structure chillers and chilled Yes 2200 Cable in water pump area 263 IN Recombiner access area 259 Yes 1405 None 2 217-0 13-kV switchgear area 336 Yes 6570 Cable in 3 Batte y room 323 Yes 144 Battery 4 Battery room 324 Yes 128 Cable in Battery 5 Battery room 360 Yes 144 Battery 6 Battery room 361 Yes 144 Battery 7 239-0 Corridor 437 Yes 528 Cable ir 8 " | |||
Battery room 425 Yes 470 Battery | |||
1 c - | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 1 of 17 TABLE A-1 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT HESISTANCE kATING SUPPRESSION CAPA8ILITY | |||
-CAPMILITY SEVERITY ERIAL CLASS QUANTITY LOADI]) | |||
(1b/ft (Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION | |||
- - - - 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual sulation C 150 lb 0.37 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual f sulation C 782 lb 1.43 9 0 3 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual sulatten C 782 lb 1.43 9 0 3 3 0 0 $ - - Hose. station Manual sulation C 350 lb 1.21 8 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual sulation C 350 lb 1.21 8 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual sulation C 749 lb 0.42 3 0 0 0 3 3'0 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual sulation C 749 lb 0.42 3 0 0 3 0 3 0 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual | |||
- - - - 3 u3 2 3 0 - - Hose station Manual Tulation C 8736 lb 1.65 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 34 CO2 hose reel Manual | |||
.ases A 30 lb 0.36 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reet Manual Heat I ulation C 83 lb 1.22 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual ases A 30 lb Heat 1 ases A 30 lb 0.36 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual Heat 1 (ases A 30 lb 0.36 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual Heat 1 , | |||
tulation C 2246 lb 5.29 32 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 5 Hose station Manual ases A 120 lb 0.45 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 1 I | |||
i | |||
*N . % | |||
ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGhATED RELATED (sq ft) MATERI d Control 239-0 Battery room 436 Yes 470 Battery cas 10 Battery room 426 Yes 468 Battery ca: | |||
11 Battery room 427 Yes 442 Battery ca2 12 4-kV switchgear compartment 434 Yes 470 Cable insul 13 4-kV switchgear compartment 435 Yes 470 Calle insul 14 4-kV switchgear compartment 432 Yes 400 Cable insul 15 4-kV switchgear compartment 433 Yes 400 Cable insul 16 4-kV switchgear compartment 430 Yes 400 Cahle insul 17 4-kV switchgear compartment 431 Yes 400 Cable insul 18 4-kV switchgear compartment 428 Yes 470 Cable insul 19 4-kV switchgear compartment 429 Yes 470 Cable inal 20 254-0 Static inverter room unit 1. area 452 Yes 715 Cable insul 21 Static inverter room unit 2, area 453 Yes 1000 Cable insul 22 Cable spreading room unit 1 Yes 2610 Cable insul 23 Cable spreading room unit 2 Yes 2610 Cable insul 24A 269-0 Control room 533 Yes 5208 Cable insul | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 2 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAIARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY L CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) | |||
(Ib/ft (Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATIUN ts A 120 lb 0.45 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station hanual Heat 1 ts A 120 lb 0.45 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual Heat 3 ts A 120 lb 0.48 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 1 ition C 250 lb 0.66 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manu:1 i Heat 2 . | |||
ition C 167 lb 0.44 3 3 3 3 3_ 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 2 ition C 250 lb 0.78 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station hanual Heat 2 ition C 167 lb 0.52 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 2 btion C 250 lb 0.78 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manuel Heat 2 ition C 167 lb 0.52 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 2 ition C 250 lb 0.66 4 1 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 2 ption C 167 lb 0.44 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual I Heat 2 | |||
\ tion C 9558 lb 16.63 128 2 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual | |||
; tion C 11814 lb 14.69 115 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 6 Hose station Manual | |||
: tion C 35526 lb 16.93 130 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 14 CO2 total flood Automatic Bion C 35526 lb 16.93 1 30 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 14 CO2 total flood Automatic | |||
, tion C 4327 lb 1.03 7 3 3 1 1 3 3 Smoke 23(1) CO2 hose reel Manual Smoke 10(2) | |||
-= | |||
, . - . . , , -e nr- w- e.----- - . - . . . - -. ,, e .-- - ,- . - - - . - - | |||
*% m ITEM SAFETY- AREA No. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DES!GNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER 24B Control 269-0 Control room utility room 529 Yes 224 None 24C Control room office 531 Yes 256 None 24D Control room shift supt. 532 Yes 320 None 24E Control room shop 534 Yes 256 None 24f Control room instrument lab 535 Yes 384 None 25A 289-0 Auxiliary equipment room 542 Yes 6676 Cable insul 258 Remote shutdown panel area 540 Yes 192 None 27 304-0 Control structure fan room 619 Yes 6450 Cable insul Charcoal 2BA 332-0 SGTS access area 625 Yes 5450 Charcoal 288 332-0 SGTS filter compartment 624 Yes 1872 Charcoal 28C Control room fresh air intake plenum Yes 320 None 29A Unit 1 181-11 Suppression chamber 101 Yes 5464 None primary centaiment 29b Supression chamber inside pedestal Yes 314 None 29C 217-0 Drywell drain sump area Yes 314 None 30A 237-11 Drywell area 400 Yes 2865 Cable insul. | |||
Lubricating J)B Drywell inside pedestal Yes 661 Cable insul, vw | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 3 of 17 TABLEA-1(Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPA8ILITY LOADINQ SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY (lb/ft'). (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 0 3 3 1 1 3 Smoke 1 C02 hose reel Manual 0 0 3 1 1 3 Smoke 1- CO2 hose reel Manual 3 0 3 1 1 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual 0 3 1 3 1 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual (Photo-Elect) 2 0 1 3 1 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual l (Photo-Elect) | |||
Jtion C 16640 lb 3.10 20 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 27(3) 3 Halon (raised fir) Automatic Smoke 23(4) 2 0 0 3 3 3 Smoke 1 Halon (ritsed fir) Automatic Smoke 2 . | |||
st f on C 250 lb 2.24 14 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 10 Filter water Manual A 8750 lb Heat 2 spray system (inside plenum) | |||
A 3435 lb 1.02 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 Heat 2 Filter water Manual (inside spray system | |||
, plenum) | |||
} A 20000 lb 17.25 130 0 0 0 0 0 3 Heat 2 Filter water Manual (inside spray system plenum) 0 0 0 2 3 3 Smoke 3 - - | |||
6 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual i | |||
1 0 0 0 0 0 ' | |||
3 - - - - | |||
0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 91on C 3328 lb 2.14 12 3 3 3 3 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual Gil B 108 gal Gion C 4992 lb 9.39 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hose station Manual ; | |||
} | |||
i k | |||
f I | |||
i l | |||
2 | |||
^m ITEM SAFETY- AREA h0. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATERI) 31 Unit 1 177-0 RHR heat exchanger & pump room 103 Yes 2050 Lubricating reactor Cable insuli 32 RHR heat exchanger & punp ro'.n 102 Yes 1700 Lubricating Cable insuli 33 RCIC pump room 108 Yes 600 Lubricating Cable insuli 34 HPCI pump room 109 Yes 1100 Lubricating Cable insuli 35 Core spray pump room 110 Yes 575 Lubricating Cable insuli 36 Core spray pump room 113 Yes 600 Lubricating Cable insuli 37 Core spray pump room 114 Yes 600 Lubricating Cable insula 38 Core spray pump room 117 Yes 575 Lubricating Cable insula 39 Sump room 115; passageway 118 Yes 1700 Lubricants Cable insula 40 Corridor 111 Yes 525 Cable insula 41 201-0 RECW equipment area 207 Yes 4020 Lubricants Cable insula 42A Safeguard system access area 200 Yes 3178 Cable insula 42B Isolation valve compartment 209 Yes 280 None 43 217-0 Safeguard system isolation valve area 309 Yes 2350 Cable insula 44 Safeguard system access area 304 Yes 8930 Cable insula 45A 253-0 CRD hydraulic equipment area 402 Yes 12860 Cable insula v w | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 4 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSilBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPkESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY LOADIhg' | |||
.L CLASS QUANTITY (lb/ft s (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION sil B 72 gal 0.85 6 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual tion C 333 lb 211 B 72 gal 1.02 8 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual tion C 333 lb 311 B 80 gal 2.79 18 3 2 3 3 0 3 Smoke 3 Pre-actio.* Automatic tion C 167 lb sprinkler systerr 311 B 155 gal 2.77 18 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 3 Pre-action Automatic tion C 167 lb sprinkler system 311 B 24 gal 1.13 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual tion C 167 lb 211 B 24 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual tion C 167 Ib 211 B 24 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual tion C 167 lb E11 B 24 gal 1.13 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual tion C 167 lb , | |||
B hegligible 0.37 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 | |||
, Smoke I hose station Manual tion C 499 lb tion C Negligible (0.1 - | |||
2 3 3 3 3 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual B 0.25 gal 0.73 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 , Smoke 3 Hose station Manual tion C 2330 lb tion C 3578 lb 1.40 9 3 2 3 3 3 3 Smoke 3 Hose sta Q n Manual 3 3 3 0 3 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual tion C 2912 lb 1.54 10 3 3 3 3 3 0 Smoke 10 Hose station Manual tion C 28290 lb 3.94 22 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 25 Hose station Manual l ion t C 17306 lb 1.67 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 19 Sprinkler system Autamatic (partial) 4 | |||
l i | |||
%.d - | |||
i i | |||
\ | |||
\ | |||
s 1 | |||
1 | |||
\.. | |||
s t | |||
i ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATEI 45B! Unit 1 253-0 Neutron monitoring system area 406 Yes 630 Cable insi | |||
'i reactor 45C ' - CRD repair room 403 No 785 None 46 Main steam tunnel Yes 384 None 47A ' 283-0 Corridor 506; general equipment area 500 Yes 9800 Cable inst 478 " | |||
295-3 Isolation valve compartment 518 Yes 750 Cable inso 47C 283-0 Fuel pool cooling water pump and heat No 1660 Cable inst | |||
, / exchanger area 511 , | |||
470 Isolation valve compartment 510 Yes 580 None | |||
) | |||
RWCU pump rocs /509 47E No 160 None 47F RWCU pump roam 508 No 130 None 47G RWCU pump room 507 No 145 None 47H Non-regen heat exchanger area 505 No 420 None 47J Non-regen heat exchanger area 504 No 420 None 47K Regen heat exchanger area 503 No 420 None 47L RWCU backwash receiving tank area 502 No 400 None 47M Isolation valve compart:aent 501 Yes 470 None 48A 3i3-0 Laydewn areas 601 and 602; corridor Yes 6500 Cable insu and RERS fan area 605 | |||
* 48B RWCU holding pump compartment No 216 None 48C RWCU holding pump compartment No 216 None 49 Reactor enclosure lower fan room 607 No 4320 Cable insu I | |||
DJA 331-0 Reactor enclosure upper f an room 615 No 2416 None s | |||
v W | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 5 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY IAL CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) | |||
(Ib/ft (Minutes) N 5 E W UP'DN TYPE NO. TYPF ACTUATION 1ation C 1331 lb 2.63 16 0 0 0 3 0 3 Smoke 5 Hose station Manual 0 2 0 3 0 3 $ soke 1 Hose station- Manual 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual lation C 17971 lb 2.28 14 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 20 Sprinkler system Automatic (partial) lation C 1248 lb 2.07 12 3 3 0 0 3 3 Smoke 2 hose station Manual lation C 1498 lb 1.12 7 0 0 3 0 0 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual 0 0 3 0 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual lation C 3744 lb 0.72 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 8 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual lation C 624 lb 0.18 1 3 0 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 3 3 3 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
, _ . , _ , . _ . m.. _ | |||
%-J ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGhATED RELATEDL (sq ft) MATERf 50B Unit 1 331-0 Equipment compartment exhaust filter No 468 Charcoal reactor room 616 50C Equipment compartnent exhaust filter No 468 Charcoal room 617 51A " " | |||
RERS filter compartment 618 Yes 720 Charcoal 51B RERS filter compartment 618 Yes 720 Charcoal 52A Unit 2 181-11 Suppression chamber 172 Yes 5464 Mone primary containment 528 " " | |||
Suppression chamber inside pedestal Yes 314 None 52C 217-0 Drywell drain sump area Yes 314 None 53A " | |||
237-11 Drywell area 473 Yes 2865 Cable insut Lubricating 538 Drywell inside pedestal Yes 661 Cable insul 54 Unit 2 177-0 RHR heat exchanger & pump room 173 Yes 2050 Lubricating reactor Cable insul 55 RHR heat exchanger & pump room 174 Yes 1700 Lubricating Cable insul | |||
, 5b " " | |||
RCIC pump room 179 Yes 600 Lubricating Cable insul 57 HPCI pump room 180 Yes 1100 Lubricating Cable insul 5b " " | |||
Core spray pump room 181 Yes 575 Lubricating Cable insul v ~ro | |||
w - | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 6 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE E'JUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY LOADING SEVERITY LL CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft 2) (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATIUN A 11175 lb 38.56 310 3 0 0 3 3 0 heat 1 Filter water Manual (inside spray system plenum) | |||
A 11175 lb 38.56 310 3 0 0 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) | |||
A 5000 lb 11.22 80 3 3 0 3 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) | |||
A 5000 lb 11.22 80 3 3 3 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - | |||
stion C 3328 lb 2.14 12 3 3 3 3 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 1:11 B 108 gal tion C 4992 lb 9.39 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual l oil B 72 gal 0.82 6 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual ytton C 291 lb oil B 72 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual ition C 416 lb loil B 80 gal 2.79 18 3 2 3 3 0 3 Smoke 3 Pre-action Automatic | |||
? tion C 167 lb sprinkler system loil B 155 gal 2.77 18 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 3 Pre-action Automatic | |||
;tiin C 167 lb sprinkler system i | |||
gil B 24 gal 1.13 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual g tton C 167 lb l | |||
~ ~ - . ~ . .- - .. --- | |||
O~ m f | |||
1 | |||
( | |||
j L | |||
SAFETY- AREA ITEM SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. | |||
59 Unit 2 177-0 Core spray pump room 184 Yes 600 Lubricatin reactor Cable ina 60 | |||
" " Core spray pump room 185 Yes 600 Lubricatin Cable insu bl " " Core spray pump room 188 Yes 575 Lubricatin Cable insu 62 | |||
" " Sump room 166; passageway 189 Yes 1700 Lubricants Cable insu 63 Corridor 182 Yes $25 Cable insu 64A 201-0 RECW equipment area 284 Yes 4020 Lubricants Cable insu 648 | |||
" " Isolation valve compartment 286 Yes 280 None Safeguard system access area 279 Yes 3178 Cable insu | |||
( 65 66 217-0 Safeguard system sccess area 376 Yes 2350 Cable insu 67 Safeguard system access area 370 Yes 8930 Cable insu 68A 253-0 CRD hydraulic equipment area 475 Yes 12860 Cable insu 6BB | |||
" " Neutron monitoring system area 479 Yes 630 Cable insu | |||
" " CR0 repair room 476 Yes 785 None 68C Main steam tunnel Yes 384 None 69 70A 283-0 Corridor 580; general equipment area 574 Yes 9800 Cable insu 295-3 Isolation valve compartment 587 Yes 750 Cable inso 708 70C 283-0 f uel pool cooling water pump and heat No 1660 Cable inst exchanger area 585 | |||
" " Isolation valve compartment 584 Yes 580 None 700 v w | |||
i e , -- | |||
* LGS FPER SHEET 7 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION F?RE HAZARD COM8USTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY | |||
'AL CLASS QUANTIT_Y LOADINj) | |||
(1b/ft (Minutes)_ N S E W UP ON TYPE NO. TYFE AC1UAT10N cil B 24 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual (Gion C 167 lb | |||
. cil B 24 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual < | |||
Ction C 167 lb cil 8 24 lb 1.13 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual lCtion C 167 lb B Negligible 0.37 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual | |||
,atton C 499 lb a? ' sn C Negligible <0.1 - 2 3 3 3 3 3 - - Hose statien Manual B 0.25 gal 0.91 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual a? ion C 1912 lb , | |||
3 3 3 0 3 3 - - Hose stattan Manual atirn C 3578 lb 1.40 9 3 2 3 3 3 3 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual atton C 3203 lb 1.69 10 3 3 3 3 3 0 Smoke 10 Hose station Manual ation C 31117 lb 4.34 26 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 25 Hose station Manual atton C 15559 lb 1.51 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 19 Sprinkler system Automatic (partial) | |||
.atito C 1498 lb 2.96 18 3 0 0 3 0 3 Smoke 5 Hose station Manual | |||
- - - - 0 2 3 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual | |||
- - - - 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
;ation C 17056 lb 2.17 14 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 20 Sprinkler tytem Automatic (partial) | |||
,ation C 1380 lb 2.28 14 3 3 0 0 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual | |||
,ation C 1647 lb 1.23 9 0 0 0 3 0 3 Smoke 2 Hose station hanual | |||
- - - - 0 0 0 3 3 3 Smoke 2 hose station Manual i | |||
I | |||
r c% | |||
ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MA1 70E Unit 2 283-0 RWCU pump room 583 No 160 None reactor 70F RWCU psnp room 582 No 130 None 706 RWCU pump room 581 No 145 None 70H Non-regen heat exchanger area 579 No 420 None 70J Non-regen heat exchanger area 578 No 420 None 70K Regen heat exchanger area 577 No 420 Ncne 70L Backwash receiving tank area 576 No 400 None 70M Valve compartment 575 Yes 470 None 71A " | |||
313-0 Laydown areas 637 and 638; corridor Yes 6500 Cable ir and RERS f an area 641 71B RWCU holding pump compartment No 216 None 71C r'WCU holding pump compartment No 216 None 72 Reactor enclosure lower fan room 643 No 4320 Cable ir 73A 331-0 Reactor enclosure upper fan room 647 No 2416 None 73B Equipment compartment exhaust filter No 468 Charcoal room 648 730 " " | |||
Equipment compartment exhaust filter No 468 Charcoal room 649 74A " " | |||
Recirc filter compartment 651 Yes 720 Charccel 74B Recirc filter compartment 651 Yes 720 Charcoal 75 Common 198-0 Service water pipe tunnel Yes 3840 None reactor l | |||
-~ | |||
\ | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 8 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZAR3 COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY ERIAL CLASS QUANTITY LOADI}t) | |||
(1b/f (Minutest N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUAT10h 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual | |||
- - - - 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual Julation C 4119 lb 0.79 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 8 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
;ulation C 705 lb 0.20 1 3 0 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
- - - - 3 3 3 3 3 0 - - | |||
hose station Manual A 11175 lb 38.56 310 3 0 3 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) | |||
A 11175 lb 38.56 310 3 0 0 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) | |||
A 5000 lb 11.22 80 3 3 3 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) | |||
A 5000 lb 11.22 60 3 3 0 3 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) | |||
- - - -' 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual I | |||
p q"ma w- -- | |||
w- - | |||
m /=e. | |||
ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MAT 7b Common 217-0 Refueling hoistway No 960 None reactor 77 - | |||
South exhaust stack No 620 None 78A 352-0 Refueling area Yes 16640 None 788 Shower and dressing area 701 No 3500 None 78C Shower and dressing area 709 No 3500 None 79 Diesel- 217-0 Diesel-generator cell unit 1 Yes 1765 Fuel oil generator Lubricatin-Cable ins! | |||
80 " | |||
Diesel-generator cell unit 1 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatini Cable ins! | |||
81 ' " | |||
Diesel-generator cell unit 1 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatin< | |||
Cable insu 82 " " | |||
Diesel-generator cell unit 1 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatina Cable insu 63 " " | |||
Diesel-generator cell unit 2 Yes 1765 Fuel oil tubricatini Cable insu 64 " | |||
Diesel-generator cell unit 2 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatinc Cable insu i 85 * " | |||
Diesel-generator cell unit 2 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatins Cable insu' 86 " | |||
Diesel-generator cell unit 2 Yes 1765 fuel oil Lubricatins Cable insui 87 Unit 1 189-0 Condensate pump room 256 No 1590 Cable insul turbine | |||
-w | |||
I LGS FPER TABLE 8.-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAlARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY IAL CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft LOADING) (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - | |||
3 3 3 3 3 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 3 0 0 2 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 3 0 2 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action i oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic atton C 666 lb Heat 1 8 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action i oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C 666 lb Heat 1 8 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action ioil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic atton C 666 lb Heat 1 B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action i oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C 666 lb Heat 1 B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic Ction C 666 lb Heat 1 8 800 gal 11.15 70 3 C 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic lction 666 lb Heat 1 B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action oil B 250 gal smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic Stion C 666 lb Heat 1 B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action cil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic | |||
'tton C (66 lb Heat 1 tion C 1165 lh 0.91 6 3 3 2 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER) | |||
BSA Unit 1 200-0 Condenser area 254 and feedwater heater No 12334 Cable insul turbine 239-0 service area 438 888 Feedwater heater room 441 No 2220 Cable insul B8C Feedwater heater room 440 No 2220 None 88D Feedwater heater room 439 No 2220 None 69A 200-0 Control rod drive water pump area 252 No 9275 Lubricating and lube oil reservoir areas 260, 261, Cable insul and 262 (area contains 3 reservoirs 0 1000 gal each) 89B Condensate filter demineralizer No 2240 Cable insul compartments 90 217-0 Air ejector and steam packing ho 1610 Cable insul exhauster compartment 333 91 Air ejector and steam packing No 1610 Cable insul exhauster compartment 334 92 Vacuum pump room 337 No 702 Cale insula 93 Air compressor area 328; EHC power unit ho 3420 Lubricating area 330; and lube oil storage tank Cable insul area 331 (area 331 contains 3 tanks W 16,000 gal each) 94A Reactor feed pump access area 325; No 11270 Cable insul control panel area 341 94B Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 340 No $70 None 94C Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 340 No 570 None 94D Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 340 No 570 None 95 239-0 MCC room 442; TECW equipment area No 3918 Lubricating 445; lube oil equipment room 446 Cable insul (room 446 contains lube oil reservoir) 96 Battery room 443 No 462 Battery cas vw | |||
i l | |||
t LGS FPER SHEET 10 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft LOADING) (Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATIUN 4 | |||
atior C 28746 lb 2.90 18 0 0 3 3 0 0 - - | |||
Sprinkler system Automatic (partial) " | |||
stion C 1065 lb 0.60 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual oil B 3000 gal 5.94 32 3 3 3 3 0 0 Heat 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C Negligible (partial) stion C 1915 lb 1.% 7 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
. tion C 125 lb 0.10 1 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ation C 108 lb 0.08 <1 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual tiin C 874 lb 1.55 10 3 3 3 3 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual oil B 48000 gal 258.50 1550 0 3 2 0 0 3 Heat 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C 2247 lb (partial) stion C 19261 lb 2.13 13 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual | |||
! oil B 13800 gal 67.14 403 3 3 3 0 0 0 Heat 3 Sprinkler system Automatic htion C 7788 lb (partial) | |||
Deluge system Automatic (partial) | |||
A 240 lb 0.91 6 3 3 3 3 0 Smoke I hose station Manual Heat 1 i | |||
s r | |||
f t | |||
i f f | |||
I | |||
I ITEM SAF ETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) __ MATER 97 Unit 1 239-0 Equipment hatch corridor 448 No 3132 Cable insu turbine 9BA 269-0 Recirc pump motor-generator area 548 No 13020 Lubricatin4 Cable insu 988 Feedwater heater room 547 No 880 None 98C feedwater heater room 546 No 880 None 98D Feedwater heater room 545 No B80 None 99A 302-0 Turbine enclosure HVAC area 620 No 13080 Cable insu 998 Turbine enclosure equipment compartment No 1228 Charcoal exhaust filter area 621 100 Unit 2 189-0 Condensate pump room 266 No 1590 Cable insul turbine 101A 200-0 Condenser area 268 and feedwater No 12334 Cable insul 239-0 heater service area 464 101B Feedwater heater room 458 No 2220 Cable insul 101C Feedwater heater room 457 No 2220 None 101D feedwater heater room 456 No 2220 None 102A " | |||
200-0 Control rod drive water pump area 270 No 9275 Lubricatinc and lube oil reservoir areas 274, 275, Cable insul and 276 (trea Contains 3 reservoirs 91000 gal each) 102B Condensate filter demineralizer No 2240 Cable insul compartments 103 217-0 Air ejector and steam packing No 1610 Cable insul exhauster compartment 348 104 Air ejector and steam packing No 1610 Cable insul exhauster compartment 349 105 Vacuum pump room 350 No 702 Cable insu' | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 11 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUST!BLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPAh!LITY LOADING SEVERITY 21 CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft 2) (Minutes) N 5 E W UP ON TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUAT!DN ation C 250 lb 0.10 1 3 3 3 0 0 0 .- - | |||
Hose station Manual oil B 3000 gal 5.82 35 0 3 3 0 0 0 Smoke 13 Pre-action sprink- Automatic Cti n C 16640 lb ler system (partial) 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
; tion C 2746 lb 0.26 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual A 40000 lb 52.61 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 2 Filter water Manual (inside spray system plenum) - | |||
ation C 1165 lb 0.91 6 3 3 3 2 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 28746 lb 2.90 18 0 0 3 3 0 0 - - Sprinkler system Automatic (partial) ation C 1065 lb 0.60 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual oli 8 3000 gal 5.94 32 3 3 3 3 0 0 Heat 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C Negligible (partial) ation C 1915 lb 1.06 7 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 125 lb 0.10 1 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ation C 108 lb 0.08 <1 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ation C 874 lb 1.55 10 3 3 3 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual | |||
mm ITLM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATERI, 106 Unit 2 217-0 Air compressor area 357; EHC power No 3420 LubricatinJ turLine unit area 358; and lube oil storage Cable insul tank area 356 (area 356 contains 3 tanks 9 16,000 gal each) 107A Reactor feed pump access area 346; No 11270 Cable insul control panel area 354 107B Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 353 No 570 None 107C Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 353 ha 570 None 107D Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 353 No 570 None 108 239-0 MCC room 459; TECW equiment area 461; No 3918 Lubricating lube oil equipment room 463 (room 463 Cabne insul contains lube oil reservoir) 109 " " | |||
Battery room 460 No 462 Battery cas 110 Equipment hatch corridor 466 No 3132 Cable insul 111A " | |||
269-0 Recirc pump motor-generator area 564 No 13020 Lubricating Cable insul 111B feedwater heater room 561 No 880 None IllC " | |||
Feedwater heater room 560 No B80 None 1110 " | |||
feedwater heater room 559 No 880 None ll2A " | |||
302-0 Turbine enclosure HVAC area 628 No 13080 Cable insul ll2B " " | |||
Turbine enclosure equipment compartment No 1228 Charcoal exhaust filter area 629 Il3A Lommon 217-0 Railroad access area 335 No 7632 Cable insul turbine 1138 239-0 Generator equipment areas 44/ and 465 No 16310 Cable insul Seal oil w w | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 12 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY LL CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) | |||
(1b/ft (Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATIUN oil B 48000 gal 258.13 1550 0 3 0 3 0 3 Heat 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ition C 1248 lb (partial) ition C 19261 lb 2.13 13 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - Hose station hanual | |||
- - - - 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual | |||
- - - - 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual oli B 13800 gal 67.14 403 3 3 0 3 0 0 Heat 3 Sprinkler system Automatic ition C 7788 lb (partial) | |||
Deluge system Automatic (partial) es A 240 lb 0.91 6 3 3 3 3 3 0 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual Heat 1 ition C 250 lb 0.10 1 3 3 0 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual oil B 3000 gal 5.82 35 0 3 0 3 0 0 Smoke 13 Pre-action sprink- Automatic ition C 16640 lb 1er system (partial) 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual stion C- 2746 lb 0.26 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual A 40000 lb 52.61 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 2 Filter water Manual (inside spray system plenum) stion C 9936 lb 1.6' 10 0 3 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Pre-action Automatic sprinkler systta ition C 36452 lb 3.98 23 0 3 3 3 0 0 - - | |||
Pre-action Automatic B 1060 gal sprinkler system Deluge s stem Automatic (partial l | |||
5 i | |||
f i | |||
s . | |||
e | |||
c - | |||
*% m ITEM SAFETY- AREA h0. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER: | |||
114 Connon 269-0 Operating floor for units 1 and 2 No 45800 Cable insul turbine libA Tunnel 187-0 Radwaste pipe tunnel No 1280 None 115B Radwaste pipe tunnel No 1790 None ll5C " | |||
183-0 Radwaste pipe tunnel No 1680 None 115D 191-0 Radwaste pipe tunnel No 510 None 116A Raowaste 162-0 Pipe tunnel access No 590 None ll6B " " | |||
Corridor 135 No 10 % Cable insu 116C Corridor 149 No 496 Cable insu 1160 Corridor 152 and MCC room 145 No 318 Cable insu (x ll6E " " | |||
Waste sludge ptsnp room 124 No 288 None ll6F " " | |||
Waste sludge tank room 123 No 576 None ll6G " " | |||
Condensate decant pump room 126 No 240 None 116H Condensate sludge disch pump room 127 No 198 Cableinsu{ | |||
ll6J " " | |||
Condensate phase separator room 125 No 800 None 116K Condensate sludge disch pump room 129 No 192 None ll6L " " | |||
Condensate decant pump room 130 No 240 None - | |||
Il6M " | |||
Condensate phase separator room 128 No 800 None 116h Chemical waste tank pump room 137 No 144 hone ll6P " " | |||
Chemical waste tank room 136 No 144 None 116Q Equip. drain collection tank room 131 No B64 None ll6R " " | |||
Equip. drain collection pump room 132 No 320 None 1165 Floor drain collection and sample tank No 1824 Cable insull roora 134 and pump room 133 a | |||
l_ | |||
T | |||
^ | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 13 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE OETECTION FIRE HAZAR0 COMBbTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) | |||
(Ib/ft ' Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPF ACTUATION ction C 8320 lb 0.23 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 Heat 8 Pre-action Automatic Smoke 2 sprinkler system (partial) 3 0 0 3 0 3 - - - - | |||
3 3 0 0 0 3 - - - - | |||
0 3 0 3 0 0 - - - - | |||
0 3 3 3 0 0 - - - - | |||
3 0 3 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual atitn C 1539 lb 1.75 11 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ition C 166 lb 0.42 3 0 0 0 2 0 3 - - | |||
Hosest5 tion Manu11 iti:n C 957 lb 3.74 23 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ition C 208 lb 1.31 8 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Ibse station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 2 0 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual tion C 524 lb 0.36 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
r sw a ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATEE 116T Radwaste 162-0 Floor drain spent resin pump res 138 & 139 No 394 Cable ins! | |||
116U Floor & equip, drain spent resin pump No 220 None room 140 ll6V " " | |||
RWCU decant pump room 142 No 242 Cable ins 2 116W RWCU phase separator room 141 No 320 None libX " | |||
RWCU sludge disch mixing pump room 144 No 253 Cable insI ll6Y " | |||
RWCU phase separator room 143 No 320 None 1162 Equip. & floor drain sump and pump No 206 Cable ins! | |||
room 146 Charcoal ll6AA " | |||
Equipment drain sample room 147 No 400 Cable insi ll6BB " " | |||
Equipment drain sample tank room 148 No 990 Cable insI 117 187-b Offgas pipe tunnel No 880 None 118A. 191-0 Pipeway 221 No 384 None 118B " " | |||
Corridors 213 and 235; fuel pool F/0 No 2721 Cable insI precoat area ll8C " | |||
Corridor 246 No 4% Cable ins 1 1180 Laundry drain tank and pump room 228 No 792 Cable insI ll8E " " | |||
Evaporator pump room 231 No 288 Cable ins 1 I | |||
ll8F " " | |||
Evaporator pump room 232 No 240 Cable insi ll8G Evaporator tank room 230 No 576 None libH " " | |||
Evaporator tank room 234 No 250 None i ll8J " " | |||
Evaporator tank room 233 No 250 None 118K Control panel area No 220 Cable insu 118L Evaporator and condenser room 242 No 400 Cable insu 118M Evaporator and condenser room 243 No 384 None l | |||
%/ % | |||
i | |||
.. ._ s LGS FPER SHEET 14 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION C!PABILITY SEVERITY | |||
:AL CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft LOADING) MINUTES N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION lation C 125 lb 0.39 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual lati:n C 125 lb 0.64 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 2 0 0 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual lation C 125 lb 0.61 4 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 3 0 3 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual lation C 125 lb 4.60 28 0 0 3 0 0 3 Heat 1 Filter water Manual A 491 lb (inside spray system plenun) lation C 83 lb 0.26 2 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual lation C 25 lb 0.03 <1 0 3 3 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 3 0 3 0 0 3 - - - - | |||
3 0 3 0 0 3 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
; tion C 6323 lb 2.89 18 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 125 lb 0.31 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 - - | |||
Kose station Manual 4 tion C 275 lb 0.43 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 83 lb 0.36 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual attin C 316 lb 1.64 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 483 lb 2.73 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 441 lb 1.37 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
%.- v ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATEE 118N Radwaste 191-0 Chemical addition room 244 No 432 None 11bP Fuel pool holding pump compartments 236 No 160 Noner 118Q Fuel pool filter demin. compartment 239A No 190 Cat,1e inst 11BR Fuel pool filter demin. compartment 239B No 165 Cable insa 1185 Fuel pool filter demin. compartment 239C No 165 Cable insa 118T Floor and equipment drain filter holding No 416 None pump rooms 237 & 238 118U " | |||
Floor drain filter compartment 240A No 158 Cable ins 3 118V Floor drain demineralizer compartment 240B No 168 Cable ins 3 118W Equipment drain demineralizer compartment No 180 Cable ins 3 2ilA 1;bX " " | |||
Equipment drain filter compartment 241B No 174 Cable ins 3 118Y Floor and equipment drain surge tank pump No 355 Cable ins 3 room 248 118Z Floor and equip. drain surge tank room 245 No 3200 None 119A 195-0 Corridor 214 and product storage area 225 No 4240 Cable insu 119B Offgas adsorber compartment No 800 Cable insu 119C Offgas adsorber compartment No 800 Cable inse 119D Offgas adsorber compartment No 800 Cable insu 119E Offgas adsorber vault No 192 None 119F Offgas adsorber vault No 192 None 119G Offgas adsorber vault No 192 None 119H Reboiler area 226 No 1536 None 120A 217-0 Corrider 419 No 720 Cable insu | |||
.z w | |||
LGS FPER SHEET 15 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY LOADIN SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY (th/ft ) (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - rose station Manual ati:n C 166 lb 1.09 - | |||
0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ati:n C 166 lb 1.25 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 166 lb 1.25 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 166 lb 1.31 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Man;al ation C 183 lb 1.36 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station 'anual M | |||
etion C 191 lb 1.32 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 100 lb 0.71 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose s'.ation Manual ati::n C 166 lb 0.58 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 3 3 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 1664 lb 0.49 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - | |||
ation C 416 lb 0.65 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - | |||
Stion C 416 lb 0.65 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - | |||
Stton C 41b lb 0.65 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - | |||
0 0 0 3 0 0 - - - - | |||
0 0 0 3 0 0 - - - - | |||
0 0 0 3 0 0 - - - - | |||
0 3 0 3 0 0 - - - - | |||
: tion C 33 lb 0.06 <1 3 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 1 | |||
; .M | |||
liEM SAFETY- AREA | |||
,30 STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER: | |||
120B Radwaste 217-0 Toilet 413 No 80 None 120C Decontamination and change areas 414 and No 340 Cable insu' 414A 1200 " | |||
Raawaste control room 415 No 594 Cable insu' 120E Health physics 412 No 128 None 120F Clean clothes room 416 No 224 None 120G Laundry room 417 No 320 None 120H Counting room 410 No 160 None 120J Conventional chemical lab 411 No 280 None 120K Radiation chemical lab 418 No 400 None 120L " " | |||
Corridor 424 No 3442 Cable insu' 120M Waste drum storage room 420 No 376 None 120N Cask loading area 421; HSA & LSA fill No 3856 Cable insu' station 422; decontamination and monitoring station 423 121A | |||
* 237-0 Air exhaust fan area 484 No 6320 Cable insu' 121B Filter room 485 No 480 None 121C Filter room 486 No 480 None 1210 " " | |||
Solidification equipment room 472 No 220 None 121E Hopper room 471 No 80 None 121F Hopper room 470 No 80 None 121G Solidification equipment room 469 No 72 None 121H 257-0 Exhaust fan area 525 No 5937 Cable insul 121J Future equipment area 517 No 264 None | |||
.s w | |||
i LGS FPER SHEET 16 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'e) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRL HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) | |||
(1b/ft (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 50 lb 0.18 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual ation C 1747 lb 3.66 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual ation C 666 lb 0.24 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Sprinkler system Automatic stion C 582 lb 0.19 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manu11 stion C 998 lb 0.20 2 3 0 3 0 0 0 Smoke - | |||
Hose station Manual 3 0 0 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - | |||
Hose staion Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual Stion C 998 lb 0.21 2 3 0 3 3 0 0 Smoke 10 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - | |||
Hose station Manual | |||
ITEM SAF ETY- AREA No. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER 121K Radwaste 257-0 Centritage room 516 No 160 None 121L Centrifuge room 515 No 160 None 121M Air supply fan area 526 No 5004 Cable insu 122A Spray 268-0 ESW and RHRSW pump area Yes 1420 Lubricants pond pump Cable insu structure 122B " | |||
237-0 Wet pit Yes 680 None 122C 251-0 ESW and RHRSW pipeway Yes 570 None 1220 268-0 Access hatch area Yes 544 None 122E 251-0 RHRSW valve compartment Yes 560 Cable insu 122F 237-0 RHRSW pipeway Yes 544 None 123A 268-0 ESW and RHRSW pump area Yes 1420 Lubricants Cable insu 123b " | |||
237-0 Wet pit Yes 680 None 123C 251-0 ESW and RHRSW pipeway Yes 570 None 123D 268-0 Access hatch area Yes 544 None 123E 251-0 RHRSW valve compartment Yes 560 Cable insu 123F 237-0 RHRSW pipeway Yes 544 None (1) These smoke detectors are located below the suspended ceiling in the control room. | |||
(2) These smoke detectors are located aDove the suspended ceiling in the control room. | |||
(3) These smoke detectors are installed below the ceiling in the auxiliary equipment room. | |||
(4) The smoke detectors are installed below the raised floor in the auxiliary equipment room, and do not include the smoke detectors inside the PGCC floor sections. | |||
ww | |||
4 LC3 FPER SHEET 17 of 17 TA8LE A-1 (Cont'd) | |||
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION. | |||
FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUFPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY lAL CLASS . QUANTITY LOADING) | |||
(Ib/ft (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 - '. Hose station Manuel 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual lation C 557 lb 0.14 1- 0 3 3 0 0 0 - - hose station Manual-B Negligible 0.22 2 0 0 3 0 3 0 Smoke 4 - - | |||
lation C 250 lb 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - - - | |||
0 0 3 O 3 - - - - | |||
- - - - 0 0 0 3 3 0 - - - - | |||
lation C 258 lb 0.57 4- 0 0 0 3 0 0 Smoke 2 - - | |||
- - - - 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - - - | |||
i B Negligible 0.22 2 0 0 0 3 3 0 Smoke 4 - - | |||
lation C 250 lb | |||
- - . . 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - - - | |||
- - - - 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - - - | |||
t 0 0 3 0 3 0 - - - - | |||
atior C 258 lb 0.57 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 Smoke 2 - - | |||
0 0 3 0 0 3 - - - - | |||
s r D | |||
) | |||
i b | |||
8 d | |||
~ | |||
,i | |||
' ~ " " | |||
'; LGS FPER m | |||
2- , TABLE A-2 | |||
/ | |||
s HEAT'0F COMBUSTION VALUES 8 .: | |||
s ,. | |||
.,s, | |||
. HEAT OF COMBUSTION MATERIAL (Btu /lb) | |||
. ~ Solids, Charcoal n. 12,920 Battery cases (butadiene acrylonitrile) 14,000 | |||
.Electrica}, cable insulation and 9,950 jacketing , ,, | |||
! Liquids M | |||
: . Lubricating oils and lubricants (1) 20,400 | |||
: n. . | |||
l | |||
, t Fuel oil (1) 19,800 1 | |||
9 % | |||
j3)Oilh-is assumed to weigh 7.2 pounds per gallon- | |||
/ Y | |||
* * .n e a | |||
.} | |||
.R - | |||
y .s. | |||
\- | |||
h ~~ | |||
*' \ d Ns ., b ' N. | |||
s | |||
\ e N | |||
%' m,.w N | |||
; c | |||
. . . \ * ,\ | |||
, t .A | |||
't . a | |||
,,J-* % , | |||
b's t, , a \.s, | |||
\ \- | |||
@[ s. s s | |||
4 A r , - | |||
l - .. | |||
p. | |||
_ s | |||
.a,. | |||
,i _s ' i | |||
. 4*- 'l, - * | |||
\ | |||
% s ..- | |||
' . s | |||
- s i | |||
, \ '' , | |||
s- 1.; | |||
sa g , | |||
' . - . . . -,,,,.--,---.,.--,.-,_..,_,.---.--,-.-..-,-,,-,,e.,..--- ao * - - - - . , , , , - - - - - , - - - , , | |||
-------------mWe-- rn-e-.e-- ,- , -- 4 A-, n - '*'*' - | |||
l l | |||
' LGS FPER O. . | |||
TABLE A ', (Page 1 of 3) | |||
INSULATION AND' JACKETING MATERIALS USED FOR ELECTRICAL CABLING CABLE APPLICATION INSULATION JACKETING Communication Polyvinyl chloride Polyvinyl chloride Lighting Thermoplastic (THHN, None THWN, on THW) | |||
Instrumentation Cross-linked Neoprene polyethylene Flamtrol (flame- Flamtrol retardant cross-linked ') | |||
polyolefin) | |||
Coaxial and triaxial Cross-linked Cross-linked polyolefin polyolefin 600V control Cross-linxed Neoprene O polyethylene Rubber ; Neoprene i | |||
Rockbestos P.ockbestos "Heatzone I" "Heatzone I" 600V power Cross-linked Neoprene polyethylene Ethylene propylene Hypalon rubber 5-kV and 15-kV Ethylene propylene Hypalon power rubber Ethylene propylene Semi-conducting rubber chlorinated polyethylene O | |||
I l | |||
1 LGS FPER TABLE A-3 (Cont'd) | |||
(Page 2 of 3) | |||
CABLE APPLICATION INSUL TION JACKETING j | |||
Computer cables Cross-linked Neoprene polyethylene Rayolin F (cross-linked Flamtrol radiation-resistant polyolefin) | |||
Multi-conductor (1) Cross-linked Neoprene polyethylene Multi-conductor Cross-linked Neoprene or (shielded)(1) polyethylene or cross-linked cross-linked polyolefin modified polyolefin Twisted shielded Cross-linked Cross-linked pairs (1) polyalkene and poly- modified polyolefin vinylidene fluoride Thermocouple (1) Cross-linked Cross-linked O'i polyethylene polyethylene Coaxial (RG type)(1) Cross-linked Cross-linked polyethylene polyethylene Coaxial (twin Alkaneimide polymer Cross-linked | |||
, conductor)(1) cross-linked polyethylene l polyolefin i | |||
Coaxial (high Cross-linked Cross-linked temperature, polyethylene polyethylene radiation resistant)(1) i* | |||
I O | |||
l | |||
LGS FPER TABLE A-3 (Cont'd) (Page 3 of 3) | |||
CABLE APPLICATION INSULATION JACKETING _ , | |||
Twisted pairs or Polyalkene and poly- Cross-linked twisted triples vinylidene fluoride polyvinylidene (high performance)(8) fluoride and cross-linked polyolefin i | |||
I (1)These cables are associated with the PGCC. | |||
(2) Insulation for lighting cables is specified as flame retardant in accordance with the National Electric Code. | |||
Insulation and jacketing for all other cables, with the exception of communications cables, are specified to meet the IEEE No. 383 flame test requirements. | |||
(3) Ignition of electrical cabling, in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling, is extremely unlikely. The consequences of an overload condition are minimized by conservative cable ratings and by the use of overload devices in power circuits and fault current interrupting i | |||
O devices in essentially all circuits. In addition, cable insulation and jacketing materials are chosen for their fire retardant and self-extinguishing properties, such l | |||
, that fuel contribution to a cable fire is minimized and propagation of a fire along cables is self-limiting. | |||
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f E2. C I i | |||
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+eh. CIRCULATla4G WATER PUMP STRUCTURE | |||
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I O | |||
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@l N *ih I t =. r f | |||
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m t.) a 5'$"~ .. ,@1,. | |||
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x u.a n .u . .-:::. . - < | |||
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>{.' | |||
g m... . r .1.'.I. i | |||
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1 a '">'" h""" . ''l. | |||
6., g LIMERICK GENER ATING STATION A | |||
l g ;] h bb ai pa j | |||
r U.i.nc ' | |||
UNITS 1 AND 2 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION REPORT I F w | |||
. .i 6 | |||
:1 6::t . ;i. " | |||
4 | |||
'[' | |||
_I'_eA GD,, | |||
2 _ ...... | |||
Ef | |||
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,.g T.;!.'.'g%, '.*."' **".'.*ah | |||
: n. FlRE PROTECTION SYSTEM P&lD | |||
_,Y.j!1 t t tutotunt . .P te p | |||
{ | |||
FIGURE B-2 SHEET 1 OF 2 | |||
; 4 3 l , | |||
I 2 l 1 | |||
8' **. M H | |||
M f WTT1 1 essw.5,r e.ctes e g . | |||
. D l 3 .. I-b J1t' . m._'t; | |||
_ .. ei ., t. .,. a _ .. a ,0. . . o , . . .. - | |||
1, ,4 +, j | |||
* 3, i ma :- | |||
"a | |||
,l | |||
;c | |||
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n n. o..m | |||
<w . .r:;ETr.' | |||
s.1 o i. . 3r- t f -, | |||
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t g , | |||
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. ..a r.j n .m . | |||
+ | |||
et f.F F !I .m. | |||
*d r ... '*. g | |||
: V* a a | |||
- .6nr. . .rprist), | |||
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me m | |||
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n n< | |||
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a:rvtT fi.7s)UL | |||
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3 e. | |||
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e .. %I..st T.t.tus.fet..? | |||
m 'r | |||
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tat.fL | |||
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q. | |||
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s -; ........... | |||
c . . . . . . ... . . .. ... ... . _ . . . . | |||
,a,- >-(.,_y m | |||
<~ | |||
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m.............s :r ...~..-..u~. .. | |||
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. . .n .. a, ~.. '. | |||
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m .. . . . | |||
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_ u ..u.. | |||
v.eical att.e ee sen. .tra sysitu * ~a a = v. m | |||
* tt 7 a.L C . | |||
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, , , , Yv.iCat p.t . .C Tso. m. | |||
....m... 3 ...1 | |||
>3 1 nie = | |||
e ' *7 '[ | |||
@~ - h - e **'.*n"'" . . , - | |||
., u .u 3.,,,,@, | |||
:g . + | |||
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soie. ..tvi. | |||
, , . . , , , + - - , ** 3.. | |||
-rm. | |||
wi .> !.n-"*. s | |||
.a | |||
,a. "= .- un.n m... , | |||
g._ ..,u.....,,...,./ | |||
q., r ret TypsCat asp?owatic <c, gygyg u,.yo,,,,,,,,,,,,) | |||
serm y S . 9 Net 5, Situ 7..ic.L . : | |||
W 4 5 6 I | |||
l | |||
rwr ~ a- | |||
: o ,...,u , . . a. . | |||
g --c..... | |||
T.TTill fTJTT | |||
.l :IS . ..m.m. a ---- -- | |||
r c... ... | |||
1- e ra ra | |||
" . am i I | |||
C. - | |||
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n.rrr =m c a _ _ _ | |||
_- <m-"._ %, | |||
+ r n n.. | |||
3 | |||
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. . . . - -,.-m_ t | |||
.: M ,' T EE) .n ." # ' , , $. i n. i. ] , .sb . ".4. . ' . . , | |||
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puun l | |||
Ta M ...,"i " .9 . | |||
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"*'"I | |||
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u d.n LL* it j . | |||
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g, 1 | |||
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p , a , " *<,r, .,:m | |||
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E C"%, me gg ,. ... , , ' ~b | |||
- p .. m . . . . - , . . | |||
b | |||
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--- r i. ,,.;-- ~ - ny F.1 | |||
-g u,r | |||
..a u, a os .,e.us mu MRI EI ' #"" .:$ = [, | |||
,r.,T-], g | |||
- - , , -j - | |||
g "gy' _ _ , ,, . . | |||
=.= g,g | |||
: .wsr | |||
- m i - | |||
wr~ h. , .e.. d..- ! | |||
li t C f .f- ..,,0,. mew, WsI4 i -t - - - | |||
r m ge%:,r.D.'l g.ctog,.e . | |||
m,Fu - | |||
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t A . . * | |||
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* g ltj ji | |||
--.r.*r.* * | |||
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SI | |||
.^ s FutL O,tt.u,0.aG t | |||
's .5 ,b -"" | |||
-M g, ![- ,_ | |||
i . . | |||
_m$.8 .= t- w p. ''III' | |||
- g- | |||
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ke w- ,' ,..x:.1 _y | |||
: w.;.a | |||
_ , c .... s. | |||
[ g s | |||
_f. Q. c.y. 4 (e i | |||
g. | |||
3 I | |||
n oo.u *'t . | |||
.r. | |||
s . | |||
3 0 i i Eli 4Es l | |||
_j Is | |||
' D -b. u | |||
:g h rN. ' *d * | |||
'h r... . | |||
.'' | |||
* T' .','l '" | |||
l 't.pt i corso? | |||
31 ., -- | |||
.., ,, - 7 .,;;- - - | |||
t g p,-. g i,. | |||
- .!.?'?. ._ | |||
i.u u nem . m,c t n. | |||
L ir-,- | |||
: u. n.a.. .wm.o | |||
. .n n m = =..u .. n .... ,u mnot n. = m u .w. n .. | |||
. ......... o P" ' | |||
l' :! :''.u'o','ll, nuer "mu m H | |||
^ | |||
Un*_ ., ._.f=_. f.. . | |||
u.o.. ..m.m mn. amn= =n * - = - u m n = n u.s.a | |||
.....6_'......... | |||
... aa ..u == n. m .. at . =. =. | |||
m.u. . n... a | |||
-_J t. _- + - n . . g. | |||
n,, r..y . ,,, , u. .o..m. o.. | |||
, . .!: ',;',' . ..',1!? VY m acc. m.c= =__ | |||
( | |||
Y ,x.,,... | |||
- a =.. -.. , o m.u.n. : | |||
um .r.n i n. . | |||
. , n u. n =,n a n .n a m.u. .mm ...u.-.. | |||
, ; a | |||
-,......u ...... | |||
.a.n.n .n .a .n..m. | |||
... .. m man n, nm ...... .u..m. | |||
n . mn nmm .. m. | |||
, a.tu.. . . . .. . ... . . m g...... | |||
. q.. | |||
,. . . . .. n ..~..~.. ~- .. ....o | |||
. . .=.. .... | |||
m er m.c= m | |||
,.. .n | |||
. Q. -- | |||
,,, c,. ,,,,m ,a | |||
. .. a. ,,n;, ) 7,mu .mu m..- pam _ __ ,. . | |||
w.- %_.-.g n .c.o .,, _ ,co...,.., | |||
_, ,; , , _ _ _ tg - , , , . . . o. ... i . | |||
.... . ..u .. m., | |||
ia,9 *_4.& | |||
* c o,, . m .m, -.>~ m= n-n= - - - * . -n - | |||
__.4t** n | |||
.s.m .. _ | |||
4 _ _ _ ~~ . m. .. | |||
.u,,u,; | |||
~..4..'*, | |||
. . ,m,, 4* | |||
, ,. , .., ,. .n,. .'m.a.ipn m. w m. .. | |||
m... n. .n .m.. n. .n a... | |||
rrrr ''" '' | |||
_ _ , _ _ ..__ _u_u,m ;q i .. . | |||
, ., ,..,... ,n. , ,.,.n, | |||
,.,.,.n,., . , . .. , . | |||
..n. n | |||
,0.':r.". u % rm jm .I.; o "',; ~ ~ 7.*:." "' .::::7,i'" "" | |||
g2".tr.' lW;;.P:P "i,:." "" | |||
. ... (""*" l " | |||
2f :.: g p.= .::: 1;::r: | |||
g y , l"m,, !; | |||
CJr.'.i . | |||
g ?l | |||
.... . ... n. . . | |||
f j ::;; i ;;~ | |||
l . , | |||
.= | |||
n::': i::' :.;.;.;. | |||
,n'Q g s.....it e s,s ,t u - * * ' * " " n ... . | |||
g .. | |||
= an ne m.= In..== . | |||
v . | |||
3 m.4 .ni.2_ | |||
n p . . .. .,.,.e , | |||
. e.....i .ng " " ' | |||
: n. m i | |||
= | |||
: g. . g g | |||
.= | |||
.. c v . .) t | |||
: a. a .a i 4 c ..e w ... .ac.g, h rea" l _ s e'c acs ..- | |||
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 | |||
<u c.,,,4.. . . , c u . . t's . | |||
l 1 -- | |||
FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION REPORT | |||
. tin L -- | |||
je ten .x r | |||
r . ir a. a -. . " ...- | |||
';.," r' :.' :: * -3. .n i n .~ | |||
.r."".'.". | |||
* n'r*%'' | |||
't'!?.':* - | |||
.h-5." O | |||
"'.'t;;.?"' FIRE PROTECT 10N SYST EM P&lD bt ..c.1#. G 0. C Ds.. 0. f e.CLO.u.9 FIGURE B.2 SHEET 2 OF 2 s l 4 l 3 l 2 1 1 | |||
r | |||
*wr% 1 to en en y e.; )is xx - | |||
g.;,e,=,r .\ C | |||
.. s | |||
'fte!7.'. g ='ar \ N e -+<*' t r. .,,. U s s u / | |||
9 t * * | |||
~3 4.a.,;.f/ | |||
m s i -r'i,? | |||
= >/ ,:,l:,:" | |||
u | |||
// | |||
fa"78 | |||
%.. .',~. | |||
. g.3y | |||
$$:;i17.W%f* G A m | |||
1r t | |||
/j Ef7G }.1pw'a,,/15. | |||
v- | |||
\ .5 -6 . | |||
: f. .Y* , , . | |||
m,{ | |||
/s'. -.- | |||
'~t.?Dt*/ Ei,& | |||
IRLV 4.,.y,h -- | |||
gg / | |||
,,g,,,; y_ ,g H 4 gemen | |||
< w | |||
<\i,u_i , q | |||
=o ODh eL s u M. .W. f no 4 sa me9 Ol | |||
- .Em | |||
\' | |||
um . \,,,,. t., q | |||
., e mia.no ... | |||
\ dre 897 , | |||
D4 MT! WLWT | |||
\ | |||
N 4 post eucatosi ave (riv) | |||
V da m m - | |||
n (;,M?d g | |||
J tvu mtamet wms aest wut 'titilldr-e c. a e ru ar O m em w FW HYEWANTSCHEOl/LE 1 1:: .r+ v:- w | |||
@$f_]NOff. .ms f VALVE ' HEDULE d-jdhj!!![-!M- "Tir!-i'J- | |||
.-(Ii. | |||
g | |||
:::; ':a* -nc T441AF :!F .-- | |||
mn m,.,%, | |||
," -.6c | |||
.zg | |||
~e. n~~~ r< '^ | |||
+-v o-=l;- | |||
~I s a~T jQip uT~nifw '** *IfY ~ I !*^"V Jt -.t* l' ' '*'V h,,~p ..w i ., ,''m$ . u ?, ,, | |||
se au eaw ~~w TT "To su- | |||
<-db~ r,or7P Ig,,r__p_.sgo+ ,F | |||
, . m-e < | |||
9 d," | |||
.J $mdk es"% | |||
1 w_.rr a4 lL_j O c.a w r=w4 I | |||
i A e so ~ *r i | |||
. _ , . L. T , T,T- | |||
.T .T .T . | |||
T | |||
.g5 | |||
, .u | |||
' M!. | |||
g j, A G M - | |||
Wr r r r 'r | |||
~ | |||
, I T T~~r , , , | |||
f 'S 'e Q''"y*~* | |||
h**2* %x %I, I'. | |||
f ."a"l*" C a ,, | |||
~,~,,r | |||
, , , , , *~ L**;",n , "~O yo.g hD STIar=~ | |||
' " ~ " | |||
s '~$'lhl *- | |||
f.'~~ M = k | |||
[''"' | |||
q w ,,y,J A msupWaYQ''b,**g*? | |||
~ '' * * " " | |||
'?K. " "" pe?,EgQ?3, h-5Ef".JA[,*o" , j F | |||
MD 0000 ) % J 'r%" | |||
=nny~ , =. | |||
, *= ~~ ; - -Q/* , l * ;w%% ,2 := | |||
g ww - ~~~ Y & *' t-)~55 | |||
~~ | |||
t.T va.t,.v.. | |||
E/ T .::;,_ | |||
"" ..r g Ci* | |||
fl,*~[,, zwr gg | |||
"~ | |||
n gesum. | |||
Wa 4 .f$;, gere-N-P.nt'rreu s a | |||
+ g[E'".,, | |||
-mas JN 'i_ @F f T.'7.*!. s a *' a j "m | |||
,, t $f= | |||
J6gra.'"A | |||
',' ,4 = | |||
_ i aigrea.EH- Tsu r= ==~ | |||
exa a+ M 'f 4 / No - | |||
ram i | |||
f3 gsy | |||
'~ | |||
as j f | |||
"~' | |||
( 'W"$',, " - | |||
,,,,,,, 74% ,, . 9 flHH ', | |||
*~"fg Q fhb n-y | |||
/1T!.". Ags | |||
/ m= ~ | |||
k L_ S.1 j,11tlW | |||
~ | |||
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. .}} |
Latest revision as of 13:55, 6 January 2021
ML20064K621 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Limerick ![]() |
Issue date: | 03/17/1981 |
From: | PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20064K619 | List: |
References | |
NUDOCS 8103190570 | |
Download: ML20064K621 (365) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.. _ _- . _ - . . . -_ 1 O Fire Protection
- Evaluation Report O
Limerick Generating Station Units 1 Et 2 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY O 810 3 l'90 57k
LGS FPER TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION e CHAPTER 2 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2.1 Fire Protection Water Supply Systems 2.2 Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems 2.3 Pre-action Sprinker Systems 2.4 Deluge Systems 2.5 Water Spray for Charcoal Filters () 2.6 2.7 Wet Standpipes and Hose Stations Foam Extinguishing System 2.8 Low Pressure Carbon Dioxide System 2.9 Halon Extinguishing Systems 2.10 Portable Fire Extinguishers 2.11 Fire and Smoke Detection System CHAPTER 3 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION ASB 9.5-1 3.1 Detailed Comparison to Appendix A of Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 3.2 Explanatory Notes CHAPTER 4 EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL FIRE HA2ARDS () 4.1 Scope of Evaluation _i_
1 LGS FPER , 4.2 Procedure CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE SAFE SHUTDOWN 5.1 Methodology 5.2 Description of Reactor Shutdown Methods 5.3 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Control Structure 5.4 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Unit 1 Reactor Enclosure 5.5 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Unit 2 Reactor Enclosure 5.6 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Diesel-Generator Enclosure 5.7 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Spray Pond Pump Structure 5.8 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Turbine Enclosure 5.9 Safe Shutdown Analysis - Radwaste Enclosure APPENDIX A TABLES A-1 Fire Protection Evaluation A-2 Heat of Combustion Values A-3 Insulation and Jacketing Materials Used for Electrical Cabling APPENDIX B FIGURES B-1 P&ID Legend and Symbols B-2 Fire Protection System P&ID
-ii-
I 1 l LGS FPER B-3 Fire Protection Water Supply Yard Piping B-4 General Floor Plan, El. 162'-0", 177'-0", 180'-0" B-5 General Floor Plan, El. 191'-0", 195'-0", 200'-0", 201-0" B-6 General Floor Plan, El. 217'-0" B-7 General Floor Plan, El. 237'-0", 239'-0", 253'-0", 254'-0" B-8 General Floor Plan, El. 257'-0", 269'-0", 283'-0", 289'-0", 300'-3" B-9 General Floor Plan, El. 302'-0", 304'-0", 3'13'-0", 331'-0" B-10 General Floor Plan, El. 332'-0", 350'-0", 352'-0" B-11 Spray Pond Pump Structure, El. 237'-0" B-12 Spray Pond Pump Structure, El. 251'-0", 268'-0" O
-lii-
LGS FPER O CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION On September 30, 1976, the Director of the Division of Project Management, of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, requested a re-evaluation of the fire protection program for the Limerick Generating Station. Atcached to that document was Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1, " Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976". The following report was prepared in response to that request and discusses the fire protection program as it relates to nuclear safety ar.d addresses our conformance to Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1. It is the philosophy of Philadelphia Electric Co. (PECo) that fire protection be provided for all company facilities to minimize the effects of a fire. Therefore, proper fire protection was an original design objective for the Limerick Generating Station. Responsibility for the fire protection program is vested in PECo managerial personnel in the same manner
,_ as other operating and design responsibilities. To support these responsibilities, PECo employs qualified fire protection
(' personnel to ensure an adequate fire protection program is provided. Bechtel Power Corporation provided the fire protection engineers and consultants to develop the design concept, preparation of specifications, and selection of experienced fire protection contractors. Bechtel has designed the fire protection cystems for several operating nuclear plants and has a specialized staff that monitors the latest in fire protection methods. The term " fire protection system" refers to the integrated complex of components and equipment provided for detection and l suppression of fires. In addition to this system, the " fire protection program" includes the concepts of design and layout implemented to prevent or mitigate fires, administrative controls and procedures, and personnel training. The fire protection program uses a defense-in-depth approach aimed at preventing fires, minimizing the effect of any fires that occur, providing i appropriate fire detection and suppression equipment, and training personnel in fire prevention and fire fighting. The Limerick Generating Station has been evaluated with regard to l fire protection to verify that the total fire protection program provides reasonable assurance that a fire will not prevent the n (_,/ performance of necessary safe shutdown functions and will not cause an undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Chapter 2 of this report provides a general description of the l l 1-1
LGS FPER ftre detection and suppression systems provided for the Limerick Generating Station. Chapter 3 presents a point-by-point comparison of the LGS fire protection program with the guidelines set forth in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1. Chapter 4 provides an evaluation of the combustible loadings in the plant and the ability of specific fire barriers to withstand postulated fires. Chapter 5 provides an evaluation of the ability to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire in any fire area, to O O 1-2
LGS FPER CHAPTER 2 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION This section provides a description of the fire suppression and fire detection systems. The specific guidelines contained in Appendix A of Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1 are addressed in Chapter 3. Figure B-1 shows the legend and symbols for P& ids. The P&ID for the fire protection system is shown in Figure B-2. 2.1 FIRE PROTECTION WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS 2.1.1 Water Source The source of water for the fire protection system is two cooling tower basins which have a capacity of 7,200,000 gallons each, for a total capacity of 14,400,000 gallons. For a system pumping capacity of 5000 gpm, this allows continuous operation of both gQ fire pumps for 48 hours. If one cooling tower basin or supply
\_/ line is not available, the remaining water source provides both fire pumps with a 24-hour supply of water. Water for the fire pumps is taken from either Unit 1 or Unit 2 cooling tower water basins through connections to the circulating water lines. Check valves are installed at the pump discharges to prevent water from one source from being pumped into the other source.
2.1.2 Pumps There are two horizontal centrifugal-type fire pumps, eacit rated for 2500 gpm at 125 psig total head. The lead pump is electric motor-driven and the 100% capacity backup pump is diesel engine-driven. The pumps and their controllers are UL-listed. The fire water system is sufficient to maintain a pressure of 65 psig with a flow of 500 gpm at the highest elevation of each standpipe. When the fire pumps are not running, the standpipes are maintained full of water by a 2-inch connection to the service water system which is capable of replenishing 50 gpm for leakage. When a portion of the fire water system is activated, a low pressure switch set at 100 psig starts the motor-driven pump automatically. If the motor-driven pump fails to start, the diesel-driven pump starts upon a lower pressure signal setpoint of 95 psig. Both pumps are stopped manually. () The electric power for the motor-driven fire pump is taken from a load center that is supplied from the non-Class IE 13-kV O 2-1
l l LGS FPER I 1 switchgear. The primary power source for the switchgear is the unit auxiliary transformer, and the secondary power source is the offsite power supplies. If the primary power source fails, the switchgear is automatically transferred to one of the two offsite power supplies. Switching from one offsite power supply to the other can be performed manually from the control room. The diesel oil supply tank for the diesel engine has a capacity of 550 gallons. This volume is sufficient to allow operation of the diesel engine for approximately 40 hours at full pump capacity. The fire pumps are located at one end of the circulating water pump structure north of.the power block. The motor-driven fire pump and its controls are in an area common with the circulating water pumps and are protected by hose reels and portable fire extinguishers. The diesel-driven fire pump and controls are in a separate compartment whose floor, ceiling, walls, and door are rated as 3-hour fire barriers. The diesel oil day tank is located in a curbed area within the diesel-dris'n fire pump compartment. This compartment is provided with an automatic sprinkler system. 2.1.3 Yard Piping Fire protection water is distributed to the various areas of the h plant from a yard fire main loop which completely encircles the power block. The connections to the yard fire main loop from the two fire pumps located in the circulating water pump structure are spaced about 6 feet apart and are provided with valving so that either connection can be isolated while retaining 100% water supply capacity to the yard fire main. The routing of the yard fire main loop and its branch piping is shown on Figure A-3. The yard fire main loop consists of 12-inch cement-lined cast iron piping which is buried below the frost line. The west and east ends of the loop are cross-connected by piping which traverses the Unit 1 and Unit 2 turbine enclosures. Locked-open post indicator valves provide sectionalized control and isolation of portions of the fire main loop. There are 12 yard bydrants spaced at intervals of 250 to 300 feet along the fire main loop. Each hydrant is provided with a key-operated 6-inch gate valve with a curb box. Five hose cart houses are located in the yard area in the vicinity of the hydrants, each enclosing a hose cart which can be manually moved to any hydrant where it is needed. The system cf hydrants connected to the fire main loop is designed in accordance with NFPA 24. O 2-2
LGS FPER O V 2.2 WET PIPE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS Wet pipe sprinkler systems are provided to protect the following areas and equipment:
- a. Turbine enclosure - feedwater pump lube oil reservoir compartments
- b. Turbine enclosure - lube oil storage tanks and electro-hydraulic control power unit
- c. Turbine enclosure - main turbine lube oil reservoir and lube oil centrifuge area
- d. Turbine enclosure - main turbine condenser area
- e. Turbine enclosure - main turbine moisture separator area
- f. Reactor enclosure - electric cable penetration areas at elevations 253 and 283 feet
- g. Radwaste enclosure compactor area
() h. i. Lube oil storage enclosure Auxiliary boiler enclosure
- j. Warehouse, machine shop, and construction shop
- k. Circulating water pump structure - diesel fire pump compartment.
- 1. Administration building - offices and engineering lab Each wet pipe sprinkler system consists of an outside screw and yoke (OS&Y) gate valve, an alarm check valve assembly, piping, and fusible element sprinkler heads.
Wet pipe sprinkler system operation is initiated when ambient temperature rises to the melting point of fusible links on sealed sprinkler heads, thus causing the spray heads to open. The flow of water through alarm check valves energizes a flow switch which transmits the alarm condition to the fire protection panels in the control room. l l The wet pipe sprinkler system operation is terminated manually by shutting the OS&Y gate valve. 2-3
LGS FPER 2.3 PRE-ACTION SPRINKLER SYSTEMS Pre-action sprinkler systems are provided to protect the following areas and equipment:
- a. Reactor enclosure - HPCI pump compartment
- b. Reactor enclosure - RCIC pump compartment
- c. Standby diesel-generator compartments
- d. Turbine enclosure - railroad access area
- e. Turbine enclosure - generator equipment area
- f. Turbine enclosure - under the turbine's appearance lagging and turbine bearing housings 1 through 9
- g. Turbine enclosure - reactor recirculation pump motor-generator set.
Each pre-action sprinkler system is automatically actuated by a rate-compensated heat detector. The temperature sensor releases a tripping device to open the deluge valve, thus supplying water under pressure to the closed sprinkler heads. A rise in ambient temperature to the melting point of the fusible links on the sealed sprinkler heads causes the spruy heads to open, with subsequent water flow through those heads which have opened. Actuation of the temperature responsive device also initiates a local alarm, and registers an alarm condition on the fire protection panels in the control room. The dry-pipe system from the air check valve to the sprinkler heads is pressurized with instrument air. On loss of air pressure, a low pressure switch energizes a local alarm and registars an alarm condition in the control room. Both deluge valve operation and loss of pressure in the sprinkler system are separately annunciated in the control room. High or low air supply pressure downstream of the pressure regulator to the dry-pipe system is annunciated in the control room. 2.4 DELUGE SYSTEMS Deluge systems are provided to protect the following areas and equipment:
- a. Main transformers, auxiliary transformers, and safeguard transformers (all located outdoors) 2-4 l
l
LGS FPER O b. Generator hydrogen seal oil-unit
- c. Main turbine lube oil reservcir and lube oil centrifuge.
Operation of a deluge sprinkler system is initiated by a fixed temperature detector. This sensor detects a fixed high temperature and releases a tripping device to open the deluge valve, thus supplying water under pressure to the open spray heads. Actuation of the temperature responsive device also initiates a local alarm, and registers the alarm condition on the fire protection panels in the control room, independently of water flow in the system. Manual release of the deluge valve tripping device, or actuation by the local hand switch, also initiates local and remote alarms. 2.5 WATER SPRAY FOR CHARCOAL FILTERS Charcoal filters in the ventilation systems of the plant are provided with water spray systems for fire protection. The water is supplied to the filters by means of a fixed piping system. An indicating gate valve is manually opened when a heat detector actuates a local alarm system and registers an alarm condition on O the fire protection panels in the control room. The operation is terminated manually by shutting the gate valve.
. 2.6 WET STANDPIPES AND HOSE STATIONS Wet standpipes are designed for Class III service in accordance with NFPA 14. All areas in the power block are within reach of at least one effective hose stream. Each hose station has 100 feet of 1-1/2 inch woven, jacket-lined fire hose. Hose stations are located outside entrances to normally unoccupied areas, and outside both entrances of the control room.
Adjustable fog and straight-stream nozzles are provided for all hose reels. 2.7 FOAM EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM 1 A foam system is provided for the protection of the fuel oil transfer structure and two outdoor fuel oil storage tanks, and is designed in accordance with NFPA 11. The foam is educted from a foam solution tank by water from the main fire water header. Contacts are provided to annunciate operation of the system in O the control room. l 2-5 i
3 LGS FPER The two storage tanks are each provided with a fixed foam maker at the tank. Foam making is initiated manually from a local station after a high temperature condition at one of the tanks has been alarmed locally and annunciated on the fire protection panels in the control room. Fire protection inside the fuel oil transfer structure is provided by a foam playpipe with hose rack. When the playpipe is removed from its holder, an electric switch located in the holder actuates a control valve to allow foam solution to enter the hose. A squeeze-type playpipe valve enables the operator to control the flow of foam. 2.8 LOW PRESSURE CARBON DIOXIDE SYSTEM The low pressure CO, tystem is designed in accordance with NFPA 12. In addition to the total flooding CO, system provided for the cable spreading rooms, CO, fire protection is provided by CO, hose reels in the 13.2 kV switchgear compartment, outside both entrances to the control room, and along the north side of the turbine enclosure operating deck. The design discharge rate of the total flooding CD, system in the cable spreading room is based on reaching a 50% concentration within 7 minutes. The storage tank has sufficient capacity to maintain a 50% concentration in both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable spreading rooms simultaneously for a period of 1 hour, while leaving a reserve in the tank for hose reel operation. The total flooding CO, system provided for the cable spreading room is actuated by heat detectors. A predischarge alarm sounds locally and in the control room. HVAC system penetrations into the area are sealed off by steam isolation dampers which close automatically when the CO, system is actuated. CO, hose reels are activated by removing a playpipe from its holder. An electric switch, located in the playpipe holder, actuates a control valve to allow CO, into the hose. A squeeze-type playpipe valve enables the operator to control the flow of the CO, discharge. 2.9 HALON EXTINGUISHING SYSTEMS , Two separate Halon extinguishing systems are provided in the auxiliary equipment room. One system serves the Unit 1 side of the room and the second system serves the Unit 2 side of the room. Each system discharges simultaneously into all floor sections in its respective half of the auxiliary equipment room. 2-6
LGS FPER The flooring in'the auxiliary equipment room consists of 1-foot high floor sections resting on the concrete slab at elevation 283 feet. The floor sections are of all-steel construction and are used for the routing of cabling to and from the electrical equipment located in the room. This equipment includes the power generation control complex (PGCC) equipment, the plant computers, the remote shutdown panels, the Samac panels, a tone cabinet, an oscillograph,'and possibly three panels of vibration and loose i parts monitoring equipment. The PGCC for each unit consists of ten floor sections that are 8 feet wide and 20 feet'long, each of which has vertical panels mounted near the center of the floor section. A termination cabinet is located at the end of each PGCC floor section. Smoke and fire detectors are located in the termination cabinets. Each Halon extinguishing system consists of a pair of cylinders (pressurized with dry nitrogen) containing liquified Halon 1301 at ambient temperature, plus distribution piping, spray nozzles, a control panel, a manual actuation switch, heat detectors, and product-of-combustion (ionization) detectors. The product-of-combustion detectors actuate early warning alarms both locally and in the control room. The heat detectors actuate pre-discharge alarms followed by discharge of the Halon after a time delay. The Halon extinguishing systems are designed in O accordance with NFPA 12A. Each Halon system is designed to achieve a concentration of 20% by volume within the raised flooring that it serves, with a
- concentration of 6% by volume being reached within 10 seconds !
after discharge begins. The first Halon cylinder is discharged autematically and has sufficient capacity to maintain the 20% concentration for 20 minutes. The remaining Halon cylinder, which is manually discharged, provides a 100% reserve capacity. 2.10 PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS ' Portable fire extinguishers, using extinguishing agents compatible with the combustible material in the area in which they are located, are provided throughout the plant. ,, 2.11 FIRE AND SMOKE DETECTION SYSTEM ! The fire and smoke detection system is in compliance with NFPA 72A. The system also complies with the requirements of NFPA 72D for a Class B system with the following exceptions: ()
- a. No device is provided for permanently recording incoming signals with the date and time of receipt.
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LGS FPER
- b. Operation and supervision of the system is not the primary function of the operators.
- c. In lieu of complete reliance on NFPA 72E, smoke and fire detector locations are established by a qualified fire protection engineer.
Fire and smoke monitoring, detection, and alarm are accomplished by installing smoke detectors and/or heat-responsive detectors in areas where fire potencial exists. Fire and smoke detection systems for annunciaticn are separate from fire detection systems for actuation of fire extinguishing systems. The fire and smoke detection system is electrically supervised to detect circuit breaks, ground faults, and power failure. All fire or trouble alarms register on the audible-visual annunciator on the fire protection panels in the control room. O O 2-8 i
i LGS FPER - CHAPTER 3 COMPARISON TO APPENDIX A OF NRC BRANCH TECHNICAL POSITION ASB 9.5-1 The purpose of this chapter is to compare the fire protection provisions of Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Units 1 and 2 with the guidelines in Appendix A to Branch Technical Position ASB 9.5-1. To identify areas of potential impact and to facilitate comparison, a matrix addressing each guideline of Appendix A and relating to the plant systems, equipment, and components, is included as Section 3.1. The matrix has extracted all suggested guidelines from Appendix A and given each an item number 1 through 210. Each item has condensed a particular guideline and makes reference to the page and paragraph in Appendix A where that guideline can be found. The general degree of conformance to the guideline is indicated in the " comparison" column, using codes defined as follows: C - indicates conformance to the guideline or O conformance to its intent. Substantiating statements are included as part of the matrix or the manner of conformance is discussed in Section 3.2. AC - indicates conformance to the guidelines by alternate means or methods. The manner of conformance is included in the matrix or discussed in Section 3.2. i i WC - indicates that design changes, means, or methods are planned in order to conform, or conform to the intent of the guideline. The planned design
- changes, means, or methods and the manner of l conformance are discussed in Section 3.2.
I NC - indicates that the plant is not in conformance and no design changes are planned. The basis for ! non-conformance to the guideline is included in the
- matrix or discussed in Section 3.2.
l l NA - indicates that the guideline is not applicable to
- Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2.
! Substantiating statements are included as part of l the matrix in Section 3.1. ( () In the " remarks" column, additional information is provided to explain or expand on the degree of conformance. Alternatively, 3-1 i
LGS FPER reference may be made to Section 3.2 (or other sections in this report) for a more detailed discussicn. The item numbers in Section 3.2 correspond to those in Section 3.1. O O 3-2
J LGS FPER v SECTION 3.1 DETA.TLED COf8PARISON TO l APPENDIX A OF BRANCH TECHNICAL POSIYION A9B 9. 5-1 ] APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPAPISON REMARKS N3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE Page Item l overall Pequirements of Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Program Management responsibility for 1 A.1 WC See note 1 1. fire protect on program and delegation t authority. Qualification requirements for fire A.1 WC Qualified fire protection engineers of
- 2. 1 the Bechtel Power Corporation provided i
protection engineers. assistance in the development of the l design and equipment specification for the fire protection system. Training of the fire fighting and A.1 WC See note 1
- 3. 1 operating crew.
Responsibilities of the fire pro- 1 A.1 WC See note 1 4. tection staff. 2 A.2 C See Chapters 4 and 5
- 5. The fire protection program should be based on evaluation of potential fire hazards and the ef fect of postulated fires on safety-related systems and radioactivity releases.
2 A.3 C All automatic fire suppression systems
- 6. Backup fire suppression capability should be provided. are backed up by two methods of manual extinguishment (hose stations and oortable extinguishers) .
Primary and backup fire suppression 2 A.4 C See Section 3. 2 7. capability should satisfy the single failure criterion. Ef f ects of lightning strikes should 3 A.4 C Lightning protection is provided per 8. be included in the fire protection NFPA No. 78. program. 3- 3
LGS FPER C3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item
- 9. Failure or inadvertent operation of 3 A.5 NC See Section 3.2 fire suppression systems should not incapacitate saf ety-related systems.
- 10. Fire suppression systems 3 A.5 C Moderate-energy leakage cracks in fire that are pressurized during normal suppression system piping are analyzed plant operation should meet the in accordance with BTP APCSB 3-1.
guidelines specified in BTP APCSB 3-1.
- 11. The fire protection program for new 3 A.6 C The fire protection program for the fuel areas should be fully opera- new fuel area will be completed and tional before fuel is received at fully operational before fuel is the site. received at the site.
- 12. The fire protection program should be 4 A.7 C The fire protection program for each fully operational prior to initial reactor unit will be completed and fuel loading. fully operational prior to initial fuel loading.
- 13. Multiple reactor unit site fire 4 A.8 WC See Section 3.2 protection program.
- 14. Simultaneous fires in more than one 4 A.9 C See Section 3. 2 reactor unit need not be postulated.
Administrative t rocedures, cont rols, and Fire Brigade
- 15. Provision of administrative 4 B.1 WC See note 1 procedures.
- 16. Administrative measures for com- 5 B.2 WC See note 1 bustible material storage.
- 17. Management control of normal and 5 B.3 WC See note 1 abnormal conditions and modifi-cation work to assure adequate fire protection.
- 18. Ignition sources: procedure review 5 B.3.a WC See note 1 and approval, training and equip-ping, fire watch.
- 19. Leak testing should use aerosol 6 B.3.b WC See note i techniques rather than open flames or combustion generated smoke.
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O C LGS FPER O N3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item
- 20. Combustible material usage: 6 B.3.c WP See note 1 control and minimization in safety-related areas.
- 21. The plant should be self-sufficient 6 B.4 WC See note 1 with respect to fire fighting activities, and rely on public fire department only for backup.
- 22. Fire brigades: organization, 7 B.5 WC See note 1 training, and equipping.
- 23. Testing and maintenance of fire 7 B. S. a WC See note 1 protection program.
- 24. Training of fire brigade; drills 8 B. S. b WC See note 1 I quarterly and with local fire department at least annually.
- 25. Training of all shif t members: 8 B.S.c WC See note 1-coordination with and training of local fire department personnel.
- 26. Standards for guidance: NFPA 27, 9 B.S.d WC See note 1 194, 196, 197, 601, and others.
Quality Assurance Proqram
- 27. QA programs of applicants and 10 C AC/WC See Section 3.2 contractors to assure proper control for the fire protection program for safety rela ted areas; program under manage-ment control of the QA organi-zation.
General Guidelines for Plant Protection
- 28. Plant layout should be arranged to 12 D.1.a.1 C Safety-related systems are located in isolate safety-related systems f rom fire areas separate from those unacceptable fire hazards. containing major fire hazards.
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LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item
- 29. Plant layout should be arranged to 12 D.1.a.2 NC See Section 3.2 separate redundant safety-related systems f rom each other.
- 30. Identification of safety-related 13 D. I b C See Section 3. 2 systems and fire hazards.
- 31. Cable spreading rooms should not 13 D.1.c C Cable spreading rooms are not shared be shared between multiple reactor between reator units, units.
- 33. The cable spreading room should 13 D.1.c C Cable spreading room is separated from be separated f rom other areas of the other olant areas by 3-hour barriers.
plant by 3-hour fire barriers.
- 33. Redundant cabling in cable 13 D.1.c NC Cabling associated with redundant spreading room should be separated safety-related systems is routed in by 3-hour barriers. separate raceways which are separated in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75.
- 34. Interior wall and structural 13 D.1.d C See Section 3.2 components, thermal insulation, soundproofing, and radiation shielding materials should be noncombustible.
- 35. Interior finishes should be noncom- 13 D.1.d C See Section 3. 2 bustible or listed by a testing laboratory for flame spread, smoke, and fuel contribution of 25 or less.
- 36. Metal deck roof construction 13 D.1.e AC See Section 3.2 should be noncombustible or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Approval Guide.
- 37. Suspended ceilings and supports 14 D.1.f C The suspended ceiling in the control should be noncombustible. room is of noncombustible construc-tion, consisting of mineral fiber panels resting on a metal grid system which is supported by steel wires.
- 38. Concealed spaces should be devoid 14 D.1.f NC See Section 3.2 of csmbustibles.
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O O LGS FPER O N3. APPEN3IX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item
- 39. High voltage - high amperage trans- 14 D.1.g C All indoor transformers are air formers in buildings containing cooled, dry type, or cooled by non-safety-related systems should be combustible fluids.
dry or cooled with noncombustible liquid.
- 40. Protection of buildings containing 14 D.1.h C All outdoor oil-filled transformers safety-related systems from exposure are located more than 50 feet from or spill fires involving oil-filled any safety-related structure.
transformer.
- 41. Floor drains sized for expected 15 D'.1.1 C Adequate floor drainage is provided fire fighting water flow should be in all plant areas provided with provided f or areas with fixed fixed water fire suppression systems.
suppression systems.
- 42. Floor drains should be provided 15 D.1.i NC See Section 3.2 where needed to prevent fire hose water from causing unacceptable damage to equipment.
- 43. Equipment should be mounted on 15 D.1.1 C Floor-mounted safety-related pedestals, or curbs should be components are raised above floor provided to contain and direct level either by the use of an extended water to floor drains. frame base or by mounting on a pedestal.
- 44. Drains in areas containing com- 15 D.1.1 C See section 3.2 bustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of fire throughout the drain system,
- 45. Water drainage from areas which 15 D.I.i C Potentially radioactive liquid wastes may contain radioactivity should are collected and monitored prior be sampled and analyzed before to discharge.
discharge to environment.
- 46. Floors, walls, and ceilings 15 D.1.j NC See Section 3.2 enclosing separate fire areas should have a minimum fire rating of 3 hours.
- 47. Doors in barriers separating fire 15 D.1.j AC See Section 3.2 areas should be 3-hour rated.
3-7 m
LGS FPER N3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Ttem
- 48. Doors in barriers separating fire 15 D.1.j NC See Section 3.2 areas should be normally closed and locked, or provided with an-nunciation in the control room.
- 49. Ventilation system penetrations in 16 D.1.j C Fire dampers or fire doors, compatible barriers separating fire areas with the fire barrier, are installed should be protected by a standard at all ventilation duct penetrations
" fire door damper" where required. through fire barriers.
Control of Combustibles
- 50. Safety-related systems should be 16 D.2.a C To the maximum extent possible, separated from combustible materials significant concentrations of com-where possible and when not, special bustible materials are located protection should be provided to outside structures containing safety-prevent a fire from defeating the related components. In those cases safety system function, for which this is not possible, such as the standby diesel-generator fuel oil day tanks, special fire pro-tection consisting of automatic fire suppression systems and/or construc-tion capable of withstanding a fire is provided.
- 51. Bulk gas storage (compressed or 16 D.2.b NC See Section 3.2 cryogenic) should not be permitted inside structures housing safety-related equipment. Flammable gases should be stored outdoors or in separate detached buildings.
- 52. Ifigh pressure gas storage 17 D.2.b C High pressure gas storage cylinders containers should be located with are stored vertically.
the long axis parallel to building walls.
- 53. Use of compressed gases inside 17 D.2.b WC See Section 3. 2 buildings should be controlled.
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c O LGS FPER O NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item
- 54. Plastic material usage should be 17 D.2.c C See Section 3.2 minimized. Halogenated plastics such as PVC and neoprene should be used only when substitute non-combustible materials are not available.
- 55. Storage of flammable liquids should 17 D.2.d C Liquid fuels are stored either in comply with NFPA 30. aboveground tanks that have been provided with suitable fire barriers or in underground tanks.
Electrical Cable Construction t Cable Trays and Penetrations
- 56. Only noncombustible materials 18 D.3.a C Aluminum cable trays are used.
should be used for cable tray construction.
- 57. Cable spreading rooms fire 18 D. 3. b -
See items 138 through 151 protection guidelines.
- 58. Automatic water sprinkler 18 D.3.c NC See Section 3. 2 systems should be provided for cable trays outside the cable spreading room.
- 59. Cables should be designed to 18 D.3.c C Cable insulating systems include allow wetting down without proprietary jacketing materials electrical faulting. designed for wetting.
- 60. Cable trays should have manua.i 18 D.3.c AC See Section 3.2 hoses and portable extinguishers provided as backup to automatic sprinklers.
- 61. Safety-related equipment in 18 D.3.c C See Section 3.2 in vicir 'ty of cable trays should be protected from sprinkler system operation or malfunction.
l l l 3-9
LCS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Paqe Item
- 63. Cable and cable tray penetration 18 D.3.d WC see Section 3. 2 of fire barriers should be sealed to give protection equivalent to that of the fire barrier.
The design of fire barriers for cable trays should meet the require-ments of ASTM E-119.
- 63. Fire breaks should be provided as 'd D.3.e C See Section 3. 2 deered necessary by fire hazards analysis. Flame or fire re-tardant coatings may be used as a fire break for grouped electri-cal cables.
- 64. Electrical cable construction 19 D.3.f AC See Section 3.2 should pass the IEEE 383 flame test.
- 65. To the extent practical, cable 19 D.3.g C See section 3.2 construction that does not give of f corrosive gases while burning should be used.
- 66. Cable trays, raceways, 19 D.3.h C Electrical cable raceways are used conduit, trenches, or culverts oniv for cables, should be used only for cables.
Miscellaneous storage should not be permitted, nor should piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases be installed in cable routing area.
- 67. The design of cable tunnels, 19 D.3.1 AC Building ventilation cystems are culverts, and spreading rooms capable of being manually controlled should provide for automatic or to effect smoke removal in safety-manual smoke venting as required related areas with cable concen-to f acilitate manual fire fighting. trations.
- 68. Cables in the control room should 19 D.3.j C Cables entering the control room be kept to the minimum necessary are essential to the operation of the number. All cables entering the control room and terminate within control room should terminate there. the control room.
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O O LGS FPER O NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item
- 69. Cables should not be installed in 19 D.3.j C See Section 3.2 trenches or culverts in the control room.
ventilation
- 70. Smoke and corrosive gases in 20 D.4.a AC See Section 3.2 specific fire areas - evaluation and control; discharge to outside.
- 71. Ventilation systems exhausting 20 D. 4. b AC See Section 3. 2 smoke or corrosive gases should be evaluated to assure single failure or inadvertent operation does not violate controlled areas of the plant design.
- 72. Power supply and cont /ols for 20 D.4.c. AC See Section 3. 2 ventilation systems sL)uld be run outside the fire asea served by the system.
- 73. Fire suppression systens should 20 D.4.d AC See Section 3.2 be installed to protect charcoal j filters in accordance with Regulatory l Guide 1.52.
- 74. Air intakes for ventilating systems 20 D.4.e C Air intakes serving areas which serving areas containing safety- contain safety-related systems related systems should be remote f rom are remote from exhaust and smoke exhaust and smoke outlets of other outlets of other fire areas.
fire areas.
- 75. Design and use of stairwells 21 D.4.f AC See Section 3.2 and elevators.
- 76. Smoke and heat vents; minimum 21 D.4.g AC See Section 3. 2 ratios for natural convection and forced convection.
- 77. Requirements for breathing 21 D.4.h WC See Section 3.2 apparatus for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel.
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LGG FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item
- 78. For total flooding gas extinguishing 22 D.4.i. C Initiation of the carbon dioxide total systems, area intake and exhaust flooding system for the cable spreading ventilation dampers should close upon room actuates pressure switches which initiation of gas flow, initiate isolation of the steam flooding dampers in the ventilation ducts penetra-ting the cable spreading room walls.
Lighting and Communication
- 79. Fixed emergency lighting should 22 D.5.a NC See Section 3.2 consist of sealed beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery power supplies.
- 80. Sealed bea's battery-powered 23 D.5.h WC Portable lights will be provided.
portable tand lights should be provided for emergency use.
- 81. Fixed emergency communication 23 D.S.c NC See Section 3. 2 should use voice powered head sets at preselected stations.
- 82. Fixed repeaters for portable 23 D.S.d NA See Section 3.2 radio communication units should be protected from fire damage.
Fire Detection and Suppression Fire Detection
- 83. Fire detection compliance with 23 F.1. a NC See Section 3. 2 NFPA 720.
- 84. Fire detection system should 23 E.1.b C Fire and smoke detection signals give audible and visual alarm are annunciated audibly and and annunciation in the control room. visually at the fire protection panel in the control room.
- 83. Local audible alarms should also 23 E.1. b AC Local annunciators near the cri- 3 sound at the location of the fire. tical hazards sound audible alarms.
- 86. Fire alarms should be distinctive 23 E.1. c C Audible fire alarms are unique and unique. and distinct from other plant alarms.
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m N % U d LGS FPER J NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item
- 87. Fire detection and actuation 23 E.1.d C See Section 3.2 systems should be connected to the plant emergency power supply.
Fire Protection Water Supply Systems
- 88. An underground yard fire main loop 23 E.2.a C The yard fire main has been should be installed furnish antici- installed in compliance with NFPA pated fire water requireA?nts; use No. 24.
of NFPA 24.
- 89. Lined steel or cast iron pipe should 24 E. 2. a C The yard fire main untilizes be used to reduce turberculation. cement-lined cast iron pipe.
- 90. Means for treating and flushing of 24 E.2.a AC Water used for fire protection fire main should be provided. service meets the requirements of NFPA No. 22 and does not require treatment. Flushing of the fire main is possible by sectionalized control of the fire main loop.
- 91. Approved visually indicating 24 E.2.a C Post indicator valves provide sectional control valves should be sectionalized control and isolation provided for isolation of fire of portions of the fire main loop.
main portions during maintenance or repair without shutting off entire system.
- 92. Fire main system piping separate 24 E. 2. a C The fire main loop is separate f rom from service or sanitary water service water and domestic water system piping. system piping.
- 93. A common yard fire main loop may 24 E.2.b C A common fi re main loop is provided loop may serve multi-unit nuclear and cross-connected between units.
power plant sites, if cross-connected between units.
- 94. Redundant 100% capacity fire pumps. 25 E.2.c C Two UL-listed fire pumps are provided, each capable of supplying 100% of the fire water-system flow requirements.
- 95. Fire pump connections to the yard 25 F.2.c AC See Section 3.2 fire main should be widely separated.
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LGS FPER N3. APP 2NDIX e. GUIDELINE APPE:! DIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Ttem
- 96. tach pump should have its own 25 E.2.c C Each fire pump is provided with dciver with independent power individual drive, power source, cupplies and control. and controls.
- 97. At least one fire pump should be 25 E.2.c c One fire pump is diesel engine-driven.
driven by non-electrical means, preferably diesel engine.
- 98. Fire pumps and drivers should 25 E.2.c NC See Section 3.2 be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by 3-hour fire walls.
- 99. Fire pump alarms indicating pump 25 E.2.c C Fire pump availability, running, running, driver availability, or and trouble alarms are annunciated failure to start should be in the control room.
provided in the control room. 100.- Fire pump installation should 25 E.2.c C The fire pump installation conforms conform-to NFPA 20 as a minimum. to the requirements of NFPA 20. 101. Two separate reliable water supplies 25 E.2.d C Fire protection wtter is normally should be provided. supplied from two cooling tower basins. 102. Requirements for tanks used to 25 E.2.d NA Tanks are not utilized for fire supply fire protection water. protection water supply. 10 The fire water supply should 26 E.2.e C See Section 3.2 be based on the largest expected flow rate for a period of 2 hours (300,000 gallon minimum). 104. Lakes or f resh water ponds 26 E.2.f NA Two cooling tower basins are of sufficient size may qualify as utilized for fire protection water sole source of water for fire supply. protection. 105. If a common water supply is used 26 E.2.f NA The fire protection system and the for fire protection and ultimate ultimate heat sink do not use a heat sink, then fire water require- common water supply. ments should be included in total storage capacity, and failure of the fire protection system should not degrade the ultimate heat sink. 3-14 O O O
J J' v 4 LGS FPER N3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item 106. Outside manual hose stations should 27 E.2.g AC Hydrants are spaced tetween 250 and be able to reach any location 300 feet apart along the fire main loop. approximately every 250 feet on yard mair) . 107. Yard main laterals to hydrants 27 E.2.g C Each hydrant is provided with a key-should be controlled by a visually operated gate valve with a curb box. indicating or key operated (curb) valve. 1G8. Hose houses should be equipped as 27 E.2.g AC See section 3.2 recommended in NFPA 24, and should be provided as needed, but at least every 1000 feet. 109. Threads on hydrants, hose 27 E.2.g C The hose threads are compatible with couplings, and standpipe risers those of the local fire department. should be compatible with those used by local fire departments. Water sprinckler and nose standpipe systems 110. Each automatic sprinkler and 27 E. 3. a NC See Section 3. 2 manual hose station standpipe should have an independent con-nection to the yard main or to headers fed from each end. 111. Each sprinkler and standpipe 28 E.3.a AC See Section 3.2 system should be equipped with OSSY gate valve, or other approved shutoff valve, and water flow alarm. 112. Safety-related equipment 28 E.3.a AC See Section 3.2 should be protected from sprinkler discharge if such discharge could result in unacceptable damage to the equipmect. 113. Fire water system valves should 28 E.3.b NC See Section 3. 2 be electrically supervised with indication in the control room and other locations as appropriate. 3-15
LGS FPER CO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMAR KS Page Item 114. Automatic sprinkler systems 28 E.3.c C Automatic sprinkler and deluge conform to appropriate NFPA systems comply with the appli-standard as a minimum. cable requirements of NFPA Nos. 13 and 15. 115. Recommendations for interior 28 E.3.d NC See section 3.2 manual hose installations. 116. Location of hose stations based 29 E.3.d NC See Section 3.2 on whether an area is normally occupied or normally unoccupied; location of shutoff valves and pressure-reducing devices outside safety-related areas. 117. Hose nozzle selection should be 30 E.3.e AC See Section 3. 2 based on the fire hazard analysiu; electrically safe nozzles should be provided in vicinity of electri-cal hazards. 118. Foam fire suppression. 30 E.3.f AC See Section 3.2 Halon Suppression Systems 119. Recommendations f or Halon 31 E.4 C See Section 3.2 suppression systems. Carbon Dioxide suppression systems 120. Recommendations for carbon dioxide 31 E. 5 C See Section 3.2 suppression systems. Portable Extinguishers 121. Fire extinguishers shaald be provided 32 E.6 C Portable extinguishers compatible in accordance with NFPA 10. with the combustible material are provided in accordance with NFPA 10 and the requirements of OSHA. 122. Dry chemical extinguishers should 32 F.6 WC Dry chemical extinguishers will be be installed wit h due consideration provided as required. of cleanup problems and possible adverse ef fects on equipment in area. 3-16 O O O
d O 3 3 LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas I Prima ry and Secondary Containment
! 123. Fire protection requirements should 32 F.1. a C Fire hazards have been identified, as be provided on the basis of specific discussed in Chapter 4, and fire identified hazards. suppression systems have been provided J accordingly. The types and locations of suppression systems are identified in Table A-1 and Figures B-4 through B-12.
124. Because of inaccessability of 33 F.1.a NC See Section 3.2 these areas, protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems. 125. Operation of the fire protection 33 F.1. a C The fire protection system does not systems should not compromise integ- penetrate the primary containment rity of the containment or other boundary. Also see item 9. saf ety-related systems. 126. Fire detection systems should alarm 33 F.1. a C Actuation of the early warning fire and annunciate in the control room, detection system, as well as actua-tion of any automatic fire suppression system, is annunciated on the fire protection panels in the control roem. Type and location of fire detectors used is indicated in Table A-1. 127 A backup fire detection 33 F.1.a NC See Section 3.2 capability should be provided for the primary containment. 128. Manual fire fighting capability 34 F.1.b AC See Section 3.2 should be permanently installed in containment. 129. Independent self-contained 34 P.I.b WC See iten 77 i breathing apparatus should be provided near containment entrances. 3-17
LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item cantrol Raom 130. The control room should be separated 35 F.2 C See Section 3.2 f rom other areas of the plant by 3-hour fire barriers. 131. Recommendations for manual fire 35 F.2 C See Section 3. 2 fighting capability. 132. Fire detection in the control 36 F.2 AC See Section 3. 2 room. 133. Breathing apparatus for control 36 F.2 WC See item 77 room operators should be readily available. 134. All penetration seals should be 36 F.2 C All penetrations in the control room airtight. walls, floor, and ceiling will be sealed airtight. 135. Control room ventilation 36 F.2 AC See Section 3.2 provisions; smoke detection, automatic isolation, and venting. 136. Cables should not be located in 36 F.2 NC See items 38 and 69 ' concealed floor and ceiling spaces. 137. All cables that enter the control 36 F. 2 C Cables entering the control room are room shall terminate in control roca essential to the operation of the control room and terminate within the control room. Cable spreading Poom 138. Use of automatic water or foam 37 F.3.a.1 AC See Section 3.2 extinguishing systems in the cable spreading room. 139. Manual hoses and portable extin- 38 F. 3. a. 2 C Manual hose stations and portable guishers should be provided as extinguishers are located outside backup. both entrances to the cable spread-ing room. 3-18 O , O 9
O O O LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISCN REMARKS Page Item 140. Each cable spreading room should 33 F.3.a.3 NC All four divisions of safety-related have divisional cable separation. cabling are routed through the cable spreading room. The raceways thrcugh which the dif ferent divisions are routed are separated from each other in accor-dance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. 141. The cable spreading room should 38 F.3.a.3 C The cable spreading rooms of the two be separated from other areas of reactor units are separated trom plant by a 3-hour rated fire wall. eacn other and from other plant areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers. 142. Two remote and separate entrances 38 F.3.a.4 C Two remote and separate entrances to the cable spreading room should are provided for access to each be provided. cable spreading room. 143. Aisle separation between tray 38 F. 3. a. S NC The minimum aisle separation between stacks should be 3 feet wide by 8 stacks is approximately 3 feet high. wide. The minimum clear headroom is approximtely 6-1/2 feet high. 144. Divisional cable separation should 38 F. 3. b.1 C Safety-related cable divisions are meet the guidelines of Regulatory located in cable raceways that are Guide 1.75. separated f rom each other and from nonsafety-related raceways in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. 145. Cabling should be covered with a 38 F.3.b.2 NC Although no cables are covered with suitable fire retardant coating. fire retardant coating, cable in-sulation systems used pass the IEEE-383 flame test. 146. Automatic gas systems are acceptable 38 F. 3. L. 3 AC See item 138. for primary fire suppression if a fixed water system is used as backup 147. An auxiliary shutdown system with 39 F. 3. b. 4 C Even though the guidelines of Regulatory cabling independent of the cable Guide 1.75 are met, each reactor unit spreading room should be provided is provided with a remote shutdown if R.G. 1.75 guidelinas are not met. panel with cabling that is not routed through the cable spreading room. 3-19 m
LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISDN REMAR KS Pagg Item 148. For multiple reactor unit sites, 39 F.3 C F.ach reactor unit is served by a cable spreading rooms should separate cable spreading room, not be shared. 149. The ventilation system to the 39 F.3 C In the event of actuation of the cable spreading rcom should be CO, system in the cable spreadiang designed to isolate the area room, ventilation ducts penetrating upon actuation of a gas extinguishing the boundaries of the room are auto-system. matica11y isolated by steam fiooding dampers. The dampers are actuated by pressure switches connected to the CO, distribution piping. 150. Smoke venting of the cable spreading 39 F.3 NC Automatic smoke venting for areas room should be controlled automati- served by gas extinguishing systems cally by the fire detection or is not recommended and is not needed suppression system. in the cable spreading room. 151. Capability for remote manual 39 F.3 AC See item 76 control of smoke venting should be provided. Plant Compjater Poom 152. Fire protection recommendations 39 F.4 NA The plant computer is not for safety-related computers. safety-related. Switchgear Rooms 153. Switchgear rooms should be 40 F.S NC The switchgear rooms at El. 239 separated f rom the remainder of the feet in the control structure are plant by 3-hour rated fire barriers separated from each other by to the extent practicable. 3-hour rated fire walls. These rooms and the one at El. 217 feet in the control structure are separated from thts remaining areas of the plant by 3-hour rated fire walls. *he floors and ceilings of the rooms are capable of 3-hour fire ratings with the exception of exposed structural steel supporting the slabs. 3-20 0 0 0
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LGS FPER N3. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item ) 154. Automatic fire detection should 40 F.5 C Each emergency switchgear room is alarm locally and in the control room provided with heat and ionization smoke detectors with local and control room alarm and annunciation. 155. Hose stations and portable fire 40 F.5 C CO, bose stations are provided in extinguishers should be readily the 13.2 kV switchgear room, and available. water hose stations are provided near the entrances to the 4 kV switchgear r m s. Portable fire extinguishers will be provided for use in both areas. 156. Fire protection provisions for 40 F.6 C See Section 3.2. 3 remote safety-related panels; fire ! detection, combustible material control, and manual extinguishment. Station Battery Rooms , 157. Battery rooms should be 41 F.7 C See Section 3.2 separated from each other and other plant areas by 3-hour rated fire barriers. . 158. Ventilation should maintain 41 F.7 C See Section 3.2 hydrogen concentration below 2% by volume. 159. Hose stations and portable 41 F.7 C Hase stations and portable extinguishers should be provided. extinguishers are located in the vicinity of the battery rooms to provide effective coverage , of these areas. Turbine Lubrication and control Oil Storage and Use Areas 160. A fire wall with a minimum rating 41 F.8 C Three-hour fire walls with Class A of 3 hours should separate all fire doors separate areas containing safety-related areas and equip- safety-related equipment from the ment from turbine oil systems. turbine oil systems. 3-21 9
LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item Diesel Generator Areas 161. Diesel ger.erators should be 42 F.9 AC The diesel-generators are separated separated from each other and from f rom each other and other parts of other plant areas by fire barriers the plant ty 3-hour fire walls having a minimum rating of 3 hours. with Class A fire doors. 162. Automatic fire suppression such 42 F.9 C Rach diesel-generator room is as AFFF (f oam) or sprinklers 7 orovided with a pre-action sprinkler should be installed. system actuated by heat detectors. 163. Automatic fire detection should 42 F.9 C Each diesel-generator is provided be provided to alarm locally and to with fire detectors which alarm alarm and annunciate in control room. locally and also annunciate in the control room. 164. Drainage for fire fighting water 42 F.9 AC See Section 3.2 and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided. 165. The day tank should be located in 42 F.9. a C Each day tank is located in a separate 3-hour rated enclotare separate 3-hour rated enclosure capable capable of containing the urtire of containing the entire tank capa-tank capacity. city of 800 gallons. 166. The day tank enclosure should be 42 F. 9. a NC Each day tank is located in a totally ventilated to avoid accumulation of enclosed vault area. of oil fumes. 167. The day tank tanclosure should 42 F.9.b C See Section 3. 2 be protected by automatic fire suppression. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Areas 168. Recommended locations for diesel 42 F.10 C See Sec. don 3.2 fuel oil storage tanks. 169. Diesel fuel oil tanks located 43 F.10 NA Diesel fuel oil tanks are buried. in separate buildings should be provided with automatic fire suppression. 3-22 O O O
s_ LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item 170. Diesel fuel oil tanks should not be 43 F.10 C No safety-related equipment is located directly above or located above the buried tanks. below safety-related systems or equipment regardless of fire rating separation. Safety-Related Pumps 171. Separation of safety-related 44 F.11 C See Section 3.2 pumps by fire barriers; use of automatic sprinklers. 172. Early warning fire detection 44 F.11 C Early warning fire detection is should be installed with alarm and provided in all areas housing annunciation locally and in the safety-related pumps. control room. 173. Local hose stations and portable 44 F.11 NC Except for the spray pond pump extinguishers should also be structure, hose stations and provided. portable fire extinguishers are provided for use in all areas housing safety-related pumps. In consideration of the low combustible loading in the spray pond pump structure, portable extinguishers are deemed adequate to control and extinguish a fire at any pump. 174. Equipment pedestals or curbs 44 F.11 C Safety-related equipment is and drains should be provided to mounted on pedestals or suitable remove and direct water away from framework. Drainage facilities are saf ety-related equipment. provided throughout the plant as required. 17 5. Provisions should be made for 44 F.11 C See item 76 manual control of the ventilation system for smoke removal. New Pbel Area 176. Portable extinguishers should be 44 F.12 C A portable extinguisher is available located within this area. in the area immediately adjacent to the new fuel storage vault. 3-23
LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON - REMARKS Page Item 177. Hose stations should be located 44 F.12 C A hose station is located adjacent within hose reach of this area. to the new fuel storage vault. 178. Automatic fire detection should 44 F.12 NC There is no fire detection provided alarm and annunciate in the control on the refueling floor level in the room and alarm locally. reactor enclosure. 179. Combustibles should be limited 45 F.12 WC Combustibles will be controlled by to a minimum in the new fuel area. administrative procedures. See note 1. 180. Storage area drainage capability 45 F.12 C See Section 3. 2 181. The storage configuration of new 45 F.12 C See Section 3.2 fuel should be such that critically is precluded for any water density that might occur during fire fighting. Spent Fuel Pool Area 18 2. Local hose stations and 45 F.13 C Hose stations and portable ex-portable extinguishers should be tinguishers are available at the provided. spent fuel storage pool. 183. Automatic fire detection should 45 F.13 NC See item 178 be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and to alarm locally. Radwaste Enclosure 184. The radwaste enclosure should be 45 F.14 C The radwaste enclosure is separated separated from other areas of the from other parts of the plant by plant by fire barriers 1.aving at 3-hour fire barriers with Class A least 3-hour ratings. fire doors. 185. Automatic sprinklers should be 45 P.14 C See Section 3. 2 used in areas where combustible materials are located. 186. Automatic fire detection should be 45 F.14 AC See Section 3.2 provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. 3-24 O O O
c O LGS FPER O NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Pace Item 187. Ventilation systems should be 45 F.14 C The radwaste enclosure ventilation capable of being isolated during system is capable of being isolated. a fire. Fire dampers and doors restrict the spread of fire. 188. Water should drain to liquid 45 F.14 C All drainage in the radwaste radwaste sumps. enclosure is to liquid radwaste sumps. Decontamination Areas 189. The decontamination areas should be 46 F.15 C see section 3.2 protected by automatic sprinklers if flammable liquids are stored. 190. Automatic fire detection should be 46 F.15 NC No automatic fire detection is provided to annunciate and alarm provided for the decontamination locally. areas. 191. The ventilation system should 46 F.15 C The ventilation systems for the be capable of being isolated. access control and radwaste enclosure decontamination rooms can be isolated. 192. Hose stations and portable extin- 46 F.15 C Hose stations and portable extin-guishers should be provided. guishers are available for use in all decontamination areas. Safety-Related Water Tanks 193. Fire protection provisions for 46 F.16 NA The plant has no safety-related safety-related water tanks. water tanks. 3-25
LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARES Page Item Coolino Towers 19 4. Cooling towers should be of non- 46 F.17 C The cooling towers are of noncombustible combustible construction, or construction except for the fill material, located so that a fire will not which is polyvinyl chloride. No safety-affect safety-related systems. related structures or systems are located near the cooling towers such that they could be af fected by a fire in the cooling towers. 195. Cooling towers should be of 46 F.17 AC See Section 3.2 noncombustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply. Miscellaneous Areas 196. Miscellaneous areas (e. g. , record 47 F.18 C Warehouse, machine chop, record storage areas, shops, warehouses, storage, auxiliary boiler room, auxiliary boiler rooms) should be and other miscellaneous areas are located so that a fire in such separated from areas containing areas will not adversely affect safety-related systems by 3-hour any safety-related systems. rated fire barriers so that safe shutdown will not be jeopardized, 197. Fuel oil tanks for auxiliary 47 F.18 C No. 2 fuel oil and No. 6 fuel boilers should be buried, or oil for the auxiliary boilers is provided with dikes to contain the stored in aboveground outdoor entire tank contents. tanks which are provided with dikes large enough to contain the entire tank contents. Welding and Cuttino, Acetylene-Oxygen Fuel Gas Systems 198. Storage locations should be chosen 47 G.1 AC Compressed gas storage cylinders to permit fire protection by for welding are located outdoors. sprinkler systems. The requirements of NFPA No. 51 and 51B will be followed. 3-26 O O O
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/ k,j LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item 199. Local hose stations and portable 47 G.1 C A local hose station and portable extinguishers should be provided. extinguishers are available.
200. The requirements of NFPA 51 and 47 G.1 KC See item 198 51B are applicable to these hazards. 201. A permit system should be required 47 G.1 WC See note 1 for utilization of this equipment. Storage Areas for Dry Ion Exchange 20 2. Dry ion exchange resins should not 47 G.2 WC Storage areas will be remote from be near essential safety-related essential safety-related systems. systems. 203. Dry unused resins should be 47 G.2 NC Local hose stations and portable protected by automatic wet pipe fire extinguishers are provided in sprinkler systems. the vicinity of storage areas for dry resins. 20 4. Fire detection by smoke and heat 47 G.2 NC No fire detection is provided for detectors should alarm and annunciate dry resin storage areas. in the control room and alarm locally. 20 5. Local hose stations and portable 47 G.2 C See item 203 extinguishers should be provided. 206. Storage areas of dry resins 47 G.2 NC No curbs are provided, should have curbs and drains. Harardous Chemicals 207. Recommendations for storage of 48 G.3 WC See Section 3.2 hazardous chemicals. 208. Materials that collect and contain 48 G.4 WC See note 1 radioactivity (e. g. , spent ion exchange resins, charcoal filters, HEPA filters) should be stored in closed metal tanks or containers located in areas free from ignition sources or combustibles. 3-27
[ LGS FPER NO. APPENDIX A GUIDELINE APPENDIX A LOCATION COMPARISON REMARKS Page Item 209. These materials should be protected 48 G.4 WC See note 1 from exposure to fires in adjacent areas. 310. Consideration should be given 48 G.4 C Provisions for accommodating decay to requirements for removal of heat are considered when selecting isotopic decay heat from entrained containers, radioactive materials. ( a > Mainistrative controls and procedures concerning fire protection will be developed, during preparation of plant procedures. 3-28 j
LGS FPER 3.2 EXPLANATORY NOTES Item 7 Appendix A Guideline A single failure in the fire suppression system should not impair both the primary and backup fire suppression capability. For example, redundant fire water pumps with independent power supplies and controls should be provided. LGS Design As described in Section 2.1.2, fire water is supplied by two redundant pumps, each of which is capable of providing the design fire protection system flowrate at the design pressure. Power for the motor-driven fire pump is provided from either of two independent offsite power sources. The controls for the diesel er.gine-driven fire pump are dc-operated and are powered from batteries which supply only the engine-driven fire pump. Therefore, no single failure of the power supplies can affect both fire pumps. By the use of sectional isolation valves, damaged portions of the yard fire main loop can be isolated without affecting the major portion l f-~x t () of the loop. The provision of hose reels and portable extinguishers for manual fire fighting precludes-the possibility of a single failure in an automatic fire suppression system from disabling all means of fire suppression for a given area. Item 9 Appendix A Guideline Failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system should not incapacitate safety-related systems or components. LGS Design Although it can be postulated that failure or inadvertent operation of the fire suppression system may incapacitate safety-related systems or components, such failure or l inadvertent operation will not prevent safe shutdown from being achieved through the use of redundant safety-related systems. O 3-29
LGS FPER Item 13 O Appendix A Guideline On multiple-reactor sites where there are operating reactors and construction of remaining units is being completed, the fire protection program should provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire barriers, fire protection capability, and administrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards. The superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection. LGS Design Administrative procedures will be prepared to protect the operating Unit 1 from fire hazards associated with construction of Unit 2. Special precautions will be taken to prevent and control fire hazards. Use of open flames and welding or cutting equipment will be properly supervised. Construction of both the underground yard fire main and the fire water distribution piping inside both units of the plant will be completed prior to Unit 1 operati.on so that manual hose station coverage will be available in Unit 2 as well as Unit 1. Portable fire extinguishers will also be available in the Unit 2 portions of the plant during its construction. The construction site will be kept clean and orderly and contractors' sheds will be kept outside the confines of new construction. Item 14 Appendix A Guideline Simultaneous fires in more than one reactor need not be postulated, where separation requirements are met. A fire involving more than one reactor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units. LGS Design The fire protection program is based on the occurrence of a fire in only one reactor unit or one common area at a time. The unitized portions of the turbine enclosures and reactor enclosures are separated from each other and from common areas by 3-hour rated fire walls. The operating floor of the turbine enclosures and the refueling floor of the reactor enclosures are common areas which serve both units. The control structure and the radwaste enclosure are common areas which are separated from the adjacent reactor enclosures and turbine enclosures by 3-hour rated fire walls. The Unit 1 3-30
LGS FPER O and Unit 2 diesel-generator enclosures are separated from the adjacent portions of the reactor enclosures'by 3-hour rated fire walls. The spray pond pump' structure, which is located away from all other structures, is a common area and is separated into two halves by a 3-hour rated fire wall. Item 27 Appendix A Guideline Quality assurance (OA) programs of applicants and contractors should be developed and implemented to assure _that the requirements for design, procurement, installation, and testing and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety-related areas as defined in this Branch Position are satisfied. The program should be under the management control of the OA organization. LGS Design
- The OA program described below will be under the management control of the PECo Engineering & Research Department GA organization during the construction phase.
- 1. Desion Control and Procurement Document Control The design review performed to compare the_ Limerick design to the BTP guidelines provides assurance that necessary_ design features are included in appropriate design and procurement documents.
Deviations from the design and procurement documents will be controlled by mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project.
- 2. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawinas These requirements will be met during the construction phase through the use of a documented, final installation inspection and through implementation of a written pre-operational test. ;
- 3. Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and-Services Based upon the status of procurements and the identification of significant design or manufacturing features, certain fire protection equipment may be subject to shop inspection during manufacture.
Receipt inspection at the construction site shall be O e performed. 1 3-31 i s :
LGS FPER
- 4. Inspection These requirements will be met through the use of a documented, final installation inspection and through implementation of a written preoperational test.
- 5. Test and Test Control Documented preoperational test procedures including evaluation of results and followup action, if indicated, shall be employed to meet these requirements relative to the construction phase of the plant.
- 6. Inspection, Test, and Operatina Status Installation inspections, as described in Item 4 above, shall be documented in such a manner as to indicate the acceptability of the item / activity inspected. Deficiencies shall be identified and corrected in accordance with mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project.
Satisfactory completion of the preoperational test and release for operation shall be accomplished and documented in accordance with mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project.
- 7. Nonconformino Items Nonconforming items shall be identified, controlled, and correcteo in accordance with the mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project.
- 8. Corrective Action Conditions adverse to fire protection (such as failures, ,
malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective components, l and nonconformances) during the construction phase shall be reported and corrected in accordance with mechanisms specified in the 10 CFR 50, Appendix B OA program for this project.
- 9. Records Records shall be prepared and maintained to furnish evidence that the criteria described in Items 1 through 10 are being -
met for activities affecting the fire protection program. l 9 3-32 J
I LGS FPER O 10. Audits The activities described above are subject to audit. In addition, implementation of receipt inspections, final installation inspections, and pre-operational tests shall be subject to audit to conform with documented instructions, procedures, and drawings. Item 29 Appendix A Guideline Plant layouts should be arranged to: (2) Separate redundant safety-related systems from each other so that both are not subject to damage from a single fire hazard. LGS Design In some cases, components of redundant safety-related systems are located in the same fire area. In each case, the potential for damage to both redundant systems from a single fire hazard has been evaluated, as described in Chapter 5. The capability to safely shut the plant down has been assured, based on consideration of physical separation O between the redundant systems, additional fire barriers provided between the systems, and combustible loading in the fire area. , Item 30 Appendix A Guideline In order to accomplish 1.(a) above, safety-related systems and fire hazards should be identified throughout the plant. l Therefore, a detailed fire hazard analysis should be made. The fire hazards analysis should be reviewed and updated as necessary. l i LGS Design As described in Chapter 4, an evaluation of the combustible materials present in the various areas of the plant has been performed. These combustible materials and their quantities are listed in Table A-1. The safety-related systems located in each fire area were identified as part of the safe shutdown analysis, described in Chapter 5. Table A-1 identifies which fire areas and fire zones contain safety-related components. l l O 3-33
LGS FPER Item 34 Appendix A Guideline Interior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials and soundproofing should be noncombustible. LGS Design Most interior walls are constructed of either reinforced concrete, or concrete masonry units. Limited use is made of walls constructed of metal studs with gypsum plaster on expanded metal lath. Structural components consist of structural steel or reinforced concrete. Thermal insulation materials are noncombustible. Soundproofing materials, if required, will be noncombustible. Radiation shielding consists of concrete, concrete masonry unit, or steel plates. Item 35 Appendix A Guideline Interior finishes should be noncombustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwritecs Laboratory, Inc, for flame spread, smoke, and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration (ASTM E-84 Test, " Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials"). LGS Design Areas containing systems or equipment required for safe shutdown of the plant are unfinished, or are finished with materials which are either noncombustible or are listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory for flame spread, smoke, and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration. Item 36 Appendix A Guideline Metal deck roof construction should be noncombustible (see the building materials directory of the Underwriters Laboratory, Inc) or listed as Class I by Factory Mutual System Approval Guide. ( 3-34
LGS FPER p V LGS Desian Metal roof deckings consist of manufactured fluted panels with rigid insulation and builtup roofing membrane with gravel. This is a Class A UL fire-resistive rated builtup roofing system. Item 38 Appendix A Guideline Concealed spaces should be devoid of combustibles. LGS Design Electrical cables (associated primarily with control room annunciators and control room lighting) are routed in cable tray, gutter, and conduit above the suspended ceiling in the control room. The cables in gutter and cable tray will be coated with a fire-retardant material to prevent the propagation of fire along the cables. In addition, fire detectors will be located above the suspended ceiling to provide early warning of fires occurring within that area.
/~N Item 42 Appendix A Guideline r Drains should also be provided in other areas where hand hose lines may be used if such fire fighting water could cause unacceptable damage to equipment in the area.
LGS Desion Most plant areas are provided with drainage facilities adequately sized to remove all the water discharged from a 1-1/2 inch hand hose line. Some areas which contain primarily electrical and electronic equipment are not provided with floor drains. For these latter areas, the doors which would be open to provide access for hand hose usage would also provide a flow path for fire protection water to drain to areas not containing safety-related components. Item 44 Appendix A Guideline Drains in areas containing combustible liquids should have provisions for preventing the spread of the fire throughout t the drain system. 3-35
LGS FPER LGS Desion Drains from the turbine oil systems discharge to an oil separator remotely separated from safety-related systems. Drains from each diesel-generator room are provided with traps prior to ccnnection into an oil separator receiver serving the diesel-generator rooms. The combination of traps ' and the separation effectively provides for the prevention of fire propagation through this drainage system. Item 46 Appendix A Guideline Floors, walls, and ceilings enclosing separate fire areas should have minimum fire rating of three hours. Penetrations in these fire barriers, including conduits and piping, should be sealed or closed to provide a fire resistance rating at least equal to that of the barrier itself. LGS Desion The reactor enclosures, turbine enclosures (main portion), turbine auxiliary bays, diesel-generator enclosures, radwaste I enclosure, and administration building are separated from I each other by 3-hour rated fire walls. Walls internal to these structures (and also the spray pond pump structure) which serve as boundaries bbtween different fire areas are provided with fire ratings or construction details consistent with the fire hazard existing in each area. The locations of fire-rated walls are shown on Figures B-4 through B-12, and the walls surrounding each fire area are further described in the fire area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9. Concrete floor slabs in the control structure and reactor enclosures are provided with 3-hour rated seals for penetration openings in the slabs. The structural steel beams supporting the floor slabs at four elevations in the control structure (254, 269, 289 and 304 feet) have been fireproofed to provide a 3-hour rating for the complete floor assembly. The structural steel beams supporting floor slabs in other areas have not been fireproofed. The fire ratings of ficor slabs above and below each fire area are listed in the fire area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9. Those slabs which are shown as "3 hr*" are capable of being rated as 3-hour fire barriers, except for the lack of fireproofing on the structural steel beams supporting the slab. Fire barrier penetrations, including piping, conduits, and h cable trays, will be sealed with materials and methods 3-36
LGS FPER acceptable to American Nuclear Insurers (ANI), to provide a fire resistance rating consistent with the rating of the barrier. Item 47 Appendix A Guideline Door openings should be protected with equivalent rated doors, frames, and hardware that have been tested and approved by a nationally recognized laboratory. IGS Design Door openings in rated fire barriers are provided with fire doors having ratings consistent with the barrier itself. With the exception of steamtight doors, access openings in 3-hour barriers are provided with Class A (3-hour) UL-labeled . doors and access openings in 2-hour barriers are provided l with Class B (1-1/2 hours) UL-labeled doors. Although not provided with UL labels, steamtight doors which will be designated as fire rated are certified by the manufacturer to conform to standards established for UL-labeled fire-rated doors. These steamtight doors are identified in the fire (T . area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9 by a
\/ double asterisk (**) following the indicated fire rating.
4 Item 48 Appendix A Guideline Such doors should be normally closed and locked or alarmed with alarm and annunciation in the control room. LGS Design Fire-rated doors are either unlockable or are locked only in the entry direction as required by NFPA NO. 101, " Life Safety Code." Specified doors are locked in accordance with the security plan. Security doors alarm and annunciate in the control room. Fire doors which are not also security doors are generally not alarmed nor annunciated in the control room. All fire doors are normally closed or are equipped with either fusible links or magnetic door holders. Those doors used for communication between various areas of the plant are not locked. Doors to isolated areas, such as the diesel-generator rooms, and doors used for access control are normally locked. Os 3-37
LGS FPER Although locked doors provide no access for fire fighting nor O egress for personnel to escape a fire, certain fire doors are maintained locked because of access control. Doors which must be locked are equipped with door closers and panic hardware as required and specified by OSHA, NFPA No. 101,
" Life Safety Coce," and local building codes.
Item 51 l Appendix A Guideline Bulk gas storage (either compressed or cryogenic) should not be permitted inside structures housing safety-related equipment. Storage of flammable gas such as hydrogen, should be located outdoors or in separate detached buildings so that a fire or explosion will not adversely affect any safety-related systems or equipment. LGS Design Compressed gases are stored either outdoors or in non-safety-related structures whenever possible. However, compressed gases with safety-related uses must be stored in safety-related structures. For this reason, compressed gas cylinders associated with the primary containment instrument gas system and containment combustible gas monitoring system W are located in the reactor enclosure. Compressed gas cylinders used for welding are stored in the construction shop (during periods of usage only) and the machine shop. Hydrogen used in cooling of the main generators is provided from hydrogen cylinders stored at an outdoor location that is separated from all structures. The compressed propane gas used for ignition of the auxiliary boilers is also stored i outdoors. The supply line penetrates only the auxiliary I boiler enclosure. Item 53 1 Appendix A Guideline Use of compressed gases (especially flammable and fuel gases) inside buildings snould be controlled. (Refer to NFPA 6, ,
" Industrial Fire Loss Prevention.") l LGS Design The usage of compressed gases for cutting and welding is limited to those activities authorized as to be outlined in the administrative procedures. ;
The usage of compressed fuel gases for laboratory and shop h use is limited to a low pressure supply system for Bunsen 3-38
a LGS FPER burners in the radioactive chemistry laboratory in the radwaste enclosure and the instrument repair shop on the 269-foot level of the control structure. Compressed fuel gas cylinders and gas pressure-reducing stations are installed outside of the building at a location that does not expose nuclear safety-related structures, systems, and equipment to potential damage from fire at the storage location. Item 54 Appendix A Guideline The use of plastic materials should be minimized. In particular, halogenated plastics such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and neoprene should be used only when substitute noncombustible materials are not available. LGS Design The use of plastic materials within the plant has been minimized to the greatest extent practicable. However, alternatives to plastic or elastomeric materials for electrical cable insulating systems, with an optimum balance w of electrical, physical, and environmental characteristics, are not available. Cable insulation and jacketing materials are chosen for their fire-retardant and self-extinguishing prcperties, such that fuel contribution to a cable fire is minimized and propagation of a fire along cables is self-limiting in the absence of an external fire hazard. The types of electrical cable insulation and jacketing used in the plant are listed in Table A-3. Electrical components located throughout the plant, such as control panels, relay panels, motor control centers, and power distribution panels, contain relatively small amounts of plastic in the form of terminal blocks, relay cases, circuit breaker cases, and other small items. The use of plastic in these applications is necessary because of its electrically insulating properties. Plastic materials are also used for electrical conduit, but only when totally embedded within poured concrete walls and floor slabs. Item 58 Appendix A Guideline Automatic water sprinkler systems should be.provided for () cable trays outside the cable spreading room. 3-39
LGS FPER LGS Design O Concentrations of cable trays near the primary containment electrical penetrations at elevations 253 and 283 feet are provided with automatic sprinkler systems. Automatic sprinkler systems are not provided for cable trays in other areas of the plant. Redundant cables outside the cable spreading room are routed with separation in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75. Cable tray arrangement and/or fire barriers are designed so that a fire cannot prevent redundant safety system components from performing their design safety functions. Item 60 Appendix A Guideline Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers should be provided as backup. LGS Design With the exception of those areas (identified in Item 58) in whicn automatic sprinkler systems are provided, manual hose stations and portable extinguishers serve as both the primary and backup means of fire suppression for cable trays outside the cable spreading room. Item 61 Appendix A Guideline Safety-related equipment in the vicinity of such cable trays, that does not itself require water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage from sprinkler water discharge, should be protected from sprinkler system operation or malfunction. LGS Design Sprinkler systems are providad in certain areas for protection of safety-related systems and equipment other than cable trays. In such areas, sprinkler system discharge is controlled to prevent unacceptable damage to adjacent equipment. Safety-related electrical equipment, such as motor control conters, located in areas protected by automatic water extinguishing systems will be protected against water. 3-40
LGS FPER O Item 62 Appendix A Guideline Cable and cable tray penetration of fire barriers (vertical ' and horizontal) should be sealed to give protection at least equivalent to the fire barrier. The design of fire barriers for horizontal and vertical cable trays should, as a minimum, ' meet the requirements of ASTM E-119, " Fire Test of Building Construction and Materials," including the hose stream test. LGS Design Sealants for cable and cable tray penetrations of fire barriers are based on the use of materials and methods which l have undergone a test program. Such sealants are consistent with the recommendations of American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) and of ASTM E-119. Item 63 Appendix A Guideline i Fire breaks should be provided as deemed necessary by .ae fire hazards analysis. Flame or fire-retardant coatings may ( be used as a fire break for grouped electrical cables to limit spread of fire in cable routings. (Possible cable derating owing to use of such coating materials must be considered during design.) LGS Desian f Vertical runs of cable trays are provided with fire breaks at ' solid floor and ceiling penetrations and at intermediate levels as necessary such that the height between fire breaks does not exceed 20 feet. Fire breaks are also provided for horizontal runs of cable trays at fire barrier penetrations. , Fire breaks in other tray installations will be provided as deemed necessary by a fire hazard analysis. Item 64 Appendix A Guideline Electrical cable constructions should as a minimum pass the current IEEE No. 383 flame test. (This does not imply that cables passing this test will not require additional fire protection). O 3-41
s LGS FPER LGS Design With the exception of cables associated with the lighting and communicaticn systems, electrical cable insulation and jacketir,q systems pass the IEEE No. 383 flame test. Cables associated with the lighting and communication systems are routed exclusively in conduit and are not routed together with cables associated with other plant systems. Itce 65 ' Appendix A Guideline To the extent practical, catle construction that does not giv,e'off corrosive *gase9-while burning should be used. i ' LGS Design The performance characteristics and verifying tests for cables purchased for this plant are specified in three separate technical'spacifications covering approximately 100 different cables with' voltage insulation ratings of 15 kV, 5 kV, and 600 V. Typical tasts required on cable insulation are: A. Physical Tests (Section 3.6 of IPCEA S-66-524 (Typicai))
- 1. Initfal
- 2. After accelerated aging ,
- 3. Moisture absorption B. Electrical Tests (Section 3.7.2 of IPCEA S-66-524 (Typical))
C. Flame-Resisting Tests
- 1. Prototype samples tested to Section 5.7.3 of Specification 8031-E-18 (Typical),
" Philadelphia Electric Cable Tray Fire Test" The design considerations for cabling involve an optimized balance of electrical, physical, cnd environmental characteristics. Among the environmental prerequisites of the jacketing material are high flame retardance, radiation resistance, and capability to sucvive a postulated accident condition. Typical insulating material for the individual conductors consists of cross-linked polyethylene insulation with a Neopiene protective covering. Fire involvement of these jacketing materials will give off potentially corrosive gases. However, alternative materials which satisfy the \
3-42
LGS FPER primary design basis and do not release potentially corrosive gases were not available when purchase orders were placed for cables for this plant. It should be noted that these gases are not in themselves corrosive, but will form corrosive acids in the presence of substantial moisture or water. Due to lack of suitable alternative materials, the cable constructions used are considered to have reduced corrosive gas generation "to the extent practical". Item 69 Appendix A Guideline Cables should not be installed in floor trenches or culverts in the control room. LGS Design Although cables are not located in concealed floor spaces in the control room, cables are installed in the r aised floor sections in the auxiliary equipment room. Automati: fire detection systems and automatic halon suppression systems are provided in the floor sections in the auxiliary equipment O room. Removable floor plates permit access for manual fire fighting operations. Item 70 Appendix A Guideline The products of combustion that need to be removed from a specific fire area should be evaluated to determine how they will be controlled. Smoke and corrosive gases should generally be automatically discharged directly outside to a safe location. Smoke and gases containing radioactive materials should be monitored in the fire area to determine l if release to the environment is within the permissible limits of the plant Technical Specifications. LGS Desion The products of combustion from a fire in any area of the plant will be removed by the normal plant ventilating systems ! and exhausted through the ventilation stacks above the ! reactor roof. Radiation monitors are provided in the ventilation stacks to determine if the radioactive release to the environment is within the permissible limits of the plant Technical Specifications. \ () Exhaust from the control room is discharged directly to the
-' rosphere by alignment of dampers. Exhaust from potentially 3-43
LGS FPER contaminated areas of the turbine enclosure and the control structure is diccharged through deep bed charcoal filters prior to release to the atmosphere, with a means provided to bypass the filters for direct discharge. Independent systems provide filtered exhaust from the radwaste enclosure and the reactor enclosure with discharge through ventilation stacks above the reactor enclosure roof. Standby fans in all systems may be manually started to augment the normal venting capability of the systems. Exhaust from the cable spreading room is through transfer grilles into the generator equipment area of the turbine enclosure. Item 71 Appendix A Guideline Any ventilation system designed to exhaust smoke or corrosive gases should be evaluated to assure that inadvertent operation or single failures will not violate the controlled areas of the plant design. This requirement includes containment functions for protection of the public and maintaining habitability for operations personnel. LGS Design No portion of the ventilation system is specifically dedicated to smoke removal except for'the purge mode of the control room ventilation system (see Items 168 and 169). The basic design of the overall plant ventilation system considers the effects of inadvertent operation and single failure. The fire dampers provided within the ventilation system affect only those portions isolated by the dampers with no adverse effects on the balance of the systems. Item 72 Appendix A Guideline The power supply and controls for mechanical ventilation systems should be run outside the fire area served by the system. LGS Design The power supply and controls for ventilation and smoke removal systems for safety-related areas are run and operated outside the area served by the system. These provisions assure that t'ae ventilation systems remain unimpaired and accessible for manual operation during a postulated fire event inside the area protected. h 3-44
LGS FPER O V Item 73 Appendix A Guideline Fire suppression systems should be installed to protect charcoal filters in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.52,
" Design Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Atmospheric Cleanup Air Filtration."
LGS Design Manually-actuated sprinkler systems with water spray nozzles are provided as an integral component of the charcoal filters in the standby gas treatment system, the control room emergency ventilation system, the turbine enclosure equipment compartment exhaust system, the reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust system, and the radwaste enclosure tank vent exhaust system. Heat detectors monitor charcoal filter temperature and alarm in the control room on high temperature. . Item 75 Appendix A Guideline
)
Stairwells should be designed to minimize smoke infiltration during a fire. Staircases should serve as escape routes and access routes for fire fighting. Fire exit routes should be clearly marked. Stairwells, elevators and chutes should be enclosed in masonry towers with minimum fire rating of three hours and automatic fire doors at least equal to the enclosure construction, at each opening into the building. Elevators should not be used during fire emergencies. LGS Design The reactor enclosures, turbine enclosures, and radwaste ; enclosure are each provided with at least two separated l stairwells, and the control structure is provided with its ) own stairwell. These stairwells are completely enclosed by fire-rated walls and are designed to provide escape routes and access routes for fire fighting. The control structure and the two reactor enclosures are each provided with an l elevator shaft adjacent to one of the stairwells. These j elevator shafts also have fire-rated walls. The walls of the stair towers and elevator shafts consist of g3 nominal 8-inch thick (solid grouted) concrete masonry units () and/or 6-inch thick reinforced concrete, equivalent to a 2-hour rated fire barrier. Although the walls of stair 3-45
LGS FPER towers and elevator shafts may be capable of qualifying for a O higher fire rating, the doors are B-labeled (1-1/2 hour), consistent with NFPA No. 80, for use in openings in two-hour enclosures of vertical communication within the building. The doors of the stair towers, being self-closing, will minimize any smoke infiltration during a fire. Item 76 Appendix A Guideline Smoke and heat vents may be useful in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms and diesel fuel oil storage areas and switchgear rooms. When natural-convection ventilation is used, a minimum ratio of 1 square foot of venting area per 200 square feet of floor area should be provided. If forced-convection ventilation is used, 300 cfm should be provided for every 200 square feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke control. LGS Desion The cable spreading rooms and switchgear rooms are not provided with smoke exhaust systems separate from the normal ventilation. Smoke exhaust capabilities for these areas are part of the general exhaust systeme. For the diesel fuel oil storage areas, sufficient ventilation air for smoke removal is provided by the diesel engine room exhaust system. The turbine enclosure is provided with smoke and heat vents in a ratio of 1 square feet of venting area to each 100 square feet of floor area. Smoke and heat removal for all other buildings is accomplished with the normal ventilation exhaust system at a minimum equivalent of 1 square feet of venting area to each 200 square feet of floor area, in accordance with ANI requirements. Item 77 ) Appendix A Guideline Self-contained breathing apparatus, using full face positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health - approval formerly given by the U.S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided for fire brigade, damage control, and control room personnel, control room personnel may be furnished breathing air by a manifold system piped from a storage reservoir if practical. Service or operating life should be a minimum of one-half hour fbr the self-contained units. O 3-46
l l J 4 LGS FPER O At least two extra air bottles should be located onsite for l i each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an onsite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged
; to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are ! used as a source of breathing air, only units approved for breathing air should be used. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants.
i LGS Design Self-contained breathing apparatus will be available for use by control room personnel and fire brigade members. The breathing apparatus will have a minimum operating life of 4 hours for control room personnel and 1 hour for fire brigade members.
, An onsite reserve air supply of six hours for'at least five persons will be provided in stored air bottles. Compressors, i if used, will be units approved for breathing air.
Item 79 i
-s Appendix A Guideline \' # Fixed emergency lighting should consist of sealed beam units
! with individual 8-hour minimum battery power supplies. LGS Design The emergency lighting system consists of an ac subsystem and an ac/dc subsystem. .The emergency ac lighting is powered I from Class IE buses which automatically transfer to the standby diesel-generators upon loss of the normal power source. Emergency ac lighting is provided throughout the plant to maintain minimum lighting levels necessary for access and for emergency-related activities. All lighting in the spray pond pump structure (with the exception of the ac/dc lights at the exit doors) is associated with the emergency ac lighting system. The emergency ac/dc lighting is normally powered from the . Class 1E buses. In the event of loss of the Class IE ac source, an automatic transfer switch immediately transfers this lighting to the 125 V de non-Class IE station battery source. All emergency ac/dc lighting fixtures are of the incandescent type. Emergency ac/dc lighting is provided for the following areas:
- a. Control room N, b. Auxiliary equipment room
- c. Cable spreading room 3-47
LGS FPER
- d. Static inverter room O
- e. 4kV switchgear compartment
- f. 13kV switchgear compartment
- g. Drywell
- h. HPCI, RCIC, and RHR pump compartments (at exit doors only)
- 1. Diesel-generator compartments
- j. Spray pond pump structure (lights with individual battery packs, at exit doors only)
- k. Stairways and access corridors.
The cables for both emergency lighting subsystems are routed exclusively in conduit, most of which is embedded in concrete. The cables for the two subsystems are routed through separate fire areas so that a fire in any given fire area would not result in loss of both emergency lighting subsystems for a different safety-related fire area. Item 81 Appendix A Guideline Fixed emergency connunication should use voice powered head sets at preselected stations. LGS Desian Requirements for the reporting of fires and the direction of fire fighting efforts are considered in the design of the plant communication system. Fixed emergency communication equipment is located at every floor level of the plant at preselected stations but does not include voice powered head sets. Item 82 Appendix A Guideline Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from exposure fire damage. LGS Design Portable radio communication units will not be provided at the site. The use of portable radios has been known to energize or de-energize electrical equipment and components. This effect has been considered in light of the requirement that fire protection equipment should not adversely affect shutdown equipment. 3-48
' LGS FPER C
Item 83 Appendix A Guideline Fire detection systems should as a minimum comply with NFPA 72D, " Standard for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Proprietary Protective Signaling Systems." LGS Design The fire and smoke detection system is in compliance with NFPA 72A. The system is electrically supervised to detect circuit breaks, ground faults, and power failure. The system also complies with the requirements of NFPA 72D for a Class B system with the following exceptions:
- a. No device is provided for permanently recording incoming signals with date and time of receipt.
- b. Operation and supervision of the system is not the primary function of the operators.
- c. In lieu of complete reliance on NFPA 72E, smoke and O fire detector locations are established by a qualified fire protection engineer.
Item 87 Appendix A Guideline Fire detection and actuation systems should be connected to the plant emergency power supply. i LGS Design ' Several detection and actuation systems are utilized throughout the plant. i Power for the early warning fire and smoke detection systems is provided from a Class IE ac motor control center, which is powered from the standby diesel-generators in the event of loss of offsite power. The detection and actuation system for the total flooding carbon dioxide system is powered from Class IE ac motor control centers (for power) and from the Class IE dc power supply (for controls). The Class IE motor control centers are powered from the standby diesel-generators in the event of loss of offsite power.
)
3-49
LGS FPER The detection and actuation systems for deluge and pre-action sprinkler systems are connected to the Class IE dc power supply. Item 95 Appendix A Guideline The connection to the yard fire main loop from each fire pump should be widely separated, preferably located on opposite sides of the plant. LGS Design The connections to the yard fire main loop from each of the fire pumps are spaced about 10 feet apart. Since these connections are buried underground, they are protected from damage. The two connections are separated by a post indicator valve on the fire main loop and additional valves are provided and arranged so that either connection may be isolated while retaining 100% water supply capacity to the fire main loop. Item 98 Appendix A Guideline Pumps and drivers should be located in rooms separated from the remaining pumps and equipment by a minimum three-hour fire wall. LGS Design The two fire pumps are located at the west end of the circulating water pump structure, which is north of the power block. The electric motor-driven fire pump and controls are located in an area common with the circulating water pumps. The diesel engine-driven fire pump and controls are in a separate compartment that is provided with floor, walls, and ceiling that are rated as 3-hour fire barriers. The diesel oil day tank is located in a curbed area within the diesel engine-driven fire pump compartment. The door to the diesel engine-driven fire pump compartment is a Class A fire door and the compartment is protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. O 3-50
LGS FPER O O Item 103 Appendix A Guideline The firewater supply (total capacity and flow rate) should be calculated on the basis of the largest expected flow rate for a period of two hours, but not less than 300,000 gallons. This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 1000 gpm for manual hose streams plus the greater of: (1) all sprinkler heads open and flowing in the largest designed fire area; or (2) the largest open head deluge system (s) operating. LGS Design Fire protection water is supplied from the basins of the two cooling towers in the Unit 1 and Unit 2 circulating water systems. The total capacity of each cooling tower basin is 7,000,000 gallons. Each fire water pump takes suction from both cooling tower basins through connections to tbc 96-inch circulating water lines. The cooling tower basin storage capacity exceeds the (\_/') 370,000-gallon capacity required for two-hour operation of the turbine condenser compartment sprinkler system at i 2090 gpm plus 1000 gpm for hose streams. Item 108 Appendix A Guideline l A hose house, equipped with hose and combination nozzle, and other auxiliary equipment recommended in NFPA 24, "Outside Protection", should be provided as needed but at least every 1000 feet. LGS Desian Hose cart houses are provided at 5 selected hydrants in the yard area at intervals of approximately 650 feet. Each hose cart will be equipped with the following fire fighting equipment:
- a. 600 feet of 2-1/2" rubber lined hose
- b. 400 feet of 1-1/2" rubber lined hose
- c. One 30" playpipe
- d. Two 1-1/2" adjustable spray nozzles
- e. Two 1-1/2" ball shutoff O f.
g. One One 2-1/2" adjustable fog nozzle 2-1/2" ball shutoff 3-51
LGS FPER
- h. One siamese connection (gated wye)
O
- i. 2-1/2" to 1-1/2" spanner wrench
- j. One hydrant wrench
- k. One fire axe Item 110 Appendix A Guideline Each automatic sprinkler system and manual hose station standpipe should have an independent connection to the plant underground wacer main. Headers fed from each end are permitted inside buildings to supply multiple sprinkler and standpipe systems. When provided, such headers are considered an extension of the yard main system.
LGS Desian Because of the high number of sprinkler systems and manual hose stations in the plant, it is impractical to provide a separate connection to the yard fire main for each sprinkler system and manual hose station standpipe. Therefore, sprinkler systems and manual hose stations are fed from a number of headers, each serving a particular area of the plant. These headers may be connected to the yard fire main at one end or both ends. Item 111 Appendix A Guideline Each sprinkler and standpipe system should be equipped with OS&Y (outside screw and yoke) gate valve, or other approved shutoff valve, and water flow alarm. LGS Design Each sprinkler and deluge system is provided with an OS&Y gate valve adjacent to the system's automatic control or alarm valve. Each sprinkler system is provided with local water flow alarms and control room annunciation. In the deluge and pre-action systems, the actuation of the heat responsive device initiates an alarm locally and in the control room. Water flow in the standpipe systems due to manual hose station usage is indicated by pump running annunciation with the absence of automatic system actuation annunciation. Individual standpipe flow alarms are not provided. Each connection of a fire water header to the yard fire main is provided with a post indicator valve to permit isolation 3-52
LGS FPER of the header. In many cases, branch connections to the headers are provided with approved shutoff valves so that groups of sprinkler systems and/or manual hose stations can be isolated without interrupting the supply to other sprinkler systems and manual hose stations connected to the same header. Item 112 Appendix A Guideline Safety-related equipment that does not itself require sprinkler water fire protection, but is subject to unacceptable damage if wetted by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles. LGS Design Safety-related equipment not requiring sprinkler protection is provided with water shields and/or protected from unacceptable water damage by zoned discharge or directional 4 spray nozzles. Item 113 Appendix A Guideline All valves in the fire water systems should be electrically supervised. The electrical supervision signal should indicate in the control room and other appropriate command locations in the plant. (See NFPA 26, " Supervision of Valves.") LGS Design Other than the non-indicating gate valves with curb boxes controlling laterals to the fire hydrants, all valves in the yard fire loop and headers into the buildings are post indicator valves. The valves are locked in the open position using padlock-type locking devices. These valves are not equipped with supervisory (tamper) switches. All of the fire protection water control OS&Y valves directly controlling each wet pipe sprinkler system, pre-action sprinkler system, and water spray system are provided with electrically actuated supervisory (tamper) switches with annunciation in the control room. O x_- 3-53
LGS FPER Item 115 O Appendix A Guideline Interior manual hose installation should be able to reach any location with at least one effective hose stream. To accomplish this, standpipes with hose connections, equipped with a maximum of 75 feet of 1-1/2 inch woven jacket-lined fire hose and suitable nozzles should be provided in all buildings, including containment, on all floors and should be spaced at not more than 100-foot intervals. Individual standpipes should be of at least 4-inch diameter for multiple hose connections and 2-1/2-inch diameter for single hose connections. These systems should follow the requirements of NFPA 14, " Standpipe and Hose Systems" for sizing, spacing and pipe support requirements. LGS Desion Readily accessible hose reels or cabinet-mounted racks are installed throughout the plant and are spaced to provide coverage by effective hose streams. No hose stations are located inside the primary containment. Hose stations are provided with a maximum of 100 feet of 1-1/2 inch woven jacket-lined fire hose equipped with adjustable fog and straight stream nozzles. Wet standpipes are not less than 3 inches in diameter for one or two hose connections and 4 inches in diameter for more than two hose connections. The standpipe and hose station installations are constructed in accordance with NFPA No. 14. Item 116 Appendix A Guideline Hose stations should be located outside entrances to normally unoccupied areas and inside normally occupied areas. Standpipes serving hose stations in areas housing safety-related equipment should have shutoff valves and pressure reducing devices (if applicable) outside the area. LGS Desion The only area of the plant which houses safety-related equipment and is considered to be normally occupied is the control room. Hose stations (both water and carbon dioxide) are located outside both entrances to the control room. In areas that are compartmentalized, hose stations are typically located outside the entrances to the compartments. In other areas, hose stations are located near stairwells. 3-54
LGS FPER O Since the hose stations serving compartmentalized areas are located outside the compartments, shutoff valves in the i associated standpipes are also located outside the compartments. All headers supplying hose stations can be isolated near their connection to the yard fire main loop. Pressure-reducing devices are not used in the fire protecticn water supply system. ( Item 117 Apoendix A Guideline The proper type of hose nozzles to be supplied in each area should be based on the fire hazard analysis. The usual combination spray / straight-stream nozzle may cause unacceptable mechanical damage (for example, the delicate electronic equipment in the control room) and be unsuitable. Electrically safe nozzles should be provided at locations where electrical equipment or cabling is located. LGS Design Combination-type nozzles will be installed on the wet l standpipe hose stations for flexibility. The fire brigade training will stress the proper use of combination nozzles on ' (~'))
\_ fires involving energized electrical equipment. Silice Class A combustibles may be present from time to time, and
( . often require a straight stream for effective extinguishment, it is desirable to have adjustable nozzles with straight i stream capability provided at strategic locations rather than one specific nozzle type. Item 118 Appendix A Guideline Certain fires such as those involving flammable liquids respond well to foam suppression. Consideration should be given to use of any of the available foams for such l specialized protection application. These include the more ! common chemical and mechanical low expansion foams, high expansion foam and the relatively new aqueous film forming foam (AFFF). LGS Design Flammable liquids used in the plant include fuel oils, lubricating oils, and solvents. The solvents used in maintenance operations are not stored inside buildings containing safety-related equipment. Buried tanks are used Os for diesel-generator fuel oil storage. Aboveground storage tanks are used for No. 2 and No. 6 fuel oil for the auxiliary 3-55
LGS FPER boiler, and are provided with mechanical foam extinguishing O systems. The fuel tank for the diesel-driven fire pump is surrounded by a concrete curb and is located inside the diesel fire pump enclosure. The tank and pump are protected by an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system. Other than integral systems, lubricating oil systems and storage facilities are protected by automatic sprinklers with portable dry chemical extinguishers and hose stations available for initial attack and backup. Flammable liquid fires are effectively controlled by water spray delivered by hose streams or automatic sprinklers. Although foam suppression is very effective for flammable liquid fires, NFPA 11B does not recommend its use on hot oil fires due to the possibility of frothing. Item 119 Appendix A Guideline The use of Halon fire extinguishing agents should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12A and 12B, "Halogenated Fire Extinguishing Agent Systems - Halon 1301 and Halon 1211." Only UL or FM approved agents should be used. In addition to the guidelines of NFPA 12A and 12B, preventative maintenance and testing of the systems, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders should be done at least quarterly. Particular consideration should also be given to: (a) minimum required Halon concentration and soak time (b) toxicity of Halon (c) toxicity and corrosive characteristics of thermal decomposition products of Halon. LGS Design A total flooding Halon 1301 system is provided for the entire raised floor of the auxiliary equipment room at elevation 289 feet in the control structure. The system design and installation is in accordance with NFPA 12A. Administrative procedures will be established to provide for maintenance and testing of the system, including check weighing of the Halon cylinders, to be performed at least quarterly. 3-56
LGS FPER O (a) The design concentration for the Halon 1301 system is ; 20% with a 20 minute soak time. (b) The Halon 1301 system is provided only under the raised floor of the auxiliary equipment room, rather than in the entire room. Emergency procedures will require personnel to use self-contained breathing apparatus when entering the auxiliary equipment room following the discharge of Halon. (c) The Halon 1301 system is designed to achieve a concentration of 6% within the first 10 seconds after discharge begins. This concentration is sufficient to extinguish the flames, which will largely end the production of toxic gases as a result of the thermal decomposition of Halon. Thus, rapid extinguishment of the flames will prevent the production of a significant quantity of toxic gases. . Item 120 Appendix A Guideline The use of carbon dioxide extinguishing systems should as a minimum comply with the requirements of NFPA 12, " Carbon O-s Dioxide Extinguishing Systems." Particular consideration should also be given to: (a) minimum required CO, concentration and soak time: (b) toxicity of CO,; (c) possibility of secondary thermal shock (cooling) damage; (d) offsetting requirements for venting during CO, injection to prevent overpressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent; (e) design requirements from overpressurization; and (f) possibility and probability of CO, systems being out of service because of personnel safety consideration. CO, systems are disarmed whenever people are present in an area so protected. Areas entered frequently (even though duration time for any visit is short) have often been found wtih CO, systems shut off. O 3-57
LGS FPER LGS Desian A low pressure, total flooding CO, system is provided for the cable spreading rooms. The system design and installation is in accordance with NFPA No. 12. (a) The design concentration for the CO, system is 50%, achieved within 7 minutes. (b) The protected space is normally unoccupied. The emergency procedures will require personnel to use breathing apparatus when entering the space following carbon dioxide discharge. (c) CO, discharge will be directed so as not to impinge directly on any cables. (d) Automatic initiation of the system closes the steam flooding dampers in the ventilation ducts which penetrate the cable spreading room walls. (e) Leakage around the doors leading into the cable spreading rooms will prevent overpressurization of the rooms due to the carbon dioxide discharge. (f) The electric power circuit for the CO, system is h supervised, and causes alarm registry in the control room when the circuit is interrupted. A supervised 1/4-inch ball valve is provided in the CO, system. This valve is provided with a limit switch which activates a local alarm and is annunciated in the control room. The audible predischarge alarm provides ample time for personnel to evacuate the area. Routine inspections and maintenance activities can be safely made in the cable spreading room area without disarming the system. The periodic inspection and testing of the ionization smoke detectors can be safely made, since the automatic actuation of the carbon dioxide system is initiated by thermal fire detectors. Additionally, local stations and controls are provided near , the CO, bulk storage unit to permit, under administrative procedures, the isolation of the CO, bulk storage unit by a - valve normally locked in the open position, and/or permit operation of the CO, total flooding system independent of automatic controls and, if necessary, without electric power. O 3-58
LGS FPER
~
Item 124 Appendix A Guideline Because of the general inaccessability of these areas during normal plant operations, protection should be provided by automatic fixed systems. Automatic sprinklers should be installed for those hazards identified as requiring fixed suppression. LGS Design The secondary containment is accessible during all modes of normal plant operations. Therefore, fire suppression for most areas of the secondary containment is provided by manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers. Areas with significant concentrations of combustible materials have been provided with fixed suppression systems (the HPCI and RCIC pump compartments are provided with pre-action sprinkler systems, electrical penetration areas at elevations 253 and 283 feet are provided with wet pipe sprinkler systems, and charcoal filters are provided with water spray sy. stems). Fire suppression coverage for the primary containment is provided by manual hose stations and portable fire O extinguishers located outside the two entrances to the suppression chamber at elevation 217 feet and the two entrances to the drywell at elevation 253 feet. Item 127 ! Appendix A Guideline A primary containment general area fire detection capability should be provided as backup for the above-described hazard detection. To accomplisa this, suitable smoke detection (e.g., visual obscuration, light scattering, and particle counting) should be installed in the air recirculation system ahead of any filters. LGS Design Fire detectors are not provided inside the primary containment. During reactor operation, the primary containment is inerted with nitrogen, and the oxygen concentration is maintained below 5% by volume. This inert atmosphere will prevent fires from )ccurring in the primary containment. Administrative procedures provide for fire watches when necessary during maintenance operations when the drywell has been de-inerted. 3-59
LGS FPER Item 128 Appendix A Guideline In addition, manual fire fighting capability should be permanently installed in containment. Standpipes with hose stations, and portable fire extinguishers, should be installed at strategic locations throughout containment for any required manual fire fighting operations. Equivalent protection from portable systems should '2e provided if it is impractical to install standpipes with hose stations. LGS Desion There are no provisions for permanently installed fire suppression within the primary containment. Manual hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are installed at locations throughout the secondary containment, including locations near the entrances to the primary containment. The extension of the standpipe system into the primary , containment is not recommended nor is the permanent installation of portable extinguishers. Item 130 l Appendix A Guideline l The control room is essential to safe reactor operation. It must be protected against disabling fire damage and should be separated from other areas of the plant by floors, walls, and roof having minimum fire resistance ratings of three hours. LGS Desion The walls, floor, and ceiling of the control room are rated as 3-hour fire barriers. The two entrances are provided with 3-hour rated doors, ventilation ducts entering the room are provided with 3-hour rated fire dampers, and all other penetrations are provided with 3-hour rated seals. The walls and ceilings separating the control room proper from its support facilities (such as office, shop, toilet, utility room, and instrument laboratory) are rated as 1-hour fire barriers. Ventilation ducts serving these support facilities are provided with 1-hour rated fire dampers, and the entrances to the individual rooms are provided with C-label (3/4 hour) doors. O 3-60
l l LGS FPER O Item 131 Appendix A Guideline Control room cabinets and consoles are subject to damage from two distinct fire hazards: (a) Fire originating within a cabinet or console; and (b) Exposure fire involving combustibles in the general room area. Manual fire fighting capability should be provided for both - hazards. Hose stations and portable water and Halon extinguishers should be located in the control room to eliminate the need for operators to leave the control room. An additional hose piping shutoff valve and pressure-reducing devices should be installed outside the control room. Hose stations adjacent to the control room with portable extinguishers in the control room are acceptable. Nozzles that are compatible with the hazards and equipment in the control room should be provided for the manual hose r~N station. The nozzles chosen should satisfy actual fire V) fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety, and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement. LGS Design Portable carbon dioxide fire extinguishers are located in the control room. In addition, manual hose stations of both the carbon dioxide and water types are located outside both entrances to the control room. The water hoses are equipped with combination nozzles. No hose stations are located within the control room. Item 132 Appendix A Guideline Fire detection in the control room, cabinets, and consoles should be provided by smoke and heat detectors in each fire area. Alarm and annunciation should be provided in the control room. Fire alarms in other parts of the plant should also be alarmed and annunciated in the control room. O 3-61
LGS FPER LGS Design O , Fire detectors are not located inside the individual ~ cabinets and consoles in the control room. The control room panels are not gasketed and therefore are not airtight. Any smoke generated within the cabinets will leak out and be detected by the fire detectors in the control room. Twenty-three detectors are distributed throughout the control room to provide rapid detection of smoke originating in any panel. Actuation of any of these detec tors is annunciated on the fire protection panels in the control room. The indicator light on the detector itself will then identify the specific detector originating the alarm. Fire alarms from other areas in the plant are also annunciated on the fire protection panels in the control room. Item 135 Appendix A Guideline The control room ventilation intake should be provided with smoke detection capability to automatically alarm locally and isolate the control room ventilation system to protect operators by preventing smoke from entering the control room. Manually operated venting of the control room should be available so that opcrators have the option of venting for visibility. LGS Desion The control room ventilation intake is provided with smoke detection capability to automatically detect and alarm the presence of smoke. Upon receipt of the alarm, the control room ventilation system can be manually placed in the recirculation mode in order to isolate the control room from the outside. For purge operation of the control room ventilation system the outside supply air and exhaust air dampers are fully opened and the return air damper to the control room is closed. The control room purge system can be operated from both inside and outside the control room. The control room ventilation system is a safety-related system. Automatic actuation of the recirculation mode by means of a non-safety-related signal is not permitted based on the separation criterion applicable to safety-related equipment. 3-62
F LGS FPER O Item 138 Appendix A Guideline The preferred acceptable methods are:
- 1. Automatic water syn' ?m such as closed head sprinklers, open h .1 deluge, or open directional spray nozzles. De,-Je and open spray systems should have pcovisions for manual operation at a remote station; however, there should also be provisions to preclude inadvertent operation.
Location of sprinkler heads or spray nozzles should consider cable tray sizing and arrangements to assure adequate water coverage. Cables should be designed to allow wetting down with deluge water without electrical faulting. Open head deluge and open directional spray systems should be zoned so that a single failure will not deprive the entire area of automatic fire suppression capability. The use of foam is acceptable, provided it is of a type capable of being delivered by a sprinkler or deluge system, such as an Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF). LGS Desian Automatic fire protection for the cable spreading room is provided by a total flooding carbon dioxide extinguishing system, in lieu of water or foam systems. The design of the carbon dioxide system is discussed in Section 2.8. In addition to the heat detectors provided for actuation of the carbon dioxide system, a separate group of fire detectors is located in the cable spreading room to provide early warning of an incipient fire. Item 156 Appendix A Guideline The general area housing remote safety-related panels should be provided with automatic fire detectors that alarm locally and alarm and annunciate in the control room. Combustible materials should be controlled and limited to those required for operation. Portable extinguishers and manual hose stations should be provided. O 3-63 , j
LGS FPER LGS Desion All safety-related panels are located in the control room and auxiliary equipment room except for the containment hydrogen recombiner power cabinets and the containment combustible gas sample cabinets, which are located in the reactor exclosure. The remote shutdown panel is located in the auxiliary equipment room. Other safety-related instrumentation is located in open racks and not within enclosed panels. The safety-related panel areas in the auxiliary equipment room are provided with automatic smoke detectors with local alarm as well as annunciation in the control room. The auxiliary equipment room will be used for electrical equipment only and not for any other purpose. Portable fire extinguishers and hose stations are available for general areas housing safety-related panels and racks. Item 157
. Appendix A Guideline Battery rooms should be protected against fire explosions.
Battery rooms should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers having a minimum fire rating of three hours inclusive of all oenetrations and openings. (See NFPA 69, " Standard on Explosion Prevention systems.") LGS Desian All battery rooms (both the safety-related battery rooms in the control structure and the non-safety-related battery rooms in the turbine enclosure) are individually enclosed by fire walls with minimum ratings of 3 hours. Ceilings above and floors below the battery rooms are capable of 3-hour fire ratings with the exception of exposed structural steel supporting the concrete slabs. Item 158 Appendix A Guideline Ventilation systems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen concentration well below 2 vol. % hydrogen concentration. LGS Design Ventilation air for the safety-related battery rooms is supplied by the safety-related OAV118 and 08V118 fan cabinets, and is exhausted by the nonsafety-related OAV124 3-64
LGS FPER O and OBV124 fan cabinets. Both sets of fans are 100% redundant and are controlled such that the standby fan will start running automatically if the lead fan fails. In the event of loss of flow through the battery room exhaust ducts, due either to fan stoppage or isolation damper closure, the battery room exhaust will automatically be recirculated to the suction of the OAV118 and OBV118 fan cabinets. The ventilation flow rate through the battery rooms provides 12 air changes per hour, which maintains hydrogen concentration far below 2% by volume. Ventilation air for the nonsafety-related battery rooms is provided by the turbine enclosure air supply and air exhaust systems, which are non-safety-related. A hydrogen monitor continuously samples the air in the battery rooms; high hydrogen concentration is annunciated in the control room. The low rate at which hydrogen builds up in the battery rooms provides ample time for the operators to take corrective action. Item 164 Appendix A Guideline
~ /~' Drainage for fire fighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided.
LGS Desian Each diesel-generator cell is provided with trapped and vented floor drains with adequate drainage capacity to cope with the maximum sprinkler water flow in each room. Each diesel-generator cell is provided with two exhaust fans, each capable of 40 air changes per hour for cooling and/or smoke removal. The ventilation system is controlled manually from a local control panel and is also started automatically by either high air temperature or a diesel engine start signal. Item 167 Appendix A Guideline The enclosure should be protected by automatic fire l suppression systems such as AFFF or sprinklers. LGS Desian The diesel oil day tank and the lube oil tank are installed within a 3-hour rated enclosure located inside each diesel-j generator room. A pre-action sprinkler system is provided ' 3-65 i
LGS FPER for the diesel-generator room and the day tank enclosure. Item 168 Appendix A Guideline Diesel fuel oil tanks with a capacity greater than 1100 gallons should not be located inside the buildings containing safety-related equipment. They should be located at least 50 feet from any building containing safety-related equipment, or if located within 50 feet, they should be housed in a separate building with construction having a minimum fire resistance rating of three hours. Buried tanks are considered as meeting the three-hour fire resistance requirements. See NFPA 30, " Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code", for additional guidance. LGS Desion The plant has eight diesel fuel oil storage tanks, each with a capacity of 41,500 gallons. The tanks are buried underground away from buildings. Item 171 Appendix A Guideline Pump heuses and rooms housing safety-related pumps or other safety-related equipment should be separated from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having at least three-hour ratings. These rooms should be protected by automatic sprinkler protection unless a fire hazards analysis can demonstrate that a fire will not endanger other safety-related equipment required for safe plant s!.utdown. LGS Desion The safety-related pump compartments located at elevation 177 feet in the reactor enclosure are separated from each other and from other areas of the plant by 3-hour rated fire l walls. The spray pond pump structure is located remote from other plant structures, and the two divisions of pumps within the structure are separated by a 3-hour rated fire wall. The HPCI pump compartment and the RCIC pump compartment are protected by automatic pre-action sprinkler systems. Fires originating in other safety-related pump compartments would not endanger other safety-related equipment required for safe plant shutdown, as di'scussed in Section 5.0. O 3-66
e LGS FPER O Item 180 Aopendix A Guideline The storage area should be provided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of water. LGS Desian A 4-inch floor drain serves to collect water on the refueling floor in the vicinity of the new fuel storage vault. A curb around the top of the vault prevents water on the refueling floor from draining into the vault. A 4-inch floor drain at the bottom of the new fuel storage vault prevents water from accumulating there. Item 181 Appendix A Guideline The storage configuration of new fuel should always be so maintained as to preclude criticality for any water density that might occur during fire water application. LGS Design The new fuel storage racks are designed to preclude the possibility of a fuel assembly being placed in an abnormal position that would increase the reactivity of the array. Based on criticality analyses performed by the fuel and storage rack vendor, the spray density ranges of fire fighting devices are well below the ranges which could result in new fuel criticality. In addition, a cover is provided over the top of the new fuel storage vault to prevent fire fighting water from inadvertently impinging on the fuel. Item 185 Appendix A Guideline Automatic sprinklers should be used in all areas where combustible materials are located. LGS Design An automatic wet pipe sprinkler system is provided for the vaste drum storage area at elevation 217 feet in the radwaste enclosure. Hose stations and portable fire extinguishers are provided for fire suppression coverage of the remainder of the radwaste enclosure. 3-67
s LGS FPER Item 186 Appendix A Guideline Automatic fire detection should be provided to annunciate and alarm in the control room and alarm locally. LGS Desian Automatic fire detection is provided in limited areas of the radwaste enclosure, as shown in Table A-1. In consideration of the low combustible loading in the remaining areas of the radwaste enclosure, detection by personnel in the vicinity is deemed sufficient. Item 189 Appendix A Guideline The decontaml cation areas should be protected by automatic sprinklers if flammable liquids are stored. LGS Desian No flammable liquids are stored in decontamination areas. j Fire suppression coverage is provided by hose stations and l portable fire extinguishers. Item 195 Appendix A Guideline Cooling towers should be of noncombustible construction when the basins are used for the ultimate heat sink or for the fire protection water supply. LGS Desion The cooling tower basins serve as a source of water for the fire protection system but not for any safety-related systems. The cooling towers are constructed entirely of i non-combustible material except for the splash bars and drift l eliminators, which are polyvinyl chloride, and the splash bar support grids, which are fire retardant polyester and fiberglass. The fill material is contained in a ring-shaped area around the periphery of each tower. The ring is separated into six cells by fire walls located at 600 intervals. A fire occurring in any one cell would have no effect on safety-related structures or systems, since such a fire would not affect the structural integrity of the cooling tower and the towers are located away from safety-related structures. This arrangement has been accepted by ANI for 3-68
LGS FPER O design of cooling towers with PVC and polyester fill material and without fire protection sprinklers. Item 207 Aprendix A Guideline Hazardous chemicals should be stored and protected in accordance with the recommendatons of NFPA 49, " Hazardous Chemicals Data." Chemicals storage areas should be well-ventilated and protected against flooding conditions since some chemicals may react with water to produce ignition. LGS Desian Hazardous chemicals are stored in areas that are remote from ' safety-related areas, are well ventilated, and are protected against flooding. The controls and precautions relative to hazardous chemicals to be commonly used in the plant will be set forth in the administrative procedures. Hazardous chemicals will be transported in the usual shipping containers, stored in suitable areas. Protection, g separation, and isolation criteria will be followed in s ,/ accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 49, " Hazardous Chemical Data." The ventilation system provided for the chemical storage ' . areas will assure that the toxicity level and potentially explosive gaseous mixtures in these areas meet the requirements of NFPA 49. Adequate drainage will be provided. O 3-69
m- .- LGS FPER CHAPTER 4
; EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL FIRE, HAZARDS 4.1 SCOPE OF EVALUATION ,
This chapter provides an evaluation of the potential for occurrence of fires within the plant and a summary of the capabilities of the existing fire pro,tection program. This evaluation was performed for all structures that contain - saf ety-related equipment or could af fect safety-related structures by virtue of the fire hazards present. A review of the plant wan'made to identify the combustible materials present, quantify the fire hazard in terms of combustible loading, andirelate the potential hazard to the capabilities of the< existing fire barriers and fire suppression systems. This informatio'n is presented in Table A-1 which lists the type andLquantity of combustible materials present in each fire zone, the corresponding combustible loading, and the availadility of detect-fon and suppression equipment. Figures B-4 through.B-12 show the'locaticas of the fire zones, fire barriers, 7 O and fire' suppressior. (coverage. 4.2 PROCEDURE The evaluation of fire hazards was performed using a procedure i that is summarized by the following steps:
- a. For identification purposes, the various st.ructures of the plant were divided into specific fire areas. A fire area is defined as that portion of a structure that is separated from other areas by boundaries (walls, floors, and ceilings) which are of a type of construction which is sufficient to prevent the spread of fire across the boundary, considering the combustible loading in the area. Many fire areas were further subdivided into fire zones to permit more precise identification of the locations of combustible materials, fire detection.and suppression systems,'and components associated with safety-related systems. The breakdown into fire zones was based on the locations of interior walls and slabs within each fire area.; Fire areas are identified by a unique number, and fire zones within the same fire area are identified by a subletter. The fire area and fire
/~N zone designations arc listed in Table A-1 under b " Item No.".
s 4-1 4
LGS FPER
- b. Each fire zone was surveyed to determine the type, quantity, and distribution of combustible materials present.
- c. The combustible loading for each fire zone is determined based on the quantity of combustible materials present and the heat of combustion of each type of combustible material. The heat of combustion values used in this analysis are listed in Table A-2. The quantity of each type of combustible material (in Ib) is multiplied by the appropriate heat of combustion (in Btu /lb) to determine the heat release (in Btu) of each type of combustible material. The total heat release of all combustibles in the fire zone is then expressed in terms of the weight of equivalent wood by dividing by the heat of combustion of wood (8000 Btu /lb). To obtain the combustible loading (in Ib of equivalent wood per square foot of floor area) for each fire zone, the total heat release (in Ib of equivalent wood) is divided by the floor area of the fire zone. The combustible loading thus obtained is listed in Table A-1.
- d. The next step was to determine the adequacy of the building components in limiting the propagation of an uncontrolled postulated fire. For this analysis the combustibles in an area were categorized from A-slight through E-severe in accordance with National Fire Protection Handbook, Fourteenth Edition, Table 6-8C.
Battery cases were placed in the A-slight category. Charcoal and electrical cabling were both placed in the C-moderately severe category. All combustible liquids were placed in the E-severe category. In general, if the distribution of the combustible material in the area being considered was nonuniform, a more severe category was selected than would have been warranted by homogeneous material distribution. In analyzing fire zones that contained combustible liquids, it was assumed that the entire contents of the liquid reservoir in the particular zone was distributed uniformly over the floor area of the zone unless limited by curbs or other architectural features. It was then assumed that the liquid was ignited and burned at a rate of 4 mm/ min. This method of analysis represents a conservative approach since it will generate the maximum heat release rate and thus minimize the effectiveness of the plant fire brigade in reducing fire damage. National Fire Protection Handbook, Figure 6-8E was then , utilized to determine the expected duration of the fully l developed period of the fire. In certain cases where significant quantities of combustibles in different occupancy categories were present, interpolation between 4-2
LGS FPER time-temperature curves was used to yield a realistic expected duration. To establish the adequacy of fire area boundaries, an equivalent fire severity was then determined. The area under the time-temperature curve for each occupancy category was compared to the National Bureau of Standards Time-Temperature Curve. This normalization process yields an equivalent fire severity in minutes. For example, a fire loading of 4 psf in an A-slight area will have an expected duration of 96 minutes but an equivalent severity of 50 minutes. The same loading in a C-moderately severe area will have an expected duration of 34 minutes and equivalent severity of 22 minutes. The equivalent fire severity thus determined is listed in Table A-1. O O 4-3
LGS FPER O CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE SAFE SHUTDOWN 5.1 METHODOLOGY This chapter provides an evaluation of the effects of postulated fires in each fire area on the ability of the operator to achieve a safe shutdown of the plant. Of the numerous possible combinations of equipment that could be used to effect a safe shutdown, two specific conbinations were selected for detailed study for the purposes of this evaluation. These two shutdown methods are described in Section 5.2. In performing the safe shutdown analysis, the two shutdown methods were examined to determine the minimum equipment, control, and power, requirements for operability of each method. The locations of the equipment itself and the cabling associated with the required equipment were identified with respect to the
- various fire areas.
l Each fire area was then examined to determine which components associated with the shutdown methods, if any, would be rendered l inoperable by the occurrence of a fire within the fire area. The results of the safe shutdown analysis are summarized in l
~ections 5.3 through 5.9 for each fire area.
l The following assumptions were used in performing the safe shutdown analysis: ! a. No credit is taken for manual fire fighting efforts or the operation of automatic fire suppression systems. The fire is assumed to disable all equipment and i electrical cabling located in the fire area, unless the
- fire hazard analysis demonstrates otherwise. An electrical cable tray fire is assumed not to propagate from one tray to another, provided that no combustible pathways exist between the trays, and the trays are physically separated by a sufficient distance considering the combustible loading in the area.
- b. Plant accidents and severe natural phenomena are not colsidered to occur concurrently with the postulated fire. However, offsite power is assumed to be unavailable after the onset of the fire.
! c. A single active component failure is not assumed to j occur concurrently with the fire.
[} 5-1
LGS FPER
- d. Credit is taken for reactor trip. Any fire affecting the reactor protection system or the control rod drive circuitry will not prevent the reactor from being tripped. A reactor trip can be performed manually (in the control room), automatically (by the RPS logic), or by tripping the RPS power supplies (in the auxiliary equipment room).
- e. No credit is taken for proper operation or proper positioning of equipment which is not required to change its status during the course of the shutdown procedure (e.g., a motor-operated valve). If control or power cabling associated with such equipment is routed through a fire area under consideration, loss of operability and loss of function is assumed. This assumption provides a worst case analysis regarding spurious signals associated with cabling failures in a fire area.
Those floor slabs identified by an asterisk following the indicated fire rating in the fire area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9 are discussed in Item 46 of Section 3.2. Those watertight and steamtight doors identified in Sections 5.3 through 5.9 by a double asterisk (**) following the indicated fire rating are discussed in Item 47 of Section 3.2.
5.2 DESCRIPTION
OF REACTOR SHUTDOWN METHODS The following sections provide descriptions of methods that can be used for reactor shutdown and cooldown from the control room, both with and without offsite power, and also from outside the control room using the remote shutdown panel. Each of these methods includes a system by which makeup water can be added to the reactor vessel, a system by which energy can be removed from the reactor vessel, and any support systems needed to accommodate energy removal to an ultimate heat sink or to return water to its supply source. Although the safe shutdown analysis for the various fire areas places primary emphasis on achievement of reactor shutdown using the methods described below, many alternative shutdown methods would be available. Use of safety-related and nonsafety-related l systems not addressed in the safe shutdown analysis, plus manual 1 operation of certain equipment and controls, would provide numerous combinations of systems with adequate capability to 3 safely shut the plant down. l l
)
h 5-2
l l LGS FPER O 5.2.1 Reactor Shutdown With Offsite Power After the turbine-generator has been tripped and all control rods inserted into the reactor core during the course of a normal shutdown and cooldown, reactor decay heat and sensible heat is removed by bypassing main steam to the condenser. Heat is removed from the condenser by the circulating water system and rejected to the atmosphere by the cooling tower. Makeup water is supplied to the reactor vessel by the condensate and feedwater system, taking suction on the condenser hotwell. When the reactor has been depressurized below a nominal 75 psig, the RHR system is initiated in the shutdown cooling mode of operat.;cn. In this mode, reactor water is circulated through the RHR neat exchangers, where it is cooled by the RHRSW system. Heat is rejected from the RHRSW system to the atmosphere by using either the cooling tower or the spray pond. The reactor vent valves are opened when reactor pressure reaches atmospheric. 5.2.2 Reactor Shutdown Without Offsite Power For the purposes of this safe shutdown analysis, two methods of shutdown that are operable without offsite power were selected for detailed study. Shutdown method A requires Class IE power from Divisions 1 and 3 (both ac and de) in order to be operable. Shutdown method B requires Class IE power from Divisions 2 and 4 ()S (both ac and de) plus de power from either Division 1 or Division 3 in order to be operable. The two methods are described below. Method A After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the RCIC system is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber. The operation of the RCIC system also removes energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the RCIC turbine. During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption of the RCIC system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which open when reactor pressure reaches the valve setpoint. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the i RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. In order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure of 75 psig. This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, operation of the RCIC system is terminated and the RHR system is switched from the fi suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode. In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger 5-3
LGS FPER by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the followings
- a. Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only)
- b. ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in addition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the compressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instrument gas system will provide the necessary gas.
If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas supply line cannot be opened by its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.)
- c. RCIC pump and associated valves
- d. RHR heat exchanger "A"
- e. RHR pump "A" and associated valves (The outboard isolation valve on the shutdown cooling return line is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 2 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 2 power is not available.)
- f. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The outboard valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 2 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 2 power is not available.)
- g. RHRSW pump "A" and associated valves (for Unit 1);
RHRSW pump "C" and associated valves (for Unit 2)
- h. ESW pump "A" and associated valves (for Unit 1);
ESW pump "C" and associated valves (for Unit 2)
- 1. RHR compartment unit cooler "A"
- j. RCIC compartment unit cooler "A"
- k. Spray pond pump structure fan "A"
- 1. Diesel-generator enclosure fans "A", "C", "E", and "G"
- m. Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder "A"
- n. Standby diesel-generators "A" and "C"
- o. Station batteries "A" and "C" 5-4
LGS FPER O Method B After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the HPCI system is used to supply makeup water to the reactor vessel from the suppression chamber. The operation of the HPCI system also removes energy from the reactor in the form of steam used to drive the HPCI turbine. During the period in which steam is generated at a rate greater than the consumption of the HPCI system, steam is relieved to the suppression pool by the automatic actuation of the main steam relief valves, which open when reactor pressure reaches the valve setpoint. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. In order to initiate operation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system, it is necessary to depressurize the reactor below a nominal pressure of 75 psig. This is accomplished by using the ADS valves to discharge steam to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below 75 psig, the RHR system is switched from the suppression pool cooling mode to the shutdown cooling mode. Heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. The items of equipment that are required for this shutdown method include the following:
- a. Main steam relief valves (self-actuated mode only)
- b. ADS valves (If a compressed gas supply is needed in addition to that stored in the ADS accumulators, the compressed gas cylinders of the primary containment instrument gas system will provide the necessary gas.
j If the outboard containment isolation valve on the gas
- supply line cannot be opened by its motor operator, the valve will be opened manually.)
- c. HPCI pump and associated valves
- d. RHR heat exchanger "B"
- e. RHR pump "B" and associated valves l f. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valves (The
! inboard valve is a motor-operated valve powered from the Division 1 switchgear; this valve will be operated manually at the valve location if Division 1 power is not available.)
- g. RHRSW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1);
5-5
1 LGS FPER RHRSW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2)
- h. ESW pump "B" and associated valves (for Unit 1);
ESW pump "D" and associated valves (for Unit 2)
- 1. RHR compartment unit cooler "B"
- j. HPCI compartment unit cooler "A"
- k. Spray pond pump structure fan "B"
- 1. Diesel-generator enclosure fans "B", "D", "F", and "H".
- m. Reactor vessel pressure and level recorder "B"
- n. Standby' diesel-generators "B" and "D"
- o. Station batteries "B" and "D" plus either the "A" or "C" batteries 5.2.3 Reactor Shutdown from Outside the Control Room In the unlikely event that the control room becomes uninhabitable, the plant can be shut down from the remote shutdown panel, located in the auxiliary equipment room.
Transfer switches on the remote shutdown panel allow the operator to transfer control of the systems involved from the control room panels to the remote shutdown panel. Instrumentation and j controls for the following systems are provided on the remote t I shutdown panel:
- a. RCIC
- b. Main steam relief valves "A", "C", and "N"
- c. RHR loor "A"
- d. RHRSW loop "A" l
- e. ESW loop "A"
- f. Reactor vessel and containment monitoring 9
5-6
l i LGS FPER O 5.3 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - CONTROL STRUCTURE 5.3.1 Fire Area 1: Recombiner Compartments, Condensate Backwash Compartments, and Control Structure Water Chiller Areas (El. 180'-0" and 200'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-4 and B-5): Construction Ratino Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part 3 hr I below El. 200'-0") S - Concrete masonry unit (part 3 hr above El. 200'-0", eastern l half) l S - Concrete masonry unit (part None above El. 200'-0", western half, contains two HVAC ( O penetrations without fire dampers) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr j Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Steamtight door connecting to 1.5 hr** stairwell no. 7 Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 89 and 102 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Control structure water chillers OAK 112 and OBK112 (2) Control structure chilled water circulation pumps OAP162 and OBP162 (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable trays. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) () (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: 5-7
LGS FPER (1) Loss of control structure chilled water system loop A or loop B (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of either loop of the control structure chilled water system may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safety shut the plant down. Due to the provision of fire walls at El. 200'-0" within fire area 1, a postulated fire cannot affect both loops of the control structure chilled water system simultaneously. A 3-hour rated fire wall is located between the loop A and loop B control structure water chiller areas, and the north, south, and east walls of the loop B water chiller area are lh also fire rated. Therefore, at least one of the chilled water loops will remain available to provide cooling for the control structure in the event of a fire in this area. 5.3.2 Fire Area 2: 13-kV Switchgear Area (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit - (part 3 hr adjacent to battery rooms) E- Reinforced concrete - (remainder) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit (part 3 hr adjacent to battery rooms) W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no.[7) Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* 5-8
LGS FPER O Access: Door connecting to stairwell no. 7 1.5 hr Doors connecting to areas 3, 3 hr 4, 5, and 6 Steamtight doors connecting to areas 3 hr** 94, 107, and 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets OAV118 and OBV118 and associated ventilation dampers . (2) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with ' the following Unit 1 components:
- a. Class IE de motor control centers 10D201 (Div. 1),
10D202 (Div. 2), and 10D203 (Div. 2)
- b. Class IE dc distribution panels 1CD102 (Div. 3),
IDD102 (Div. 4), 1AD501 (Div. 1), 1BD501 (Div. 2), 1CD501 (Div. 3), and 1DD501 (Div. 4)
- c. Class IE instrument ac transformers 10X106 (Div. 1), 10X107 (Div. 2), 10X108 (Div. 3), and 10X109, (Div. 4) .
(3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following Unit 2 components:
- a. Class IE de motor control centers 20D201 (Div. 1),
20D202 (Div. 2), and 20D203 (Div. 2)
- b. Class IE de distribution panels 2CD102 (Div. 3),
O 2DD102 (Div. 4), 2AD501 (Div. 1), 2BD501 (Div. 2), 2CD50t (Div. 3), and 2DD501 (-D i v . 4). (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with HVAC dampers in the battery room exhaust ducts (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Unit 1 systems
- a. Loss of Unit 1 Class IE de power supplied by motor control centers 10D201 (Div. 1), 10D202 (Div. 2),
and 10D203 (Div. 2)
- b. Loss of Unit 1 Class IE de power supplied by distribution panels 1CD102 (Div. 3), 1DD102 (Div. 4), IAD501 (Div. 1), IBD501 (Div. 2), ICD 501
() (Div. 3), and 1DD501 (Div. 4) 5-9
LGS FPER
- c. Loss of Unit 1 Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y101 (Div. 1),
10Y102 (Div. 2), 10Y103 (Div. 3), and 10Y104 (Div. 4)
- d. Loss of diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D
- e. Loss of the Div. 3 and Div. 4 4-kV switchgear (2) Unit 2 systems
- a. Loss of Unit 2 Class IE de power supplied by motor control centers 20D201 (Div. 1), 20D202 (Div. 2),
and 20D203 (Div. 2)
- b. Loss of Unit 2 Class IE dc power supplied by distribution panels 2CD102 (Div. 3), 2DD102 (Div. 4), 2AD501 (Div. 1), 2BD501 (Div. 2), 2CD501 (Div. 3), and 2DD501 (Div. 4)
- c. Loss of Unit 2 Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 20Y102 (Div. 1),
20Y102 (Div. 2), 20Y103 (Div. 3), and 20Y104 (Div. 4)
- d. Loss of diesel-generators 2A, 2B, 2C, and 2D h
- e. Loss of the Div. 3 and Div. 4 4-kV switchgear (3) Loss of ventilation for the 4-kV switchgear compartments, Class IE battery rooms, and static inverter compartments (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: This fire area contains a number of conduits containing electrical cabling associated with shutdown methods A and B for Units 1 and 2. All portions of conduits located within this fire area which are associated with shutdown methods A or B will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent 5-10
LGS FPER O fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damcge affecting safe shutdown capability. This supplementary fire protection ensures that both of the shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safety shut the plant Gawn in the event of a fire. Loss of ventilation for the control structure areas listed in (d)(3) above could result in a long-term temperature increase in those areas, depending on the heat loads in the various compartments. In order to prevent temperatures from becoming excessive if the normal ventilation cannot be re-established in those areas, portable fans will be provided for use in maintaining airflow through the affected compartments. 5.3.3 Fire Area 3: Unit 1 Class IE Battery Room (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 2 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 he i S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Door connecting to area 2 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) , Class IE battery 1DD101 (Div. 4) (2) Battery charger IDD103 (3) Fuse box 1DD105 (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Ci Loss of Class IE de power supplied by battery 1DD101 (Div. 4) 5-11
LGS FPER (2) Loss of diesel-generator ID and associated 4-kV switchgear (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detector, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade wil,1 be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the' ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described - in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. 5.3.4 Fire Area 4: Unit 1 Class IE Battery Room (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Door connecting to area 2 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE battery 1CD101 (Div. 3) (2) Battery charger 1CD103 (3) Fuse box ICD 105 5-12
LGS FPER O (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by battery 1CD101 (Div. 3) (2) Loss of diesel-generator 1C and associated 4-kV switchgear (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detector, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. 5.3.5 Fire Area 5: Unit 2 Class IE Battery Room (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): O 5-13
LGS FPER Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Door connecting to area 2 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE battery 2DD101 (Div. 4) (2) Battery charger 2DD103 (3) Fuse box 2DD105 (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by battery 2DD101 (Div. 4) (2) Loss of diesel-generator 2D and associated 4-kV , switchgear ' (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detector, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safety shut Unit 1 down. O S-14
LGS FPER O With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. 5.3.6 Fire Area 6: Unit 2 Class IE Battery Room (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Door connecting to area 2 3 hr
,/ (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: )
(1) Class IE battery 2CD101 (Div. 3) (2) Battery charger 2CD103 (3) Fuse box 2CD105 (4) Rigid steel conduit containing cables associated with fan cabinet OBV118 outlet damper (HD-78-097B) (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by battery 2CD101 (Div. 3) (2) Loss of diesel-generator 2C and associated 4-kV switchgear
! (3) Loss of air flow through fan cabinet OBV118 (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
, gg The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual
, g ,/
! annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the 5-15 I
LGS FPER control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. 5.3.7 Fire Area 7: Corridor (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 9, 11, 13, 3 hr 15, 17, and 19 Steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** areas 97 and 110 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following Unit 1 components:
- a. Class IE instrument ac transformers 10X106 (Div. 1) and 10X108 (Div. 3)
- b. Class IE load center transformers 10X201 (Div. 1),
10X202 (Div. 2), and 10X203 (Div. 3)
- c. Instrument rack 10C001 (core spray loop "A")
- d. Instrument rack 10C018 (RHR loop "A" and RHRSW loop "A")
5-16
LGS FPER O e. Instrument racks 10C075, 10C076, and 10C078 (RHR pumps "A", "B", and "D" discharge pressure)
- f. Core spray pump 1BP206
- g. Core spray pump discharge pressure transmitters (PT-52-1N055C&G)
- h. RHR flow transmitters (FT-51-1N015B,C&D and FT-51-1N052B,C&D)
- 1. HPCI instrumentation
- j. HPCI leakage detection system
- k. RCIC instrumentation
- 1. RCIC leakage detection system
- m. Diesel-generator ID (2) Rigid steel conduit containing cables associated with power supply from Unit 1 Class IE instrument ac panel 10Y102 (Div. 2) to the following components:
- a. RHR and coro spray vertical board 10C601
- b. RHR and core spray relay board 10C618
- c. HPCI vertical board 10C647
- d. HPCI relay board 10C620
- e. ESW and RHRSW vertical board OBC 667
- f. Spray pond pump structure HVAC control panel OBC 564
- g. MSIV leakage control system relay board 10C644
- h. SGTS area HVAC control panel 00C124 (3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following Unit 2 components:
O a. Class IE instrument ac transformers 20X106 (Div. 1) and 20X108 (Div. 3)
- b. Class IE load center transformers 20X201 (Div. 1),
20X202 (Div. 2), and 20X203 (Div. 3)
- c. Instrument rack 20C001 (core spray loop "A")
- d. Instrument rack 20C018 (RHR loop "A" and RHRSW loop "A")
- e. Instrument racks 20C075, 20C076, 20C077, and 20C078 (RHR pumps "A", "B", "C", and "D" discharge pressure)
- f. Core spray pump 2BP206
- g. RCIC instrumentation
- h. RCIC leakage detection system
- 1. HPCI leakage detection system
- j. Diesel-generator 2D (4) Rigid _ steel conduit containing cables associated with power supply from Unit 2 Class IE instrument ac panel 20Y102 (Div. 2) to the following components:
- a. RHR and core spray vertical board 20C601
- b. RHR and core spray relay board 20C618
- c. HPCI vertical board 20C647
- d. HPCI relay board 20C620
- e. ESW and RHRSW vertical board OBC 677
- f. MSIV leakage control system relay board 20C644 (5) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with O the following common components:
5-17
LGS FPER
- a. Control structure chilled water loop "A" components (water chiller 0AK112, chiller oil pump OAP168, chilled water circulation pump OAP162, and instrumentation)
- b. Control structure battery room HVAC exhaust dampers
- c. Emergency switchgear and battery room HVAC system components (fan cabinet OBV118, plus inlet and outlet dampers for fan cabinets 0AV118 and OBV118)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Unit 1 systems
- a. Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B202 (Div. 2)
- b. Loss of Class IE ac powet* supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y101 (Div. 1) and 10Y103 (Div. 3)
- c. Loss of RCIC system
- d. Loss of HPCI system
- e. Loss of core spray injection capability through loops "A" and "B"
- f. Loss of capability to use steam condensing mode of RHR loop "A"
- g. Loss of RHR loop "B"
- h. Loss of diesel-generator ID (2) Unit 2 systems
- a. Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 20B201 (Div. 1) and 20B202 (Div. 2)
- 6. Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 20Y101 (Div. 1) and 20Y103 (Div. 3)
- c. Loss of RCIC system
- d. Loss of HPCI system
- e. Loss of core spray injection capability through loops "A" and "B"
- f. Loss of capability to use steam condensing mode of RHR loop "A"
- g. Loss of RHR loop "B"
- h. Loss of diesel-generator 2D O
5-18
LGS FPER O (3) Common systems
- a. Loss of ESW loop "B"
- b. Loss of RHRSW loop "B"
- c. Loss of spray pond pump structure ventilation using fan cabinet OBV543
- d. Loss of control structure water chiller 0AK112
- e. Loss of ventilation to the 4-kV switchgear compartments, Class IE battery rooms, and static inverter compartments (e) Consequencee of fire with active fire supperssion:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the 7 smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown:
~
This fire area contains cable trays, conduits, and gutters containing electrical cabling associated with shutdown ((_,')s methods A and B for Units 1 and 2. All portions of raceways located within this fire area which are associated with shutdown methods A or B will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting safe shutdown capability. This supplementary fire protection ensures that both of the shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire. Loss of ventilat. ion for the control structure areas listed in (3)e above coulC result in a long-term temperature increase in those areas, depending on the heat loads in the various compartments. In order to prevent temperatures from becoming excessive if the normal ventilation cannot be re-established in those areas, portable fans will be provided for use in maintaining airflow through the affected compartments. 5.3.8 Fire Area 8: Unit 1 Class IE Battery Room (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area
) (see Figure B-7):
l 5-19 1 L
LGS FPER Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Door connecting to area 9 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to 3 hr** area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE batteries 1B1D101 and 1B2D101 (Div. 2) (2) Battery chargers 1B1D103 and 1B2D103 (3) Fuse box IBD105 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Control structure battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system OAV124/OBV124)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of diesel-generator 1B and the Div. 2 4-kV switchgear (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by motor control centers 10D202 and 10D203 and power distribution panel 1BD102 (all Div. 2) (3) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans l l (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. 1 5-20 l
LGS FPER O (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 1 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. 5.3.9 Fire Area 9: Unit 1 Class IE Battery Room (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area ' (see Figure B-7): [} Construction Ratina Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 3 hr and 8 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE batteries 1 AID 101 and 1A2D101 (Div. 1) (2) Battery chargers 1A1D103 and 1A2D103 (3) Fuse box 1AD105 (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire, o 5-21
LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based O on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of diesel-generator 1A and the Div. 1 4-kV switchgear (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by motor control center 10D201 (Div. 1) and power distribution panel 1AD102 (Div. 1) (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors which will cause an audible-visual l I annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 anwn. 5.3.10 Fire Area 10: Unit 2 Class IE Battery Room (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr l E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr 5-22
l LGS FPER Access: Door connecting to area 11 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to 3 hr** area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE batteries 2B1D101 and 2B2D101 (Div. 2) (2) Battery chargers 2B1D103 and 2B2D103 (3) ruse box 2BD105 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Control structure battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system OAV124/OBV124)
(c) Postulated fire in areas Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of diesel-generator 2B and the Div. 2 4-kV switchgear O (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by motor control centers 20D202 and 20D203 and power distribution panel 2BD102 (all Div. 2) (3) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. /r With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling ( associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire 5-23
LGS FPER area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. 5.3.11 Fire A'ea r 11: Unit 2 Class IE Battery Room (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 10 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE batteries 2A1D101 and 2A2D101 (Div. 1) (2) Battery chargers 2 AID 103 and 2A2D103 (3) Fuse box 2AD105 (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of diesel-generator 2A and the Div. 1 4-kV switchgear (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by motor control center 20D201 (Div. 1) and power distribution panel 2AD102 (Div 1) O 5-24
LGS FPER O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the l control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. 5.3.12 Fire Area 12: Unit 1 4-kV Switchgear Compartment Os (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Ratino l Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr l E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Door connecting to area 13 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to 3 hr** area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 10A117 (Div. 3) (2) Class IE de distribution panel 1CD102 (Div. 3) (3) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 10Y103 O (Div. 3) 5-25
- - - - - - ~, - - >
LGS FPER (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with O the following components:
- a. RCIC leakage detection system
- b. Instrument rack 10C001 (core spray loop "A")
- c. Instrument rack 10C018 (RHR loop "A" and RHRSW loop "A")
- d. Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure)
- e. ESW pump OAP548
- f. RHRSW loop "A" components (pump OAP506 and valves HV-12-017A and HV-12-034A)
- g. Spray pond pump structure HVAC system components (fan cabinet OAV543, heating coil OAE701, and instrument ac power to control panel OAC564)
- h. Unit 1 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system OAV124/OBV124)
(5) Rigid steel conduit containing cables ascociated with power supply from Class IE dc distribution panel 1AD102 (Div. 1) to the following components:
- a. RHR and core spray vertical board 10C601
- b. RHR and core spray relay board 10C617
- c. RCIC relay board 10C621
- d. ADS relay board 10C628
- e. RCIC vertical board 10C648
- f. RPS channel "A" vertical board 10C609 (c) Postulated fire in area:
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed i
, in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely l unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the I cabling.)
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based ot: the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Unit 1 systems
- a. Loss of 4-kV switchgear 10A117 (Div. 3)
- b. Loss of Class IE de power supplied by de distribution panel 1CD102 (Div. 3) !
- c. Loss of Class IE'ac power supplied by instrument ac l distribution panel 10Y103 (Div. 3) l
- d. Loss of RCIC system '
- e. Loss of RHR loop "A"
- f. Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A"
- g. Loss of ADS valves (2) Common systems
- a. Loss of ESW pump OAP548
- b. Loss of RHRSW pump OAP506 5-26
LGS FPER (~' N)'
- c. Loss of spray pond pump structure fan cabinet OAV543 and associated components
- d. Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. With regard to Unit 1, no equipment or cabling associated C) with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, with the exception of the electrical power supply to the ADS valves. The components / cabling involved in the power supply to the ADS valves are de distribution panel 1CD102 (Div. 3) and electrical cabling associated with de distribution panel 1ADIO2 (Div. 1). Power from either one of these two dc distribution panels is sufficient to operate the ADS valves. All portions of the raceways within this fire area that are associated with the power supply from panel 1AD102 to the ADS valves will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting shutdown method A. This supplementary fire protection ensures that shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the i ductwork leading from the Unit 1 battery rooms to the battery 1 room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and , battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action I
/ will ensure the centinued ventilation of the battery rooms.
V) 5-27
LGS FPER 5.3.13 Fire Area 13: Unit 1 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 12 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 10A115 (Div. 1) (2) Class IE dc distribution panel 1AD102 (Div. 1) (3) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 10Y101 (Div. 1) (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Class IE load center transformer 10X203 (Div. 3)
- b. Class IE instrument ac panel 10Y103 (Div. 3)
- c. Control structure chilled water system components (water chiller OAK 112, chiller oil pump OAP162, chilled water circulation pump OAP168, and the Div. 3 instrument ac power supply to control panel 00C562)
- d. Unit 1 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system OAV124/OBV124)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 10A115 (Div. 1) (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by de distribution panel 1AD102 (Div. 1) 5-28
l LGS FPER . O (3) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 10B203 (Div. 3) (4) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y101 (Div. 1) and 10Y103 (Div. 3) (5) Loss of control structure water chiller OAK 112 and associated components (6) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual ~ annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described O- in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. ! With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling asosociated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 1 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. 5.3.14 Fire Area 14: Unit 1 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): O 5-29
LGS FPER Construction Rating O Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Door connecting to area 15 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to area 113 3 hr** (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 10A118 (Div. 4) (2) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 10Y104 (Div. 4) (3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Unit 1 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system 0AV124/0BV124)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 10A118 (Div. 4) (2) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 10Y104 (Div. 4) (3) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. 5-30
LGS FPER (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on.the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. .e. , _ With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain avilable to safely shut Unit 1 down. In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 1 or 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAVi18 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. 5.3.15 Fire Area 15: Unit 1 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") () (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr. l l Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* l Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 14 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 10A116 (Div. 2) (2) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 10Y102 (Div. 2) (3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Class IE load center transformer 10X204 (Div. 4)
- b. Unit I and 2 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan systems 0AV124/0BV124 and
(, OAV118/0BV118) 5-31
LGS FPER
- c. Inlet and outlet dampers associated with emergency O
switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118) (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 10A116 (Div. 2) (2) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 10Y102 (Div. 2) (3) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 10B204 (Div. 4) (4) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (5) Loss of ventilation for 4-kV switchgear compartments, Class IE battery rooms, and static inverter compartments (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no effect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. Loss of ventilation for the control structure areas listed in (d)5 above could result in a long-term temperature increase in those areas, depending on the heat loads in the various 5-32
LGS FPER O compartments. In order to prevent temperatures from becoming ; excessive if the normal ventilation cannot be re-established ) in those areas, portable fans will be provided for use in maintaining airflow through the affected compartments. 5.3.16 Fire Area 16: Unit 2 4-kV Switchgear Compartment 1 (El. 239'-0") 1 (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr I Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr l Access: Door connecting to area 17 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to area 113 3 hr** l (} (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 20A118 (Div. 4) (2) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 20Y104 , (Div. 4) l (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components
?.vcated in the area and all cabling routed through the area):
(1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 20A118 (Div. 4) (2) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 20Y104 (Div. 4) (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the
,/
smoke detectors, which will cause an airdible-visual s annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the 5-33
LGS FPER control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. With regard to Unit 2. since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. 5.3.17 Fire Area 17: Unit 2 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 16 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 20A116 (Div. 2) (2) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 20Y102 (Div. 2) (3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with Unit 2 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system 0AV124/0BV124) (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely l 5-34
i l LGS FPER O V unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 20A116 (Div. 2) (2) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 20Y102 (Div. 2) (3) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. () (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. 5.3.18 Fire Area 18: Unit 2 4-kV Switchgear Compartment (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): O 5-35
LGS FPER Construction Rating O Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Door connecting to area 19 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to area 113 3 hr** (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 20A117 (Div. 3) (2) Class IE de distribution panel 2CD102 (Div. 3) (3) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 20Y103 (Div. 3) (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following Unit 2 components:
- a. RCIC leakage detection system
- b. Instrument rack 20C001 (core spray loop "A")
- c. Instrument rack 20C018 (RHR loop "A" and RHRSW loop "A")
- d. Instrument rack 20C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure)
(5) Rigid steel conduit containing cables associated with power supply from Class IE de distribution panel 2AD102 (Div. 1) to the following components:
- a. RHR and core spray vertical board 20C601
- b. RHR and core spray relay board 20C617
- c. RCIC relay board 20C621
- d. ADS relay board 20C628
- e. RCIC vertical board 20C648
- f. RPS channel "A" vertical board 20C609 (6) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following common components:
- a. RHRSW pump OCP506
- b. Unit 2 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers (leading to fan system 0AV124/OBV124)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) 5-36
LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Unit 2 systems , a. Loss of 4-kV switchgear 20A117 (Div. 3)
- b. Loss of Class IE de power supplied by de distribution panel 2CD102 (Div. 3)
- c. Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 20Y103 (Div. 3)
- d. Loss of RCIC system j e. Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A"
- f. Loss of RHR loop "A" (2) Common systems
- a. Loss of RHRSW pump OCP506
- b. Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the
/) control room. Once the alarm has been received in the
(_) control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in i (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. O 5-37
LGS FPER 5.3.19 Fire Area 19: Unit 2 4-kV Switchgear Compartment O (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Doors connecting to areas 7 and 18 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Class IE 4-kV switchgear 20A115 (Div. 1) (2) Class IE de distribution panel 2AD102 (Div. 1) (3) Class IE instrument ac distribution panel 20Y101 (Div. 1) (3) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with I the following components: l
- a. Class IE load center transformer 20X203 (Div. 3)
- b. Class IE instrument ac panel 20Y103 (Div. 3) ,
- c. Unit 2 battery room HVAC exhaust dampers '
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of 4-kV switchgear 20A115 (Div. 1) (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by de distribution panel 2AD102 (Div. 1) (3) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac l distribution panel 20Y101 (Div. 1) l (4) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 20B203 (Div. 3) - (5) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 20Y103 (Div. 3) h 5-38
I l LGS FPER O (6) Closure of HVAC dampers leading to battery room exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection pahels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 1. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. With regard to Unit 2, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B is located in this fire O area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. In the event of closure of any of the HVAC dampers in the ductwork leading from the Unit 2 battery rooms to the battery room exhaust fans, the exhaust from the affected rooms will be automatically recirculated to the emergency switchgear and battery room fan cabinets (OAV118 and OBV118). This action will ensure the continued ventilation of the battery rooms. 5.3.20 Fire Area 20: Unit 1 Static Inverter Compartment (El. 254'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 2 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr O 1 Access: Two doors connecting to area 22 3 hr 5-39
LGS FPER (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) 125V de power distribution panels 1BD102 (Div. 2) and 1DD102 (Div. 4) (2) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403
- b. Control structure chilled water loop "A" instrumentation (3) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RCIC system valves (HV-49-1F026 and HV-50-1F005)
- b. RHR loop "A" components (pump 1AP202 and instrumentation)
- c. RHR loop "C" components (pump suction valve HV-51-1F004C and instrumentation)
- d. Core spray loop "A" components (instrumentation and valves HV-52-1F031A and HV-52-1F001A&C)
- e. RHRSW loop "A" components (pump OAP506 and valve HV-12-003A)
- f. ESW loop "A" components (pump OAP548 and valves HV-11-015A, HV-11-041, HV-11-071, HV-11-121, and HV-11-123)
- g. Standby liquid control system components (pump 1AP208 and outboard containment. isolation valve HV-48-1F006)
- h. Containment hydrogen recombiner suction and discharge isolation valves (HV-57-161 and HV-57-162)
- 1. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1A2V212,.1C1V212, 1C2V212, 1E1V212, 1E2V212, 1G1V212, and 1G2V212
- j. Drywell cooling water source select valves
- k. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water containment isolation valves (HV-13-106 and HV-13-107)
- 1. Diesel-generators 1A and 1C
- m. Class IE load center transformers 10X201 (Div. 1) and 10X203 (Div. 3)
- n. Instrument ac distribution panel 10Y201 (Div. 3)
- o. Control structure water chiller OAK 112
- p. SGTS exhaust fan OAV109
- q. Control room return air fan OAV121 and associated inlet and outlet dampers (HD-78-059A&B and HD-78-060A&B)
- r. Control room emergency fresh air supply system components (fan OAV127, duct heater OAE191, and dampers HD-78-002A and HD-78-009A)
- s. Control structure HVAC system dampers (HD-78-018, HD-7B-019, and HD-78-056)
(4) Cable trays containing cables associated with the power supply from Class IE instrument ac panel 10Y101 (Div. 1) to the following components: 5-40
LGS FPER O a. RHR and core spray vertical board 10C601
- b. RHR and core spray relay board 10C617
- c. RCIC relay board 10C621
- d. RPS channel "A" vertical board 10C609
- e. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panel 1AC563 l
- f. MSIV leakage control system relay board 10C645 l
- g. Drywell unit cooler control panel 10C234 l
- h. SGTS area HVAC control panel 00C124 l
- i. Reactor enclosure recirculation system control- i panel 10C207 l (5) Cable trays containing cables associated with the power i supply from Class IE instrument ac panel 10Y103 (Div. 3) l to the following components:
l a. RHR and core spray relay board 10C640
- b. Control structure HVAC control panel 00C101 i
- c. Unit cooler control panel 1CC208 l
- d. SGTS area HVAC control panel 00C124 (c) Postulated fire in area:
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.)
- (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based
! on the assumption that damage occurs to all components . located in the area and all cabling routed through the area):
- (1) Reactor trip (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by distribution panels 1BD102 (Div. 2) and 1DD102 (Div. 4)
(3) Loss of 4-kV switchgear in Divisions 2 and 4
- (4) Loss of diesel-generators 1A and 1C
! (5) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B203 (Div. 3) (6) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 10Y201 (Div. 3) (7) Loss of RCIC system (8) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (9) Loss of RHR loop "A" (10) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump "C" (11) Loss of RHRSW loop "A" (12) Loss of ESW loop "A" ' (13) Loss of standby liquid control system (14) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 (15) Loss of drywell unit coolers 1AV212, 1CV212, 1EV212, and 1GV212 (16) Loss of cooling water to all drywell unit coolers (17) Loss of cooling water to reactor recirculation pumps O (18) Loss of the outboard portion of the MSIV leakage control system 5-41
LGS FPER (19) Loss of control structure water chiller OAK 112 (20) Loss of SGTS exhaust fan OAV109 (21) Loss of ventilation for the control room, auxiliary equipment room, and control structure fan room (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: This fire area contains two de distribution panels that are associated with shutdown method B, as well as several raceways containing electrical cabling associated with shutdown method A. All portions of the raceways within this fire area that are associated with shutdown method A.will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting shutdown method A. This supplementary fire protection ensures that shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.3.21 Fire Area 21: Unit 2 Static Inverter Compartment (El. 254'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two doors connecting to area 23 3 hr Steamtight door connecting to area 113 3 hr** 5-42
LGS FPER O (b) Major safciy-related components in fire area: (1) 125V de power distribution panels 2BD102 (Div. 2) and 2DD102 (Div. 4) (2) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Containment hydrogen recombiner 2BS403
- b. Control structure chilled water loop "B"'
instrumentation (3) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RHR loop "D" components (pump 2DP202 and instrumentation)
- b. Core spray loop "B" components (instrumentation and valve HV-52-2F001D)
- c. RHRSW loop "B" components (pump ODP506 and valve HV-12-003D)
- d. ESW loop "B" components (pump ODP548 and valves)
- e. Containment hydrogen recombiner suction and discharge isolation valves (HV-57-263 and HV-57-264)
- f. Drywell unit cooler fans 2B2V212, 2D2V212, 2F2V212, and 2H2V212
- g. Diesel-generator 2D
() h. Class IE load center transformer 20X204 (Div. 4) (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based I on the assumption that damage occurs to all components l located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Reactor trip l (2) Loss of Class IE de power supplied by distribution panels 2DB102 (Div. 2) and 2DD102 (Div. 4) (3) Loss of 4-kV switchgear in Divisions 2 and 4 (4) Loss of diesel-generator 2D (5) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 20B204 (Div. 4) (6) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "B" (7) Loss of RHRSW loop "B" i (8) Loss of ESW loop "B" (9) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 2BS403 (10) Loss of control structure chilled water pump OBP162 1
- O I
5-43
LGS FPER (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: O The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. With regard to Unit 1, since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. 5.3.22 Fire Area 22: Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room (El. 254'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit (part) 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two doors connecting to area 20 3 hr ! Doors connecting to area 23 3 hr and stairwell no. 7 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: l l (1) Cabling for Div. 1, 2, 3, and 4 safeguard equipment (in cable tray, gutter, and conduit) (2) Cabling for Div. A1, A2, B1, and B2 of the reactor , protection system (in cable tray) l 5-44
LGS FPER O (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed i in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire-without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components i located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): l l The loss of all electrical cabling in this area would render l all Unit 1 systems inoperable from the control room. i (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. In the event that a postulated fire is not controlled by fire brigade response, heat detectors will actuate discharge of the automatic, total-flooding CO, system. HVAC system penetrations into the area will be s/ sealed off by steam isolation dampers which close l automatically when the CO, system is actuated. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area would have no effect on Unit 2, with the exception of common systems that are shared between Units 1 ' and 2. Shutdown methods A and B (as described in Section 5.2.2) would both remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. As noted in (d) above, a fire in this area would interfere with the control of Unit 1 systems from the control room. However, such a fire would not affect the remote shutdown panels, since cables associated with the remote shutdown panels are not routed through the cable spreading room. The remote shutdown panels (described in Section 5.2.3) provide controls for sufficient systems to enable the operator to safely shut Unit 1 down. As additional protection agcinst the effects of a postulated fire, all portions of raceways located within this fire area which are associated with shutdown methods A or B will be () covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent fire 5-45
r LGS FPER barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will O not result in cable damage affecting the systems used for shutdown methods A or B. 5.3.23 Fire Area 23: Unit 2 Cable Spreading Room (El. 254'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Ratino Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two doors connecting to area 21 3 hr l Door connecting to area 23 3 hr i (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Cabling for Div. 1, 2, 3, and 4 safeguard equipment (in cable tray, gutter, and conduit) (2) Cabling for Div. A1, A2, B1, and B2 of the reactor protection system (in cable tray) (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.)
'd) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area):
The loss of all electrical cabling in this area would render all Unit 2 systems inoperable from the control room. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smcke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to 5-46
~ LGS FPER O U extinguish the fire. In the event that a postulated fire is not controlled by fire brigade response, heat detectors will actuate discharge of the automatic, total-flooding CO, system. HVAC system penetrations into the area will be sealed off by steam isolation dampers which close automatically when the CO, system is actuated. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area would have no effect on Unit 1, with the exception of common systems that are shared between Units 1 and 2. Shutdown methods A and B (as described in Section 5.2.2) would both remain available to safely shut Unit 1 down. As noted in (d) above, a fire in this area would interfere with the control of Unit 2 systems from the control room. However, such a fire would not affect the remote shutdown panels, since cables associated with the remote shutdown panels are not routed through the cable spreading room. The remote shutdown panels (described in Section 5.2.3) provide controls and instrumentation for sufficient sytems to enable () the operator to safely shut Unit 2 down. As additional protection against the effects of a postulated fire, all portions of raceways located within this fire area which are associated with shutdown methods A or B will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting the systems used for shutdown methods A or B. 5.3.24 Fire Area 24: Control Room and Peripheral Rooms (El. 269'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8): Construction Ratina. Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell No. 7) N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr O adjacent to stairwell no. 7) 5-47
LGS FPER Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** area 114 (b) Safety-related components in fire area: Safety-related control panels as listed below are located in the control room. Unit 1 Panels 10C601 Residual heat removal (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) Core spray (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) MSIVs (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) Reactor pressure and level (Div. 1 & 2) Containment atmospheric control system (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 10C602 Reactor water cleanup (Div. 1& 2) Reactor recirculation system Reactor head vent valves Drywell floor and equipment drain sumps 10C603 Reactor control (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 10C614 NSSS temperature recorder and leak detection 10C626 Automatic depressurization system (Div. 1 & 3) MSIV leakage control (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) Containment combustible gas analyzer (Div. 3 & 4) , 10C647 HPCI (Div. 2 & 4) 10C648 RCIC (Div. 1 & 3) 10C651 Feedwater, condensate, and turbine (Div. 1, 2. 3) 10C668 Feedwater (Div. 1) 10C669 Condensate (Div. 1) 10C681 Reactor enclosure HVAC (Div. 1 & 2) Control structure HVAC (Div. 1& 2) Spray pond pump structure HVAC (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 1AC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 1) h 5-48
r LGS FPER O IBC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 2) l l ICC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 3) 1DC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 4) 1AC696 Containment hydrogen recombiner package "A" (Div. 1) j 1BC696 Containment hydrogen recombiner package "B" (Div. 2) l Unit 2 Panels i 20C601 Residual heat removal (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) Core spray (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) MSIVs (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) Reactor pressure and level (Div. 1 & 2) Containment atmospheric control system (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 20C602 Reactor water cleanup (Div. 1& 2) Reactor recirculation system Reactor head vent valves () 20C603 Drywell floor and equipment drain sumps Reactor control (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4)
- o 20C614 NSSS temperature recorder and leak detection 20C626 Automatic depressurization system (Div. 1& 3)
MSIV leakage control (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) Containment combustible gas analyzer (Div. 3& 4) 20C647 HPCI (Div. 2& 4) 20C648 RCIC (Div. 1 & 3) 20C651 Feedwater, condensate, and turbine (Div. 1, 2, 3) 20C668 Feedwater (Div. 1) 20C669 Condensate (Div. 1) 20C681 Reactor enclosure HVAC (Div. 1& 2) Control structure HVAC (Div. 1 & 2) Spray pond pump structure HVAC (Div. 1, 2, 3, 4) 2AC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 1) 2BC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 2) 5-49 i
LGS FPER 2CC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 3) O 2DC661 Safeguard ac power supply (Div. 4) 2AC696 Containment hydrogen recombiner package "A" (Div. 1) 2BC696 Containment hydrogen recombiner packagd "B" (Div. 2) Common Panels CAC667 ESW and RHRSW (Div. 1) OBC 667 ESW and RHRSW (Div. 2) OCC667 ESW and RHRSW (Div. 3) ODC667 ESW and RHRSW (Div. 4) (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray, gutter, or control panels. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: l The raceways and control panels in the control room have been designed to incorporate divisional separation in order to maintain the independence of redundant divisions of safety-related cables and electrical devices. Considering the absence of combustibles which could contribute to an exposure fire in this area, the separation is adequate to prevent a fire in one division of cabling from propagating and affecting a redundant division. Spurious actuation or shutdown of equipment may occur in the division in which the fire originates. Faulty. indications and annunciations may also occur in the affected division. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. The operator will then bring the plant fire brigade to manually extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. O 5-50
LGS FPER Q V (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area could affect either of the reactor units or, if common systems are involved, both units. However, since divisional separation of raceways and in-panel wiring will limit the fire to one division of cabling, no more than one of the two shutdown methods (methods A and B as described in Section 5.2.2) would be disabled. The other shQtdown method will remain ava,ilable to bring both reactor units to safe shutdown. In the event that the control room beccmes uninhabitable due to the effects of a fire, the operator can use the remote shutdown panels to adequately control the plant. In order to prevent a fire in the control room from adversely affecting the operability of the remote shutdown panels, the cables associated with these panels are not routed through the control room. The remote shutdown panels (described in Section 5.2.3) provide controls and instrumentation for sufficient systems to enable the operator to bring both reactor units to safe shutdown. 5.3.25 Fire Area 25: Auxiliary Equipment Room (El. 289'-0") O (a) S uctural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8): Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Access: Two doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 7 Steamtight door connecting to area 3 hr** 111 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: The safety-related components located in the auxiliary l 5 equipment room consist mainly of the power generation control complexes (PGCC) for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The PGCC for each l 5-51
LGS FPER unit consists of vertical boards mounted on raised floor sections, with a termination cabinet located at one end of each floor section. The safety-related portions of the PGCC are identified in the following listing. The listing applies specifically to Unit 1, but the Unit 2 PGCC is identical. Floor Sect. & Term. Cabinet Vertical Board 10U791 & 10C617 RHR and core spray (Div. 1) 10C791 10C640 RHR and core spray (Div. 3) 10C621 RCIC 10C628 ADS (Div. 1) 10C631 ADS (Div. 3) 10U792 & 10C618 RHR and core spray (Div. 2) 10C792 10C641 RHR and core spray (Div. 4) 10C620 HPCI 10C613 Process instrumentation 10C644 MSIV leakage control system (Div. 2) 10U787 & 10C645 MSIV leakage control system (Div. 1) 10C787 10C608 Power range neutron monitoring 10U788 & 10C623 Outboard containment isolation ' 10C788 valves j l Startup range neutron monitoring "A" 100789 & 10C606 10C787 10C609 RPS channel A 100790 & 10C633 Startup range neutron monitoring "B" 10C790 10C611 RPS channel B 10U793 & 10C622 Inboard containment isolation valves 10C793 10C612 Feedwater and reactor recirculation . instrumentation ! Also located in the auxiliary equipment room are the remote shutdown panels (10C201 and 20C201), which are not specifically associated with the PGCC. (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray, termination l cabinets, raised flooring, or vertical boards. (As discussed l in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely l unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) O I 5-52 i
LGS FPER O (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: The raceways, raised flooring, termination cabinets, and vertical boards in the auxiliary equipment room have been designed to incorporate divisional separation in order to maintain the independence of redundant divisions of safety-related cables and electrical devices. The only fire potential in this area is ignition of cable insulation due to electrical faulting. Since the majority of the cables in the area involve low voltage instrument and control circuits, overload protection is provided, and cable insulation is flame retardant, this potential source of fire is minimal. Particular attention has been given to minimizing the potential for fire and maximizing divisional separation in the power generation control complex (PGCC) and associated facilities. The PGCC and the computer facilities, both of which are located in the auxiliary equipment room, utilize raised flooring approximately 1 foot high. The raised flooring is divided into sections typically 8 feet wide and approximately 20 feet long; PGCC panels or computer equipment are mounted near the center of each floor section. The floor sections are of all-steel construction and are each divided into four longitudinal raceways and numerous lateral , raceways, each of whi'ch is totally enclosed and therefore O physically isolated from adjacent raceways. To minimize the possibility of occurrence of a fire, the cabling routed in , these raceways is provided with flame retardant insulation, and no other combustible material exists in the floor sections. In addition, the routing of power cabling through the floor section raceways is minimized; power cabling which cannot be eliminated from these raceways is routed in conduit or as armored cable. To prevent the spread of a postulated . fire between different divisions of raceways within a floor section or between adjacent floor sections, fire stops are provided at the ends of the longitudinal raceways, at the , ! ends of those lateral raceways which do not have end caps, in the lateral raceways where cables run from a longitudinal to a lateral raceway, and at the raceway openings at the bottom of the vertical panels. These fire stops consist of l refractory material covered by silicone rubber. ! The General Electric Company licensing topical report NEDO-
- 10466-A, " Power Generation Control Complex Design Criteria and Safety Evaluation" (February 1979), describes the design
! concepts for the construction of the PGCC components, their arrangement within the PGCC, and the routing of interpanel cabling. The report includes typical plant configurations which are conceptually applicable to the Limerick Generating Station. Additionally, a safety evaluation is provided which addresses NRC and industry safety guidelines and demonstrates / design compliance. 5-53 l 4
- . - . - . , - - . , _ - - - ,_. - _ - - . - . - , ~ , _ . _ _ . - - . , -
LGS FPER Considering the absence of combustibles which could contribute to an exposure fire in this area, the separation is adequate to prevent a fire in one division of cabling from propagating and affecting a redundant division. Spurious actuation or shutdown of equipment may occur in the division in which the fire originates. ' Faulty indications and annunciations may also occur in the affected division. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Smoke detectors are located inside each of the termination cabinets and floor sections in the auxiliary equipment room to provide early warning cf fires originating in these components. Additional fire detectors are located in the general area of the auxiliary equipment room, near the ceiling, to provide early warning of fires originating outside the termination cabinets and floor sections. Activation of any of the above smoke detectors will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received fa che control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. In the event that a fire in the floor sections is not extinguished by fire brigade response, heat detectors in the floor sections will activate the Halon extinguishing system. The Halon system is described in Section 2.9. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of a postulated fire, loss of the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area could affect either of the reactor units or, if common systems are involved, both units. However, since divisional separation of raceways and in-panel wiring will limit the fire to one division of cabling, no more than one of the two shutdown methods (methods A and 3 as described in Section 5.2.2) would be disabled. The other shutdown method will remain available to bring both reactor units to sale shutdown. 5.3.26 Fire Area 27: Control Structure Fan Room (El. 304'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): O 5-54
LGS FPER O Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell noc. 7 and 8) N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 8) E- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7) Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 7 and 8 Two steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** area 99 Steamtight door connecting to area 112 3 hr** (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y163 (Div. 3), which serves the following components: -
- a. Diesel-generator enclosure HVAC control panel ICC563
- b. Unit cooler control panel 1CC208
- c. Control structure HVAC local panel 0AC101
- d. SGTS control panel OCC124
- e. Containment combustible gas analyzer package 10S206
- f. ESW control valve XC-11-053A (for control structure chiller "A")
- g. Control structure chilled water control valves XC-90-042A, XC-90-043A, and XC-90-044A (2)* HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y164 (Div. 4), which serves the following components:
- a. Diesel-generator enclosure HVAC control panel 1DC563
- b. Unit cooler control panel 1DC208
- c. Control structure HVAC local panel OBC 101
- d. SGTS control panel OCC124
- e. Containment combustible gas analyzer 10S205
- f. ESW control valve XC-11-053B (for control structure chiller "B"
- g. Control structure chilled water control valves XC-90-042B, XC-90-043B, and XC-90-044B (3) Motor control center 00B131 (Div. 3), which serves the C' following components:
- a. HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y163 5-55 l
LGS FPER
- b. Control room emergency supply air fan (OAV127) and intake heater (OAE191) .
I c. Control room emergency air intake isolation valve l HV-78-020C
- d. Control room air supply fan cabinet (OAV116) and heater (OAE192) e Control room return air fan OAV121
'. Auxiliary equipment room supply air fan cabinet (OAV114) and heater (0AE193) ,
- g. Auxiliary equipment room return air fan 0AV120
- h. Emergency switchgear and battery room supply air fan cabinet 0AV118
- i. Control structure chilled water pump (OAP162), oil pump (0AP168), pumpout compressor (OAK 114)
(4) *dotor control center 00B132 (Div. 4), which serves the following components:
- a. HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y164
- b. Control room emergency supply air fan (0BV127) and intake heater (0BE191)
- c. Control room emergency air intake isolation valve HV-78-020D
- d. Control room air supply fan cabinet (0BV116) and heater (0BE192)
- e. Contorl room return air fan OBV121
- f. Auxiliary equipment room supply air fan cabinet (0BV114) and heater (OBE193)
- g. Auxiliary equipment room return air fan OBV120
- h. Emergency switchgear and battery room supply air fan cabinet OBV118
- 1. Control structure chilled water pump (0BP162), oil pump (0BP168), and pumpout compressor (0BK114)
(5) Control structure HVAC local panels 0AC101, OBC 101, OCC101, and ODC101 (6) Auxiliary equipment room supply air fan cabinets OAV114 and OBV114 (7) Control room supply air fan cabinets OAV116 and OBV116 (8) Auxiliary equipment room return air fans OAV120 and OBV120 (9) Control room return air fans OAV121 and OBV121 (10) Control room emergency fresh air supply fans and filter trains OAV127 and OBV127 (11) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. SGTS exhaust fan OAV109
- b. SGTS inlet heater OAE188
- c. SGTS compartment unit cooler OAV140
- d. SGTS access area unit cooler OAV141
- e. Reactor enclosure HVAC valve HV-76-167 (c) Postulated fire in areat Ignition of charcoal filters. O 5-56
l l LGS FPER O (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of containment combustible gas analyzer packages 10S205 and 10S206 (2) Loss of unit coolers for core spray pumps "C" and "D" and RHR pumps "C" and "D", which may affect the long-term operability of those pumps (3) Loss of ventilation for diesel-generator cells 1C and ID (4) Loss of SGTS system (5) Loss of ventilation for the following areas in the control structure
- a. Battery rooms
- b. 4-kV switchgear compartments
- c. Static inverter compartments
- d. Control room
- e. Auxiliary equipment room
- f. Control structure fan room
- g. SGTS access area
- h. SGTS filter compartments (6) Loss of ventilation exhaust from refueling floor (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. In the event of a fire in one of the control room emergency fresh air filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a, water spray system inside the filter plenum. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: A fire in this area will have no affect on the ability to achieve a safe shutdown on Unit 2. Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut Unit 2 down. This fire area contains two ac distribution panels that are associated with shutdown methods A and B for Unit 1. The two () panels are separated by a distance of approximately 70 feet, 5-57
LGS FPER ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not affect O more than one of the panels. The cables associated with the ac distribution panels are generally routed on opposite sides of the control structure, in order to maximize the separation between the two redundant divisions. At the south side of the control structure, where the separation between the two divisions of cabling is at a minimum, the cables are routed within about 12 feet of each other. Those portions of the raceways containing these cables which are located within 20 feet of the redundant raceways will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in cable damage affecting more than one of the shutdown methods. This supplementary fire protection ensures that at least one of the shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut Unit I down. Loss of ventilation for the control structure areas listed in (d)(5) above could result in a long-term temperature increase in those areas, depending on the heat loads in the various compartments. Design changes will be implemented as necessary to prevent excessive temperatures from occurring. 5.3.27 Fire Area 28: SGTS Filter Compartments and Access Area (El. 332'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-10): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall, also contains louver openings) N- Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 7 and 8) E- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr . adjacent to stairwell no. 8) E- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reit: forced concrete 3 hr W- Reintu.ced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 7)
~
Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (roof slab) 3 hr* 5-58
LGS FPER Access: Two doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 7 Door connecting to stairwell no. 8 1.5 hr Steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** areas 46 and 69 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) SGTS filters Train A: OAF 169, OAF 170, OAF 183 Train B: OBF169, OBF170, OBF183 (2) SGTS exhaust fans OAV109 and OBV109 (3) SGTS compartment exhaust fans 0AV131 and OBV131 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables, associated with the following components:
- a. Refueling floor air supply valves (HV-76-117 and HV-76-118)
- b. RERS inlet valves (HV-76-151 and HV-76-152)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of charcoal filters. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based O on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of standby gas treatment system (2) Loss of ventilation for the SGTS compartments and SGTS access area (3) Loss of ventilation supply to refueling floor (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: In the event of a fire in one of the standby gas treatment system filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system ; inside the filter plenum. j (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: l Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5-59
e l l LGS FPER I i i l THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK O O 5-60
LGS FPER O 5.4 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - UNIT I REACTOR ENCLOSURE 5.4.1 Fire Area 29: Suppression Chamber (El. 181'-11") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-4, B-5, and B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: All around - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (primary containment wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (diaphragm None slab) Access: Two access hatches connecting to None area 44 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) O Primary containment vacuum relief valve assemblies PSV-57-137A,B,C&D (c) Postulated fire in area: Since there are no combustible materials located in this area, no fire is postulated to occur. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: Not applicable (see item (c)). (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Not applicable (see item (c)). (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Not applicable (see item (c)). 5.4.2 Fire Area 30: Drywell (El. 237'-11") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7, B-8, and B-9): O 5-61
1 LGS FPER Construction Rating O Walls: All around - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (primary containment wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete (diaphragm None slab) Ceiling: Steel dome (drywell head) None Access: Equipment hatch connecting to None area 45 Equipment hatch with personnel None lock connecting to area 45 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Control rod drive mechanisms (total of 185) (2) Main steam isolation valves (inboard, one per steam line) (3) Main steam relief valves (total of 14) (4) Drywell unit coolers (total of 8) (5) Inboard containment isolation valves for HPCI steam supply line, RCIC steam supply line, RWCU letdown line, and RHR shutdown cooling suction line 1 g (c) Postulated fire in area: (1) Leakage of lube oil from a recirculation pump motor onto the diaphragm slab, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (2) Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray or gutter. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: With two exceptions (cabling associated with the neutron monitoring system (NMS) and cabling associated with CRD position and temperature indication), electrical cabling in the drywell is routed in rigid steel conduit attached to either the drywell liner plate or to structural steel beams. The NMS and CRD cables terminate inside the RPV pedestal at the neutron monitoring assemblies and control rod drive mechanisms extending downward from the bottom head of the reactor vessel. The NMS and CRD cables are routed within the RPV pedestal in metal gutters. In the general drywell area outside the RPV pedestal, the NMS cables are routed in conduit whereas the CRD cables are routed in cable tray. Thus, the CRD cables are the only cables in the general drywell area that are not routed in conduit. Since the NMS and CRD cables are low-power instrumentation cables and are very 5-62
1 1 LGS FPER conservatively rated, no significant hazard of ignition ' of insulation and jacketing materials due to electrical ! faulting exists. In addition, the insulation and jacketing materials of these cables are fire-retardant so that burning cables will not propagate a flame and will self-extinguish once any source of ignition has been removed. Neither the NMS cables nor the CRD cables are needed for safe shutdown of the plant. Conduits containing cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B are not routed through the lower 17 feet of the drywell, with the exception of cabling to the inboard isolation valves for the HPCI and RCIC steam supply lines, which are located about 9 feet and 8 feet, respectively, above the diaphragm slab. Since the conduits containing cabling for the HPCI and RCIC steam supply line isolation valves are routed along the periphery of the drywell (attached to the liner plate), it is unlikely that this cabling would be affected by a fire involving lube oil leaked from one of the recirculation pump motors. Any leakage from these motors, rather than spreading across the diaphragm slab, would be collected by floor drains located beneath the recirculation pumps, and would drain into the drywell floor drain sump. The height above the diaphragm slab O' of conduits containing other cables associated with shutdown methods A or B precludes the possibility of damage to these cables from an oil fire. In summary, the limited quantities of combustible materials located within the drywell and the separation of safe shutdown conduits from each other and from the combustible materials ensures the availability of shutdown methods A and B in the event of a postulated fire in the drywell. The possibility of a fire in the drywell is limited to periods when the reactor is shut down. This is because the primary containment is inerted with nitrogen during reactor operation, so that the oxygen concentration is maintained below 5% by volume. This inert atmosphere will prevent fires from occurring in the primary containment. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in the drywell, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to El. 253 feet in the reactor enclosure. The fire brigade will enter the drywell through the O personnel airlock and will ensure extinguishment of the fire through the use of portable fire extinguishers or o 5-63
LGS FPER hoses from hose reels located outside the entrances to the drywell. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: As discussed in item (d) above, a postulated fire in the drywell will not jeopardize the integrity of electrical cabling associated with either of the specified shutdown methods. Shutdown methods A and B (as described in Section 5.2.2) will both remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.3 Fire Area 31: Residual Heat Removal Compartment (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): Construction Rating Walls: NW - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part 3 hr adjacent to area 75, part adjacent to unexcavated area) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (ceiling contains None 115 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels leading to area 43) Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 32 and 39 Stear: tight doors (at El. 201 feet) 3 hr** connecting to areas 32 and 41 0 5-64
f LGS FPER O (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) RHR pumps 1BP202 and IDP202 (2) RHR heat exchanger 1BE205 (3) RHR compartment unit coolers 1BV210, 1DV210, 1FV210, and 1HV210 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-044, HV-11-124, and HV-11-125)
- b. HPCI compartment unit coolers
- c. Containment hydrogen recombiner isolation valves (HV-57-163 and HV-57-164)
- d. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water valves (HV-13-108, HV-13-109, HV-13-110, and HV-13-111)
(5) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components: l O O 5-64a
LGS FPER O a. ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-044, HV-11-72, HV-11-073, HV-11-124, and HV-11-125)
- b. HPCI valves (HV-55-1F028 and HV-56-1F025)
- c. Containment hydrogen recombiner isolation valves (HV-57-163 and HV-57-164)
- d. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water valves (HV-13-108, HV-13-109, HV-13-110, and HV-13-111)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from both RHR pump motors onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of RHR loop "B" (2) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump
- "D" (3) Loss of HPCI compartment unit coolers, which may O (4) affect the long term availability of the HPCI system Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 (5) Loss of cooling water to both reactor recirculation pumps The existence of unrated metal panels in the ceiling of this fire area is acceptable because the low combustible loadings in the areas above and below the panels and the height of the panels above the floor (40 feet) preclude the possibility of fire propagating through the panels.
Penetrations of piping and electrical raceway through the ceiling are provided with 3-hour rated seals. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. O 5-65
LGS FPER (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: O Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in , this fire area, this method will remain available to I safely shut the plant down. I 5.4.4 Fire Area 32: Residual Heat Removal Compartment (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr NW - Reinforced concrete 3 hr NE - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part adjacent to area 75, part adjacent to unexcavated area) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (ceiling None contains 150 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels leading to area 43) Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 31 and 33 Steamtight doors (at El. 201 feet) 3 hr+c connecting to areas 31 and 42 (bi Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) RHR pumps IAP202 and 1CP202 (2) RHR heat exchanger 1AE205 (3) RHR compartment unit coolers 1AV210, 1CV210, 1EV210, and 1GV210 (4) Flow transmitters FT-11-011A, FT-11-011B, and FT-11-013A for ESW supply and return headers (5) ESW loop "A" valves (HV-11-041, HV-11-071, HV-11-121, and HV-11-123) (6) Rigid steel conduit containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RCIC turbine exhaust containment isolation valve (HV-49-1F060)
- b. Motor control center 10B217 5-66
LGS FPER O (7) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RCIC turbine exhaust containment isolation
! valve (HV-49-1F060)
- b. Diesel-generator control board 1AC514
- c. Diesel-generator HVAC control panel 1AC563
- d. ESW supply and return valves for diesel-generator 1A (HV-11-131A, HV-11-132A, HV-11-133A, and HV-11-134A)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from both RHR pump motors onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (*) Loss of RHR loop "A" (2) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump
,c, (3)
O (4) (5) Loss of RCIC system Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (6) Loss of drywell unit cooler fans 1C2V212 and 1G2V212 (7) Loss of diesel-generator 1A The existence of unrated metal panels in the ceiling of this fire area is acceptable because the low combustible loadings in the areas above and below the panels and the height of the panels above the floor (40 feet) preclude the possibility of fire propagating through the panels. Penetrations of piping and electrical raceway through the ceiling are provided with 3-hour rated seals. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the i functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. 5-67
1 LGS FPER (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: The ESW flow transmitters located in this area are part of a leak detection system and their loss will have no effect on the operability of the ESW system. Since no other equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safety shut the plant down. 5.4.5 Fire Area 33: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Compartment (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): 1 Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr NW - Reinforced concrete 3 hr NE - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) SE - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part 2 he adjacent to stairwell no. 3) S - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr exterior wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (ceiling None contains 25 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels leading to area 43) Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 32 and 34 Dcor connecting to stairwell no. 3 1.5 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) RCIC pump 10P203 (2) RCIC turbine 1GS212 (3) RCIC compartment unit coolers 1AV208 and 1BV208 (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated l with the following components: l a. Instrument rack 10C018 (Div. 1 RHR and Div. 1
- RHRSW)
- b. Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure) 5-68
LGS FPER O c. Instrument rack 10C077 (RHR pump "C" discharge pressure)
- d. ESW loop "A" flow transmitters (FT-11-011A and FT-11-013A)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from RCIC turbine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of capability to use steam condensing mode of RHR loop "A" The existence of unrated metal panels in the ceiling of this fire area is acceptable because the low combustible loadings in the areas above and below the panels and the height of the panels above the floor (40 feet) preclude the possibility of fire propagating through the panels. ()
\d Penetrations of piping and electrical raceway through the ceiling are provided with 3-hour rated seals.
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke genereted by a fire in this area will activate l the smoke detet. ors, which will cause an audible-visual l annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the I pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. O 5-69
l 1 LGS FPER 5.4.6 Fire Area 34: High Pressure Coolant Injection O Compartment (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) SE - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (ceiling None contains 160 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels leading to area 43) Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 33 and 40 (b) Major safety-related components in fire zone: (1) HPCI pump 10P204 (2) HPCI turbine 10S211 (3) HPCI compartment unit coolers 1AV209 and 1BV209 (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from HPCI turbine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of HPCI system The existence of unrated metal panels in the ceiling of this fire area is acceptable because the low combustible loadings in the areas above and below the panels and the height of the panels above the floor (40 feet) preclude the possibility of fire propagating through the panels. Penetrations of piping and electrical raceway through the ceiling are provided with 3-hour rated seals. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: h 5-70
i LGS FPER The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of HPCI system operability may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.7 Fire Area 35: Core Spray Compartment (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Watertight door connecting to area 40 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Core spray pump 1AP206 (2) Core spray compartment unit coolers 1AV211 and IEV211 (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from core spray pump motor onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. 5-71
l l 1 LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of core spray loop "A" operability may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.8 Fire Area 36: Core Spray Compartment (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): Construction Rating Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr SE - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Watertight door connecting to area 40 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Core spray pump 1CP206 (2) Core spray compartment unit coolers ICV 211 and 1GV211 5-72
LGS FPER (3) Junction box containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RHR pump 1CP202
- b. Instrument rack 10C077 (RHR pump "C" discharge pressure) l
- c. RCIC leak detection temperature elements (c) Postulated fire in area:
l Leakage of lube oil from core spray pump motor onto the I floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (2) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump "C" (3) Loss of RCIC system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. l (f) Effect of 're on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.9 Fire Area 37: Core Spray Compartment (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): O 5-73
LGS FPER Construction Ratino Walls: W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr SW - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr l containment wall) l Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Watertight door connecting to area 39 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Core spray pump 1DP206 (2) Core spray compartment unit coolers 1DV211 and 1HV211 (3) Junction box containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RHR pump 1DP202
- b. HPCI leak detection system temperature elements (c) Postulated fire in area:
Leakage of lube oil from core spray pump motor onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent igniLion of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "B" (2) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump "D" (3) Loss of HPCI system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the l 5-74
LGS FPER severity sad rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.10 Fire Area 38: Core Spray Compartment (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Watertight door connecting to area 39 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Core spray pump 1BP206 (2) Core spray compartment unit coolers 1BV211 and 1FV211 (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from core spray pump motor onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed ' through the area): (1) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "B" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: 5-75
LGS FPER The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke O detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of core spray loop "B" operability may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.11 Fire Area 39: Sump Room and Passageway (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 1) E - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr adjacent to unexcavated area) S - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr primary containment wall) W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 31, 37 and 38 Door connecting to stairwell no. 1 1.5 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Containment isolation valves (HV-52-127 and HV-52-128) for suppression pool cleanup pump suction line. (2) Instrument rack 10C076 (RHR pump "B" discharge pressure) (5) Instrument rack 10C078 (RHR pump "D" discharge pressure) 5-76
LGS FPER O (4) Junction box containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RHR pump 1BP202
- b. Core spray pump 1BP206
- c. HPCI leak detection system temperature elements
- d. Instrument rack 10C014 (HPCI system)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray, (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all i components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): j (1) Loss of control of both containment isolation valves on the suppression pool cleanup pump suction ! line i (2) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "B" iO (3) (4) Loss of RHR loop "B" Loss of HPCI system ] (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received , in the control room, the plant fire brigade will~be i dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.12 Fire Area 40: Corridor (El. 177'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): 5-77
LGS FPER Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4) N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Watertight doors connecting to 3 hr areas 34, 35 and 36 Door connecting to stairwell no. 4 1.5 hr Elevator door 0.75 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) HPCI pump discharge flow transmitters (FT-55-1N008 and FT-55-1N051) (2) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RHR pump 1AP202
- b. Core spray pump 1AP206
- c. RCIC leak detection system temperature elements
- d. RCIC system
- e. Instrument rack 10C018 (Div. 1 RHR and Div. 1 RHRSW)
- f. Instrument rack 10C077 (RHR pump "C" discharge pressure)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of HPCI system (2) Loss of RHR loop "A" (3) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" 5-78
i LGS FPER
'O (4) Loss of RCIC system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: In order to prevent a fire in this area from affecting components associated with both of the specified shutdown methods, the junction boxes containing cables associated with components used for shutdown method A will be covered with a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. This blanket will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier, ensuring that shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut the plant down. O 5.4.13 Fire Area 41: Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water Equipment Area (El. 201'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-5): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr N - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr i adjacent to stairwell no. 1) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr , W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr ! SW - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr ! containment wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 1 Door connecting to area 31 3 hr l (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: 5-79
LGS FPER (1) Instrument rack 10C021 (Div. 2 RHR and Div. 2 RHRSW) (2) Suppression chamber pressure transmitter (PT-57-101) > (3) ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-044, HV-11-074, HV-11-124, HV-11-125, HV-11-126, HV-11-127 and HV-11-128) (4) HVAC unit cooler control panels 1BC208 and IDC208 (5) Motor control center 10B218, which serves the following components:
- a. RHR loop "D" valves
- b. RHR compartment unit coolers 1DV210 and 1HV210
- c. Core spray loop "B" valves
- d. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1DV211 and 1HV211
- e. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068B)
- f. Drywell unit cooler fans 1D2V212 and 1F2V212
- g. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 and associated valves (6) Junction box containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RCIC leak detection system temperature elements
- b. Core spray pump 1CP206
- c. RHR pump 1CP202 (7) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-072 and HV-11-073)
- b. HPCI system valves (HV-55-1F028 and HV-56-1F025)
- c. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1BV211 and IFV211
- d. Core spray pump suction valve (HV-5?-1F001B)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabli"- ) (d) Consequences of fire wi'S' t s tive fire suppression (based on the assumptijn ;sr iamage occurs to all components located in t..e at:, and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of core spray injection capability through loops "A" and "B" (3) Loss of capability to remove heat from RHR loop "B" j l 5-80
.' x i
LGS FPER O (4) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pumps "C" and "D"
; (5) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loops "A" and "B" (except diesel-generators) i (6) Loss of unit coolers for the HPCI compartment, RHR compartment B, and core spray compartments B and D Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 (7)
(e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
' The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke; detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided.
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: In order to prevent a fire in this area from affecting components associated with both of the specified
< shutdown methods, the junction box containing cables ascociated with components used for shutdown method A O will be covered with a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber olanket. This blanket will provide a 1-hour aquivalent fire barrier, ensuring that shutdown method A will remain available to safely shut the plant down.
5.4.14 Fire Area 42: Safegeard System Access Area (El. 201'-0") (a) Structural cnd architectural design features of fire
- area (see Figure B-5):
C6nstruction Rating Walls: N .- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4) N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr SE - Reinforced concrete (primary 3 hr containment wall) S - Reinforced concrete (part 2 he adjacent to stairwell no. 3)
! S - Rainforced concrete (part) 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr 5 adjacent to stairwell no. 4)
( Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* 5-81 _ l
LGS FPER Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Elevator door 0.75 hr Doors connectjng to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 3 and 4 Door connecting to area 32 3 hr Watertight door connecting 3 hr to area 75 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) HPCI valves HV-55-1F007 (pump discharge) and HV-55-1F008 (pump discharge recirculation to condensate storage tank) (2) RCIC valves HV-49-1F012 (pump discharge) and HV-49-1F022 (pump discharge recirculation to condensate storage tank) (3) Instrument rack 10C014 (HPCI) (4) HPCI level transmitters (LT-55-IN061B&F) and turbine exhaust pressure transmitters (PT IN055D&H) (5) Instrument rack 10C017 (RCIC) (6) RCIC turbine exhaust pressure transmitters (PT-50-1N055C&G) (7) Instrument rack 10C018 (Div. 1 RHR and Div. 1 RHRSW) (8) Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure) (9) Instrument rack 10C077 (RHR pump "C" discharge pressure) i (10) HVAC unit cooler control panels 1AC208 and 1CC208 , (11) Motor control center 10B217, which serves the I following components:
- a. RHR loop "C" valves
- b. RHR compartment unit coolers ICV 210 and 1GV210
- c. Core spray pump suction valve (HV-52-1F001C)
- d. Core spray compartment unit coolers ICV 211 and 1GV211
- e. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "A" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068A)
- f. Drywell unit cooler fans 1C2V212 and 1G2V212
- g. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 and associated valves (12) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. HPCI system valves, flow transmitters, and level transmitters
- b. RCIC system valves
- c. ESW loop "A" flow transmitters (FT-11-011A and FT-11-013A)
O 5-82
LGS FPER O (13) Junction oox containing cables associated with temperature elements for HPCI compartment unit coolers (14) Cable tray containing cables aF7DCiated with the following components:
- a. RCIC components (barometric condenser vacuum pump 10P219, barometric condenser condensate pump 10P220, valves, and instrumentation)
- b. R3R loop "A" minimum flow recirculation valve (HV-51-1F007A)
- c. Core spray pump suction valve (HV-52-1F001A)
- d. ESW loop "A" valves (HV-11-041, HV-11-071, HV-11-121, HV-11-123, and HV-11-106A&B)
- e. RCIC compartment unit cooler 1AV208
- f. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1AV211 and 1EV211
- g. ESW supply and return valves to diesel-generator 1A (HV-11-131A, HV-11-132A, HV-11-133A, and HV-11-134A)
- h. Diesel-generator control board 1AC514 (c) Postulated fire in Area:
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical s cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): _ (1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of HPCI system (3) Loss of core spray injection capability through loop "A" (4) Loss of RHR loop "A" minimum flow recirculation (5) Loss of capability to remove heat from RHR loop "A" (6) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pump "C" (7) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loops "A" and "B" (except diesel-generators) (8) Loss of diesel-generator 1A (9) Loss of unit coolers for the RCIC compartment, RHR compartment A, and core spray compartments A and C (10) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: I) The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual 5-83
l LGS FPER I i annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Of the various safety-related systems that have components located in this fire area, only the HPCI system is associated with shutdown method B. Therefore, the remaining systems associated with shutdown method B can be used to shut the reactor down, and full shutdown capability will be retained if a system other than HPCI is available to depressurize the reactor. This depressurization function can be provided by manual actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS). When shutting down the reactor without the aid of either the RCIC system or the HPCI system, the ADS serves to permit the operation of a low pressure core cooling system, rather than just allowing initiation of the shutdown cooling mode of the RHR system. With this scheme of operation, two RHR pumps will need to be operated simultaneously, in which case the following components must be available in addition to those listed under " Method B" in Section 5.2.2: (1) RHR pump "D" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "D" Since none of the above components (or their associated cabling) is located in this fire area, their availability in the event of a fire is assured. Safe shutdown of the plant using shutdown method B modified as described above would be accomplished in the following manner. After closure of the main steam isolation valves, the reactor is depressurized by manually controlling the valves of the automatic depressurization system. The opening of these valves allows reactor steam to be discharged to the suppression pool. Makeup water is supplied to the reactor vessel from the suppression pool by operating one loop of the RHR system in the LPCI mode after reactor pressure has decreased to a nominal 295 psig. Heat is removed from the suppression pool by operating a different loop of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode. In this mode, water from the suppression pool is circulated through an RHR heat exchanger and then returned to the suppression pool. When the reactor has been depressurized below a nominal 75 psig, the RHR loop 5-84
LGS FPER O operating in the suppression pool cooling mode is switched to the shutdown cooling mode. In both of these modes, heat is removed from the RHR heat exchanger by the RHRSW system, which in turn dissipates heat at the spray pond. The shutdown cooling mode of RHR will maintain the reactor in a cold shutdown condition. 5.4.15 Fire Area 43: Safeguard System Isolation Valve Area (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (exterior None wall, contains 150 fta of unrated blowout panels) W- Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Interior boundary - Reinforced 3 hr concrete (primary containment wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains 450 fta None of unrated metal blowout panels from areas 31, 32, 33, and 34) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Two steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** area 44 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) HPCI steam line containment isolation valves (HV-55-1F003 and HV-55-1F100) (2) RCIC steam line containment isolation valves (HV-49-1F008 and HV-49-1F076) (3) RHR system valves: HV-51-1F008 (shutdown cooling suction containment isolation) HV-51-1F015A&B (shutdown cooling return containment isolation) HV-51-1F047A&B (heat exchanger inlet) HV-C-51-1F048A&B (heat exchanger bypass) HV-51-1F052A&B and HV-51-153 A&B (steam inlet shutoff) HV-51-1F023 (head spray containment k isolation) 5-85
LGS FPER (4) Containment atmospheric control system purge isolation valves (HV-57-121, HV-57-122, HV-57-123, HV-57-124, HV-57-125, HV-57-163, and HV-57-164) (5) Primary containment instrument gas system supply line containment isolation valve (HV-59-135) (6) HPCI system leakage detection temperature elements RCIC system leakage detection temperature elements (7) (8) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1B1V212, 1C1V212, 1D1V212, 1E1V212, 1F1V212, 1G1V212, and 1H1V212
- b. HPCI leak detection system temperature elements
- c. HPCI turbine exhaust pressure transmitters (PT-56-1N055D&H)
- d. RHR "A" and "C" flow transmitters
- e. RCIC system components (steam line outboard containment isolation valve, instrument rack 10C017, and instrument rack 10C038)
- f. DC power distribution panel 1DD501 (for diesel-generator 1D)
(9) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. HPCI system components (turbine auxiliary oil pump, barometric condenser vacuum pump, valves, and other auxiliaries)
- b. HPCI compartment unit coolers
- c. ESW loop "B" valves
- d. RHR loop "B" flow transmitters !
- e. RCIC turbine exhaust pressure transmitters I
- f. Diesel-generator 1C (10) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. HPCI system components (turbine auxiliary oil pump 10P213, barometric condenser condensate pump 10P215, barometric condenser vacuum pump 10P216, valves, and instrumentation)
- b. ESW loop "B" valves (HV-11-042, HV-11-043, and HV-11-103A&B) l
- c. HPCI compartment unit coolers 1AV209 and ,
1BV209 (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) O 5-86
i LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of HPCI system (3) Loss of RHR loops "A" and "B" (4) Loss of RHR loop "C" minimum flow recirculation (5) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loop "B" (except diesel-generators) (6) Loss of diesel-generators 1C and ID (7) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 l (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. O (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: RHR loops A and B are both routed through this fire area and, as indicated in (b) above, several valves are located in these portions of the RHR piping. Physical separation between the two RHR loops is achieved by routing loop A through the west side of- the fire area and loop B through the east side of the fire area. The minimum separation between the valves in the two loops (or their associated cabling) within the fire area is 28 feet, which is sufficient to prevent any postulated fire from resulting in damage to both RHR loops. Also located in this fire area are components associated with the HPCI and RCIC systems. In the event of loss of both of these systems due to a fire in this area, manual actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS) can be used to depressurize the reactor so that cooling water can be supplied to the reactor by the LPCI pumps. With this modification to the shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2, the shutdown procedure would be the same as the alternate shutdown procedure discussed in item (f) of Section 5.4.14 (fire area 42). When using this alternate procedure with shutdown method A, the (\ following components are required in addition to those (_ ,/ items of equipment listed under " Method A" in Section 5.2.2: 5-87
LGS FPER (1) RHR pump "C" and associated valves O (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "C" When using this alternate procedure with shutdown method B, the following components are required in addition to those items of equipment listed under
" Method B" in Section 5.2.2:
(1) RHR pump "D" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "D" The outboard isolation valve for the RHR shutdown cooling suction line is located in this fire area, and must be opened in order to initiate shutdown cooling regardless of which RHR loop is used. If the cabling to this valve is damaged by fire, the valve will be opened manually using the attached handwheel. Since the reactor can be maintained subcritical and adequately cooled in the hot shutdown mode without using the shutdown cooling mode of RHR, ample time is available for plant personnel to open the valve. Using the alternate shutdown procedures described above and in item (f) of Section 5.4.14, the capability to achieve safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire in fire area 43 is assured. 5.4.16 Fire Area 44: Safeguard System Access Area (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 2 hr (parts adjacent to stairwell nos. 1 and 4) N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (part adjacent 2 hr to stairwell no. 1) E - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 3) S - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete (part adjacent 2 hr to stairwell nos. 3 and 4) W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Interior boundary (part) - 3 hr , Reinforced concrete and concrete i 5-88
r LGS FPER O masonry unit walls Interior boundary (part) - 3 hr Reinforced concrete (primary containment wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 1, 3, and 4 Two steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr ** area 43 Door connecting to area 76 3 hr Equipment airlock door None Elevator door 0.75 hr Suppression chamber access hatches None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Core spray full flow test recirculation valves (HV-52-1F015A&B) (2) Containment atmospheric control system purge line isolation valves (HV-57-103, HV-57-104, HV-57-105, and HV-57-162) C1 (3) RHR system valves: HV-51-125A&B (containment isolation for recirculation to supptession chamber) HV-51-1F027A&B (containment isolation for suppression chamber spray) HV-51-1F010A&B (loops C and D recirculation to suppression chamber) HV-51-1F024A&B (lcops A and B recirculation to suppression chamber) (4) Instrument racks 10C001 (core spray loop A) and 10C019 (core spray loop B) (5) Instrument racks 10C015, 10C025, 10C041, and '10C042 (main steam and reactor recirculation flow) (6) Instrument racks 10C016 and 10C036 (HPCI) (7) Instrument racks 10C035 and 10C038 (RCIC) (8) Instrument racks 10C006, 10C009, 10C010, and 10C022 (reactor recirculation system pressure and jet pump flow) (9) RHR flow transmitters (FT-51-1N015A,B,C&D and FT-51-1N052A,B,C&D) (10) Motor control center 10B211, which serves the following components:
- a. RHR loop "A" valves
- b. RHR compartment unit coolers 1AV210 and 1EV210
- c. Core spray loop "A" valves O d. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1AV211 and 1EV211 5-89
LGS FPER
- e. RHRSW inlet valve to RHR "A" heat exchanger O
(HV-51-1F014A)
- f. Reactor head spray inboard isolation valve (HV-51-1F022)
- g. RHR shutdown cooling suction inboard isolation valve (HV-51-1F009)
- h. RCIC compartment unit coolers 1AV208 and 1BV208
- 1. Reactor water cleanup inboard isolation valve (HV-44-1F001)
- j. Main steam drain line inboard isolation valve (HV-41-1F016)
- k. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1C1V212, IE1V212, and 1GIV212 (11) Motor control center 10B212, which serves the following components:
- a. RHR loop "B" valves
- b. RHR compartment unit coolers 1BV210 and 1FV210
- c. Core spray loop "B" valves
- d. Core spray compartment unit coolers 1BV211 and 1FV211
- e. RHRSW inlet valve to RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F014B)
- f. RHR shutdown cooling return isolation valve (HV-51-1F015A)
- g. Reactor recirculation pump suction valve (HV-43-1F023B)
- h. HPCI compartment unit coolers 1AV209 and IBV209
- 1. Drywell unit cooler fans 1B1V212, 1D1V212, 1F1V212, and 1H1V212 (12) Motor control center 10B215, which serves the following components:
- a. RHR loop "A" valves
- b. RCIC system valves
- c. MSIV leakage control outboard system blowers and valves
- d. Suppression pool cleanup pump suction isolation valve (HV-52-127)
- e. Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147A)
- f. Drywell floor drain and equipment drain containment isolation valves (HV-61-112 and HV-61-132)
(13) Motor control center 10B216, which serves the following components:
- a. RHR loop "B" valves
- b. HPCI system valves
- c. MSIV leakage control inboard system blower and valves
- d. Suppression pool cleanup pump isolation valve l
(HV-52-128) 5-90
r LGS FPER
- e. Drywell pressure tap isolation valve
< f. Suppression pool level tap isolation valves (HV-55-120 and HV-55-121)
- g. Reactor head spray outboard isolation valve (HV-51-1F023)
- h. RHR shutdown cooling suction outboard isolation valve (HV-51-1F008)
- 1. RWCU outboard isolation valve (HV-44-1F004)
- j. Main steam drain line outboard isolation valve (HV-41-1F019)
(14) DC motor control center 10D201, which serves the following components:
- a. RCIC system
- b. Div. 1 RPS and UPS static inverter
- (15) DC motor control center 10D202, which serves the i
HPCI system (16) DC motor control center 10D203, which serves the following components:
- a. HPCI system
- b. Div. 2 RPS and UPS static inverter (17) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D
- b. DC distribution panels 1AD501, 1BD501, 1CD501, O c.
d. and 1DD501, which serve the diesel-generators Load center transformer 10X203 (Div. 3) Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1B1V212, 1C1V212, 1D1V212, 1E1V212, 1F1V212, 1G1V212, and 1H1V212
- e. Instrument rack 10C021 (Div. 2 RHR and Div. 2 RHRSW)
- f. Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump A discharge pressure)
! g. Instrument rack 10C076 (RHR pump B discharge pressure)
- h. Instrument rack 10C078 (RHR pump D discharge pressure)
- i. ESW loop "B" valves
- j. ESW loop "A" flow transmitters (FT-11-011A and i FT-11-013A)
- k. HPCI system components (flow transmitters and level transmitters)
- 1. RCIC system components (steam line isolation valve, leak detection system, and instrument j
i rack 10C017)
- m. Instrument ac transformer 10X108 (Div. 3) 4 n. RHR shutdown cooling suction isolation valve
- o. LPCI injection isolation valve (HV-51-1F017A)
- p. RHR compartment unit coolers 1DV210 and 1HV210 0
V 5-91
LGS FPER (18) Junction boxes containing cabling associated with the following components:
- a. Diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and ID
- b. DC distribution panels 1AD501, IBD501, and 1CD501, which serve the diesel-generators
- c. ESW supply and return valves to diesel-generators IA and 1B (HV-11-131A&B, HV-11-132A&B, HV-11-133A&B, and HV-11-134A&B)
- d. Motor control center 10B515 (serving diesel-generator 1A)
- e. Diesel-generator HVAC control panel 1AC563
- f. RHR pump 1AP202
- g. Core spray pump 1AP206
- h. HPCI system components (valves, level switches, pressure transmitters, leak detection system, and instrument rack 10C014)
- i. RCIC leakage detection system (19) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RCIC system valves and instrumentation
- b. HPCI system valves and instrumentation
- c. Core spray loop "A" valves and instrumentation
- d. Core spray loop "B" valves
- e. RHR loop "A" valves and instrumentation
- f. RHR loop "B" valves
- g. RHR loop "C" valves
- h. RHR loop 'D' valves and instrumentation
- 1. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "A" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068A)
- j. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068B)
- k. ESW loop "A" valves
- 1. ESW loop "B" valves
- m. Diesel-generators 1A and 1B
- n. Load center 10B201 (Div. 1)
- o. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panel 1AC563
- p. Reactor protection system channel "A" vertical board 10C609
- q. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 and associated valves
- r. Inlet valve to containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 (HV-57-163)
- s. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A2V212, 1C2V212, 1D2V212, 1E2V212, IF2V212, and 1G2V212 (c) Postulated fire in area:
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) lh 5-92 1
LGS FPER O (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Los" of RCIC system (2) Lost F HPCI system (3) Los' if core spray injection capability through
- pm "A" and "B" (4) Loss of RHR loops "A" and "B" (5) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pumps "C" and "D" (6) Loss of capability to remove heat from RHR loops "A" and "B" (7) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loops "A" and "B" (except diesel-generators)
(8) Loss of diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and ID (9) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B203 (Div. 3) (10) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panel 10Y202 (Div. 4) (11) Possible MSIV closure (12) Loss of containment hydrogen recombinerr 1AS403 and 1BS403 (13) Loss of drywell unit coolers 1AV212, ICV 212, O 1DV212, 1EV212, 1FV212, and 1GV212 (14) Loss of MSIV leakage control system (15) Loss of RWCU system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which wi.11 cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, lose of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: This fire area contains valves, motor control centers, instrument racks, and locally-mounted instrumentation associated with shutdown methods A and B. In general, the components associated'with shutdown method A are located in the western portion of the fire area, and the components associated with shutdown method B are located in the eastern portion of the fire area. The only exceptions to this generalization are the instrument O racks associated with the HPCI system (racks 10C016 and 10C036) and the RCIC system (racks 10C035 and 10C038). 5-93
LGS FPER By using the alternate shutdown procedure discussed in item (f) of Section 5.4.14, operability of the HPCI and RCIC systems need not be relied upon. When using this alternate procedure with shutdown method A, the following components are required in addition to those components listed under " Method A" in Section 5.2.2: (1) RHR pump "C" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "C" When using this alternate procedure with shutdown method B, the following components are required in addition to those components listed under " Method B" in Section 5.2.2: (1) RHR pump "D" and associated valves (2) RHR compartment unit cooler "D" The electrical raceways in this fire area have been routed so that raceways associated with shutdown method A are located primarily in the western portion of the area, and raceways associated with shutdown method B are located primarily in the eastern portion of the area, thereby maximizing physical separation between the cables of the two shutdown methods. For those cases in which raceways associated with the two shutdown methods are separated by less than 20 feet, the raceways of both shutdown methods will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. For those cases in which electrical cabling associated with one shutdown method is separated from components associated with the other shutdown method by less than 20 feet, the cabling involved will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. These blankets will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier for a 2-inch thickness, and a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier for a 1-inch thickness, ensuring that a postulated fire in this area will not result in damage to cabling associated with more than one of the shutdown methods. The measures described above for physical separation and provision of fire barriers ensure that at least one of the two shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire. 5.4.17 Fire Area 45: CRD Hydraulic Equipment Area and Neutron Monitoring System Area (El. 253'-0") O 5-94
l LGS FPER (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 1 and 4) N - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 1) E - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part adjacent 2 hr to stairwell no. 3) S - Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 3 and 4) W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Interior boundary (part adjacent 3 hr to main steam tunnel) - Reinforced concrete Interior boundary (part) - Reinforced 3 hr concrete (primary containment wall) ( Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 1, 3, and 4 Elevator door 0.75 hr Drywell access hatches None Watertight door connecting to 3 hr area 46 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Drywell chilled water system valves HV-87-122, HV-87-123, HV-87-128, and HV-87-129 (supply and return line containment isolation) (2) Control rod drive system master control station (3) Control rod drive system hydraulic control units (4) Containment combustible gas analyzer sample package 10S206 (5) Load center 10B203 (Div. 3) (6) MSIV leakage control system blowers 10K208, 1AK209, and 1EK209 (7) Instrument racks 10C004, 10C005, 10C026, and 10CO27 O (RPV instrumentation and LPCI injection valve AP transmitters) 5-95 l : 1
LGS FPER (8) RHRSW radiation monitors 0AS578, 1CS579, and 1DS579 O (9) Motor control center 10B223, which serves the following components:
- a. LPCI injection containment isolation valve (HV-51-1F017C)
- b. RHR loop "C" minimum flow recirculation isolation valve (HV-51-105A)
- c. RCIC system valves
- d. Standby liquid control pump 1AP208
- e. Standby liquid control injection outboard isolation valve (HV-48-1F006)
- f. Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147C)
- g. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A2V212 and 1E2V212
- h. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water isolation valves (HV-13-106 and HV-13-107)
(10) Motor control center 10B224, which serves the following components:
- a. LPCI injection containment isolation valve (HV-51-1F017D)
- b. RHR loop "D" minimum flow recirculation isolation valve (HV-51-105B)
- c. HPCI system valves
- d. Standby liquid control pump 1BP208
- e. Drywell pressure tap isolation valve (HV-42-147D)
- f. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water source select valves (HV-13-108, HV-13-109, HV-13-110, and HV-13-111)
- g. Drywell unit cooler fans 1B2V212 and 1H2V212 (11) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. HPCI system components (flow transmitters, level transmitters, and instrument rack 10C036)
- b. RHR loop "A" components (LPCI injection isolation valve and flow transmitters)
- c. Instrument rack 10C017 (RCIC)
- d. Instrument rack 10C019 (core spray)
- e. Instrument rack 10C021 (Div. 2 RHR and Div. 2 RHRSW)
- f. Instrument rack 10C075 (RHR pump "A" discharge pressure)
- g. Instrument rack 10C076 (RHR pump "B" discharge pressure)
- h. Motor control center 10B516 (Div. 2)
- 1. Containment hydrogen recombiners 1AS403 and 1BS403
- j. ESW loop "A" flow transmitters (FT-11-011A and FT-11-013A)
- k. ESW loop "B" flow transmitter (FT-11-011B)
. 5-96 l
LGS FPER O (12) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Load center transformer 10X204 (Div. 4)
I b. Motor control centers 10B211 (Div. 1), 10B212 (Div. 2), 10B218 (Div. 4), 10B515 (Div. 1), 10B516 (Div. 2), and 10B518 (Div. 4)
- c. ESW supply and return valves for diesel-generators 1C and 1D I
- d. Diesel-generator control boards 1CC514 and 1DC514
- e. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panels ICC563 and 1DC563 (13) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following cdmponents:
- a. RCIC system valves and instrumentation
- b. HPCI system valves and instrumentation
- c. Core spray loop "A" valves and instrumentation
- d. Core spray loop "B" valves and instrumentation
- e. RHR loop "A" valves, instrumentation, and pump 1AP202
- f. RHR loop "B" valves and instrumentation
- g. RHR loop "C" valves and instrumentation
- h. RHR loop "D" valves and instrumentation
- i. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "A" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068A)
\ j. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "B" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068B)
- k. RHRSW pump OAP506
- 1. ESW loop "A" valves and pump OAP548
- m. ESW loop "B" valves and pump ODP548
- n. Diesel-generators 1A, 13, 1C, and 1D
- o. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panels 1AC563, ICC563, and 1DC563
- p. Load centers 10B201 (Div. 1), 10B202 (Div. 2),
and 10B203 (Div. 3)
- q. Reactor protection system channel "A" vertical board 10C609 and channel "B" vertical board 10C611
- r. Main steam relief valves (non-ADS)
- s. ADS channel "A" and "C" solenoid pilot valves
- t. Inboard MSIVs
- u. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A1V212, 1A2V212, IB1V212, 1C1V212, 1C2V212, ID1V212, 1E1V212, 1E2V212, 1F1V212, 1G1V212, 1G2V212, and 1H1V212
- v. Containment hydrogen recombiner 1AS403 and associated valves
- w. Inlet valve to containment hydrogen recombiner 1BS403 (HV-57-163)
- x. Control structure water chiller OBK112 OP (c) Postulated fire in area:
5-97
LGS FPER Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As O discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical , cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire I source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of HPCI system (3) Loss of core spray injection capability through loops "A" and "B" (4) Loss of RHR loops "A" and "B" (5) Loss of LPCI injection capability using RHR pumps "C" and "D" (6) Loss of capabili'y to remove heat from RHR loops "A" and "B" (7) Loss of ESW loops "A" and "B" (8) Loss of diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D (9) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load center 10B201 (Div. 1), 10B202 (Div. 2), 10B203 (Div. 3), and 10B204 (Div. 4) (10) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y101 (Div. 1) and 10Y102 (Div. 2) (11) Loss of capability to manually actuate the MSRVs, both ADS and non-ADS related (12) Possible closure of MSIVs (13) Loss of reactor pressure and reactor water level recorders "A" and "B" (14) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiners 1AS403 and 1BS403 (15) Loss of standby liquid control system (16) Loss of containment combustible gas sample cabinet 10S206 (17) Loss of MSIV leakage control system (18) Loss of RWCU system (19) Loss of cooling water supply to reactor recirculation pumps (20) Loss of all drywell unit coolers (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the fire is in the area of the drywell electrical penetrations, wet pipe sprinkler systems will provide automatic suppression of the fire. At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will 5-98
LGS FPER O open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: This fire area contains two instrumen.t racks, two motor control centers, and one load center that are associated with shutdown methods A and B. The minimum separation between those components associated with shutdown method A and those associated with shutdown method B is greater than 50 feet. The electrical raceways routed through this fire area carry cables for a number of components associated with shutdown methods A and B, in addition to cables for the components discussed in the preceding paragraph. For those cases in which raceways associated with the two shutdown methods are separated by_less than 20 feet, the raceways of both shutdown methods will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. For those cases in which electrical cabling associated with one O shutdown method is separated from components associated with the other shutdown method by less than-20 feet, the cabling involved will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket. These blankets will provide a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier for a 2-inch thickness, and a 30-minute equivalent fire barrier for a 1-inch thickness. The measures described above for physical separation and provision of fire barriers ensure that at least one of i the two shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section
- 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire.
j 5.4.18 Fire Area 46: Main Steam Tunnel (El. 253'-0") l (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7, B-8, B-9, and B-10): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (contains 3 hr 188 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels) E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr O- S-primary containment wall) Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr 5-99
LGS FPER W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (part at 3 hr* El. 295'-3") Reinforced concrete (part None at El. 365' roof slab) Access: Watertight door connecting to 3 hr area 45 Steamtight doors connecting to areas 3 hr** 28 and 47 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Main steam line outboard containment isolation valves (HV-41-1F028 A,B,C&D) (2) Feedwater line outboard containment isolation valves (HV-41-1F022A&B and HV-41-1F074A&B) (3) Main steam drain line outboard containment isolation valve (HV-41-1F019) (4) MSIV-LCS outboard containment isolation valves (HV-40-1F001B,F,K&P and HV-40-1F002B,F,K&P) (5) RCIC injection valve (HV-49-1F013) (6) Steam line radiation sensors (RE-41-1N006A,B,C&D) (c) Postulated fire in area: Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Possible closure of MSIVs (3) Loss of outboard portion of MSIV leakage control system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will shut the reactor down. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to elevations 253 and/or 283 feet in the reactor enclosure and will enter the main steam tunnel through doors at those elevations. The fire brigade will extinguish the fire using portable fire extinguishers or hoses from hose stations located outside the entrances to the main steam tunnel. 5-100
LGS FPER O Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. l (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain avialble to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.19 Fire Area 47: RWCU Compartments, FPCC Compartment, and General Equipment Area (El. 283'-0" and 295'-3") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 1 and 4) N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr i E- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr
- adjacent to stairwell no. 1)
E- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr
. S- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr l adjacent to stairwell no. 3)
S- Reinforced concrete (part, 3 hr exterior wall) W- Reinforced concrete (parts 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 3 and 4) W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Interior boundary (east and west 3 hr i walls of area 46) - Reinforced l concrete , Interior boundary (primary 3 hr ' containment wall) - Reinforced j concrete l Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Doors connnecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 1, 3, and 4 Steamtight door connecting to 3 hr** area 46 Elevator door 0.75 hr l l 5-101
7 LGS FPER (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: O (1) Containment hydrogen recombiner packages 1AS403 and 1BS403 , (2) Standby liquid control system components: l Storage tank 10T204 ' Injection pumps 1AP208 and 1BP208 Explosive valves XV-48-1F004A&B (3) Core spray loop "A" injection valves (HV-52-1F004A and HV-52-1F005) (4) Core spray loop "B" injection valves (HV-52-1F004B, HV-52-1F037,'and HV-52-108) (5) RHR system valves: HV-51-1F017A,B,C&D (LPCI injection line containment isolation) HV-51-1F021A&B (drywell spray line containment isolation) HV-51-1F016A&B (drywell spray line shutoff) (6) HPCI system injection valve (HV-55-1F006) (7) RWCU supply line containment isolation valve (HV-44-1F004) (8) Containment atmospheric control system purge line containment isolation valves (HV-57-111, HV-57-113, HV-57-114, and HV-57-161) (9) Containment combustible gas analyzer sample cabinet 10S205 (10) Load center 10B204 (Div. 4) (11) HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y206 (Div. 1), which serves the following components:
- a. Diesel-generator enclosure HVAC control panel IAC563
- b. Unit cooler control panel 1AC208
- c. Control structure HVAC loca.1 panel 0CC101
- d. SGTS control panel 0AC124 !
- e. RERS control panel 10C207 (12) HVAC 120V ac distribution panel 10Y207 (Div. 2),
which serves the following components:
- a. Diesel-generator enclosure HVAC control panel 1BC563
- b. Unit cooler control panel 1BC208
- c. Control structure HVAC local panel OCC101
- d. SGTS control panel 0BC124
- e. RERS control panel 10C207 (13) Motor control center 10B213, which serves the following components:
- a. RHR loop "A" valves
- b. Core spray loop "A" valves
- c. Feedwater startup recirculation valves (HV-41-109A&B)
- d. Shutoff valves for main steam to miscellaneous steam-driven components (HV-01-108, HV-01-109, HV-01-111, and HV-01-150) 5-102
LGS FPER
- e. 'Drywell chilled water source select valves
, f. SGTS heater 0AE188 i
- g. SGTS exhaust fan 0AV109 i (14) Motor control center 10B214, which serves the following components:
- a. RHR loop "B" valves
! b. Core spray loop "B" valves
- c. MSIV leakage control inboard system pipe heaters and isolation valves
- d. .Drywell cooling water containment isolation
- valves
- e. SGTS heater OBE1088
- f. SGTS exhaust fan OBV109 l' (15) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Motor control centers 10B212 (Div. 2), 10B515 (Div. 1), 10B516 (Div. 2), and 00B520 (Div. 2)
- b. Core spray pump 1BP206
- c. Safeguard pump room unit cooler control panels 1CC208 and IDC208
- d. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panel ICC563
- e. Instrument rack 10C004 (RPV instrumentation and LPCI injection valve "A" AP transmitter)
O f. g. Instrument rack 10C021 (Div. 2 RHR and Div. 2 RHRSW) Instrument rack 10C076 (RHR pump "B" discharge-
; pressure)
I h. HPCI system level transmitters (LT ; 1N062B&F) '
! i. Outboard main steam isolation valves
- j. MSIV leakage control system valves (16) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Load center transformer 10X201 (Div. 1)
- b. Motor control centers 00B131 (Div. 3) and 4 00B519 (Div. 1)
I
- c. Instrument rack 10C005 (RPV instrumentation 4 and LPCI injection valve "C" AP transmitter)
- d. HPCI injection valve (HV-55-1F006)
(17) Cable trays containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. RCIC system valves and instrumentation
- b. HPCI system valves and instrumentation
- c. Core spray pump suction valve (HV-52-1F001C)
- d. Core spray loop "B" instrumentation
- e. RHR loop "C" valves and instrumentation
- f. RHR loop "D" valves and instrumentation
- g. RHRSW outlet valve from RHR "A" heat exchanger (HV-51-1F068A)
, O h. ESW loop "A" valves (HV-11-071 and HV-11-123) i 5-103
l i LGS FPER
- i. ESW supply and return shutoff valves for O
diesel-generator 1C (HV-11-131C, HV-11-132C, HV-11-133C, and HV-11-134C)
- j. Diesel-generators 1C and ID
- k. Diesel-generator cell HVAC control panel 1DC563
- 1. ADS channel "A" and "C" solenoid pilot valves
- m. Instrument ac transformer 10X108 (Div. 3)
- n. Instrument ac distribution panel 10Y201 (Div. 3)
- o. Drywell unit cooler fans 1A2V212, 1C2V212, 1E2V212, and 1G2V212
- p. Reactor recirculation pump cooling water isolation valves (HV-13-106 and HV-13-107)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of RCIC system (2) Loss of HPCI system (3) Loss of core spray injection capability through - loops "A" and "B" (4) Loss of RHR loops "A" and "B" (5) Loss of LPCI injection capability through loops "A" and "B" (6) Loss of RHRSW loops "A" and "B" (7) Loss of cooling water supply to components served by ESW loop "A" (except diesel-generators 1A, 1B, and ID) (8) Loss of ventilation for diesel-generator cells 1A and 1B (9) Loss of diesel-generators 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D (10) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B204 (Div. 4) (11) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by instrument ac distribution panels 10Y102 (Div, 2), 10Y103 (Div. 3), and 10Y201 (Div. 3) (12) Possible closure of outboard MSIVs (13) Loss of reactor pressure and reactor water level recorder "A' (14) Loss of containment hydrogen recombiners 1AS403 and 1BS403 (15) Loss of standby liquid control system 5-104
LGS FPER O (16) Loss of containment combustible gas sample cabinet 10S205 (17) Loss of MSIV leakage control system (18) Loss of RWCU system (19) Loss of standby gas treatment system (20) Loss of reactor enclosure recirculation system (21) Loss of cooling water supply to reactor recirculation pumps (22) Loss of cooling water to drywell unit coolers (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the fire is in the area of the drywell electrical penetrations, wet pipe sprinkler systems will provide automatic suppression of the fire. At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Valves, motor control centers, ac power distribution ! panels, and a load center associated with shutdown methods A and B are located within this fire area. The electrical raceways routed through this area carry cables for a number of components which are associated with shutdown methods A or B and which are located in other fire areas. In general, the components and raceways associated with shutdown method A are located in the western portion of the fire area, and the components and raceways associated with shutdown method B are located in the eastern portion of the fire
- area. However, there are several raceways associated l
with shutdown method A that are routed through the i eastern portion of the fire area. The portions of these raceways that are located in the eastern portion of the fire area will be covered by a 2-inch thickness of a ceramic fiber blanket, providing a 1-hour equivalent fire barrier. Ccbling associated with both channels of ADS solenoid pilot valves are routed through this fire area. Since the ADS valves are needed for both shutdown methods, at least one of the channels of ADS cabling must remain undamaged by a postulated fire. Therefore,
, ,e g all raceways within this fire area that contain cables Q associated with the ADS valves will be covered by a 1-inch thickness of ceramic fiber blanket.
5-105
LGS FPER The minimum separation between those components and O raceways associated with shutdown method A and those associated with shutdown method B, other than the raceways to be covered by ceramic fiber blankets, is approximately 26 feet. The measures described above for physical separation and provision of fire barriers ensure that at least one of the two shutdown methods (A and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down in the event of a fire. 5.4.20 Fire Area 48: RWCU Holding Pump Compartments, RERS Fan Area, and Corridors (El. 313'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent ':o stairwell no. 4) N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 3) W- Reinforced concrete (part, None i exterior wall) W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 4) Interior boundary - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (primary containment wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 3 and 4 Two doors connecting to area 49 3 hr Elevator door 0.75 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Reactor enclosure recirculation system fans (1AV213 and 1BV213) (2) Load center 10B201 (Div. 1) (3) Load center 10B202 (Div. 2) (4) Rigid steel conduits containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Motor control center 00B132 (Div. 4) 5-106
LGS FPER O b. Safeguard pump room unit cooler' control panel IDC208 (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs-to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of Class IE ac power supplied by load centers 10B201 (Div. 1) and 10B202 (Div. 2) (2) Loss of reactor enclosure recirculation system (3) Loss of core spray compartment unit coolers IDV211 and 1HV211, potentially affecting the long term availability of core spray pump 1DP206 (4) Loss of RHR compartment unit coolers IDV210 and 1HV210, potentially affecting the long term availability of RHR pump 1DP202 (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: The only components in this fire area that are associated with shutdown methods A and B are two load centers (10B201 and 10B202) and their associated transformers. The two load centers are separated by a distance of more than 35 feet. All cabling which is associated with these load centers and is needed for safe shutdown enters the load centers from below, and therefore is not exposed in this fire area. The separation between the two load centers is adequate to ensure that a postulated fire in this area will not cause damage to more than one of the load centers. O Therefore, at least one of the two shutdown methods (A 5-107
LGS FPER and B) described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.21 Fire Area 49: Reactor Enclosure Lower Fan Room (El. 313'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): Construction Rating Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall) S- Louvers open to outside None atmosphere (part) W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete None Access: Two doors connecting to 3 he area 48 Emergency exit in ceiling None (6.25 ft2 opening) (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of normal ventilation for Unit 1 portion of refueling floor (2) Loss of normal reactor enclosure supply ventilation O 5-108
- 4 LGS FPER O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
Once the control room operators have been notified that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of the ventilation functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.*A2 Fire Area 50: Reactor Enclosure Upper Fan Room and Equipment Compartment Exhaust Filter Rooms (F1. 331'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E ,- Reinforced concrete 3 hr
. S;- Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall)
W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell no. 3) W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete None Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: ' Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 3 Two doors connecting to area 51 3 hr Emergency exit in floor None (6.25 ft2 opening) (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of charcoal filters. 5-109
LGS FPER (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression O (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of normal reactor enclosure exhaust ventilation (2) Loss of reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust fans (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: In the event of a fire in one of the reactor enclosure equipment compartment exhaust filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the affected ventilation system will be shut down and the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: g Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safety shut the plant shown. 5.4.23 Fire Area 51: RERS Filter Compartments (El. 331-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) l l Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Access: Two doors connecting to area 50 3 hr O 5-110
r LGS FPER (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Reactor enclosure recircualtion system filter assemblies (1AS297 and 1BS297) (c) Postulated fire in areas Ignition of charcoal filters. l (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression . (based on the assumption that damage occurs to all components located in the area and all cabling routed through the area): (1) Loss of reactor enclosure recirculation system (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: In the event of a fire in one of the reactor enclosure recirculation system filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to O extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. (f) Effect of tire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.24 Fire Area 75: Service Water Pipe Tunnel (El. 198'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire l area (see Figure B-5): 1 Construction Ratino Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr I S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) i W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* l 5-111 l
i LGS FPER Access: Watertight doors connecting 3 hr to areas 42 and 65 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) ESW discharge header isolation valves (HV-11-011A&B and HV-11-015A&B) (c) Postulated fire in area: Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: The only components within this fire area that are associated with the shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 are valves HV-11-011A and HV-11-015B. The . two valves are located at opposite ends of the service water pipe tunnel and are separated by more than 200 feet. The conduits carrying cables associated with these valves are routed such that their minimum separation within the service water pipe tunnel is 100 feet. This degree of separation is sufficient to prevent any postulated fire from affecting the operability of both valves. Therefore, a fire could cause the loss of one ESW loop at most. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receipt of notification in the control room that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of any ESW valving may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: As discussed in (d) above, a fire in this area could cause the loss of no more than one ESW loop. Therefore, at least one of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.25 Fire Area 76: Refueling Holstway (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-6, B-7, B-8, and B-9): O 5-112
LGS FPER ! Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Concrete hatch plugs connecting None to area 78 Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 44 and 67 Railroad car airlock doors None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in areas Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: Since no equipment or cabling of any significance is located in this area, a fire will have no effect on plant systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receipt of notification in the control room that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.26 Fire Area 77: South Ventilation Exhaust Stack (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7, B-8, B-9, and B-10): O 5-113
s LGS FPER Construction Rating O Walls: N- Reinforced concrete 3 hr E- Precast concrete panels None S- Precast concrete panels None W- Precast concrete panels None Floor: None (open to outside) Ceiling: None (open to outside) Access: Door connecting to area 78 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components located in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in areas Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: Since nothing other than HVAC ductwork is located in this area, a fire will have no effect on plant systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receipt of notification in the control room that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.4.27 Fire Area 78: Refueling Area (El. 352'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-10): Construction Ratina Walls: N- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 4 and 6) N- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr E- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr 5-114
LGS FPER O adjacent to stairwell nos. 5 and 6) E- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr S- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 3 and 5) S- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr W- Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr adjacent to stairwell nos. 3 and 4) W- Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete 3 hr* Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Doors to stairwell nos. 1.5 hr 3, 4, 5, and 6 Two doors to area 77 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Reactor enclosure crane (2) Refueling platforms for Units 1 and 2 (c) Postulated fire in area: Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Loss of reactor enclosure crane (2) Loss of refueling platforms for Units 1 and 2 (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receipt of notification in the control room that a fire has occurred in this area, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling essociated with either of the two shutdown methods described in Section 5.2.2 is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. i l O 5-115
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LGS FPER O 5.5 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - UNIT 2 REACTOR ENCI.OSURE This section will be submitted after the cable routing in the i Unit 2 reactor enclosure has been substantially completed. t I 2 l
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LGS FPER 5.6 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - DIESEL-GENERATOR ENCLOSURES 5.6.1 Fire Area 79: Diesel-Generator Cell 1A (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None () (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Diesel-generator IA and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-131A, HV-11-132A, HV-11-133A, and HV-11-134A) (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 1AV512 and IEV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 1AC514 (5) DC distribution panel 1AD501 (serving diesel-generator 1A and auxiliaries) (6) Motor control center 10B515, which serves the following l components: i
- a. Auxiliaries of diesel-generator 1A l
- b. ESW loop "A" discharge valve (HV-11-011A)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. l (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Loss of diesel-generator 1A (2) Loss of ESW loop "A" g (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression:
~I 5-171
LGS FPER The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of the components discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. . 5.6.2 Fire Area 80: Diesel-Generator Cell IC (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Diesel-generator 1C and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-131C, HV-11-132C, HV-11-133C, and HV-11-134C) (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 1CV512 and 1GV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 1CC514 (5) DC distribution panel 1CD501 (serving diesel-generator 1C and auxiliaries) (6) Motor control center 10B517, which serves auxiliaries of diesel-generator IC (c) Postulated fire in area: 5-172
LGS FPER O Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: Loss of diesel-generator IC. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of diesel-generator 1C operability may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: O Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.6.3 Fire Area 81: Diesel-Generator Cell IB (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Dies 1-generator 1B and auxiliaries 5-173
LGS FPER (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves O (HV-11-131B, HV-11-132B, HV-11-133B, and HV-11-134B) (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 1BV512 and 1FV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 1BC514 (5) DC distribution panel 1BD501 (serving diesel-generator 1B and auxiliaries) (6) Motor control center 10B516, which serves auxiliaries of diesel-generator 1B (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: Loss of diesel-generator 1B. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler W system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of diesel-generator 1B operability may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.6.4 Fire Area 82: Diesel-Generator Cell 1D (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): O 5-174 s
LGS FPER Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Diesel-generator ID and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-131D, HV-11-132D, HV-11-133D, and HV-11-134D) (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 1DV512 and 1HV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board IDC514 (5) DC distribution panel IDD501 (serving diesel-generator 1D and auxiliaries) /~ T (6) Motor control center 10B518, which serves the following V components:
- a. Auxiliaries of diesel-generator ID
- b. ESW loop "B" discharge valve (HV-11-015B)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the dies 91 engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Loss of diesel-generator ID (2) Loss of ESW loop "B" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is O extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread 5-175
LGS FPER of the fire, complete loss of the components discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.6.5 Fire Area 83: Diesel-Generator Cell 2A (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratino Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Diesel-generator 2A and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-231A, HV-11-232A, HV-11-233A, and HV-11-234A) , (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 2AV512 and 2EV512 l (4) Diesel-generator control board 2AC514 l (5) DC distribution panel 2AD501 (serving diesel-generator
- 2A and auxiliaries)
(6) Motor control center 20B515, which serves auxiliaries of diesel-generator 2A (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Loss of diesel-generator 2A. h 5-176
i LGS FPER O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of diesel-generator 2A operability may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.6.6 Fire Area 84: Diesel-Generator Cell 2C (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area
/ 'l (see Figure B-6):
V Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Diesel-generator 2C and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-231C, HV-11-232C, HV-11-233C, and HV-11-234C) (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 2CV512 and 2GV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 2CC514 (5) DC distribution panel 2CD501 (serving diesel-generator rg 2C and auxiliaries)
\ ,) (6) Motor control center 20B517, which serves the following components:
5-177
. , , _ _ _ _ - . . _m--. _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . , _ . __ , _ - - - _ - .--
s LGS FPER O
- a. Auxiliaries of diesel-generator 2C
- b. ESW loop "A" discharge valve (HV-11-015A)
(c) Postulated fire in areat Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Loss of diesel-generator 2C (2) Loss of ESW loop "A" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of the components discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.6.7 Fire Area 85: Diesel-Generator Cell 2B (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): O 5-178
l LGS FPER Construction Ratino Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Diesel-generator 2B and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-231B, HV-11-232B, HV-11-233B, and HV-11-234B) (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 2BV512 and 2FV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 2BC514 (5) DC distribution panel 2BD501 (serving diesel-generator 2B and auxiliaries) (~' (6) Motor control center 20B516, which serves the following components:
- a. Auxiliaries of diesel-generator 2B
- b. ESW loop "B" dischargo valve (HV-11-0115)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the Iloor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oi?. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Loss of diesel-generator 2B (2) Loss of ESW loop "B" (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 212or, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is O' extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread . 5-179
LGS FPER of the fire, complete loss of the components discussed in (d) O above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.6.8 Fire Area 86: Diesel-Generator Cell 2D (El 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr g Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door at north side of cell 3 hr Door at south side of cell None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Diesel-generator 2D and auxiliaries (2) ESW supply and return shutoff valves (HV-11-231D, HV-11-232D, HV-11-233D, and HV-11-234D) (3) Diesel-generator air exhaust fans 2DV512 and 2HV512 (4) Diesel-generator control board 2DC514 (5) DC distribution panel 2DD501 (serving diesel-generator 1 2D and auxiliaries) (6) Motor control center 20B518, which serves auxiliaries of diesel-generator 2D (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of fuel oil or lubricating oil from the diesel engine onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: Loss of diesel-generator 2D 5-180 . {
LGS FPER O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire will activate the smoke detectors in this area, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, complete loss of diesel-generator 2D operability may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. O O 1 1 5-181
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LGS FPER O 5.7 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - SPRAY POND PUMP STRUCTURE 5.7.1 Fire Area 122: Spray Pond Pump Structure, Western Half (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-11 and B-12): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door connecting to area 123 3 hr O Door connecting to outside Roolup door connecting to outside None None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) ESW pumps OAP548 and OCP548 (2) RHRSW pumps OAP506 and OCP506 (3) Sluice gates HV-12-003A&C (4) RHRSW valves: HV-12-031A&C (winter bypass line) HV-12-032A&C (spray networks A and C) HV-12-034A (spray network cross-connection) HV-12-112 and HV-12-114 (inlet from the Unit I cooling tower) (5) Spray pond pump structure supply fans OAV543 and OCV543 (6) Motor control centers OOB519 (Div. 1) and OOB521 (Div. 3), which serve the following components:
- a. ESW loop "A" valves
- b. RHRSW loop "A" valves
- c. Spray pond pump structure supply fan OAV543 and associated heaters and dampers
- d. Spray pond pump structure supply fan OCV543 and associated heaters and dampers (c) Postulated fire in area:
O 5-183
LGS FPER Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Loss of ESW loop "A" (2) Loss of RHRSW loop "A" (3) Loss of all ventilation for western half of spray pond pump structure (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cauce an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, this method will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.7.2 Fire Area 123: Spray Pond Pump Structure, Eastern Half (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-11 and B-12): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete None (exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation None Ceiling: Reinforced concrete roof slab 3 hr* Access: Door connecting to area'122 Door connecting to outside Roolup door connecting to outside 3 hr None () None 5-184
LGS FPER (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) ESW pumps OBP548 and ODP548 (2) RHRSW pumps OBP506 and ODP506 (3) Sluice gates HV-12-003B&D (4) RHRSW valves: HV-12-031B&D (winter bypass line) HV-12-032B&D (spray networks B and D) HV (spray network cross-connection) HV-12-212 and HV-12-214 (inlet from the Unit 2 cooling tower) (5) Spray pond pump structure supply fans OBV543 and ODV543 (6) Motor control centers OOB520 (Div. 2) and OOB522 (Div. 4), which serve the following components:
- a. ESW loop "B" valves
- b. RHRSW loop "B" valves
- c. Spray pond pump structure supply fan OBV543 and associated heaters and dampers
- d. Spray pond pump structure supply fan ODV543 and associated heaters and dampers (c) Postulated fire in area:
Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely O' unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppreusion: (1) Loss of ESW loop "B" (2) Loss of RHRSW loop "B" _ (3) Loss of all ventilation for eastern half of spray pond pump structure (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, loss of all the functions discussed in (d) above may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown method A (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire O area, plant this method will remain available to safely shut the down. 5-185
ISS FPER O THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK i i l l l 1 l 1 l l l O 5-186
LGS FPER O 5.8 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - TURBINE ENCLOSURE 5.8.1 Fire Area 87: Condensate Pump Rocm (El. 189'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5 and B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (below elev. 217 feet) E - Concrete masonry unit 2 hr (above elev. 217 feet) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) () Access: Watertight door connecting to area 88 3 hr Two doors connecting to area 113 1.5 hr Removable metal panels connecting 2 hr to area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire O' brigads to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. 5-187
LGS FPER (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: O Since no equipment or cabling associated with chutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.2 Fire Area 88: Main Condenser Area and Feedwater Heater Rooms (El. 200'-0" and 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5, B-6, and B-7): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (below elev. 217 feet) N - Reinforced concrete None and precast concrete panels (exterior wall, above elev. 217 feet) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (below elev. 217 feet; contains 25 fta og y unrated steel plate as separation from area 115) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (above elev. 217 feet) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (below elev. 217 feet) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (between elev. 217 and 239 feet) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (above elev. 239 feet, contains 188 ft2 of unrated metal blowout panels) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr ' (portion north of column line N) W - Concrete masonry unit' None (exterior wall above elev. 239 feet) 5-188
s s
,q sa s
{f
> LGS FPER Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat (elev. 200 feet)
Reinforced concrete (elev. None 239 feet; supported by structural
, ,; steel members without fireproofing)
Ceiling: Reinforced concrete None
,J '
Access: Watertight doors connecting to , 3 hr areas 87 and 94 l C Three doors connecting to , 3 hr
- area 89 Five doors connecting to 3 hr area 97 Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 95 and 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Main turbine stop valve position switches (2S-01-104A,B,C&D)
(2) Turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches (PS-01-102A,B,C&D) (3) Main steam line area temperature detectors [ (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As 3 t discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical
', cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire , source external to the cabling.)
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Possible reactor trip (2) MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. If the fire is in the main condenser area and the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler; system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the, fire, MSIV closure and reactor trip may s be avoided. ,, () (f) Effectoffire\onsafeshutdown:
~?
5-189
LGS FPER Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown O methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.3 Fire Area 89: Reactor Feedwater Pump Lube' Oil Areas, Control Rod Drive Water Pump Area, and Condensate Filter /Demineralizer Compartments (El. 200'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5 and B-6): Construction Ratino Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat (contains 76 ft2 grating opening connecting to area 115) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None 156 fta grating opening connecting to area 94) Access: Three doors connecting to 3 hr area 88 Door connecting to area 1 3 hr Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 30 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area None (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from the reactor feedwater pump lube oil reservoirs onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ig'ition of the oil. (d) Consequences (. f fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: O 5-190
LGS FPER l The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler systems will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.4 Fire Area 90: Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Compartment (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): () Walls: N - Construction Reinforced concrete Rating 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr concrete masonry unit S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to area 113 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: () Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical (As 1 5-191 1
LGS FPER cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire O source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.5 Fire Area 91: Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Compartment (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit S - Reinforced concrete 3 he and concrete masonry unit W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to area 113 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None 5-192
LGS FPER O (c) Postulated fire in area: i Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in.this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.6 Fire area 92: Mechanical Vacuum Pump Room (El. 217'-0") l (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to area 94 3 hr () (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: 5-193
LGS FPER None O (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of e'.ectrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of'a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.7 Fire Area 93: Air Compressor Area, EHC Power Unit Area, and Turbine Lube Oil Storage Tank Area (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Constraction Ratina Walls: N - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) j E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr k' - Precast concrete None ! panels (exterior wall) l Floor: Reinfoced concrete foundation 3 hr mat I 1 Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 55 fta of steel plate and a 96 ft2 opening partially filled with grating) Access: Door connecting to area 94 3 hr 5-194
LGS FPER Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 32 Rollup door to outside None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from the turbine lube oil storage tanks onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels
~ in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads l
(- ) in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.8 Fire Area 94: Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine Compartments and Reactor Feedwater Pump Access Area (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratino Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry O S - unit Reinforced concrete 3 hr 5-195
LGS FPER (part) S - Reinforced concrete None and concrete masonry unit (part adjacent to area 89; contains 8 HVAC duct pene-trations without fire dampers) S - Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior wall) W - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None 156 ft2 grating opening connecting to area 89) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 66 ft2 of steel plate) Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 92, 93, and 120 Steamtight door connecting 3hr** to area 2 Watertight door connecting 3 hr to area 88 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr i no. 30 : Rollup door to outside None ) Open stairwell leading up to None I area 95 l (b) Major safety-related components in fire areat None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: 5-196
l l LGS FPER O Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) stiset of fire on safe shutdown: ! Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown ) methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will ) remain available to safely shut the plant down. I 5.8.9 Fire Area 95: MCC Room, TECW Equipment Area, and Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir and Centrifuge Area ' (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architecutral design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): ! Construction Rating Walls: N - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr \~' S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 55 fta of steel plate and a 96 fta opening partially filled with grating) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 78 fta of steel plate) Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 88 and 96 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 32 Open stairwell leading down None to area 94 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Main turbine first stage pressure transmitters O (PT-01-1N052A,B,C&D) 5-197
LGS FPER (2) Main steam line pressure transmitters O (PT-01-1N076A,B,C&D) (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from the turbine lube oil reservoir onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Possible reactor trip (2) Possible MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. In addition, a compartment temperature of 2120F will cause actuation of the deluge systems located over the turbine lube oil reservoir and the turbine lube oil centrifuge. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip and MSIV closure may be avoided. (f) Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.10 Fire Area 96: Battery Room (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Ratino Walls: N - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) h 5-198
LGS FPER O, I Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to area 95 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke and heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke and heat detectors which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire N- brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.11 Fire Area 97: Equipment Hatch Corridor (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) S - Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior p wall) W - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) 5-199
LGS FPER Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None O equipment hatch with 66 ft2 of steel plate) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Five doors connecting to 3 hr area 88 Steamtight door connecting 3 hr** to area 7 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 30 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the lgnition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) gg (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will restit from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.12 Fire Area 98: Reactor Recirculation Pump M-G Set Area and Feedwater Heater Rooms (El. 269'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-8): O 5-200
LGS FPER O , Construction Ratino Walls: N - Concrete masonry 3 hr unit E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) S - Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior wall) W - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None two equipment hatches covered with steel plate, one of 75 ft2 and one of 110 ft*) Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 30 3 hr (~] \ms Door connecting to area 45 Two doors connecting to 3 hr area 114 Two rollup doors connecting 3 hr to area 114 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Main turbine stop valve position switches (ZS-01-104A,B,C&D)
- b. Turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches (PS-01-102A,B,C&D)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from the recirculation pump M-G sets onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Possible reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: 5-201
LGS FPER The smoke generated by a fire in,this area will activate O the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the fire is in the area of the recirculation pump M-G sets, the pre-action sprinkler system will provide automatic suppression of the fire. A rise in compartment temperature to 1900F will cause the deluge valve to open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.13 Fire Area 99: Turbine Enclosure HVAC Area and Equipment Compartment Exhaust Filter Area (El. 302'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): Construction Rating Walls: N - Concrete masonry 3 hr i unit l E - Reinforced concrete a hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) S - Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior 1 wall) W - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None two equipment hatches covered with steel plate, one of 75 ft2 and one of 110 ftz) Ceiling: Metal deck, non-reinforced UL Class A concrete, and built-up roofing Access: Door connecting to stairwell no. 30 1 5. hr lh l 5-202
LGS FPER O Two steamtight doors connecting 3 hr** to area 27 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of charcoal filters. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: l No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: In the event of a fire in one of tne turbine enclosure equipment compartment exhaust filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be s dispatched to extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. No effect on safety-related systems will result from a fire in this area. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.14 Fire Area 100: Condensate Pump' Room (El. 189'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5 and B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (below elev. 217 feet) W - Reinforced concrete 2 hr O (above elev. 217 feet) l \ 5-203 I
- _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _.__J
~
l l LGS FPER Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr O mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Watertight door connecting to 3 hr area 101 Two doors connecting to area 113 1.5 hr Removable metal panels connecting 2 hr to area 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: g
~
No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.15 Fire Area 101: Main Condenser Area and Feedwater Heater Rooms (El. 200'-0" and 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5, B-6, an6 B-7): O 5-204
r LGS FPER O Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (below elev. 217 feet) N - Reinforced concrete None and precast concrete panels (exterior wall, above elev. 217 feet) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (portion north of column line N) E - Concrete masonry unit None (exterior wall above elev. 239 feet) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (below elev. 217 feet) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (between elev. 217 and 239 feet) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr O (above elev. 239 feet; contains 188 fta og unrated metal blowout panels) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (below elev. 217 feet; contains 25 fta og unrated steel plate as separation from area 115) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (above elev. i*7 feet) Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat (elev. 200 feet) Reinforced concrete (elev. None 239 feet; supported by structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete None Access: Watertight doors connecting 3 hr to areas 100 and 107 Three doors connecting to 3 hr 5-205
)
LGS FPER area 102 O Five doors connecting to 3 hr area 110 Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 108 and 113 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: (1) Main turbine stop valve position switches (2S-01-204A,B,C&D) (2) Turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches (PS-01-202A,B,C&D) (3) Main steam line area temperature detectors (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Possible reactor trip (2) MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. If the fire is in the main condenser area and the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, MSIV closure and reactor trip m - be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling asscciated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.16 Fire Area 102: Reactor Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Areas, Control Rod Drive Water Pump Area, and Condensate Filter /Demineralizer Compartments (El. 200'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-5 and B-6): ll 5-206
I l LGS FPER
\
Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None 156 ft2 grating opening connecting to area 107) Access: Three doors connecting to 3 hr area 101 Two doors connecting to area 1 3 hr Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 31 Door connectir.g to area 115 None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area; Leakage of lube oil from the reactor feedwater pump lube oil reservoirs onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusibl.e link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler systems will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. () (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: 5-207
LGS FPER Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.17 Fire Area 103: Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Compartment (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concretre masonry unit S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to area 113 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. 5-208
1 l l LGS FPER ) (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.18 Fire Area 104: Air Ejector and Steam Packing Exhauster Compartment (El. 217'-0") (a) Structure and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit O' s Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported by structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to area 113 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire
, source external to the cabling.)
(d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: 5-209
O LGS FPER Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in i this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire l brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown ) methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.19 Fire Area 105: Mechanical Vacuum Pump Room (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit S - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to area 107 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area; None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. 5-210
LGS FPER (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.20 Fire Area 106: Air Compressor Area, EHC Power Unit Area, and Turbine Lube Oil Storage Tank Area (El. 217'-0")
- (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6)
Construction Ratinc Walls: N - Precast concrete None O E - panels (exterior wall) Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation 3 hr mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 55 fta of steel plate and a 96 ft* opening partially filled with grating) Access: Door connecting to area 107 3 hr Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 33 Rollup door to outside None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None O) (s, (c) Postulated fire in area: 5-211
LGS FPER Leakage of lube oil from the turbine lube oil storage O tanks onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which eill cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will h remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.21 Fire Area 107: Reactor Feedwater Pump Turbine Compartments and Reactor Feedwater Pump Access Area (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) S - Reinforced concrete None and concrete masonry unit (part adjacent to area 102; contains 8 HVAC duct pene-trations without W fire dampers) & Reinforced concrete 3 hr T and concrete masonry 5-212 i L.
LGS FPER unit Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None 156 ft2 grating opening connecting to area 102) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None I equipment hatch with 66 fta of steel plate) Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 105, 106, and an entryway to the Unit 2 reactor
/ enclosure Two doors connecting to the 3 hr administration complex Steamtight door connecting 3 hr**
to area 2 Watertight door connecting 3 hr to area 101 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 31 Rollup door to outside None Open stairwell leading to None () (b) area 108 Major safety-related components in fire area: l None (c) Postulated fire in area: i l Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: ( Since no egoipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is 5-213
LGS FPER located in this fire area, both of these methods will O remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.22 Fire Area 108: MCC Room, TECW Equipment Area, and Turbine Lube Oil Reservoir and Centrifuge Area (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Ratino Walls: N - Precast concrete None panels (exterior 5 wall) E - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 55 ft2 of steel plate and a 96 ft2 opening partially filled with grating) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch with 78 ft2 of steel plate) Access: Doors connecting to areas 3 hr 101 and 109 Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 33 Open stairwell leading down None to area 107 (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Main turbine first stage pressure transmitters (PT-01-2N052A,B,C&D) (2) Main steam line pressure transmitters (PT-01-2N076A,B,C&D) (c) Postulated fire in area: Leakage of lube oil from the turbine lube oil reservoir onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: 5-214
l l LGS FPER O (1) Possible reactor trip (2) Possible MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the compartment temperature rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. In addition, a compartment temperature of 2120F will cause actuation of the deluge systems located over the turbine lube oil reservoir and the turbine lube oil centrifuge. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip and MSIV closure may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is () located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.23 Fire Area 109: Battery Room (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Consiruction Rating Walls: N - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr S - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to area 108 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None 5-215 t ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -
i LGS FPER O (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of battery cases caused by an exposure fire. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppryssion: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke and heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke and heat detectors which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.24 Fire Area 110: Equipment Hatch Corridot (El. 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reirforced concrete 3 hr E - Precast concrete None panels (exterior l wall) l S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) S - Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr i Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None eqdipment hatch with 66 ft2 of steel plate) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members ' without fireproofing) S-216
)
F t t i ff 4 LGS FFER O . Access: Five doors connecting to 3 hr area 101 4Steamtight door connecting to . 3 hr**
-area 7 Loor connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 30 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area:
None (c) Postulated fire in areas Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlit.ely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppress on; i (N Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methodv A or,B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is 3 located.intthis fire area, both of these methods will remain'available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.25 Fire Area 111: Reactor Recirculation Pump M-G ' Set Area'and Feedwater Heater Rooms (El. 269'-0") I (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (ses Figure B-8): Construction Rating . Walls: N - Concrete masonry unit 3 hr E - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part) S - Precast concrete ' None 7-~)s ( panels (part, exterior wall) , 5-217
- N
s LGS FPER W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr O Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None two equipment hatches covered with steel plate, one of 75 ft2 and one of 110 ft2) Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 31 Door connecting to administration 3 hr complex Two doors connecting to area 114 3 hr Two rollup doors connecting to 3 hr area 114 (b) Major safety-related components in fire areas (1) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components:
- a. Main turbine stop valve position switches (2S-01-204A,B,C&D)
- b. Turbine control valve fast closure pressure switches (PS-01-202A,B,C&D)
(c) Postulated fire in areat Leakage of lube oil from the recirculation pump H-G sets onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Possible reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke generated by a fire in this area will activate the smoke detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. If the fire is in the area of the recirculation pump M-G sets, the pre-action sprinkler , system will provide automatic suppression of the fire. A rise in compartment temperature to 1900F will cause the deluge valve to open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. lh 5-218
r"'s LGS FPER Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.26 Fire Area 112: Turbine Enclosure HVAC Area and Equipment Compartment Exhaust Filter Area (El. 302'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-9): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Concrete masonry 3 hr unit E - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (-x3 (part) y ,/ S - Precast concrete None panels (part, exterior wall) W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains nsne two equipment hatches covered with steel plate, one of 75 ft2 and one of 110 ft2) Ceiling: Metal deck, non-reinforced UL Class A concrete, and built-up roofing Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 31 Steamtight door connecting 3 hr** to area 27 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: () Ignition of charcoal filters. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: 5-219
LGS FPER No effect on safety-related systems. O (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: In the event of a fire in one of the turbine enclosure equipment compartment exhaust filters, a heat detector inside the filter plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. The fire brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. No effect on safety-related systems will result from a fire in this area. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.8.27 Fire Area 113: Railroad Access Area and Generator Equipment Area (El. 217'-0" and 239'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire arca (see Figures B-6 and B-7): Construction Rating Walls: N - Retriforced concrete None and concrete masonry unit (exterior wall) E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (part) E - Concrete masonry 2 hr unit (part adjacent to area 100) S - Reinforced concrete 3 he and concrete masonry unit W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit (part) W - Concrete masonry 2 hr unit (part adjacent to area 87) Floor: Re'inforced concrete foundation 3 hr h mat 5-220 A
LGS FPER % O Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains - None a 1960 fta hatchway partially filled with grating) Access: Two doors connection to area 87 1.5 hr and two doors connecting to area 100 Removable metal panels connecting 2 hr to areas 87 and 100 Door connecting to areas 88, 90, 3 hr 91, 101, 103, and 104 Steamtight doors connecting to 3 hr** i to areas 2, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, and stairwell no. 7 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area Leakage of seal oil from the generator hydrogen seal oil units onto the floor of the compartment, with subsequent ignition of the oil. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: i A rise in compartment temperature to 1400F will cause l the deluge valve to open and prime the pre-action l sprinkler system with water. At 1650F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. In addition, a compartment temperature of 2120F will cause actuation of the deluge systems located over the generator hydrogen seal oil units. The plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire ares, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5-221
LGS FPER 5.8.28 Fire Area 114: Turbine Operating Floor (El. 269'-0") O (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures 7-8 and 7-9): Construction Rating Walls: N - Precast concrete Nene panels (exterior wall) E - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit W - Precast concrete None panels (exterior wall) Floort Reinforced concrete (contains None a 1960 ft2 hatchway partially filled with grating, plus 14 equipment hatches covered with steel plate) Ceiling- Metal deck, non-reinforced UL Class A concrete, and built-up roofing Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 32 and 33 Two doors connecting to area 3 hr 98 and two doors connecting to area 111 Two rollup doors connecting 3 hr to area 98 and two rollup doors connecting to area 111 Two steamtight doors connecting 3 hr** to area 24 and one steam-tight door connecting to stairwell no. 7 (b) Major safety-related components located in fire area-(1) Main condenser pressure transmitters (PT-01-1N075A,B,C&D) (2) Junction boxes containing cables associated with the following components:
- d. Main turbine first stage pressure transmitters (PT-01-1N052A,B,C&D) 5-222
( l () LGS FPER
- b. Main steam line pressure transmitters 1 (PT-01-1N076A,B,C&D)
(c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: (1) Possible reactor trip (2) Possible MSIV closure, with resultant reactor trip (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: The smoke and heat generated by a fire in this area will activate the early warning smoke and heat detectors, which will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to (~' g extinguish the fire. If the fire occurs under the turbine's appearance lagging, the pre-action sprinkler system will provide automatic suppression of the fire. At 1900F, the deluge valve will open and prime the pre-action sprinkler system with water. At 2120F, individual sprinkler heads will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. Depending on the severity and rate of spread of the fire, reactor trip and MSIV closure may be avoided. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. O 5-223
IGS FPER O TIIIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK 1 0 l 5-224
1 l O LGS FPER 5.9 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS - RADWASTE ENCLOSURE 5.9.1 Fire Area 115: Radwaste Pipe Tunnel (El. 183'-0", 187'-0", 191'-0", and 200'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-4 and B-5): Construction Ratina Walls: East wall at column line 27.4 None between columns J and Ka - Concrete masonry unit (contains piping penetrations without 3-hour rated seals) West wall near column line 18, None approx. 19 feet north of column line N, between elev. 200 and 205 feet - Steel plate (25 fta) \s / East wall near column line 28, approx. None 19 feet north of column line N, between elev. 200 and 205 feet - Steel plate (25 fta) North wall at 7.5 feet north of None column line J, between columns 19.4 and 23, and between elev. 200 and 217 feet - Concrete masonry unit (contains 2 HVAC duct penetrations without fire dampers) All other walls - Reinforced concrete 3 hr and concrete masonry unit Floor: Below zone 115D between column None lines 19.4 and 26.6 - Reinforced concrete (supported by structural steel members without fireproofing) Below all other portions of the fire 3 hr 4 area - Reinforced concrete foundation mat Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains 76 fta None O grating opening connecting to area 89) 5-225
LGS FPER Access: Door connecting to area 102 None Door connecting to area 118 3 hr (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.9.2 Fire Area 116: Miscellaneous Radwaste Equipment Areas (El. 162'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch filled with 49 ft2 of steel plate) Access: Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr 5-226
LGS FPER nos. 1 and 2 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated ' ire in area: (1) Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (2) Ignition of charcoal filters. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receivi2.g notification that a fire has occurred in this : I area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to [' extinguish the fire. In the event of a fire in the waste
' tank vent exhaust filter, a heat detector inside the filter i
plenum will cause an audible-visual annunciation to register l- on the fire protection panels in the control. The fire
- brigade will utilize a manual valve in the fire protection l water supply system to initiate operation of a water spray system inside the filter plenum. No effect on safety-related systems will result from a fire in this area.
(f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.9.3 Fire Area 117: Offgas Pipe Tunnel (El. 186'-0" and 187'-6") l ! (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-4): lO 5-227
LGS FPER Construction Rating Walls: West wall adjoining fire area None 119 - Reinforced concrete (contains piping penetrations without fire rated seals) North wall adjoining fire area 119, None at 3 feet north of column line H - Reinforced concrete and concrete masonry unit (contains piping penetrations without fire rated seals) All other walls - Reinforced concrete 3 hr Floor: Reinforced concrete foundation mat 3 hr Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported by None structural steel members without fireproofing). Access: Concrete hatch plugs None g (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Since no combustible materials are located in this area, the origin of a postulated fire is indeterminate. (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety -lated systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5-228
LGS FPER 5.9.4 Fire Area 118: Miscellaneous Radwaste Equipment Areas (El. 191'-0") l (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-5): ! Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr i W - Reinforced concrete None (part adjacent to area 119; containc piping and electrical penetrations without fire-rated seals and HVAC duct penetrations without fire dampers) l Floor: Reinforced concrete (contains None equipment hatch filled with 49 fta () Ceiling: of steel plate) Reinforced concrete (supported by None structural steel members without fireproofing) j Access: Door connecting to area 115 3 hr I Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 1 and 2 Door connecting to area 119 None ( ! (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: ( l None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. A (_,) (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: 5-229
LGS FPER Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.9.5 Fire Area 119: Offgas Equipment Areas (El. 195'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-5): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete None (contains piping and electrical penetrations without fire-rated seals and HVAC duct penetrations without fire dampers) S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr W - Reinforced concrete 3 hr , Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported None in some areas by structural steel members without fire-proofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 1 Door connecting to area 118 None (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: 5-230
P LGS FPER Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: , No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: Upon receiving notification that a fire has occurred in this area, the operator will dispatch the plant fire brigade to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems l will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. 5.9.6 Fire Area 120: Radwaste Control Room, Laboratories, Laundry, Decontamination and Change Areas, Waste Drum Storage Room, and Cask Loading Area (El. 217'-0") (a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figure B-6): Construction Ratina Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall) ! S - Reinforced concrete (part 2 hr l adjacent to stairwell no. 1) W - Reinforced concrete (contains None piping penetrations without fire-rated seals) Floor: Reinforced concrete (supported by None structural steel members without fireproofing) Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported by None
/) structural steel members without
(_ / fireproofing) 5-231
LGS FPER Access: Doors connecting to area 94 and 3 hr stairwell no. 4 Doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr nos. 2 and 3 Two doors to outside None Rollup door to outside None Open stairwell leading up None to area 121 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: If a fire occurs in the fire zones which are provided with smoke or heat detectors, the smoke and heat generated by the fire will activate the detectors, causing an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. If a fire occurs in the waste drum storage room and the temperature in that area rises to 2120F, individual fusible link sprinkler heads in the wet pipe sprinkler system will open to control and/or extinguish the fire. Again, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to ensure that the fire is extinguished. No effect on safety-related systems will result from a fire in this area. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. O 5-232 1
f)
\_/ LGS FPER 5.9.7 Fire Area 121: Centrifuge Rooms, Solid Radwaste Equipment Rooms, Ventilation Filter Compartments, and Supply and Exhaust Fan Areas (El. 237'-0" and 257'-0")
(a) Structural and architectural design features of fire area (see Figures B-7 and B-8): Construction Rating Walls: N - Reinforced concrete 3 hr E - Reinforced concrete 3 hr S - Reinforced concrete 3 hr (part, exterior wall) S - Reinforced concrete (part None adjacent to area 120 between elev. 237 and 257 feet; contains piping and electrical penetrations withcut fire-t rated seals) W - Reinforced concrete (part None adjacent to area 120 between elev. 237 and 257 feet; j contains piping penetrations without fire-rated seals) W - Reinforced concrete (part, None exterior wall above elev. 257 feet containing louvered openings) W - Reinforced concrete (part) 3 hr Floor Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) i Ceiling: Reinforced concrete (supported None by structural steel members without fireproofing) Access: Door ccnnecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 2 Two doors connecting to stairwell 1.5 hr no. 3 ' Open stairwell leading down to area None 120 (b) Major safety-related components in fire area: None (c) Postulated fire in area: 5-333
~ LGS FPER Ignition of electrical cabling in cable tray. (As discussed in Table A-3, the ignition of electrical cabling is extremely unlikely in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling.) (d) Consequences of fire without active fire suppression: No effect on safety-related systems. (e) Consequences of fire with active fire suppression: If a fire occurs in the fire tones which are provided with smoke detectors, the smoke generated by the fire will activate the detectors, causing an audible-visual annunciation to register on the fire protection panels in the control room. Once the alarm has been received in the control room, the plant fire brigade will be dispatched to extinguish the fire. No effect on safety-related systems will result from such a fire. (f) Effect of fire on safe shutdown: Since no equipment or cabling associated with shutdown methods A or B (as described in Section 5.2.2) is located in h this fire area, both of these methods will remain available to safely shut the plant down. O S-234
LGS FPER LEGEND FOR TABLE A-1 The information presented in each column of Table A-1 is explained as follows: Item No.: Identification code for fire areas and fire zones. Fire zones with identification codes beginning with the same number are located in the same fire area. Structure & Elev.: Location of the fire area or fire zone, by structure and elevation. Locations are shown on drawings B-4 through B-12. Space Designated: Description of compartments included within the fire area or fire zone. Safety-Related: Indicates whether or not the fire area or zone contains safety-related equipment or electrical cabling. Area: Floor area of the fire area or fire zone. 7-s
-- Class: Fire classification as defined in NFPA 10, Section 1.3.
Quantity: . Quantity of combustible material located within the fire Area or zone, by weight for solids and by volume for liquids. Combustible Loading: Equivalent weight of all combustible material within a fire area or zone, in pounds of wood per square foot of floor area. Equivalent Severity: A normalization of standard time-temperature curves based on the combustible loading in a fire area or fire zone (as described in Section 4.2). Structural Fire Rating in hours based on the type of Resistance Rating: construction of each wall, floor, and ceiling that forms part of the boundary of a fire area or fire zone. (The ratings listed in this table apply to the major portion of the boundary on each side of a fire area or fire zone. In [) A ,/ those cases where the boundary on one side of a fire area consists of segments j with different types of construction, A-1
I 1 LGS FPER , small areas with lower fire ratings or zero fire ratings may exist. For a more detailed description of the ratings of the boundaries of the various fire areas, refer to the fire area discussions contained in Sections 5.3 through 5.9). Detection Type of fire detectors and number of Capability: detectors provided in the fire area or zone. Unless indicated otherwise, all smoke detectors are of the ionization type. Suppression Type of fire suppression system and Capability: method of actuation in the fire area or zone. O O A-2
ITEM SAFETY- ARE *. NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RFLATED (sq ft) MA1 1A Control 160-0 Corridor 164 No F30 None IB Corridor 166 No 500 Cable ir 1C Recombiner room 154 No 670 None ID Recombiner room 155 No 670 None 1E Future recombiner room 153 No 670 None IF Future recombiner room 156 No 670 None 1G Backwash receiving tank room 163 No 680 Cable ir th Backwash receiving tank room 157 No 680 Cable ir 1J Backwash transfcr pump room 161 & 162 No 360 Cable in 1K Backwash transfer pump rooms 150 & 159 No 360 Cable in IL " 200-0 Control structure chillers and chilled Yes 2200 Cable in water pump area 258 1H ' " Control structure chillers and chilled Yes 2200 Cable in water pump area 263 IN Recombiner access area 259 Yes 1405 None 2 217-0 13-kV switchgear area 336 Yes 6570 Cable in 3 Batte y room 323 Yes 144 Battery 4 Battery room 324 Yes 128 Cable in Battery 5 Battery room 360 Yes 144 Battery 6 Battery room 361 Yes 144 Battery 7 239-0 Corridor 437 Yes 528 Cable ir 8 " Battery room 425 Yes 470 Battery
1 c - LGS FPER SHEET 1 of 17 TABLE A-1 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT HESISTANCE kATING SUPPRESSION CAPA8ILITY
-CAPMILITY SEVERITY ERIAL CLASS QUANTITY LOADI])
(1b/ft (Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION
- - - - 0 0 0 3 0 3 - -
Hose station Manual sulation C 150 lb 0.37 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual f sulation C 782 lb 1.43 9 0 3 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual sulatten C 782 lb 1.43 9 0 3 3 0 0 $ - - Hose. station Manual sulation C 350 lb 1.21 8 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual sulation C 350 lb 1.21 8 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual sulation C 749 lb 0.42 3 0 0 0 3 3'0 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual sulation C 749 lb 0.42 3 0 0 3 0 3 0 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual
- - - - 3 u3 2 3 0 - - Hose station Manual Tulation C 8736 lb 1.65 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 34 CO2 hose reel Manual .ases A 30 lb 0.36 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reet Manual Heat I ulation C 83 lb 1.22 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual ases A 30 lb Heat 1 ases A 30 lb 0.36 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual Heat 1 (ases A 30 lb 0.36 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual Heat 1 ,
tulation C 2246 lb 5.29 32 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 5 Hose station Manual ases A 120 lb 0.45 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 1 I i
*N . %
ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGhATED RELATED (sq ft) MATERI d Control 239-0 Battery room 436 Yes 470 Battery cas 10 Battery room 426 Yes 468 Battery ca: 11 Battery room 427 Yes 442 Battery ca2 12 4-kV switchgear compartment 434 Yes 470 Cable insul 13 4-kV switchgear compartment 435 Yes 470 Calle insul 14 4-kV switchgear compartment 432 Yes 400 Cable insul 15 4-kV switchgear compartment 433 Yes 400 Cable insul 16 4-kV switchgear compartment 430 Yes 400 Cahle insul 17 4-kV switchgear compartment 431 Yes 400 Cable insul 18 4-kV switchgear compartment 428 Yes 470 Cable insul 19 4-kV switchgear compartment 429 Yes 470 Cable inal 20 254-0 Static inverter room unit 1. area 452 Yes 715 Cable insul 21 Static inverter room unit 2, area 453 Yes 1000 Cable insul 22 Cable spreading room unit 1 Yes 2610 Cable insul 23 Cable spreading room unit 2 Yes 2610 Cable insul 24A 269-0 Control room 533 Yes 5208 Cable insul
LGS FPER SHEET 2 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAIARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY L CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) (Ib/ft (Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATIUN ts A 120 lb 0.45 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station hanual Heat 1 ts A 120 lb 0.45 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual Heat 3 ts A 120 lb 0.48 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 1 ition C 250 lb 0.66 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manu:1 i Heat 2 . ition C 167 lb 0.44 3 3 3 3 3_ 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 2 ition C 250 lb 0.78 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station hanual Heat 2 ition C 167 lb 0.52 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 2 btion C 250 lb 0.78 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manuel Heat 2 ition C 167 lb 0.52 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 2 ition C 250 lb 0.66 4 1 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual Heat 2 ption C 167 lb 0.44 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual I Heat 2 \ tion C 9558 lb 16.63 128 2 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual
; tion C 11814 lb 14.69 115 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 6 Hose station Manual
- tion C 35526 lb 16.93 130 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 14 CO2 total flood Automatic Bion C 35526 lb 16.93 1 30 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 14 CO2 total flood Automatic
, tion C 4327 lb 1.03 7 3 3 1 1 3 3 Smoke 23(1) CO2 hose reel Manual Smoke 10(2) -= , . - . . , , -e nr- w- e.----- - . - . . . - -. ,, e .-- - ,- . - - - . - -
*% m ITEM SAFETY- AREA No. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DES!GNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER 24B Control 269-0 Control room utility room 529 Yes 224 None 24C Control room office 531 Yes 256 None 24D Control room shift supt. 532 Yes 320 None 24E Control room shop 534 Yes 256 None 24f Control room instrument lab 535 Yes 384 None 25A 289-0 Auxiliary equipment room 542 Yes 6676 Cable insul 258 Remote shutdown panel area 540 Yes 192 None 27 304-0 Control structure fan room 619 Yes 6450 Cable insul Charcoal 2BA 332-0 SGTS access area 625 Yes 5450 Charcoal 288 332-0 SGTS filter compartment 624 Yes 1872 Charcoal 28C Control room fresh air intake plenum Yes 320 None 29A Unit 1 181-11 Suppression chamber 101 Yes 5464 None primary centaiment 29b Supression chamber inside pedestal Yes 314 None 29C 217-0 Drywell drain sump area Yes 314 None 30A 237-11 Drywell area 400 Yes 2865 Cable insul.
Lubricating J)B Drywell inside pedestal Yes 661 Cable insul, vw
LGS FPER SHEET 3 of 17 TABLEA-1(Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPA8ILITY LOADINQ SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY (lb/ft'). (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 0 3 3 1 1 3 Smoke 1 C02 hose reel Manual 0 0 3 1 1 3 Smoke 1- CO2 hose reel Manual 3 0 3 1 1 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual 0 3 1 3 1 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual (Photo-Elect) 2 0 1 3 1 3 Smoke 1 CO2 hose reel Manual l (Photo-Elect) Jtion C 16640 lb 3.10 20 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 27(3) 3 Halon (raised fir) Automatic Smoke 23(4) 2 0 0 3 3 3 Smoke 1 Halon (ritsed fir) Automatic Smoke 2 . st f on C 250 lb 2.24 14 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 10 Filter water Manual A 8750 lb Heat 2 spray system (inside plenum) A 3435 lb 1.02 8 0 3 3 3 3 3 Heat 2 Filter water Manual (inside spray system , plenum) } A 20000 lb 17.25 130 0 0 0 0 0 3 Heat 2 Filter water Manual (inside spray system plenum) 0 0 0 2 3 3 Smoke 3 - - 6 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual i 1 0 0 0 0 0 ' 3 - - - - 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 91on C 3328 lb 2.14 12 3 3 3 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual Gil B 108 gal Gion C 4992 lb 9.39 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hose station Manual ; } i k f I i l 2
^m ITEM SAFETY- AREA h0. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATERI) 31 Unit 1 177-0 RHR heat exchanger & pump room 103 Yes 2050 Lubricating reactor Cable insuli 32 RHR heat exchanger & punp ro'.n 102 Yes 1700 Lubricating Cable insuli 33 RCIC pump room 108 Yes 600 Lubricating Cable insuli 34 HPCI pump room 109 Yes 1100 Lubricating Cable insuli 35 Core spray pump room 110 Yes 575 Lubricating Cable insuli 36 Core spray pump room 113 Yes 600 Lubricating Cable insuli 37 Core spray pump room 114 Yes 600 Lubricating Cable insula 38 Core spray pump room 117 Yes 575 Lubricating Cable insula 39 Sump room 115; passageway 118 Yes 1700 Lubricants Cable insula 40 Corridor 111 Yes 525 Cable insula 41 201-0 RECW equipment area 207 Yes 4020 Lubricants Cable insula 42A Safeguard system access area 200 Yes 3178 Cable insula 42B Isolation valve compartment 209 Yes 280 None 43 217-0 Safeguard system isolation valve area 309 Yes 2350 Cable insula 44 Safeguard system access area 304 Yes 8930 Cable insula 45A 253-0 CRD hydraulic equipment area 402 Yes 12860 Cable insula v w
LGS FPER SHEET 4 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSilBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPkESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY LOADIhg' .L CLASS QUANTITY (lb/ft s (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION sil B 72 gal 0.85 6 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual tion C 333 lb 211 B 72 gal 1.02 8 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual tion C 333 lb 311 B 80 gal 2.79 18 3 2 3 3 0 3 Smoke 3 Pre-actio.* Automatic tion C 167 lb sprinkler systerr 311 B 155 gal 2.77 18 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 3 Pre-action Automatic tion C 167 lb sprinkler system 311 B 24 gal 1.13 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual tion C 167 lb 211 B 24 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual tion C 167 Ib 211 B 24 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual tion C 167 lb E11 B 24 gal 1.13 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual tion C 167 lb , B hegligible 0.37 5 3 3 3 3 3 3
, Smoke I hose station Manual tion C 499 lb tion C Negligible (0.1 -
2 3 3 3 3 3 - - Hose station Manual B 0.25 gal 0.73 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 , Smoke 3 Hose station Manual tion C 2330 lb tion C 3578 lb 1.40 9 3 2 3 3 3 3 Smoke 3 Hose sta Q n Manual 3 3 3 0 3 3 - - Hose station Manual tion C 2912 lb 1.54 10 3 3 3 3 3 0 Smoke 10 Hose station Manual tion C 28290 lb 3.94 22 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 25 Hose station Manual l ion t C 17306 lb 1.67 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 19 Sprinkler system Autamatic (partial) 4
l i
%.d -
i i
\ \
s 1 1
\..
s t i ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATEI 45B! Unit 1 253-0 Neutron monitoring system area 406 Yes 630 Cable insi
'i reactor 45C ' - CRD repair room 403 No 785 None 46 Main steam tunnel Yes 384 None 47A ' 283-0 Corridor 506; general equipment area 500 Yes 9800 Cable inst 478 "
295-3 Isolation valve compartment 518 Yes 750 Cable inso 47C 283-0 Fuel pool cooling water pump and heat No 1660 Cable inst
, / exchanger area 511 ,
470 Isolation valve compartment 510 Yes 580 None
)
RWCU pump rocs /509 47E No 160 None 47F RWCU pump roam 508 No 130 None 47G RWCU pump room 507 No 145 None 47H Non-regen heat exchanger area 505 No 420 None 47J Non-regen heat exchanger area 504 No 420 None 47K Regen heat exchanger area 503 No 420 None 47L RWCU backwash receiving tank area 502 No 400 None 47M Isolation valve compart:aent 501 Yes 470 None 48A 3i3-0 Laydewn areas 601 and 602; corridor Yes 6500 Cable insu and RERS fan area 605
- 48B RWCU holding pump compartment No 216 None 48C RWCU holding pump compartment No 216 None 49 Reactor enclosure lower fan room 607 No 4320 Cable insu I
DJA 331-0 Reactor enclosure upper f an room 615 No 2416 None s v W
LGS FPER SHEET 5 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY IAL CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) (Ib/ft (Minutes) N 5 E W UP'DN TYPE NO. TYPF ACTUATION 1ation C 1331 lb 2.63 16 0 0 0 3 0 3 Smoke 5 Hose station Manual 0 2 0 3 0 3 $ soke 1 Hose station- Manual 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual lation C 17971 lb 2.28 14 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 20 Sprinkler system Automatic (partial) lation C 1248 lb 2.07 12 3 3 0 0 3 3 Smoke 2 hose station Manual lation C 1498 lb 1.12 7 0 0 3 0 0 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual 0 0 3 0 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual lation C 3744 lb 0.72 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 8 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 - - Hose station Manual lation C 624 lb 0.18 1 3 0 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 3 3 3 0 - - Hose station Manual
, _ . , _ , . _ . m.. _
%-J ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGhATED RELATEDL (sq ft) MATERf 50B Unit 1 331-0 Equipment compartment exhaust filter No 468 Charcoal reactor room 616 50C Equipment compartnent exhaust filter No 468 Charcoal room 617 51A " "
RERS filter compartment 618 Yes 720 Charcoal 51B RERS filter compartment 618 Yes 720 Charcoal 52A Unit 2 181-11 Suppression chamber 172 Yes 5464 Mone primary containment 528 " " Suppression chamber inside pedestal Yes 314 None 52C 217-0 Drywell drain sump area Yes 314 None 53A " 237-11 Drywell area 473 Yes 2865 Cable insut Lubricating 538 Drywell inside pedestal Yes 661 Cable insul 54 Unit 2 177-0 RHR heat exchanger & pump room 173 Yes 2050 Lubricating reactor Cable insul 55 RHR heat exchanger & pump room 174 Yes 1700 Lubricating Cable insul
, 5b " "
RCIC pump room 179 Yes 600 Lubricating Cable insul 57 HPCI pump room 180 Yes 1100 Lubricating Cable insul 5b " " Core spray pump room 181 Yes 575 Lubricating Cable insul v ~ro
w - LGS FPER SHEET 6 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE E'JUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY LOADING SEVERITY LL CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft 2) (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATIUN A 11175 lb 38.56 310 3 0 0 3 3 0 heat 1 Filter water Manual (inside spray system plenum) A 11175 lb 38.56 310 3 0 0 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) A 5000 lb 11.22 80 3 3 0 3 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) A 5000 lb 11.22 80 3 3 3 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - stion C 3328 lb 2.14 12 3 3 3 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 1:11 B 108 gal tion C 4992 lb 9.39 65 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual l oil B 72 gal 0.82 6 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual ytton C 291 lb oil B 72 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual ition C 416 lb loil B 80 gal 2.79 18 3 2 3 3 0 3 Smoke 3 Pre-action Automatic ? tion C 167 lb sprinkler system loil B 155 gal 2.77 18 3 3 3 3 0 3 Smoke 3 Pre-action Automatic
- tiin C 167 lb sprinkler system i
gil B 24 gal 1.13 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual g tton C 167 lb l
~ ~ - . ~ . .- - .. ---
O~ m f 1 ( j L SAFETY- AREA ITEM SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. 59 Unit 2 177-0 Core spray pump room 184 Yes 600 Lubricatin reactor Cable ina 60
" " Core spray pump room 185 Yes 600 Lubricatin Cable insu bl " " Core spray pump room 188 Yes 575 Lubricatin Cable insu 62 " " Sump room 166; passageway 189 Yes 1700 Lubricants Cable insu 63 Corridor 182 Yes $25 Cable insu 64A 201-0 RECW equipment area 284 Yes 4020 Lubricants Cable insu 648 " " Isolation valve compartment 286 Yes 280 None Safeguard system access area 279 Yes 3178 Cable insu
( 65 66 217-0 Safeguard system sccess area 376 Yes 2350 Cable insu 67 Safeguard system access area 370 Yes 8930 Cable insu 68A 253-0 CRD hydraulic equipment area 475 Yes 12860 Cable insu 6BB
" " Neutron monitoring system area 479 Yes 630 Cable insu " " CR0 repair room 476 Yes 785 None 68C Main steam tunnel Yes 384 None 69 70A 283-0 Corridor 580; general equipment area 574 Yes 9800 Cable insu 295-3 Isolation valve compartment 587 Yes 750 Cable inso 708 70C 283-0 f uel pool cooling water pump and heat No 1660 Cable inst exchanger area 585 " " Isolation valve compartment 584 Yes 580 None 700 v w
i e , --
- LGS FPER SHEET 7 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd)
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION F?RE HAZARD COM8USTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY 'AL CLASS QUANTIT_Y LOADINj) (1b/ft (Minutes)_ N S E W UP ON TYPE NO. TYFE AC1UAT10N cil B 24 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual (Gion C 167 lb
. cil B 24 gal 1.08 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual <
Ction C 167 lb cil 8 24 lb 1.13 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual lCtion C 167 lb B Negligible 0.37 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual ,atton C 499 lb a? ' sn C Negligible <0.1 - 2 3 3 3 3 3 - - Hose statien Manual B 0.25 gal 0.91 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual a? ion C 1912 lb , 3 3 3 0 3 3 - - Hose stattan Manual atirn C 3578 lb 1.40 9 3 2 3 3 3 3 Smoke 3 Hose station Manual atton C 3203 lb 1.69 10 3 3 3 3 3 0 Smoke 10 Hose station Manual ation C 31117 lb 4.34 26 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 25 Hose station Manual atton C 15559 lb 1.51 10 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 19 Sprinkler system Automatic (partial) .atito C 1498 lb 2.96 18 3 0 0 3 0 3 Smoke 5 Hose station Manual
- - - - 0 2 3 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual - - - - 3 3 3 3 0 3 - -
Hose station Manual
- ation C 17056 lb 2.17 14 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 20 Sprinkler tytem Automatic (partial)
,ation C 1380 lb 2.28 14 3 3 0 0 3 3 Smoke 2 Hose station Manual ,ation C 1647 lb 1.23 9 0 0 0 3 0 3 Smoke 2 Hose station hanual
- - - - 0 0 0 3 3 3 Smoke 2 hose station Manual i
I
r c% ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MA1 70E Unit 2 283-0 RWCU pump room 583 No 160 None reactor 70F RWCU psnp room 582 No 130 None 706 RWCU pump room 581 No 145 None 70H Non-regen heat exchanger area 579 No 420 None 70J Non-regen heat exchanger area 578 No 420 None 70K Regen heat exchanger area 577 No 420 Ncne 70L Backwash receiving tank area 576 No 400 None 70M Valve compartment 575 Yes 470 None 71A " 313-0 Laydown areas 637 and 638; corridor Yes 6500 Cable ir and RERS f an area 641 71B RWCU holding pump compartment No 216 None 71C r'WCU holding pump compartment No 216 None 72 Reactor enclosure lower fan room 643 No 4320 Cable ir 73A 331-0 Reactor enclosure upper fan room 647 No 2416 None 73B Equipment compartment exhaust filter No 468 Charcoal room 648 730 " " Equipment compartment exhaust filter No 468 Charcoal room 649 74A " " Recirc filter compartment 651 Yes 720 Charccel 74B Recirc filter compartment 651 Yes 720 Charcoal 75 Common 198-0 Service water pipe tunnel Yes 3840 None reactor l
-~
\
LGS FPER SHEET 8 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZAR3 COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY ERIAL CLASS QUANTITY LOADI}t) (1b/f (Minutest N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUAT10h 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual
- - - - 0 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 3 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual Julation C 4119 lb 0.79 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 Smoke 8 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 - -
Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 3 3 - - Hose station Manual
;ulation C 705 lb 0.20 1 3 0 3 3 0 3 - -
Hose station Manual
- - - - 3 3 3 3 3 0 - -
hose station Manual A 11175 lb 38.56 310 3 0 3 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) A 11175 lb 38.56 310 3 0 0 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) A 5000 lb 11.22 80 3 3 3 0 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum) A 5000 lb 11.22 60 3 3 0 3 3 0 Heat 1 Filter water spray Manual (inside system plenum)
- - - -' 3 3 3 3 3 3 - -
Hose station Manual I p q"ma w- -- w- -
m /=e. ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MAT 7b Common 217-0 Refueling hoistway No 960 None reactor 77 - South exhaust stack No 620 None 78A 352-0 Refueling area Yes 16640 None 788 Shower and dressing area 701 No 3500 None 78C Shower and dressing area 709 No 3500 None 79 Diesel- 217-0 Diesel-generator cell unit 1 Yes 1765 Fuel oil generator Lubricatin-Cable ins! 80 " Diesel-generator cell unit 1 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatini Cable ins! 81 ' " Diesel-generator cell unit 1 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatin< Cable insu 82 " " Diesel-generator cell unit 1 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatina Cable insu 63 " " Diesel-generator cell unit 2 Yes 1765 Fuel oil tubricatini Cable insu 64 " Diesel-generator cell unit 2 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatinc Cable insu i 85 * " Diesel-generator cell unit 2 Yes 1765 Fuel oil Lubricatins Cable insu' 86 " Diesel-generator cell unit 2 Yes 1765 fuel oil Lubricatins Cable insui 87 Unit 1 189-0 Condensate pump room 256 No 1590 Cable insul turbine
-w
I LGS FPER TABLE 8.-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAlARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY IAL CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft LOADING) (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - 3 3 3 3 3 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 2 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 2 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action i oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic atton C 666 lb Heat 1 8 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action i oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C 666 lb Heat 1 8 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action ioil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic atton C 666 lb Heat 1 B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action i oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C 666 lb Heat 1 B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic Ction C 666 lb Heat 1 8 800 gal 11.15 70 3 C 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action oil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic lction 666 lb Heat 1 B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action oil B 250 gal smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic Stion C 666 lb Heat 1 B 800 gal 11.15 70 3 0 3 3 3 3 Flame 1 Pre-action cil B 250 gal Smoke 4 Sprinkler system Automatic
'tton C (66 lb Heat 1 tion C 1165 lh 0.91 6 3 3 2 3 0 3 - -
Hose station Manual
ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER) BSA Unit 1 200-0 Condenser area 254 and feedwater heater No 12334 Cable insul turbine 239-0 service area 438 888 Feedwater heater room 441 No 2220 Cable insul B8C Feedwater heater room 440 No 2220 None 88D Feedwater heater room 439 No 2220 None 69A 200-0 Control rod drive water pump area 252 No 9275 Lubricating and lube oil reservoir areas 260, 261, Cable insul and 262 (area contains 3 reservoirs 0 1000 gal each) 89B Condensate filter demineralizer No 2240 Cable insul compartments 90 217-0 Air ejector and steam packing ho 1610 Cable insul exhauster compartment 333 91 Air ejector and steam packing No 1610 Cable insul exhauster compartment 334 92 Vacuum pump room 337 No 702 Cale insula 93 Air compressor area 328; EHC power unit ho 3420 Lubricating area 330; and lube oil storage tank Cable insul area 331 (area 331 contains 3 tanks W 16,000 gal each) 94A Reactor feed pump access area 325; No 11270 Cable insul control panel area 341 94B Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 340 No $70 None 94C Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 340 No 570 None 94D Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 340 No 570 None 95 239-0 MCC room 442; TECW equipment area No 3918 Lubricating 445; lube oil equipment room 446 Cable insul (room 446 contains lube oil reservoir) 96 Battery room 443 No 462 Battery cas vw
i l t LGS FPER SHEET 10 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft LOADING) (Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATIUN 4 atior C 28746 lb 2.90 18 0 0 3 3 0 0 - - Sprinkler system Automatic (partial) " stion C 1065 lb 0.60 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual oil B 3000 gal 5.94 32 3 3 3 3 0 0 Heat 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C Negligible (partial) stion C 1915 lb 1.% 7 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual
. tion C 125 lb 0.10 1 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ation C 108 lb 0.08 <1 3 3 3 3 0 3 - -
Hose station Manual tiin C 874 lb 1.55 10 3 3 3 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual oil B 48000 gal 258.50 1550 0 3 2 0 0 3 Heat 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C 2247 lb (partial) stion C 19261 lb 2.13 13 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual ! oil B 13800 gal 67.14 403 3 3 3 0 0 0 Heat 3 Sprinkler system Automatic htion C 7788 lb (partial) Deluge system Automatic (partial) A 240 lb 0.91 6 3 3 3 3 0 Smoke I hose station Manual Heat 1 i s r f t i f f I
I ITEM SAF ETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) __ MATER 97 Unit 1 239-0 Equipment hatch corridor 448 No 3132 Cable insu turbine 9BA 269-0 Recirc pump motor-generator area 548 No 13020 Lubricatin4 Cable insu 988 Feedwater heater room 547 No 880 None 98C feedwater heater room 546 No 880 None 98D Feedwater heater room 545 No B80 None 99A 302-0 Turbine enclosure HVAC area 620 No 13080 Cable insu 998 Turbine enclosure equipment compartment No 1228 Charcoal exhaust filter area 621 100 Unit 2 189-0 Condensate pump room 266 No 1590 Cable insul turbine 101A 200-0 Condenser area 268 and feedwater No 12334 Cable insul 239-0 heater service area 464 101B Feedwater heater room 458 No 2220 Cable insul 101C Feedwater heater room 457 No 2220 None 101D feedwater heater room 456 No 2220 None 102A " 200-0 Control rod drive water pump area 270 No 9275 Lubricatinc and lube oil reservoir areas 274, 275, Cable insul and 276 (trea Contains 3 reservoirs 91000 gal each) 102B Condensate filter demineralizer No 2240 Cable insul compartments 103 217-0 Air ejector and steam packing No 1610 Cable insul exhauster compartment 348 104 Air ejector and steam packing No 1610 Cable insul exhauster compartment 349 105 Vacuum pump room 350 No 702 Cable insu'
LGS FPER SHEET 11 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUST!BLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPAh!LITY LOADING SEVERITY 21 CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft 2) (Minutes) N 5 E W UP ON TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUAT!DN ation C 250 lb 0.10 1 3 3 3 0 0 0 .- - Hose station Manual oil B 3000 gal 5.82 35 0 3 3 0 0 0 Smoke 13 Pre-action sprink- Automatic Cti n C 16640 lb ler system (partial) 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual
- tion C 2746 lb 0.26 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual A 40000 lb 52.61 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 2 Filter water Manual (inside spray system plenum) -
ation C 1165 lb 0.91 6 3 3 3 2 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ation C 28746 lb 2.90 18 0 0 3 3 0 0 - - Sprinkler system Automatic (partial) ation C 1065 lb 0.60 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual oli 8 3000 gal 5.94 32 3 3 3 3 0 0 Heat 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ation C Negligible (partial) ation C 1915 lb 1.06 7 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ation C 125 lb 0.10 1 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ation C 108 lb 0.08 <1 3 3 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ation C 874 lb 1.55 10 3 3 3 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual
mm ITLM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATERI, 106 Unit 2 217-0 Air compressor area 357; EHC power No 3420 LubricatinJ turLine unit area 358; and lube oil storage Cable insul tank area 356 (area 356 contains 3 tanks 9 16,000 gal each) 107A Reactor feed pump access area 346; No 11270 Cable insul control panel area 354 107B Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 353 No 570 None 107C Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 353 ha 570 None 107D Reactor feed pump turbine compartment 353 No 570 None 108 239-0 MCC room 459; TECW equiment area 461; No 3918 Lubricating lube oil equipment room 463 (room 463 Cabne insul contains lube oil reservoir) 109 " " Battery room 460 No 462 Battery cas 110 Equipment hatch corridor 466 No 3132 Cable insul 111A " 269-0 Recirc pump motor-generator area 564 No 13020 Lubricating Cable insul 111B feedwater heater room 561 No 880 None IllC " Feedwater heater room 560 No B80 None 1110 " feedwater heater room 559 No 880 None ll2A " 302-0 Turbine enclosure HVAC area 628 No 13080 Cable insul ll2B " " Turbine enclosure equipment compartment No 1228 Charcoal exhaust filter area 629 Il3A Lommon 217-0 Railroad access area 335 No 7632 Cable insul turbine 1138 239-0 Generator equipment areas 44/ and 465 No 16310 Cable insul Seal oil w w
LGS FPER SHEET 12 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY LL CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) (1b/ft (Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATIUN oil B 48000 gal 258.13 1550 0 3 0 3 0 3 Heat 4 Sprinkler system Automatic ition C 1248 lb (partial) ition C 19261 lb 2.13 13 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - Hose station hanual
- - - - 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual - - - - 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual oli B 13800 gal 67.14 403 3 3 0 3 0 0 Heat 3 Sprinkler system Automatic ition C 7788 lb (partial)
Deluge system Automatic (partial) es A 240 lb 0.91 6 3 3 3 3 3 0 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual Heat 1 ition C 250 lb 0.10 1 3 3 0 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual oil B 3000 gal 5.82 35 0 3 0 3 0 0 Smoke 13 Pre-action sprink- Automatic ition C 16640 lb 1er system (partial) 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual stion C- 2746 lb 0.26 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 Smoke 1 Hose station Manual A 40000 lb 52.61 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 2 Filter water Manual (inside spray system plenum) stion C 9936 lb 1.6' 10 0 3 3 3 0 3 - - Pre-action Automatic sprinkler systta ition C 36452 lb 3.98 23 0 3 3 3 0 0 - - Pre-action Automatic B 1060 gal sprinkler system Deluge s stem Automatic (partial l 5 i f i s . e
c -
*% m ITEM SAFETY- AREA h0. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER:
114 Connon 269-0 Operating floor for units 1 and 2 No 45800 Cable insul turbine libA Tunnel 187-0 Radwaste pipe tunnel No 1280 None 115B Radwaste pipe tunnel No 1790 None ll5C " 183-0 Radwaste pipe tunnel No 1680 None 115D 191-0 Radwaste pipe tunnel No 510 None 116A Raowaste 162-0 Pipe tunnel access No 590 None ll6B " " Corridor 135 No 10 % Cable insu 116C Corridor 149 No 496 Cable insu 1160 Corridor 152 and MCC room 145 No 318 Cable insu (x ll6E " " Waste sludge ptsnp room 124 No 288 None ll6F " " Waste sludge tank room 123 No 576 None ll6G " " Condensate decant pump room 126 No 240 None 116H Condensate sludge disch pump room 127 No 198 Cableinsu{ ll6J " " Condensate phase separator room 125 No 800 None 116K Condensate sludge disch pump room 129 No 192 None ll6L " " Condensate decant pump room 130 No 240 None - Il6M " Condensate phase separator room 128 No 800 None 116h Chemical waste tank pump room 137 No 144 hone ll6P " " Chemical waste tank room 136 No 144 None 116Q Equip. drain collection tank room 131 No B64 None ll6R " " Equip. drain collection pump room 132 No 320 None 1165 Floor drain collection and sample tank No 1824 Cable insull roora 134 and pump room 133 a l_
T
^
LGS FPER SHEET 13 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE OETECTION FIRE HAZAR0 COMBbTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) (Ib/ft ' Minutes) N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPF ACTUATION ction C 8320 lb 0.23 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 Heat 8 Pre-action Automatic Smoke 2 sprinkler system (partial) 3 0 0 3 0 3 - - - - 3 3 0 0 0 3 - - - - 0 3 0 3 0 0 - - - - 0 3 3 3 0 0 - - - - 3 0 3 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual atitn C 1539 lb 1.75 11 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ition C 166 lb 0.42 3 0 0 0 2 0 3 - - Hosest5 tion Manu11 iti:n C 957 lb 3.74 23 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual ition C 208 lb 1.31 8 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Ibse station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 2 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual tion C 524 lb 0.36 3 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual
r sw a ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATEE 116T Radwaste 162-0 Floor drain spent resin pump res 138 & 139 No 394 Cable ins! 116U Floor & equip, drain spent resin pump No 220 None room 140 ll6V " " RWCU decant pump room 142 No 242 Cable ins 2 116W RWCU phase separator room 141 No 320 None libX " RWCU sludge disch mixing pump room 144 No 253 Cable insI ll6Y " RWCU phase separator room 143 No 320 None 1162 Equip. & floor drain sump and pump No 206 Cable ins! room 146 Charcoal ll6AA " Equipment drain sample room 147 No 400 Cable insi ll6BB " " Equipment drain sample tank room 148 No 990 Cable insI 117 187-b Offgas pipe tunnel No 880 None 118A. 191-0 Pipeway 221 No 384 None 118B " " Corridors 213 and 235; fuel pool F/0 No 2721 Cable insI precoat area ll8C " Corridor 246 No 4% Cable ins 1 1180 Laundry drain tank and pump room 228 No 792 Cable insI ll8E " " Evaporator pump room 231 No 288 Cable ins 1 I ll8F " " Evaporator pump room 232 No 240 Cable insi ll8G Evaporator tank room 230 No 576 None libH " " Evaporator tank room 234 No 250 None i ll8J " " Evaporator tank room 233 No 250 None 118K Control panel area No 220 Cable insu 118L Evaporator and condenser room 242 No 400 Cable insu 118M Evaporator and condenser room 243 No 384 None l
%/ %
i
.. ._ s LGS FPER SHEET 14 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd)
STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION C!PABILITY SEVERITY
- AL CLASS QUANTITY (Ib/ft LOADING) MINUTES N 5 E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION lation C 125 lb 0.39 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 - -
Hose station Manual 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual lati:n C 125 lb 0.64 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 2 0 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual lation C 125 lb 0.61 4 0 3 0 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 0 3 0 3 - - Hose station Manual lation C 125 lb 4.60 28 0 0 3 0 0 3 Heat 1 Filter water Manual A 491 lb (inside spray system plenun) lation C 83 lb 0.26 2 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual lation C 25 lb 0.03 <1 0 3 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual 3 0 3 0 0 3 - - - - 3 0 3 0 0 3 - - Hose station Manual
; tion C 6323 lb 2.89 18 0 0 3 0 0 0 - -
Hose station Manual ation C 125 lb 0.31 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 - - Kose station Manual 4 tion C 275 lb 0.43 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 83 lb 0.36 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual attin C 316 lb 1.64 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 483 lb 2.73 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 441 lb 1.37 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual
%.- v ITEM SAFETY- AREA NO. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATEE 118N Radwaste 191-0 Chemical addition room 244 No 432 None 11bP Fuel pool holding pump compartments 236 No 160 Noner 118Q Fuel pool filter demin. compartment 239A No 190 Cat,1e inst 11BR Fuel pool filter demin. compartment 239B No 165 Cable insa 1185 Fuel pool filter demin. compartment 239C No 165 Cable insa 118T Floor and equipment drain filter holding No 416 None pump rooms 237 & 238 118U " Floor drain filter compartment 240A No 158 Cable ins 3 118V Floor drain demineralizer compartment 240B No 168 Cable ins 3 118W Equipment drain demineralizer compartment No 180 Cable ins 3 2ilA 1;bX " " Equipment drain filter compartment 241B No 174 Cable ins 3 118Y Floor and equipment drain surge tank pump No 355 Cable ins 3 room 248 118Z Floor and equip. drain surge tank room 245 No 3200 None 119A 195-0 Corridor 214 and product storage area 225 No 4240 Cable insu 119B Offgas adsorber compartment No 800 Cable insu 119C Offgas adsorber compartment No 800 Cable inse 119D Offgas adsorber compartment No 800 Cable insu 119E Offgas adsorber vault No 192 None 119F Offgas adsorber vault No 192 None 119G Offgas adsorber vault No 192 None 119H Reboiler area 226 No 1536 None 120A 217-0 Corrider 419 No 720 Cable insu
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LGS FPER SHEET 15 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY LOADIN SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY (th/ft ) (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - rose station Manual ati:n C 166 lb 1.09 - 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ati:n C 166 lb 1.25 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 166 lb 1.25 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 166 lb 1.31 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Man;al ation C 183 lb 1.36 9 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station 'anual M etion C 191 lb 1.32 8 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 100 lb 0.71 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose s'.ation Manual ati::n C 166 lb 0.58 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 3 3 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 1664 lb 0.49 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - ation C 416 lb 0.65 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - Stion C 416 lb 0.65 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - Stton C 41b lb 0.65 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - - - 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - - - 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - - - 0 3 0 3 0 0 - - - -
- tion C 33 lb 0.06 <1 3 0 3 0 0 0 - -
Hose station Manual 1
; .M
liEM SAFETY- AREA
,30 STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER:
120B Radwaste 217-0 Toilet 413 No 80 None 120C Decontamination and change areas 414 and No 340 Cable insu' 414A 1200 " Raawaste control room 415 No 594 Cable insu' 120E Health physics 412 No 128 None 120F Clean clothes room 416 No 224 None 120G Laundry room 417 No 320 None 120H Counting room 410 No 160 None 120J Conventional chemical lab 411 No 280 None 120K Radiation chemical lab 418 No 400 None 120L " " Corridor 424 No 3442 Cable insu' 120M Waste drum storage room 420 No 376 None 120N Cask loading area 421; HSA & LSA fill No 3856 Cable insu' station 422; decontamination and monitoring station 423 121A
- 237-0 Air exhaust fan area 484 No 6320 Cable insu' 121B Filter room 485 No 480 None 121C Filter room 486 No 480 None 1210 " "
Solidification equipment room 472 No 220 None 121E Hopper room 471 No 80 None 121F Hopper room 470 No 80 None 121G Solidification equipment room 469 No 72 None 121H 257-0 Exhaust fan area 525 No 5937 Cable insul 121J Future equipment area 517 No 264 None
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i LGS FPER SHEET 16 of 17 TABLE A-1 (Cont'e) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION FIRL HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUPPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY AL CLASS QUANTITY LOADING) (1b/ft (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 50 lb 0.18 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual ation C 1747 lb 3.66 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 Smoke 4 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 3 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 Heat 1 Hose station Manual ation C 666 lb 0.24 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Sprinkler system Automatic stion C 582 lb 0.19 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manu11 stion C 998 lb 0.20 2 3 0 3 0 0 0 Smoke - Hose station Manual 3 0 0 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - Hose staion Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual 0 0 0 3 0 0 - - Hose station Manual Stion C 998 lb 0.21 2 3 0 3 3 0 0 Smoke 10 Hose station Manual 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual
ITEM SAF ETY- AREA No. STRUCTURE ELEV. SPACE DESIGNATED RELATED (sq ft) MATER 121K Radwaste 257-0 Centritage room 516 No 160 None 121L Centrifuge room 515 No 160 None 121M Air supply fan area 526 No 5004 Cable insu 122A Spray 268-0 ESW and RHRSW pump area Yes 1420 Lubricants pond pump Cable insu structure 122B " 237-0 Wet pit Yes 680 None 122C 251-0 ESW and RHRSW pipeway Yes 570 None 1220 268-0 Access hatch area Yes 544 None 122E 251-0 RHRSW valve compartment Yes 560 Cable insu 122F 237-0 RHRSW pipeway Yes 544 None 123A 268-0 ESW and RHRSW pump area Yes 1420 Lubricants Cable insu 123b " 237-0 Wet pit Yes 680 None 123C 251-0 ESW and RHRSW pipeway Yes 570 None 123D 268-0 Access hatch area Yes 544 None 123E 251-0 RHRSW valve compartment Yes 560 Cable insu 123F 237-0 RHRSW pipeway Yes 544 None (1) These smoke detectors are located below the suspended ceiling in the control room. (2) These smoke detectors are located aDove the suspended ceiling in the control room. (3) These smoke detectors are installed below the ceiling in the auxiliary equipment room. (4) The smoke detectors are installed below the raised floor in the auxiliary equipment room, and do not include the smoke detectors inside the PGCC floor sections. ww
4 LC3 FPER SHEET 17 of 17 TA8LE A-1 (Cont'd) STRUCTURAL FIRE DETECTION. FIRE HAZARD COMBUSTIBLE EQUIVALENT RESISTANCE RATING CAPABILITY SUFPRESSION CAPABILITY SEVERITY lAL CLASS . QUANTITY LOADING) (Ib/ft (Minutes) N S E W UP DN TYPE NO. TYPE ACTUATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 - '. Hose station Manuel 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - Hose station Manual lation C 557 lb 0.14 1- 0 3 3 0 0 0 - - hose station Manual-B Negligible 0.22 2 0 0 3 0 3 0 Smoke 4 - - lation C 250 lb 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - - - 0 0 3 O 3 - - - -
- - - - 0 0 0 3 3 0 - - - -
lation C 258 lb 0.57 4- 0 0 0 3 0 0 Smoke 2 - -
- - - - 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - - -
i B Negligible 0.22 2 0 0 0 3 3 0 Smoke 4 - - lation C 250 lb
- - . . 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - - - - - - - 0 0 0 3 0 3 - - - -
t 0 0 3 0 3 0 - - - - atior C 258 lb 0.57 4 0 0 3 0 0 0 Smoke 2 - - 0 0 3 0 0 3 - - - - s r D ) i b
8 d
~ ,i ' ~ " " '; LGS FPER m
2- , TABLE A-2
/
s HEAT'0F COMBUSTION VALUES 8 .: s ,.
.,s, . HEAT OF COMBUSTION MATERIAL (Btu /lb) . ~ Solids, Charcoal n. 12,920 Battery cases (butadiene acrylonitrile) 14,000 .Electrica}, cable insulation and 9,950 jacketing , ,,
! Liquids M
- . Lubricating oils and lubricants (1) 20,400
- n. .
l , t Fuel oil (1) 19,800 1 9 % j3)Oilh-is assumed to weigh 7.2 pounds per gallon-
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s- 1.; sa g , ' . - . . . -,,,,.--,---.,.--,.-,_..,_,.---.--,-.-..-,-,,-,,e.,..--- ao * - - - - . , , , , - - - - - , - - - , ,
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l l
' LGS FPER O. .
TABLE A ', (Page 1 of 3) INSULATION AND' JACKETING MATERIALS USED FOR ELECTRICAL CABLING CABLE APPLICATION INSULATION JACKETING Communication Polyvinyl chloride Polyvinyl chloride Lighting Thermoplastic (THHN, None THWN, on THW) Instrumentation Cross-linked Neoprene polyethylene Flamtrol (flame- Flamtrol retardant cross-linked ') polyolefin) Coaxial and triaxial Cross-linked Cross-linked polyolefin polyolefin 600V control Cross-linxed Neoprene O polyethylene Rubber ; Neoprene i Rockbestos P.ockbestos "Heatzone I" "Heatzone I" 600V power Cross-linked Neoprene polyethylene Ethylene propylene Hypalon rubber 5-kV and 15-kV Ethylene propylene Hypalon power rubber Ethylene propylene Semi-conducting rubber chlorinated polyethylene O I l
1 LGS FPER TABLE A-3 (Cont'd) (Page 2 of 3) CABLE APPLICATION INSUL TION JACKETING j Computer cables Cross-linked Neoprene polyethylene Rayolin F (cross-linked Flamtrol radiation-resistant polyolefin) Multi-conductor (1) Cross-linked Neoprene polyethylene Multi-conductor Cross-linked Neoprene or (shielded)(1) polyethylene or cross-linked cross-linked polyolefin modified polyolefin Twisted shielded Cross-linked Cross-linked pairs (1) polyalkene and poly- modified polyolefin vinylidene fluoride Thermocouple (1) Cross-linked Cross-linked O'i polyethylene polyethylene Coaxial (RG type)(1) Cross-linked Cross-linked polyethylene polyethylene Coaxial (twin Alkaneimide polymer Cross-linked , conductor)(1) cross-linked polyethylene l polyolefin i Coaxial (high Cross-linked Cross-linked temperature, polyethylene polyethylene radiation resistant)(1) i* I O l
LGS FPER TABLE A-3 (Cont'd) (Page 3 of 3) CABLE APPLICATION INSULATION JACKETING _ , Twisted pairs or Polyalkene and poly- Cross-linked twisted triples vinylidene fluoride polyvinylidene (high performance)(8) fluoride and cross-linked polyolefin i I (1)These cables are associated with the PGCC. (2) Insulation for lighting cables is specified as flame retardant in accordance with the National Electric Code. Insulation and jacketing for all other cables, with the exception of communications cables, are specified to meet the IEEE No. 383 flame test requirements. (3) Ignition of electrical cabling, in the absence of a fire source external to the cabling, is extremely unlikely. The consequences of an overload condition are minimized by conservative cable ratings and by the use of overload devices in power circuits and fault current interrupting i O devices in essentially all circuits. In addition, cable insulation and jacketing materials are chosen for their fire retardant and self-extinguishing properties, such l , that fuel contribution to a cable fire is minimized and propagation of a fire along cables is self-limiting. l O l l
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