ML20202E946: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(StriderTol Bot insert)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:' ..  $ .
    ..                                                                              1
                                U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                              REGION lil
                      Docket No:                50 331
                      License No:              DPR-49
                      Report No.                50 331/97017(DRP)
                      Licensee:                IES Utilities Inc.
                                                200 First Street S.E.
                                                P. O, Box 351
                                                Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-0351
i
                      Facility:                Duane Amold Energy Center
                      Location:                Palo, lows
                      Dates:                    November 11 December 22,1997
                    Inspectors:                C. Lips, Senior Resident inspector
                                                M. Kurth, Resident inspector
                      Approved by:              R. D. Lanksbury, Chief
                                                Reactor Projects Branch 5
        9002190093 990102
        PDR  ADOCK 03000331
        Q                PDR
  ~
                                                                                  _
 
,,  .
..
                                          EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
                                        Duane Amold Energy Center
                              t.'RC Inspection Report No. 50 331/g7017(DRP)
    This inspection report included resident inspectors' evaluation of aspects of licensee operations,
    eng'neering, maintenance, and plant support areas.
    Operations
    e      The licensee's completed and planned actions for cold weather protection were adequate
            to protect plant components and systems from cold weather. (Section 02.3)
    *      There was one instance of concom regarding operator attention to detsil during
            performance of routine surveillance testing. An operator did not question the
            unreasonably low filter train differential pressure during the standby gas treatment
            surveillance test. Otherwise, the conduc' of operations was professional and focussed on
            safety as evidenced by error free performance during infrequently performed evolutions.
            These infrequently performed evolutions included receipt of new fuel and emergent repair
            of a steam line draln. (Section 01.1)
    *      The licensee maintained the reactor core Isolation coolir.? system in the proper standby
            readiness condition. Minor discrepancies were promptly ruolved. (Section 02.2)
    Maintenance
    e      The inspectors identified that the licensee did not follow the procedural controls in the
            engineered maintenance action process for an activity where relay coils were replaced
            with those with a different voltage rating. (Section M1.2).
    e      The licensee promptly responded to 125 Vdc bettery charger problems. (Section M1.3)
    *      The licensee identified four examples where problems were encountered during routine
            planned maintenance. The causes appeared to be related to weak pre-job planning or
            new procedure revisions. T he inspectors concluded that problems were properiy hsndled
            es they came up. Hmever, these problems represented an increase in the number of
            work planning problems over that typically encounterei and resulted in safety-related
            equipment being out of service longer than necessar';. (Section M1.4)
    *      The licensee promptly resolved the emergent equipment issues that occurred during the
            period. Engineering department personnel provided appropriate support where
            requested. Maintenance activities were property prioritized and completed in a timely
            manner. (Section M2.1)
    Enaineerina
    e      The inspec. ors were concemed whh the licensee's performance in planning and
            implementing control building chiller 100 percent load testing. Specifically, the inspectors
            were concemed that the licensee did not perform a safety evaluation pdor to the test and
            did not have test controls in place during the test. (Section E1.1)
                                                        2
 
*, 4  ,
<.
  Plant Suncort
  e      The licensee's Respiratory Protection Program was inadequatoY implemented. Several
          individuals required to be quellflod to wear respirators had expired qualifications.
          (Section R5.1)
    e    The fire watch performed duties appropriately. The required areas were toured in the
          required times in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors had no -
          concoms. (Section F1)
                                                                                              i
                                                    3
              .                                                    . .    .
 
      *
            s.                                                                                                                                .
                                                                                                                                              l
    .  ,,
k
                                                          Resort Detalle
!-
'          Summary of Plant Status
                                                                                                                                              j
}-          The plant began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On December 5, igg 7, plant power
;          was reduced to approximately 80 percent for several hours to allow repair of a steam leak. The
            leak was in a steam line drain for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The plant
,          was operated at approximately 100 percent for the remainder of the period,
i
:                                                        l. Operations                                                                      ;
i                                                                                                                                              l
            01      Conduct of Operations                                                                                                  ,
:                                                                                                                                            l
          - O ', ,1  General Comments (71707)
'
I            a.      Inacection Scone
!
'
                      The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 and conducted
                      frequent reviews of plant operations. This included observing routine control room                                    i
                      activities, accompanying in-plant operators on daily rounds, attending shift tumovers,
                      crew briefings and special evolution briefings, and performing panel walkdowns.
-
              bi      Observations and Findinas
3
                      The inspectors observed several routine crew briefings and two special briefings for
                      infrequently performed evolutions The two infrequent evolution briefings were for receipt
                      of new fuel and for a repair on the HPCI steam line drain. The inspectors observed good
                      communication and ivolvement among participants. There was appropriate emphasis
                      on safety. The evol nions were also well coordinated.
                      On December 5, igg 7, the inspectors identified one concem with a licensed operators
*
                      performance during a surveillance test. During monthly standby gar, treatment
                      surveillance testing, the operator was required to record filter train differential pressure.
                      The value indicated on the instrument in the control room was unreasonably low;
                      however, the operator did not question the reading. Subsequently, the inspectors
,                      questioned the operator on the reading when other data taken during the test conflicted
.                      with the differential pressure reading recorded eariier, The operator consulted with the
c '
                      shift supervisor who directed that the gage be tapped. The instrument responded and
                      indicated a readhg that was consistent with the other data. The inspectors were                                      r
                                                                                                                                            '
;.                    concemed with the operators attention to detailin this case.
              c;      Conclusions
3
                    ' There was one instance of concem regarding operator attention to detail during
                      performance of routine surveillance testing. Otherwise, the inspectors found conduct of
                      operations to be professional and focussed on safety.
                                                                4
                                                                                                                                            ,
                                                                                                                    -mm v-w m -, n m,-w.---
 
  +
        .  .
.  . .
        02        C;:2:xl Status of Feelleties and Equipment
        02.1 General Plant Tours ano System Walkdowns
                - The inspectors followed the gu; dance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in walking down
                  sooessible portions of the following systems:
                  e      Standby diesel generators
                  e      River water supply -
                  Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were noceptable in all
                  cases. Several minor discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and ware
                  corrected. The inspectors identified no substantive concems as a result of these
                  walkdowns.
          07.2 Detailed Walkdown of the Reactor Core Isolation Coohna (RCIC) Systern
          a.    l tsoection Scone (71707)
                  During the inspection period, the inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection
                  Procedure 71707 and conducted a detailed walkdown of the RCIC system to verify its -
                  standby readiness condition. The inspectors reviewed system diagrams, Operating
                  instruction (01) 150, " Reactor Core isolation Codng System," the Updated Final Safety
                  Analysis Report (UFSAR) description, and maintenance history,
          b.    Observations and Findinas
                  The inspectors verified that the RCIC system components in the electrical lineup and
                  valve lineup were in the required position in accordance with 01150, * Reactor Core
                  Isolation Cooling System,' Attachments 1 and 2. The inspecters identified two globe
                  valves (V24-0059, RCIC Steam Supply Drain Line Trap DT 2408 Isolation and V24-0062,
                  RCIC Steam Supply Drain Trap Test Line Isolation) that were labeled as gate valves on -
                  the component database and system diagram (M 124). These minor discrepancies were
                  discussed with the licensee and prompt actions were taken to resolve the differences,
          c.      Conclusions
                  The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained the RCIC system in the proper
                  standby readiness condition. Minor component database and drawing discrepancies
                  were promptly resolved.
          02.3 - Cold Weather Preparations
            a,    lnspection Scope (71714)
                  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for pro'. acting safety-related systems
                  against the effects of cold weather. The inspectors reviewed applicable licensee
                  documentation, Interviewed operations staff, and conducted plant system walkdowns.
                                                            5
  s
 
    -
        ..
    ,
  .  ,
          b.    QhattyMens_and Findinns
                Uoontee personnel completed integrated Plant Operating instruction (IPol) 6, " Cold
                                                                            .
                Weather Operations," Revision 12, prior to the onset of cold weather.
                The inspectors evaluated the intake structure, pump house, cooling tower valve houses,
                cooling tower breaker houses, and the well water pump houses and found that they were
                heated with unit heaters or portable heaters. Thermometers were vertfied to be in-place
                at each location and were to be read by auxiliary operators during their daily routeds to
                verify that area temperatures were adequate,
                The inspectors verified that Attachment 1. * Plant Winterization Check List," of IPol 6 was
                completed, signed and dated by the appropriate personnel. The inspectors identified no
                discrepancies for cold weather preparations,
          c.    Conclusions
                The inspectors concluded that the licensee's completed and planned actions for cold
                weather protection were adequate to protect plant components and systems from cold
                weather.
        .OS      Miscellaneous Operations lasues (92700, 92e03)
1
,        Od.1    (Closed) Inspection Follow Item (IFI) 50 331/9600410: The DAEC UFSAR defined the
                rosloual heat removal system in the spent fuel pool cooling mode (RHF.4FPC) as the
!                altemate cooling path for the spent fuel pool. Questioning by the inspectors determmed
                that the valve had only been tested during the initial plant t"'+sp testing, in
                October 1996 DAEC determined by walkdown that operations personnel would be able to
                line up RHR SFPC within a reasonable time, estimated to be between 4 and 6 hours.
                The licensee also determined that all valves in the system had been cycled except
                V34-001. On October 15,1997, DAEC successfully cycled valve V34 001. This item is
                  closed.
        -08.2 (Closed)IFl 50-331/96006-04: The licensee had identified a potential UFSAR
                  discrepancy regarding the storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool and planned to obtain an
,                analysis from an outside vendor. Holtec Intemational analysis Hl 971708, " Criticality
                  Safety Evaluation of the Spent Fuel Storegs Rocks in the Duane Amold Energy Center for
                . Maximum Enrichment Capability" concluded that spent fuel could be safety stored in -
                  either type of storage racks used at DAEC A UFSAR change was completed and will be
                - submitted with the next cycle UFSAR update. This item is closed.
                                                    11. Maintenance
        M1      Conduct of Maintenance
        M1.1 General Comments
          a. -  Inspection Scope (62707. 61726)
                  The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities and
                  surymillances tests:
                                                          6
                                                                      ,.              ..
                                                                                            .
                                                                                                      .
                                                                                                          .. .
                                                                                                              \
 
  <.
.
        *        Relay coil replacements for containment isolation valve logic, corrective
                  maintenance action request (CMAR) A38242
        e        Monthly standby gas treatment system testing, STP 47LC01.M
        e        125 Vdc battery charger maintenance, CMAR A36453
        e        'A' and *B' control building chiller repair and testing
        e        Safety-related instrument air compressor repair, CMAR A38348
        o        HPCl/RCIC steam line drain leak repair
          e        Rod block monitor maintenance and testing
          e        Core Spray engineering change package
          e        24 Vdc preventive maintenance, preventive maintenance action request
                  (PMAR) 1101482
  M1.2 Failure to Use Enaineered Maintenance Action (EMA) Process for a Maintenance Activity
  a.    Inspection Scope (62707)
        The inspectors reviewed CMAR A38249 Ger the CMAR was authorized for work by the
          control room. The work involved replau,ig relays for several containment isolation
          valves. The inspectors also reviewed the TSs, post maintenance testing, and operability
          testing.
  b.    Observations and Findinas
          The inspectors identified a discrepancy in the CMAR planning. The CMAR provided
          instructions to replace existing 115 Vac relay coils with 120 Vac coils for several relays.
          Although the co..s were being replaced with new coils of a different voltage rating, the
          'EMA" block was marked *N' for not applicable. The inspectors were concemed that this
          was not consistent wi.ii actministrative control procedure (ACP) 109.1, ' Engineered
          Maintenance Action," Revision 6. The ACP specifies that the EMA process is used when
          the change alters a component's model number, materiel specification, or design
          characteristics.
          The inspectors interviewed the maintenance planner, w''o provided background
          information to support the acceptability of the change in voltage rating. The inspectors
          had no concems with the appropriateness of the change; however, the inspectors were
          concemed that the EMA process as required by ACP 109.1 was not followed. This minor
          violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC
          Enforcement Policy (50-331/97017-01(DRP)),
    c.    Conclusions
          The inspectors had no operability concems with the work that was performed. However,
          the licensee did not follow the procedural controls in this case.
  M1.3 Ingpp..r_gble 125 Volt Direct Current (Vde) Battery Charaers Followina Preventive
          Mejntenance
    a.      Inspection Scope (62706)
            The inspectors observed partial performance of preventive maintenance per
            CMAR A36453 on the Division i 125 Vdc battery charger 1D12. The CMAR involved
            replacing the firing board, sensing current limit board and amplifier board. Discussions
                                                        7                                            j
 
  '
      *  .
    9
              were held with electrical maintenance personnel, engineering personnel, and operations
              personnel,
        b.    Observations and Findinas
              on November ig 1997, electrical maintenance personnel performed preventive
              maintenance on the Division i 125 Vdc battery charger (1D12) by replacing the firing
              board, sensing current limit board, and amplifier board in accordance with CMAR A36453.
              The vendor recommended this preventive rnalntenance in response to the licensee's
              concem for their need to make periodic adjustments to the battery charger. When the
              work was completed, restoration of the 1D12 battery charger was attempted. The
              battery charger failed to operate. The licensee removed the 1D12 battery charger from
              service at that time and attempted to restore the backup battery charger (1D120). The
              backup battery charger could not be restored due to the failure of breaker 1D10-03 to
              close and prevented connecting the battery backup charger to the 125 Vdc distribution
              panel. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately entered a 12-hour Limiting      -
              Condition for Operation (LCO) in accordance with TS 3.8.B.2.b. The licensee promptly
              responded by developing corrective actions to restore both battery chargers.
              The licensee replaced the circuit boards that were changed out in the 1D12 battery
              charger with circuit boards that were previously in use. The 1D12 cattery charger was
              rectored and met all operating requirements for operability. The inspectors observed
              good coordination between electrical maintenance personnel, engineering personnel, and
              operations personnelin promptly restoring the 1D12 battery charger.
              During the investigation of the failure of breaker 1D10-03 to close, electrical maintenance
l            personnelidentified a shorted diode in the battery backup charger. The diode was
i            replaced and the backup battery charger was retumed to service. The inspectors
              observed that electrical maintenance personnel effectively identified the cause of the
              breaker failure and appropriately replaced the failed diode.
              The LCO was exited shortly after declaring the battery chargers operable. A root cause
              investigation was being conducted by the licensee regarding the failure of the
              1D12 battery charger to operate. This is considered an inspection follow up item
              (50 331/g7017-02(DRP)) pending the results of the root cause investigation.
          c.  Conclut19nt
              The inspectors concluded that the licensee promptly responded to the 125 Vdc battery
              charger problems. The inspectors will review the licensee's root cause investigation
              when completed.
        M1A Recent Work Plannino issues
          a.  luspection Scope (62707)
                The inspectors observed routine maintenance activities, following the guidance of
                Inspection Procedure 62707.
                                                          8                                                  ;
        -
  u
                  - -
                                                                        -
                                                                                                          -_-
 
    '
      .
  e
      b.  Observations and Findinas
          During this inspection period, the inspectors observed that the licensee backed out of
          several activities after they were started due to problems with planning of work activities
          or procedures in another case, an LCO on the "A" control building chiller lasted longer
          than expected due to coordination problems, in each case, the licensee identified the
          wncem, documented the issue on an Action Request (AR), and ensured the plant was in
          a safe condition.
          The inspectors considered the licensee's actions in each case to be appropriate.
          However, the inspectors were concemed with a potential adverse tren f in work planning
          issues. The examples are listed below;
          e      Work planning problems during maintenance on the *A* control t'uilding chiller
                  resulted in exiting the LCO on day 21 of 30, which was much later than planned.
                  The licensee held a post Job critique and planned to implement several corrective
                  actions.
            *      During implementation of an engineering change package on a core spray
                  instrument, problems were encountered when testing per the new surveillance
                  procedure. The licensee backed out of the test and corrected the procedure.
                  (AR 972731)
            *      During scheduled work on the 24 Vdc system, problems with a new procedure
                  occurred. The licensee backed out of the activity and corrected the procedure.
                  (AR 972808)
            *      During surveillance testing of the rod block monitors, certain steps of the
                  procedure did not address how to handle data that did not meet acceptance
                  criteria. The procedure was corrected.
      c.  Conclusions
            The inspectors concluded that problems in work planning and adequacy of procedures
            were oroperly handled as they came up. However, these problems represented an
            increase in the numt,er of work planning problems over that typically encountered and
            resulted in safety related equipment being out-of service longer than necessary.
      M2    Maintenance and Materiel Condition of Facilities and Equipment
      M2.1  Plant Materiel Condition
      a.  InJspection Scope (62707)
            The inspectors reviewed several emergent work items to ensure appropriate operability
            evaluations were performed, TS were met, repairs were made, and root causes were
            determined where appropriate.
                                                      9
e
 
      '
          <  ,
    . 1,
            b.    Observations and findinas
                  The inspectors noted that there were several emergent equipment issues during the
                  Inspection period, in two cases, the licensee entered a 12 hour shutdown LCO, but
                  repairs were completed before power was reduced. The inspectors observed appropriate
                  licensee response in performing repairs and to determine the root cause. The examples
                  are listed below:
                  -e        On December 3,1997, the "B" instrument air compressor (1K004) failed during
                            surveillance test NS30001, *lnstrument Air Compressors Monthly Functional
                            Test." The cause was an air Isak on a flHer, The licensee entered a 12 hour
                              shutdown LCO according to T8, The maintenance was completed and the LCO
                            was exited before power reduction was commencodi (AR 972763)
                    e        On November 19,1997, the li ensee encountered problems with the 125 Vdc
                              battery charger following maintenance, Ses Section M1.3 (or detslis. The
                              licensee entered a 12 hour shutdown LCO according to TS. The LCO was exited
                              before power reduction was commenced. (AR 972655)
                    e        On December 15,1997, the supply breaker for the Division i 125 Vdc battery -
                              charger opened unexpectedly during a preventive meintenance activity. The
                              breaker was declared inoperable and a new one was ordered. The Division I
                              loads were transferred to the altemate battery charger The inspectors vertfled
                              that the TS were met with the operable battery chargers.
                              (AR 972845)-
                    e        On December 2,1997, an LCO was entered on the 'B' control building chiller
                            ' when a large oil leak was discovered by a fire watch on rounds. This occurred
'
                              i day after the "A" chiller was ret'imed to service following a 21 day
                              Out of service. The "B' chiller was repaired promptly. (AR 972760)
              c.    Conclusions
                    The licensee promptly resolved the emergent equipment issues discussed above.
                    Engineering department personnel provided appropriate support where requested,
  '
                  - Maintenance activities were property prioritized and completed in a timely manner. The
                  - control building chillers continue to be a challenge at Duane Amold.
            M8    - Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)
            M8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-301/96004 0t Instrument Used for TS Reading Not
                    in Calibration Program. As discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-331/96004, there were
                    no vendor recommendations for periodic calibration of spent fuel pool level instrument
                    Ll3413c This instrument was installed by a modification in 1990 without establishing
                    calibration requirements. The inspectors verified that instrument Ll3413 was not required
                    to be calibrated. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the instrument was indicating
                    property by comparing its reading to readings from redundant local instrumentetion. The
                    inspectors also reviewed other instrumentation used for TS surveillances and found no
                  - additional examples where the instruments were not periodically calibrated. This item is
                    closed.
                                                                                                                                              !
                                                                  10
        -
                                                                                                  _ , , , - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - > -
 
        '
            .
    . '.
          M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Ev3nt Report (LER) 50-331/97-12-00: Spurious RCIC Steam t.eak
                Detection Isolation. The licensee determined the cause of the isolation to be a spurious
                signal from temperature switch TDS 2445A. The switch was replaced and tested
                satisfactorily. This item is closed.
                                                    111. Enoineerina
          E1    Conduct of Engineering
            a.  Inspection Scope (37551)
                The inspectors evaluated cngineering involvement in resolution of emergent material
                condition problems and other routine activities. The inspectors reviewed areas s' .:t as
                operability evaluations, root cause analyses, safety committees, and self asst ssnients.
                The effectiveness of the licensee's controls for the identification, resolution, and
                prevention of problems were also examined.
          E1.1  Testina on Control Buildina Chiller Without a Safety Evaluation
            a.  Inspection Scope (37551)
                The inspectors reviewed the details of a 100 percent load test on control bu'.' ding chillers
                on November 19,1997. This review was conducted during the testing and included
                documents such as TS, UFSAR, tagout, and CMAR.
            b.  Observations and Findinas
l                The licensee intended to perform a 100 percent load test on the 'A" chiller. Due to low
l
                natural heat load during winter conditions, the load needed to be artificially increased to
                  support this test. The licensee used tagout 971369 to fall open a control valve in the
                heating loop to increase heat in the control building. The inspectors were concemed with
,                several aspects of the chiller testing:
l
                  e      The testing was not described in the UFSAR; however, the licensee did not
                          perform a safety evaluation.
                  *      There was no prncedure or acceptance criteria for the testing. The only controlin
                          place was a tagout on several valves in the control building heating loop.
                  e      The shift supervisor had established informal monitoring of the contrn! room
                          temperature. However, no specific plans were made on what to do if
                          temperatures went too high. Additionally, steps were not taken to monitor the
                          other areas affected by the test.
                  e      According to UFSAR Section 9.4.4.2, the control building ventilation system
                          serves the control room, cable spreading rocm, safety-related battery rooms, and
                          essential switchgear rooms. The inspectors were concemed that safety related
                          components in these rooms could have been adversely affected by the testing
                          unless a detailed review was performed prior to the test and formal controls were
                          in place during testing.
                                                            11
  m
 
  *      *
            .
        ,
    '
      .
                  The licensee's testing was successfully performed with negligible increase in control
                  building temperatures, The inspectors recognized that the licensee made a change to
                  the notisafety-related heating loop for the building. The inspectors need to review this
                  issue further to determine whether the licensee was in violation of 10 CFR 50.5g or
                  10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. This is an unresolved item (URI)
                  (50 331/g7017-03(DRP)).
            c.  Conclusiqat
                  The inspectors were concemed with the licensee's performance in planning and
                  implementing control building chiller 100 percent load testing. Specifically, the inspectors
                  were concemed that the licensee did not perform a safety evaluation prior to the test and
                  did not have adequate test controls in place during the test.
            E8    Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92902)
            E8.1  (Closed) IFl 50-331/9600211: Discrepancy Between Updated Final Safety Analysis
                  Report (UFSAR) and Plant Configuration. The inspectors had Identified a long term
                  tagout on the fire protection system. This resulted in the system configuration not
                  matching the UFSAR. The licensee decided to incorporate the long-term tagout and
l                  revised the drawing and UFSAR. This item is closed.
l
                                                      IV. Plant Suppod
            R5    Staff Training and Qualification In Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls
            R5.1  Expired Resolrator Qualifications
              a.  Inspection Scope
                  The inspectors reviewed qualification requirements and records to determine whether
                  licensed and non licensed operators had maintained qualifications consistent with the
                    licensee's program. This included a review of administrative control procedure
                  ACP 1411.20, " Respiratory Protection," Revision 5. The inspectors also reviewed the
                    accessibility of corrective lens inserts for respirators where required.
              b.  Observations and Findinag
                    The inspectors identified that two licensed operating shift supervisors (OSS) and one shift
                    technical advisor (STA) had expired qualifications for radiological mask fit. Special
                    Order 97-01 required that members of certain job classifications, such as OSS and STA,
                    must be respirator and self-contained breatning apparatus qualified. ACP 1411.20,
                    Section 3.3(1)(b), required individuals to have been fit tested for respiratory protective
                    devices within the previous 12 months plus 30 days, in the case of the two OSS's and
                    the STA mentioned above, the mask fit was overdue by less than 1 nionth,2 months, arid
                    5 months, respectively. ACP 1411.20, Section 3.1(6)(a) required that respirator users
'
                    shall maintain current respirator qualifications. The failure to maintain current respirator
                    qualifications in accordance with ACP 1411.20 was a violation (50-331/g7017-04(DRP)).
                                                                12
                                                                                                                  )
 
      ,,'.                                                                                                              k
  . .
            The inspectors also noted discrepancies in the training records for several personnel from
            other departments. The licensee initiated AR 972919 to review the issue and determine
            corrective actions,
        c. Conclusions
            The inspectors were concemed that the licensee did not maintain control of personnel
            respirator qualifications in accordance with program requirements.
        F1  Control of Fire Protection Activities
        a. InsDection ScoDo (71750)
            The inspectors accompanied a fire watch on routine rounds to evaluate adherence to the
            licensee's fire plan,
        b. Qtti3Iygtlons and Findinal
            The inspectors observed that the fire watch performed duties appropriately. The required                    y
            areas were toured in the required times and Iri accordance with the licensee's fire plan.
            The inspectors had no concems.
            As discussed in Section M2.1, a fire watch on rounds identified an oil leak on the control
            building chiller. This was promptly communicated to the control room and enabled a
            quick response to the problem.
                                          V. Mananoment Meetinas
        X1  Exit Meeting Summary
            The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at
j            the conclusion of the inspection on December 22,1997. The licensee acknowledged the
            findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined
            during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
            identified.
                                                      13
                                                                                                      _
                                                                                                        _ _ _ - _ _ _ ,
 
  '
      ,, *.
,
    '.
                                    PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
          Licensee
          J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear
          G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager
          R. Anderson, Manager, Outage and Support
          J. Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent
          D. Curtland, Operations Manager
          R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection
          M. McDermot, Manager, Engineering
          K. Peveler, Manager, Regulatory Performance
    ._
                                    .            =        _
                                                      14
                                                      ~
                                                              --
                                                .                    -
                                                                        -
                                                                          --
 
  '
        '
          ''
      .
    '
      .
'
                                          INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
          IP 37551:    Onsite Engineering
          IP 40500:    Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing
                        Problems
          IP 61726:    Surveillance Observation-
          lP 62703:    Maintenance observation
          IP 62707:    Maintenance observation
          IP 71707:    Plant Operations
          IP 71750:    Plant Support
          IP 71714:    Cold Weather Preparations
          IP 92700:    Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
                                                                                                      )
                        Facilities
          IP 92901:    Followup Operations
          IP 92902:    Followup - Engineering
          IP 92903:    Followup Maintenance
                                      ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
          Opened
'
          50 331/97017-01        NCV    Failure to follow EMA process
          50-331/97017 02        IFl    125 Vdc battery charger failures
          50-331/97017 03        URI    Testing of control building chiller without SE
            50 331/97017 04      VIO    Failure to maintain current respirator qualifications
            Closed
            50 331/96002 11      IFl    Discrepancy between UFSAR and plant configuration
            50-331/96004 01      URI    instrument used for TS reading not in calibration program
            50-331/96004 10      IFl    Inconsistencies in spent fuel pool cooling mode
            50 331/96006-04      IFl    Spent fuel pool rack criticality analysis
            $0-331/9712 00        LER    Spurious RCIC steam leak detection isolation
                                                            15
                                                                                  _
 
                                      ,
                                                                                            s
                '
                      ,.
                        ** .
                  * .*
                                                            LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
                        -ACP'          Administrative Control Procedure
                            CFR        Code of Federal Regulations
                            CMAR        Corrective Maintenance Action Request
                            DAEC      Duane Amold Energy Center
                            EPAA      Engineered maintenance action
                            HPCI      High pressure coolant Injection
                            IFl        inspection followup item
                            IP        inspection Procedure
                            ' Pol      Integrated Plant Operating Instruction
                            IR        inspection Report
                            LCO        Limiting condition for Operation
                            LER        Licensee Event Report
                            NCV        Non cited violation
                            NOV        Notice of violation
                              NRC      Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              NRR'      Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations
                            01        Operating Instruction
                            OSS        Operations Ehlft Supervisor
l
                              RCIC      Reactor core isolation cooling
                              RHR SFPC  Residual heat removal-spent fuel pool cooling
l                            STA      Shift technical advisor
l
                              STP      Surveillance Test Procedure
                            TS        Technical Specification
                              UFSAR    Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
                              URI        Unresolved item
                              Vac      Volts altomating current
                              Vdc      Volts direct current
                                                                          16
  . . -. . . . .          .        .
                                        .
                                                          .
                                                .
                                                                .
                                                                                          .
                                                                                      .
                                                                                              ,
                                                                                        ..
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 20:58, 1 January 2021

Insp Rept 50-331/97-17 on 971111-1222.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maintenance,Engineering & Plant Support
ML20202E946
Person / Time
Site: Duane Arnold NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/02/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20202E929 List:
References
50-331-97-17, NUDOCS 9802190093
Download: ML20202E946 (16)


See also: IR 05000331/1997017

Text

' .. $ .

.. 1

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION lil

Docket No: 50 331

License No: DPR-49

Report No. 50 331/97017(DRP)

Licensee: IES Utilities Inc.

200 First Street S.E.

P. O, Box 351

Cedar Rapids, IA 52406-0351

i

Facility: Duane Amold Energy Center

Location: Palo, lows

Dates: November 11 December 22,1997

Inspectors: C. Lips, Senior Resident inspector

M. Kurth, Resident inspector

Approved by: R. D. Lanksbury, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5

9002190093 990102

PDR ADOCK 03000331

Q PDR

~

_

,, .

..

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Duane Amold Energy Center

t.'RC Inspection Report No. 50 331/g7017(DRP)

This inspection report included resident inspectors' evaluation of aspects of licensee operations,

eng'neering, maintenance, and plant support areas.

Operations

e The licensee's completed and planned actions for cold weather protection were adequate

to protect plant components and systems from cold weather. (Section 02.3)

  • There was one instance of concom regarding operator attention to detsil during

performance of routine surveillance testing. An operator did not question the

unreasonably low filter train differential pressure during the standby gas treatment

surveillance test. Otherwise, the conduc' of operations was professional and focussed on

safety as evidenced by error free performance during infrequently performed evolutions.

These infrequently performed evolutions included receipt of new fuel and emergent repair

of a steam line draln. (Section 01.1)

  • The licensee maintained the reactor core Isolation coolir.? system in the proper standby

readiness condition. Minor discrepancies were promptly ruolved. (Section 02.2)

Maintenance

e The inspectors identified that the licensee did not follow the procedural controls in the

engineered maintenance action process for an activity where relay coils were replaced

with those with a different voltage rating. (Section M1.2).

e The licensee promptly responded to 125 Vdc bettery charger problems. (Section M1.3)

  • The licensee identified four examples where problems were encountered during routine

planned maintenance. The causes appeared to be related to weak pre-job planning or

new procedure revisions. T he inspectors concluded that problems were properiy hsndled

es they came up. Hmever, these problems represented an increase in the number of

work planning problems over that typically encounterei and resulted in safety-related

equipment being out of service longer than necessar';. (Section M1.4)

  • The licensee promptly resolved the emergent equipment issues that occurred during the

period. Engineering department personnel provided appropriate support where

requested. Maintenance activities were property prioritized and completed in a timely

manner. (Section M2.1)

Enaineerina

e The inspec. ors were concemed whh the licensee's performance in planning and

implementing control building chiller 100 percent load testing. Specifically, the inspectors

were concemed that the licensee did not perform a safety evaluation pdor to the test and

did not have test controls in place during the test. (Section E1.1)

2

  • , 4 ,

<.

Plant Suncort

e The licensee's Respiratory Protection Program was inadequatoY implemented. Several

individuals required to be quellflod to wear respirators had expired qualifications.

(Section R5.1)

e The fire watch performed duties appropriately. The required areas were toured in the

required times in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors had no -

concoms. (Section F1)

i

3

. . . .

s. .

l

. ,,

k

Resort Detalle

!-

' Summary of Plant Status

j

}- The plant began this inspection period at 100 percent power. On December 5, igg 7, plant power

was reduced to approximately 80 percent for several hours to allow repair of a steam leak. The

leak was in a steam line drain for the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The plant

, was operated at approximately 100 percent for the remainder of the period,

i

l. Operations  ;

i l

01 Conduct of Operations ,

l

- O ', ,1 General Comments (71707)

'

I a. Inacection Scone

!

'

The inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection Procedure 71707 and conducted

frequent reviews of plant operations. This included observing routine control room i

activities, accompanying in-plant operators on daily rounds, attending shift tumovers,

crew briefings and special evolution briefings, and performing panel walkdowns.

-

bi Observations and Findinas

3

The inspectors observed several routine crew briefings and two special briefings for

infrequently performed evolutions The two infrequent evolution briefings were for receipt

of new fuel and for a repair on the HPCI steam line drain. The inspectors observed good

communication and ivolvement among participants. There was appropriate emphasis

on safety. The evol nions were also well coordinated.

On December 5, igg 7, the inspectors identified one concem with a licensed operators

performance during a surveillance test. During monthly standby gar, treatment

surveillance testing, the operator was required to record filter train differential pressure.

The value indicated on the instrument in the control room was unreasonably low;

however, the operator did not question the reading. Subsequently, the inspectors

, questioned the operator on the reading when other data taken during the test conflicted

. with the differential pressure reading recorded eariier, The operator consulted with the

c '

shift supervisor who directed that the gage be tapped. The instrument responded and

indicated a readhg that was consistent with the other data. The inspectors were r

'

. concemed with the operators attention to detailin this case.

c; Conclusions

3

' There was one instance of concem regarding operator attention to detail during

performance of routine surveillance testing. Otherwise, the inspectors found conduct of

operations to be professional and focussed on safety.

4

,

-mm v-w m -, n m,-w.---

+

. .

. . .

02 C;:2:xl Status of Feelleties and Equipment

02.1 General Plant Tours ano System Walkdowns

- The inspectors followed the gu; dance of Inspection Procedure 71707 in walking down

sooessible portions of the following systems:

e Standby diesel generators

e River water supply -

Equipment operability, material condition, and housekeeping were noceptable in all

cases. Several minor discrepancies were brought to the licensee's attention and ware

corrected. The inspectors identified no substantive concems as a result of these

walkdowns.

07.2 Detailed Walkdown of the Reactor Core Isolation Coohna (RCIC) Systern

a. l tsoection Scone (71707)

During the inspection period, the inspectors followed the guidance of Inspection

Procedure 71707 and conducted a detailed walkdown of the RCIC system to verify its -

standby readiness condition. The inspectors reviewed system diagrams, Operating

instruction (01) 150, " Reactor Core isolation Codng System," the Updated Final Safety

Analysis Report (UFSAR) description, and maintenance history,

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors verified that the RCIC system components in the electrical lineup and

valve lineup were in the required position in accordance with 01150, * Reactor Core

Isolation Cooling System,' Attachments 1 and 2. The inspecters identified two globe

valves (V24-0059, RCIC Steam Supply Drain Line Trap DT 2408 Isolation and V24-0062,

RCIC Steam Supply Drain Trap Test Line Isolation) that were labeled as gate valves on -

the component database and system diagram (M 124). These minor discrepancies were

discussed with the licensee and prompt actions were taken to resolve the differences,

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the licensee maintained the RCIC system in the proper

standby readiness condition. Minor component database and drawing discrepancies

were promptly resolved.

02.3 - Cold Weather Preparations

a, lnspection Scope (71714)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's program for pro'. acting safety-related systems

against the effects of cold weather. The inspectors reviewed applicable licensee

documentation, Interviewed operations staff, and conducted plant system walkdowns.

5

s

-

..

,

. ,

b. QhattyMens_and Findinns

Uoontee personnel completed integrated Plant Operating instruction (IPol) 6, " Cold

.

Weather Operations," Revision 12, prior to the onset of cold weather.

The inspectors evaluated the intake structure, pump house, cooling tower valve houses,

cooling tower breaker houses, and the well water pump houses and found that they were

heated with unit heaters or portable heaters. Thermometers were vertfied to be in-place

at each location and were to be read by auxiliary operators during their daily routeds to

verify that area temperatures were adequate,

The inspectors verified that Attachment 1. * Plant Winterization Check List," of IPol 6 was

completed, signed and dated by the appropriate personnel. The inspectors identified no

discrepancies for cold weather preparations,

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the licensee's completed and planned actions for cold

weather protection were adequate to protect plant components and systems from cold

weather.

.OS Miscellaneous Operations lasues (92700, 92e03)

1

, Od.1 (Closed) Inspection Follow Item (IFI) 50 331/9600410: The DAEC UFSAR defined the

rosloual heat removal system in the spent fuel pool cooling mode (RHF.4FPC) as the

! altemate cooling path for the spent fuel pool. Questioning by the inspectors determmed

that the valve had only been tested during the initial plant t"'+sp testing, in

October 1996 DAEC determined by walkdown that operations personnel would be able to

line up RHR SFPC within a reasonable time, estimated to be between 4 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The licensee also determined that all valves in the system had been cycled except

V34-001. On October 15,1997, DAEC successfully cycled valve V34 001. This item is

closed.

-08.2 (Closed)IFl 50-331/96006-04: The licensee had identified a potential UFSAR

discrepancy regarding the storage of fuel in the spent fuel pool and planned to obtain an

, analysis from an outside vendor. Holtec Intemational analysis Hl 971708, " Criticality

Safety Evaluation of the Spent Fuel Storegs Rocks in the Duane Amold Energy Center for

. Maximum Enrichment Capability" concluded that spent fuel could be safety stored in -

either type of storage racks used at DAEC A UFSAR change was completed and will be

- submitted with the next cycle UFSAR update. This item is closed.

11. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 General Comments

a. - Inspection Scope (62707. 61726)

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following work activities and

surymillances tests:

6

,. ..

.

.

.. .

\

<.

.

  • Relay coil replacements for containment isolation valve logic, corrective

maintenance action request (CMAR) A38242

e Monthly standby gas treatment system testing, STP 47LC01.M

e 125 Vdc battery charger maintenance, CMAR A36453

e 'A' and *B' control building chiller repair and testing

e Safety-related instrument air compressor repair, CMAR A38348

o HPCl/RCIC steam line drain leak repair

e Rod block monitor maintenance and testing

e Core Spray engineering change package

e 24 Vdc preventive maintenance, preventive maintenance action request

(PMAR) 1101482

M1.2 Failure to Use Enaineered Maintenance Action (EMA) Process for a Maintenance Activity

a. Inspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors reviewed CMAR A38249 Ger the CMAR was authorized for work by the

control room. The work involved replau,ig relays for several containment isolation

valves. The inspectors also reviewed the TSs, post maintenance testing, and operability

testing.

b. Observations and Findinas

The inspectors identified a discrepancy in the CMAR planning. The CMAR provided

instructions to replace existing 115 Vac relay coils with 120 Vac coils for several relays.

Although the co..s were being replaced with new coils of a different voltage rating, the

'EMA" block was marked *N' for not applicable. The inspectors were concemed that this

was not consistent wi.ii actministrative control procedure (ACP) 109.1, ' Engineered

Maintenance Action," Revision 6. The ACP specifies that the EMA process is used when

the change alters a component's model number, materiel specification, or design

characteristics.

The inspectors interviewed the maintenance planner, wo provided background

information to support the acceptability of the change in voltage rating. The inspectors

had no concems with the appropriateness of the change; however, the inspectors were

concemed that the EMA process as required by ACP 109.1 was not followed. This minor

violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section IV of the NRC

Enforcement Policy (50-331/97017-01(DRP)),

c. Conclusions

The inspectors had no operability concems with the work that was performed. However,

the licensee did not follow the procedural controls in this case.

M1.3 Ingpp..r_gble 125 Volt Direct Current (Vde) Battery Charaers Followina Preventive

Mejntenance

a. Inspection Scope (62706)

The inspectors observed partial performance of preventive maintenance per

CMAR A36453 on the Division i 125 Vdc battery charger 1D12. The CMAR involved

replacing the firing board, sensing current limit board and amplifier board. Discussions

7 j

'

  • .

9

were held with electrical maintenance personnel, engineering personnel, and operations

personnel,

b. Observations and Findinas

on November ig 1997, electrical maintenance personnel performed preventive

maintenance on the Division i 125 Vdc battery charger (1D12) by replacing the firing

board, sensing current limit board, and amplifier board in accordance with CMAR A36453.

The vendor recommended this preventive rnalntenance in response to the licensee's

concem for their need to make periodic adjustments to the battery charger. When the

work was completed, restoration of the 1D12 battery charger was attempted. The

battery charger failed to operate. The licensee removed the 1D12 battery charger from

service at that time and attempted to restore the backup battery charger (1D120). The

backup battery charger could not be restored due to the failure of breaker 1D10-03 to

close and prevented connecting the battery backup charger to the 125 Vdc distribution

panel. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately entered a 12-hour Limiting -

Condition for Operation (LCO) in accordance with TS 3.8.B.2.b. The licensee promptly

responded by developing corrective actions to restore both battery chargers.

The licensee replaced the circuit boards that were changed out in the 1D12 battery

charger with circuit boards that were previously in use. The 1D12 cattery charger was

rectored and met all operating requirements for operability. The inspectors observed

good coordination between electrical maintenance personnel, engineering personnel, and

operations personnelin promptly restoring the 1D12 battery charger.

During the investigation of the failure of breaker 1D10-03 to close, electrical maintenance

l personnelidentified a shorted diode in the battery backup charger. The diode was

i replaced and the backup battery charger was retumed to service. The inspectors

observed that electrical maintenance personnel effectively identified the cause of the

breaker failure and appropriately replaced the failed diode.

The LCO was exited shortly after declaring the battery chargers operable. A root cause

investigation was being conducted by the licensee regarding the failure of the

1D12 battery charger to operate. This is considered an inspection follow up item

(50 331/g7017-02(DRP)) pending the results of the root cause investigation.

c. Conclut19nt

The inspectors concluded that the licensee promptly responded to the 125 Vdc battery

charger problems. The inspectors will review the licensee's root cause investigation

when completed.

M1A Recent Work Plannino issues

a. luspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors observed routine maintenance activities, following the guidance of

Inspection Procedure 62707.

8  ;

-

u

- -

-

-_-

'

.

e

b. Observations and Findinas

During this inspection period, the inspectors observed that the licensee backed out of

several activities after they were started due to problems with planning of work activities

or procedures in another case, an LCO on the "A" control building chiller lasted longer

than expected due to coordination problems, in each case, the licensee identified the

wncem, documented the issue on an Action Request (AR), and ensured the plant was in

a safe condition.

The inspectors considered the licensee's actions in each case to be appropriate.

However, the inspectors were concemed with a potential adverse tren f in work planning

issues. The examples are listed below;

e Work planning problems during maintenance on the *A* control t'uilding chiller

resulted in exiting the LCO on day 21 of 30, which was much later than planned.

The licensee held a post Job critique and planned to implement several corrective

actions.

  • During implementation of an engineering change package on a core spray

instrument, problems were encountered when testing per the new surveillance

procedure. The licensee backed out of the test and corrected the procedure.

(AR 972731972731

  • During scheduled work on the 24 Vdc system, problems with a new procedure

occurred. The licensee backed out of the activity and corrected the procedure.

(AR 972808972808

  • During surveillance testing of the rod block monitors, certain steps of the

procedure did not address how to handle data that did not meet acceptance

criteria. The procedure was corrected.

c. Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that problems in work planning and adequacy of procedures

were oroperly handled as they came up. However, these problems represented an

increase in the numt,er of work planning problems over that typically encountered and

resulted in safety related equipment being out-of service longer than necessary.

M2 Maintenance and Materiel Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M2.1 Plant Materiel Condition

a. InJspection Scope (62707)

The inspectors reviewed several emergent work items to ensure appropriate operability

evaluations were performed, TS were met, repairs were made, and root causes were

determined where appropriate.

9

e

'

< ,

. 1,

b. Observations and findinas

The inspectors noted that there were several emergent equipment issues during the

Inspection period, in two cases, the licensee entered a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shutdown LCO, but

repairs were completed before power was reduced. The inspectors observed appropriate

licensee response in performing repairs and to determine the root cause. The examples

are listed below:

-e On December 3,1997, the "B" instrument air compressor (1K004) failed during

surveillance test NS30001, *lnstrument Air Compressors Monthly Functional

Test." The cause was an air Isak on a flHer, The licensee entered a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

shutdown LCO according to T8, The maintenance was completed and the LCO

was exited before power reduction was commencodi (AR 972763972763

e On November 19,1997, the li ensee encountered problems with the 125 Vdc

battery charger following maintenance, Ses Section M1.3 (or detslis. The

licensee entered a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shutdown LCO according to TS. The LCO was exited

before power reduction was commenced. (AR 972655972655

e On December 15,1997, the supply breaker for the Division i 125 Vdc battery -

charger opened unexpectedly during a preventive meintenance activity. The

breaker was declared inoperable and a new one was ordered. The Division I

loads were transferred to the altemate battery charger The inspectors vertfled

that the TS were met with the operable battery chargers.

(AR 972845972845-

e On December 2,1997, an LCO was entered on the 'B' control building chiller

' when a large oil leak was discovered by a fire watch on rounds. This occurred

'

i day after the "A" chiller was ret'imed to service following a 21 day

Out of service. The "B' chiller was repaired promptly. (AR 972760972760

c. Conclusions

The licensee promptly resolved the emergent equipment issues discussed above.

Engineering department personnel provided appropriate support where requested,

'

- Maintenance activities were property prioritized and completed in a timely manner. The

- control building chillers continue to be a challenge at Duane Amold.

M8 - Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-301/96004 0t Instrument Used for TS Reading Not

in Calibration Program. As discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-331/96004, there were

no vendor recommendations for periodic calibration of spent fuel pool level instrument

Ll3413c This instrument was installed by a modification in 1990 without establishing

calibration requirements. The inspectors verified that instrument Ll3413 was not required

to be calibrated. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the instrument was indicating

property by comparing its reading to readings from redundant local instrumentetion. The

inspectors also reviewed other instrumentation used for TS surveillances and found no

- additional examples where the instruments were not periodically calibrated. This item is

closed.

!

10

-

_ , , , - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - > -

'

.

. '.

M8.2 (Closed) Licensee Ev3nt Report (LER) 50-331/97-12-00: Spurious RCIC Steam t.eak

Detection Isolation. The licensee determined the cause of the isolation to be a spurious

signal from temperature switch TDS 2445A. The switch was replaced and tested

satisfactorily. This item is closed.

111. Enoineerina

E1 Conduct of Engineering

a. Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors evaluated cngineering involvement in resolution of emergent material

condition problems and other routine activities. The inspectors reviewed areas s' .:t as

operability evaluations, root cause analyses, safety committees, and self asst ssnients.

The effectiveness of the licensee's controls for the identification, resolution, and

prevention of problems were also examined.

E1.1 Testina on Control Buildina Chiller Without a Safety Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the details of a 100 percent load test on control bu'.' ding chillers

on November 19,1997. This review was conducted during the testing and included

documents such as TS, UFSAR, tagout, and CMAR.

b. Observations and Findinas

l The licensee intended to perform a 100 percent load test on the 'A" chiller. Due to low

l

natural heat load during winter conditions, the load needed to be artificially increased to

support this test. The licensee used tagout 971369 to fall open a control valve in the

heating loop to increase heat in the control building. The inspectors were concemed with

, several aspects of the chiller testing:

l

e The testing was not described in the UFSAR; however, the licensee did not

perform a safety evaluation.

  • There was no prncedure or acceptance criteria for the testing. The only controlin

place was a tagout on several valves in the control building heating loop.

e The shift supervisor had established informal monitoring of the contrn! room

temperature. However, no specific plans were made on what to do if

temperatures went too high. Additionally, steps were not taken to monitor the

other areas affected by the test.

e According to UFSAR Section 9.4.4.2, the control building ventilation system

serves the control room, cable spreading rocm, safety-related battery rooms, and

essential switchgear rooms. The inspectors were concemed that safety related

components in these rooms could have been adversely affected by the testing

unless a detailed review was performed prior to the test and formal controls were

in place during testing.

11

m

  • *

.

,

'

.

The licensee's testing was successfully performed with negligible increase in control

building temperatures, The inspectors recognized that the licensee made a change to

the notisafety-related heating loop for the building. The inspectors need to review this

issue further to determine whether the licensee was in violation of 10 CFR 50.5g or

10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI. This is an unresolved item (URI)

(50 331/g7017-03(DRP)).

c. Conclusiqat

The inspectors were concemed with the licensee's performance in planning and

implementing control building chiller 100 percent load testing. Specifically, the inspectors

were concemed that the licensee did not perform a safety evaluation prior to the test and

did not have adequate test controls in place during the test.

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92902)

E8.1 (Closed) IFl 50-331/9600211: Discrepancy Between Updated Final Safety Analysis

Report (UFSAR) and Plant Configuration. The inspectors had Identified a long term

tagout on the fire protection system. This resulted in the system configuration not

matching the UFSAR. The licensee decided to incorporate the long-term tagout and

l revised the drawing and UFSAR. This item is closed.

l

IV. Plant Suppod

R5 Staff Training and Qualification In Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

R5.1 Expired Resolrator Qualifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed qualification requirements and records to determine whether

licensed and non licensed operators had maintained qualifications consistent with the

licensee's program. This included a review of administrative control procedure

ACP 1411.20, " Respiratory Protection," Revision 5. The inspectors also reviewed the

accessibility of corrective lens inserts for respirators where required.

b. Observations and Findinag

The inspectors identified that two licensed operating shift supervisors (OSS) and one shift

technical advisor (STA) had expired qualifications for radiological mask fit. Special

Order 97-01 required that members of certain job classifications, such as OSS and STA,

must be respirator and self-contained breatning apparatus qualified. ACP 1411.20,

Section 3.3(1)(b), required individuals to have been fit tested for respiratory protective

devices within the previous 12 months plus 30 days, in the case of the two OSS's and

the STA mentioned above, the mask fit was overdue by less than 1 nionth,2 months, arid

5 months, respectively. ACP 1411.20, Section 3.1(6)(a) required that respirator users

'

shall maintain current respirator qualifications. The failure to maintain current respirator

qualifications in accordance with ACP 1411.20 was a violation (50-331/g7017-04(DRP)).

12

)

,,'. k

. .

The inspectors also noted discrepancies in the training records for several personnel from

other departments. The licensee initiated AR 972919972919to review the issue and determine

corrective actions,

c. Conclusions

The inspectors were concemed that the licensee did not maintain control of personnel

respirator qualifications in accordance with program requirements.

F1 Control of Fire Protection Activities

a. InsDection ScoDo (71750)

The inspectors accompanied a fire watch on routine rounds to evaluate adherence to the

licensee's fire plan,

b. Qtti3Iygtlons and Findinal

The inspectors observed that the fire watch performed duties appropriately. The required y

areas were toured in the required times and Iri accordance with the licensee's fire plan.

The inspectors had no concems.

As discussed in Section M2.1, a fire watch on rounds identified an oil leak on the control

building chiller. This was promptly communicated to the control room and enabled a

quick response to the problem.

V. Mananoment Meetinas

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at

j the conclusion of the inspection on December 22,1997. The licensee acknowledged the

findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined

during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was

identified.

13

_

_ _ _ - _ _ _ ,

'

,, *.

,

'.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

J. Franz, Vice President Nuclear

G. Van Middlesworth, Plant Manager

R. Anderson, Manager, Outage and Support

J. Bjorseth, Maintenance Superintendent

D. Curtland, Operations Manager

R. Hite, Manager, Radiation Protection

M. McDermot, Manager, Engineering

K. Peveler, Manager, Regulatory Performance

._

. = _

14

~

--

. -

-

--

'

'

.

'

.

'

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering

IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing

Problems

IP 61726: Surveillance Observation-

lP 62703: Maintenance observation

IP 62707: Maintenance observation

IP 71707: Plant Operations

IP 71750: Plant Support

IP 71714: Cold Weather Preparations

IP 92700: Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

)

Facilities

IP 92901: Followup Operations

IP 92902: Followup - Engineering

IP 92903: Followup Maintenance

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

'

50 331/97017-01 NCV Failure to follow EMA process

50-331/97017 02 IFl 125 Vdc battery charger failures

50-331/97017 03 URI Testing of control building chiller without SE

50 331/97017 04 VIO Failure to maintain current respirator qualifications

Closed

50 331/96002 11 IFl Discrepancy between UFSAR and plant configuration

50-331/96004 01 URI instrument used for TS reading not in calibration program

50-331/96004 10 IFl Inconsistencies in spent fuel pool cooling mode

50 331/96006-04 IFl Spent fuel pool rack criticality analysis

$0-331/9712 00 LER Spurious RCIC steam leak detection isolation

15

_

,

s

'

,.

    • .
  • .*

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

-ACP' Administrative Control Procedure

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CMAR Corrective Maintenance Action Request

DAEC Duane Amold Energy Center

EPAA Engineered maintenance action

HPCI High pressure coolant Injection

IFl inspection followup item

IP inspection Procedure

' Pol Integrated Plant Operating Instruction

IR inspection Report

LCO Limiting condition for Operation

LER Licensee Event Report

NCV Non cited violation

NOV Notice of violation

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations

01 Operating Instruction

OSS Operations Ehlft Supervisor

l

RCIC Reactor core isolation cooling

RHR SFPC Residual heat removal-spent fuel pool cooling

l STA Shift technical advisor

l

STP Surveillance Test Procedure

TS Technical Specification

UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

URI Unresolved item

Vac Volts altomating current

Vdc Volts direct current

16

. . -. . . . . . .

.

.

.

.

.

.

,

..