IR 05000289/2011007: Difference between revisions

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| number = ML110600907
| number = ML110600907
| issue date = 03/01/2011
| issue date = 03/01/2011
| title = IR 05000289/2011007; 01/24/2011 - 02/11/2011; Exelon Generation Company, LLC; Three Mile Island, Unit 1; Triennial Fire Protection Team Inspection
| title = IR 05000289/2011007; 01/24/2011 - 02/11/2011; Exelon Generation Company, Llc; Three Mile Island, Unit 1; Triennial Fire Protection Team Inspection
| author name = Rogge J F
| author name = Rogge J F
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB3
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB3

Revision as of 01:06, 19 February 2018

IR 05000289/2011007; 01/24/2011 - 02/11/2011; Exelon Generation Company, Llc; Three Mile Island, Unit 1; Triennial Fire Protection Team Inspection
ML110600907
Person / Time
Site: Three Mile Island Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/01/2011
From: Rogge J F
Engineering Region 1 Branch 3
To: Pacilio M J
Exelon Generation Co
References
IR-11-007
Download: ML110600907 (23)


Text

UNITED STATESN UGLEAR REGULATORY GOMMISSIONREGION I475 ALLENDALE ROADKING OF PRUSSIA. PA 19406-141s+***fMarch 1., 20LIMr. Michael J. PacilioSenior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLCPresident and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear4300 Winfield Rd.Warrenville, lL 60555

SUBJECT: THREE MILE TSLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIREPROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO289/201 1OO7

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On February 11,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennialfire protection inspection at Three Mile lsland, Unit 1. The enclosed inspection reportdocuments the inspection results, which were discussed on February 11,2011, with Mr. RichardLibra and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of yourlicense. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, andinterviewed personnel. The inspectors also reviewed mitigation strategies for addressing largefires and explosions.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 2.390 of the NRC's "Rulesof Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be availableelectronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the PubliclyAvailable Records (PARs) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS isaccessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.sov/readino-rm/adams.html (The PublicElectronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,K7-@{ohn F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3Division of Reactor SafetyDocket No.: 50-289License No.: DPR-50 Mr. Michael J. PacilioSenior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLCPresident and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear4300 Winfield Rd.Warrenville, lL 60555

SUBJECT: THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1 - NRC TRIENNIAL FIREPROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT O5OOO289/201 1OO7

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On February 11,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennialfire protection inspection at Three Mile lsland, Unit 1. The enclosed inspection reportdocuments the inspection results, which were discussed on February 11,2011, with Mr. RichardLibra and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of yourlicense. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, andinterviewed personnel. The inspectors also reviewed mitigation strategies for addressing largefires and explosions.Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.ln accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 2.390 of the NRC's "Rulesof Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be availableelectronically for puOtic inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the PubliclyAvailable Records (PARs) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS isaccessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.qov/readins-rm/adams.html (The PublicElectronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RNJohn F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3Division of Reactor SafetYDocket No.: 50-289License No.: DPR-50SUNSI Review Gomplete: JFR (Reviewer's Initials)ADAMS ACC #ML110600907DATE 2128111OFFICIAL RECORD COPY M. Pacilio

Enclosure:

cc w/encl:2lnspection Report No. 050002891201 1007Distribution via ListServ M. PacilioDistribution w/encl: (via E-mail)W. Dean, RA (RIORAMAIL ResourceD. Lew, DRA (RIORAMAIL ResourceD. Roberts, DRP (RIDRPMAlL ResourceJ. Clifford, DRP (RIDRPMAlL ResourceP. Wilson, DRS (RIDRSMAIL ResourceS. Weerakkody, DRS (RI DRSMAIL ResourceJ. Rogge, DRSJ. Lilliendahl, DRSR. Bellamy, DRPS. Barber, DRPC. Newport, DRPN. Lafferty, DRPD. Kern, DRP, SRIJ. Heinly, DRP, RlC. LaRegina, DRP, OAJ. Trapp, Rl OEDOD. Bearde, DRSRidsNrrPMThreeMilelsland ResourceRidsNrrDorlLpl 1 -2 ResourceRO P Re portsReso u rce@n rc. gov U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IDocket No.: 50-289License No.: DPR-50Report No.: 05000289/2011007Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLCFacility:Three Mile lsland Station, Unit 1Location: Middletown , PA 17057Dates:January 24,2011 - February 11,2011Inspectors: J. Lilliendahl, Reactor Inspector, DRS (Team Leader)W. Schmidt, Senior Reactor Analyst, DRSR. Fuhrmeister, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRSK. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRSJ. Rady, Reactor InsPector, DRSApproved by: John F. Rogge, ChiefEngineering Branch 3Division of Reactor SafetYEnclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGSlR 0500028 gl2O11O07;0112412011 - 0211112011; Exelon Generation Company, LLC; ThreeMile lsland, Unit 1; Triennial Fire Protection Team Inspection.The report covered a two-week triennialfire protection team inspection by specialist inspectors.The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors isdescribed in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.No findings were identified.Enclosure REPORT DETAILSBackqroundThis report presents the results of a triennial fire protection inspection conducted in accordancewith NRC Inspection Procedure (lP) 711 11.05T, "Fire Protection." The objective of theinspection was to assess whether Exelon has implemented an adequate fire protection programand that post-fire safe shutdown capabilities have been established and are being properlymaintained at the Three Mile lsland (TMl) Station, Unit 1. The following fire areas (FAs) and firezones (FZs) were selected for detailed review based on risk insights from the TMI IndividualPlant Examination (lPE)ilndividual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE):o AB-FZ-S, Auxiliary Building General Area281 Foot Elevation;. CB-FA-3D, 1S Switchgear;. CB-FA-3D, Relay Room; ando lB-FZ-3, Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump Area'Inspection of these areas/zones fulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect aminimum of three samples.The inspection team evaluated the licensee's fire protection program (FPP) against applicablerequirements which included plant Technical Specifications, Operating License Conditions 2.C.4and 2.C.17, NRC Safety Evaluations, 10 CFR 50.48, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, and BranchTechnical Position (BTP) Chemical Engineering Branch (CMEB) 9.5-1. The team also reviewedrelated documents that included the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Sectiong.9, the fire hazards analysis report (FHAR), and the post-fire safe shutdown analyses.The team also evaluated two licensee mitigating strategies for addressing large fires andexplosions as required by Operating License Conditions 2.C.17. Inspection of these strategiesfulfills the inspection procedure requirement to inspect a minimum of one sample.Specific documents reviewed by the team are listed in the attachment.1. REACTORSAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R05 Fire Protection (lP 711 11.05T).01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilitiesa. lnspection ScopeThe team reviewed the FHAR, safe shutdown analyses and supporting drawings anddocumentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected.Enclosure b.a..022The team ensured that applicable separation requirements of Section lll.G of10 CFR 50, Appendix R and the licensee's design and licensing bases were maintainedfor the credited safe shutdown equipment and their supporting power, control andinstrumentation cables. This review included an assessment of the adequacy of theselected systems for reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal,process monitoring, and associated support system functions.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Passive Fire Protectionlnspection ScopeThe team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe materialconditions and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, ceilings,floors, fire doors and fire dampers), electrical raceway fire barriers, and equipment firebarriers to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.The team reviewed installation, repair and qualification records for a sample of openingsand penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and thatthe installation met the engineering design. The team reviewed similar records for thefire protection wraps to ensure the material was of an appropriate fire rating and that theinstallation met the engineering design. The team also reviewed completed surveillanceand maintenance procedures for selected passive fire protection features to verify thatmaintenance and inspection activities are adequate.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Active Fire ProtectionInspection ScopeThe team reviewed the design, maintenance, testing, and operation of the fire detectionand suppression systems in the selected plant fire areas. This included verification thatthe manual and automatic detection and suppression systems were installed, tested,and maintained in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codeof record, or as NRC approved exemptions, and that each suppression system wouldcontrol or extinguish fires associated with the hazards in the selected areas. A review ofthe design capibilities of the suppression agent delivery systems were verified to meetthe code requirements for the hazards involved. The team also performed a walkdownof accessible portions of the detection and suppression systems in the selected areas aswell as a walkdown of major system support equipment in other areas (e.9. fire pumpsand carbon dioxide storage tanks and supply system) to assess the material conditionand the operational lineup and availability of the systems and components'Enclosure.03 3The team reviewed electric and diesel fire pump flow and pressure tests to ensure thatthe pumps were meeting their design requirements. The team also reviewed the firemain loop flow tests to ensure that the flow distribution circuits were able to meet thedesign requirements.The team assessed the fire brigade capabilities by reviewing training, qualification, anddrill critique records. The team also compared pre-fire plans for the selected fire areaswith as-built plant conditions and fire response procedures to verify fire-fighting pre-fireplans are consistent with the fire protection features and potential fire conditionsdescribed in the FPP. In addition, the team inspected the fire brigade equipment(including smoke removal equipment) to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.b. FindinosNo findings were identified..04 Protection From Damaoe From Fire Suppression Activitiesa. Inspection ScopeThe team performed document reviews and plant walkdowns to verify that redundanttrains of systems required for hot shutdown, which are located in the same fire area, arenot subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertentoperation of fire suppression systems. Specifically, the team verified that:. A fire in one of the selected fire areas would not indirectly, through production ofsmoke, heat or hot gases, cause activation of suppression systems that couldpotentially damage all redundant safe shutdown trains;o A fire in one of the selected fire areas (or the inadvertent actuation or rupture of afire suppression system) would not indirectly cause damage to all redundanttrains (e.g. sprinkler caused flooding of other than the locally affected train); and,r Adequate drainage is provided in areas protected by water suppression systems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..05 Shutdown Capabilitv - Normal and Alternativea. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the safe shutdown analysis, operating procedures, piping andinstrumentation drawings (P&lDs), electrical drawings, the UFSAR and other supportingdocuments for the selected fire areas to verify that the licensee had properly identifiedthe systems and components necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdownconditions' Encrosure b..064The team assessed the adequacy of the selected systems and components for reactivitycontrol, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and supportsystem functions. This review included verification that alternative post-fire shutdowncould be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power. Plantwalkdowns were also performed to verify that the plant configuration was consistent withthat described in the safe shutdown and Iire hazards analyses. The team verified thatthe systems and components credited for use during shutdown would remain free fromfire damage.The team verified that the training program for licensed and non-licensed operatorsincluded alternative shutdown capability. The team also verified that personnel requiredfor safe shutdown using the normal or alternative shutdown systems and procedures aretrained and available onsite at all times, exclusive of those assigned as fire brigademembers.The team reviewed the adequacy of procedures utilized for post-fire shutdown andperformed an independent walk through of procedure steps to ensure theimplementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The team also verifiedthat the operators could be reasonably expected to perform specific actions within thetime required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.Specific procedures reviewed for normal and alternative post-fire shutdown included thefollowing:. OP-TM-EOP-020, Cooldown From Outside of Control Room;. OP-TM-AOP-001-C28, Fire in 1S 480V Switchgear Room;. OP-TM-AOP-001-A05, Fire in AB 281'GeneralArea; ando OP-TM-AOP-001, Fire.The team reviewed manual actions to ensure that they had been properly reviewed andapproved and that the actions could be implemented in accordance with plantprocedures in the time necessary to support the safe shutdown method for each firearea. The team also reviewed the periodic testing of the alternative shutdown transfercapability and instrumentation and controlfunctions to ensure the tests are adequate toensure the functionality of the alternative shutdown capability.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Circuit AnalvsisInspection ScopeThe team verified that the licensee performed a post-fire safe shutdown analysis for theselected fire areas and the analysis appropriately identified the structures, systems, andcomponents important to achieving and maintaining safe shutdown.a.Enclosure 5Additionally, the team verified that the licensee's analysis ensured that necessaryelectrical circuits were properly protected and that circuits that could adversely impactsafe shutdown due to hot shorts or shorts to ground were identified, evaluated, anddispositioned to ensure spurious actuations would not prevent safe shutdown.The team's review considered fire and cable attributes, cable routing, potentialundesirable consequences and common power supply/bus concerns. Specific itemsincluded the credibility of the fire threat, cable insulation attributes, cable failure modes,and actuations resulting in flow diversion or loss of coolant events.The team also reviewed cable raceway drawings and cable routing matrices for asample of components required for post-fire safe shutdown to verify that cables wererouted as described in the safe-shutdown analysis. The team also reviewed equipmentimportant to safe shutdown, but not part of the success path, to verify that the licenseehad taken appropriate actions in accordance with the design and licensing basis andNRC Regulatory Guide 1.189.Cable failure modes were reviewed for the following components:o EF-P-2A(B), Emergency Feedwater Motor Driven Pumps;o DH-P-1A(B), Decay Heat Removal Pumps;o DH-V-6A(B), Decay Heat Sump lsolation Valves;r MU-V-16C(D), RCS Make-UP Valves;r Pl-949, RCS Pressure Wide Range Indicator;r Pl-963, RCS Pressure Wide Range Indicator; ando RC3A-Pl, RCS Pressure Wide Range Indicator.The team reviewed a sample of circuit breaker coordination studies to ensure equipmentneeded to conduct post-fire safe shutdown activities would not be impacted due to a lackof coordination that could result in a common power supply or common bus concern.The team verified that the transfer of control from the control room to the alternativeshutdown location(s) would not be affected by fire-induced circuit faults (e.9., by theprovision of.separate fuses and power supplies for alternative shutdown control circuits).b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..07 Communicationsa. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed safe shutdown procedures, the safe shutdown analysis, andassociated documents to verify an adequate method of communications would beavailable to plant operators following a fire.Enclosure b.6During this review the team considered the effects of ambient noise levels, clarity ofreception, reliability, and coverage patterns. The team also inspected the designatedemergency storage lockers to verify the availability of portable radios for the fire brigadeand for plant operators. The team also verified that communications equipment such asrepeaters and transmitters would not be affected by a fire.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Emerqencv LiqhtinqInspection ScopeThe team observed the placement and coverage area of eight-hour emergency lightsthroughout the selected fire areas to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access andegress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation or instrumentationmonitoring for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also verified that the battery powersupplies were rated for at least an eight-hour capacity. Preventive maintenanceprocedures, the vendor manual, completed surveillance tests, and battery replacementpractices were also reviewed to verify that the emergency lighting was being maintainedconsistent with the manufacturer's recommendations and in a manner that would ensurereliable operation.FindinqsNo findings were identified.Cold Shutdown RepairsInspection ScopeThe team verified that the licensee had dedicated repair procedures, equipment, andmaterials to accomplish repairs of components required for cold shutdown which mightbe damaged by the fire to ensure cold shutdown could be achieved within the timeframes specified in their design and licensing bases. The team verified that the repairequipment, components, tools, and materials (e.9. pre-cut cables with preparedattachment lugs) were available and accessible on site'FindinqsNo findings were identified..08.09a.b.Enclosure 7.10 CompensatoryMeasuresa. Inspection ScopeThe team verified that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service,degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment, systems,or features (e.9. detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive firebarriers, or pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions orcapabilities). The team also verified that the short term compensatory measurescompensated for the degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actioncould be taken and that the licensee was effective in returning the equipment to servicein a reasonable period of time.The team reviewed compensatory measures in the form of manual actions for 10 CFRPart 50 Appendix R, Section lll.G.2 areas to verify that there is reasonable assurancethat manual actions can be accomplished. Specific attributes reviewed includediagnostic instrumentation, environmental consideration, staffing, communications,equipment availability, training, procedures, and verification and validation.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..11 Fire Protection Prooram Changesa. lnsoection ScopeThe team reviewed recent changes to the approved fire protection program to verify thatthe changes did not constitute an adverse effect on the ability to safely shutdown.b. FindinosNo findings were identified..12 Control of Transient Combustibles and lqnition Sourcesa. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the licensee's procedures and programs for the control of ignitionsources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires andin controlling combustible loading within limits established in the FHAR. A sample of hotwork and transient combustible control permits were also reviewed. The teamperformed plant walkdowns to verify that transient combustibles and ignition sourceswere being implemented in accordance with the administrative controls.Enclosure 8b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..13 Larqe Fires and Explosions Mitioation Strateqiesa. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the licensee's preparedness to handle large fire or explosions byreviewing two mitigating strategies to verify they continue to meet operating licensecondition 2.C.17 by determining that:. Procedures are being maintained and adequate;. Equipment is properly staged and is being maintained and tested; and,o Station personnel are knowledgeable and can implement the procedures.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.4. OTHER ACTIVITIES [OA]4OA2 ldentification and Resolution of Problems.01 Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficienciesa. Inspection ScopeThe team verified that the licensee was identifying fire protection and post-fire safeshutdown issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the corrective actionprogram. The team also reviewed a sample of selected issues to verify that the licenseehad taken or planned appropriate corrective actions.b. FindinosNo findings were identified.4OAO Meetinqs. Includinq ExitExit Meetino SqmmarvThe team presented their preliminary inspection results to Mr. Richard Libra, PlantManager, and other members of the site staff at an exit meeting on February 11,2011.No proprietary information was included in this inspection report.Enclosure A-1ATTACHMENTSUPPLEM ENTAL INFORMATIONKEY POINTS OF CONTACTLicensee PersonnelR. Libra, Plant ManagerP. Alaimo, Reactor OperatorT. Alvey, Operations Service ManagerG. Ciraula, Fire Protection EngineerJ. Dullinger, Senior Operations Service ManagerR. Ezzo, Senior Staff EngineerM. Fitzwater, Licensing EngineerW. McSorley, Design EngineerR. Meyers, Site Fire MarshallT. O'Connor, Fire Protection ContractorC. Pragman, Exelon Corporate Fire ProtectionJ. Schork, Senior Operations Training InstructorT. Snyder, Reactor OperatorM. Taylor, Exelon Corporate Fire ProtectionM. Torborg, Steam Generator Program EngineerJ. Troiano, Warehouse ManagerNRCJ. Rogge, Chief, Engineering Branch 3, Division of Reactor SafetyD. Kern, Senior Resident Inspector, Three Mile lslandJ. Heinly, Resident Inspector, Three Mile lslandLIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSEDNoneAttachment A-2LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDFire Protection Licensinq Documents990-1745, TMI-1 Fire Hazards Analysis Report, Rev.24Exemption TMl, Unit 1, TMI Nuclear Generating Station, 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix R ExemptionRequest, Dated 7111197Exemption TMl, Unit 1, Request for Exemption from Title 10 of the Code of Federal RegulationsPart 50, Appendix R Requirement, Dated 3/30/09Exemption Request, Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section lll.G, "FireProtection of Safe Shutdown Capability," Dated 214108Exemption Request, Response to Request for Additional Information from 10 CFR 50, AppendixR, Section lll.G, "Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability," Dated 1128109UFSAR Section 9.9, Fire Protection Program, Rev. 20SER, Fire Protection for TMI-1, Dated 12130186Desiqn Chanqes08-01051, Revise FHAR Control Room Evaluation and Loss of Seal Cooling Strategy, Rev. 009-00196, FHAR Changes for Manual Action Submittals, Rev. 010-00194, Add ELU for 1D 4160, Rev. 1ECR TM 08-00145, Replacement of Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves MS-V-4A/B, Rev. 1FPE No. 113202341, Permanent Installation of Lead Shielding on DH System, Rev. 0Temporary Shielding Package 99-1-019, Rev. 0Temporary Shielding Package 99-1-020, Rev' 0c-1101-211-E610-066, Makeup Tank Level and Pressure Limits, Rev. 9Calculations/Enqineerinq Evaluation Reportsg6-9101 191-001 , TMI-1 Appendix R Transient Evaluation Summary, Dated 6/8/09C1101-732-5350-005, Sh. 7, TMI-1 Emergency Feedwater Pumps - 450 Hp Time CurrentCh a racteristi c Cu rve, EF -P -2 A(2B), Dated 1 21 281 95C1101-732-53S0-005, Sh. 11, TMI-1 Decay Heat Removal Pumps - 350 Hp Time CurrentCharacteristic Curve, DH-P-1A(1 B), Dated 12128195Ci1O1-Zg2-0350-005, Sh. 15, TMI-1 4.16KV Switchgear 1D and 1E Time Current CharacteristicCurves, Dated 12128195C1iO1-733-5350-003, Sh. 27, TMl-1 Class 1E 480V Switchgear Time Current CharacteristicCurve, Dated 2117187Configuration Change - #T1-CCD-417109-001, Rev. 3ECD C306691, TMI-1 Aux Building Fire Boundary Re-Classification, Dated 5113198Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Evaluation Report, Rev. 0Fire Test Configuration for BISCO Three Hour Fire Seal, Report No. 3001-03-8, Rev. 0Metal Clad FirsWall Penetration Barrier Fire Testing, BISCO Test No. 748-14, Rev' 0PC 26455, Procedure Changes Documenting OMA Timelines, Dated 619110PC 26717, Procedure Changes to OP-TM-AOP-001, OP-TM-AOP-001 1, OP-TM-EOP-020, OP-TM-AOP-0201, Documenting OMA Timelines, Dated 216109Attachmenl A-3Technical Evaluation 352410, Loss of RCP Seal Cooling lmpact on TMI FHAR Assumptions,Dated 1012109Technical Evaluation 751354-11, RCP Trip Manual Action Time Basis, Dated 5/8/08Technical Evaluation 817422, Time between Fire Detection and Cable Failure in CB-FA-3d andCB-FA-4b, Dated 712109TM 07-00702, Add CO Values to the FHAR and Change MU Valves Action Times, Dated 317108TM 09-00034, Technical Evaluation for Time to lsolate Seal Return in Event of Fire, Dated2t3t09TM 09-00527, Appendix R Control Room Evacuation Transient Analysis, Dated 8112109Procedures1104-45R, Fire Protection System Operations Surveillance, Rev. 01301-15.1, Appendix"R" Cold Shutdown RepairMaterial lnventory, Rev. 13, 13,A, and141303-12.24, Raceway Fire Barrier Inspection, Rev. 171303-13.4, Remote Shutdown System FunctionalTest, Rev. 81420-Y-30, Repair of Appendix "R" Cold Shutdown and Remote Shutdown Sys. Circuits,Rev. 151430-Y-41, Foxboro Multinest Power Supply Maintenance, Rev. 4AP 1038, Administrative Controls, Fire Protection Program, Rev. 76CC-AA-209, Fire Protection Program Configuration Change Review, Rev. 1CC-AA-211-1001, Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations, Rev. 0OP-AA-201-005, Fire Brigade Qualification, Rev. 7OP-TM-102-106, Control of Time Critical Operator Actions at TMl, Rev. 0TQ-AA-173, Emergency Services Training, Rev' 0WC-TM-430, Surveillance Testing Program, Rev. 0Operations ProceduresOP-TM-226-901, Loss of all RCP Seal Cooling, Rev' 4OP-TM-424-901, Emergency Feedwater, Rev. 1OP-TM-AOP-001, Fire, Rev. IOP-TM-AOP-001-A05, Fire in AB 281'General, Rev. 3OP-TM-AOP-001-C28, Fire in 1S 480V Switchgear Room, Rev. 6OP-TM-AOP-001 1, Fire in AB 281', General Area Basis Document, Rev. 5OP-TM-AOP-001 1, Fire in 480V Switchgear Room Basis Document, Rev. 8OP-TM-EOP-020, Cooldown From Outside of Control Room, Rev. 12OP-TM-EOP-0201, Cooldown From Outside of Control Room Basis Document, Rev. 6OP-TM-AOP-041, Loss of Seal lnjection, Rev. 5OP-TM-AOP-0411, Loss of Seal lnjection Basis Document, Rev. 5OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormaland Emergency Events, Rev. 18Com pleted Tests/Su rveillancesST 1301-12.2, Hose Station Inspection, Completed 8118110ST 1301-12.3, Fire System Hose Station Inspection and FunctionalTest, Completed 8/19/10ST 1302-6.6A, Calibration of ChannelA RCS Temp/Press, Tsat Monitor, ATWS, and DSS,Completed 1119110Attachment A-4ST 1303-12.8A, Fire Protection Instrumentation FunctionalTest (Control Building Elevation355'), Completed 7 l 12110ST 1303-12.88, Fire Protection Instrumentation FunctionalTest (Control Building Elevation338'), Completed 11 122110ST 1303-12.8C, Fire Protection Instrumentation FunctionalTest (Control Building Elevation322'), Completed 7 l 121 10ST 1302-12.11, Halon System Tests, Completed 11113110ST 1303-4.16, Emergency Power System, Rev. 121, Completed 9/10/09ST 1303-12.23, Fire Damper Inspection, Rev. 28ST 1303-12.24, Raceway Fire Barrier Inspection, Completed 1120110ST 1303-13.4, Remote Shutdown System FunctionalTest, Completed 9/9/09,1Q128109,1 1 13109, 1 1 121 109, and 1 1 127 109ST 1303-13.4, Remote Shutdown System Functional Test, Completed 12118109 and 12126109ST 1303-13.4, Remote Shutdown System FunctionalTest, Rev.7ST 1303-14.2, Inspection of Fire Brigade Vehicle Equipment, Rev' 10ST 3303-42,Fire System Main Header Flush and Loop Test, Completed 6/28110ST 3303-42, Fire System Main Header Flush and Loop Test, Completed 6/28110ST 3303-42, Fire System Main Header Flush and Loop Test, Completed 9/13/09ST 3303-43, Fire Pump Capacity Testing, Completed 6126110 and 7130109ST 3391-SA1, Fire Hydrant Inspection, Rev. 27Qualitv Assurance Audits and Self AssessmentsNOSA-TMl-08-09 (AR 766950766950 Three Mile lsland, Rev' 0NOSA-TMI-10-10 (AR 1101376) Three Mile lsland, Rev. 01081194, Inspection Preparatory Self-Assessment, Rev. 0Svstem Health Reports762-Emergency Lighting System, 2no Quarter 2010762-Emergency Lighting System, 4'n Quarter 2010Drawinqs and Wirinq Diaorams1E-120-01-001, Site Plan Units No. 1 & 2, Above Ground Facilities, Rev. 741E-156-02-003, General Arrangement Intermediate Building Floor Plan EL 332', Rev. 1 11-FHA-025, Fire Area Layout Aux Building and Air Intake Tunnel Plans and Sections, Rev. 71-FHA-026, Fire Area Layout, Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings, Rev. 181-FHA-027, Fire Area Layout Auxiliary and Fuel Handling Buildings Plan Floor 305', Rev. 101-FHA-035, Fire Area Layout, Control Tower 322', Rev' 131-FHA-037, Fire Area Layout, ControlTower Section A-A, Rev. 61-FHA-038, Fire Area Layout, Control Tower Section B-8, Rev. 61-FHA-039, Fire Area Layout, lntermediate Building 295', Rev. 71-FHA-040, Fire Area Layout, Intermediate Building 305', Rev' 41-FHA-043, Fire Area Layout, Intermediate Building Sections, Rev. 41-FHA-046, Fire Area Layout, lntake Screen and Pump House, Rev. 8201-401, Electrical-Arrangement Remote Shutdown PanelA Front Panel Layout, Rev. 1201-402, Electrical-Arrangement Remote Shutdown Panel B Front Panel Layout, Rev. 1Attachment A-5201-404, Electrical-Arrangement Auxiliary Remote Shutdown Panel B Front Panel Layout,Rev.0201-411, TMI-1 Remote Shutdown Transfer Switch Panel B, Rev. 02Q8-203, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear (ES) (1D3) Motor Driven EmergencyFeedwater Pump EF-P2A, Rev. 15208-205, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear (ES) (1E5) Motor Driven EmergencyFeed Water Pump EF-P-28, Rev. 17208-211, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear (ES) (1DO) Decay Heat RemovalPump DH-P-1A, Rev. 3208-212, Electrical Elementary Diagram 4160V Switchgear (ES)(1E7) Decay Heat RemovalPump DH-P-18, Rev. 52Q8-434, Sh. 1, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center 1A-ESV Unit 38 RB Sumpto DH Pump A Valve DH-V-6A, Rev. 8208-434, Sh.2, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center 1B-ESV Unit 38, RB Sumpto DH Pump B Valve DH-V-68, Rev. 6208-442, Sh. 3, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center 1B-ESV Unit 48Emergency Makeup Valve MU-V-16C, Rev. 6208-442, Sh.4, Electrical Elementary Diagram 480V Control Center 1B-ESV Unit 4CEmergency Makeup Valve MU-V-16D, Rev. 0208-750, TMI-1 Electrical Elementary Diagram Remote Shutdown Trnsfr Switch Panel B, Rev. 2208-752, TMI-1 Electrical Elementary Diagram Remote Shutdown Trnsfr Switch Panel B, Rev. 3208-753, TMI-1 Electrical Elementary Diagram Remote Shutdown Trnsfr Switch Panel B, Rev..2208-756, TMI-1 Electrical Elementary Diagram Remote Shutdown Trnsfr Switch Panel A, Rev. 4208-757, TMI-1 Electrical Elementary Diagram Remote Shutdown Trnsfr Switch Panel A, Rev. 1208-758, TMI-1 Electrical Elementary Diagram Remote Shutdown Trnsfr Switch Panel C, Rev. 3208-759, Electrical Elementary Diagram Remote Shutdown EDG B, Rev' 1210-483, Electrical Arrangement and Wiring Diagram Remote Shutdown Panel B Rear and SidePanel, Rev.3224-336, Sh. 5, Electrical lnstrumentation ChannelA Containment Vessel Penetration No.204E, Rev. 16224-336, Sh. 7, Electrical lnstrumentation Channel B Containment Vessel Penetration No.205E, Rev. 19CB2B-7, SWGR Room EastWall, Rev.4CD-13-1, Sh. 1, TMI-1 Reactor Coolant System Saturation Margin Monitor Channel A, Rev. 9CD-23-1, TMI-1 Reactor Coolant System Saturation Margin Monitor Channel B, Rev. ID-215-183, TMI-1 Electrical Conduit and Cable Layout Auxiliary Building Elev. 305'AuxiliaryPlan, Rev. 18D8032703, Auxiliary Control System Detailed Schematic Reactor Coolant Part 3, Rev. XD8042008, Schematic Diagram Engineered Safeguards System Reactor Pressure AnalogSubsystem - Part 1 Analog Channel 1, Rev. ME-206-011, TMI-1 Electrical Main One Line and Relay Diagram, Rev. 51E-214-024, TMI-1 Electrical Cable Trays Reactor Aux Building Below Elev. 329', Rev. 13Pipinq and Instrumentation Diaqrams302-011, Main Steam Flow Diagram, Rev. 72302-031, Composite Startup Flow Diagram, Rev. 9302-081, Feedwater Flow Diagram, Rev.54Attachment A-6302-082, Emergency Feedwater Flow Diagram, Rev. 24302-101, Condensate, Rev. 64302-131, Condenser, Rev. 45302-202, Nuclear Services River Water, Rev. 77302-231, Sh. 1, Fire Services Water, Rev 107302-231, Sh. 2, Fire Services Water, Rev. 16302-231, Sh. 3, Fire Services Water, Rev. 20302-231, Sh. 4, Fire Services Water, Rev. 8302-231, Sh. 5, Fire Services Water, Rev. 1302-610, Closed Cycle Cooling Water, Rev. 78302-620,Intermediate Cooling Flow Diagram, Rev. 50302-650, Reactor Coolant System Flow Diagram, Rev. 59302-660, Make-up and Purification Flow Diagram, Rev. 44302-661, Make-up and Purification Flow Diagram, Rev. 59lE-200-21-1000, Reactor Plant Systems Flow Diagram, Rev. 1Vendor ManualsMIN-1, Electroswitch Miniature Instrument and Control Switch for Power Industry Applications,Dated 411191Pre-Fire PlanslB-FZ-3, Rev. 2CB-FA-2B, Rev.2CB-FA-3D, Rev.2AB-FZ-5, Rev. 1Fire Briqade TraininqFBP01, Introduction/Orientation, Rev. 6FBP02, Protective Clothing, Rev. 5FBP04, Fire Behavior and Essentials, Rev. 10FBP05, Ventilation, Rev. 6FBP07, Hose Streams, Appliances, Tools, Rev.6FBP09, Extinguishers and Agents, Rev. 8FBP1 1, Tactics and Strategy, Rev. 8FBP13, Plant Communications, Rev. 3FBPl 4, Building Construction/Awareness, Rev. 6FBP15, Pre-Fire Plans, Rev.6FBP17, Foam/Multi-Agent Operations, Rev. 2IMS-01, Incident Management System, Rev. 2Attachment A-7Operator Safe Shutdown Trai.ninqN-TM-TQ-104-E20, Cooldown From Outside Control Room, Rev. 2TQ-TM-104-E20-S001, Cooldown Outside Control Room, Rev. 4TQ-TM-106-A01-5002,Fire in ESAS Room, Rev. 1Miscellaneous Job Performance Measure Scenarios, Reviewed on 1127111Miscellaneous DocumentsSP-1101-11-245, Specification for Procurement of Replacement 4KV Breakers, Rev. 2GAI Report - Cable and Cable Tray Routing Data2544244, Certificate of Calibration for Fluke Digital Multimeter, Dated 1012410310293143, Certificate of Calibration for Programma Vidar, Dated 111510410297315, Certificate of Calibration for Aristo Stopwatch, Dated 2117lO410627797, Certificate of Calibration for Programma Micro Ohmmeter, Dated 11711110632409, Certificate of Calibration for Programma Vidar, Dated 217111E-Light Condition Monitoring Failure Report, Dated 2110111Operations Shift Roster, Dated 1lll11through 114111lssue Reports0812129081 3701081 5641081 58770869855098531 41 059605105988710598931059933* NRC identified during105994910599741 0600001 0600061 06004810600511060065106007010600771119408this inspection.1129297115708411575791 1 57593115766411577061166262*1167489*1 167550.1167613*1 1 681 03.1 1 681 05.1170412"1171108"1 1 73363.1173432.173456-173654-173657"173662.Attachment A-8Work OrdersA21 86408A2214541422147354221984742227513c2005480c2005481c2005482c2005483c2005484R1835635R2072878R2072880R2102398R2112272R2112274R2112276R2112433R2112434R2112488R2113256R2126681R2132441R2165284R2173076Laroe Fires and Explosions Mitioation Strateoies DocumentsSP 3303-A3, Rev. 16ER-TM-TSC-0025, Rev.2OP-AA-201 -01 0-1 001, Rev. 0OP-TM-220-91 1, Rev. 4OP-TM-424-921, Rev. 3OP-TM-811-911, Rev. 1OP-TM-AOP-009, Rev.4Attachment A-9LIST OF ACRONYMSADAMS Agencyruide Documents Access and Management SystemBTP Branch Technical PositionCFR Code of Federal RegulationsCMEB Chemical Engineering BranchDRS Division of Reactor SafetyDRP Division of Reactor ProjectsFA Fire AreaFHAR Fire Hazards AnalYsis RePortFPP Fire Protection ProgramFW FeedwaterFZ Fire ZonelP Inspection ProcedureIPE lndividual Plant ExaminationIPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External EventslR Inspection ReportNFPA National Fire Protection AssociationNRC Nuclear Regulatory commissionPAR Publicly Available RecordsP&lD Piping and Instrumentation DrawingTMI Three Mile lslandUFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis ReportAttachment