IR 05000289/2011004
| ML113080106 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/2011 |
| From: | Travis Tate NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Pacilio M Exelon Nuclear, Exelon Generation Co |
| tate, travis l | |
| References | |
| IR-11-004 | |
| Download: ML113080106 (34) | |
Text
September 30, 2011
SUBJECT:
THREE MILE ISLAND STATION, UNIT 1 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 5000289t201 1 004
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On September 30, 2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Three Mile lsland, Unit 1 (TMl) facility. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2011, with Mr. Glen Chick, Site Vice President, and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice", a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.oov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5046 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Travis L. Tate, Acting Chief Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No: 50-289 License No: DPR-50 Distribution w/encl: See Next Page ML1 130g0106 SUNSI Review Complete: TLT (Reviewer's Initials)
DOC NAME:G:\\DRP\\BRANCH6\\+++THREE MILE ISLAND\\TMI INSPECTION REPORTS\\TMI 11-OO4.DOCX After declaring this document "An Otficial Agency Record" it will be released to the Public.
o receive a copv of this document. indicate in the box' uC"= Cooy wiftout atbchmenUenclosure "E"=CoDy with CFFICE mmf RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRP
\\AME DWerkheiser/ EMD for ADuoandzic/EMD for TTate/ TLT
)ATE 10t13t11
't0t31t't1 11t03 t11 T
uNn=No @py
Docket No:
License No:
Report No:
Licensee:
Facility:
Location:
Dates:
lnspectors:
Approved by:
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION 1 50-289 DPR-50 05000289/2011004 Exelon Generation Company Three Mile lsland Station. Unit 1 Middletown, PA 17057 July 1 through September 30, 2011 D. Werkheiser, Senior Resident Inspector J. Heinly, Resident Inspector R. Nimitz, Senior Health Physicist D. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector T. Tate, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS lR 0500028912011004;71112011-91301201 1; Three Mile lsland, Unit 1; Integrated Inspection Report.
The report covered a three-month period of baseline inspection conducted by resident inspectors and announced inspections by a regional specialist inspector. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS Summarv of Plant Status Three Mile lsland, Unit 1 (TMl) began the inspection period at approximately 100 percent power.
On September 2, TMI reduced power to perform turbine valve testing and then continued to reduce power to 50 percent to perform planned condenser water box leak search and repairs.
Reactor power was returned to 100 percent on September 5 and continued to operate at full power until the end of the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 3 samples of AW)
lmpendinq Adverse Weather (AW)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Exelon's readiness and response to the listed three adverse weather events. The inspectors reviewed station implementation of OP-M-108-111-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines, Rev. 5 and OP-TM-108-1 1 1-1001, TMI Site Inaccessibility Plan, Rev. 3. The inspectors performed station walkdowns, interviewed operators and security officers, and observed plant operations prior to, during, and after each of the events to verify TMI operation was consistent with Technical Specifications (TS), that the security plan was properly implemented, and emergency response organization (ERO) capabilities were maintained in accordance with EP-AA-1009, Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for TMI Station, Rev. 16. As a result of the storms, emergency notification sirens became inoperable after hurricane lrene and Lee.
Exelon instituted appropriate compensatory actions to maintain adequate emergency notification, as necessary. The inspectors reviewed the compensatory actions as well as reportability criteria. In addition, the inspectors walked down plant area to identify indications of rain water intrusion and reviewed its potential impact on plant equipment.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
. Severe thunderstorms and high winds (July 25)
. High winds and precipitation associated with Hurricane lrene (August 26-28)
o High winds, precipitation, and flooding associated with Hurricane Lee (September 7-10)
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
Enclosure
1 R04 Equipment Aliqnment (71111.04)
a. Inspection Scope Partial Svstem Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 2 samples)
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
. A' train decay heat system during suction relief valve change-out on the 'B' train on September 14
. 'A' train motor-driven emergency feedwater system during 'B' train testing on September 15 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical specifications, work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system peformance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.
The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The inspectors also reviewed whether Exelon staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the corrective action program for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterlv Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that Exelon controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment was available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan, and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out of service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance with procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. Fire zones and areas inspected included:
o Fire Zone FH-FZ-2, Fuel Handling Building Elevation 305', General Area o Fire Zone DG-FA-2, Diesel Generator Building, EG-Y-18 Room and Control Panel o Fire Zone SBO Fuel OilTank Room, SBO Diesel Fuel OilTank Room Enclosure
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
.2 Fire Protection - Drill Observation (71111.05A - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed a fire brigade drill scenario conducted on September 6, 2011 that involved a simulated fire in the Intermediate Building 295-foot level, at the instrument air compressor cubicle. The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the plant fire brigade to fight fires. The inspectors verified that Exelon personnel identified deficiencies, openly discussed them in a self-critical manner at the debrief, and took appropriate corrective actions as required. The inspectors evaluated specific attributes as follows:
. Proper wearing of turnout gear and self-contained breathing apparatus
. Proper use and layout of fire hoses
. Employment of appropriate fire-fighting techniques
. Sufficient fire-fighting equipment brought to the scene
. Effectiveness of command and control
. Search for victims and propagation of the fire into other plant areas o Smoke removal operations e Utilization of pre-planned strategies o Adherence to the pre-planned drill scenario
. Drill objectives met The inspectors also evaluated the fire brigade's actions to determine whether these actions were in accordance with Exelon's fire-fighting strategies. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection (71111.06 * 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope On July 19, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR, the applicable flooding analysis, plant procedures, and performed visual inspections of flood barriers, system boundaries, water line break sources, and floor drains located in the makeup pump cubicles vault where internal flooding could adversely affect safety related systems needed for safe shutdown of the plant. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the design and execution of flood indications and mitigation strategies for internal flooding of the cubicles. The inspectors also reviewed the corrective action program to determine if internal flooding mitigation and indication deficiencies were identified and corrected. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Enclosure
c. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Proqram (71111.11Q - 1 sample)
Resident Inspector Quarterlv Review a. Inspection Scope On August 19, the inspectors observed licensed operator requalification training at the control room simulator for the 'E' operator crew and pre-simulator demonstration on the to-be-installed next outage digital control rod system. The inspectors observed the operators' simulator drill performance and compared it to the criteria listed in TMI Operational Simulator Scenario TQ-TM-106-622-S001, DCRS Demonstration, and TQ-TM-106-5005, Feedwater Pump Trip, Steam Generator Tube Leak and Emergency Declaration.
The inspectors reviewed the operators' ability to correctly evaluate the simulator training scenario and implement the emergency plan. The inspectors observed supervisory oversight, command and control, communication practices, and crew assignments to ensure they were consistent with normal control room activities. The inspectors observed operator response during the simulator drill transients. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and TS action statements entered by the crew. The inspectors evaluated training instructor effectiveness in recognizing and correcting individual and operating crew errors. The inspectors attended the post-drill critique and reviewed the written crew critique in order to evaluate the effectiveness of problem identification.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q -2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of maintenance activities on structures, systems, and components (SSC) performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed system health reports, corrective action program documents, maintenance work orders, and maintenance rule basis documents to ensure that Exelon was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (aX2) performance criteria established by Exelon staff was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Exelon staff was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Enclosure
. Fire service pump 1 overheat during testing, July '15,2011 (lR 1240433)
e Decay river system piping integrity deficiencies, September 13, 2011 (lR 1262612)
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance RiskAssessments and EmerqentWork Control (71111.13-4 samples)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Exelon performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Exelon personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 60.65(aX4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When Exelon performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk.
The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results of the assessment with the station's probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment
. Station planned activities during high grid load conditions and high Susquehanna River temperature on July 22 r Elevated station risk during adverse weather conditions and planned station blackout diesel generator maintenance on July 25
. Planned surveillance testing on the heat sink protection system and the preservation of 'green' risk condition by crediting operator actions to manipulate the emergency feedwater (EFW) injection valves on August 9 e The planned replacement of the 'A' decay heat relief valve, DH-V-60, and the review of station's evaluations to ensure availability of the decay heat removal system on August 31 b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R15 Operabilitv Evaluations (71111.15 - 2 samples)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:
. lssues identified in lR 01253738 regarding nuclear service to reactor river system check valve, NS-V-205, failing to seat on August 21 Enclosure
. Nuclear service to reactor river system cross connect valve, NS-V-135, failure on September 1 The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the operability determinations to assess whether technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and UFSAR to Exelon's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable.
Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Exelon. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 1 sample)
Temoorarv Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the temporary modifications listed below to determine whether the modifications affected the safety functions of systems that are important to safety.
The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 50.59 documentation and postmodification testing results, and conducted field walkdowns of the modifications to verify that the temporary modifications did not degrade the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the affected systems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
o Engineering Change Request (ECR) 1 1-00313, Rev. 1,Technical Evaluation to Justify Addition of Undenuater Demineralizer in Spent Fuel Pool b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testinq (71111.19 - 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed Enclosure
I
the test or reviewed test data to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
. On July 15, the 'B' spent fuel pool cooling pump motor was replaced during planned preventive maintenance for the system. Operators performed 1300-3E8, IST of "B" SF Pump and Valves, Rev. 3 (WO R2180708) as a post maintenance test
. On July 27, maintenance activities to emergency diesel generator, EG-Y-IA, ventilation fan, AH-E-29A (AR A2282771)
. On August 4, the control building emergency ventilation filter, AH-F-3A, was removed from service for replacement of the selected charcoal filter banks. Operators performed 1303-1 1.13, Control Room Filtering System Test, Rev. 21 as a post maintenance test for operability (WO R2166809)
. On August 24, replacement of ESAS relays and subsequent testing and visual inspection per 1303-5.1A (WO R218295301)
. On September 17, testing of 'B' reactor river water pump after maintenance activities (oP-TM-534-204)
. On September 21, technicians replaced relays in the ESAS and operations performed post maintenance testing in accordance with 1303-5.2A, "A" Emergency Loading Sequence and HPI Logic Channel/Component test, Rev. 6 (WO R2184413)
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R20 Refuelinq and Other Outaoe Activiti-es F1111.20 - 1 partial sample)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed activities during the quarter to assess Exelon's preparation for a refueling outage. The inspectors reviewed or observed the following:
o New fuel receipt and inspection, including the movement of nuclear fuel in the spent fuel pool
. Attended pre-outage readiness meetings
. Observed the setup of scaffolding in safety-related and radiologically controlled areas b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testino (71111.22 - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope (5 routine surveillance samples)
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied technical specifications, the UFSAR, and Exelon procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations Enclosure
and the range and accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:
r On July 13, 3303-A3, Fire Pump Capacity Testing, Rev. 17
. On August 5, OP-TM-214-254, BS Leakage Exam Train B, Rev. 3, performance of a leakage exam on the 'B' building spray system
. On August 2, ST1303-1 1.37A, HSPS - OTSG Level and Pressure Channel I Tests, Rev.28
. On September 15, OP-TM-300-302, Quadrant Power Tilt and Axial Power lmbalance Using the Out-of-Core Detector System, Rev. 1
. On September 30, ST1302-6.14, PORV and Code Safety D/P Monitors, Rev. 15b b. Findinos No findings were identified.
lEPO Drill Evaluation (71114.00 - 2 samples)
Emerqencv Preparedness Drill Observation a. lnspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the conduct of routine Exelon emergency drills on August 8 and September 2Q,2011 to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulator and technical support center to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the station drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified by Exelon staff in order to evaluate Exelon's critique and to verify whether Exelon staff was appropriately identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findinqs No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure
2.
RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety (OS)
2RSO1 Access Control to Radiolooicallv Siqnificant Areas (71124.01)
a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed selected activities and associated documentation in the below listed areas. The evaluation of Exelon's performance was against criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 20, applicable Technical Specifications, and applicable station procedures.
The inspectors reviewed Performance lndicators (Pls) for the Occupational Exposure Cornerstone. The inspectors also reviewed the results of recent radiation protection program audits and assessments and any reports of operational occurrences related to occupational radiation safety since the last inspection. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Radioloqical Hazard Assessment The inspectors discussed plant operations to identify any significant new radiological hazard for onsite workers or members of the public. The inspectors assessed the potential impact of the changes (e.9., fuel integrity status) and the implementation of periodic monitoring, as appropriate, to detect and quantify the radiological hazard.
The inspectors toured various radiological controlled areas and reviewed radiological surveys from selected plant areas (auxiliary building and spent fuel pool areas) to verify that the thoroughness and frequency of the surveys were appropriate for the given radiological hazard. The inspectors selectively reviewed radiological controls for change-out of the make-up filter radiation work permit (RWP) No. 11-14.
The inspectors selectively reviewed posted radiological surveys during plant tours and compared measurements to independent survey measurements made by the inspectors.
During plant tours, the inspectors selectively challenged three Locked High Radiation Areas doors.
I nstructions to Workers The inspectors toured the radiological controlled areas and reviewed the labeling of radioactive material containers.
Problem ldentification and Resolution The inspectors selectively verified through review of corrective action documents that problems associated with radiation monitoring and exposure controlwere being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and were properly addressed for resolution in the licensee corrective action program. The inspectors also selectively evaluated the appropriateness of the corrective actions for a selected sample of problems documented.
(See Section 4OA2)
Enclosure
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
2RS02 Occupational ALARA Planninq and Controls (71124.02)
a. lnspection Scope The inspectors selectively reviewed information regarding plant collective exposure history, current exposure trends, and ongoing or planned activities in order to assess current performance and exposure challenges.
The inspectors determined the site-specific trends in collective exposures (using NUREG-0713, "Occupational Radiation Exposure at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors and Other Facilities," and plant historical data) and source term.
The inspectors reviewed site-specific procedures associated with maintaining occupational exposures as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) including processes used to estimate and track exposures from specific work activities. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Radioloqical Work Planninq The inspectors obtained a list of completed and planned work activities ranked by actual or estimated exposure (> 5 person-rem or radiological risk significant). The inspectors attended a monthly Station ALARA Committee meeting (No. 11-07).
The inspectors reviewed the ALARA work activity evaluations (reactor disassembly/reassembly, fuel movement, scaffolding, steam generator inspection, cavity decontamination), exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation requirements. The inspectors determined if the licensee reasonably grouped the radiological work into work activities, based on historical precedence, industry norms, and/or special circumstances.
The inspectors reviewed shutdown coolant clean-up plans.
The inspectors selectively verified that the licensee's planning identified appropriate dose mitigation features; considered, commensurate with the risk of the work activity, alternate mitigation features; and defined reasonable dose goals. The inspectors selectively verified that ALARA requirements were being incorporated into work procedure and RWP documents.
Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure TrackinL_Svstems The inspectors selected work activities (> 5 person-rem work activities and selected risk significant activities) and reviewed the assumptions and basis (including dose rate and man-hour estimates) for the current annual collective exposure estimate for reasonable accuracy. The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures to determine the methodology for estimating exposures from specific work activities and the intended dose outcome.
The inspectors verified, for the selected work activities, that the licensee had established measures to track, trend, and if necessary to reduce, occupational doses for ongoing work activities. The inspectors selectively reviewed and verified that trigger points or Enclosure
criteria were established to prompt additional reviews and/or additionalALARA planning and controls.
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's method of adjusting exposure estimates, or re-planning work, when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work were encountered.
Source Term Reduction and Control The inspectors discussed, and used licensee records to determine historical trends and current status of significant tracked plant source terms known to contribute to elevated facility aggregate exposure. The inspectors determined if the licensee was making allowances or developing contingency plans for expected changes in the source term as the result of changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry.
Problem ldentification and Resolution The inspectors selectively verified that problems associated with ALARA planning and controls were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. (See Section 4OA2)
b. Findinos No findings were identified.
2RS03 ln-Plant Airborne Radioactivitv Control and Mitiqation (71124.03 - 1 sample)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to identify areas of the plant designed as potential airborne radiation areas and any associated ventilation systems or airborne monitoring instrumentation. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR for overview of the respiratory protection program and a description of the types of devices used, as applicable. The inspectors selectively reviewed the UFSAR, Technical Specifications, and emergency planning documents, to identify location and quantity of respiratory protection devices stored for emergency use.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for maintenance, inspection, and use of respiratory protection equipment including self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
and procedures for air quality maintenance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
The inspectors reviewed the reported Pls to identify any related to unintended dose resulting from intakes of radioactive materials.
Enqineerinq Controls The inspectors selectively discussed, reviewed, and verified that the licensee uses ventilation systems as part of its engineering controls (in lieu of respiratory protection devices) to control airborne radioactivity. The inspectors reviewed guidance for use of installed plant systems, such as containment purge, spent fuel pool ventilation, and Enclosure
auxiliary building ventilation, and verified that the systems were used, to the extent practicable, during high-risk activities.
The inspectors selectively discussed and reviewed two installed ventilation systems used to mitigate the potential for airborne radioactivity, to verify that ventilation airflow capacity, flow path (including the alignment of the suction and discharges), and filter/charcoal unit efficiencies were consistent with maintaining concentrations of airborne radioactivity in work areas below the concentrations of an airborne area to the extent practicable.
The inspectors selectively evaluated installed systems to monitor and warn of changing airborne concentrations in the plant. The inspectors reviewed and discussed alarms and set-points to prompt licensee/worker action to ensure that doses were maintained within the limits of 10 CFR Part20 and ALAM.
The inspectors reviewed procedures that established trigger points for evaluating levels of airborne beta-emitting and alpha-emitting radionuclides.
Use of Respiratorv Protection Devices The inspectors selectively verified that the licensee provides respiratory protective devices such that occupational doses were ALARA. The inspectors reviewed and discussed the licensee evaluation process to determine the need for respiratory protection. The inspectors verified that the licensee had established means to verify that the level of protection (protection factor) provided by the respiratory protection devices during use was at least as good as that assumed in the licensee's work controls and dose assessment.
The inspectors selectively verified that respiratory protection devices, used to limit the intake of radioactive materials, were certified by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health/Mine Safety and Health Administration or have been approved by the NRC per 10 CFR 20.1703(b).
The inspectors selectively reviewed records 0f air testing for supplied-air devices and SCBA bottles. The inspectors selectively verified that air used in the devices met or exceeded Grade D quality.
The inspectors selected five individuals, qualified to use respiratory protection devices, and verified that they had been deemed fit to use the devices.
The inspectors selectively evaluated respiratory equipment storage, maintenance, and quality assurance. The inspectors observed the physical condition of the device components (mask or hood, harnesses, air lihes, regulators, air bottles, etc.) and reviewed records of routine inspection for eaoh. The inspectors reviewed, as available, records of maintenance on the vital components (e.9., pressure regulators, inhalation/exhalation valves, hose couplings), The inspectors verified that, as applicable, onsite personnel assigned to repair vital components received vendor-provided training or relied on vendor personnel to repair the devices.
Enclosure
Self-Contained Breathinq Aoparatus for EmerFencv Use The inspectors reviewed the status and surveillance records of three SCBAs (Pack 41, 1, and 2) staged in-plant for use during emergencies. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's capability for refilling and transporting SCBA air bottles to and from the control room and operations support center during emergency conditions.
The inspectors selected three individuals on oontrol room shift crews, and three individuals from designated departments curr0ntly assigned emergency duties. The inspectors determined the individuals were trdined and qualified in the use of SCBAs (including personal bottle change-out). The irlspectors determined that personnel assigned to refill bottles were trained and qualified for that task. The inspectors verified that appropriate mask sizes and types were available for use.
The inspectors observed operating shift personnel in the control room to verify that they had no facial hair that would interfere with the sealing of the mask to the face. Also, the inspectors verified that respirator use vision cprrection lenses were readily available in the control room, as appropriate.
The inspectors reviewed the most recent inspection history for the recently obtained SCBA units used to support operator activitiep during accident conditions and designated as "ready for service." The inspectors discusbed maintenance or repairs on an SCBA unit's vital components. The inspectors verifibd periodic air cylinder hydrostatic testing was documented and up to date. The inspectors discussed supplies of bottles and filling of cylinders.
Problem !dentification and Resolution The inspectors selectively verified that problelns associated with the control and mitigation of in-plant airborne radioactivity were being identified by the licensee at an appropriate threshold and addressed for resolution in the corrective action program.
(See Section 4OA2)
b. Findinos No findings were identified.
2RS04 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04 - ;1 sample)
a.
lnspection Scope The inspectors selectively reviewed the results of radiation protection program audits related to internal and external dosimetry (e.9., licensee's quality assurance audits, self-assessments, or other independent audits).
The inspectors reviewed the most recent National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accreditation report to detprmine the status of the licensee's dosimetry accreditation.
The inspectors selectively reviewed licensee procedures associated with dosimetry operations, including issuance/use of externdl dosimetry (routine, multi-badging, Enclosure
extremity, neutron, etc.), assessment of interrial dose (operation of whole body counter, assignment of dose based on derived air con$entration (DAC) hours, urinalysis, etc.), and evaluation of and dose assessment for radioldgical incidents (distributed contamination, hot particles, loss of dosimetry, etc.). The inspectors selectively verified that the licensee had established procedural requirements for determining when external and internal dosimetry was required. Documents reviewefl are listed in the Attachment.
External Dosimetrv The inspectors verified that the licensee's were NVLAP accredited. The inspectors dosimeters that required processing irradiation test categories for each type of personnel dosimeter used to if they were consistent with the types and energies of the radiation present, and the that the dosimeter was being used (e.9., to measure deep dose equivalent, shallow The inspectors evaluated supplemental energy beta exposures.
uivalent (SDE), or lens dose equivalent.
for dose assessment for exposure to low The inspectors evaluated onsite storage of ddsimeters before their issuance, during use, and before processing/reading including guidfnce provided to radiation workers with respect to care and storage of dosimeters.
The inspectors determined if the licensee usQd a "correction facto/'to address the response of the electronic dosimeter (ED) as bompared to thermoluminescent dosimeter for situations when the ED must be used to afsign dose.
The inspectors selected available dosimetry Qccurrence reports or corrective action program documents to review for adverse trepds related to electronic dosimeters, such as interference from electromagnetic frequenpy, dropping or bumping, or failure to hear alarms to determine if the licensee had identified any trends and implemented appropriate corrective actions.
lnternal Dosimetrv The inspectors selectively reviewed procedurbs used to assess dose from internally deposited nuclides using whole body counting equipment (e.9., methods for determining if an individual is internally or externally contaminated, release of contaminated individuals, determination of entry route (inge$tion, inhalation), and assignment of dose).
For whole body counting, the inspectors seleftively verified that the frequency of such measurements was consistent with the biolo$ical half-life of the potential nuclides available for intake.
The inspectors selectively evaluated screenirig for intakes (e.9., passive monitoring using portal monitors) and the minimum detectable activity (MDA) of the instrument to determine if the MDA was adequate to deterrinine the potential for internally deposited radionuclides sufficient to prompt additional ifivestigation.
The inspectors selectively evaluated three body counts to ensure: appropriate sensitivity for the potential radionuclides of i
- the appropriate nuclide library was used; and any anomalous count pea indicated in each output spectra received appropriate disposition, as applicable. The i also reviewed the licensee's Enclosure
T
10 CFR Part 61, "Licensing Requirements Disposal of Radioactive Waste,"
analyses to ensure that the libraries include a inspectors also evaluated dose determination gamma-emitting nuclides. The for hardto-detect nuclides.
The inspectors selectively evaluated the program for in-vitro monitoring (i.e.,
urinalysis and fecal analysis) including and storage of samples. The inspectors discussed the counting lab's quality program.
The inspectors selectively reviewed the of the licensee's program for dose assessments based on airborne/DA0 including lower limits of detection and proceduralguidance used to assess dose n using respiratory protection.
The inspectors selectively reviewed and assessments, as available.
Special Dosimetric Situations the licensee's internal dose The inspectors selectively verified that the informed workers, as appropriate, of the risks of radiation exposure to the
, the regulatory aspects of declaring a pregnancy, and the specific process to be for (voluntarily) declaring a pregnancy.
The inspectors selected one individualwho h declared their pregnancy during the current assessment period to verify that the
's radiological monitoring program (internal and external) for declared pregnant was technically adequate to assess the dose to the embryo/fetus. The i reviewed exposure and monitoring controls.
The inspectors selectively reviewed the
's methodology for monitoring external dose in situations in which non-uniform fields would exist (e.9., diving activities and steam expected or large dose gradients selectively verified that the licensee nerator jumps). The inspectors criteria for determining when alternate monitoring techniques (i.e., use of m or determination of effective dose equivalent for external exposures using an The inspectors selectively reviewed use of current assessment period.
method) were to be implemented.
Iti-badging for two individuals during the The inspectors selectively reviewed the The inspectors evaluated the licensee's
's program for shallow dose assessment.
for calculating SDE from distributed skin contamination or discrete radioactive The inspectors evaluated the licensee's dosimetry program, including dosimeter type(s) and/or survey instrumentation. The selected one neutron exposure situation (at-power containment entries) to dose including use of ratios, as applicable.
use of dosimetry and determination of Problem ldentification and Resolution The inspectors selectively verified that s associated with occupational dose assessment were being identified by the and entered into the corrective action program for resolution. (See Section 4OA2)
Enclosure
b. Findinqs No findings were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 1 Reactor Coolant Svstem Specific Activitv a. Inspection Scope b.
mple)
The inspectors reviewed Exelon's submittal the RCS specific activity performance indicator for the period October 1,2010 h September 30, 2011. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data for this period, the inspectors used definition and guidance contained in NEI t 99'02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 6 The inspectors also reviewed RCS sample analysis and control room logs of daily Findinqs No findings were identified.
ldentification and Resolution of Problems (71 52-2 annualsamples)
lnspection Scope As required by Inspection Procedure71152, ldentification and Resolution,' the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during reviews to verify that Exelon entered issues inspection activities and plant status the corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, gave adequate to timely corrective actions, and identified and addressed adverse trends. In order to with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performed a daily screening of items entered ce issues for follow-up, the inspectors the corrective action program and periodically attended issue report screening Findinqs No findings were identified.
4c.A2
.1 a.
b.
Inspection Scope The inspectors selectively reviewed action documents to determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective Exelon's threshold for entering issues into program for resolution and to evaluate program. The review included a check of or radiation protection technician possible repetitive issues, such as radiation Enclosure
errors. Also, selectively reviewed were audits and assessments, as appropriate The review was against the criteria contained Specifications, and station procedures b. Findinqg No findings were identified.
10 CFR Parl20, Technical (1 sample)
a. Insoection Scope The inspectors performed an in-depth review Exelon's root cause analysis and corrective actions associated with lR 111
, unexpected plant runback and turbine trip.
Specifically, a signal converter from the control system (lCS) to the digital turbine controlsystem (DTCS) had failed resulting in a turbine trip.
The inspectors assessed Exelon's problem threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews, compensatory and prioritization and timeliness of corrective action to determine whether characterizing and conecting problems was appropriately identifying, planned or completed conective actions appropriate. The inspectors compared the action taken to the requirements of Exelon's action program and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors maintenance activities and interviewed engineering personnel to assess the of the implemented conective actions.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Findinqs and Observationg No findings were identified.
Exelon evaluation determined the ICS to signal converter failed due to age-related (EP-005), that installed the signal degradation. The GPU design change converter in 1995, did not identify the need a PM to periodically calibrate and replace nge process was identified as one root the signal converter. The deficient design cause for the failure. The manufacturer the mean time between failures of the signal converter was approximately 10.4 and a 10 year replacement PM should have been performed, The signal converter in service for 15 years. Corrective actions to address the gaps in the design I process were completed after the (CC-AA-1 92) in 2002. The Exelon implementation of the Exelon design modification process incorporates a review modification and ensures that the and corrective action program documents.
Attachment.
reviewed are listed in the with this issue and whether the allcomponents associated with a PMs are assigned.
Additionally, in 2007, Exelon implemented a nce centered maintenance (PCM)
program (MA-AA-71 6-21 0) that contained intervals for specific components. Exelon with recommended PM actions and that during the implementation of the program, components not covered under a template were reviewed on a system ICS to DTCS signal converter was not level, not an individual component level.
Enclosure
associated with a specific PCM template the engineering review did not identify the component and assign appropriate PMs.
initiated a comprehensive corrective action review of components installed in operational risk systems to validate that f, reactivity management risk, and assigned to the components. This extent of review would incorporate all components installed under the previous MA-M-716-210 was updated to provide change process, EP-005. In addition, on required actions for components with no designated PCM templates. Engineering with subject matter experts, the vendor, and operating experience were appropriate PM assignments.
into the decision making process for The inspectors reviewed Exelon's corrective of a critical plant component due to deficient to prevent the recurrence of a failure The inspectors performed a risk-informed sample of systems to validate the prioritization of component PM deficiencies Additionally, the inspectors independently to verify operability of safety related ESAS PM actions and intervals are ion, characterization and by Exelon's extent of condition ted the concern in fR 1203015 and
,4 review. The inspectors concluded that an components with deficient PMs and that a uate methodology was used to identify prioritization in the work management process existed commensurate with the components safety significance.
The updated PCM and design modification were reviewed to confirm the impfemented revisions would adequately components that require PMs and assign the appropriate actions and intervals inspectors performed field observations duri maintenance. Furthermore, the the replacement of critical components identified as a result of the extent of review. The review yielded no inadequacies with the corrective actions to recurrence.
(1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope Independent assessments (e.9., NRC, peer groups) in late 2010 and the first half of 2011 identified TMI maintenance quality and/or adherence deficiencies.
Several of the specific deficiencies identified associated with procedures used to verify operability of engineered safeguards protection system (RPS) functions. Exelon tion system (ESAS) and reactor performed a multi-disciplined root cause (RCE). Based on the risk importance of the ESAS and RPS functions, the performed an in-depth review of Exelon's RCE and corrective actions associated with rR 1203015.
eleven periodic test procedures used RPS functions. The review was performed to evaluate procedure adequacy support equipment operability, worker procedure adherence during the last two of each procedure, and station the selected test procedures.
identification of problems encountered while The inspectors also reviewed a risk informed sample of maintenance procedure-related issue reports written during the last 3 years were properly corrected.
determine whether identified problems The inspectors assessed Exelon's problem i threshold, cause analyses, and the prioritization and timeliness of extent-of-condition reviews, compensatory Enclosure
b.
corective actions to determine whether characterizing, and correcting problems was appropriately identifying, with this issue and whether the fundamentals, and supervisors'
The RCE identified that similar planned or completed conective actions were actions taken to the requirements of Exelon's appropriate. The inspectors compared the action program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors field walkdowns and interviewed engineers, technicians, and managers to the effectiveness of the implemented corrective actions. Documents reviewed are in the Attachment.
Findinss and Observations No findings were identified.
The RCE documented the root causes to be procedure adherence and (2) failure to apply
) failure to reinforce site standards for to develop and maintain maintenance department procedures.
correc*ive actions included establishing a 4-year procedure upgrade project to replace component specific procedures for over 500 supervisors on procedure quality, procedure maintenance procedures with and training for first line responsibility for enforcement of procedure maintenance procedure deficiencies had identified in the past, but were not successfully resolved in the past.
, the RCE established several individual effectiveness of lR 1203015 corrective corrective actions in the future to evaluate actions. The inspectors concluded the RCE and depth were comprehensive, the evaluation was probing, and the resulting appropriate.
actions/assignments were The inspectors determined that most quality related lRs were properly corrected. The inspectorc identified several adherence deficiencies which had not been procedure q uality and/or by station personnel. Examples included inaccurate operability determ ination out-oftolerance instrument readings not identified by technicians, instrument performance trending, extent-of'condition reviews not performed, and i plete corective actions. Station personnel initiated lRs to address each issue in the 1265602, 1265603, 1265609, 1265613, 1 action program (lRs 1265599, 18, 1265021, and 1265625). Each deficiency was minor in nature, and did not affect operability of the safety related function being tested. The reviewed these issues with maintenance managers and concluded these deficiencies additional examples of the problems identified and addressed in the RCE. The concluded the scope of corrective actions for the RCE remained appropriate to the root cause of these deficiencies.
Event Follow-uo (71153 - 1 sample)
Plant Events Inqoection Scope For the plant event listed below, the reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The inspectors communicated the events to appropriate regional personnel, and compared the event details criteria contained in IMC 0309, "Reactive of potential reactive inspection 40A3
.1 a.
Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors," for Enclosure
activities. As applicable, the inspectors classification assessments and properly Parts 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors activity being below the operating basis performed independent walkdowns and event to assure that Exelon implemented with their safety significance. Documents that Exelon made appropriate emergency the event in accordance with 10 CFR the lioensee's asseEsment of seismic magnitude for TMl. The inspectors Exelon's follow-up actions related to the corrective actions c,ommgnsurate are listed in the Attachment.
40A6 o Declaration of Unusual Event due to activity on August 23 Findinos No findings were identified.
Meetinos. Includino Exit On October 12,2011, the inspectors the inspection reeults to Mr. Glen Chick, Site Mce President, Three Mile lsland and The inspectors verified that no proprietary documented in this report.
members of the Three Mile lsland staff.
was retained by the inspectors or ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMA Enclosure
Licensee Personnel D. Atherholt P. Bennett G. Chick D. Divittore J. Dullinger M. Fitaanter M. Hardy C. Incorvati J. Karkoska M. Kersey M. Krause R. Libra R. Masoero W. McSorley D. Neff S. Nowak T. Orth J. Piazza M. Reed C. Robles P. Steiner L. Weber S. Wilkerson M. Willenbecher G. Wright M. Wyatt B. Young Other D. Dyckman A-1 SUPPLEMENTARY KEY POINTS OF Manager, Regulatory Manager, Design Site Vice President Manager, Radiological Operations Manager Senior Regulatory Assurance System Engineer-Flood Director, Maintenance Manager, Site Security Risk Management Engineer Component Monitoring Plant Manager System Engineer-lnservice T Program Owner Procedures and Flood Manager, Emergency Component Monitoring Control Specialist - Instrumentation &
Electrical and Instrumentation & Control Control Department Manager, Chemistry Senior Manager, Design System Engineer System Engineer Assistant Maintenance Chemist Manager, Design Engineering Supervisor, Planning Senior Work Week Manager Manager, Training $upport Manager, Instrumentation and Nuclear Safety Specialist, Protection, Bureau of LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, OpenejUClosed None Department of Environmental Protection USSED, AND UPDATED Attachment
LIST OF Section 1R01: Adverce Weather Procedurqs EP-M-1009, TMI Emergency Action Level Matrix OP-TM-AOP-002, Flood, Rev. 3 and Rev. 4 OP-M-108-11 1-1001, Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidance, Rev. 1 OP-TM-1 08-1 1 1 -1 001, TMI Inaccessibility Plan, OP-TM-122-901, Inflate Aux & FHB Door Seals, MA-TM-122-901, InstallUnil 1 Flood Baniers, Rev.
Drawinos UpsnRfigure 2.6-15, Dike Freeboard - Design Other TMI-1, TS 3.14.2, Flood Condition for Placing the in l'lot Stardby TMI area NationalWeather Service and USGS dated September 8-12, 20fi TMI-1 Shift Operations Logs dated July 25,2O11 TMI Station News Ffashes, dated $eptember &12,
lRs: 1256396 1256524 125S356 1257518 1262822 1262803 UFSAR, $ection 2,6, Hydrology and Flood Studies Section 1R04: Eoulpment Aisnment Other RE!4EWED
.1 Control Room Status logs, September 14 & 15, 201 DH & EFW configuration control diagrams, dated Section 1R05: Fire Protection Procedures 1 038, Administrative Controls-Fire Protection 1301-8.2, Diesel Generator Major Inspectbn OP-M-201-003, Fire Drills, Rev. 12 OP-MA-201 -007, Fire Protection Syrtem Other l
CC-AA-309-1 0 1. Engineering Technical Evaluatfons, lRs: 1253065 1255002 Pre-Fire Plan for TMt-1, lB, 295' Level Air 250341 263647 Rev.76
), Rev.90 Control, Rev. p Rev. 11 Cubicle 12s8327 1257429 1263310 14 & 15,2011 Sestion 1R06: Flood Protection ilcasureg Procedures OP-TM-1 0 2-1 06, Control of Time Griticsl Operator OP-TM-216251, BS and DH Floor Drain Inspedion, V-17, Zurn Floor Drain Inspection, Rev. 14 Drawinos 902-n9, Sump Pump and Drainage System, Rsv.
1247409 R21 19206 Olher IR WO 1249444 1262908 Aftachment
Section I Rl 2: Maintenance Effectivenecs ProcedHres ER-M-310, lmplementation of the MaintenancE Rev.8 OP-TM-533-252, DR Train B Leakage Exam, Rev.
Other Technical Evaluation 12CI3847 -A2, 7 I 1312A1'l ASME, IWD-5000, System Pressure Tests, 1989 ECR 02-00842, Replacement Controller for FS-P-1 ECR 03-00397, Replacement ControlNer for F$'P-3 Operability Evaluation 03-25, Rev. 3 lRs: 1203858 1262612 1122773 1141245 1161740 1190664 1102848 1105364 1106340 1139305 1153968 117fft',12 1240433 1247030 WOs: RA021614 R2106531 R2181089 Other TMI-1 Shift Operations Logs dated Ju$ 22 &25, fRs: 591795 1015513 1252560 WOs: R2086066 C2020306 R217O964 Section I Rl 5: Operabllitv Evaluatlons Procedures OP-M-10&1 1 1, Adverce Condition Monitoring and OP-AA-1 08-1 1 5, Operability Determinations, Rev.
OP-M-1 08-1 1 5-1 002, Supplemental Determinations, Rev.2 OP-TM-53+228,l$T of RR-P-18 and Valvgs 129672 213407 106504 221550
'1134244 1215471 11 101 19
'1229703 1141236 1238827 1 1 10971 1239787 Procedures 1082.1, TMI Risk Management Program, Rev. 8 1303-1 1.378, HSPS * OTSG Level and PressurE llTests, Rev. 30 ER-AA-310, lmplementation of the Maintenance
, Rgv.8 MA-M-736-610, Application of Fregze Sealto all Rev.7 OP-TM-212-201, IST of DH-P-1A and Valvos from Standby Mode, Rev. 9 OP-TM-424-212,IST of EF-V-3Os and EF-V-S2E, OP-TM-999-092, Functional Test of DH-V-594/8, OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal Ernergency Events, Rev. 18 WC-M-101, On-LineWork Control Process, Rev. 1 Drawinqs 302482, Emergency Feed1atEr Flow Diagram, Re{. 24 302-640, Decay Heat Removal Flow Diagram, Rev.l83 302-670, OhemicalAddition Flow Diagram, Rev. 34 201013 012M227 112312 Plan, Rev.8 for On-Shift lmmEdiate Operability Cold Shutdown, Rev.2
, Rev. 11 OP-TM-534-901, RB Emergency Qooling Attachment
Drawinqs Other ECR TM 02-00755, NSIRR Crosstie Excess Flsw fR 1258323 1005866 A1250417 wo c2024227 CGM-102, Design Input and Conffguration CC-AA-103, Configuratircn Change Control, Rev. 21 Ol-TM-201, Installation and OpEration of the Other EEC ECR 11-00313, Tech Evaluation to Justify 50.59 Evaluation for ECR 11-00313 PORC 20:1147 Minutes, dated August 27,2011 Section lR19: Poct Haintenance Tertinq Pro-cedures WGTM-430-1 001, Surveillance Testing Program 1 302-6.1 4, PORV and Code Safety D/P lrfionitorsi 3303-A3, Fire Pump Capacrty Tes$ng, Rev. 17 1303-5.5A, Confol Room Emergency Filtering 1303-11.13, Control Room Filtering System Teet, 1420-Y-11, ESAS Channel Relay f,feintenance, OP-TM42-301, ES Actuation Relay Inspection, U-36, Ventilation Filter DOP and Halide Testing, Drawings 302-630, Spent Fuel Cmling System Fbrv Diagram 302-842, ControlBuilding and Machine Shop Other VM-TM-I223, Ventilation Charcoal Filter Slcbma, 1 QM029, Charcoal Absorber Reftlling ProEurement ASME N510-2007, Testing of Nucbar Air WO: R2162630 R2185235 Q2A25776 R2122469 R2122191 C2035842 fR: 1226352 504314 516401 Section lRil2: Surwlllancc Tectlno Procedures E-1, Vibration Monitoring for Rotatrq Equipment, ER-M-335-015, VT-2 Msual Examination, Rev. 10 OP-TM-214-202, IST of BS-P-18 and Valves, Rev.
WC-TM-430, Surveillance Testiqg Program, Rev. 0 Dr?winqs 302-231, Fire $ervice Water Flow Dbgram, Rev. 1 NS-V-135 lrrstall, Rev, 1 24$299 1A$738 lmpac{ Screening, Rev. 20 Dbminoraliaer, Rov.0 of UnderwEler Dgmln to SFPr Rev, 1
"A' Operational Test, Rev. 3
.21
?9
.2
Rev.31
, Rev.57 17ng Syst6ms, 1A7tW 1040 R3180708 R2151050 u255125 150 R?184413 1244320 A1W45g4
,22
lntErface and Maintenanc, Rev. 1
. 15and 15a
.49 Attachment 302-712, Reac-tor Building Spray Flow Dlagram,
Other IR WO 1251016 1247030 1261371 R2146680 R2181860 R2165086 12W74',
01248690*
512CI7
- - lR as a reeult of inspection Section IEPO: Drill Evaluation Procedures EP-AA-I 009, Exelon Nuclear Radiologicat LS-AA-I 1 50, Errent Notifications, Rev..O OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip, Rev. 10 Other Plan Ainor for TMt Statloffi, Rav. 17 NEI 99-02, Regulatory AgsessmEnt P6rform6ncs Guidefina, Rsv,6.
TMI 201 1 Full Scale Drill Evaluation Reportl August,2411,
datsd,Sffiof,n&S ?9,,201 1 2e6162 1265887 1265597 TMI 2011 Emergency Preparednerc ScEnarlo fRs: 1249760 1266699 1257973 1265628 1265564 Documents Radiological Eurvey Posting Radiation Work Permits (RWP 10-03, 11-14\\
RP-AA400-1007, Elevated Dose Rate Respns RP-M-400-1 008, Exposure Goal Recovery Plen, RP-AA-400-2000, Dose Zoalot, Rev. 0 Procedures RP-M-400, ALAFI,A Progmm, Rev. I RP-M-400-1 003, Work Oroup Expeeura fsduc{io-n RP-AA-400-1004, Emergnnt hss Control and Rcv.3 Rev.0 Rev. 13
RP-M-401, Operational ALAffi Phnniqg and RP-AA-401 -1 002, Radiobglcal Ri*lt klartagement, RP-TM-401-1002, Three Mile lshnd Ostagc RP AA-402, Radiation Prolectlon hea Excellgnce RP-M-441, Evaluation and $eloctbn Frowsslor 661 0-f MR3282.41, hstailation of Tempomry ard Cor#ol, Rev.0 Rgv" ?
Rocpirator Use, Rev. 4 Documents Department Do$o Reduction Plans (2011)
General Source Term Data - $MRP Survey Poinb Chemistry Shutdswn Clean-up Plan T1R19 Dose Zealot Meeting Notee ALARA Reviews (Radiation WorlcPermit ALARA
{s25, $20,411,514, S23, 602))
RP:300, Radiofogical $urvey Progrwlr,' ft6y, f RP-AA-3O 1, Radiologieal Air Sarnpting Fliqrarn, RP-AA-302, Determination of Alpha Lowfs ehd Attachmont
ll:-
A-0 RP-AA*440, Respimtory Protedion Prograqr, Rev, RP-AA-/141, Evaluatbn ard Saledlgn Proeessf6 fupFeffiUbe, REv,4
- '9" r
':
,ncv.'O Monitor Model *[f$'3, &v; 1
&ck pf fi*.Sbs{irn.?hta Air RP AA-825, Maintenance, Gare and Inopectbn of ftisfqtb4,,Equiptnent, Rev. 3 RP-M-870-1002, Use of Vacuurn Oeaners ifl RP AA443, Quantitiatiw Resdrator Ffr TeEtrr& F RP-M444, Contqlld f\\bgsth Pres$urg.(Ff#)
RP-AA-70&1300, Calibiison, @retbu atd Scx RP-AA-1 301, Calibration, $q.rrsa ShE ; furaffil Monitor Model Ati$4, &v. O.
Regulator$CBAe :
r. !
1l.[1-21, Radiation fi,tonito$g,$yeFm 8d fufts, 661 910-OP9451 0.04, Rerylrabr FaerPiem T 66 1 0-OPS-451 0.03 lrepec,tion' snd lil$ntenanm of prdectiw Equipment, Rev. 4 SFtem, Rev. t RP-TM-82S-001, Monthly Inepe l ard Documents
$hift $bffing repofts
,. ', :
Air Quelity testing - TA-AA-92&'F040, {-e*l l Air fnspection Records - SCBA qF$i 47,1,2 Rev.10 l
Reactor Building Cooling and Ventibtion $yrtem, RP-TM-44001, $ampfing ff66$rir Alr Sbtgrt RP-TM,440-003, Uae of OompqoeWd Aif RP-TM-440-004, Rechargirg d Breafiirg Ak Enpswe Cot*rd a*d.Autltn*@tion, RP AA-350, Personnel Contamlnafpn RP-AA-700-1215, Calibntkxr of Lo-Volwne Air CmSoM Arsa, Rev. 2 t-up d Ebotlirp BBta Air Ak Rospiratorg, Rav. 1
' Uslng Ingwaoll-Rsd Recharging of HSA Firehswk Mask Mq.rnted
.80
"
Rsv. g TMI Operation Plant Manual, Au#lary anel Fgal BuildlfiH lsating snd Vsntifatbn,
RP-AA-203-1 001, Perssnnel E4osure Fcv.0 RP-M-210, Wtlry lssue, Usrop qrxd Aon$o{i, r.20 RP-A,A-215; Cal+rbtiry and CilFdttlrg Bwef$tn RP:AA-220-1001, @ection nrd Ha@$Sd sf hf\\
RP-M-270, Prenatal Rdiation Exrcwp, Rev. 6 RP 4A-301, Rdi@ical Air $anrplirq Pnogmam, I RP-M-302, Ddorminatbn of 441t LtvlFfs r{F1g'td
- e Ges Eryarre, Rw. 0 Bioassay Sampbs, Rov. 0 RP-AA-700-1277, Calibntion and @mtion of RP-M-700-1245, Operation of Hi Vbhrne A* $
66 1 GADM 4246.A1. Operation, Oafibration and Whob Body Countlng $grtem, R6v..8,
Doournents Alpha Monltoring and Assessrnmt* RAF-1S0i0 Vadous dooimelry repordE {ncltl-d-i6g ftttgnmt Check{n Aseeso*tgnt - 1f3ge6S tlVlSP Accreditatlon - 1005$6-0 FASA -102872 and Rsportirg, Rev. 9 Air Sarn$ers, Rsv. 0 rdsgtrance df tho Ganbena Attachment
Progp$urag 1001J.1, Survoifbnce Teating Prsgfam, ReV, I 1302-5.2, RPS Hbh and to*f RO Frarslrra ftw. e+
1302-5.6, RCP Power Monitw Calibretbn ard 1302-5.8, High and Low PressurE lrffeflon Anapg 1302-5.10, REador BulHing 4 P*lS Ctuthffif,,Sl6v, 1 302-5. 1 5A.4, CF3-LTZ Level Channal Clibrdbrl 19i lmpact Screening, Rcv. 21 8l Conrpsator Tmt, Rev. 26 Rov.27 r11$0ffi 11183?9 1186375 1213837 13A2-5.17, Make-Up Tank Lewl& Pree*ura Rv.28 1302-6, Calibratbn of Non-Tech Spec Insfurnenb for Tech Spec Compliance, Rev. 65 1302-16, l0Gltll and N$Sfiltt Lswf Oalibmthrr, 1303-11.39A, H$P$ - EFW Auts lnltiathn, Rev. 41 GGM-102, Design lnput and Configurt$ipn ER-M-520, Instrument PErformar*e lC-l, Differentlst ftassur Tranomittor Loop
, Rs{.80 lG't lC-4, Thermooouple (TC) Ternperature Loop T MA-M-71 6-2 1 0, Performanoa Centsfed MA-M-71 0-21 0-1 901, Porfarmanea Centorod lssue ReDorts 0826500 0826503 1008004 1192656 1138067 11,41920 1213870 1215829 1233885 Maintenance Work Orders R2044421 R2045324 R204$A5 R2066468 R2076637 R2077Cp3 R20s5s64 R200S989 R2108119 PAfi3240 R2113254 R2115366 P21ffi472 MiscsllamouE Rcpah snd Cslibration, Rev. 13 P,gse,gs,Rev. 11 empfsh, Rw.9 011 npo??
R2'l R2r33 R20***+t Rsffi4330 R207EIF3 R2078484 R2112310 R21131e9 R213E849 R21385s0 Calculation G1101-Ee4-E510-9ffi, TMI Cora Fbd and Loop Enon (CR2;LT1, ?, 3, Fs 4), Rsv. 0 TMI Unit 1 Tecinicaf Spdlistion Tshb $.5-1, TMI Unit 1 TEchnical Specitlmtbn TsbF 4.1-1, TMI Unit 1 Pnocdure Charqo Baddog List, is of LevS. CA&lkrtion; BEealine Cslibrathn Opffiting Condithma Surwihnca Req uinements 12,2Q11 t1erH8 1ffi922 Other ARs:
WOs:
A2000928 cl006341 A17?6348 c2019590 41V22497 c100e341 A1ruAs ff$1282 EP-M-1 009, Exelon Nudtrr Radiolagial Fldn fulndx fff Tltl $tetisn, Rev. 1 7 l0n-214, Seiemic Monitoring $lragn.Tast, Rev. 2 LS-AA-I 1 50, Event.l-.fdlftestlant, Rov. 0 OP-TM-AOP-003, Earthquake, Rcv. 1 Attachmsnt
TMI-1 OBE Critsia Ewluatim, dated Arr3nrei TMI-1 State/Local FbtiFebn FormE, dabd I EAL declaratbn'HU5' et 2:01 pm.
lRs: 1266162 1255$5 Othqr 10 CFR 199 agp.A, V{af,2},
Alann Response. Oard fw"PRF -1',,
Alarm Respme Gard fsr PRF-1-3, NRC wni lrfotiftmtbn #4?1$0; TMI Event $ummery Rspartfor TMI-I Shift Operations LogF, dst6d TMI-1 Seismic
!i.
ery$ryq ebd Augrat 29.2071
$:1i!ggnrrr& rinav. Klfor tgf,r4s-i..r:j ras6 $g i
Atta$fiet*
usr 0#
ADAMS ALARA ASME CFR co DAC DH DRP DTCS ECR ED EDG EFlry ERO ESAS FASA FSAR HSPS rcs IR rsT MDA MR NCV NEI NRC NVLAP PADEP PARS PCM PI PMT RCE RPS RWP sBo SCBA SPE ssc TMI TS UFSAR FFo&etwr Agerrcyrvids Docum*rts ard lvbna As Low As Reasmbly Ar*tbva&
American Society cf ftlednnical Er Code of,Fdsral Rsgr$tlgf-ls Carbon Monoride Dgdvgd Air frncsnMn' '.
.
Decay Fleat Division of Reactor Prolaots Digital Turbina Control $ntem Engineering Change Request Elec'tronic F0simeler :
,
Emergency Dicsl Generator Emergency FecdYvabr Emergency Responga Organization Enginesrud $afeg[*@*
Focused Area Sef-Asscssrpnt Final Safety Anslyris @ort Het S,tn* mot4qr'$yeteln'
Integmted Control System lssue Report Inservice Teeting Minimum Dshehble Asthdly Maintgaanca Rule l.lon-cited Vrolation Nudear Erprgy Instituta Nuclea r Rqulatory Cornmission l,latienal Votr.*ntsry,'l.abffiqry At Pennei4vanla Ssm*mO$ af Publicly Ara.ihble fucq(dg,
$haflow frse Eguf\\rcHlt Strudures, Syrbms, and Three Mile lshnd, Unit 1 Technical Speciflcations Berfmmanw Cantcrad MairrF#n$
Performanso lndicator :
PoEt Maintenan Teotirq Root CsuE6 Ewftnation Rsactor Ftotectbn i
'
Radiation Work Permit Stafron Blacko$
ser-mntainsd Frdstf&e*#i.fefuE w
Updstsd Finaf Sfaty An$ysle'Report