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. v e JhpfD UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 84 FE827 P2:30 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CFF'"~ | |||
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD g hk[f., | |||
In the Matter of LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Docket No. 50-382 OL (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3) | |||
MOTION TO OPEN QUALITY ASSURANCE CONTENTION February 20, 1984 Now before this Honorable Board, through undersigned counsel, comes Gary Groesch, Chairman of Waterford 3 Joint Intervenors, who with respect moves the following: | |||
THAT a new contention with regard to quality assurance be opened, based in part on the enclosed material; THAT mover be given a reasonable time to obtain applicable affidavits and otherwise perfect his case: | |||
THAT applicant, Louisiana Power & Light, be ordered to give mover written assurance to be shown to prospective | |||
" whistle-blowers" that there will be no retaliation by applicant;and THAT this Commission make available to mover and to every party on the appended service list the 237-page sworn statement to Richard K. Herr, Director, Office of Investigation, and William A. Crossman, Chief of Projects Section of Region IV, that was given by George Hill on January 10 and 11,1984, all as noted on Page One of the following enclosure. | |||
8402280468 840220 PDR ADOCK OSOOO3R2 9 PDR | |||
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WHEREFORE, mover prays this Honorable Board for all the relief enumerated above. | |||
Respectfully subnitted, | |||
~ | |||
Carole H. Burstein Co-Counsel for Joint Intervenors 445 Walnut Street. | |||
New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 Telephone: (504 ) 866-6363 CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that all parties on the attached service list have been mailed a copy of the above pleading. | |||
New Orleans, Louisiana, February 22, 1984. | |||
6L N Carole H. nurstein | |||
- - = = = . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . | |||
F I . ,. . , | |||
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~ | |||
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of Docket No. 50-382 OL LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3) | |||
SERVICE LIST Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosmi. | |||
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ceauni . Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Docketing & Service Section (3) | |||
Office of the Secretary W. Reed Johnson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. | |||
Atomic Safety & Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. | |||
Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Bruce Churchill, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Howard A. Wilber 1800 M Street, N.W. | |||
Atomic Safety & Licensing Washington, D.C. 20036 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossa. | |||
Washington, D.C. 20555 . | |||
Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm. | |||
Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing | |||
-Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conan. | |||
Washington, D.C. 20555. | |||
me si i i ei n - - | |||
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7, s ; COMM2RTARW - | |||
Waterford IIh An Exchange of Letters q 1 | |||
i recogrution than a small group of expe-Office of frivesugauon, and Mr. Wdham g | |||
"" t,~ p? -. 7 3 A Crossman. "Cluef, P 'iccts Section" InresayDecember, Gambu publis'hed art on senous problems with qual-control records in the Waterford lll (. i.a i, rienced Quality Assurance Engmeers. | |||
j i am a*are of your reputation, we have of Regior. IV. Therefore, i ocheve the con-g(. | |||
# ' worked on the same project in previous cerns that were not properly handled whde t nuclear power plant Our article was l l based in part on long interviews with i gbgjg4**Y 6 L yh years. The real concern is the reputatasn I was at Waterford III, or afterwards, will be resobed by the two above mennoned kEl George Hdl, en expenenced quahty assur- ! | |||
A -, | |||
da . . . . j i of Waterford Ill's Management Staff "W: i dunns 95 percent of its construction. De NRC representauves. I have confidence in 2 ance engmeer with an excellent record in | |||
'@+ i Utility and Architect Eagineer had very their reputation and past expenence for Y the nudcar indust y who held a high poss- 3 g ; little quality verification or control of investigsting similar problems at other i uon in quality assurance at Wa.erford. , | |||
W p n ,'. g *? nuclear sites. My obbgauon as a Quahts -- | |||
Mnce the pubbcation of our article, offi- their subcontractors / vendors during con-aals at LP&L have written to George Hill j | |||
;Wq.t 5 struction, which resulted in many defi- Assurance Representative has been 5 | |||
.'s''' fulfihed by reporting my concerns to 5 tellms him they don't beheve there is any j . | |||
4E | |||
* cien;ies identified pnor to Turn-over. | |||
Many concerns were not properly resobed NR, therefore I do not feel ans further real problem but offering to meet with I e- ~ | |||
Q-him We have obtamed copies of that let- ; | |||
s M, by Management, and when I was con- contact with LP&L, or any other parties ter to Hill and of his reply. Both letters foi- . - | |||
*M , iacted t y "The GamNr" in December, concermns Waterford 111 is necessary == | |||
lor i | |||
- 1983, I f elt it was r , obhgation to inform George Hill =ii | |||
' an outude pr.rty to essure they were inves- | |||
==Dear Mr. Hm:== | |||
gy The purpose nf this letter is to invite , ; rigated by someone who cared abo.u get- | |||
-g ting the joh done nght. | |||
_] y you to meet with me to discuss your , | |||
y reported concerns relating to the safety of i , My conc *rns were given to the, local - | |||
newspap:r, and other committees, the Waterford Nuclear Station. because the AE and Utihty had a tendency g As you may know, I have recently been ,l 7 F to overlook senous deficiencies, or pre- - - | |||
==j hired by Louisiana Pbwer and Light Com-vent additional deficiencies from bems p e j pany as Senior Vice President - Nuclear % ,, = | |||
adentified that might impact schedule. ' | |||
= | |||
operauons. In that capacity I am respon- j De problems identined by the paper may sible for oversight of LTAL's nuclear 1 5 have been addressed by your personnel; '/ l operations and for the safe and timely lnstam, "o"ne':.les fw var infamadon. | |||
p will note that this oms- In at kast did you verify the method the however, completion of the Waterford Ill station. I ! | |||
have considerable expenence with nuclear ened a items were closed, and did they really , | |||
a[s address the root causeto assure similar , | |||
-a power in the Umted States Navy and with i | |||
/ | |||
8 problems do not exist? Also, are these . . | |||
5 alleged proWietns which can be idennned deficiencies reported and closed, in ' | |||
8 G accordance with procedural, contract. | |||
Gambit Has a l "frmn the mspapa accents. De resuhs l%n'iT,"'"a*"," "*""""* sen. . aad resui=tary rea"irements? ( C#, J i, if an experienced Quality Assurance '' | |||
= ="" ' i=''*.ss, e"'d a ad' = 'd''d- ' Engmen, rr- a mtimidatmn. = = out-t | |||
= | |||
New Data E' ' | |||
Gamb n s yo t cies. A tvpical example is the closure of , | |||
on Tbs sdays for home dehvenes and ; | |||
f ida. an relat NCR W34245, where the imtiator evalu- gg g gy%f) ] | |||
an I ndan at news b, mes and sales out-a | |||
'tocal News coverag, ' | |||
E"*'*'ea"+'"'O wenda, s-t n. m.=s. .d tfadts L i 2',,L',",l"f'a'"o'"u, "r~t o, mai, | |||
;l, ;- McO n*"v" a f*rymchmmr*= 'Te'0o% , | |||
n_,,on a, ,,, a, acdca * ** **l q spon: ud mienanunent miumns can "nea"h'**" | |||
travel arrangements for you to come to | |||
**. P,'" s'"L''l2,d" #n".""3 J Og'* indicaie -y sims Love's story = | |||
, ="a "; ode ="~ ~,/;=g2;r", | |||
= | |||
* j a=' 'lar cases Numerous NCR's dunng the hat can be said atout a senes called j dme . hen New ~ u, -s. ,"="';*t";,*f #* | |||
'"''' # E*' * "I paper wdlbegmits waks two days ear- during normal work hours or at my horne' departure of 7-83 were initiated, dispost- three episodes? That it ran the risk of being her t oned and closed by the same mdividuals corny? That it seemed like televtuon news = | |||
Sincerely- " | |||
, Roth 5, leddick wehout venfication or Engmeering justi- at h most sacchanne form? | |||
fication. This is not the common pracoce All of those things can be said abo,.t 31 l Senim Vice Prmdent within the nuclear industry, and is not in Angela Hill's little senes aluch began on i a number of commercial nuclear power ' Nuclea: Operamms units. Those projects with which I have . Louisiana Ibwcr & l.ight compliance with your exisung procedures. Channel 4 on Valentine's evemns and in Q i was notined by LP&L personnel in which each episode focused on a marned 3 been connected have achieved excellent i couple that had been together at least t!urty 1 safety and performance records anu it is ! . nud Decernber, that your intenuon av to : | |||
have a meeung and hear my concerns. I years. Thow ttungs plus the conclusion myintenuontoassurethat Waterfordlives i | |||
==Dear Mr. laddick:== | |||
I appreciate vour invitation to meet had no objections at the time, but the that despite the nsks, the senes somehow up to the samc high standards } worked. | |||
with you to discuss my concerns, however NRC had mntacted me for an interview, Over a penod of some months a local Why it workod serened to be a function 4 weekly newspaper in New Orleans has ' a meetmg would be purposeless. My con- and on January 10th and Ilth I expressed cerns have already been conveyed to the all my concerns in a 237 page sworn state- of good editmg and good ta.ste on HilPs ! | |||
reported disturbmg allegations of prob- Jl lems at Waterford I have enclosed those ! proper comnuttees, wtuct utay have more ' rnent to Mr. Richard K. Herr, 'Duector, part. We can thmk of some televtsion news t | |||
~._. | |||
S E | |||
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...e G A M HI'll JANUARY 14,1984 DOCTOREDRECORDS AT WATERIORDill w' v'an | |||
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By RON r*11DENHOUR .J __ _ .___ -/R 1;r&& ^ -e' we contractors at I.muassana Power four crkical safety systems the two coa. eral codes. or the drawmss new actually and (Jaht Company's increasirgly- tractors had earher wrtined to be com- changed co nflect the "as m" Installation. | |||
Ttroubled waterford Ill power plant devised and implementert a plate, auckar the contractors. EBASCO and LPAL, agreed to bring the contractors | |||
* even though k was in violation of NRC standards. | |||
systematic program to doctor flased mark at whterford into coniphance with One Gem 6ft source derply invohed in safety records as the plant in the summer NRC requirements. That agreement reviewing Mercury's quahty assurance imY r$ $ | |||
both companies. The doctored records woodII.. 'pYi7BecYwn lac., to reinspect all their installat s a that mot ma the company's acords review, re-s"p n,caDed of W1t f saf want quahty and wash a coen her | |||
- .and .orked. | |||
..: g st,u of .rms mi, f.c.8s au .o,k ato com. *r.mr. _ | |||
=='=, o.erming n== p'== . ===eg | |||
* f** = fay ==d-* =d am== f= To'nrk-Ba-a had | |||
* The rec.ords . involve 6st) sources. despite the ::: .' & *ineering t.r&L eng specificaoces. same opmion of TompkmBeckenh's re. | |||
in==d.a=.hng=G mar >=m =. | |||
two Critical safety of * ===i tri=t in wiai-- | |||
* e cords are supposed io refieci. Ai ihe | |||
'=o-=== =d -c=* - effai ^ iso management for both wercury and : weaking on ine condioon that he not ne Systems: The piping u- a .- - - - -;ng begaa. trat. | |||
ks prime contractor. ERASCO Services. | |||
wnnk-Be a. app =oy = | |||
* blesses of ERASC(Ys Qualh) Assurance | |||
: -a. as - ch-=i-i a oB45-CO's records review oversight of the systems and the w.. and ihe i-o co.iraciors .ere sii wana.er. L.A. -tarry sonson. esiah- ibmpkma-Beck-sih re-insi coon and re-control room tubing. OdL",""rano'T4lhe 2; "ae'nro"u." | |||
p ' :::r'."e".o':l'''*; Tan'"'""r"es'-W#ff"re''lll"C records of the corarac' ors and the work grve them the appearance of federal coan- .e ni. order to enrechte the turnover of they t nto corapliance with . y nst t .ou their syst to . | |||
Installed la erit the alt gh na o insta pk -k th. BASCO an tion of %aterford: one instaDed the instru- symem was made to see if the added h:for- LPAL internal documents deshng wnh mentation haes that run between the station represented the actual uatus of the the process that Gambre has recently rch ectS n'- with her con pt syuem ical t O en nas s icant sa ety ed re .=wk natal an 3-mont -long des gned c - | |||
Working under a special agreenent laoons accordmg to Gembert sources. rect the problems. Gamber's sources in s of 193 ft a n. th a ly R they saad t - | |||
serious deficiencies een discovered ta lanialed or " signed off" as meetag fed- ity assurance program at waterford ill | |||
~ GAa Mht msey u. ius.s 19 l | |||
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semams highly problematic. According to these comes the Nudear Reguhitory Com-a letter wraten to the NRC by several of nussion aM as staff of inspectors who these sources but nos yet ma. led. LP&L a make penodr spot cherk:of plants under and ESASCO management huwe consis- 8%e If you,Ve lost traceabslity of rnaterials one .dbla W.8v .? conarwtion. | |||
tently "f ailed to address and resolw" defi- to go out and rernove those inatenals ano put in traceatnd Quaisy control and gitahty assurance ciencies identified by "many personne!" fnatenals. sre the ibp skies of the safety program. | |||
in the quahty assurance program at %hter- Qualny control mspectors are responsible ford. " Management 7 accordmg to the let- Q, 7hagg the only aCCepfaNe Way? lw ensunns that the conuructen hself is ter, "has been makmg decisions that 40 technically r.orrect as the plant goes up, u | |||
,,her pr$ni'ih | |||
's . No, that4 not the only acceptable way. Wu can do, again. '$;, f m | |||
Nthat innverned by Conuruction Management what LP&L did in a lot of cases. Act ept tne cor'sequench the weid itself is correctly done. Quahty and LP3.L Start-Up." Say. ' Hey.we don't have traceat>hty on this portion of the assurance is a ngorous record keepm3 pm-Areas cf concern ihat need NRCinven- planL if 4 have a failure en tne matenals we'll replace all of gram designed to provide independent usation, accordmg to the letter and mter- th0Se inatenals, wrification of the adequacy of a0 safety-wwws enh tes wrners, include: related work done on a nuclear power | |||
*Conuruction and quality anurance defi- plant. Every weld, every piece of pipe, O. But that coud happen dunn; operafens, very length of steel used in a safety-ciencies found durms the review of docu- e. elated system in a nuclear project mun be mematen for all contractors that remma a That's corrn 8's. ,,,c,, isle. Theft has to be a p ece of paper "open" at Waterford | |||
*The quahricahons of qushey assurance showmg where each piece was manufac-and qualuy control mspectors for er least he Andthof CoudCauseanacCfdenf7 tured, by wluch company, in w hKh manu-sa contractors at Waterford, includmg resuka | |||
. facturms not and the qual.ty te"er ute for each km. The nam ofibe wei Mercury and Tompkins Beckwith, are A. Tha. Could cause, depend:ng on which systern itt in and made each weld, the name of each quahty suspeci and may be bned on inadequ*" where its at, that could cause an accident presious job empenence and felasfied resu- control mapector eho inspected and mes a accepted each weld, must all be recorded | |||
*UnauthctMed alterations in quahty We Colhey'fe fo&ng the dfCe? along with documentation shommg that anurance documentation includma many welders and inspectors ahke were techni-mstancesof falufkasen A. They're folhng the dice. cany qmhfwd to perform the work | |||
* Serious problems in the welding and inwohed- | |||
.',. AD of k is done acmrdmg to a broad boltme of uructural meet. both in the field and a the accompanying QA dccumema- | |||
* J f i e -- m *+<'.,rg (L 8 range of intrKate but Widely accepted | |||
"" y trade craft and professional standards. | |||
"I C,ri a-- | |||
M g,,,, | |||
ten , , , , | |||
*Non<onforming conditions in safery- t ,= ese such as those of the American Society of related piping supports and hangers %*!5%,/- /* 4' g Mechanical Enginee-ing ( ASME) or the mstahed by Mercur% Tompkms-Beckwah g . d t t 4 S.s.# 39 ' Amencan Society for bondestructive 1r- .24 . . i. f"("'" '". | |||
and Fischbach and Moore ; - *= ' | |||
,, ,, e e y e Testmg (ASNT). Nuclear Regulatory | |||
*"As-built" arch sectural drawings tha' ha ben okmd but do not mnai = I i ( (3t,*S | |||
* Commission regulanons specify which sianda,ds are io ine iimei fc,r vanoi,s types actual installations ir. the plant or the f | |||
'2 h..$ Q ;* % In= l - | |||
Mg-a}*p.'. I.iLggp of work throughout a plant. Before corb approved engmeering designs | |||
*Non.conformance reports on quality l | |||
ie,a F' @ | |||
., hy.,k; uructen can begm on a new plam the util-ity involved must file a comples anurance breakdowns that have beca ) i .* e | |||
* 5 m * . \ * *( t ,* ,g "y * * | |||
( ",~ | |||
engineering plan with the NRC outhams, among other things, how they wi'1 awet impropeny closed without substam atmg **??f9 1 Wy, the required quahty contml pad quahty evidence of corrective acten | |||
* Systematic intmudance of QA/QC per. | |||
sonnel for EBASCO, Mercury and a/ | |||
"t > U^ ' | |||
i.4- assurance manJards. Governms all of this is a ha of 13 quahty assurance entena that i f* ~ - ' ' | |||
the QA/QA programs of each subcon-Tompkinn-Beckwith - j | |||
,/ | |||
These and other problems, accordmg to tractor, the pnme contra tor and the ut6 O [, | |||
. Cambil's sources, render somenhere wy must measure up to, | |||
* h is a amnumental task, requinns the between 23 and 30 Merent of the work at Waterford "mdeternunate"- it is impos-sible to assess the actual quahty of the g j maimenance and accumulanon of tens of thousands of pgges of records for each work and its poiential impact on the - | |||
* major subcontractor. As each comractor niant's safe operanon. Whde mamtannir.3 fimshes their work, then QA document that possure. Gamber) sources behew A. ...on a case by case basis i can sa and iustey accepono p=um == 6 = rad o = = * :in= | |||
that the QA failures an the work of Mer. contractor, who is responsible for Y SOCa''l en@neer. So can any good OA revwwmg them for both completeness and cury and Tompkms.Beckwith could lead to a senous accident if the plant goes mto engirseer. And an N Inspector can sa and accept that comphance with N RC godehnes. The opersJon before the probiens are JushflCation- prime contractor in turn releases the com- | |||
> '.4[ f.. | |||
motved. pleted poruons of the plant to the utiu y ty . e y LP&L's official position is that them are O. One by one? on a system-by sysiem ban along with | |||
: s. ; M their accompanyms QA document pack- | |||
< ; .. j no senous problems at waterford. Durms 4i; j. an imerview lam December. LP&L Qual-hy Assurance Manager Dm Genus ami Ae one by one, but tnatis iike going out into the forest and asm. Whe= | |||
* o^ pacuse* a= '==d oser to the ut&ty, h pna contracer n l looking at one tree. There4 thousantis of other trees. Nog required to provide bindmg assurantes | |||
' ,IV yy - LPAL Vice Prenders for Nuclear Opera-tions | |||
* Mike" Leddick both assured Gers, ber that the review and re-6nspection you take all those deficiencies and it sells you you had a definite problern as far as the Quahty assurance the the Q biocumemauon n both com-pleie and in cornpkence with feoeral | |||
'#y'a safety standards. The utihty m its turn | |||
;''-- ' program of Mercury and Tompkins- frnplernentaten dunng Construction is Concerned-must then review the packages agam for p | |||
M..aV Bakwah are nearly complete. Ahhough some opea deficwncies reraia for he Vl/hoff raises Questons hbouf fneinfegnty of the entire...? both completeness and comphance and J. g(. &- Tompkins-Beckwith, accordhia to Ger- then make those packages avadable for | |||
"* '*" '" hd wnd LP&L NRCinspacon.Dw emargroms s se ke CorreCL Wu're taDono x number of thout.ande of def,caencaes W to MC mgulanon W Manons d expe ts to load fuel and bar's lowW | |||
.g.*., 3. i [ tem soranons by late spnas or early sum-in docufnentation that were handled Corrected with very httle NRC guidelines above a certain level of mer, hardware re-wot seversy am required to be reported to the NRC witnsa 24 hours. Violauons of fed- | |||
. r. | |||
7 | |||
,i %'hde leddick is a recent arrbal at - | |||
Waterford, having come to the LPAL O. And the fact that vou had so rnany of these thrgs andscated eral standards are subject to fine and Q '' | |||
* y team late last July, Ocrrets has been there that there prDbably was a JDf (note hardware re work could usult in suspension of construc. | |||
? L st almost since the beginnmg. Gemtur's 8="- | |||
: tr neCOSsa@ | |||
sources say that Gerrets has knows of Mercury of Norwood and Tompkins-the records doctor %g operstras bang Bakwith, accordapt to all accounts, thor-run by Mercury and 1bmpkms-BecLwah g* M Y98- oughly failed in their QA efforts on for erweral months, smce at least early in systems Wal to the safe oferation of the summer of 1933 and perhaps longer- .,,_ | |||
%hierford. Mercury con" acted to instah Genets demes any such knowledge. . the pneumatic and hydrauhe tubing con-Under NRC mgulanons LPAL is ulti- their p.are contractce, EBASCO, but it began in the lane finies. each cc.ntractor is necung the instrumematen between the mately responsible for seeing that %hter- semains LP&L's responsibdity to ensure requued to stataram both quahty control teactor and as beam centist, the reactor ford lit asetts federal quahty assurance taat EBASCO and its subcontractors and quality assurance inspectors. The control room. Tompkins-Beckwith was guidehnen, as the safety g=ogram is offi- siees the required QA standards. Under pnme contractor. EBA5CO as waterford, hired to instaD most of the plant's piping csany known. NRC rules allow them to the system that has evolvgi smce construc- is also required to maintam a staff of QA/ systems, includmg most of the eystems delegate snuch of that responsabihty to = tion on commercial nuclear reactors QC inspectors and engmeers. On top of critical to shuttmg the reactor dowg safely Gwert Jeury ss insa 21 | |||
. .m - | |||
s | |||
. ,o = | |||
a. | |||
@ ^ | |||
V I Freedom ofInformation Act,was a com- LP&L to bnns the plant on bne on the and - of theQAbreakdownsin incaseof anaccident. the work of both compames became more in earty 1932 Mercu,y and Tompkms. I plete breakdown of the quahty assurance other EBASCO assigned several contract Beckwith, under the tutelage vf EBAS- programs of Mercury. Tompkas-Bec6 employees who speciahm in reneweg and apparent and the imphcanons those - | |||
CO, were preparms to release the first with and f.BA5CO. Maintaimag the pulhns together Q A documentahon pecb breakdowns had for the plant's comple-w ages to help renew the two companies' non date became clear, the mood four of more then 120 syuems at %ater- pohte fictron that they di cowred the QA ford to LP&L. LP&L, enh the s nallent breakdowns on their own initiatiw, records packages and guide theta ento changed. Instead of gettmg it done right. | |||
LP&L ordered both Mercury and Tomp- comphance. The firs step of thal process, our sourres say, the emphasis slufted to QA naff at a reactor under constructice kms Beckwah to undertake a major over- however, was to identefy the problems. gestang it done, penod. | |||
sa the ennte country, had bsen unda coa-imuous prenure from the NRC fce most haul of their quahry assurance programs Renewers working wuh both ctAnpames "%'henever we couldn't find anything of 1931 to espand their QA staff to la June of 1932, while :he NRC lookeo reported similar experiences to their right in the records," one source who include a Q A rcam spccefically assigned io on. Under the NRC-pushed overhaul fnends: the more they looked the more worked on the Mercury records review prepare the plant for operauons. They Mercury and Tompkins-Beckwith were problems they found; the more problems r-.nM desenbmg the earty days of the fmally dad so in late 1981 and early 1932. cach ordered to funain aD their quahty they found the more reustaoce ther review program,"we'd go out to the field. | |||
The operanons QA team, under direct control and quality assurance inspectors, received, first from the management of (%e)went and looked at the m rananan in r | |||
pressure from the NRC, began to emanune re-review au their QA documentation, Mercury anJ Tompkins-Beckwith and the field and fund that it was just about the QA documentauon for the four safety conduct a 100 percent re mspechon of all then from: the n anagernent of EBASCO. as shoddy as the records, and in some systems EBASCO, Mercury and Tomp- safety-related maanations and brms it au Some Gambir sources beheve that the caers, worse. Then they wouldn't allow us kms-Seckwith claimed were ready for into complance with NRC QA guide- management of EBASCO and LP&L in the field any more because we were operanons. hnes. undertook the iniual charge to revamp the identifying too many problems" Re-What they found, accordmg to NRC Under the NRC's regulatory gun on the Mercury and Tornpkins-Beckwith QA viewsrs warkmg wah Tompkms-Beckeuh | |||
.- documents obtened by Gembu under the one hand and the increasu:3 pressure from programs in good fanh, but as the number say they were running into smular prob-lems and encountering smular pressures to Where You Can Buy WC%a mse,me-,d_,,a, the quahry assurance and construcuon organuations involved in a nuclear con-struction protect maintain separate, dis-I' <;wA "f J tinct and comp 6ctety mdegendent hnes of | |||
; 1 | |||
' '^ | |||
4 authorsyL recognuma that there is a natu-4 | |||
. 7j ral anchnation for the pressures of meetmg | |||
- +1 construction schedules to overnde the j srmsent and often aggravatmg demands required to meet high quality assurance f j ! mandards.NuclearQA/QCanspectorsare | |||
; ' i protaded from threats dir=cted agamst | |||
' om. se,e | |||
_._.._' CBD arri ,- aay an ; ;: ihm sobs or ihm persons by manage-24M So Canoihon Jo* 3 C%nries mem, worned about meeting construc-7Ju bya! | |||
l FIard g '.. g% ! pp Theave tion schedules, by federa' crmunal laws. | |||
; egge,y,y,,,,,,g Nevertheless, accordma to Gamber's 9a tar rw ;,e 9 sn jac Deve i 53h hyura ( | |||
l . He mm eng a | |||
* kleure t"s ; | |||
N eMo side. i Dani Wentas Fili. Me aardre m. 'the Men ury and Tompkins-Beckwah QA p m 3 a O.rm 2 m Cwres E A k Mces SW M*wa ' | |||
-. projects who refused to 30 along to get ule l flaming o Do.lpen Book, Store gg,3 9 *g e , | |||
Hole Beggs Bldg. er e.n fx,uar along were the ribjects of frequent efforts u 99 e pts Conee end Tee Co. | |||
l Pome cherwein Hesel ! to intu:udate them into backm3 off. The ITM Bldg. C.a.rmee Ft r.re t 6 f4,e ase 2021 s Crwne 7713 Map | |||
* i " head" renewers on both projects even-7 sually became the targets of background | |||
" ; Lt1 Cenerei e Gerden Dneertet Beek Riverbead Basieurent M ** w Store M V W**ca j investiganons initisied by EBASCO, Mother's Rest. ! Tw mnk on Py*ete ew nw Geta according to our sources, in an effort to | |||
. .&ne Theatre Nortgay 6.c Frevnm.c Cosel VLHere M M MW. find some provocance to remove them | |||
'****'Ad- 9 W Can* Sareeece Sendwichee , %epg j | |||
6434 5c Caen 4,< ' " * | |||
* Eckead Druge Despite resistance to the bad news i ne La Av' f.s g gg . _ | |||
4 Le Pow 611oe e SWaefs Newomend M Mg W Tomhhe's m krz.s ._ 7essee Demote t 331 > Canen QA disasters from its %aterford-based | |||
* managetnent, the magmtude of the prob-Ruk s Peaceke | |||
, j [**d C* lems and me impact en om hanng a M H W C.% s~ d a .cm - n - - ed Toew.,er .m e. | |||
4+ Lea me m.,e 4W hyseras j . h45. . | |||
Lo ltr'arua Pry 4me e-ee | |||
: p. ~ Meltline, d'*d1gf^i{ | |||
EBA3CO's headquarters in New Jency | |||
} i - | |||
that somethms had to be done. Some ume e Ohwer a Neweesad I n October,1982, EBASCO headquarters | |||
''" $ 9 Inc00tfes/femdcrjdMmsstcyldOJf!th A8 ; * * $3 Rud M dispatched a QA specialist to %aterford to head p a task force to get the s l d Jer3 Gr8 OCIMPEfthWIhIyWlUVe OfC 8 ga3 Amortcen leak , | |||
W 4P7 the firm taken by task force s ber.m. h f0 Mk b yotl NeQue CCMedt d 52SM.' '' was tocotrpile a but of all outstandma QA E 1m e do,,,e ,oe,,, ore - ,,, unmencm ae ,lant. | |||
By the end of October,1932,the hn had W (.x asper 7000 Vaarars Hwy | |||
' l twen emnpiled. The task force showed a t/d y EDS | |||
- e Cilmeee's ga pg N- ;- M sg Meier bed hst of 20.0C0 opeo deficienc;es and grow- | |||
! 4.M P 4 e yt.e go,e, ing, including at that time, over 14.000 geherated by the flawed Tompkins-i NI .s j l, O d\'e.g* | |||
N~ | |||
al-1532 Rot =rt E lm Beckwith QA program alone. %ithin Csee Ss Gerles Wa A_ i ' :^:- j' e Time ggvi Seve,, | |||
Meim . pwi weeks of her arrival, according to Gem-f a /$ " " " " - - .L., e time so,.e 3G5 wee bNarede ber t sources. EBASCO's task force lender. | |||
a woman named Maxinne Butgan, was at Telly He ex aar tm QL - 4 - | |||
e Everybody e Pisas loggerheads wah EBASCO's en-sne QA JG35 Meiere has Manager, Larry Stmson. Bergan was | |||
_ 9 pushms a abroughgoing review, re. | |||
W | |||
%,eLuea s &,Thheew 1 m e Muner's Neweseemd 217 Veerar* tt*Y e French Qwerter Mee gg{ hkg - e Coeveatent Feed inspecnon and re-work program, our sources say, a urategy that was adamantly Ceuer ,, seere opposed by Sunson. Burgan argued for | |||
* W4"* 2108 mer aHwy enterms the deficiencies mee the plant's h= e Lakee6de hews cothputerued master trackmg systent and e 4 herbury's N | |||
MC" a number of other good management | |||
* E*emer Howe & Beek Seere strategies designed to expedite the control | |||
) 2M Vaarere twy | |||
- enCheni Le C,eart | |||
: a. Bldg. g and resolution of the QA brea6 downs, all | |||
' ppa'ad 65 Sua$aa The ruamas | |||
. wk.i. r.ed Co. y e Ciese, seek Siero mo"le'between Burgan and Sew.an fen-W3 E4*9eJe ki erg gye n goes, batt tered untd January of 1983. whez Burgan d - | |||
? and several members of her task force | |||
, atte'npted to force the issue and have Sun-ee . | |||
8 , S . | |||
. .h $ . | |||
@$0 son removed. They knt.and it was Bur 6an ee e S er O9 @. W ar $ e = ho was mstead sent packmg tAk to New Jeney. sources say. | |||
N lsAdaliJerwery se igfd ~ | |||
f-- | |||
E' s e e e n | |||
V Mercury and Tompkin>Beckwith had, traceable to the part after k is innalled or comparisons of the records agasr.st the ! just writeit in." | |||
meanwhde, begun so symematwally aher it has *. be on the part kself. In a large installed work wm seldom made. l EBASCO and LP&L management problemanc Q A records sometant in Sep- number of cases for both Mercury and By early 1933, according to GemNti I referred to this process as the makmg of tember,1932, according to GemNr's Tompkin>Beckwith, accordmg to Gem- sources, the system Lad become some . "administraitwe changes'' accordma to sources. Botk companies had senous bet sources who worked on these records in what more refmed and syuematic. Both i Gemhaisources,a process the managesa problems with what is called matersal both cases, c:ther the part or the number Mercury and Tompkms-Beckwith hired found acceptable. Most of the records traceabihtv. All pipng and fittag and entered on the records was wrong. crews of clerks, characterued as recent revweers inw hed, hoe ever, conudered k 2 weldmg rods used ia a nuclear power plant During the early stages of the re- "Ha'mvine high school graduates" who outright falsification. The process oc-are 4:gned s lot or " heat" number. That inspectica and review program at simply assigned acceptable bene numbm curred not only wah heat numbers, but number 's supposed to be traceable back Tompkins-Beckwith, according to one to probsematic records as they came in, with weld symbols, pipmg supports and to the mechanical and phynxal testing Gamber source directly involved in k, QA "1bu'd take a record in there wth a bad hanger installaoons and "apbudt" draw-performed on a to make sure that k meets records with incorrect heat numbers heat number on k7 one source recaued, ings as weu. One source, who has worked established manufactunns standards. would "go into the QA ==nafer's office" "and one of the guls would houer out, in at least five other nuclear construction i That number has to be carried on the and re. emerge a short time later with an ' Hey, what's a good heat number for 2- projects, called the Tompkins.Beckenh material throughout installs 4on. The acceptable heat number. According to inch stamless steel pipe?' Somebody QA records for hangers "some of the number must other be on a record that is sources who worked in both programs, would gre her a good number and she'd worst I ewr ran across? Another source familiar with Mmury's QA problems reeled off an almost identxal be of woes | |||
@g g ble for the problems. issiung a120,000 flne agame the utihty last March for escept where they meet at the cross. | |||
meds of money While h is imposuble thert: " totally incorrect" han aer trace-ainlity, incorrect ambuih drawmss, incer-Ogghg dgg' ' the breakdown of Mercury's and to accurately weigh the vahdity of rect best numbm, undersued welds - | |||
another contractor) QA programs. either party's claims from the dis- most of wtuch wete corrected by "pencB h E Accordmg to the NRC LP&L should tance, conversapons wah several sharpenit's? | |||
have caught and vectified the fadures Gamber sources and a review of docu- 'As the outset 7 one source close to the On the 1933,morning what mayofturn December out to be aI, la Mercury % quabry assurance pro- ments now to Gember's possession management process at EBASCO sold fateful disagreernent was reached gram kmg before they duL sossest that they asay weu both be Gamber,"I behave that LPAL was smcere m between representatives of Ia=ia== Mercurs pr*W5 has a far dif- right. in wanting to do k r'ght. And then, when Power and Light Company and those f: rent perspective from LP&L's. la There is no questior that Mercury 4 they marted doing h nght and they saw the of Mercury of Norwood, Inc.,la a their suit the Massachusetts-based quahty assurance program suffered ranufk=na==,the day 40< lay mountma of meetms held at LP&L's Waterford ill coatractor names both LPAL and serious and repeated breakdowns that documemalme, hardware deficiencers - | |||
Nuclear Project site at 1htt,I a====== %hterford's architect /ensmeer and were the result of poor trainms, poor a cost factor got invohed, a schedehng LPAL and Mercury came together prime metractor. EBASCO Services, supervmon, poor quahty control and factot" thm to present each other with ther Inc. Mercury) position,la a phrmae, is poor quahty assurance practices. For 1baipkins-Beckwith and Mercury claims and counter clanns concernmg that they were tricked. The trukner, Gamber is la r-== of dozens of thousands of deficuncies were corrected the work Mercury performed at they say, was EBASCO.1b hear Mer- aon.conformance reports detarhng with very Pttle hardware re-work. LP&L's Waterford durms tlw u==Hana= of cury teD k EBASCO fooled them by breakdownsin Macury)QA program Leddick told Osmber in an inverview in the plant's pneummit and electrosue teihng them to base their Si ce the . that read like &long and tirmg haany of December that the problems a both com-instrumentataan and control synems, projets on a specified esta .ite oflabor bad weHing and snspection pre = pan were repaireJ with less than 2 per-When Mercury and LPAL f.iled to hours, the figures for whd were gno- breakdowns in the basic skins and cent to-work. Wb9e LP&L officials agree about who owed wheat how wided by FMSCO. liscluded in the su , sus Mercury contracted ta prtwide tended to see the QA deh:s as am-much for the work Mercyry did at bid, accouing to Mercury was an ob- regardless of wherewr faihees ought ply paper problems need og a paper fin, Waterford both parties fDed suit later scure labor category tkler., maceDa- be assigned to FJBASCO. Gember) sources, men wah decades of thar sar w day. Each charged the other neous. Mercury had worked on pre- E5ASCO,on the other hand, bars collective experience in the nuclear with neghgence and incompetence. At vious projects under EBASCO's a heavy burden of responsibihry for indunty, take a different view. "The prob. | |||
Issue are the enormous coes curruns direction, the company) sun says, and the failure of the quahty assurance lems in the records indicate in my own incurred by Mercury la its work at EBASCX)cincutms assured them that programs for Mercury and several vienf one of than sa.d. "that they haw a Waterford, a sure that seeded from the contract at Meterfor:lwould not be other contractors at Wasdeford whose massive configuration problem in the the origmally agreed upon 16.73 mil- much different froen those. QA programs have prown to be plam." | |||
hon at the tane the contracs was let in Based on those amurances Mercury senously flawed, accordmg to Gamber But that is news no one in Waterford's July 1973 tol50.44 minionialate Sep subndried a bid for $6.73 milhon. In sources close to the problems AR of top manayement marited to hear, our tember 1983. the contract Mercury and EBASCO the work done by compa nes contract- sourcas say. "They didn't bancally wan; to Wlule k is impossible to teu froun (actmg as LP&L) agent) entered into ing with the architect / engineer in a approach that espect of it," one told us. | |||
readmg the two petkions whose argu- en July 13, 1973,according to Mer- auclear construction project, our "Tb y didn't want to approach the resolu-ments the courts wiD ewntually sup. cury *EBASCO expressly represented sources say, are heavily dependent on tion of records deficiencies wuh hardware pert, if indeed the case cames that far, to Mercury that the denga for the prt> the specifications the A/E generates. correctioris because it does add tocom and the legal battle between the two cone ject was for all relevant purposes com- One of the most serious problems at schedule. And that gets back to traceabd-panies allows the pubhc to penetrs.: plete? That did not turn out to be true, Wa'erford, our sources aD agree, is , ky of matenals. If you'w lost traceabday for the firm time what hasbeen LP&L*s according to Mercury, and anther did that EBASCO wrote conumently poor ! of matenals Ihe one acceptable way 00 rightly held ved cper the enormous cost severalother claims EBASCO uiade to and inadequate specifications frore j repair the problemi is to remove those overruns at materford. The plant's them, aR of which mateiauy affected day one. , materials and put in traceable matenals? | |||
estimated cost has shot fresa the ori- their ukunale costs. One result of that, according to There is another way to deal with the smal enamate of $230 mdhon in 1970 Mereiry begna site mobiluatson at these sources, was the creation of j problem. Rou the dice. "You can do what to the current projection of $2.67 bil. EBASCO's direction in August of numerous *genenc" quainy amurance | |||
., bon and chmbms. 1973, but the engineering drawings deficiencies: QA failurts that were 3,saad. | |||
LP&L did inthe | |||
" Accept a comequences. | |||
los of cases," one Say. source | |||
' Hey. | |||
lb hear LPAL teB k,the fault in this they were supposed to be working budt into the darly processes of = w don't haw traceability on this pornor case is a0 Mercury's. " Mercury's from were far from complete at the EBASCO itself and na but the most l of the plant. If we haw a fadure m mate-failure to complete the work in accord time. "Of the orirnal 125 instrurnent experienced and well-orgaruzei of ; nals WB replace aH of those matenals! " | |||
with the contract," LP&L's sust pipmg details (engmeenng drewmssk their subcontractors. h is a perspectrw The problem wnh that approach, the charges, *its fadure to esercue reason- I12 were subsiantially revised by wluch provides at least one possible sources say,is that by then it could be too able skal and its negligence resuhed in EBASCO ouh most of the sevisions monwe for some ERASCO managers late. In the synems instaDed by Mercury extensiw defective work beyond that not hans furnahed to Mercury untd at Waterford who, our sources say, and Tompkms.Beckwuh, for msumce, a concevably anticipated at the tune of late in 1930" Ftorn that inauspicious were determined supporters of the . matenal failure under operstmg conds-the contract? Beyond that, accordmg beginning, accordans to Mercury's efforts of Mercury, Tompkas. Beck- tions could lead to enher a serious acci-a to LP&L, M-cury agreed to perform, complamt, things went steadily wah and sewral other %trerford con- dent or a Three Mile Island style laspeet and document their work dowahdl, with EBASCO steaddy tractoss to doctor ther fland quahty near. accident that would reMer the reac. 1 under the contract in accordance wah increasing the demands they placed on assurance records. tot useless and could ponnbly lead to a Nuclear Regulatory Compuanon- Mercury whde ', fashng Beyond the fadures of EBASCO more serious consequences. | |||
asyrmed quahty control and quahty to provide the sabcontractae with andthersubcontractor ,however, lays Could that actually happen? h could. | |||
assurance program. " Mercury's "either essentially compleie ensi- LP&L and their responsibthty to puer- The quemen is thss: how senous are the fadure to comply wuh this contractual meertng drawings or engmeerms data" see an appropnate conuruction and safety problems created by the loss of obligat on has caused LP&L great Because cf those kmds of persutent quahry assurance program. Under snatenal traceabdity at waterford and the expense to brms the weit into cond faapures by EBASCO. Meitury) sua NRC regulations and federal law systematic fadute to correct poor gaahry phance with federal segulataons* the contends Mercury was forced so peo- LP&L, as the construction pennit instal ation work at the plant? The sus argues. LP&L's petman asks Ihr vide their own drawags and a great holder for %aterford and the party answer, accordmg to Gemberi sources, is almost 130 authon in damages frorn deal of other "nosHnanuallabor" that who wiB adtsmatety own and operate that no one knows. %orne yet. they saw Mercury. had not been enginaDy comracted for. the plant should it be hcensed is the trail has been so muddied in the case NRC docurnents obtamed by Gem- For that reason, the suit clauna, Msw responsit le to oversee all the work of Mercury and Tompkms.Berkeith by err through the Freedorn of Informs. cury's ongmaDy estimated $1.6 mil- that. Whatewr the internal calculus the faluficanon of records that it may now twa Act show that there mdeed was a hon non-manuallabor costs baDooned of the quality assurance breakdowns be unposuble to re4 race. The question for thorough breakdown of Mercury's to $24.6 milhon. at Wsteford, under ti.e law it is work done by these two contractors is | |||
* QA program at %bterford, but the Nether party addresses any of the LP&L) responsibdny to prewnt them especially entacal, because the systems NRC ukunstely hekt LP&L responsi- concerns of the other la ther clasas, or pay the pnce if they don't. they deak wuh are both absolutely essen-tial to the safe operation of the plant. | |||
, GAMBif.Jwwery 14 90a4 N l - | |||
2 | |||
: l. . . .. . - . . | |||
wm J% ms y . | |||
x | |||
.: y. COMMENTARY - . | |||
e l Congressional Inspection at Waterford I I < | |||
Nuclear Regulatory C-W alreMy whethe'r these has been serious wrong. | |||
n this issue of Gamber, resnrter Ron Itak in 1hxas, at Diablo Canyoes in Cali-has egg on its face and may be motivted doing by both the utility and the NRC, Ridenhour reveals that top quality- fornia - the Nuclear Regulatory Com- if the area of investigation were outside mission has siniply not done the joS of to cowr up the problems rather than to assurance records inspectors at the renal them at this late date. As long ago the nuclear industry, we would suggest Wal rford III nuclear poner plans claun quahty control which is its responsibihty. that the FBI and the Justice Department le has taken outside forces to bring even as last July, after Gambst first surfaced its two contractors responsible for critica: should take a hard look at what has hap-such grave problems as these plants have reports of serious construction problems safety-related systems circumvented the at Waterford NRC inspectors who came pened at Waterford. But the fact is that orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Com- suffered under proper scrutmy by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. At. the record of federal law enforcement mission and falsified tecords in order to Zimmer, for example, the work of a where malfrasance has occurred at whitewash what may be serious construc- nuclear power plantsis dismal. A tion defects-in earher stories. Gambit has revealed pnvate mvestigator was followed by an Wu.h thud party audit of records N gOf30 W b The only outside agency which has the power, the dignity and the credibdity to h | |||
that records inspectors responsible for before construction on that plant was % WifGfW #9 8S3fJFIFBg conduct a complete and thorough investi-I reviewing work on basic structural ele. halted. ggg M g gfyg It has gone beyond the point where sation of Watertord III and indeed the ments at Waterford were frustrated in "* UEI other troubled nuclear power plants in the their attempt to complete a competent reassuring ststements from the utility United States is the Congress. There are company that they are investigating prob. 28If0ft Seff04ASly and thorough inspection by orders from congressumal committees whose mandate lems at Waterford can be taken senously. includes overseeing the activities of the superiors at the plant who cut off their work. Accordirig to GenrNr's sources - people NRC and we would urge time congres-with decades of experience in the nuclear to GamNt to make inquiries were defen-Questions of safety in the w,@ en. sional committees to look closely at industry who enjoyed high positions at nive about the quality of woik at Waver-of a nuc! car power plant are not to be | |||
%aterford and remain respected members ford and insist:d that there were no Waterfo:dlit. | |||
taken lightly. When it appears, as it does Or if necessary, we call for the establish-of the nuclear engineering profession - serious problemt. In short it is no longer in this case, that the normal controls have ment of a special congressionalinvestigat-the utihty company has had every oppor- reassuring to hes r the Nuclear Regulatory broken down, the situation is nothing less ing committee to hold hearings on the tunity to uncover these problems for Commission state that they are investigat-than an emergency. | |||
ins poblems at Waterford. | |||
Waterford III nuclear power plant and The Nuclear Regulatory Commission several years. The same can be said for the allow all concerned parties to bring forth Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Among It's time for a really serious investiga-has broad powers and grave responsibili- tion of the construction problems at the evidence under oath at public heanngs in ties to ensure the quahty of construction at the top tecords inspection prrsonnel at an atmosphere free of intimidation or fear Waterford. Nuclear Regulatory Commis- Waterford til nuclear power plant and a nuclear power plant such as Waterford. such an investigation can not in the nature of reprisal. It may be that such an investi-But around the country at the nuclear sion supervision was regar&d as so inade- gauon is the only sure way the public will ~ | |||
quate that it was httle nure than a joke. of things be adequately done by the utihty power plants where grave problems have itself or by the NRC Indeed, part of the ever find out just how safe or unsafe the been discovered - at Midlands in Michi. Furthertnore, the pmblems at Water- Waterford Ill nuclear power plant is. | |||
subject of the investigation should be gan, at Zimmer in Oh:a. at Comanche ,I ford haw gone on for so long now that the - | |||
k G | |||
O | |||
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Latest revision as of 08:23, 14 May 2020
ML20080R961 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Waterford ![]() |
Issue date: | 02/20/1984 |
From: | Burstein C JOINT INTERVENORS - WATERFORD |
To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
References | |
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8402280468 | |
Download: ML20080R961 (8) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _
. v e JhpfD UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 84 FE827 P2:30 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CFF'"~
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD g hk[f.,
In the Matter of LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY Docket No. 50-382 OL (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3)
MOTION TO OPEN QUALITY ASSURANCE CONTENTION February 20, 1984 Now before this Honorable Board, through undersigned counsel, comes Gary Groesch, Chairman of Waterford 3 Joint Intervenors, who with respect moves the following:
THAT a new contention with regard to quality assurance be opened, based in part on the enclosed material; THAT mover be given a reasonable time to obtain applicable affidavits and otherwise perfect his case:
THAT applicant, Louisiana Power & Light, be ordered to give mover written assurance to be shown to prospective
" whistle-blowers" that there will be no retaliation by applicant;and THAT this Commission make available to mover and to every party on the appended service list the 237-page sworn statement to Richard K. Herr, Director, Office of Investigation, and William A. Crossman, Chief of Projects Section of Region IV, that was given by George Hill on January 10 and 11,1984, all as noted on Page One of the following enclosure.
8402280468 840220 PDR ADOCK OSOOO3R2 9 PDR
'h O'
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a .. .
WHEREFORE, mover prays this Honorable Board for all the relief enumerated above.
Respectfully subnitted,
~
Carole H. Burstein Co-Counsel for Joint Intervenors 445 Walnut Street.
New Orleans, Louisiana 70118 Telephone: (504 ) 866-6363 CERTIFICATE I hereby certify that all parties on the attached service list have been mailed a copy of the above pleading.
New Orleans, Louisiana, February 22, 1984.
6L N Carole H. nurstein
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board In the Matter of Docket No. 50-382 OL LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3)
SERVICE LIST Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosmi.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ceauni . Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Docketing & Service Section (3)
Office of the Secretary W. Reed Johnson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Washington, D.C. 20555 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Administrative Judge Bruce Churchill, Esquire Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Howard A. Wilber 1800 M Street, N.W.
Atomic Safety & Licensing Washington, D.C. 20036 Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossa.
Washington, D.C. 20555 .
Sherwin E. Turk, Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing
-Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conan.
Washington, D.C. 20555.
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Waterford IIh An Exchange of Letters q 1
i recogrution than a small group of expe-Office of frivesugauon, and Mr. Wdham g
"" t,~ p? -. 7 3 A Crossman. "Cluef, P 'iccts Section" InresayDecember, Gambu publis'hed art on senous problems with qual-control records in the Waterford lll (. i.a i, rienced Quality Assurance Engmeers.
j i am a*are of your reputation, we have of Regior. IV. Therefore, i ocheve the con-g(.
- ' worked on the same project in previous cerns that were not properly handled whde t nuclear power plant Our article was l l based in part on long interviews with i gbgjg4**Y 6 L yh years. The real concern is the reputatasn I was at Waterford III, or afterwards, will be resobed by the two above mennoned kEl George Hdl, en expenenced quahty assur- !
A -,
da . . . . j i of Waterford Ill's Management Staff "W: i dunns 95 percent of its construction. De NRC representauves. I have confidence in 2 ance engmeer with an excellent record in
'@+ i Utility and Architect Eagineer had very their reputation and past expenence for Y the nudcar indust y who held a high poss- 3 g ; little quality verification or control of investigsting similar problems at other i uon in quality assurance at Wa.erford. ,
W p n ,'. g *? nuclear sites. My obbgauon as a Quahts --
Mnce the pubbcation of our article, offi- their subcontractors / vendors during con-aals at LP&L have written to George Hill j
- Wq.t 5 struction, which resulted in many defi- Assurance Representative has been 5
.'s fulfihed by reporting my concerns to 5 tellms him they don't beheve there is any j .
4E
- cien;ies identified pnor to Turn-over.
Many concerns were not properly resobed NR, therefore I do not feel ans further real problem but offering to meet with I e- ~
Q-him We have obtamed copies of that let- ;
s M, by Management, and when I was con- contact with LP&L, or any other parties ter to Hill and of his reply. Both letters foi- . -
- M , iacted t y "The GamNr" in December, concermns Waterford 111 is necessary ==
lor i
- 1983, I f elt it was r , obhgation to inform George Hill =ii
' an outude pr.rty to essure they were inves-
Dear Mr. Hm:
gy The purpose nf this letter is to invite , ; rigated by someone who cared abo.u get-
-g ting the joh done nght.
_] y you to meet with me to discuss your ,
y reported concerns relating to the safety of i , My conc *rns were given to the, local -
newspap:r, and other committees, the Waterford Nuclear Station. because the AE and Utihty had a tendency g As you may know, I have recently been ,l 7 F to overlook senous deficiencies, or pre- - -
=j hired by Louisiana Pbwer and Light Com-vent additional deficiencies from bems p e j pany as Senior Vice President - Nuclear % ,,
adentified that might impact schedule. '
=
operauons. In that capacity I am respon- j De problems identined by the paper may sible for oversight of LTAL's nuclear 1 5 have been addressed by your personnel; '/ l operations and for the safe and timely lnstam, "o"ne':.les fw var infamadon.
p will note that this oms- In at kast did you verify the method the however, completion of the Waterford Ill station. I !
have considerable expenence with nuclear ened a items were closed, and did they really ,
a[s address the root causeto assure similar ,
-a power in the Umted States Navy and with i
/
8 problems do not exist? Also, are these . .
5 alleged proWietns which can be idennned deficiencies reported and closed, in '
8 G accordance with procedural, contract.
Gambit Has a l "frmn the mspapa accents. De resuhs l%n'iT,"'"a*"," "*""""* sen. . aad resui=tary rea"irements? ( C#, J i, if an experienced Quality Assurance
= ="" ' i=*.ss, e"'d a ad' = 'dd- ' Engmen, rr- a mtimidatmn. = = out-t
=
New Data E' '
Gamb n s yo t cies. A tvpical example is the closure of ,
on Tbs sdays for home dehvenes and ;
f ida. an relat NCR W34245, where the imtiator evalu- gg g gy%f) ]
an I ndan at news b, mes and sales out-a
'tocal News coverag, '
E"*'*'ea"+'"'O wenda, s-t n. m.=s. .d tfadts L i 2',,L',",l"f'a'"o'"u, "r~t o, mai,
- l, ;- McO n*"v" a f*rymchmmr*= 'Te'0o% ,
n_,,on a, ,,, a, acdca * ** **l q spon: ud mienanunent miumns can "nea"h'**"
travel arrangements for you to come to
- . P,'" s'"Ll2,d" #n".""3 J Og'* indicaie -y sims Love's story =
, ="a "; ode ="~ ~,/;=g2;r",
=
- j a=' 'lar cases Numerous NCR's dunng the hat can be said atout a senes called j dme . hen New ~ u, -s. ,"="';*t";,*f #*
'" # E*' * "I paper wdlbegmits waks two days ear- during normal work hours or at my horne' departure of 7-83 were initiated, dispost- three episodes? That it ran the risk of being her t oned and closed by the same mdividuals corny? That it seemed like televtuon news =
Sincerely- "
, Roth 5, leddick wehout venfication or Engmeering justi- at h most sacchanne form?
fication. This is not the common pracoce All of those things can be said abo,.t 31 l Senim Vice Prmdent within the nuclear industry, and is not in Angela Hill's little senes aluch began on i a number of commercial nuclear power ' Nuclea: Operamms units. Those projects with which I have . Louisiana Ibwcr & l.ight compliance with your exisung procedures. Channel 4 on Valentine's evemns and in Q i was notined by LP&L personnel in which each episode focused on a marned 3 been connected have achieved excellent i couple that had been together at least t!urty 1 safety and performance records anu it is ! . nud Decernber, that your intenuon av to :
have a meeung and hear my concerns. I years. Thow ttungs plus the conclusion myintenuontoassurethat Waterfordlives i
Dear Mr. laddick:
I appreciate vour invitation to meet had no objections at the time, but the that despite the nsks, the senes somehow up to the samc high standards } worked.
with you to discuss my concerns, however NRC had mntacted me for an interview, Over a penod of some months a local Why it workod serened to be a function 4 weekly newspaper in New Orleans has ' a meetmg would be purposeless. My con- and on January 10th and Ilth I expressed cerns have already been conveyed to the all my concerns in a 237 page sworn state- of good editmg and good ta.ste on HilPs !
reported disturbmg allegations of prob- Jl lems at Waterford I have enclosed those ! proper comnuttees, wtuct utay have more ' rnent to Mr. Richard K. Herr, 'Duector, part. We can thmk of some televtsion news t
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...e G A M HI'll JANUARY 14,1984 DOCTOREDRECORDS AT WATERIORDill w' v'an
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By RON r*11DENHOUR .J __ _ .___ -/R 1;r&& ^ -e' we contractors at I.muassana Power four crkical safety systems the two coa. eral codes. or the drawmss new actually and (Jaht Company's increasirgly- tractors had earher wrtined to be com- changed co nflect the "as m" Installation.
Ttroubled waterford Ill power plant devised and implementert a plate, auckar the contractors. EBASCO and LPAL, agreed to bring the contractors
- even though k was in violation of NRC standards.
systematic program to doctor flased mark at whterford into coniphance with One Gem 6ft source derply invohed in safety records as the plant in the summer NRC requirements. That agreement reviewing Mercury's quahty assurance imY r$ $
both companies. The doctored records woodII.. 'pYi7BecYwn lac., to reinspect all their installat s a that mot ma the company's acords review, re-s"p n,caDed of W1t f saf want quahty and wash a coen her
- .and .orked.
..: g st,u of .rms mi, f.c.8s au .o,k ato com. *r.mr. _
=='=, o.erming n== p'== . ===eg
- f** = fay ==d-* =d am== f= To'nrk-Ba-a had
- The rec.ords . involve 6st) sources. despite the ::: .' & *ineering t.r&L eng specificaoces. same opmion of TompkmBeckenh's re.
in==d.a=.hng=G mar >=m =.
two Critical safety of * ===i tri=t in wiai--
- e cords are supposed io refieci. Ai ihe
'=o-=== =d -c=* - effai ^ iso management for both wercury and : weaking on ine condioon that he not ne Systems: The piping u- a .- - - - -;ng begaa. trat.
ks prime contractor. ERASCO Services.
wnnk-Be a. app =oy =
- blesses of ERASC(Ys Qualh) Assurance
- -a. as - ch-=i-i a oB45-CO's records review oversight of the systems and the w.. and ihe i-o co.iraciors .ere sii wana.er. L.A. -tarry sonson. esiah- ibmpkma-Beck-sih re-insi coon and re-control room tubing. OdL",""rano'T4lhe 2; "ae'nro"u."
p ' :::r'."e".o':l'*; Tan'"'""r"es'-W#ff"relll"C records of the corarac' ors and the work grve them the appearance of federal coan- .e ni. order to enrechte the turnover of they t nto corapliance with . y nst t .ou their syst to .
Installed la erit the alt gh na o insta pk -k th. BASCO an tion of %aterford: one instaDed the instru- symem was made to see if the added h:for- LPAL internal documents deshng wnh mentation haes that run between the station represented the actual uatus of the the process that Gambre has recently rch ectS n'- with her con pt syuem ical t O en nas s icant sa ety ed re .=wk natal an 3-mont -long des gned c -
Working under a special agreenent laoons accordmg to Gembert sources. rect the problems. Gamber's sources in s of 193 ft a n. th a ly R they saad t -
serious deficiencies een discovered ta lanialed or " signed off" as meetag fed- ity assurance program at waterford ill
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semams highly problematic. According to these comes the Nudear Reguhitory Com-a letter wraten to the NRC by several of nussion aM as staff of inspectors who these sources but nos yet ma. led. LP&L a make penodr spot cherk:of plants under and ESASCO management huwe consis- 8%e If you,Ve lost traceabslity of rnaterials one .dbla W.8v .? conarwtion.
tently "f ailed to address and resolw" defi- to go out and rernove those inatenals ano put in traceatnd Quaisy control and gitahty assurance ciencies identified by "many personne!" fnatenals. sre the ibp skies of the safety program.
in the quahty assurance program at %hter- Qualny control mspectors are responsible ford. " Management 7 accordmg to the let- Q, 7hagg the only aCCepfaNe Way? lw ensunns that the conuructen hself is ter, "has been makmg decisions that 40 technically r.orrect as the plant goes up, u
,,her pr$ni'ih
's . No, that4 not the only acceptable way. Wu can do, again. '$;, f m
Nthat innverned by Conuruction Management what LP&L did in a lot of cases. Act ept tne cor'sequench the weid itself is correctly done. Quahty and LP3.L Start-Up." Say. ' Hey.we don't have traceat>hty on this portion of the assurance is a ngorous record keepm3 pm-Areas cf concern ihat need NRCinven- planL if 4 have a failure en tne matenals we'll replace all of gram designed to provide independent usation, accordmg to the letter and mter- th0Se inatenals, wrification of the adequacy of a0 safety-wwws enh tes wrners, include: related work done on a nuclear power
- Conuruction and quality anurance defi- plant. Every weld, every piece of pipe, O. But that coud happen dunn; operafens, very length of steel used in a safety-ciencies found durms the review of docu- e. elated system in a nuclear project mun be mematen for all contractors that remma a That's corrn 8's. ,,,c,, isle. Theft has to be a p ece of paper "open" at Waterford
- The quahricahons of qushey assurance showmg where each piece was manufac-and qualuy control mspectors for er least he Andthof CoudCauseanacCfdenf7 tured, by wluch company, in w hKh manu-sa contractors at Waterford, includmg resuka
. facturms not and the qual.ty te"er ute for each km. The nam ofibe wei Mercury and Tompkins Beckwith, are A. Tha. Could cause, depend:ng on which systern itt in and made each weld, the name of each quahty suspeci and may be bned on inadequ*" where its at, that could cause an accident presious job empenence and felasfied resu- control mapector eho inspected and mes a accepted each weld, must all be recorded
- UnauthctMed alterations in quahty We Colhey'fe fo&ng the dfCe? along with documentation shommg that anurance documentation includma many welders and inspectors ahke were techni-mstancesof falufkasen A. They're folhng the dice. cany qmhfwd to perform the work
- Serious problems in the welding and inwohed-
.',. AD of k is done acmrdmg to a broad boltme of uructural meet. both in the field and a the accompanying QA dccumema-
- J f i e -- m *+<'.,rg (L 8 range of intrKate but Widely accepted
"" y trade craft and professional standards.
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- Non<onforming conditions in safery- t ,= ese such as those of the American Society of related piping supports and hangers %*!5%,/- /* 4' g Mechanical Enginee-ing ( ASME) or the mstahed by Mercur% Tompkms-Beckwah g . d t t 4 S.s.# 39 ' Amencan Society for bondestructive 1r- .24 . . i. f"("'" '".
and Fischbach and Moore ; - *= '
,, ,, e e y e Testmg (ASNT). Nuclear Regulatory
- "As-built" arch sectural drawings tha' ha ben okmd but do not mnai = I i ( (3t,*S
- Commission regulanons specify which sianda,ds are io ine iimei fc,r vanoi,s types actual installations ir. the plant or the f
'2 h..$ Q ;* % In= l -
Mg-a}*p.'. I.iLggp of work throughout a plant. Before corb approved engmeering designs
- Non.conformance reports on quality l
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., hy.,k; uructen can begm on a new plam the util-ity involved must file a comples anurance breakdowns that have beca ) i .* e
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engineering plan with the NRC outhams, among other things, how they wi'1 awet impropeny closed without substam atmg **??f9 1 Wy, the required quahty contml pad quahty evidence of corrective acten
- Systematic intmudance of QA/QC per.
sonnel for EBASCO, Mercury and a/
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i.4- assurance manJards. Governms all of this is a ha of 13 quahty assurance entena that i f* ~ - ' '
the QA/QA programs of each subcon-Tompkinn-Beckwith - j
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These and other problems, accordmg to tractor, the pnme contra tor and the ut6 O [,
. Cambil's sources, render somenhere wy must measure up to,
- h is a amnumental task, requinns the between 23 and 30 Merent of the work at Waterford "mdeternunate"- it is impos-sible to assess the actual quahty of the g j maimenance and accumulanon of tens of thousands of pgges of records for each work and its poiential impact on the -
- major subcontractor. As each comractor niant's safe operanon. Whde mamtannir.3 fimshes their work, then QA document that possure. Gamber) sources behew A. ...on a case by case basis i can sa and iustey accepono p=um == 6 = rad o = = * :in=
that the QA failures an the work of Mer. contractor, who is responsible for Y SOCal en@neer. So can any good OA revwwmg them for both completeness and cury and Tompkms.Beckwith could lead to a senous accident if the plant goes mto engirseer. And an N Inspector can sa and accept that comphance with N RC godehnes. The opersJon before the probiens are JushflCation- prime contractor in turn releases the com-
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motved. pleted poruons of the plant to the utiu y ty . e y LP&L's official position is that them are O. One by one? on a system-by sysiem ban along with
- s. ; M their accompanyms QA document pack-
< ; .. j no senous problems at waterford. Durms 4i; j. an imerview lam December. LP&L Qual-hy Assurance Manager Dm Genus ami Ae one by one, but tnatis iike going out into the forest and asm. Whe=
- o^ pacuse* a= '==d oser to the ut&ty, h pna contracer n l looking at one tree. There4 thousantis of other trees. Nog required to provide bindmg assurantes
' ,IV yy - LPAL Vice Prenders for Nuclear Opera-tions
- Mike" Leddick both assured Gers, ber that the review and re-6nspection you take all those deficiencies and it sells you you had a definite problern as far as the Quahty assurance the the Q biocumemauon n both com-pleie and in cornpkence with feoeral
'#y'a safety standards. The utihty m its turn
- -- ' program of Mercury and Tompkins- frnplernentaten dunng Construction is Concerned-must then review the packages agam for p
M..aV Bakwah are nearly complete. Ahhough some opea deficwncies reraia for he Vl/hoff raises Questons hbouf fneinfegnty of the entire...? both completeness and comphance and J. g(. &- Tompkins-Beckwith, accordhia to Ger- then make those packages avadable for
"* '*" '" hd wnd LP&L NRCinspacon.Dw emargroms s se ke CorreCL Wu're taDono x number of thout.ande of def,caencaes W to MC mgulanon W Manons d expe ts to load fuel and bar's lowW
.g.*., 3. i [ tem soranons by late spnas or early sum-in docufnentation that were handled Corrected with very httle NRC guidelines above a certain level of mer, hardware re-wot seversy am required to be reported to the NRC witnsa 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Violauons of fed-
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,i %'hde leddick is a recent arrbal at -
Waterford, having come to the LPAL O. And the fact that vou had so rnany of these thrgs andscated eral standards are subject to fine and Q
- y team late last July, Ocrrets has been there that there prDbably was a JDf (note hardware re work could usult in suspension of construc.
? L st almost since the beginnmg. Gemtur's 8="-
- tr neCOSsa@
sources say that Gerrets has knows of Mercury of Norwood and Tompkins-the records doctor %g operstras bang Bakwith, accordapt to all accounts, thor-run by Mercury and 1bmpkms-BecLwah g* M Y98- oughly failed in their QA efforts on for erweral months, smce at least early in systems Wal to the safe oferation of the summer of 1933 and perhaps longer- .,,_
%hierford. Mercury con" acted to instah Genets demes any such knowledge. . the pneumatic and hydrauhe tubing con-Under NRC mgulanons LPAL is ulti- their p.are contractce, EBASCO, but it began in the lane finies. each cc.ntractor is necung the instrumematen between the mately responsible for seeing that %hter- semains LP&L's responsibdity to ensure requued to stataram both quahty control teactor and as beam centist, the reactor ford lit asetts federal quahty assurance taat EBASCO and its subcontractors and quality assurance inspectors. The control room. Tompkins-Beckwith was guidehnen, as the safety g=ogram is offi- siees the required QA standards. Under pnme contractor. EBA5CO as waterford, hired to instaD most of the plant's piping csany known. NRC rules allow them to the system that has evolvgi smce construc- is also required to maintam a staff of QA/ systems, includmg most of the eystems delegate snuch of that responsabihty to = tion on commercial nuclear reactors QC inspectors and engmeers. On top of critical to shuttmg the reactor dowg safely Gwert Jeury ss insa 21
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V I Freedom ofInformation Act,was a com- LP&L to bnns the plant on bne on the and - of theQAbreakdownsin incaseof anaccident. the work of both compames became more in earty 1932 Mercu,y and Tompkms. I plete breakdown of the quahty assurance other EBASCO assigned several contract Beckwith, under the tutelage vf EBAS- programs of Mercury. Tompkas-Bec6 employees who speciahm in reneweg and apparent and the imphcanons those -
CO, were preparms to release the first with and f.BA5CO. Maintaimag the pulhns together Q A documentahon pecb breakdowns had for the plant's comple-w ages to help renew the two companies' non date became clear, the mood four of more then 120 syuems at %ater- pohte fictron that they di cowred the QA ford to LP&L. LP&L, enh the s nallent breakdowns on their own initiatiw, records packages and guide theta ento changed. Instead of gettmg it done right.
LP&L ordered both Mercury and Tomp- comphance. The firs step of thal process, our sourres say, the emphasis slufted to QA naff at a reactor under constructice kms Beckwah to undertake a major over- however, was to identefy the problems. gestang it done, penod.
sa the ennte country, had bsen unda coa-imuous prenure from the NRC fce most haul of their quahry assurance programs Renewers working wuh both ctAnpames "%'henever we couldn't find anything of 1931 to espand their QA staff to la June of 1932, while :he NRC lookeo reported similar experiences to their right in the records," one source who include a Q A rcam spccefically assigned io on. Under the NRC-pushed overhaul fnends: the more they looked the more worked on the Mercury records review prepare the plant for operauons. They Mercury and Tompkins-Beckwith were problems they found; the more problems r-.nM desenbmg the earty days of the fmally dad so in late 1981 and early 1932. cach ordered to funain aD their quahty they found the more reustaoce ther review program,"we'd go out to the field.
The operanons QA team, under direct control and quality assurance inspectors, received, first from the management of (%e)went and looked at the m rananan in r
pressure from the NRC, began to emanune re-review au their QA documentation, Mercury anJ Tompkins-Beckwith and the field and fund that it was just about the QA documentauon for the four safety conduct a 100 percent re mspechon of all then from: the n anagernent of EBASCO. as shoddy as the records, and in some systems EBASCO, Mercury and Tomp- safety-related maanations and brms it au Some Gambir sources beheve that the caers, worse. Then they wouldn't allow us kms-Seckwith claimed were ready for into complance with NRC QA guide- management of EBASCO and LP&L in the field any more because we were operanons. hnes. undertook the iniual charge to revamp the identifying too many problems" Re-What they found, accordmg to NRC Under the NRC's regulatory gun on the Mercury and Tornpkins-Beckwith QA viewsrs warkmg wah Tompkms-Beckeuh
.- documents obtened by Gembu under the one hand and the increasu:3 pressure from programs in good fanh, but as the number say they were running into smular prob-lems and encountering smular pressures to Where You Can Buy WC%a mse,me-,d_,,a, the quahry assurance and construcuon organuations involved in a nuclear con-struction protect maintain separate, dis-I' <;wA "f J tinct and comp 6ctety mdegendent hnes of
- 1
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4 authorsyL recognuma that there is a natu-4
. 7j ral anchnation for the pressures of meetmg
- +1 construction schedules to overnde the j srmsent and often aggravatmg demands required to meet high quality assurance f j ! mandards.NuclearQA/QCanspectorsare
- ' i protaded from threats dir=cted agamst
' om. se,e
_._.._' CBD arri ,- aay an ; ;: ihm sobs or ihm persons by manage-24M So Canoihon Jo* 3 C%nries mem, worned about meeting construc-7Ju bya!
l FIard g '.. g% ! pp Theave tion schedules, by federa' crmunal laws.
- egge,y,y,,,,,,g Nevertheless, accordma to Gamber's 9a tar rw ;,e 9 sn jac Deve i 53h hyura (
l . He mm eng a
- kleure t"s ;
N eMo side. i Dani Wentas Fili. Me aardre m. 'the Men ury and Tompkins-Beckwah QA p m 3 a O.rm 2 m Cwres E A k Mces SW M*wa '
-. projects who refused to 30 along to get ule l flaming o Do.lpen Book, Store gg,3 9 *g e ,
Hole Beggs Bldg. er e.n fx,uar along were the ribjects of frequent efforts u 99 e pts Conee end Tee Co.
l Pome cherwein Hesel ! to intu:udate them into backm3 off. The ITM Bldg. C.a.rmee Ft r.re t 6 f4,e ase 2021 s Crwne 7713 Map
- i " head" renewers on both projects even-7 sually became the targets of background
" ; Lt1 Cenerei e Gerden Dneertet Beek Riverbead Basieurent M ** w Store M V W**ca j investiganons initisied by EBASCO, Mother's Rest. ! Tw mnk on Py*ete ew nw Geta according to our sources, in an effort to
. .&ne Theatre Nortgay 6.c Frevnm.c Cosel VLHere M M MW. find some provocance to remove them
'****'Ad- 9 W Can* Sareeece Sendwichee , %epg j
6434 5c Caen 4,< ' " *
- Eckead Druge Despite resistance to the bad news i ne La Av' f.s g gg . _
4 Le Pow 611oe e SWaefs Newomend M Mg W Tomhhe's m krz.s ._ 7essee Demote t 331 > Canen QA disasters from its %aterford-based
- managetnent, the magmtude of the prob-Ruk s Peaceke
, j [**d C* lems and me impact en om hanng a M H W C.% s~ d a .cm - n - - ed Toew.,er .m e.
4+ Lea me m.,e 4W hyseras j . h45. .
Lo ltr'arua Pry 4me e-ee
- p. ~ Meltline, d'*d1gf^i{
EBA3CO's headquarters in New Jency
} i -
that somethms had to be done. Some ume e Ohwer a Neweesad I n October,1982, EBASCO headquarters
" $ 9 Inc00tfes/femdcrjdMmsstcyldOJf!th A8 ; * * $3 Rud M dispatched a QA specialist to %aterford to head p a task force to get the s l d Jer3 Gr8 OCIMPEfthWIhIyWlUVe OfC 8 ga3 Amortcen leak ,
W 4P7 the firm taken by task force s ber.m. h f0 Mk b yotl NeQue CCMedt d 52SM.' was tocotrpile a but of all outstandma QA E 1m e do,,,e ,oe,,, ore - ,,, unmencm ae ,lant.
By the end of October,1932,the hn had W (.x asper 7000 Vaarars Hwy
' l twen emnpiled. The task force showed a t/d y EDS
- e Cilmeee's ga pg N- ;- M sg Meier bed hst of 20.0C0 opeo deficienc;es and grow-
! 4.M P 4 e yt.e go,e, ing, including at that time, over 14.000 geherated by the flawed Tompkins-i NI .s j l, O d\'e.g*
N~
al-1532 Rot =rt E lm Beckwith QA program alone. %ithin Csee Ss Gerles Wa A_ i ' :^:- j' e Time ggvi Seve,,
Meim . pwi weeks of her arrival, according to Gem-f a /$ " " " " - - .L., e time so,.e 3G5 wee bNarede ber t sources. EBASCO's task force lender.
a woman named Maxinne Butgan, was at Telly He ex aar tm QL - 4 -
e Everybody e Pisas loggerheads wah EBASCO's en-sne QA JG35 Meiere has Manager, Larry Stmson. Bergan was
_ 9 pushms a abroughgoing review, re.
W
%,eLuea s &,Thheew 1 m e Muner's Neweseemd 217 Veerar* tt*Y e French Qwerter Mee gg{ hkg - e Coeveatent Feed inspecnon and re-work program, our sources say, a urategy that was adamantly Ceuer ,, seere opposed by Sunson. Burgan argued for
- W4"* 2108 mer aHwy enterms the deficiencies mee the plant's h= e Lakee6de hews cothputerued master trackmg systent and e 4 herbury's N
MC" a number of other good management
- E*emer Howe & Beek Seere strategies designed to expedite the control
) 2M Vaarere twy
- enCheni Le C,eart
- a. Bldg. g and resolution of the QA brea6 downs, all
' ppa'ad 65 Sua$aa The ruamas
. wk.i. r.ed Co. y e Ciese, seek Siero mo"le'between Burgan and Sew.an fen-W3 E4*9eJe ki erg gye n goes, batt tered untd January of 1983. whez Burgan d -
? and several members of her task force
, atte'npted to force the issue and have Sun-ee .
8 , S .
. .h $ .
@$0 son removed. They knt.and it was Bur 6an ee e S er O9 @. W ar $ e = ho was mstead sent packmg tAk to New Jeney. sources say.
N lsAdaliJerwery se igfd ~
f--
E' s e e e n
V Mercury and Tompkin>Beckwith had, traceable to the part after k is innalled or comparisons of the records agasr.st the ! just writeit in."
meanwhde, begun so symematwally aher it has *. be on the part kself. In a large installed work wm seldom made. l EBASCO and LP&L management problemanc Q A records sometant in Sep- number of cases for both Mercury and By early 1933, according to GemNti I referred to this process as the makmg of tember,1932, according to GemNr's Tompkin>Beckwith, accordmg to Gem- sources, the system Lad become some . "administraitwe changes accordma to sources. Botk companies had senous bet sources who worked on these records in what more refmed and syuematic. Both i Gemhaisources,a process the managesa problems with what is called matersal both cases, c:ther the part or the number Mercury and Tompkms-Beckwith hired found acceptable. Most of the records traceabihtv. All pipng and fittag and entered on the records was wrong. crews of clerks, characterued as recent revweers inw hed, hoe ever, conudered k 2 weldmg rods used ia a nuclear power plant During the early stages of the re- "Ha'mvine high school graduates" who outright falsification. The process oc-are 4:gned s lot or " heat" number. That inspectica and review program at simply assigned acceptable bene numbm curred not only wah heat numbers, but number 's supposed to be traceable back Tompkins-Beckwith, according to one to probsematic records as they came in, with weld symbols, pipmg supports and to the mechanical and phynxal testing Gamber source directly involved in k, QA "1bu'd take a record in there wth a bad hanger installaoons and "apbudt" draw-performed on a to make sure that k meets records with incorrect heat numbers heat number on k7 one source recaued, ings as weu. One source, who has worked established manufactunns standards. would "go into the QA ==nafer's office" "and one of the guls would houer out, in at least five other nuclear construction i That number has to be carried on the and re. emerge a short time later with an ' Hey, what's a good heat number for 2- projects, called the Tompkins.Beckenh material throughout installs 4on. The acceptable heat number. According to inch stamless steel pipe?' Somebody QA records for hangers "some of the number must other be on a record that is sources who worked in both programs, would gre her a good number and she'd worst I ewr ran across? Another source familiar with Mmury's QA problems reeled off an almost identxal be of woes
@g g ble for the problems. issiung a120,000 flne agame the utihty last March for escept where they meet at the cross.
meds of money While h is imposuble thert: " totally incorrect" han aer trace-ainlity, incorrect ambuih drawmss, incer-Ogghg dgg' ' the breakdown of Mercury's and to accurately weigh the vahdity of rect best numbm, undersued welds -
another contractor) QA programs. either party's claims from the dis- most of wtuch wete corrected by "pencB h E Accordmg to the NRC LP&L should tance, conversapons wah several sharpenit's?
have caught and vectified the fadures Gamber sources and a review of docu- 'As the outset 7 one source close to the On the 1933,morning what mayofturn December out to be aI, la Mercury % quabry assurance pro- ments now to Gember's possession management process at EBASCO sold fateful disagreernent was reached gram kmg before they duL sossest that they asay weu both be Gamber,"I behave that LPAL was smcere m between representatives of Ia=ia== Mercurs pr*W5 has a far dif- right. in wanting to do k r'ght. And then, when Power and Light Company and those f: rent perspective from LP&L's. la There is no questior that Mercury 4 they marted doing h nght and they saw the of Mercury of Norwood, Inc.,la a their suit the Massachusetts-based quahty assurance program suffered ranufk=na==,the day 40< lay mountma of meetms held at LP&L's Waterford ill coatractor names both LPAL and serious and repeated breakdowns that documemalme, hardware deficiencers -
Nuclear Project site at 1htt,I a====== %hterford's architect /ensmeer and were the result of poor trainms, poor a cost factor got invohed, a schedehng LPAL and Mercury came together prime metractor. EBASCO Services, supervmon, poor quahty control and factot" thm to present each other with ther Inc. Mercury) position,la a phrmae, is poor quahty assurance practices. For 1baipkins-Beckwith and Mercury claims and counter clanns concernmg that they were tricked. The trukner, Gamber is la r-== of dozens of thousands of deficuncies were corrected the work Mercury performed at they say, was EBASCO.1b hear Mer- aon.conformance reports detarhng with very Pttle hardware re-work. LP&L's Waterford durms tlw u==Hana= of cury teD k EBASCO fooled them by breakdownsin Macury)QA program Leddick told Osmber in an inverview in the plant's pneummit and electrosue teihng them to base their Si ce the . that read like &long and tirmg haany of December that the problems a both com-instrumentataan and control synems, projets on a specified esta .ite oflabor bad weHing and snspection pre = pan were repaireJ with less than 2 per-When Mercury and LPAL f.iled to hours, the figures for whd were gno- breakdowns in the basic skins and cent to-work. Wb9e LP&L officials agree about who owed wheat how wided by FMSCO. liscluded in the su , sus Mercury contracted ta prtwide tended to see the QA deh:s as am-much for the work Mercyry did at bid, accouing to Mercury was an ob- regardless of wherewr faihees ought ply paper problems need og a paper fin, Waterford both parties fDed suit later scure labor category tkler., maceDa- be assigned to FJBASCO. Gember) sources, men wah decades of thar sar w day. Each charged the other neous. Mercury had worked on pre- E5ASCO,on the other hand, bars collective experience in the nuclear with neghgence and incompetence. At vious projects under EBASCO's a heavy burden of responsibihry for indunty, take a different view. "The prob.
Issue are the enormous coes curruns direction, the company) sun says, and the failure of the quahty assurance lems in the records indicate in my own incurred by Mercury la its work at EBASCX)cincutms assured them that programs for Mercury and several vienf one of than sa.d. "that they haw a Waterford, a sure that seeded from the contract at Meterfor:lwould not be other contractors at Wasdeford whose massive configuration problem in the the origmally agreed upon 16.73 mil- much different froen those. QA programs have prown to be plam."
hon at the tane the contracs was let in Based on those amurances Mercury senously flawed, accordmg to Gamber But that is news no one in Waterford's July 1973 tol50.44 minionialate Sep subndried a bid for $6.73 milhon. In sources close to the problems AR of top manayement marited to hear, our tember 1983. the contract Mercury and EBASCO the work done by compa nes contract- sourcas say. "They didn't bancally wan; to Wlule k is impossible to teu froun (actmg as LP&L) agent) entered into ing with the architect / engineer in a approach that espect of it," one told us.
readmg the two petkions whose argu- en July 13, 1973,according to Mer- auclear construction project, our "Tb y didn't want to approach the resolu-ments the courts wiD ewntually sup. cury *EBASCO expressly represented sources say, are heavily dependent on tion of records deficiencies wuh hardware pert, if indeed the case cames that far, to Mercury that the denga for the prt> the specifications the A/E generates. correctioris because it does add tocom and the legal battle between the two cone ject was for all relevant purposes com- One of the most serious problems at schedule. And that gets back to traceabd-panies allows the pubhc to penetrs.: plete? That did not turn out to be true, Wa'erford, our sources aD agree, is , ky of matenals. If you'w lost traceabday for the firm time what hasbeen LP&L*s according to Mercury, and anther did that EBASCO wrote conumently poor ! of matenals Ihe one acceptable way 00 rightly held ved cper the enormous cost severalother claims EBASCO uiade to and inadequate specifications frore j repair the problemi is to remove those overruns at materford. The plant's them, aR of which mateiauy affected day one. , materials and put in traceable matenals?
estimated cost has shot fresa the ori- their ukunale costs. One result of that, according to There is another way to deal with the smal enamate of $230 mdhon in 1970 Mereiry begna site mobiluatson at these sources, was the creation of j problem. Rou the dice. "You can do what to the current projection of $2.67 bil. EBASCO's direction in August of numerous *genenc" quainy amurance
., bon and chmbms. 1973, but the engineering drawings deficiencies: QA failurts that were 3,saad.
LP&L did inthe
" Accept a comequences.
los of cases," one Say. source
' Hey.
lb hear LPAL teB k,the fault in this they were supposed to be working budt into the darly processes of = w don't haw traceability on this pornor case is a0 Mercury's. " Mercury's from were far from complete at the EBASCO itself and na but the most l of the plant. If we haw a fadure m mate-failure to complete the work in accord time. "Of the orirnal 125 instrurnent experienced and well-orgaruzei of ; nals WB replace aH of those matenals! "
with the contract," LP&L's sust pipmg details (engmeenng drewmssk their subcontractors. h is a perspectrw The problem wnh that approach, the charges, *its fadure to esercue reason- I12 were subsiantially revised by wluch provides at least one possible sources say,is that by then it could be too able skal and its negligence resuhed in EBASCO ouh most of the sevisions monwe for some ERASCO managers late. In the synems instaDed by Mercury extensiw defective work beyond that not hans furnahed to Mercury untd at Waterford who, our sources say, and Tompkms.Beckwuh, for msumce, a concevably anticipated at the tune of late in 1930" Ftorn that inauspicious were determined supporters of the . matenal failure under operstmg conds-the contract? Beyond that, accordmg beginning, accordans to Mercury's efforts of Mercury, Tompkas. Beck- tions could lead to enher a serious acci-a to LP&L, M-cury agreed to perform, complamt, things went steadily wah and sewral other %trerford con- dent or a Three Mile Island style laspeet and document their work dowahdl, with EBASCO steaddy tractoss to doctor ther fland quahty near. accident that would reMer the reac. 1 under the contract in accordance wah increasing the demands they placed on assurance records. tot useless and could ponnbly lead to a Nuclear Regulatory Compuanon- Mercury whde ', fashng Beyond the fadures of EBASCO more serious consequences.
asyrmed quahty control and quahty to provide the sabcontractae with andthersubcontractor ,however, lays Could that actually happen? h could.
assurance program. " Mercury's "either essentially compleie ensi- LP&L and their responsibthty to puer- The quemen is thss: how senous are the fadure to comply wuh this contractual meertng drawings or engmeerms data" see an appropnate conuruction and safety problems created by the loss of obligat on has caused LP&L great Because cf those kmds of persutent quahry assurance program. Under snatenal traceabdity at waterford and the expense to brms the weit into cond faapures by EBASCO. Meitury) sua NRC regulations and federal law systematic fadute to correct poor gaahry phance with federal segulataons* the contends Mercury was forced so peo- LP&L, as the construction pennit instal ation work at the plant? The sus argues. LP&L's petman asks Ihr vide their own drawags and a great holder for %aterford and the party answer, accordmg to Gemberi sources, is almost 130 authon in damages frorn deal of other "nosHnanuallabor" that who wiB adtsmatety own and operate that no one knows. %orne yet. they saw Mercury. had not been enginaDy comracted for. the plant should it be hcensed is the trail has been so muddied in the case NRC docurnents obtamed by Gem- For that reason, the suit clauna, Msw responsit le to oversee all the work of Mercury and Tompkms.Berkeith by err through the Freedorn of Informs. cury's ongmaDy estimated $1.6 mil- that. Whatewr the internal calculus the faluficanon of records that it may now twa Act show that there mdeed was a hon non-manuallabor costs baDooned of the quality assurance breakdowns be unposuble to re4 race. The question for thorough breakdown of Mercury's to $24.6 milhon. at Wsteford, under ti.e law it is work done by these two contractors is
- QA program at %bterford, but the Nether party addresses any of the LP&L) responsibdny to prewnt them especially entacal, because the systems NRC ukunstely hekt LP&L responsi- concerns of the other la ther clasas, or pay the pnce if they don't. they deak wuh are both absolutely essen-tial to the safe operation of the plant.
, GAMBif.Jwwery 14 90a4 N l -
2
- l. . . .. . - . .
wm J% ms y .
x
.: y. COMMENTARY - .
e l Congressional Inspection at Waterford I I <
Nuclear Regulatory C-W alreMy whethe'r these has been serious wrong.
n this issue of Gamber, resnrter Ron Itak in 1hxas, at Diablo Canyoes in Cali-has egg on its face and may be motivted doing by both the utility and the NRC, Ridenhour reveals that top quality- fornia - the Nuclear Regulatory Com- if the area of investigation were outside mission has siniply not done the joS of to cowr up the problems rather than to assurance records inspectors at the renal them at this late date. As long ago the nuclear industry, we would suggest Wal rford III nuclear poner plans claun quahty control which is its responsibihty. that the FBI and the Justice Department le has taken outside forces to bring even as last July, after Gambst first surfaced its two contractors responsible for critica: should take a hard look at what has hap-such grave problems as these plants have reports of serious construction problems safety-related systems circumvented the at Waterford NRC inspectors who came pened at Waterford. But the fact is that orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Com- suffered under proper scrutmy by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. At. the record of federal law enforcement mission and falsified tecords in order to Zimmer, for example, the work of a where malfrasance has occurred at whitewash what may be serious construc- nuclear power plantsis dismal. A tion defects-in earher stories. Gambit has revealed pnvate mvestigator was followed by an Wu.h thud party audit of records N gOf30 W b The only outside agency which has the power, the dignity and the credibdity to h
that records inspectors responsible for before construction on that plant was % WifGfW #9 8S3fJFIFBg conduct a complete and thorough investi-I reviewing work on basic structural ele. halted. ggg M g gfyg It has gone beyond the point where sation of Watertord III and indeed the ments at Waterford were frustrated in "* UEI other troubled nuclear power plants in the their attempt to complete a competent reassuring ststements from the utility United States is the Congress. There are company that they are investigating prob. 28If0ft Seff04ASly and thorough inspection by orders from congressumal committees whose mandate lems at Waterford can be taken senously. includes overseeing the activities of the superiors at the plant who cut off their work. Accordirig to GenrNr's sources - people NRC and we would urge time congres-with decades of experience in the nuclear to GamNt to make inquiries were defen-Questions of safety in the w,@ en. sional committees to look closely at industry who enjoyed high positions at nive about the quality of woik at Waver-of a nuc! car power plant are not to be
%aterford and remain respected members ford and insist:d that there were no Waterfo:dlit.
taken lightly. When it appears, as it does Or if necessary, we call for the establish-of the nuclear engineering profession - serious problemt. In short it is no longer in this case, that the normal controls have ment of a special congressionalinvestigat-the utihty company has had every oppor- reassuring to hes r the Nuclear Regulatory broken down, the situation is nothing less ing committee to hold hearings on the tunity to uncover these problems for Commission state that they are investigat-than an emergency.
ins poblems at Waterford.
Waterford III nuclear power plant and The Nuclear Regulatory Commission several years. The same can be said for the allow all concerned parties to bring forth Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Among It's time for a really serious investiga-has broad powers and grave responsibili- tion of the construction problems at the evidence under oath at public heanngs in ties to ensure the quahty of construction at the top tecords inspection prrsonnel at an atmosphere free of intimidation or fear Waterford. Nuclear Regulatory Commis- Waterford til nuclear power plant and a nuclear power plant such as Waterford. such an investigation can not in the nature of reprisal. It may be that such an investi-But around the country at the nuclear sion supervision was regar&d as so inade- gauon is the only sure way the public will ~
quate that it was httle nure than a joke. of things be adequately done by the utihty power plants where grave problems have itself or by the NRC Indeed, part of the ever find out just how safe or unsafe the been discovered - at Midlands in Michi. Furthertnore, the pmblems at Water- Waterford Ill nuclear power plant is.
subject of the investigation should be gan, at Zimmer in Oh:a. at Comanche ,I ford haw gone on for so long now that the -
k G
O
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