ML113420110

2011 Braidwood Station Initial Examination Outline Submittal

ML113420110
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	03/14/2011
From:	Enright D Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
To:	Region 3 Administrator
Shared Package
ML11167A130	List: ML113420110
References
Download: ML113420110 (43)

Text

2011 BRAIDWOOD STATION INITIAL EXAMINATION OUTLINE SUBMITTAL

Exelon.

Exelon Generation Company, LLC www.exeloncorp.com Braidwood Station Nuclear 35100 South Route 53, Suite 84 Braceville, IL 60407-9619 March 14,2011 10 CFR 55.40(b)

BW110028 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region III 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210 Lisle, IL 60532-4352 Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-72 and NPF-77 NRC Docket Nos. STN 50-456 and STN 50-457

Subject:

Submittal of Initial Operator Licensing Examination Outline Enclosed are the examination outlines supporting the Initial License Examination scheduled for the weeks of June 20 and 27, 2011 at Braidwood Station .

This submittal includes all appropriate examination standard forms and outlines in accordance with NUREG-1 021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 9, Supplement 1.

In accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supplement 1, Section ES-201, "Initial Operator Licensing Examination Process," please ensure that these materials are withheld from public disclosure until after the examinations are complete.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Chris VanDenburgh, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 417-2800. For questions concerning examination materials, please contact Brian Kempen at (815) 458-7860.

i:~~2~

Dani~I-J~~~~ri~

Site Vice President Braidwood Station

Enclosures:

(Hand delivered to Bruce Palagi, Chief Examiner, Region III)

Examination Security Agreements (Form ES-201-3)

Administrative Topic Outline{s} (Form ES-301-1)

Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline (Form ES-301-2)

• PWR Examination Outline (Form ES-401-2)

• Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) (Form ES-401-3)

• Statement detailing method of Written Exam Outline generation

• Scenario Outlines (Form ES-D-1)

• Record of Rejected KfAs (Form ES-401-4)

• Completed Checklists:

- Examination Outline Quality Checklist (Form ES-201-2)

Transient and Event Checklist (Form ES-301-5) cc: (without attachments)

Chief, NRC Operator Licensing Branch NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Braidwood Station

• bcc: (without attachments)

Director, Licensing Regulatory Assurance Manager - Braidwood Station Manager, Licensing - Braidwood, Byron and LaSalle County Stations Braidwood Nuclear Licensing Administrator Exelon Document Control Desk Licensing Human Resources - Braidwood Station Director Site Training - Braidwood Station B. Kempen - Braidwood Training Department

ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES-201-2 Date of Examination: (./2.0/10, \

Initials Item Task Description a b* c#

1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with ES-401.

W R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with I Section 0.1 of ES-401 and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled.

T T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolutions, or generic topics.

E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KIA statements are appropriate.

a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number 2.

of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients.

S I

b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number M and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule U

without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using L at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated A from the applicants' audit test(s), and scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

T 0

c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative R

and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.

3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:

(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks

• W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form

/ (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form fL..

T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit test(s)

(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form

b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:

(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensinq examinations

c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.

4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam section.

G

b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.

E N c. Ensure that KIA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5.

E R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections.

A e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.

L

f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO).

a. Author

b. Facility Reviewer (*) .. -II

c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)

d. NRC Supervisor I

NOTE: # Independent NRC Reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.

• Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines .

• ES-201, Page 26 of 28

• ES-301 Facility: Braidwood Examination Level: RO~ SRO Administrative Topics Outline 0

Form ES-301-1 Date of Examination: 06/20/2011 Operating Test Number: 2011 NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

S or R, 0, R-104 Determine SDM is inadequate Conduct of Operations P KIA 2.1.25 Imp Factor 3.9 R-110 Perform Off8ite AC Power Availability Surveillance Conduct of Operations S,M with ACB 1424 control power lost.

KIA 2.1.31 Imp Factor 4.6 R-204ldentlfy leak isolation point from station mechanical Equipment Control S or R,N drawings.

KIA 2.2.41 Imp Factor 3.5 R-300 Perform Liquid Release Channel Check.

Radiation Control p,S KIA 2.3.11 Imp Factor 3.8 Emergency Plan N/A N/A NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

• ' Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (.::;. 3 for ROs;.::;. 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (::=. 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (.::;. 1; randomly selected)

• ES 301, Page 22 of 27

• ES-301 Facility: Braidwood Examination Level: RO D SRO Administrative Topics Outline

[8'1 Form ES-301-1 Date of Examination: 06/20/2011 Operating Test Number: 2011 NRQ Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code" S or R, 0, R-104 Determine SDM is inadequate Conduct of Operations P KIA 2.1.25 Imp Factor 4.2 R-110 Perform Offsite AC Power Availability Surveillance Conduct of Operations S,M with ACB 1424 control power lost.

KIA 2.1.31 Imp Factor 4.3 S-204 Review battery surveillance and determine LCOAR Equipment Control S or R, 0 requirements.

KIA 2.2.40 Imp Factor 4.7 8-302 Prepare/Perform Liquid Release Radiation Control D,S KIA 2.3.6 ImPFacto@ 3,$

ftf S-412 Make Contigency Action Plan For Fire In The Plant.

Emergency Plan 8 or R, N KIA 2.4.25 Imp Factor 3.7 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required .

.. Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (8)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (!S. 3 for ROs;!S. 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ~ 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (!S. 1; randomly selected)

• ES 301, Page 22 of 27

ES-301 Control RoomJIn-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Braidwood Date of Examination: 06/20/2011 Exam Level: RO ~ SRO-I 0 SRO-U 0 Operating Test Number: 2011 NRC Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. SIM-112 Establish Excess Letdown to the VCT M,A,S 1 KIA 004000A4.06 Imp Factor 3.6

b. SIM-215 Place VC Makeup Filter Train and Recirculation Charcoal D,S 2 Adsorber in Operation KIA 0130002.1.23 Imp Factor 4.3

c. SIM-301 Align RHR for Cold Leg Injection D,S,L 3 KIA 006000A4.04 Imp Factor 3.7

d. SIM-409S Perform RV/IV Cycling Surveillance N,A,S 4S KIA 045000A4.01 Imp Factor 3.1

e. SIM-504 Perform 1A CS Pump Post Maintenance Run .. D,A,S 5 KIA 026000A4.01 Imp Factor 4.5

f. SIM-60l Synchronize a SAT to a bus being fed by a Diesel D,S, 6 KIA 064000A4.07 Imp Factor 3.4

g. SIM-707 Operate a Rad Monitor (Disable Incore Seal Table Monitor D,S 7 Audible Alarm)

KIA 073000A4.021mp Factor 3.7 D,A,S,P~

~¢

h. SIM-800 Swap CC Pumps 8 KIA 008000A4.01 Imp Factor 3.3 5:\.-n IkS" In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. IP-211 ESF Slave Relay SUN. (K616) N 2 KIA 013000A3.02 Imp Factor 4.1

j. IP-606 Perform Local Actions for Loss of DC Bus (add FW pp local trip) M,A,E 6 KIA 000058AA1.031mp Factor 3.1

k. IP-708 Local start of CCf-Ix outlet rad monitor (2PR09J) D,R 7 KIA 0730002.1.30 Imp Factor 4.4

@ All AO ~nd SAO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SAO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-II SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/ 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank '5.9/ '5.8 I '5. 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 2:. 1 I 2:. 1 / 2:. 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - I - / 2:. 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power I Shutdown 2:. 1 / 2:. 1 / 2:. 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2:. 2 1 2:.2 / 2:. 1 (P)revious 2 exams '5.31 '5. 3 I '5. 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 2:. 1 I 2:. 1 I 2:. 1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27

ES-301 Control Room/ln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Braidwood Date of Examination: 06/20/2011 Exam Level: RO D SRO-I [8J SRO-U D Operating Test Number: 2011 NRQ Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System 1 JPM Title Type Code*

Function

a. SIM-112 Establish Excess Letdown to the VCT M,A,S 1 KIA 004000A4.06 Imp Factor 3.6

b. SIM-215 Place VC Makeup Filter Train and Recirculation Charcoal D,S 2 Adsorber in Operation KIA 0130002.1.23 Imp Factor 4.4

c. SIM-301 Align RHR for Cold Leg Injection D,S,L 3 KIA 006000A4.04 Imp Factor 3.6

d. SIM-409S Perform RVlIV Cycling Surveillance N,A,S 4S KIA 045000A4.01 Imp Factor 2.9

e. SIM-504 Perform 1A CS Pump Post Maintenance Run D,A,S 5 KIA 026000A4.01 Imp Factor 4.3 f.

g. SIM-707 Operate a Rad Monitor (Disable lneore Seal Table Monitor D,S 7 Audible Alarm)

KIA 073000A4.02 Imp Factor 3.7 **

h. SIM-800 Swap CC Pumps D,A,S,P 8 KIA 008000A4.01 Imp Factor 3.1 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SAO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. IP-211 ESF Slave Relay Surv. (K616) N 2 KIA 013000A3.02 Imp Factor 4.2 ...

j. IP-606 Perform Local Actions for Loss of DC Bus (add FW pp local trip) M,A,E 6 KIA 000058AA1.031mp Factor 3.3

k. IP-708 Local start of CC Hx outlet rad monitor (2PR09J) D,R 7 KIA 0730002.1 ,30fmp Factor 4.0

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

"Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/ 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 5.9/ 5.8 1 5. 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 2:, 1 / 2:,1 / 2:, 1 (EN)gineered safety feature -/ - / 2:, 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 2:, 1 / 2:,1 / 2:, 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2:,2/ 2:,2 / 2:, 1 (P)revious 2 exams 5. 3 / 5. 3 / 5. 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 2:, 1 / 2:,1 / 2:, 1 (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27

• ES-301 Facility: Braidwood Exam Level: RO 0 SRO-I Control Roomlln-Plant Systems Outline 0 SRO-U ~

Form ES-301-2 Date 01 Examination: 06/20/2011 Operating Test Num ber: 2011 NRC Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System 1JPM Title Type Code*

Function a.

b.

c. SIM-301 Align RHR for Cold Leg Injection (SID) 0, S, L, EN KIA 006000A4.04 Imp Factor 3.6 3

d. SIM-409S Perform RVIIV Cycling Surveillance (At Power #2) N,A,S 4S KIA 045000A4.01 Imp Factor 2.9 e.

f.

g.

h.

In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. IP-211 ESF Slave Relay SUN. (K616) (Actuation relay fails to unlatch) N 2 KIA 013000A3.02 Imp Factor 4.2

j. IP-606 Perform Local Actions for Loss of DC Bus (add FW pp local trip) M,A,E 6 KIA 000058AA 1.03 Imp Factor 3.3

k. IP-708 Local start of CC Hx outlet rad monitor (2PR09J) D,R 7 KIA 0730002.1.30 Imp Factor 4.0

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; In-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

"Type Codes Criteria for RO I SRO-II SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 I 4-6 I 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank s91 sa I s4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 2: 1 I 2:1 I 2: 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - I - I 2: 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power I Shutdown 2: 1 I 2: 1 I 2: 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2:21 2: 2 I 2: 1 (P)revious 2 exams s3 I S 3 1 s 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 2: 1 / 2: 1 I 2: 1

• (S)imulator ES-301, Page 23 of 27

• Facility: Braidwood A

P v E

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Date of Exam: 6/20/11 Scenarios Operating Test No.: 2011 NRC 1 (11-1) 2 (11-3) 3(11-5) 4 T M P E I 0

L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N I T T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION I C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L U R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 N Y 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P M(*)

T P E

RO RX 2 D NOR SRO-I

~ IIC 3,4 SRO-U MAJ 7 D TS RO RX D NOR SRO-I

~ I/C SRO-U MAJ D

RO

[&]

SRO-I D

SRO-U MAJ D TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)"

and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC pOSition. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP pOSition, one IIC malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the icant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Group 1:

Group 2:

Group 3:

ES-301, Page 26 of 27

• Facility: Braidwood A

P E

v ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Date ot Exam: 6/20/11 Scenarios Operating Test No.: 2011 NRC 1 (11-2) 2 (11-3) 3 N/A 4 N/A T M P E I 0

L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N t POSITION T T POSITION POSITION POSITION I C A S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L U R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 N Y 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P T P E

RO RX D

SRO-I NOR

~ I/C SRO-U D MAJ 7 TS RO RX D

SRO-I

~

SRO-U D

RO D

SRO-I D

SRO-U MAJ D TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)"

and "balance-at-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one IIC malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (reter to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Group 4:

ES-301. Page 26 of 27

• Facility: Braidwood A

P E

V ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Date of Exam: 6/20/11 Scenarios Operating Test No.: 2011 NRC 1 (11-2) 2 (11-4) 3 N/A 4 N/A T M P E I 0

L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T

I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION I A

C S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T L U R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 N Y 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P M(*)

T P R U E

RO RX D

SRO-I NOR

~ I/C SRO-U D MAJ TS RO RX

~ NOR SRO-I D I/C SRO-U MAJ D TS RO RX D

SRO-I NOR D

SRO-U I/C MAJ D TS Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; T8 are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)"

and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one IIC malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.

Group 5:

ES-301, Page 26 of 27

• A P

Braidwood v

E ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Date of Exam: 6/20/11 Scenarios nn,oraltinn Test No.: 2011 NAC 1 (11-2) 2 (11-4) 3N/A 4 N/A M P E I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N I T POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION I C S A B S A B S A B S A B M A T A T 0 A T 0 A T 0 A T 0 U N Y 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P M(*)

T P E

AO AX 2 0 NOA SAO-I 0

SAO-U IIC

~ MAJ 7 TS AO AX

~

SAO-I 0

SAO-U 0

AO

~

SAO-I 0

SAO-U 0

Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for AO applicants. AOs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)"

and "balance-ot-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SAOs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (IIC) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one IIC malfunction can be credited toward the two IIC malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (.) Aeactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the columns.

Group 6:

Group 7 ES-301, Page 26 of 27

• ES-401 Facility Name:Braidwood PWR Examination Outline Date of Exam:6/20/11 FORM ES-401-2 RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G Total A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 *

1. Emergency 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Abnormal 2 2 2 1 N/A 2 1 N/A 1 9 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions 5 Tier Totals 5 5 4 5 4 4 27 5 10 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 28 3 2 5 2.

2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 10 0 1 2 3 Plant Systems Tier Totals 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 38 4 4 8 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 10 7 Categories 2 3 3 2 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KIA category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KlAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.

7.* The generiC (G) KlAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KlAs.

8. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to KlAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43 .

• ES-401 , 22 of 34

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO) r-----------------------~~~~~--~ ----------~~~----------,_--~--~I E/APE # 1 Name 1 Safety Function KKK A KIA Topic(s) IR #

123 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 11 trip; verification that the MT/G has been tripped 4.3 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident 13 o of surveillance procedures. 3.7 11 Large Break LOCA I 3 2.6 I to explain and apply system limits and precautions. 3.8 7 RCP Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) 14 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup 12 3.2 Loss of RHR System I 4 o Loss of Component Cooling Water 18 i of a leak in the CCWS 2.9

,..rp,~~''71 Pressure Control System o of PZR spray following loss of PZR heaters 3.5 o relays, and disconnects 2.9 6

Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 o 3.2 2

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer Un,r.or,trolled Depressurization of all Steam 0 capacity, and function of emergency systems 3.4 IGerlerators 1 operation of AFW pumps and regulating valves 4.2 of time for which battery capacity is designed 2.7 Loss of Off-site Power 16 contained in EOP for loss of offsite power 4.4 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus 16 0 Loss of DC Power 16 o charger equipment and instrumentation 2.8 CCWS surge tank, including level control and level alanms, Loss of Nuclear Svc Water 14 3.1 radiation alanm Loss of Instrument Air I 8 0 LOCA Outside Containment I 3 o 3.5 1

0 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. 4 Sink/4 r,p,n,,,rat,,, Voltage and Electric 3.6 16 3 18 ES-401, 23 of 34

• ES-401 K

2 K

3 A

3 PWA Examination Outline Emergency and Abnonnal Plant Evolutions* Tier 1/Group 2 (AO)

K KIA Topic(s)

Form ES-401-2 Fonn ES-401 IA It us Rod Withdrawal/l 0 0

0 4.6 Pressurizer Level Malfunction /2 0 Loss of Source Range NI/7 allowable channel disagreement 2.8 0

0 0

0 Accidental Liquid RadWaste ReI. 19 0 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rei. I 9 0 0

Plant Fire On-site I 8 01 2.9 0

Loss of CTMT Integrity 15 03 access hatch and emergency access hatch 2.8 Degraded Core Cooling 14 1 04 3.3 High Reactor Coolant Activity 19 0 02 3.5 3 Steam Generator Over-pressure /4 0 Containment Flooding I 5 0 High Containment Radiation 19 02 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. 14 01 0

Steam Voide in

• 03 2 2 2 ES-401, 24 of 34 3.5

• ES-401 4 PWR Examination Outline Form ES*401*2 Form "'_'U1I1_'HI IR #

2.5; 2

2.7 Chemical and Volume Control 3.8 2.5; Residual Heat Removal 2 3.8 2.6; 2

4.2 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 3.3 Component Cooling Water 3.1 o Pressurizer Pressure Control 3.2 3.1; 2

2.8 I=nl,;n<>or"rl Safety Features 2.9 Corllalr,me,nl cooling fans 3 Conta;nrn.nt spray pump cooling 2.7 2.5; Main and Reheat Steam 2 3.7 2.7; 2

4.2 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 4.4 starldbl, eQuiPl1nent with correct emergency power AC Electrical Distribution 3.7 DC Electrical Distribution 3.5 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.2 Process Radiation Monitoring 1iI!.I~ele!ase termination when radiation exceeds selpoint 4 Service Water 3.8 3.1

~Cc"'talnmE'nt pressure, temperature, and humidity; ESF 3,7; 2

2.7 o

• Category Totals:

ES-401, Page 25 of 34 28

• ES-401 5 PWA Examination Outline Form E8-401-2 Fonn ES-401 KIA Topic(s) IR #

2.9 0

1 Pressurizer Level Control level indication when ReS is saturated 3,6 h"""'vomru, rod position indication on control room panels 3.2 to apply Technical Specifications lor a system. 3.4 Non*nuclear Instrumentation 0 In-core T emperarure Monitor 3.8 0

Recombiner and Purge 0

0 0

Fuel Handling Equipment 2.6 0

Steam Dumprruribine Bypass Control of 10ss-ol*load bistable taps upon turbine ioad ioss 2.5 Main Turibine Generator 0 Condenser Air Removal 0 0

0 Waste Gas Disposal monitoring system alarm and actuating signals 3.6 Area Radiation Monitoring 0 SWSpumps 2.6 3

0 10 ES-401, Page 26 of 34

• ES-401

~~r------------------------~~~'--r--

ElAPE # 1 Name 1 Safety Function K K 2

PWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions* Tier 1/Group 1 (SRO)

---

~~~--------_,--~r_~

KIA Topic(s)

Form ES-401-2 Form ".*tJ.lIl.'",

IR #

2 Reactor Trip* Stabilization* Recovery 11 o I auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident 13 4 operational effects.

o necessary for recovery when accident reaches stable 3.9 o

RCP Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) / 4 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 o Loss of RHR System / 4 4.1 Loss of Component Cooling Water 18 o

.. r~,"-~ltrl7f" Pressure Control System o

o Steam Gen, Tube Rupture /3 o Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer 4.7 Uroconitroilled Depressurizetion of all Steam o

o Loss of Off*site Power /6 o Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus /6 o Loss of DC Power 16 o Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 o of how abnormal operating procedures are used in Loss of Instrument Air /8 4.5 wittlEOPs.

o and selection of appropriate pro<:e<JI,res OUlmgl i

4.2 o

o 6

ES-401 , 23 of 34

• ES-401 r-----------------------~_+--r_~--

3 PWR Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (SRO)

KKK A

---

~~~--------~--~r_~I KIA Topic(s)

Form ES-401-2 Form ES-40 IR #

231 Continuous Rod Withdrawal/l o o

Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod /1 Pressurizer Level Malfunction /2 Loss of Source Range N1/ 7 Loss of Intermediate Range NI/7 o

Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 o Loss of Condenser Vacuum I 4 o Accidental Liquid RadWaste ReI. I 9 o Accidental Gaseous Radwaste ReI. /9 4.4 4.7 o

o Loss of CTMT Integrity 15 o

4.7 actions required for nign fission product activity in 3.4 o

3 Steam Generator Over.pressure /4 o o

6 High Containment Radiation /9 o o

Steam Voide in o

o o 4 ES-401 J 24 of 34

• ES-401 4 PWR Examination Outline

- Tier 21Group 1 (SRO)

Form ES-401-2 Form ES-401 KIA Topic(s) IR #

0 Chemical and Volume Control 0 Residual Heat Removal 0 Emergency Core Cooling 0 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank uverpressu"zallDn of the waste gas vent header 2.9 Component Cooling Water 0 o Pressurizer Pressure Control 3.9 4.1 Safety Features 0

0 0

0 Main and Reheat Steam 0 4.4 iliarylEmergency Feedwater 3 AC Electrical Distribution 0 DC Electrical Distribution 0 Emergency Diesel Generator 0 0

0 0

0 0

• Category Totals:

E5-401, Page 25 of 34 5

• ES-401 5 PWR Examination Outline 2 (SRO)

Form ES-401-2 Fonn .:;;",_,or" -')11 KIA Topic(s) IR #

o o

1 Pressurizer Level Control o o

o Non-nuclear Instrumentation o 7 In-core Temperature Monilor o o

Recombiner and Purge o

to explain and apply system limits and precautions. 4 o

Fuel Handling Equipment o Steam Generator o Steam DumpITurbine Bypass Control o Main Turbine Generator rod insertion limits exceeded (stabilize secondary) 2.8 Condenser Air Removal o o

o Waste Gas Disposal o Area Radiation Monitoring of abnormal coodition procedures. 4.2 Circulating Water o o

o 3

ES*401, Page 26 of 34

• ES-401

!5Name:p, Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3)

Date of ::i..,.11 ,;3/20/11 FlU Form E8-401-3 SRO-Onlv Category KIA # Topic r--o# IR # IR #

66 2.1. 06 !Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients. 3.8 1 I-67 2.1. 23 lAbility to pertorm specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation. 4.3 1 I-

1. 12.1.

I-Conduct of 94 Operations 2.1. 20 lAbility 10 interpret and execute procedure steps. 4.6 1 I-95 2.1. 32 lAbility 10 explain and apply system limits and precautions. 4 1 I-2.1.

~

ISllhtnt~1 lAbility I 'manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and 68 2.2. 02 I power levals. 4.6 1 I-69 12. 38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. 3.6 1 I-70

2. 2.2. 41 lAbility to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings. 3.9 1 I-Equipment 96 2.2.05 Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility. 3.2 1 Control I-IKnowiedge of the bases in Technical Specillcations for limiting conditions for operations and safety 97 2.2.25 Ilimits. 4.2 1 I-2.

I!=:llhtnt"d 2 Ability to radiation monitoring systems. such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms. porlable survey 71 2.3.05 . '*'ru",*nls, personnel monitoring equipment. etc. 2.9 1 I-72 2.3.07 Ability to comply with radiation work perma requirements during normal or abnormal conditions. 3.5 1 I-73 2.3. 12

~~"II '" '..".. .':'9":':" ."'.~'Y I'm,"'I'~ 1'6m""~ "' ""6".= UI'6. "~

~.' >U,," d*.

i floers, 3.2 1

' "6" 3.

I- radiation ,0ri"'"'~'Uij'" ~d""Y IJWU~' P~'''''ij '" ",.., ,"""" "","""'" "u"70'1 ~u.... ' as response to Radiation 98 12.3.13 . .. _.._ , ,a*. 3.8 1 Control I--i 2.3.

I-2.3.

Subtotal 1

.-- Imaa.~:~:r :~ I 1nlerarcny ana ' Wlm orner suPPOrt proceaur.s or 74 2.4. 16 procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident 3.5 1

-75 2.4. 34

,at ";,,.,;,

'of RD' performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the 4.2 1

- resultant operational effects,

4. 2.4.

-99 Emergency Procedures I 2.4. 16 _". of EDP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating 4.4 1

-100 Plan of facility protection requirements. including fire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment 1

2.4. 26 3.6

- 2.4.

usage.

~

~'lhtnt~1 ITier 3 Point Total

• The Braidwood 2011-1 NRC written exam outline was generated in accordance with NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Supp 1, OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION STANDARDS FOR POWER REACTORS, and TQ-AA-1S1, ILT CERTIFICATION AND NRC EXAM DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION.

The written exam outline was generated using commercially available, previously NRC approved, outline development software (Westinghouse NRC KIA Exam Generator, version 1.1) to systematically and randomly select KIA statements from NUREG-1122 to complete each of the three tiers of the written exam outline .

Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: NRC 2011 No.: Exam NRC 11-1 iners: Applicant: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-18 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 75% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, MOL. Online risk is green. 1C CW PP is OOS for intake bay inspection. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP to swap GC pumps per BwOP GC-5, in preparation for an OOS on 1GC01 PA next shift. TSO has requested Unit 1 prepare to raise turbine load to full power at 0.6 MW/min due to grid demand.

Event Malt. No. Event Event NQ. TYI DescriptiQn Preload lOR ZDI1CW01 PB 1BCW PP OOS PTL MRF ED093B OPEN 1CWOO1BOOS IMF RP02A Reactor trip breaker A fails to open IMF RP02B Reactor trip breaker B fails to open IMF RD09 Auto Rod Speed Failure (8 steps/min)

IRF RP49 OUT prevents 1A CV train valves from auto positioning on SI signal TRGSET 1 PZR PORV 1RY456 fails open

THPPRZR .GT. 2315" IMF TH11 B (1 0) 100 lOR ZDI1 RY8000B 1RY8000B fails open i AUTO 1 None N-BOP, US Swap stator cooling pumps.

2 None R-ATC, US Raise power at 0.6 Mw/Min 3 IMF FW161500 30 I-BOP, US 1PT-508 FW Htr Dsch Press fails high 4 IMFTH11A 5 C-ATC, 1RY455A partially opens TRGSET2 TS-US 1RY8000A block valve breaker trips "ZLO 1RY8000A(2)==0" MRF ED058C (2 5)

OPEN 5 IMF ED11D TS-US Loss of instrument bus 114 (Tech Spec)

DMF TH11A 5 IRF ED019 OPEN 6 IMF ED07C Bus 143 Deenergized 7 Preload M-AII ATWS 8 Preload PZR PORV 1RY 456 fails open

• (N)ormal,

{R)eactlVlty {I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient

SCENARIO OVERVIEW

• Unit 1 is at 75% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, MOL. Online risk is green. 1B CW PP is OOS for intake bay inspection. Following completion of turnover, the shift manager requests the BOP to swap GC pumps per BwOP GC-5, in preparation for an OOS on 1GC01 PA next shift. TSO has requested Unit 1 prepare to raise turbine load to full power at 0.6 MW/min due to grid demand.

After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will swap stator cooling pumps per BwOP GC-5.

After swapping stator cooling pumps, Power Team will request Unit raise turbine load to full power at 0.6 MW/min due to grid demand. The crew will commence a power ascension at 0.6 mw/min.

After a measurable change in power, feedwater line pressure detector 1PT-508 will fail high over a 30 second period. Both main feedwater pumps speed will lower, reducing feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels to begin lowering. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the main feedwater pumps. 1BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment J, will be implemented. 1PT-508 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario.

After the 1PT-508 failure is addressed, PZR PORV 1RY455A will open to the intermediate position, resulting in a slow RCS pressure drop. The ATC will isolate the PZR PORV by closing 1RY8000A, PORV block valve. Once 1RY8000A is closed, its breaker will trip open, removing power from 1 RY8000A.

1RY455A will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario. Tech spec 3.4.11, conditions Band C apply.

After the PZR PORV failure is addressed, a 10$s of instrument bus 114 will occur. The crew will enter

• 1BwOA ELEC-2. LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS, and determine that instrument bus 114 is damaged and cannot be energized from the CVT.

After the instrument bus 114 failure is addressed, bus 143 is lost causing the loss of 1A and 1C CW pumps. Condenser vacuum is lost and a manual reactor trip or an automatic turbine trip - reactor trip signal is generated. The turbine trips but the reactor does not trip, placing the plant in an ATWS condition.

1BwEP-O is entered with a transition to 1BwFR S-1. A failure of rod control to automatically insert rods at ~

48 steps/minute forces the Unit NSO to manually insert control rods. The RWST will be used as the borated water source since the BA transfer pump has lost power. RCS pressure rises and PZR PORV 1RY456 opens to reduce pressure.

Although RCS pressure starts dropping, PZR PORV 1RY456 remains open creating a loss of reactor coolant. 1BwFR-S.1 is completed and 1BwEP-O is reentered with a failure of high head injection valves (lSI8801A1B) and charging line Cnmt isolation valves (1CV81 05/6) to automatically reposition. The crew will take action to manually open 1S18801A1B and close 1CV8105/6.

Completion criteria is transition to 1BwEP ES-1.2.

Commenffi: _________________________________________________________________

NRC 11-1 Page 2 of 3

Critical Tasks

• 1. Insert negative reactivity into the core by initiating RCCA insertion at greater than or equal to 48 steps per minute prior to completion of step 1 of 1BwFR-S.1.

(ERG Critical Task number - FR-S.1--C) (KIA number - 000029EA 1.09 importance - 4.0/3.6)

2. Establish high head injection flow before transition out of 1BwEP-O.

(ERG Critical Task number - E-O--I) (KIA number - APE008AA2.10, importance - 3.6/3.6)

NOTE:

No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated on the 2011 Audit Exam nor other sections of the 2011 NRC exam.

A similar major event (ATWS) is included on the 11-spare Audit Exam scenario, however this event is different because it contains an auto rod speed failure that is not included on the Audit exam spare. Also, this scenario combines the ATWS with a fails open PZR PORV that is not included on the Audit Exam .

Comments: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

NRC 11-1 Page 3 of 3

Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No. :2011 NRC No.: Exam NRC 11-2 Examiners: Applicant:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-21 Turnover: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon. Online risk is yellow. 1B SX pump is OOS for change out of the aux lube oil pump for the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCOAR 1BwOL 3.7.B has been initiated. Expected back in service next shift. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE. Power Team has requested Unit 1 lower power to 1125 MW at 3 MWImin due to grid demand following completion of 1BwOS FW-W1. Heavy rains have been experienced at the Braidwood site over the past few days and are forecasted to continue.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No.

Preload lOR ZDI1SX01PB PTL 1B SX pump OOS lOR ZL01 SX01 PBC OFF 1B SX aux lube oil pump OOS IMF MS01C 100 1MSOO1 C fails to close from MSI switches trgset 1 "ZDI1 MS001 C(1) ==

1" 1 "DMF MS01 C" 1BwOS FW-W1 2

3 CV01B p trip (Tech Spec)

TS 4 X10A 015 I-ATC TS-US 5 C-BOP 6 IMF RX05030 I-BOP, US Steam line pressure detector 1PT-507 fails low 7 MRF ED042D OPEN M-ALL Dual unit loss of Offsite AC power MRF ED042E OPEN (unit 1 loss of all AC power)

MRF ED042H OPEN lOR ZL01 HSDG0201 OFF IMF ED15C IMF ED15G IMF EGOBA B Preload 1C MSIV Fails to Close From MSI Switches

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient

SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon. 1B SX pump is OOS for change out of the aux lube oil pump for the past 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. LCOAR 1BwOL 3.7.8 has been initiated. Expected back in service next shift. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOS FW-W1, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE. Power Team has requested Unit 1 lower power 125 MW at 3 MWImin due to grid demand following completion of 1BwOS FW-Wl. Heavy rains have been experienced at the Braidwood site over the past few days and are forecasted to continue.

After completing shift turnover and relief, the crew will perform 1BwOS FW-Wl, UNIT 1 TURBINE DRIVEN MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP STOP VALVE SURVEILLANCE.

After completing 1BwOS FW-W1, the crew will lower power to 1125 MW at 3 MWImin due to grid demand. The crew will commence a power reduction at 3 MW/min.

After a measurable change in power, 1B CV pump will trip. The crew will implement 1BwOA PRI-15, LOSS OF NORMAL CHARGING. The crew will start the 1A CV pump to restore normal charging.

Technical Specifications 3.5.2 condition A and TRM 3.l.d, condition A apply.

After the 1 B CV pump trip is addressed, First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure channell PT-505 will fail low. The ATC will diagnose the failure of 1PT-505 and take manual control of rods after verifying turbine load stable. 1BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment D, will be entered. TS 3.3.1 conditions A and P will be entered. The ATC will return rod control to automatic after verifying Tave and Tref are within 1°F.

• After the 1PT-505 failure is addressed, thelC Heater Drain pump will trip due to overcurrent. The crew will implement 1BwOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRI p. and start the 1B Heater Drain pump. Technical Specifications do not apply. On-line risk remains yellow. The 1C Heater Drain pump will remain unavailable for the rest of the scenariO.

After the 1C Heater Drain pump has been addressed, steam line pressure detector 1PT-507 will fail low over a 30 second period. Beth mrun feedwater pumps speed will lower, reducing feedwater flow and causing all steam generator levels to begin lowering. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the main feedwater pumps. 1BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL. Attachment J, will be implemented. 1PT-507 will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario. On-line risk remains yellow.

After the 1PT-507 failure is addressed, a loss of all offsite power will occur for both Units. When the 1A DG engine attempts to start, the engine will seize. A loss of DC control power to the 1B DG will prevent it from starting, resulting in a loss of all AC power to Unit 1. TranSition will be made to 1BwCA-O.O, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER. The 1C MSIV will fail to close from either MSI switch and will have to be closed from the CIS. A limited crosstie to Unit 2 will be required due to the failure of 2B DG to energize bus 142. The crew must restore power to Unit 1 within 10 minutes. After power is restored to Bus 141, SX will be cross-tied between units per 1BwCA-O.O, Attachment C.

The scenario is complete when the crew has restored CV pump flow in 1BwCA-O.O, step 23e.

Critical Tasks

1. Restore power to Bus 141 within 10 minutes of loss of all AC power.

(UFSAR 15.0.8/Table 15.0-7) (KIA number - 000055EA2.03 importance 3.9/4.7)

• 2. Isolate RCP seal injection before a CV pump is started in 1BwCA-O.O.

(ERG Critical Task number - ECA-O.O--H) (KIA number - 003000A4.01 importance - 3.3/3.2)

NRC 11-2 Page 2 of 3

NOTE:

~o normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated on the 2011 Audit Exam

" o r other sections of the 2011 NRC exam.

A similar IIC event (1 PT505 failure) is included on the 11-3 Audit Exam scenario, however this event is different because the instrument fails in the opposite direction causing a different plant response to the failure.

Comments: _______________________________

NRC 11-2 Page 3 of 3

Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2011 NRC No.: Exam NRC 11-3 Examiners: Applicant: SAO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-21 Turnover: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon. Online risk is yellow.

Control rods are in manual for troubleshooting by Instrument Maintenance. Auto rod control is not available.

Malf. 1\10. Event Event Nt) Type Description Preload IMFFW44 1B AF pump fails to start IMF AP15D 1B SI pump fails to automatically start MAF AP84 OPEI\I trgset 1 "ZL052BRKA(2) == 1" IMF CV01B (1 0) 1B CV pump trips when Rx trips trg 1 "IMF FW19C 3.5 010" Feed line break inside containment when Ax trips IMF AX170 Rod control failure requiring rods in manual.

1 . ,-, N-BOP, Lower reactive load 1 KV.

US 2 IMF ED15A A-ATC, Grid disturbance requiring turbine load reduction IMF ED0151 US 3 lOR ZDI1 CV11 OB CLS C-ATC, 1CV11 OB valve fails closed requiring ramp with lOR ZD01CV110B(1) OFF US rods only lOR ZD01CV110B(2) OFF 4 IMF FW17100 I-BOP, HOT Level Controller Failure in Auto US 5 IRF ED025 OPEN TS-US Loss of DC to inverter 113 6 IMFED07A C-ATC, Loss of bus 141 BOP TS-US 7 IMF RP09A M Inadvertent FWI Preload (ALL) Feed line break inside containment 8 Preload 1B CV pump trip when Rx trips 9 Preload Loss of heat sink (1 B AF pp)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactlvlty (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)qJor TranSient

SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, Boron concentration is BOO ppm. Online

.risk is green.

After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will lower Unit 1 reactive load 1 KV in accordance with BwOP MP-23.

After lowering reactive load, a grid disturbance will cause 345 KV lines 0103 and 0104 to be lost. One minute later, the Transmission System Operations Reliability Coordinator will contact the main control room and direct Unit 1 to initiate an emergency load reduction of 100 MW within 20 minutes to alleviate an overload condition on grid transmission lines. The state estimator alarm is not present.

During the initial boric acid addition, 1CV110B valve will fail closed (blown fuse), forcing the crew to complete the load ramp with control rods only.

After the load ramp is complete, HOT Level Controller, 1LK-H0009A, will fail to 100% demand. The 1HD046A1B valves will full open and HDT level will drop. The BOP will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the 1LK-HD009A.

After the HDT Level Controller failure is addressed, a loss of DC to instrument inverter 113 will occur. The crew will follow the annunciator response BwAR 1-4-C5. The crew will determine from field report that the instrument inverter DC input has failed. Technical Specification 3.B.7, condition A applies. On line risk becomes yellow.

Following completion of inverter 113 actions" a ground fault will occur on bus 141. 1BwOA ELEC-3 will be

. entered and the operators will start redundant equipment on bus 142 and investigate the status of bus 141 .

• Tech 5pec 3.B.9 applies. On-line risk becomes yellow.

Following completion of 1BwOA ELEC-3actions, an inadvertent FWI occurs. When the crew manually trips the reactor, a feed line break on the 1C 5G inside containment will occur. 51 will actuate. The crew will enter 1BwEP-O to stabilize the plant The 1B 51 pump fails to auto start and must be manually started due to a failure of its actuation relay. The 1B AF pump will not start (engine will seize) resulting in a transition to 1BwFR-H.1 at step 15 of 1BwEP-O. The 1B CV pump trips when the reactor trips. Bleed and feed will be required due to the status of the CV pumps.

Completion criteria is establishing startup feedwater pump flow to the non-faulted 5Gs.

Critical Tasks NRC 11-3 Page 2 of 3

1. Manually start the 1B SI pump before transition out of 1BwEP-O (ERG Critical Task number - E-O-J) (KIA number 006000A4.01 4.1/3.9)

2. Initiate RCS bleed and feed before attempting to establish main feedwater flow or condensate flow to any SG (ERG Critical Task number - FR-H.1--F) (KIA number 000 E05 EA 1.1 importance 4.1/4.0)

NOTE:

No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated on the 2011 Audit Exam nor other sections of the 2011 NRC exam.

A similar Reactivity event (Emergency load reduction) is included on the 11-spare Audit Exam scenario, however this event is different because the boration flow path is isolated by a valve failure forcing the crew to perform this load ramp with control rods only.

Comments: _____________________________________________________________________________________________

NRC 11-3 Page 3 of 3

Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2011 NRC No.: EXAM NRC 11-4 Examiners: Applicant: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-21 Turnover: Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon. Online risk is green. 1C CD/CB pump is DOS for bearing replacement. The 1C CD/CB pump is expected back in service in four days .. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOS MS-Q1, UNIT 1 MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE STROKE SURVEILLANCE.

Event Malt. No. Event Event No. Type* Description Preload lOR ZDI1CD05PC PTL 1C CD/CB Pump DOS lOR ZDI1CD05PCB PTL lOR ZDI1CB113C CLS 1 None N-BOP, US Steam Dump Valve Stroke Surv.

2 IMF RX29D 10030 I-BOP, US 1FW540 controller fails high in auto 3 IMF RX17 -4.25 C-ATC, US Rod control failure 4 IMF SW01A C-BOP, US 1A SX Pump Trip TS-US 5 IMF RX21A 2500 30 I-ATC, US 1PT-455 fails high

..... TS,.US 6 IMFTC14DO R-ATC, US #4 Governor valve servo failure closed 7 IMF TH03B 450 60 ,

M-ALL 1B Steam Generator Tube Rupture 8 IMFTH11A 0 Loss of RCS pressure control IMF TH03B 450 60 TRGSET 1 "ZL01IA066(2)==0" lOR ZDIlIA066 (1 0) CLS lOR ZA01PIRY018 (1 60) 0 30 IMF PN1555 (1 70) ON IMFTH11BO

• (N)ormal, (R)eactlVlty (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient

SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is operating at 100% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon. Online risk is green. 1C CD/CB pump is OOS for bearing replacement. The 1C CD/CB pump is expected back in service in four days. Following completion of turnover, the crew is to perform 1BwOS MS-Q1, UNIT 1 MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE STROKE SURVEILLANCE.

After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will perform 1BwOS MS*Q1, UNIT 1 MAIN STEAM DUMP VALVE STROKE SURVEILLANCE.

After completing 1BwOS MS-Q1, 1FW540 Feed Reg Valve Controller 1FK-540 will fail to 100% demand.

The 1 FW540 valve will full open and 1D SG level will rise. The crew will take actions to stabilize the plant by taking manual control of the 1FK-540.

After the 1FK*540 failure is addressed, the rod control summing amplifier will malfunction, resulting in uncontrolled inward rod motion. After checking turbine power stable, the RO will place rod control in Manual to stop the inward rod motion. 1BwOA ROD-1, UNCONTROLLED ROD MOTION, will be implemented. Rods will remain in Manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

After the rod control failure has been addressed, the 1A Essential Service Water pump will trip due to overcurrent. The crew will implement 1BwOA PRI-S, ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER MALFUNCTION, and start the 1B Essential Service Water pump. Technical Specifications 3.7.S, condition A applies. On-line risk remains yellow. The 1A SX pump will remain unavailable for the rest of the scenario.

After the Essential Service Water malfunction has been addressed, the controlling pressurizer pressure

• channel will fail high. The ATC will identify the failure and take manual control to restore pressurizer pressure. The US will enter 1BwOA INST 2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL Attachment B. Tech Specs 3.3.1 conditions A, E, and K, 3.3.2 conditions A and 0, and 3.3.4 condition A will be entered.

After the pressurizer pressure channel failure has been addressed, the #4 turbine governor valve servo will fail, causing the #4 governor valve to close. Turbine load will lower approximately 70 Mw. The ATC will borate the RCS as necessary andlor move rods in to stabilize RCS temperature. On-line risk remains yellow.

After the governor valve malfunction has been addressed, a 450 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur on the 1B SG. The crew will implement 1BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

When SI actuates, a solenoid failure will cause 11A066 to fail closed, resulting a loss of Instrument Air to containment. IA to containment will remain unavailable for the remainder of the scenario. The crew will transition to 1BwEP-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, based on secondary radiation trends on the 1B SG. After determining RCS pressure control is unavailable, the crew will transition to 1BwCA-3.3, SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL.

The scenario is complete when the crew has terminated high head SI in 1BwCA-3.3.

Critical Tasks

1. Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG prior to completing step 4 of 1BwEP-3.

(ERG Critical Task number - E-3--A) (KIA number - 00003SEA2.01 importance - 4.1/4.7)

2. Cool down to establish RCS subcooling margin, but prevent entry into 1BwFR-P.1.

• (ERG Critical Task number - E-3--B) (KIA number - 0OO03SEA1.36 importance - 4.3/4.5)

3. Terminate high head SI prior to completing step 9 of 1BwCA-3.3.

(ERG Critical Task number - CA-3.3--A) (KIA number - 00003SEA 1.30 importance - 4.0/3.S)

NRC 11-4 Page 2 of 3

NOTE:

~o normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated on the 2011 Audit Exam

. , o r other sections of the 2011 NRC exam.

A similar IIC event (SGTR) is included on the 11-3 Audit Exam scenario, however this event is different because this event is a SGTR combined with a loss of RCS pressure control while the 11-3 Audit Exam scenario contains a SGTR that is also faulted .

• comments: _________________________________________________________________

NRC 07-1 Page 3 of 3

Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario Operating Test No.: 2011 NRC No.: EXAM NRC 11-5 rs: Applicant: SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-13 Turnover: The unit is at 17% power, xenon building in, BOL, at 1BwGP 100-3 step 22. The main Turbine is at 1775 rpm ready for turbine trip test. Online risk is green. Following completion of turnover, the Shift Manager directs the crew to perform 1BwGP 100-3, step F.22.a through F.22.p, turbine trip test. 1BwOS TRM 3.3.g.3 and 3.3.g.4 will be performed concurrently by another operator who has also been briefed to take over at step F.22.q. for the turbine s'y 1.... 111 v"ization.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type*

ueSCrllJUVl1 Preload lOR ZDI1W0056A OPEN Fail 1W0056A open IRF RP29 OUT Slave relay for train A Phase A valves IRF RP37 OUT Slave relay for train A CS valves IMF MS01A 100 MSIVs fail to close IMF MS01B 100 IMF MS01C 100 IMF MS01 D 100 IMF CC02B 200 1B CC pump pressure switch failed high IMFCS01B 1B CS pump trip 1 None N-BOP, US Turbine Overspeed trip test 2 IMF CV05 600 5 I-ATC, US Letdown line pressure controller 1PK-CV131 nlltnllt fails high 3 IMF RX06K 015 I-BOP, US 1C SG NR level transmitter 1LT -539 fails low TS-US 4 IMF CC01B C-BOP, 1A component cooling pump trip with 1B TS-US component cooling pump discharge pressure switch failure 5 IMF MS07D 4.0 30 M-ALL Uncontrolled depressurization of all steam 6 Preload Igenerators m failure to actuate

• (N)ormal, (R)eactlVlty (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient

SCENARIO OVERVIEW

_he unit is at 17% power, xenon building in, BOL, at 1BwGP 100-3 step 22. The main Turbine is at 1775 rpm ready for turbine trip test. Online risk is green. Following completion of turnover, the Shift Manager directs the crew to perform 1BwGP 100-3, step F.22.a through F.22.p, turbine trip test. 1BwOS TRM 3.3.g.3 and 3.3.g.4 will be performed concurrently by another operator who has also been briefed to take over at step F.22 q. for the turbine synchronization.

After completing shift turnover and relief, the BOP will perform the turbine trip test per 1BwGP 100-3, step F.22.a thru F.22.p.

After the turbine trip test is complete, letdown pressure controller 1PK-131 output will fail high. The letdown PCV will close and letdown pressure will rise lifting the letdown line relief valve. The ATC will take manual control of letdown pressure controller and restore letdown pressure. The crew may isolate letdown due to the lifting letdown relief valve. If letdown is isolated, it will be restored per BwOP CV-17. US may choose to enter tech spec 3.4.13 and then exit when relief resets, or remain in tech spec until aRCS leakrate can verify no leakage.

After the 1 PK-131 failure is addressed, 1C SG NR level transmitter 1LT-539 will fail low. 1FW530A, Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valve, will open fully and 1C SG level will rise. The BOP will take manual control of 1C SG level and stabilize 1C SG level. 1BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment E, will be implemented. The BOP will restore 1C SG level control to automatic after 1C SG level is restored to normal and an operable 1C SG NR level contrOlling channel is selected. Technical specifications 3.3.1, conditions A and E and 3.3.2, conditions A and D are applicable.

After the 1 LT-539 failure is addressed, the 1A component cooling water pump will trip. When the 1A CC pump trips, the 1Band 0 CC pumps will not automatically start on low system discharge pressure due the 1B CC pump discharge pressure switch being failed high. The crew will manually start a standby CC pump, either the 1B or 0 CC pump, to restore system flow and dispatch operators to investigate the malfunctions.

If the 1A CC pump control switch is placed in PTL prior to manually starting a standby pump, the U-O CC pump will automatically start. Technical specification 3.7.7, condition B applies until the 1A CC pump is placed in PTL (U-O CC pump then becomes operable).

After the 1A CC pump trip is addressed, the 1D MS line ruptures inside containment. While performing the actions of 1BwEP-O, the crew should note the failure of a Phase A slave relay and manually align valves to close the WO containment penetrations. When containment pressure reaches 20 psig, Phase B actuates but the CS pumps do not start. The crew should manually realign the train A CS valves, which will start the 1A CS pump. Operators should transition to 1BwEP-2 and recognize that the MSIVs have failed to close and that an uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs is in progress. The crew should transition to 1BwCA-2.1 where they will throttle AF flow to the SGs, terminate SI and restore normal charging and letdown. An entry into 1BwFR-P.1 may be required as directed by the status trees.

Completion criteria is checking RCS subcooling per step 21 in 1BwCA-2.1 or completion of 1BwFR-P.1, step 21.

Critical Tasks

1. Manually actuate one train of containment spray prior to transition out of 1BwEP-O.

(ERG Critical Task number - E-O--E) (KIA number - 013000A4.01, importance - 4.5/4.8)

2. Manually lower AF flow to 45 gpm for each SG prior to completion of step 2 of 1BwCA-2.1.

• (ERG Critical Task number - ECA-2.1--A) (KIA number - OWE12EA1.3 importance - 3.4/3.9)

NRC 11-5 Page 2 of 3

NOTE:

NO normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated on the 2011 Audit Exam

• nor other sections of the 2011 NRC exam.

Commenffi: _________________________________________________________________

NRC 11-5 Page 3 of 3

Simulation Facility Braidwood Scenario No.: Operating Test No.: 2011 NRC NRC 11-spare Exam Examiners: Applicant:

SRO ATC BOP Initial Conditions: IC-18 Turnover: Unit 1 is at 75% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 645 ppm. Online risk is green. 1B HD pump has been OOS for breaker contact work for the past 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. 1A CW pump is OOS for impeller work. Expected back in service in one week. 1PRllJ filter change planned early in shift.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* _Dt:1""iijJuv" Preload lOR ZDll RHOl PB PTL 1B RHR pump OOS lOR ZDI1CW01PA PTL lACW PPOOS IRF ED051C OPEN IRF ED075C OPEN 1CW001AOOS IMF RP14A SI auto actuation failure (Train A)

IMF RP14B SI auto actuation failure (Train B)

IMFTC03 Turbine auto trip failure 1 None N-BOP 1PR11Jfilter change TS-US .:

2 IMF FW35A C-BOP, 1AHeater Drain Pump trip requiring turbine run back US R-ATC, US 3 IMF RX13A 100 10 I-ATC, PZR level channell LT-459 fails high (Tech Spec)

US

.TS-US 4 IMF CV23A 80180 C>ATC 1A letdown HX tube leak (or BOP),

US 5 IMF EG03 100 10 C-BOP, Generator voltage regulator failure US 6 F TH01 0.530 M-ALL PZR vapor space LOCA 7 preload Turbine auto trip failure SI auto actuation failure

• (N)ormal, {R)eactivity (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Transient

SCENARIO OVERVIEW Unit 1 is at 75% power, steady state, equilibrium xenon, MOL. RCS boron concentration is 645 ppm.

Online risk is green. 1B HD pump has been OOS for breaker contact work for the past 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. 1A CW pump is OOS for impeller work. Expected back in service in one week. 1PR11J filter change planned early in shift.

After completing shift turnover and relief, a Radiation Protection Technician will contact the main control room and request the crew shutdown 1PR11J sample pump to support daily filter replacement. The Unit Supervisor will enter Tech Spec 3.4.15, condition B. Approximately two minutes later, the RP Technician will request restart of the 1PR11J skid. 1PR11J will be restarted. LCO 3.4.15 may be exited after filter change completion and monitor is operating normally for 15 minutes.

After changing the 1PR11J filter, 1A Heater Drain Pump will trip. 1BwOA SEC-1, SECONDARY PUMP TRIP, Attachment C, will be entered. The BOP will initiate a turbine load reduction to 780 MW at 20 MW/minute. The ATC will borate the RCS as necessary to stabilize RCS temperature.

After the 1A HD pump trip has been addressed, PZR level channellLT-459 will fail high. 1CV121, charging header flow control valve, will lower charging flow and pressurizer level will lower. The ATC will take manual control of PZR level and stabilize PZR level. 1BwOA INST-2, OPERATION WITH A FAILED INSTRUMENT CHANNEL, Attachment C, will be implemented. The ATC will restore PZR level control to automatic after PZR level is restored to normal and an operable PZR level control channel is selected.

Technical Specifications 3.3.1, conditions A and K apply.

After the 1 LT-459 failure is addressed, the 1A letdown heat exchanger will develop a tube leak. Letdown flow and VCT level will lower and CC surge tank level and radiation will rise. The crew will implement 1BwOA PRI-6, COMPONENT COOLING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION, and locate and isolate the leakage.

The crew will align the 1B letdown heat exchanger in accordance with BwOP CV-22, OPERATION OF LETDOWN AND REGEN HEAT EXCHANGERS.

After the letdown heat exchanger tube is addressed, the generator voltage regulator output will fail high, causing the main generator to be overexcited. The BOP will turn the voltage regulator to off/test and manually lower main generator excitation using the base adjuster.

After the voltage regulator failure is addressed, a weld breaks on the PZR causing a PZR vapor space LOCA. When the reactor trips, the turbine will not automatically trip. The crew will manually trip the turbine.

The crew will take actions;n accordance with 1BwEP-O, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION. While performing the actions of 1BwEP-O, the crew should note the failure of SI to automatically actuate. The crew should manually actuate SI. The crew will transition to 1BwEP-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, after determining that the RCS is not intact.

The scenario is complete when the crew has determined RCS subcooling in 1BwEP-1.

Comments:

NRC 11-spare Page 2 of 3

• Critical Tasks

1. Manually trip the main turbine prior to completion of step 2 of 1BwEP-O.

(ERG Critical Task number - E-O--Q) (KIA number - 045000A4.01 importance - 3.1/2.9)

2. Manually actuate Safety Injection prior to transition to 1BwEP-1.

(ERG Critical Task number - E-O--D) (KIA number - 000040AA 1.01 importance - 4.6/4.6)

NOTE:

No normal, reactivity, IIC, Tech Spec or Major events in this scenario are repeated on the 2011 Audit Exam nor other sections of the 2011 NRC exam.

A similar IIC event (HD pump trip) is included on the 11-2 NRC Exam scenario, however this event is different because this event requires a turbine runback due to a lack of a standby pump, whereas scenario 11-2 required starting of a standby pump.

e Comments: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

e_________________________

NRC 11-spare Page 3 of 3