ML15176A541

Initial Exam 2015-301 Final Administrative Documents

ML15176A541
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/22/2015
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
50-321/15-301, 50-366/15-301 50-321/15-301, 50-366/15-301
Download: ML15176A541 (91)

Text

ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: Hatch Date of Examination: March 2015 Examinations Developed by: Facility / NRC (circle one)

Target Chief Date* Task Description (Reference) Examiners Initials

-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) PGC

-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) PGC

-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) PGC

-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) PGC l [-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)] PGC l {-75} 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, l ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, and PGC l ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d) l {-70} {7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility PGC l licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)}

l {-45} 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and l scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms PGC l ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d) l -30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due (C.1.l; C.2.g; PGC ES-202) l -14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.l; C.2.i; PGC ES-202)

-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f) PGC

-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) PGC

-7 13. Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor PGC (C.2.i; C.3.h) l -7 14. Final applications reviewed; 1 or 2 (if >10) applications audited to confirm PGC l qualifications / eligibility; and examination approval and waiver letters sent l (C.2.i; Attachment 4; ES-202, C.2.e; ES-204)

-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed PGC with facility licensee (C.3.k)

-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions PGC distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i) l

• Target dates are generally based on facility-prepared examinations and are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee.

l [Applies only] {Does not apply} to examinations prepared by the NRC.

ES-201, Page 24 of 27

ES-201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist ormES-2O1-2 Facility: E. I. HATCH 2015-301 Date of Examination: 03-23-2015 to 04-09-2015 Initials Item Task Description a b c#

1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit(s) the appropriate model, in accordance with S-4O1 N/A N/A w

R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with N/A N/A I Section D.1 of ES-401 and whether all K/A categones are appropriately sampled.

T T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolufions, or generic topics. N/A N/A

d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected K/A statements are appropriate. N/A N/A

2. a. Using Form ES-301 -5, venfy that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of ,

p normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major f4f/

S transients.

M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number and u mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule . 4 without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using at /

L A least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated from the 7 -

T applicants audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days.

a. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and L) quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D. /

3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -2:

(I) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in-plant tasks distributed W among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants audit test(s)

(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form , I.Z (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on ,-1) /

the form.

b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301 -1:

(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form ,,

-y (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified jM T (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations

c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of . p applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. 1 2L +/-S

4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.

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b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41 /43 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate.

c. Ensure that K/A importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. 44 R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. C_

L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.

f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO)r t1

a. Author

b. FacilityReviewer() éc.f __.

a. NRC Chief Examiner(#) ek-.-T

d. NRCSupervisor

\

Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines

• • Outline for the written exam was provided by the NRC.

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline - RO FINAL Form ES-301-1 Facility: PLANT E. I. HATCH ILT 9 Date of Examination: 03/23/2015 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 2015-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

U1 - Correct Reactor Water Level for high Conduct of Operations M, R drywell temperatures & SRO Only TS evaluation.

Admin 1 G2.1.35 (3.9/4.2) ALL Perform Att. 15 of 34GO-OPS-001-1, IRM Conduct of Operations D, R Alternate Power Check and then determine any Admin 2 additional actions. G2.1.23 (4.3/4.4) ALL Equipment Control Review RCIC Pump Operability Surveillance N, R Admin 3 G2.2.12 (3.7/4.1) ALL Emergency Procedures/Plan Determine the Evacuation Route During an M, R Admin 4 Emergency G2.4.39 (3.9/3.8) RO ONLY NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline - SRO-I FINAL Form ES-301-1 Facility: PLANT E. I. HATCH ILT 9 Date of Examination: 03/23/2015 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 2015-301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

U1 - Correct Reactor Water Level for high Conduct of Operations M, R drywell temperatures & SRO Only TS evaluation.

Admin 1 G2.1.35 (3.9/4.2) ALL Perform Att. 15 of 34GO-OPS-001-1, IRM Conduct of Operations D, R Alternate Power Check and then determine any Admin 2 additional actions. G2.1.23 (4.3/4.4) ALL Equipment Control Review RCIC Pump Operability Surveillance N, R Admin 3 G2.2.12 (3.7/4.1) ALL Evaluate Venting DW Irrespective of Offsite Radiation Control M, R Release rates IAW PCG G2.3.11 (4.3)

Admin 5 SRO ONLY Given Plant Conditions, Determine the Emergency Procedures/Plan D, S, R Emergency Classification and complete EN Form/

Admin 6 G2.4.29 (4.0) SRO ONLY NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline -RO FINAL Form ES-301-2 Facility: PLANT E. I. HATCH ILT 9 Date of Examination: 03/23/2015 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 2015-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function SF-1 CR/SIM 1 - Normal Start of Recirc ASD With A, L, D, S Reactivity Control Cooling Water Failure 202001K6.02 (3.1/3.2) ALL SF-2 CR/SIM 2 - Lower RWL Using The RHR System, A, E, L, M, S Reactor Water Inventory Control LR-JP-06.11 (1st Loop fails to start) 20300A4.01 (4.3/4.1) ALL SF-3 CR/SIM 3 - Roll the Main Turbine A, L, D, S Reactor Pressure Control 245000A4.06 (2.7/2.6) ALL SF-4 CR/SIM 4 - HPCI / Place HPCI in Pressure D, S Heat Removal From The Core Control Mode 206000A4.06 (4.3/4.3) ALL SF-5 CR/SIM 5 - Initiate Emergency Torus Venting A, E, M, S Containment Integrity using the Emergency Vent Path (Alt path) 223001A4.07 (4.2/4.1) ALL SF-6 CR/SIM 6 - Re-Energize Bus with Diesel A, D, S Partial or Complete Loss of AC Generator 295003AA1.02 (4.2/4.3) ALL SF-8 CR/SIM 7 - Loss of Air Actions for Rx Bldg A, D, S Plant Service System Ventilation 295019AK2.08 (2.8/2.9) ALL SF-9 CR/SIM 8 - Place Control Room HVAC Systems C , L, D Radioactivity Release in the Purge Mode, JPM 25026 290003A4.01 (3.9/4.0) RO ONLY In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

SF-8 PLANT 1 - JP20024 Actuate DG CO2 Sys D, E Plant Service System 286000A2.08 (3.2/3.3) ALL SF-3 PLANT 2 - Loss of Air / Align Emergency D, R, E Reactor Pressure Control Nitrogen to drywell Pneumatics - JPM 25028 218000A2.03 (RO 3.4/SRO 3.6) ALL SF-6 PLANT 3 - JP02718-07.1 Transfer LPCI Bus D Electrical 262001A4.03 (3.2/3.4) ALL

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 (6) / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 (9) / 8 / 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 (2) / 1 / 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 (4) / 1 / 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 (3) / 2 / 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 (0) / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 (1) / 1 / 1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline -SRO-I FINAL Form ES-301-2 Facility: PLANT E. I. HATCH ILT 9 Date of Examination: 03/23/2015 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 2015-301 Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function SF-1 CR/SIM 1 - Normal Start of Recirc ASD With A, L, D, S Reactivity Control Cooling Water Failure 202001K6.02 (3.1/3.2) ALL SF-2 CR/SIM 2 - Lower RWL Using The RHR System, A, E, L, M, S Reactor Water Inventory Control LR-JP-06.11 (1st Loop fails to start) 20300A4.01 (4.3/4.1) ALL SF-3 CR/SIM 3 - Roll the Main Turbine A, L, D, S Reactor Pressure Control 245000A4.06 (2.7/2.6) ALL SF-4 CR/SIM 4 - HPCI / Place HPCI in Pressure D, S Heat Removal From The Core Control Mode 206000A4.06 (4.3/4.3) ALL SF-5 CR/SIM 5 - Initiate Emergency Torus Venting A, E, M, S Containment Integrity using the Emergency Vent Path (Alt path) 223001A4.07 (4.2/4.1) ALL SF-6 CR/SIM 6 - Re-Energize Bus with Diesel A, D, S Partial or Complete Loss of AC Generator 295003AA1.02 (4.2/4.3) ALL SF-8 CR/SIM 7 - Loss of Air Actions for Rx Bldg A, D, S Plant Service System Ventilation 295019AK2.08 (2.8/2.9) ALL In-Plant Systems (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

SF-8 PLANT 1 - JP20024 Actuate DG CO2 Sys D, E Plant Service System 286000A2.08 (3.2/3.3) ALL SF-3 PLANT 2 - Loss of Air / Align Emergency D, R, E Reactor Pressure Control Nitrogen to drywell Pneumatics - JPM 25028 218000A2.03 (RO 3.4/SRO 3.6) ALL SF-6 PLANT 3 - JP02718-07.1 Transfer LPCI Bus D Electrical 262001A4.03 (3.2/3.4) ALL

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 (6) / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9 / 8 (8) / 4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1 / 1 (2) / 1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1 / 1 (3) / 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2 / 2 (3) / 1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 (0) / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1 / 1 (1) / 1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES-301-3 Facility: E. I. HATCH Date ot Examination: 03-23-2015 Operating Test Number: 2015-301 Initials

1. General Criteria a b* c#

a. The operating test conforms with the previously approved outline; changes are consistent with 1

,j sampling requirements (e.g., 10CFR55.45, operational importance. safety function distribution). /)

b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered during this examination. /

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c. The operating test shall not duplicate items from the applicants audit test(s). (see Section D. l.a.) 46

d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within ,s g

3 acceptable limits. -7 l4L

e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent applicants at the designated license level.

43 9.-f rj

2. Walk-Through Criteria -- --

a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:

• initial conditions

• initiating cues

• references and tools, including associated procedures

• reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee

• operationally important specific performance criteria that include: ,44 ff )L.

detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on the sequence of steps, if applicable

b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through ,, f ,

outlines (Forms ES-301 -l and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance /1-b 1 (J

criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.

3. Simulator Criteria -- --

The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ,46 ii_&

ES-301 -4 and a copy is attached. (

Printed Name [Signat re . Date a Author 1

/ir,

b. Facility Reviewer() j3 J,,j

ç 6 1

c. NRC Chiet Examiner (#) &. / /

))JO(

s )

d. NRC Supervisor )c \kC,-.s\ 3 NOTE:

• The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.

1. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c; chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist ForniES-301 -4 Facility: E. I. HATCH Date of Exam: 03-23-2015 Scenario Numbers: 1 / 2 I 3 / 4/5 Operating Test No.:201 5-301 Inmals QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES a b cit

1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.

2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events. L

3. Each event description consists of

. the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated

. the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event

. the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew j LL-( rv(

. the expected operator actions (by shift position)

. the event termination point (if applicable)

4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.

5. The events are valid with regard to physics and therrriodynamics. )P IL A L/7n

6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain  ;

complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. I ,4&.

7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. .

Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. ,4-) tP j_

Cues are given.

8. The simulator modeling is not altered. .

9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d). any open simulator N performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. /

10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.

other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section D.5 of ES-Sal.

All AJ) f-..

4

11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-3d -6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). /

44 (Y7

12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-3d -5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).

J11

13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.  ?

Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D,5.d) Actual Attributes -. -- --

1 /2/3/4/5

1. Total malfunctions (5) -, 6 / 6 / 6 I 6 / 7

2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (12) 1 / I / 1 / 1 / 2 ,44

3. Abrrormalavents(24) 31313/3/3

4. Majortransients(12) 2 / 1 / 1 / 2 / 1 ,44 k312 JJc rtç

5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (12) 2 / 2 / 2 / 2 / 1 44?

6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (02) 1 / 0 / 0 / 1 / 1

7. Critical tasks (23) 3 / 2 / 2 / 3 / 3 4)

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: E. I. HATCH Date of Exam: 03-23-2015 Operating Test No.:2015-301 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 T M P E o I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW T N I T POSfl1ON PTc?N_ i° A C S A B S A B S A B S A B L u A T A T C R T C R T 0 R T M(*)

N y C C P 0 C P 0 C P C C P A IU T P E

AC AX 2 2 2 3110 X NOR 1113111 SRC-l I/C 12442 D

SAC-U 7 7 4 2 2 1 MAJ 7,9 7,9 7 7 D TS NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0 2 2 AX 22 2 3 110 AC NCA 1113111 SAC-I I/C 3,4, 3,4, 3,4, 12 4 4 2 X 5,6 5,6 5,6 SAC-U MAJ 7,9 7 7 4 2 2 1 TS 4,5,6 3,4,6 3,5 8 0 2 2 NCA ci D

SAC-U I/C 442 MAJ 2 2 1 TS 022 NCA o-D SAC-U I/C 442 MAJ 2 2 1 TS 022 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for AC applicants. ACs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BCP) positions; Instant SACs must serve in both the SAC and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SAC additionally serves in the BCP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Aeactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Aeactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-i basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: E. I. HATCH Date of Exam: 03-23-2015 Operating Test No.:2015-301 A E Scenarios P V 5 T M P E o I L N CREW CREW CREW CREW N T

I T POSmON POSfl1ON POSmON POSmON A C S A B S A B S A B S A B L u A T R T 0 A T 0 A T 0 A T 0 M(*

N Y 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RU T P E

RO RX 1 2 2110 X NOR 2 1 2T11 SAO-l I/C 653 4,6 84 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7,8 7,8 7 7 3 2 2 1 TS NA NA NA NA NA 0 2 2 RX 12 2110 RO NOR 21 2111 SRO-l I/C 3,4, 3,4, 8 4 4 2 X 5,6 5,6 SRO-U MAJ 7,8 7 3 2 2 1 TS 3,5,6 4,6 5 0 2 2 NOR o-i D

SAO-U I/C 442 MAJ 2 2 1 TS 022 NOR SRO-l I/C 442 SRO-U MAJ 2 1 2

TS 022 Instructions:

3. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

4. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-i basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Plant E. I. Hatch Date of Examination: 03/23/2015 Operating Test No.: 2015-301 APPLICANTS RO X RO X RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I X SRO-I X SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 Interpret/Diagnose All All All All All All All All All All Events and Conditions Comply With and All All All All All All All All All All Use Procedures (1)

Operate Control All All All All All All All All All All Boards (2)

Communicate All All All All All All All All All All and Interact Demonstrate N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A All All All All All Supervisory Ability (3)

Comply With and N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 4,5,6 3,4,6 3,5 3,5,6 1,4,6 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.

ES-401 1 Rev. 9 BWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-1 Facility Hatch Date of Exam:

RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

• Total 1 3 4 3 3 3 4 20 4 3 7

1. . -

Emergency& 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 2 1 3 2

Abnormal Plant N/A N/A Evolutions 4 5 4 5 4 5 27 6 4 10 Tier Totals 1 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 26 3 2 5

2. 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 12 0 2 1 3 2 . -

Plant Systems 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 38 5 3 8 Tier Totals -

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2

1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the ATier Totals@

in each KIA category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by V'1 from that specified In the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam_must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to E5-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution In the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. *The generic (G) KIAs in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics= importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals(#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category In the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (~ote

1. 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals(#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401, REV 9 . T1G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 295001AA2.06 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced 3.2 3.3 D D D D D D D ~ D D D Nuclear boiler instrumentation ....................... .

Core Flow Circulation I 1 & 4 295003AK2.04 Partial or Complete Loss of AC I 6 3.4 3.5 D ~ D D D D D D D D D A.C. electrical loads ................................ .

295004AK2.01 Partial or Total Loss of DC Pwr I 6 3.1 3.1 D ~ D D D D D D D D D Battery charger ...................................... .

295005AK3.02 Main Turbine Generator Trip I 3 3.4 3.5 D D ~ D D D D D D D D Recirculation pump downshift/trip: Plant-Specific...

295006G2.1.31 SCRAM I 1 4.6 4.3 D D D D D D D D D D ~ Ability to locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

295016G2.4.11 Control Room Abandonment I 7 4.o 4.2 D D D D D D D D D D ~ Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

295018AA2.02 Partial or Total Loss of CCW I 8 3.1 3.2 D D D D D D D ~ D D D Cooling water temperature ............................ .

295019AA1.02 Partial or Total Loss of lnst. Air I 8 3.3 3.1 D D D D D D ~ D D D D Instrument air system valves: Plant-Specific ........ .

295021AK3.01 Loss of Shutdown Cooling I 4 3.3 3.4 D D ~ D D D D D D D D Raising reactor water level. ......................... .

295023AK1 .03 Refueling Ace Cooling Mode I 8 3.7 4.o ~ D D D D D D D D D D Inadvertent criticality.............................. .

295024EA2.08 High Drywell Pressure I 5 3.6 4.o D D D D D D D ~ D D D Drywell radiation levels ............................. .

Page 1 of 2 0311812014 6:26 AM

E5-401, REV 9 T1G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: lA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 295025EK2.01 High Reactor Pressure I 3 4.1 4.1 D ~ D D D D D D D D D RPS .................................................. .

295026EK1 .02 Suppression Pool High Water Temp. I 3.5 3.8 ~ D D D D D D D D 0 0 Steam condensation ................................... .

5 29502802.1 .25 High Drywall Temperature I 5 3.9 4.2 D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to interpret reference materials such as graphs, monographs and tables which contain performance data.

295030EA1.03 Low Suppression Pool Wtr Lvl I 5 3.4 3.4 D D 0 0 0 0 ~ D 0 0 D HPCS: Plant-Specific....... ........................ ..

295031 EK2.09 Reactor Low Water Level I 2 3.3 3.4 D ~ 0 0 0 0 D D D D 0 Recirculation system: Plant-Specific ................ .

295037EK3.03 SCRAM Condition Present and Power 4.1 4.5 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Lowering reactor water level.. ...... .. .. ............ ..

Above APRM Downscale or Unknown I1 295038EA1.01 High Off-site Release Rate I 9 3.9 4.2 D 0 0 0 0 D ~ D D D 0 Stack-gas monitoring system: Plant-Specific..........

600000AK1 .02 Plant Fire On Site I 8 2.9 3.1 ~ D D D D D D D D 0 0 Fire Fighting 70000002.2.44 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 4.2 4.4 DODOODDDDD~ Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the Distrurbancecs status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Page2 of 2 03118/2014 6:26AM

Es-401, REV 9 T1G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM Es-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 29500BG2.1 .20 High Reactor Water Level I 2 4.6 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to execute procedure steps.

295014AA2.04 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition I 1 4.1 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Violation of fuel thermal limits ..................... .

295015AK1 .02 Incomplete SCRAM I 1 3.9 4.1 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Cooldown effects on reactor power.................... .

295020AA1 .02 Inadvertent Cont. Isolation I 5 & 7 3.2 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 Drywall ventilation/cooling system .. ................. .

295032EK3.03 High Secondary Containment Area 3.8 3.9 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Isolating affected systems .......................... ..

Temperature I 5 295033EK2.02 High Secondary Containment Area 3.8 4.1 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Process radiation monitoring system .................. .

Radiation Levels I 9 295036EA1.04 Secondary Containment High 3.1 3.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 Radiation monitoring: Plant-Specific ............... ..

Sump/Area Water Level I 5 Page 1 of 1 03/18/2014 6:26 AM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 203000A2.15 RHR/LPCI: Injection Mode 4.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Loop selection logic failure: Plant-Specific 205000K3.02 Shutdown Cooling 3.2 3.3 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Reactor water level: Plant-Specific 206000A1.04 HPCI 3.7 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 Suppression pool level: BWR-2,3,4 206000A4.03 HPCI 3.1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 Turbine temperatures: BWR-2,3,4 209001 K2.01 LPCS 3.0 3.1 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Pump power 211000K1.05 SLC 3.4 3.6 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 RWCU 212000K6.05 RPS 3.5 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 RPS sensor inputs 215003A2.05 IRM 3.3 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Faulty or erratic operation of detectors/system 215004A3.01 Source Range Monitor 3.2 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 Meters and recorders 215004K2.01 Source Range Monitor 2.6 2.8 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SAM channels/detectors 215005K5.03 APRM I LPRM 2.9 3.3 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 Control rod symmetrical patterns Page 1 of3 03/18/2014 6:26 AM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 217000K3.03 RCIC 3.5 3.5 D D ~ D D D D D D D D Decay heat removal 218000K1.04 ADS 3.9 4.2 ~ D D D D D D D D D D Drywell/containment pressure: Plant-Specific 218000K5.01 ADS 3.8 3.8 D D D D ~ D D D D D D ADS logic operation 223002A4.01 PCIS/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff 3.6 3.5 D D D D D D D D D ~ D Valve closures 223002K6.02 PCIS/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff 3.0 3.2 D D D D 0 ~ D D D D 0 D.C. electrical distribution 239002K1.07 SRVs 3.6 3.8 ~ D D D D D D D D D D Suppression pool 259002A3.04 Reactor Water Level ~ontrol 3.2 3.2 D D D D D D D D ~ D D Changes in reactor feedwater flow 261000A4.02 SGTS 3.1 3.1 D D D D D D D D D ~ D Suction valves 262001A1.04 AC Electrical Distribution 2.7 2.9 D D D D D D ~ D D D D Load currents 262002K4.01 UPS (AC/DC) 3.1 3.4 D D D ~ D D D D D D D Transfer from preferred power to alternate power supplies 263000G2.1.19 DC Electrical Distribution 3.9 3.8 D D D D D D D D D D ~ Ability to use plant computer to evaluate system or component status.

Page 2 of3 03/18/2014 6:26 AM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401*1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 263000K5.01 DC Electrical Distribution 2.6 2.9 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hydrogen generation during battery charging ... ..

264000A3.06 EDGs 3.1 3.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 Cooling water system operation 300000G2.2.42 Instrument Air 3.9 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications 400000K4.01 Component Cooling Water 3.4 3.9 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Automatic start of standby pump Page 3 of3 03/18/2014 6:26AM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 201002K3.03 RMCS 2.9 3.0 D D ~ D D D D D D D D Ability to process rod block signals 201003A1 .02 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism 2.8 2.8 D D D 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 0 CAD drive pressure 201006A1.03 RWM 2.9 3.0 D D D D 0 0 ~ D D 0 D Latched group indication: P-Spec(Not-BWR6) 219000A2.13 RHRILPCI: Torus/Pool Cooling Mode 3.5 3.7 D 0 0 D 0 D D ~ 0 D D High suppression pool temperature 230000K2.02 RHRILPCI: Torus/Pool Spray Mode 2.8 2.9 D ~ 0 0 0 D D D 0 D 0 Pumps 245000K5.07 Main Turbine Gen. I Aux. 2.6 2.9 D D D D ~ 0 D D 0 0 0 Generator operations and limitations 256000K6.01 Reactor Condensate 2.8 2.8 D 0 D D 0 ~ D D D 0 0 Plant air systems 259001 G2.4.35 Reactor Feedwater 3.8 4.o D 0 D D 0 D D D D 0 ~ Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during emergency and the resultant operational effects 271000K4.01 Offgas 2.9 3.3 D 0 0 ~ 0 D D D D D 0 Dilution of hydrogen gas concentration 272000A3.02 Radiation Monitoring 3.6 3.7 D D D 0 D D D D ~ 0 0 Offgas system isolation indications 288000K1.04 Plant Ventilation 2.6 2.6 ~ D D D 0 0 D 0 D 0 D Applicable component cooling water system: Plant-Specific Page 1 of 2 03/18/2014 6:26AM

Es-401, REV 9 T2G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 290001A4.04 Secondary CTMT 2.6 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 Auxiliary building area temperature: Plant-Specific Page 2 of 2 03/18/2014 6:26 AM

ES-401, REV 9 T3 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: lA K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A 1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO G2.1 .23 Conduct of operations 4.3 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to perfonn specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

G2.1.40 Conduct of operations 2.8 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements G2.2.21 Equipment Control 2.9 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.

G2.2.36 Equipment Control 3.1 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions of operations G2.3.11 Radiation Control 3.8 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to control radiation releases .

G2.3.13 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.3.14 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during nonnal, abnonnal, or emergency conditions or activities G2.4.21 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.0 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions G2.4.32 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.6 4.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.

G2.4.49 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.6 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.

Page 1 of 1 03/1812014 6:26AM

Es-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 295001G2.1.7 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced 4.4 4.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to evaluate plant performance and make Core Flow Circulation /1 & 4 operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.

295006AA2.02 SCRAM /1 4.3 4.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Control rod position ................................. .

295024EA2.1 o High Drywall Pressure I 5 3.7 3.9 0 D 0 0 0 0 D ~ 0 0 0 Containment temperature: Mark-111... ................. .

295026EA2.01 Suppression Pool High Water Temp. I 4.1 4.2 0 0 0 D D 0 D ~ 0 D D Suppression pool water temperature................... .

5 295028EA2.05 High Drywell Temperature I 5 3.6 3.8 0 D 0 D 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Torus/suppression chamber pressure: Plant-Specific ...

295038G2.4.8 High Off-site Release Rate I 9 3.8 4.5 0 D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

600000G2.4.47 Plant Fire On Site I 8 4.2 4.2 0 D 0 D D 0 D D 0 0 ~ Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

Page 1 of 1 03/18/2014 6:26AM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 295008AA2.05 High Reactor Water Level/2 2.9 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Swell ................................................ .

295014G2.4.11 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition /1 4.o 4.2 0000000000~ Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

295035EA2.01 Secondary Containment High 3.8 3.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Secondary containment pressure: Plant-Specific .......

Differential Pressure I 5 Page 1 of 1 03/18/2014 6:26 AM

ES-401, REV 9 SAO T2G1 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 205000A2.07 Shutdown Cooling 2.1 2.1 DD D D D D D ~ DD D Loss of motor cooling: Plant-Specific 206000A2.07 HPCI 3.4 3.6 DD D D D D D ~ DD D Low suppression pool level: BWR-2,3,4 259002G2.4.20 Reactor Water Level Control 3.8 4.3 DD D D D D D D D D ~ Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions and notes.

262002G2.4.46 UPS (AC/DC) 4.2 4.2 DD D D D D D D DD ~ Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

300000A2.01 Instrument Air 2.9 2.8 DD D D D D D ~ DD D Air dryer and filter malfunctions Page 1 of 1 03/18/2014 6:26AM

Es-401, REV 9 SRO T2G2 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO 202001A2.26 Recirculation 2.9 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 Incomplete start sequence: Plant-Specific 215002G2.1.19 RBM 3.9 3.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Ability to use plant computer to evaluate system or component status.

268000A2.02 Radwaste 2.3 2.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 0 High turbidity water Page 1 of 1 03118/2014 6:26AM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 BWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-1 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SAO G2.1.39 Conduct of operations 3.6 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of conservative decision making practices G2.2.14 Equipment Control 3.9 4.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status G2.2.25 Equipment Control 3.2 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

G2.3.12 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.3.15 Radiation Control 2.9 3.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems G2.4.31 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.2 4.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of annunciators alarms, indications or response procedures G2.4.9 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.8 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ~ Knowledge of low power I shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.

Page 1 of 1 03/18/2014 6:26 AM

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A ORIGINAL K/A:

203000 RHRILPCI: Injection Mode (Plant Specific)

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHRILPCI: INJECTION MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC) ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5

/45.6)

A2.15 Loop selection logic failure: Plant-Specific. .

. 4.2*14.2*

Plant Hatch does NOT have LPCI Loop selection logic.

203000A2. 15 2/1 AFTER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF EXAMINER RO QUESTION PHIL CAPEHART ON 3/27/2014, REPLACED K/A WITH THE FOLLOWING K/A:

203000 RHRILPCI: Injection Mode (Plant Specific)

A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHRJLPCI: INJECTION MODE (PLANT SPECWIC) ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5

/45.6)

A2.14 Initiating logic failure 3.8/3.9*

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401 -4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A H ORIGINAL K/A:

295030 Low Suppression Pool Water Level EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL:

(CFR: 41.7/45.6)

EA1.03 HPCS: Plant-Specific 3.4/3.4 Plant Hatch does NOT have HPCS.

295030EA1.03 1/1 AFTER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF EXAMINER RO QUESTION PHIL CAPEHART ON 3/27/2014, REPLACED K/A WITH THE FOLLOWING K/A:

295030 Low Suppression Pool Water Level EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

EA1.05 HPCI 3.5/3.5

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401 -4 Tier I Randomy Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A ORIGINAL K/A:

300000 Instrument Air System (lAS)

G2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

(CFR: 41.7/ 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.3 I 45.3) 3.9/4.6 Plant Hatch lAS does NOT have Technical Specifications entry conditions.

300000G2.2.42 2/ 1 AFTER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF EXAMINER RO QUESTION PHIL CAPEHART ON 3/27/2014, REPLACED K/A WITH THE FOLLOWING K/A:

300000 Instrument Air System (lAS)

G2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.2/4.4 ORIGINAL K/A:

290001 Secondary Containment A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7/45.5 to 45.8)

A4.04 Auxiliary building area temperature: Plant-Specific. 2.6*/2.7 Plant Hatch lAS does NOT have an Auxiliary Building.

29000 1A4.04 2/2 AFTER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF EXAMINER RO QUESTION PHIL CAPEHART ON 9/17/2014, REPLACED K/A WITH THE FOLLOWING K/A:

290001 Secondary Containment A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 /45.5 to 45.8)

A4.02 Reactor building area temperatures: Plant-Specific. 3.3/3.4

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401 -4 I Tier / Randomly II Reason for Rejection I Group Selected K/A ORIGINAL K/A:

215002 Rod Block Monitor System G2. 1.19 Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.

(CFR: 41.10/45.12) 3.9 3.8 Unable to write a discriminatory question that hits the K/A at the SRO 215002G2.1.19 Level.

2/2 SRO QUESTION Requesting a new K/A.

AFTER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF EXAMINER PHIL CAPEHART ON 10/20/2014, REPLACED K/A WITH THE FOLLOWING K/A:

G2. 1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 4.4 4.7

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401 -4 Ii Tier /

I Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection I ORIGINAL K/A:

268000 Radwaste A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RADWASTE; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)

A2.02 High turbidity water 2.3 2.7 Unable to write a discriminatory question that hits the K/A at the SRO Level.

268000A2.02 2/2 Requesting a new K/A.

SRO QUESTION AFTER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF EXAMINER PHIL CAPEHART ON 10/20/20 14, REPLACED K/A WITH THE FOLLOWING K/A:

239003 MSIV Leakage Control System A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the MSIV Leakage Control System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.12 MSIV valve failure to close: BWR-4,5,6 3.5 3.8

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A ORIGINAL K/A:

295008 High Reactor Water Level AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL: (CFR: 41.10/43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.05 Swell 2.9 3.1 Unable to write a discriminatory question that hits the K/A at the SRO Level.

295008AA2.05 2/2 Requesting a new K/A.

SRO QUESTION AFTER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF EXAMINER PHIL CAPEHART ON 10/20/2014, REPLACED K/A WITH THE FOLLOWING K/A:

295008 High Reactor Water Level AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

AA2.01 Reactor Water Level 3.9 3.9 ORIGINAL K/A:

239003 MSIV Leakage Control System A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the MSIV Leakage Control System ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

239003A2.12 2/2 A2.12 MSIV valve failure to close: BWR-4,5,6 3.5 3.8 SRO QUESTION Plant Hatch does NOT have a MSIV Leakage Control System.

Requesting a new K/A.

AFTER PHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF EXAMINER, REPLACED K/A WITH THE FOLLOWING K/A:

ES-401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES.4O1 Facility: Plant E. I. Hatch Date of Exam: 04-09-2015 Exam Level: RD X SRO X Initial Item Description a b c

1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility.

44

2. a. NRC K/As are referenced for all questions.

b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as available.

3. SPO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401 /)

4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 P0 or 2 SRO questions L_ :AJ4-__

were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).

5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:

the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the examinations were developed independently; or

.the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain) 17/3 42/11 16/11

6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from Bank Modified New the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only question 23% / 12% 56% / 44% 21% /44%

44) 1 ( Ij/

distribution(s)_at_right.

7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory C/A exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly /

44 selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter 48%!0% 52%! 100%

the actual RO / SPO question distribution(s) at right.

8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination of .4(5 ZL 4 JL distractors.

9. Question content conforms with specific K/A statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are justified.

10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.

11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items; the total is 4.4 correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet.

Printed Name/Si nature Date a Author i I

b. Facility Reviewer(*) J A16r / L ,L--- 3-

c. NRC Chief Examiner(#) fh;I?ij &. C / -c.cr

d. NRC Regional Supervisor I Note:

• The facility reviewers initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.

1. Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column c: chief examiner concurrence required.

ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Instructions

[Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

• The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

• The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).

• The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

• The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

• One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

• The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

• The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

• The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

• The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).

6. Enter question source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Check that (M)odified questions meet criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.

7. Based on the reviewers judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

8. At a minimum, explain any U ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-9

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only RO Question Review (PRELIMINARY): ?/75 UNSAT

• Multiple implausible distractors:

• K/A mismatch:

SRO Question Review (PRELIMINARY): 4/25 UNSAT

• Multiple implausible distractors:

• K/A or License level mismatch: 76, 81, 82, 89, 92, 95, 201002 Reactor Manual Control System

1. H 3 N E K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM will have on following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.4)

K3.03 Ability to process rod block signals Q: What is the status of the RWM at 13% during a s/d? In all cases during a GP shutdown is it not bypassed? I would not recommend adding its status to the question unless necessary as this would provide cueing for the question as written.

RWM is still enforcing.

Recommend including the bulleted information for 13:00 into the initial condition statement: At 13:00, a failure occurs in the Reactor Manual Control System (RMCS) preventing energization of the MASTER timer Edit for clarity.

Q: Why is it necessary to inform the applicant of the annunciator for the second half question?

The systems level knowledge as to use of Emergency In is valid without supplying the annunciator and the alarm is not necessary to hit the K/A, but is very close to cueing the second half answer.

A way to improve the LOD to make it more discriminatory and operational would be to use a screenshot of the RWM with an insert block present.

Hatch Changes/Comments:

S Removed bullet for the RMCS/RWM Rod Block or Sys Trouble.

Removed times. Removed from stem, a RWM insert rod block exists.

Reworded second to ask if RWM insert block will allow/prevent control rod movement while using the emergency in/notch override switch//SAT by Phil///Changed the question status to NEW since the modified part of original question changed out with new part.

2/25/15 SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 201003 Control Rod and Drive Mechanism

2. H 2 M S A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM controls including:

A1.02 CRD drive pressure Recommend removing unnecessary stem information. A reactor startup is in progress.

The OATC Not sure if speed stays NORMAL is a valid choice.

Shorten stem by removing most of first two sentences to just state that a reactor startup is in progress. Changed the c1 and d1 answers to slower than normal. This is plausible if the applicant thinks the normal drive water dp is 350 psid. (350 psid is plausible since this is a dp that is used in the abnormal for a stuck rod.)//SAT by Phil 2/25/15 SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 201006 Rod Worth Minimizer System (RWM) (Plant Specific)

3. F 2 N S A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM (RWM) (PLANT SPECIFIC) controls including:

A1.03 Latched group indication: P-Spec (Not-BWR6) 60% rod density is not accessed since the answer choice does not contain the choice for the difference when less than 60%. There should be a choice for not showing the latched group rods until the 1st rod is moved one notch.

2/25/15 Reviewed. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 203000 RHR/LPCI: Injection Mode (Plant Specific)

4. H 2 M E A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHR/LPCI:

INJECTION MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC) ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

2.14 Initiating logic failure nd 2 half of question does not appear to meet the KA. No procedure usage to correct issue. Modified question to ask if RHR 2B will automatically start/must be manually started with a loss of Logic A. Modified secocnd question to how to S restart pump after securing with logic issues.//minor corrections. Placed 2B in answers. All CAPS for RESET. removed s from pumps in first question.

3/10/15 Revised question. SAT 3/19/15 Modified 2nd question to read:

fRHR pump 2B is subsequently secured and then the RHR Pump 2B RESET pushbutton is depressed and released, RHR Pump 2B will/will NOT automatically start.

205000 Shutdown Cooling System (RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode)

5. F 2 M E K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) will have on following:

K3.02 Reactor water level: Plant-Specific Remove excess stem information. Also, use increasing/decreasing or raising/lowering.

S 2/25/15 SAT 206000 High Pressure Coolant Injection System

6. F 2 N S A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

A1.04 Suppression pool level: BWR-2,3,4 2/25/15 SAT 206000 High Pressure Coolant Injection System

7. F 3 X M S A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

N (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.03 Turbine temperatures: BWR-2, 3,4 Hitting ka ? Doesnt hit ka since this is a Abilithy type ka. By knowing location would make it a K ka.

Question is a new question.

2/25/15 SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 209001 Low Pressure Core Spray System

8. F 2 M S K2. Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:

K2.01 Pump power 2/25/15 SAT 211000 Standby Liquid Control System

9. F 2 M E K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM and the following:

K1.05 RWCU 3/1/15 Unecessary info in the stem. Overlap with scenario. Question revised to ask about local switches and auto isolation of RWCU.

S 3/10/15 Revised question. SAT 212000 Reactor Protection System

10. F 2 X M S K6. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM:

K6.05 RPS sensor inputs 3/1/15 1st half does not meet the KA. Could be rewritten to ask if the sensor fails how is the logic changed? 670# is always less than 1100#.

Licensee explained that if this was the stop valve instead, no RPS 1/2 scram would exits.

Need to fix plausibility for the 1100 psig in that that is the pressure in which the turbine will trip, the standby pump starts at 1500 psig.

3/10/15 SAT 3/19/20 Modified to change bullet to transmitter output for legibility.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only

11. 215003 Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) System H 3 N S A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the INTERMEDIATE 1P RANGE MONITOR (IRM) SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.05 Faulty or erratic operation of detectors/system

- Requires clarification as to what range the other IRMs are at.

- Answer C doesnt hit the K/A as it doesnt address having the operator identify a procedure. In fact, this is the only answer choice without a procedure indicated.

- Additionally, none of the answer choices requires knowledge of any procedure to correctly answer this question since the question stem only asks for system response => K/A is not met

- The question with the existing answer choices reads as murky in what its actually asking. The exam writer cues the applicant by stating an adverse condition wrt RBM is in effect and the answer choices suggest an RPS trip system answer. (answers A and B can be discounted at face value from given information and appear to be mutually exclusive)

- I think this question could be better presented by giving the applicant the appropriate alarms/annunciators for the given condition, give them the IRM H information, and test their ability to determine the status of rod blocks and trip system response.

- Plausibility of the B and D answer choices are suspect as well considering the applicant has been supplied with an adverse condition in the B (IRM H) trip system. Seems like the question is banking on the applicant overlooking supplied information as opposed to deducing a correct answer based on initial conditions.

3/1/15 Appears SAT 215004 Source Range Monitor (SRM) System

12. H 2 M E A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM including:

A3.01 Meters and recorders 3/2/15 This does not appear to meet the KA? What automatic operation is being observed? There is auto action with the IN pushbutton but not the out pushbutton.

Only need one SRM to read > 7E4 cps. Two of the SRM detectors are > 7 E4 cps.

Change so that only A SRM is > 7E4cps? It does not have to be the selected SRM to cause the rod block.

3/3/15 Change question so S/D in progress and ask about drive in feature and one SRM >

7E4cps.

S 3/10/15 Revised question. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 215004 Source Range Monitor (SRM) System

13. F 2 B S K2. Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:

K2.01 SRM channels/detectors 3/2/15 SAT 215005 Average Power Range Monitor/Local Power Range Monitor System

14. H 3 M E K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM:

K5.03 Control rod symmetrical patterns 3/2/15 The answer leads to another procedure. Is the RO expected to know subsequent actions from memory? If so, then why do you need to lead with the change in the procedure number. This appears to be unnecessary cueing. In the supporting information the graph shows cycle 25 & 25 but in the description it sates cycle 24 compared to previous cycle (23?).

Licensee researching graphs and will change the 2nd distractor to just ask if scram or driving the rod is appropriate. Removed Symmetrical pattern. Shorten second question answers to manually scram the reactor and drive in selected rod. Updated write up to S include better pictures of axial profile for BOC and EOC. Added note to correlate axial nodes on graphs to rod positions 3/10/15 Revised question. SAT

15. 217000 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC)

H 3 N K3. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the REACTOR CORE 2P ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC) will have on following:

K3.03 Decay heat removal

- Seems like a lot of initial information that is in no way valuable to actually answering the question. The K/A asks about RCIC and its effect on DHR, why is the other information necessary?

- First question is leading. Can be rephrased to make it clearer for applicant -

At 10.05, the NPO recognizes RCIC should have _____ . The rest of this S statement as written is fluff.

- I dont see how the answer choices for the second half are plausible. Since the 1st question cues the applicant that something affecting RCIC has happened (as opposed to the applicant deducing it). How could the CDR remain the same before to after? The fact that HPCI is listed as INOPERABLE cues this to the applicant.

1/14/15 Adjusted question to ask about CDR associated with controller operation and left auto trip criteria alone.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 218000 Automatic Depressurization System

16. H 3 M E K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM and the following:

K1.04 Drywell/containment pressure: Plant-Specific 3/2/15 Suggest moving 1500 to the front. At 1500, the following Start event at 1450 with LOSP. Licensee agreed to changes S

3/10/15 Revised question.

218000 Automatic Depressurization System

17. H 3 B S K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM:

K5.01 ADS logic operation 3/2/15 C not plausible. If the ADS valves remain open, why would the timer reset?

Licensee stated that the logic reset pushbuttons could be confused with the INHIBIT logic.

219000 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Suppression Pool Cooling Mode

18. H 2 M S A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RHR/LPCI:

TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MODE ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.13 High suppression pool temperature 3/2/15 Inadvertently misspelled. Why is there info about the temp. rise @ 10:00? Not needed to answer the question given the temp. at 10:10. 1 degree F rise over 10 minutes wold make the temp 104 degrees w/o affect of suppression pool clg. Lowered temperature to 102 for operational validity since cooling is in. Licensee responded info is needed to determine temp is <100 to close disch valve in the 1st half question.

3/10/15 Revised question. SAT 223002 Primary Containment Isolation System/Nuclear Steam Supply Shut-Off

19. H 3 N S A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

A4.01 Valve closures 3/2/15 2nd half meets KA. Are there alarms associated with these temperatures? If so, why not give the alarm instead?

Licensee responded that the alarm would be a common alarm that would direct you to the individual alarm panel.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 223002 Primary Containment Isolation System/Nuclear Steam Supply Shut-Off

20. H 3 N S K6. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF:

K6.02 D.C. electrical distribution 3/2/15 Appears SAT Why is there a 10 sec delay in the question?

Licensee responded that to ensure that the times have timed out following the loss to account for stroke time.

230000 RHR/LPCI: Torus/Suppression Pool Spray Mode 21 F 2 M S K2. Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:

K2.02 Pumps 3/2/15 Appears SAT 239002 Relief/Safety Valves 22 F 3 N S K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES and the following:

K1.07 Suppression pool 3/2/15 Change to ask when the Tquenchers are uncovered in the 2nd question. Can this be made into a 1 X 4 QUESTION?

Licensee responded that a 1 X 4 question would cause overlap with the other question.

245000 Main Turbine Generator and Auxiliary Systems 23 F 3 M S K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS:

K5.07 Generator operations and limitations 3/2/15 Appears SAT 256000 Reactor Condensate System 24 F 3 B E K6. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the REACTOR CONDENSATE SYSTEM:

K6.01 Plant air systems 3/2/15 The startup level control valve lock up is based on air press. Reducing not Increasing? Can this be made into a 1 X 4 QUESTION? There are four pressures in S beginning of abnormal. Modified to remove 69 psig due to overlap to 84 psig. 84 psig plausible since this is setpoint for annunciator 34AR-700-222-2, CONTROL BLDG SERVICE AIR PRESS LOW. Licesee agreed to change to a 1X4.

3/16/15 SAT 3/19/15 "Plant Air" changed to "Instrument & Service Air 259001 Reactor Feedwater System 25 F 3 N S G2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

3/2/15 SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 259002 Reactor Water Level Control System 26 H 2 M E A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM including:

A3.04 Changes in reactor feedwater flow 3/3/15 Is INITIALLY needed?

S Licensee revised to make one sentence so that INITIALLY is stated only once.

261000 Standby Gas Treatment System 27 H 2 N S A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

A4.02 Suction valves 3/3/15 SAT 262001 A.C. Electrical Distribution 28 H 3 M S A1. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the A.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION controls including:

A1.04 Load currents 3/3/15 SAT 262002 Uninterruptable Power Supply (A.C./D.C.)

29 F 2 N S K4. Knowledge of UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) design feature(s) and/or interlocks which provide for the following:

K4.01 Transfer from preferred power to alternate power supplies 3/3/15 SAT Check to ensure to no overlap with SRO question.

263000 D.C. Electrical Distribution 30 H 3 M S G2.1.19 Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.

3/3/15 Possibly minutia? Remove most of 1st sentence. Unecessary.

License ensure this is required knowledge for system valve number relationship.

263000 D.C. Electrical Distribution 31 F 3 M E K5. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to D.C. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION :

K5.01 Hydrogen generation during battery charging 3/4/15 Is there supposed to be a link between the 1st and 2nd question? If H2 concentration goes up during both an Equalize and Float charge then this answer is always correct for any given conditions. Therefore, hi temp could only be an S additionally correct answer and not a sole answer.

Licensee stated that the applicant could be confused by the terms charge.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 264000 Emergency Generators (Diesel/Jet) 32 F 3 M S A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) including:

A3.06 Cooling water system operation 3/4/15 SAT 271000 Offgas System 33 F 3 M E K4. Knowledge of OFFGAS SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which B provide for the following:

K4.01 Dilution of hydrogen gas concentration 3/4/15 Novice operator would pick dilution because it is always safe to dilute H2 but not to discharge radioactive iodine. Can eliminate two choice w/o using KA knowledge.

Licensee agreed to change remove to purge to increase the plausibility of the distractors.

3/11/15 Replaced with the original 1 X 4 question.

272000 Radiation Monitoring System 34 F 2 X B U A3. Ability to monitor automatic operations of the RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM including:

A3.02 Offgas system isolation indications 3/4/15 Can rule out HIGH because its in 3 of the 4 choices; If HIGH was correct, then there is more than one correct answer; therefore, only A could be the correct answer.

Could use HIGH HIGH as one of the choices to correct this.

E Can reword to say: Post Treatment Rad Monitor channel A ____& B _____will cause an automatic isol. of Unit 2 Main Stack Isolation valve.

Licensee agreed to make the changes noted above.

288000 Plant Ventilation Systems 35 F 3 B S K1. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS and the following:

K1.04 Applicable component cooling water system: Plant-Specific 3/4/15 OK 290001 Secondary Containment 36 F 2 N E A4. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

A4.02 Reactor building area temperatures: Plant-Specific 3/4/15 What procedure are you referring to? Remove pump room temperatures. Not needed. Licensee will add the 34-ABT-002-1 as a reference, pipe break procedure to the references and revise stem to remove pump room temps.

S 3/16/15 SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 295001 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced Core Flow Circulation 37 H 3 N S AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION:

AA2.06 Nuclear boiler instrumentation 3/4/15 OK 295003 Partial or Complete Loss of A.C. Power 38 H 3 B AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF A.C. POWER and the following:

S AK2.04 A.C. electrical loads 3/4/15 OK 295004 Partial or Complete Loss of D.C. Power 39 H 2 B AK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF D.C. POWER and the following:

AK2.01 Battery charger 3/4/15 This question is very wordy and could be shortened to ask the same question with a lot less words. Licensee agrees to shorten the stem so that only two timelines are E needed to answer the question.

3/11/15 Modified slightly. SAT S

295005 Main Turbine Generator Trip 40 F 3 M S AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP:

AK3.02 Recirculation pump downshift/trip: Plant-Specific 3/4/15 OK 295006 Scram

41. H 2 M G2.1.31 Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to 3P determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

- Location of alternate light indications for CRD FCVs being on P610 is implausible. There are other control rod controls located there, but not CRD system controls. The pump/valve controls for CRD are only located in one place. There are alternate indications at the local CRD control station in the S field (specifically for control of the FCVs), there may be a concept available concerning use of these local controls vs the control board controls.

- Another way to test this concept is to have different casualties as the answer choices and to have the applicant use the given indications to deduce the casualty based on system response.

1/14/15 Replaced using the RSD panel as an option vs P610.

3/4/15 OK

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 295008 High Reactor Water Level 42 H 2 N S G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

3/4/15 What step is being interpreted? Not sure if this hits the KA.

Licensee responded this is based on OE with failure to identify water in the MSL due to delay of light amber indication.

295014 Inadvertent Reactivity Addition 43 H 3 M E AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to INADVERTENT REACTIVITY ADDITION :

AA2.04 Violation of fuel thermal limits 3/5/15 Verify this is not on a scenario.

Licensee verified this is not on a scenario.

3/11/15 Is not a 2 X 2 question. Will rewrite as a 1 X 4.

S 3/16/15 1X4 Question written with PCRAT and MFLCPR > 1. This gives two options >

1 and two <1.

295015 Incomplete SCRAM 44 H 3 N E AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM :

AK1.02 Cooldown effects on reactor power 3/5/15 If a subsequent press reduction.

Licensee states not needed and the word is already used in the stem.

3/11/15 Revised 1st question to ask if Cold SD weight is met. Removed up front material S in stem of question.

295016 Control Room Abandonment 45 F 3 B G2.4.11 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

3/5/15 Are the thermal level switches accessible?

Licensee responded that a novice operator may think that there is access to this in the S

plant.

295018 Partial or Complete Loss of Component Cooling Water 46 H 3 M AA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER:

AA2.02 Cooling water temperature 3/5/15 Licensee will look at shortening the question to simplify it.

S 3/11/15 Licensee shortened the stem to better clarify the question.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 295019 Partial or Complete Loss of Instrument Air 47 H 2 M AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR :

AA1.02 Instrument air system valves: Plant-Specific S

3/5/15 A distractor on Q24 is changed so that overlap with this question is removed.

295020 Inadvertent Containment Isolation 48 H 3 N AA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION :

AA1.02 Drywell ventilation/cooling system S 3/5/15 Is the DW vented at the same time N2 is added?

Licensee responded yes.

3/11/15 Shortened the stem. Modified question to ask N2 addition to the DW will continue/automatically isolate and a loss of DW cooling will/will NOT immediately occur. SAT 295021 Loss of Shutdown Cooling 49 F 3 B AK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING:

AK3.01 Raising reactor water level S

3/5/15 OK SAT 295023 Refueling Accidents 50 F 3  ? M AK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to REFUELING ACCIDENTS:

AK1.03 Inadvertent criticality E

3/5/15 What would cause these 4 CRs to move out? Validity?

Licensee response: Actual OE to support this condition has occurred.

3/11/15 Does not meet KA. Suggest changing one of the questions to ask about the velocity limiter.

S 3/16/15 How plausible is a Rx Scram during refuel fuel movement? Licensee stated there are times during refueling when shorting links are out and you can still get a scram from the SRMs.

295024 High Drywell Pressure 51 H 2 M EA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH E DRYWELL PRESSURE:

EA2.08 Drywell radiation levels S 3/5/15 The amber light needs to be ON to satisfy the KA.

Licensee agreed to increase the rad value to >138 R/hr so that the amber light is lit.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 295025 High Reactor Pressure 52 H 3 M S EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE and the following:

EK2.01 RPS 3/5/15 Press spike is post trip. Anyone confused by the question for Rx Press RPS trip since the setpoint is exceeded post trip?

Licensee addressed concern. The RPS 1/2 trips from MSIV positon and full trips via high steam pressure.

3/11/15 Modified to shorten. SAT 3/19/15 Modified to MSIV logic input into RPS up in the front of 1st question.

295026 Suppression Pool High Water Temperature 53 F 3 M EK1. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE : Steam Condensation (Missing from submitted exam) 3/5/15 Where does steam condensation enter into the reasoning for the correct response, especially since you state the reason in the response is due to the design of the S downcomers.

Agreed with licensees response as to why this meets the KA.

NOTE: 2nd half of question is correlated to the 1st half question 295028 High Drywell Temperature 54 H 2 M S G2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

3/5/15 Possible overlap with previous question? Also, is the reference needed to answer this question. You note in the discussion that a caution states that the WR instruments can not be used in rapid depress. < 500 psig.

Licensee stated the JPM in question is for plant conditions that are different. The applicant has to use the reference to determine the 1st question.

3/11/15 Changed to a 1 X 4 question by adding graph for Fuel Zone also.

295030 Low Suppression Pool Water Level 55 H 3 M S EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL:

EA1.05 HPCI 3/5/15 OK 295031 Reactor Low Water Level 56 H 3 M S EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL and the following:

EK2.09 Recirculation system: Plant-Specific 3/5/15 OK

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 295032 High Secondary Containment Area Temperature 57 F 3 M S EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE:

EK3.03 Isolating affected systems 3/5/15 Inappropriate cueing in the correct answer FSAR. Need to remove or add the Georgia power guideline in the other distractor.

3/6/15 Agreed to make the change noted above.

295033 High Secondary Containment Area Radiation Levels

58. F 3 M EK2. Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH SECONDARY 4P CONTAINMENT AREA RADIATION LEVELS and the following:

EK2.02 Process radiation monitoring system

- I think the question is solid, but where is the written justification that a S momentary exposure of the dryer will not directly affect the SBGT ventilation detectors because it remains wetted? This seems subjective and highly appeal-able without written documentation stating exactly how those detectors would respond in this situation.

1/14/15 Shored up plausibility statement.

Modified stem to have RP reports that no airborne contamination exists. SAT 295036 Secondary Containment High Sump/Area Water Level 59 H 3 B EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH SUMP/AREA WATER LEVEL:

EA1.04 Radiation monitoring: Plant-Specific 3/5/15 Question asks On a loss of Instrument Bus 2A, SC rad levels____monitored The question can be rewritten to simply ask this for the 1st question.

Licensee stated that the 1st sentence in the stem is still needed to properly address the 2nd S question.

295037 SCRAM Condition Present and Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or 60 H 2 M Unknown EK3. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to SCRAM EK3.03 Lowering reactor water level E 3/5/15 OK 3/11/15 Removed AB procedure, redundant to RC-1 actions. Increase void fraction is S partially correct but not per the BWROG basis as the reason.

3/16/15 Made the changes noted above.

295038 High Off-Site Release Rate 61 H 3 M S EA1. Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to HIGH OFF-SITE RELEASE RATE:

EA1.01 Stack-gas monitoring system: Plant-Specific 3/5/15 Does this meet the KA? Is a high off-site release in progress?

Recommended changing value to 2E-2 vs 1.0E-1 and add a emergency has been declared. Remove Unit SS suspects abnormal offsite release.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 300000 Instrument Air System (IAS) 62 H 2 M S G2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

3/5/15 Overlap?

Licensee stated this is based on the combination of alarms not the press. setpoints.

400000 Component Cooling Water System (CCWS) 63 H 3 B S K4. Knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the following:

K4.01 Automatic start of standby pump 3/5/15 One should not be capitalized. pushbutton is missing from the 1st question prior to the fill in the blank. The 2nd question does not say what you have to do with the switch to enable the auto start: i.e. Take to OFF then returned to AUTO position. Is it a spring return switch?

Licensee agreed to make the changes noted.

SAT 600000 Plant Fire On Site 64 F 2 B S AK1 Knowledge of the operation applications of the following concepts as they apply to Plant Fire On Site:

AK1.02 Fire Fighting 2/27/15 SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 700000 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances 65 H 3 x x x  ? B U G2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

E-Bus annunciators are received at 3867 Volts. Per 34AB procedure, 3825 Volts is the TS limit. Q: What information does inclusion of the annunciators provide to the question?

It appears that they are not necessary to successfully answer the question. Edit for cueing.

It appears that the 231kV SWYD voltage is also not required to successfully answer this question. (OR statement is used in step 4.4 of 34AB-S11-001-0). Edit for stem focus.

Q: Does the figure in the 34AB procedure (3825 V) coincide with the SR 3.8.7.1 requirement?

Q: Is knowledge of this 3825V requirement minutiae?

Second half question asks if an EDG is required to be placed in operation due to degraded voltage.

Q: How is distractor C plausible? (4kV bus voltage > minimum acceptable , yet one hour later, an EDG is required to be placed in service?)

Q: How is distractor B plausible? (4kV bus voltage < minimum acceptable, yet one hour later, NO EDGs are required to be placed in service?)

One way to address this K/A could be:

Initial Conditions:

• The ECC load dispatcher reports that the SE region is being affected by instabilities across the grid contributing to low voltage conditions.

• 34AB-S11-001-0, OPERATION WITH DEGRADED SYSTEM VOLTAGE is entered.

Current Conditions:

• The BOP operator reports that all 4160 VAC buses indicate 3820 VAC.

• The ECC informs the operating shift that these low voltage conditions will exist for the next four hours.

Which ONE of the following choices completes the following sentences?

IAW 34AB-S11-001-0, sustained low voltage conditions may cause actuation of *Degraded Voltage relaying/Loss of Voltage relaying .

If voltages are not restored within 30 minutes, actions will be directed per 34AB-S11-001-0 to restore Bus *2E/2G using appropriate Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs).

3/11/15 SAT Added ALL to beginning of 2nd question to increase plausibility of 2nd answers. Incorporated suggestion to lower 4160VAC to 4000VAC Removed excess info from the stem. Modifed to ask 2nd part to read If the Unit 2 4160 S VAC Emergency Bus voltages are less than the MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE voltage for one (1) hour, one (1) EDG is/two (2) EDGs are required to be manually started and connected to the respective Unit 2 Emergency Bus(es). Modified second question to state all 4160 VAC Emergency Buses. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 2.1 Conduct of Operations 66 F 3 x B E G2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

Second half question supplies flowpath for the 2N21-F165. This makes dstractors C.1 and D.1 (for first half question) implausible due to cueing.

The justification statement states that the applicant may confuse operation of the Cleanup Recirc FCV with the SULCV. There is no information in the stem which would cause an evaluation of this. Recommend including SULCV information so that it may be used as a basis for a distractor.

Can still hit the K/A with the same information contained in the CAUTION on page 101 of 34SO-N21-007-2, but would have to remove the flowpath component of the as-written question.

nd nd 2/20/15 Removed IAW in 2 question. Moved 2 question so it is now the first question. Removed piping returning to the Main Condenser to prevent inadvertent cueing.

S 3/11/15 SAT 2.1 Conduct of Operations 67 F 3 x B U/E G2.1.40 Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

Justification statement indicates that C.1 and D.1 distractors could be construed as correct due to the locking of the Mode switch in SHUTDOWN. Supplying information in the stem that the Nuclear Instruments are INOPERABLE would increase the plausibility of C.1 and D.1. Q: Would including this information be operationally valid?

Q: Is the Reactor Mode switch ever locked in the SHUTDOWN position?

Concerns plausibility for the C.1 and D.1 distractors.

st Change 1 question to ask if the mode switch is required to be locked in the Refuel or Shutdown position.

st 2/20/15 Added IRM bypassed in each RPS channel and changed 1 question to choose between Locked in SD or Locked in Refuel.

S 3/11/15 SAT 68 F 3 M S 2.2 Equipment Control G2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.

Q: Are there any surveillances at plant Hatch that measure stroke times from when a change in indication is noted?

2/20/15 Do not capitalize the word IMMEDIATELY. It is not capitalized in the procedure.

2011 Hatch NRC Exam question 3/11/15 Change the wording to ask the aceptance criteria IS/IS NOT met for opening time. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 2.2 Equipment Control 69 H 3 x M? U/E G2.2.36 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operations.

This question asks if loss of p/s to opposite train SBGT (2B) affects LCO for tagged out component (2A).

Q: If the MCCs listed for distractor B, C, D arent associated with SBGTs, how are these answers plausible? All that is required to answer the question, as written, is which p/s is associated with a SBGT.

Can this be corrected by listing all SBGT power sources as the answers? Would have to re-word the question statement. An option along these lines could be:

Current Conditions:

• Unit 1 is shutdown with CORE ALTERATIONS in progress

• Unit 2 is at 100% RTP

• 1A SBGT in standby

• 1B SBGT in service for periodic testing

• 2A SBGT tagged out for maintenance

• 2B SBGT in standby With the above current conditions, entry into an LCO 3.0.3 action statement for failure to meet LCO 3.6.4.3 would be required if maintenance was authorized on the feeder breaker to ____ .

A 1R24-S011 B 1R24-S012 C 2R24-S011 D 2R24-S012 Plausibility is ensured due to LCO 3.0.3 not being applicable for Unit 1 SBGTs (based on initial conditions). LCO 3.0.3 is still appropriate for Unit 2 SBGTs.

2/20/15 Discussed changes above. Changed MCC 2F to 2C to make there appear to be a train power supply relationship to increase the plausibility of the distractors.

3/11/15 Streamlined question to remove redundant statement.

S 2.3 Radiation Control 70 F 3 B S G2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases.

2011 Hatch NRC Exam question

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 2.3 Radiation Control 71 F 3  ? B E G2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Does the front matter of the question stem, contribute to answering the question?

First half question asks where to obtain HP keys. Q: Do HP personnel ever conduct radiation briefings in the WCC? What about in the MCR?

Addresses plausibility of C.1 and D.1 distractors. Are keys available in the MCR for emergency situations?

Second half question asks who can perform verification of LHRA door closure.

Q: Do the second half answers take into account the requirement that concurrent verification is required to verify that LHRA doors are secured and locked? (ref step 7.2.2.2.3 of 62RP-RAD-016-0) (i.e is this question valid in light of this requirement?) Perhaps rephrase the answers to permit multiple personnel, e.g. NPOs/RP Technicians ONLY . (change tense of answers from singular personnel to multiple personnel) That indirectly gives away the requirement that multiple personnel are required to verify a door is secured, but this is not being tested by the question as written.

2011 Hatch NRC Exam question S Changed second question to ask if one of the NPOs can/can not verify.

3/11/15 SAT 2.3 Radiation Control 72 F 3 B S G2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

Q: Assuming that RCIC is located in an area that also includes RHR and/or CRD.

Is the entire area normally posted as a Radiation Area at all times?

R: 2/20/15 Will change the 2nd question to ask The posting during testing will/will not be raised to a High Radiation Area.

3/16/15 Changed as noted above. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only G2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions,

73. F 2 x B S such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

5P

- Operational validity. Is the RPV pressurized enough when in SDC to pressurize the DW to 1.9 psig?

- LOD for this question is very low since the only evaluation performed is DW HI PRES signal impact on F015 (PCIS) and the F024/28 valves.

1/14/15 Modified question to make 2nd part about HPCI operation.Question is asking what happens to RHR (in SDC) and HPCI on hi DW pressure (systems LOK).

Q: With an initial condition of being in a forced outage, how is it plausible that HPCI would be in a position to automatically start and inject? (i.e. addresses plausibility of A.2 and C.2 distractors). This could be strengthened by increasing RPV pressure and stating that the plant is still performing a cooldown.

First half answer relies on setpoint knowledge of F015 logic when in SDC. Second half answer relies on setpoint knowledge of HPCI vac bkr isols.

Discussion point: K/A match basis?

3/11/15 Incorporated suggestion and modified RPV pressure to 115 psig and now a cooldown is in progress. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan 74 F 4  ?  ? M G2.4.32 Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators Plant page announcemenet has some overlap with SRO question (announcement during site intruder event Q94), although different knowledge area is being tested.

Q: Is there a loss of MCR annunciators AOP at plant Hatch? This question doesnt directly hit the K/A and is based on knowledge of EP procedures, not specifically on how loss of annunciators fit into the E-plan. (Cant use EAL chart/bases due to SRO LOK)

Assuming there is no AOP for loss of annunciators:

Recommend cutting down on front matter of question stem. This is an example, An ALERT has been declared due to loss of CR annunciation. IAW NMP-EP-111-002, Is the question asking if the announcement is required to be repeated at the two hour point or a more generic at some point within the next two hours? Q: How is is NOT plausible for the second half question? Step 6.0.b referenced states After the first 2 hrs., repeat as directed. This doesnt match your justification statement.

This question could be asked more clearly by modifying to read: After the first one/two hour(s), repeat the announcement as directed by the ED, SM, or SS.

Q: Is this minutia?

May be able to incorporate the NOTE on page 1 of NMP-EP-111-F12 as the second half question to remove any notion of minutia being present.

2007 Hatch NRC Exam question S 2/20/15 R: Could not feasible loose all annunciators at once. Close as you can get to the KA.. Ops rep. state this is RO knowledge.

3/16/15 Modified second part to incorporated suggestion for 15/30 time next page announcement is required to be made. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan 75 F 3 x M E 2.4.49 Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls Justification statement: 34AB proc vs34SO proc? Think it is referring to 34AB.

B.2 and D.2 distractors for this question hit on same information used in SRO question #87. Based on conversation and knowledge required (i.e.

memorization of AOP flowchart), this is SRO LOK. Q: How can this be a plausible distractor for RO LOK? How would these answers not provide cueing to SRO applicants taking the RO portion of the exam?

Additionally, the 3-5% power reduction also hits the same area of question #87.

Recommend revision to the second half question to remove potential overlap/cueing concerns.

Another concept that could be tested here at the RO level that would not provide cueing to SRO #87 would be the caution on page 2 of 34AB-N21-001-2. IAW 34AB-N21-001-2, Loss of feedwater heating may result in APRMs not reading within two/four percent of Core Thermal Power (CTP) (four is plausible due to the 3-5% reduction stipulated while not being as specific when used as a distractor) st 2/20/15 R: Believes 1 half is at the SRO question. Q87 was modified from prior nd discussion. The licensee intends to write a new 2 question.

2009 Hatch NRC Exam question Can add Recirc Flow Control LOWER FAST pushbutton to the stem of the question and remove from each answer choice.

S 3/11/15 Modified second part to ask, The feedwater temperatures (4) shown on SPDS __________ to determine Final Feedwater Temperature. Unit difference on how to measure. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 202001 Recirculation System 76 F 3 x x N U Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RECIRCULATION SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.26 Incomplete start sequence: Plant-Specific The 2nd part of the KA does not appear to be met. Where does the procedure selection come into play and what action was taken? Is this something the SRO would be expected to know from memory?

2/3/15 Licensee responsed that TS is the procedure being referenced to be met. I agree with the comment. SAT First half question asks for time requirements associated with RR pump start (RO LOK). Second half question asks for system response in event of disch valve closure (RO LOK).

Q: Procedural precautions and limitations are RO LOK, the limits associated with RR pump starts can be found in Section 5 (precautions/limitations) of 34SO-B31-001-2. Why are these limits considered SRO only?

It is unclear based on the given information if the RR pump discharge valve ever reached full open. The point highlighted in the distractor analysis: The valve stops at a point not fully open, but greater than 90% open, in which the Auxiliary timer will reset the main timer after a total of 96 seconds. could be considered correct with the question as written. If this was assumed by the applicant, then B.2 and D.2 would be valid answers since there is no way to disprove this assumption based on the given information. As written, the question has multiple correct answers. Edit for multiple correct answers.

S As written, this question does not rise to the SRO license level as the first half question is RO LOK and the second half of the question deals strictly with the RR pump start sequence which is also RO LOK. Q=SRO Discussed 2/11/2015:

• Revise second half question to include a time component to clearly state when the conditions of the question are being asked

• Deliverable to investigate using a 145F or 50F limit. Must verify no overlap between 34SO P/Ls and Tech Specs to ensure SRO license level is met 3/10/15 Changed parameters to incite 50 degree change.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 205000 Shutdown Cooling System (RHR Shutdown Cooling Mode)

77. F 3 x M S A2. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the SHUTDOWN 6P COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.07 Loss of motor cooling: Plant-Specific

- Implausible initial conditions. Both loops of RHR would never be involved in maintenance activities simultaneously. This may even be specifically prohibited in the work control or conduct of operations procedures.

- The actual question being asked can be presented without as much information supplied. Too much extraneous information.

- The first half question is essentially an LCO applicability question and does not rise to the level of an SRO level question. If bases knowledge were required to answer this portion (e.g. composition of an OPERABLE subsystem vs # of required OPERABLE subsystems), it would meet the SRO guidance.

- The second half question is essentially a mode of applicability question and does not rise to the level of an SRO level question.

Question Modified Slightly: Review same concerns shown above. Licensee rd states that they believe 3 bullet is being met with the current question.

2/3/15 OK for now. Have Joe review.

First half question asks if required number of RHR subsystems in SDC per TS are met (SRO LOK due to bases knowledge required).

Information concerning status of RHRSW 1D is contained in the question stem, it is not necessary to repeat this in the question statement and can be removed.

Edit for cueing.

Second half question asks if RHRSW 1B mode of applicability is met in M4 (SRO LOK due to bases knowledge required).

Discussed 2/11/2015:

• RHRSW 1D cue is removed 3/10/15 Minor change as noted above.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 206000 High Pressure Coolant Injection System 78 H 3 x x N E Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.07 Low suppression pool level 2nd part of question is for 75 inches in Torus requires Emergency Depressurization. Could this not be argued as incorrect and no correct answer given?

2/3/15 Missing plausibility for reasoning why less than 98 inches requires ED. Licensee will add missing information. Question is OK.

Q: It would be more definitive to state that RCIC is UNAVAILABLE vs stating (ONLY high pressure system available)? Wording of ONLY statement is unclear.

Q: Can the stem more simply state, An UNISOLABLE leak has developed from the Torus EOP path (?):

• Enter RC (based on RWL)

• Enter PC (based on Torus)

• PC directs maintaining Torus > 110 using 34SO-E21-001-2 or 34GO-OPS-087-2 ->

Trip HPCI, place in P-T-L

• PC directs maintaining Torus > 98 using 34SO-E21-001-2 or 34GO-OPS-087-2. -> ED

• With Torus Temp at 185F (graph 5) -> verify HCTL (graph 2) (RPV pressure not in stem, ED (CP-2) may be required)

In order to answer the first half question, applicant needs to know if HPCI can remain in service with a lowTorus level (140). HPCI is secured irrespective if Torus cannot be restored/maintained >

110. Stem conditions have HPCI NPSH limits violated per graph 17b.

HPCI is currently being operated IAW RC Table 2 (RWL steady at -150). Q: Why are C.1 and D.1 distractors incorrect? Isnt HPCI being operated IAW RC and not CP-1? (SRO LOK)

Second half question is asking if an ED is required (RO LOK).

Can significantly minimize the information provided in this question by re-stating the stem conditions. There is no need to provide Graph 17A or the initial torus level to correctly answer this question.

Can restate the first half question to read:

At 140 inches in the Torus, operators will*/will NOT direct actions to secure HPCI.

Note to NRC reviewers: Procedure selection is utilized to determine the correct answer above and must be cross referenced to the operating point that the plant is in with respect to graph 17B. If in RC, NPSH limits apply, if in CP-1, NPSH limits do not apply.

The second half question does not add to the K/A match as it asks whether an ED is required based on Torus level, this answer has no bearing on operation of HPCI as written.

Discussed 2/11/2015:

• Will clarify that RWL is -150 and lowering (to assure that CP-1 is procedure in effect)

• Will change second half of question to relate HPCI to Torus via SP or CST Levels (i.e. use CST or SP suction isol valves)

• Will change first half question to focus on applicability of NPSH limits when in either CP-1 or RC 3/10/15 Change to have only one choice in the 2nd half. Only use Torus level.

Added RWL is slowly lowering. Added UNISOLABLE leak to stem Changed 1st part to read; At 140 inches in the Torus, HPCI flowrate __________ (will remain at rated/ must be reduced to restore NPSH limits). Changed 2nd part to incorporate your suggestion of when HPCI suction swap will occur.

S Modified second question answers to remove CST portion thereby removing a separate two part question in answers. Removed bullet in stem about torus level being 144 inches and lowering. Changed beginning of second question from The to An. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 15002 Rod Block Monitor System 79 H 3 x x N E G2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

Stem statement informs the operator that only one RBM is inoperable by the nature of TS 3.3.2.1.A statement. i.e. ONE rod block monitor channel inop. Therefore this part of the exam is a direct lookup.

2/3/15 Licensee pointed out that TS B does contain criteria for both RBMs out of service. SAT Q: Why is the initial parameter condition information prefaced with the word valid?

This is misleading to the applicant. LCO entry is a given based on the first half question question statement. Edit for stem focus.

Q: Is LCO 3.3.2 entered or 3.3.2.1?

Q: Since the RBM Trip setpoints are covered by objective 11 (012.003.d.01) of C51-PRNM-LP-01203 (see also Fig 17), why would Table 3.3.2.1-1 be provided as a reference? Supplying this table out of TS as a reference makes the RBM alarm setpoints a direct lookup.

Q: Why was condition B entered? If both RBM channels are inop, then answer choices C and D are correct. This would be an assumption that cant be disproved based on the stem information supplied. Q: Is it intended for condition B to be entered based on exceeding the completion time of A.1? Stem information as written does not support this. The first half question has four correct answers as written. Edit for plausibility.

The first half question is asking what (if any) RBM setpoints have been exceeded during the rod pull based on the current power level.This can be asked by re-phrasing the question to read (no reference provided):

Initial Conditions:

• A control rod withdrawal was begun with Unit 2 at 70% RTP.

• During the withdrawal, operators noted the following Rod Block Monitor (RBM) indications:

• RBM A peak indication of 111%

• RBM B peak indication of 107%

Current Conditions:

• Control Rod withdarawal is complete with Reactor Power at 71% RTP.

Which ONE of the following completes the sentences below?

If no further action is taken for the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and in accordance with TS 3.3.2.1, CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION, __(1)__ must be placed in a TRIPPED condition within ONE hour.

Once placed in a TRIPPED condition and in accordance with Tech Specs, a reactor power increase to 80% RTP may be performed __(2)__ .

A (1) RBM A (2) irrespective of a risk assessment.

B*(1) RBM A (2) only after completion of a risk assessment.

C (1) RBM B (2) irrespective of a risk assessment.

S D (1) RBM B (2) only after completion of a risk assessment.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only Discussed 2/11/2015:

• Will clarify that LCO 3.3.2.1 is being asked about

• Will remove the word valid from stem information

• Will use supplied first half question

• Will remove references

• Will use supplied second half question. Power level desired must be > 82% (to enter different mode of applicability for 3.3.2.1)

• Will change first half question answers/distractors to read RBM A vs RBM A and RBM B (to eliminate potential for cueing with the provided RBM peak power indication) 3/10/15 Revised question. Changed 1st part to the latest time a control rod block should have occurred. Changed 2nd part to ask when LCO 3.0.3 can be exited with Both RBMs INOP. Added to stem statement that a central control rod is selected. SAT 3/19/15 Modified to add why 3.0.3 was entered. added due to A and B RBM statu

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 223002 Primary Containment Isolation System/Nuclear Steam Supply Shut-Off.

80 F 3 x M S Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.01 A.C. electrical distribution failures Is this a DC power loss question? RWCU Outboard Suction Isolation Valve (F004) is powered from Reactor Building VDC MCC 2B Essential Division II 2R24-S022.

Appears question is based on knowing loss of 600VAC causes 2R25-S063 to powered from the vital ac batteries. Is there enough information in the stem to ensure applicant does not think the plant has tripped? Why isnt 34AB-R25-001-2, LOSS OF VITAL AC, listed in the references? This was listed as the reference in the 2009 exam.

2/315 Licensee provided information that a 1/2 RPS causes a PCIS. Change travel to automatically. SAT First half question asks for position of F004 on a loss of power (RO LOK).

Second half question is an LCO 3.0.6 tech spec call (SRO LOK).

NOTE: Essential Cabinet 2B is PCIS/NSSS related.

Plausibility of first half question relies on F004 being powered (ultimately) from 2R22-S017 which has dual power supplies (600 Vac 2D and the 2B battery).

Closure signal is due to loss of RPS 2B logic.

Q: Are there any PCIS/NSSS outboard valves at plant Hatch that are powered from AC?

Second half question is asking if a forced cascade per TS is required due to loss of 600Vac Bus 2D. The question supplies the applicant with the information that LCO entry due to the loss of 2D is required (due to being present in all answer choices). Essential Cabinet 2B requires removal from answer choices due to cueing. Edit to remove cueing.

To simplify the answer choices, recommend rewording the second half question to state, In accordance with Tech Specs, a forced cascade to 600V Bus 2D sub-panels __(2)__ required based on the power loss.

A.2 and C.2: Is B.2 and D.2: Is NOT 2009 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/11/2015:

• No comments

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 259002 Reactor Water Level Control System 81 H 3 x x x N U G2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

Curious how this validated. Appears as high LOD w/o reference.

2/3/15 Reveiwed w/licensee.

First half question is testing below which pressure, injection can be established.

As written this is RO LOK.

Procedural path (?): Enter CP-2 from RC (assume initial entry based on Hi DW#)

Minimum Steam Cooling Pressure is used only when RPV flooding is required during ATWS conditions. There is no information in the question stem which would cause evaluation of whether ATWS conditions are present thereby necessitating the use of Table 10A or this method of CP-2.

Additionally, how would the C.1 and D.1 distractors ever be wrong?

Q: Does Hatch have any EOP situation where injection is required yet cannot be performed when below the shutoff head of injection systems?

Even when flooding during an ATWS, injection can only occur when below the shutoff head of injection pumps. Edit for plausibility.

The second half question is testing the 50 psid limit b/w RPV pressure and torus pressure during core re-flood (RO LOK).

The SRO justification for this question makes note of the use of Table 12 to justify the SRO license level. Q: How is Table 12 (Minimum Core Flooding Interval) of CP-2 used to answer this question?

Discussion Point: Both halves of this question stipulate that the applicant identify between differences in pressure parameters to re-establish injection. This may not hit the K/A as it is based on the Reactor Water Level Control System. Injection does provide for reactor water level control, but this isnt being tested by the question as written. Q=K/A This question could be modified to have the applicant identify the correct pump combination that would be permitted per the appropriate leg of CP-2. Another way to hit this would be to provide portions of Note 11 and Note 12 as answers and differentiate them with initial conditions (SRO LOK would be assured based on evaluation of initial conditions to determine correct leg to enter).

Discussed 2/11/2015:

• Licensee will revisit the format and subject matter of this question following conversation.

• Expect the different legs of RPV Flooding to be used with a more direct tie to the K/A statement concerning Reactor Water Level Control.

3/10/15 Revised question to incorporate your suggestion to provide portions of Note 11 & Note 12 as answers as follows: IAW the EOPs and of the listed times, conditions to ALLOW injection into the RPV. FIRST occured at _______. 10:00/10:06 & one pump/all available. Applicant has to differentiate notes 11 and 12. SAT S

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 262002 Uninterruptable Power Supply (A.C./D.C.)

82 H 3 x M U G2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

Why would someone choose B? If the Rx trips would someone confuse a 4 hr. report vs.

a 1 hr. report. Verify against validation data.

2/3/15 Reviewed. Remove the Vital AC Bus, De-energizes from the stem of the question and delete space between the bullets.

First half question asks if an E-Bus is affected due to receipt of annunciators (RO LOK). Second half question concerns reporting requirements (SRO LOK).

Q: What is correlation between Vital AC and UPS at Hatch?

Based on question construction, it appears that there are two unrelated questions present. The first half may hit the K/A but does not hit the license level.

Edit for license level.

This is a challenging K/A to hit at the correct license level without using procedure selection.

2012 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/12/2015:

• Licensee will revisit the format and subject matter of this question following conversation.

3/10/15 C1 and D1 are plausible and therefore need to be revised. Also, need procedure selection to hit this at the SRO level.

E 3/16/15 Revised question to remove most of bulleted stem items that are not needed to answer the question. Verified that F057 operational guidance is not contained in the S

AOP for low condenser vacuum.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 268000 Radwaste 83.P F 3 x N E Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the RADWASTE ; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.01 System rupture Previously approved.

2/3/15 Underlined the times in the stem for readability.

First half question asks about exceeding RCS leakage rates (RO LOK). Second half question concerns basis for OPERABILITY of RCS leakage detection.

Discussion point: Does the use of the words FIRST and LATEST provide cueing of the correct answers?

Discussed 2/12/2015:

• Will change 09:20 leakage to 2.1 gpm (i.e. SAT)

• Will remove the cue FIRST

• Will clarify in stem that initial leakage rate has been in effect for

>24 hours.

• Will remove some time stamps 3/10/15 Changed 09:20 to 2.1 gpm S

Removed FIRST Clarified leakage rate was >24 hrs Removed some time stamps Modified stem to state has been 1.3 gpm for the last 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />. SAT.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 295001 Partial or Complete Loss of Forced Core Flow Circulation 84 F 2 x x M E G2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

Q: What is the basis for including the 99% Recirc Speed indication information and ASD information into the question stem? There doesnt appear to be a need for this information to successfully answer the question. All that is being tested here is JP loop flow mismatch and TS limits.

Q: AOP entry conditions are RO LOK, the entry conditions for 34AB-B31-001-2 (Section 3, Recirc Loop Flow Mismatch) state the Jet Pump Loop Flow mismatch limits. Why are these limits considered SRO only?

Justification statement for A.1 and B.1 distractors highlight a time limit (1.5 hr) that is appropriate during RR pump recovery. However, there is no information in the stem that permits the applicant to perform this evaluation (i.e. both pumps remain in service).

One way to include a plausible distractor would be to revise the 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> distractors to read: A.1/B.1 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> The plausibility of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is assured as this time is based on jet pump INOPERABILITY per TS 3.4.2. Edit for plausibility.

Discussed 2/12/2015:

• Will change focus of question to differentiate between usage of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> mismatch limit and JP T.S. (12h)

• Will remove speed indications as they are no longer necessary

• Will remove use of AOP language from first and second half questions 3/10/15 Changed A1 & B1 distractors to 12 Hrs. Removed speed indications Removed AB (AOP) language. Removed .0 from c and d answers.

S Is this something the SRO would know from memory?

3/16/15 Licensee now agress this is appropriate SRO memory knowledge? Ops support personnel verified this is OK for SRO memory knowledge.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 295006 SCRAM 85 H 2 M S Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to SCRAM AA2.02 Control rod position First half question asks how rods are inserted during ATWS (SRO LOK). Second half question asks for EOP usage of RCA.

First half question procedure path (?):

1) RCA entered based on initial condition (6%)

2) RC/Q leg, if IRMs < R6 (incorrect per given condition) -> GO TO RSP (directs entry into distractor 34AB-C11-005-01 if RC/Q is NOT in progress)

3) Perform 31EO-EOP-103-01 (correct answer)

B and D distractors are plausible due to use of timeline.

2011 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/12/2015:

• No comments 3/19/15 Modified to provide an EOP entry condition. Added that the scram occurs due to low RWL

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 86 H 3 x M E First half question asks for the HPCI hi level trip (RO LOK). Second half question asks the procedure in effect for stopping injection during ATWS (SRO LOK).

First half question can also be asked in a simpler way, The HPCI Turbine trip setpoint was reached at __(1)__ reactor water level . (distractor is MT trip)

Revise to remove cue.

Procedural progression following inadvertent MSIV closure is (?):

1) 34AB-C71-001-2 (RSP)

2) They have to be in ATWS due to indicated power => must assume that rods did not fully insert

3) Perform RSP w/ 34AB-C11-005-02 (methods of CR insertion)

4) => given that HPCI hi level trip fails (RWL trend) (assume RCIC/RFPTs operate as designed)

5) => must assume RWCU rejection insufficient (RWL trend)

6) Perform RSP w/ 34AB-C32-001-2 (correct answer)

7) Second half question isnt phrased to ask for a specific step, although its implied with how question is constructed. RO would secure HPCI well before receiving proc direction.

8) To get to the distractor, applicant would have to enter RCA (incorrect),

transition to CP-3, make a determination as to containment conditions (provided in stem), determine that RWL cannot be restored/maintained above -185 (incorrect), determine that an ED is required (incorrect),

terminate/prevent per 31EO-EOP-113-2 31EO-EOP-113-2 also entered when lowering level to lower power during ATWS conditions.

Discussed 2/12/2015:

• Will use recommended first half question

• Will change language to specify setpoint as being tested parameter and will change answer choices to either 51.7 or 54 S 3/10/15 Changed to ask setpoint for HPCI hi RWL trip 51.7/54. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 87 H 3 x N E If intention is to use a chart, ensure given parameters are easily distinguishable using existing chart scale. There is no reason to challenge applicant ability to discern operating chart points.

First half question asks for required power level based on initial condition. Q: Is it expected that applicants have the flowchart contained within 34AB-N21-001-1 memorized? (implied by question)

Discussion required as to if this question hits the SRO license level (lack of procedure choice or TS basis) and LOD (memorization of flowchart).

I am unfamiliar with subject matter of the two procedures contained in the flowchart, but couldnt the SRO level be hit if the question were asked to decipher between the two procedures listed in the flowchart instead of relying on flowchart memorization? 34GO-OPS-005-2 and 34GO-OPS-065-0?

Q: How is the is NOT distractor of the second half question plausible? Is there another procedure which tracks abnormal operating plant parameters?

A way to ask this same question with plausible distractors would be to test the CAUTION statement in the SUV procedure, Use of Section 7.3, FINAL FEEDWATER TEMPERATURE CHECK, of 34SV-SUV-020-0, CORE PARAMETER SURVEILLANCE, is applicable to __(2)___ .

A.2 and C.2: BOTH planned and unplanned FFTR events.

B.2 and D.2: ONLY planned FFTR events (RO LOK)

Discussed 2/12/2015:

• Will remove second half question (as first half hits SRO level)

• Will change format away from 2x2 question

• Will change answers to 76% (incorrectly determine to maintain pwr), 72% (incorrectly use immediate power reduction guideline),

65% (correct answer per flowchart), 55% (incorrect answer per flowchart)

S 3/10/15 changed format to 1x4 asking maximum listed RTP allowed. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only

88. 295024 High Drywell Pressure F 2 x M E EA2. Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as they apply to HIGH 7P DRYWELL PRESSURE:

EA2.02 Drywell temperature

- Operational validity. How is drywell pressure being controlled? Is there a system available that controls DW pressure at Hatch?

- Supplied information above the question statement is not necessary and does not aid in actually answering the question. K/A match?

- Is there an action in the given attachment that mandates performing a reactor scram vs fast shutdown? I.e, Is performance of a SCRAM plausible when in the given attachment?

This question does not match the K/A statement as the given question concerning abnormal DW temperature has no correlation to determining/interpreting HI DW PRESS Neither part of question statement hits the K/A at the appropriate license level.

Q=K/A First half question asks if the DW temp (starting at 267F and increasing at 1F/min) would ever exceed DW design temp.

Q: Since no LOCA has been provided until AFTER the conditions presented in the stem, how did DW temp ever reach 267F with only a loss of DW cooling? Operational validity.

The second half question asks which procedure provides direction for a reactor shutdown. Q: How is it plausible that a GOP would be used to shutdown the Rx when the EOP network has already been entered (PC on high DW temp initial condition)?

Q: What is the purpose of the statement provided at 12:00? Additionally, is it expected that operators memorize Attachment 1 of 34AB-T47-001-1? Why is this information necessary to answer the question? (Although this doesnt affect answer, info included for 30 minute requirement.)

2009 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/12/2015:

• Will modify stem based on question modifications

• First half question will remain as is

• Will revise given information to include a DW Temp of 190F

• Will revise second half question to differentiate between 30 (correct per 34AB-T47-001-1) and 60 min

• Use of timestamps no longer necessary and will be removed 3/10/15 Swapped 1st & 2nd parts. Changed DW temp to 190°F S Time stamps removed. Added which TS we were asking about in the second question. TS B3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature. Removed with the above conditions on second question.

SAT.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 89 F 2 x B U Question does not match the K/A at the correct license level.

First half question asks for status of plant parameters wrt HCTL curve, RO LOK.

Second half question asks if ED required, RO LOK.

Since there are no evaluation conditions presented (i.e. nothing given which would force the applicant to evaluate Graph 6), A.2 and C.2 correspondingly become implausible. Can correct this by providing initial conditions which specify that the plant is currently in the UNSAFE regions of both Graph 6 and Graph 2.

Then the second half question could read as written. This permits performance of an evaluation of two UNSAFE areas where the correct answer would be dependent on the hierarchy of EOP chart usage, an SRO LOK skill. This would also provide a K/A match since an evaluation of torus water level is being provided.

2011 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/12/2015:

• Licensee will revisit the format and subject matter of this S question following conversation.

3/10/15 Changed Initial conditions to place in Unsafe region of Graph 6 SRV curve and then ask actions in the HCTL unsafe reqion. SAT 90 F 3 x B E First half question asks if Torus Spray is in the DW/T leg of PC. Second half question asks if an ED is required.

Plausibility of first half question is assured due to this being a true statement if PC/P path was used, SRO LOK. K/A is matched by first half question.

Since DW Spray would already be in service (due to the given high DW temp),

how is it operationally valid that a small LOCA would cause an additional pressure rise? Recommend revising the second half of the question to 1) incorporate the A Loop of RHR being used for spray in the initial conditions and

2) asking, in the second half question, if either B Loop of RHR be placed in service in spray mode or Emergency Depressurize. Edit for operational validity.

Discussed 2/18/2015:

• Licensee will change second half distractors and stem information to incorporate RHR information as listed above.

• The second half question will be reworded to mandate the asking of a decision point at T+5 minutes, whether to ED or incporate the opposite loop into RHR spray.

S 3/10/15 Incorporated suggestion for 2nd question to ask T+5 minutes and ask ED or B Loop in DW spray. SAT 3/19/15 Modified to change Unit 1 to Unit 2. Changed the answer to C

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 91 H 2 x N E 295035EA2.01 Q: Why is the phrase operating in TYPE A Containment provided in the opening statement?

First half question asks if 31EO-EOP-014-2 entry condition is met or not (RO LOK). Since 34AB-T22-002-2 is provided in all answer choices, there is no evaluation that needs to be performed as to its validity, it is a given condtion. A cleaner way to ask this half of the question is, Entry conditions have/have NOT been met for entry into 31EO-EOP-014-2. However, what is the evaluation being performed for this half answer? Recommend adding additional initial conditions or another procedure that would be appropriate but that doesnt have the initial condition required for entry. Could also use similar ARP procedures to obtain the same type of evaluation.

Q: What is the purpose of using the word immediately? The use of a timeline proves the correct answer due to the 120 second requirement of the 0.2 vacuum TS bases requirement. If testing the 120 second requirement though, this could be considered minutiae. The knowledge required to answer this question lies solely with knowing the 0.2 vacuum requirement, there is nothing to evaluate that disproves the was distractor (apart from lack of knowledge).

Could add information to the initial condition statement, remove the time line information , and add in information concerning RB Vent Exh Fan status and SBGT status as part of the initial condition. The the answers could then provide evaluation of whether RB Vent Exh Fans or SBGTs are required and if the given indications exceed the TS bases requirement for LCO entry. This style of edit would provide plausible distractors since an evaluation is performed to discredit the incorrect answers.

Q: What is the basis for using the language Secondary Containment Integrity? Why not simply ask if LCO entry is/is NOT required.

As written, there doesnt appear to be any basis for the information contained at 12:15.

Discussed 2/18/2015:

• Licensee will make changes to this question based on conversation. They are looking to convert this question to a 1x4 as opposed to a 2x2.

• They will incorporate comments above and are working towards a cleaner way to test evaluation of secondary containment OPERABILITY.

S 3/10/15 Revised question as noted. Ops supervisor still reviewing to ensure no subset issues.

3/16/15 Incorporated suggestion and made a 1x4 question asking the status of LCO 3.6.4.1 with various time line conditions. New Q#1 is on the exam with Q#2 the modified original. Removed Type A from stem. Removed the word Immediately from stem. Added suggestion for 1st part entry into SC chart Y/N. Modified stem to remove 12:15 line from stem and adjusted Dps. SAT 3/19/15 Modified to add that dp is becoming more negative

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 92 H 3 x x M U It is not necessary to have the bullet which informs the applicant of the steam leak if the annunciators are present. Remove the bullet but keep the annunciators. Edit for cueing.

The point at which the applicant is answering the first half question is not bounded, therefore there are multiple correct answers when it concerns the ability of operators to bypass the RCIC high temperature isolation IAW procedural direction. Can overcome this issue by stating where in the procedure the applicant is considering performing the action. I.e. if the applicant has reached Secondary Containment Step X and if they would have already passed through Table 2A, then you can ask when performing step X of Secondary Containment, the RCIC System High Area Temperature Isolation Signal is/is NOT ALLOWED to be bypassed. Since multiple procedural entries would be required for the given situation, a timeline of when the SRO entered the applicable procedures may assist in bounding this part of the question or the use of milestones could be used. Edit for multiple correct answers.

Ensure that annunciators are being used to provide the necessary information related to EOP entry in order to maintain the K/A match. The SRO justification, as written, does not supply the K/A match because the operator is not discerning between EOPs and 34AB-T22-001-2, the second half question specifically states to consider only the use of 31EO-EOP-014-2 based on the conditions and procedures above. The 34AB procedure is an AOP with actions that would never override EOP actions, unless specifically directed by an EOP.

Q: During what casualties at plant Hatch would an AOP action override an EOP action? This concerns the use of guidance specified in the 34AB procedure vs. guidance contained in 31EO-EOP-014-2.

The question does not rise to the SRO license level since an assessment of conditions is not coupled with a selection of procedures. Q=SRO.

2009 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/17/2015:

• Licensee will revisit the format and subject matter of this question following conversation.

3/10/15 Incorporated suggestion and removed line stating a steam leak exists and left associated alarms.

S Edited 1st part to ask RCIC status will be isolated IAW 34AB-D11/remain available IAW 31EO-EOP-100.

Left 2nd part. Modified question to ask The RCIC system will be isolated IAW

........ SAT 3/19/15 Modified 2nd question for readability, IAW 31EO-EOP-014-2, Secondary Containment Control/ Radioactivity Release C is/is NOT ALLOWED to be restarted.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only

93. 600000 Plant Fire On Site H 3 x N U G2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner 8P utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

- Too much information in the stem. Can get to the point that air is unavailable by merely stating it since this fact has no bearing on the question being asked.

- Instead of cueing the applicant to the ALERT entry in the question stem by supplying the wall crack, can reword the question so that the applicant must make the determination that the damaged component is/is not safety related equipment requiring ALERT entry.

- As supplied and with the reference provided, this question appears to be a direct look-up. 1/14/15 Change to ask if at 10:20 time meets the criteria (NO, exceeds 15 minutes)

There is no utility to the bullet points following the 10:00 question stem information. This statement can be re-worded to state, At 10:00 a fire is verified to be coming from the SSAC area.

Edit for clarity.

Q: Does the SS direct plant operators at plant Hatch?

The plausibility of the second half question can be increased by supplying additional time line points (e.g. 10:05 The fire brigade musters at the area and begins combatting the fire, 10:30 The fire is declared to be out, 10:35 NOUE is declared). This increases the plausibility of the A.2 and C.2 distractors by having the applicant evaluate the timeline instead of just remembering 15 minutes. Edit for clarity.

Discussed 2/18/2015:

• Licensee was working toward incorporating timeline information referenced above during discussion when K/A match was questioned due to lack of reference.

• Licensee is working to incorporate fire zone map/detector or an EAL chart into the question.

S 3/10/15 New question per suggested replacement.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only

94. G2.1.39 F 3 x x M E The plausibility of the is NOT distractor is suspect. Can have the applicant select a 9P CDR that is aggressive vs. implying that an aggressive CDR is required based on the supplied information 1/14/15 Changed 2nd part to ask if a CDR > 100 F, irrespective of CDR.

As written, the distractors for the first half question (A.1 and B.1) require revision. They are cued by the listed procedure Credible Imminent Threat of Attack On The Plant. This is actually not the name of the 34AB-Y22-004-0 procedure, but the name of the appropriate section that is entered based on the given conditions. Recommend replacing with correct procedural name. Edit for plausibility and cueing.

The following is an optional way to correct for plausibility:

Remove the unnecessary stem information from the question (i.e. everything before the actual question statement since it provides cueing and is not needed to actually answer the question) and reword it to state, Entry into 34AB-Y22-004-0, Intruder Based Security Threat, was required due to notification by Security of intruders present on site. A portion of the PA announcement required by 34AB-Y22-004-0 is ___(1)___ .

A.1/B.1 All TSC/OSC emergency response personnel wait on further instructions C.1/D.1 All TSC and OSC emergency response personnel assemble in the Simulator Building, first floor, east wing.

There is enough information available to recommend that this question not be considered UNSAT, but does require editing.

2011 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/17/2015:

• Licensee will make changes based on input above.

S 3/10/15 Revised question as noted.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 95 F 2 x N U Q: What does the phrase HPCI Pump Operability has just been completed mean? Is it referring to completion of its OPERABILITY test?

Q: If HPCI has just been verified OPERABLE (i.e. completion of an SR), why would the valves initially be in their INOPERABLE positions? If the goal is to have the applicants determine that an SR was performed incorrectly, a JPM may be a clearer way to test this concept.

The first half question, as written, is asking if the 2-E41-F008 and F011 valves when OPEN are required to demonstrate OPERABILITY for HPCI.

The second half question, as written, is asking which procedure would be used to restore equipment status. Q: Since 34SC-SUV-018-2 has operators perform a panel lineup verification only, how is it plausible as a distractor to restore equipment configuration?

Additionally, how is performance of a system operating procedure not going to return a systems valves back to their required positions?

Q: Is there any case at Hatch where performance of a section in a system operating procedure would NOT return a systems valves back to their required position?

Bullet inserted into question, ALL other valves were in the Operable (Normal) position is unnecessary due to the Subsequently.. the following Off-Normal valve positions statement above it.

Discussed 2/17/2015:

• Licensee will change wording of first half question distractors to clarify wording.

• Second half question requires revision, licensee will work on plausible procedure selections for this question.

S 3/10/15 Revised question as noted. SAT

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only There is never a condition per LCO 3.8.1 TS Bases where a loss of a single 96 H 3 x M E feeder to a F E-bus doesnt result in LCO 3.8.1 entry. (i.e. whenever a feeder to the F is affected you always enter the LCO) Q: How does this fact provide plausibility for the C.1 and D.1 distractors? This can be corrected by asking about either an E or G E-bus. In this case plausibility is ensured due to whatever conditions are stated in the stem concerning initial E-bus and upstream alignment. Edit for plausibility.

There is enough information available to recommend that this question not be considered UNSAT, but does require editing.

2013 and 2011 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/17/2015:

• This concept has been tested recently on NRC exams. The 2F bus was proposed as a measure to prevent duplication.

• Licensee will change the focus of the question to test the 2G Bus.

This will prevent supplying a repeat question and will also increase validity of distractors.

S 3/10/15 Revised question as noted above. SAT 97 F 3 x x M E Q: How is knowledge of LCO 3.0.2 used to answer this question? (stated in the SRO LOK justification)

A.1 and B.1 distractors are weaker based on their phrasing CAN be left open vs. MUST be immediately closed. Q: Are there any required action statements in Hatch T.S. which uses this type of action statement language? This could be cleared up by rephrasing the question to state, In accordance with LCO 3.6.1.2 T.S. Bases Edit for focus and plausibility.

Q: Why include the bulleted information about the OUTER airlock door?

This doesnt appear to be necessary to answer the question.

There is enough information available to recommend that this question not be considered UNSAT, but does require editing.

2009 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/18/2015:

• Licensee intended to use LCO 3.0.5 as justification for this question.

• They will change the wording of first half question to ask about T.S. Bases as recommended above.

• Changing question statement of second half question to remove S potential for cueing (use of word subsequently).

3/10/15 Revised question as noted. SAT 3/19/15 Modified to state that Unit 1 is in Mode 2 at 9% power to ensure compliance with the TS RAS note.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 98 F 4 B E G2.3.15 None of the information contained in the question stem prior to the question statement is necessary to successfully answer the question. Edit for removal.

2011 Hatch NRC Exam question Discussed 2/18/2015:

• Licensee will pare down the excess stem information.

• Licensee will remove language in all second half question distractors to remove excess choice selection.

S 3/10/15 Need to revise question still.

3/16/15 Still need to remove the unnecessary word be from the question. Also suggest spell out the word Group and identify NMP-EP-110-GL02 procedure title.

Apart from being an initial plant condition, there is no correlation in the written 99 H 3 N E question as to how being in a low power condition affects any accident mitigation strategy. The question appears to be a valid E-plan question that tests PAR strategy in conjunction with a change in classification, however, this doesnt meet the conditions stipulated by the K/A. Q=K/A Recommend use of are/are NOT distractors for first half question. Edit for clarity.

Discussed 2/17/2015:

• This question hits the K/A based on low power accident mitigation strategies by prompting an evaluation of PAR status S before and after an ED.

3/10/15 Revised question.

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only 100 H 3 x N E The first half question is entirely systems related at the RO level but does not contribute to matching the K/A. As written, this question reads as two separate unrelated questions crammed into one. Q=K/A Use of the annunciators provides no utility to the question since DW pressure is stated in the given information. Edit for removal.

Discussed 2/17/2015:

• Licensee can see that both halves of question seem unrelated to each other yet individually relate to the listed K/A. Licensee will look to changing this question so that all parts of question relate to each other as well as K/A.

• They are looking to incorporate the AOP/EOP relationship S between SBO vs LOCA casualties into the question.

3/10/15 Revised question. SAT 3/19/15 Modified to add:

At 12:59 a LOSP occurs Modified to add a bullet for LOCA at 13:19.

Modified to change 13:20 bullet to continues to slowly increase.

Question 1 was moved to question 8 Question 4 was moved to question 52 Question 8 was moved to question 1 Question 16 was moved to question 17 Question 17 was moved to question 16 Question 52 was moved to question 4

ES-403 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist I Facility: Date of Exam: 9 /) Zo1(Exam Level: RO SRO Initials Item_Description

1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading ii

2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented Afrk I

3. Applicants scores checked for addition errors (reviewers_spot_check>_25%_of examinations)

4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail

5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades -)-

are justified

6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity IJ of questions missed by half or more of the applcants I Printed Name/c Date

a. Grader

b. Facility Reviewer(*)

c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) G II 5

d. NRC Supervisor (*)

-)

(*) The facility reviewers signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.

ES-403, Page 6 of 6