Text

Initial Exam 2015-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML15176A543
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/22/2015
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
	50-321/15-301, 50-366/15-301 50-321/15-301, 50-366/15-301
	Download: ML15176A543 (110)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-02 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 2 is operating at 75%RTP.

Turnover: Hydrogen Seal Oil System is currently aligned with the Emergency Seal Oil pump in service. After turnover restore to Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup starting at step 7.3.3.2.5 of 34SO-N42-001-2. Once Hydrogen Seal Oil is returned to Normal lineup, increase reactor power to 82%

RTP using the Recirculation System.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description Restoration To Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup starting at 1 N/A N (BOP) step 7.3.3.2.5 of 34SO-N42-001-2.

2 N/A R (ATC) Raise Reactor power to 82% using Recirc.

mfR22_183 4160V Emergency Bus 2F de-energizes due to a hard ground. With mfR22_256 C (BOP) 3 time compression repair and re-energizes. 1B EDG Generator Over mf65223700 TS (SRO) current Alarm (off).

ET-R43-1 4 N/A C (ATC) Loss of CRD due to power failure.

Feedwater pump 2B cooling water controller failure. TC repair and 5 mfN21_88B I (BOP) return to auto.

mfB31_39A mfB31_45A C (ATC) Recirc Pump A Seal Leakage causes DW leakage & pressure 6 mfB31_29 TS (SRO) increase. Pump is secured & isolated. (Critical Task) mf60213160 7 mfG31_242 M (ALL) Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram.

ET-E11-11 1st RHR 2E11-F016A/B Containment Spray Valve causes associated 8 C (ATC)

ET-E11-12 RHR pumps to trip. (Critical Task)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 28 Event

Description:

Restoration To Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup starting at step 7.3.3.2.5 of 34SO-N42-001-2.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, IF contacted as SO, report the following:

Seal Oil Vacuum Pump Separator Tank oil level is between the High AND Low Oil Level on 2N42-LG-R306, Separator Tank Sight Glass 10

2N42-F042, Vacuum Tank Inlet Valve, open Mins

Oil level in the Vacuum Tank is above the bottom of the lower observation window

Seal Oil Vacuum Pump shaft has been manually rotated.

Enters Restoration To Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup at step 7.3.3.2.5

Starts 2N42-C001, H 2 Seal Oil Vacuum Pump, (2H11-P651).

Simulator Operator, WHEN contacted as SO, 2N42-R302, Vacuum Tank Pressure, is 26.5 in. Hg and steady.

Confirms 2N42-R302, Vacuum Tank Pressure, stabilizes above 26 in. Hg. by contacting SO locally.

BOP

Starts 2N42-C003, Recirc H 2 Seal Oil Pump.

Starts 2N42-C004, Main H 2 Seal Oil Pump.

Secure 2N42-C002, Emergency Seal Oil Pump, as follows:

Holds control switch for ESOP in OFF Pull To Lock position until pump stops as indicated by its extinguished red AND green lights

Alarm EMERG SEAL OIL PUMP RUNNING, (651-216) will clear after the SO resets the local panel.

AFTER pump stops, releases control switch.

Confirm its green light is illuminated.

Simulator Operator, when contacted as SO, report the following:

2N42-R300, Seal Oil Pump Disch Press, is 105 psig

2N42-R301, Seal Oil / Machine Gas dP, pressure, is 8 psig above generator gas pressure.

If asked, inform BOP the Emergency Seal Oil Pump shaft has stopped rotating.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 28 Event

Description:

Restoration To Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup starting at step 7.3.3.2.5 of 34SO-N42-001-2.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, when contacted as SO, report the following:

DELETE mf65121574, EMERGENCY SEAL OIL PUMP RUNNING (ANNUNCIATOR ON)

REPORT Local alarm, EMERG SEAL OIL PUMP RUNNING, (N43-105) has been reset

Confirms the following by contacting SO locally:

2N42-R300, Seal Oil Pump Disch Press, is 100 - 110 psig BOP

2N42-R301, Seal Oil / Machine Gas dP, pressure, is being maintained 7 - 9 psig above generator gas pressure.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 28 Event

Description:

Raise Reactor power to 70% using Recirc.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Directs ATC to increase reactor power to 82% by increasing Recirc flow.

10 Min SRO Power increases are NOT to exceed 10 MWe/min.

NOTE: May get the RBM UPSCALE, (603-202) and ROD OUT BLOCK, (603-238) alarm, if a peripheral control rod is NOT selected. This is expected and the operator may select a peripheral rod at this time.

May also get Alarm HEATER TROUBLE, (650-135), alarm. This is expected at this power level.

IAW 34SO-B31-001-2 (step 7.1.5) & 34GO-OPS-005-2, the ATC increases Recirc pump speed, NOT to exceed 10 MWE per minute by depressing the RAISE SLOW or RAISE MEDIUM pushbuttons on the Master (P603 panel) or Individual controls (P602 panel) until reactor power is 82%.

ATC

If using Individual Controls, pump speed increases will alternate between the A & B Recirc pumps to prevent excessive flow mismatches.

Monitors power increase by observing APRM and generator output indications.

Complies with 34SO-B31-001-2 , Limitation 5.2.15, which states:

WHEN changing Recirc pumps speed while in Two Loop operation maintain pump speeds to limit recirculation loop jet pump mismatch within the following limits:

ATC

<10% of rated core flow (7.7 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating

< 70% of rated core flow; AND

<5% of rated core flow (3.85 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating at

> 70% of rated core flow.

ATC Notifies the SRO that reactor power has been increased to 82%.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction OR after power has been increased by 5%, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 28 Event

Description:

2F Emergency Bus de-energizes due to a hard ground.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE TO CHIEF EXAMINER:

15 Min Event 3 (4160V Emergency Bus 2F loss) and Event 4 (Loss of CRD) will be running concurrently.

Simulator Operator, at direction of the Chief Examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-3) and ENSURE Event Trigger ET-EGR43-1 ACTIVATES

mfR22_183, 2F 4160 bus fault

ET-EGR43-1 NOTE: With the loss of 2F 4160V bus, the BOP may address 34AB-R22-002-2, Loss of 4160V Emergency Bus, first. Also the following alarms may be addressed in any order.

The following alarms associated with 2F 4160V bus will be received:

LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER, (652-202)

PSW PRESS LOW, (652-210)

ALL

4160V BUS 2F BRKR 135564 TRIPPED/LKDOUT, (652-217)

4160V BUS 2F VOLTAGE LOW, (652-222)

4160 STA SVC FDR BRKR TRIP, (650-137)

Responds to annunciators LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER, (652-202),

BOP 4160V BUS 2F BRKR 135564 TRIPPED/LKDOUT, (652-217) AND PSW PRESS LOW, (652-210).

Responds to annunciator, LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER, (652-202),

Confirms the following on 2H11-P652:

EDG 1B is operating BOP

4160V Bus 2F LOSP Lockout Relay is locked out

4160V Emergency Bus 2F is energized.

600V Emergency Buses 2C AND 2D are energized

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 28 Event

Description:

2F Emergency Bus de-energizes due to a hard ground.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Responds to annunciator 4160V BUS 2F BRKR 135564 TRIPPED/LKDOUT, (652-217),

On 2H11-P652 confirms the following:

BOP

Normal Supply breaker 135574 open

Alternate Supply breaker 135564 open

1B EDG Output breaker 135570 open:

Dispatches SO/Maintenance to investigate the loss of 4160V Bus 2F

Responds to annunciator, PSW PRESS LOW, (652-210),

On 2H11-P652:

Observes 1R24-S026 is NOT energized

Observes 2P41-C002 Standby PSW pump is NOT energized BOP

Observes 2P41-C002, STBY PSW Pump, has no lights illuminated.

Places Feeder to SST 2F1 2S11-S009 Alt Sply 1R24-S026 Diesel Bldg MCC 1B, to TRIP.

Observes 2P41-C002, STBY PSW Pump, red light illuminates.

(This restores cooling water to the 1B DG.)

Enters 34AB-R22-002-2. Loss of 4160V Emergency Bus

Confirm 1B Diesel Generator has auto started

Ensure adequate cooling water is available to the 1B Diesel Generator (if NOT previously performed):

Observes 2P41-C002, STBY PSW Pump, has no lights BOP illuminated.

Places Feeder to SST 2F1 2S11-S009 Alt Sply 1R24-S026 Diesel Bldg MCC 1B, to TRIP.

Observes 2P41-C002, STBY PSW Pump, red light illuminates.

(This restores cooling water to the 1B Diesel Generator.)

May dispatch a Systems Operator to locally trip the 1B EDG.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 28 Event

Description:

2F Emergency Bus de-energizes due to a hard ground.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Directs the BOP to enter 34AB-R22-002-2 for the loss of 4160V SRO Emergency Bus Simulator Operator: If called as the SO to trip the 1B DG, enter RB-1 to activate rfR43_162 Diesel Gen 1B Engine Fuel Rack.

Addresses Tech Specs 3.8.7 and enters an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months RAS per TS 3.8.7.C.1 to restore AC electrical power distribution subsystem to operable status.

Enters TS 3.8.1 if SRO believes 1B EDG output breaker failed to close or if 1B EDG is ordered tripped locally due to no cooling water, and performs Conditions:

B.1 in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months perform surveillance on operable required off-site circuits (34SV-SUV-013-0, Weekly Breaker Alignment Checks)

AND B.2 declare required features supported by the DG inoperable when redundant required features are inoperable (required redundant features ARE operable)

SRO AND B.3.1 in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months determines operable DG(s) are NOT inoperable due to common cause failure OR B.3.2 in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months performs surveillance on operable DG(s).

AND B.4 in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months Restore 1B DG to operable status

May address TS 3.7.2, Plant Service Water Systems & Ultimate Heat Sink, Condition A for the 2C PSW pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 3 Page 8 of 28 Event

Description:

2F Emergency Bus de-energizes due to a hard ground.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, After being dispatched, wait 5 minutes and NOTIFY the U2 SRO and INFORM, as Maintenance Electrical Team Leader, there is a fault on 2F Emergency bus and we are still investigating.

NOTE: The 2C PSW pump would be considered inoperable if alarm, PSW PUMP 2C OVLD/LOCKOUT RELAY TRIP, (650-230), were received, however in this case, the alarm was not received and the pump is just de-energized.

Responds to annunciator 4160 STA SVC FDR BRKR TRIP, (650-137);

On 2H11-P650 confirms that 2C PSW pump amber light is illuminated.

BOP

Once cause has been determined and corrected, takes the control switch for 2C PSW pump to off and spring returns to auto to clear amber light.

If directed, restarts 2C PSW pump.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 28 Event

Description:

Loss of CRD due to power failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE to Simulator Operator: NO additional malfunctions need to be entered 5 Mins for this event. This event stems from the loss of 2F 4160V bus.

NOTE: With the loss of CRD, the ATC may address 34AB-C11-001-2, Loss Of CRD, first. The following alarms may be addressed in any order.

The following alarms associated with 2F 4160V bus will be received:

CRD PUMP B BREAKER TRIP, (603-129)

ALL

CRD TEMP HIGH, (603-140)

CRD ACCUMULATOR PRESS LOW OR LEVEL HIGH, (603-148)

ATC

Notifies SRO that B CRD pump has tripped.

SRO Directs ATC to enter 34AB-C11-001-2, Loss Of CRD

Responds to annunciator, CRD PUMP B BREAKER TRIP, (603-129)

Check the following indications on 2H11-P603:

Pump indicating lights.

2C11-R600, CRD Flow controller, indicates zero flow.

ATC

2C11-R605, Cooling Wtr indicator, indicates zero flow.

2C11-R601, Charging Water Pressure indicator decreasing.

2C11-R602, Drive Water DP indicator decreasing.

2C11-R603, Cooling Water DP indicator decreasing.

Responds to annunciators CRD HYD TEMP HIGH, (603-140) and CRD ACCUMULATOR PRESS LOW OR LEVEL HIGH, (603-148);

Enter 34AB-C11-001-2, Loss Of CRD.

ATC

Dispatches an operator to CRD Temperature Recorder, 2C11-R018, (130Rx Bldg) and check temperatures.

Dispatches an operator to determine local accumulator pressures.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 4 Page 10 of 28 Event

Description:

Loss of CRD due to power failure.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator after 3 minutes, As the operator sent to the CRD temperature recorder, report that the highest temperature was 270 °F and several CRDs at this temperature.

Also inform that the operator sent to the CRD accumulators, reports that there are several accumulators with pressures less than 940 psig.

Enters 34AB-C11-001-2, Loss of CRD, or may use CRD Pump Quick Restart Placard located on 2H11-P603

Places 2C11-R600, CRD Flow Control, in manual and decreases the output to zero.

Starts the A CRD pump.

Returns the flow controller to auto and output to the pre-trip position.

ATC

IF the applicant does NOT start the A CRD pump and the following conditions exist:

Two or more withdrawn control rod scram accumulators inoperable

AND

Charging water header pressure <940 PSIG

THEN: within 20 minutes restore charging water header pressure >

940 PSIG or inserts a scram.

As time allows, may address Tech Specs 3.1.5

By the time the SRO addresses TS 3.1.5; two or more accumulators will have a trouble alarm lit. Once it has been determined that 2 or more SRO accumulators are inoperable, the SRO begins a 20 minute RAS per TS 3.1.5.B to insert a scram and declares the rods slow or inoperable in one hour.

Terminates RAS once charging water pressure is restored above 940 psig.

Simulator Operator, After 2F 4160V Emergency bus is energized from 2D SAT AND CRD has been returned to service AND at the direction of the Chief Examiner, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 28 Event

Description:

2B RFPT Cooling water controller failure. TC repair & return to Automatic.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator, INSTRUCT the ATC 8 Min operator by phone to stay on the line until told to hang up, THEN ENTER:

(RB-5) mfN21_88B, Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Cooling System Failure.

The following alarms will annunciate:

RFPT 2B BRG OIL TEMP HIGH, (650-315)

ALL

RFPT 2B BRG TEMP HIGH, (650-333)

RFP/COND BRG METAL TEMP HIGH, (650-112), (approximately 1 minute later if 2B RFPT PSW TCV is NOT opened in a timely manner)

NOTE: The BOP may immediately place the controller in manual IAW 31GO-OPS-021-0, Manipulation and Control of Equipment OR NMP-OS-007-001, Conduct of Operations Standards and Expectations, responding to a failed controller.

Addresses the high temp annunciator, pulling the ARP and confirms temperatures:

At panel 2H11-P655, checks all temperature indicators on 2N32-R616 to BOP determine actual oil temperatures.

Confirms that RFPT 2B Oil Temp controller, 2P41-R606, on panel 2H11-P650 is adjusted for 110 to 130°F.

Recognizes the automatic function of the controller has failed, closing the cooling water valve.

BOP

Places the controller in manual, depresses the open/increase pushbutton, opening the valve. Oil temperatures begin decreasing and the alarm extinguishes.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 28 Event

Description:

2B RFPT Cooling water controller failure. TC repair & return to Automatic.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notifies maintenance of the 2P41-R606, RFPT temperature controller, SRO problem.

DELETE mfN21_88B.

Simulator Operator, after 5 minutes of being dispatched, uses time compression and reports the automatic function of the temperature controller has been repaired and may be returned to service. As Shift Manager, grant permission to return controller to automatic mode.

SRO Directs the BOP to return 2P41-R606 to automatic operation.

Nulls controller and then depresses the automatic pushbutton on controller 2P41-R606.

BOP

Verifies the controller responds correctly in automatic.

Notifies the SRO the Lube Oil Temperature Controller has been returned to automatic.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, proceeds to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 28 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump A seal leakage causes DW leakage & pressure increase.

Pump is secured and isolated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, with Chief Examiners Permission:

12 Min

Call control room BOP operator and tell them to stay on the phone until directed to hang up.

ACTIVATE: (RB-6) to start Recirc Pump 2A seal leakage, mfB31_39A.

Receives Annunciator, PUMP A SEAL STAGING FLOW HIGH/LOW, (602-122)

Observes and compares 2B31-R603A, Seal A No. 1 pressure indicator, AND 2B31-R602A, Seal A No. 2 pressure indicator, to determine the Inner

(#1) seal has failed (No. 1 pressure normal with No. 2 pressure > normal).

Notifies SRO that the Inner (#1) Seal on Recirc A has failed ATC

Directs a System Operator to confirm seal water flow to Pump A is between 1.6 to 2.2 gpm locally (this indication NOT available in the Control Room).

Assigns an extra operator perform 34SV-SUV-019-2, Surveillance Checks, to determine the magnitude of leakage.

May monitor Drywell pressure.

Simulator Operator, After the ATC operator has started executing steps in the Pump A Seal Staging Flow High/Low ARP, THEN Instruct the BOP operator to hang up the phone.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 28 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump A seal leakage causes DW leakage & pressure increase.

Pump is secured and isolated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator; After 3 minutes, NOTIFY the Chief Examiner AND then press (RB-2) to ACTIVATE: mfB31_45A (10/20), Recirc A Outer Seal Failure

(**IMPORTANT**)

Ensure the ATC responds to the OUTER SEAL A LEAK DETECTION FLOW HIGH, (602-116) and performs the next set of actions (Trip and isolate the 2A Recirc Pump).

Ensure the BOP operator is the person assigned to vent the Drywell.

Receives Annunciators:

OUTER SEAL A LEAK DETECTION FLOW HIGH, (602-116)

DRYWELL/TORUS RCDR R627 TEMP HIGH, (650-204)

All

PANEL 2H11-P654 SYSTEM TROUBLE, (650-214)

PANEL 2H11-P657 SYSTEM TROUBLE, (650-224)

DRYWELL FLOOR DRAINS SUMP LEAK HIGH-HIGH, (602-408)

Observes and compares 2B31-R603A, Seal A No. 1 pressure indicator AND 2B31-R602A, Seal A No. 2 pressure indicator, to determine the outer seal has now failed (No. 1 and No. 2 seal pressure decreases).

Notifies SRO that the Outer (#2) Seal on 2A Recirc has also failed.

Has an extra operator perform 34SV-SUV-019-2, Surveillance Checks, to determine magnitude of leak.

ATC

Monitors 2D11-R630, Fission Products Monitor recorder, to determine IF primary system coolant is leaking from seals on 2H11-P604.

Monitors Drywell pressure.

PANEL 2H11-P657 SYSTEM TROUBLE, (650-224)

MULTIPOINT TEMPERATURE RCDR 2T47-R626 TEMPERATURE HIGH (657-025).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 28 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump A seal leakage causes DW leakage & pressure increase.

Pump is secured and isolated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Receives the following alarms

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT PRESS HIGH, (603-115)

All

DRYWELL FLOOR DRAINS SUMP LEAK HIGH, (602-408)

Directs Operator to Check DW Leakage SRO

Directs the BOP to vent the DW with SBGT, when DW pressure approaches 0.65 psig.

NOTE: If the crew expeditiously isolates the 2A Recirc pump the following actions for venting the Drywell may not be required.

If necessary, the operator may place SBGT in service by using the Placard that's available or using the appropriate section of the procedure. These steps assume the Placard is used. The 2A or 2B SBGT Train may be used. The following steps are written assuming "2A" Train is used. If "2B" Train is used, substitute "2B" for "2A" for valves and the alarm numbers in parenthesis.

BOP

Enters 34SO-T46-001-2, Standby Gas Treatment System procedure or uses placard at the 2H11-P657 (P654) panel to start SBGT 2A (2B).

Opens 2T46-F001A (1B) or 2T46-F003A (3B)

Places 2A (2B) SBGT Fan control switch to RUN

Alarm SBGT 2A (2B) SWITCH NOT IN AUTO, 657-091 (654-076),

will be received

Confirms 2T46-F002A (2B) OPENS

Confirms SBGT 2A (2B) Heater red light illuminates

Confirms SBGT 2A (2B) flow on recorder 2T41-R618 Point 5 (2U41-R600 Point 3)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 28 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump A seal leakage causes DW leakage & pressure increase.

Pump is secured and isolated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: The operator may place DW Venting in service by using the Placard that's available or using the appropriate section of the procedure. These steps assume the Placard is used. The 2A or 2B CAD Loop valves will be used first.

BOP

Opens 2T48-F334A and/or 2T48-F334B

The following alarms will be received:

DRYWELL VENT EXHAUST BYPASS VALVES OPEN, (657-008)

DRWL/TORUS N 2 M/U 2 INCH ISOL VALVES OPEN, (657-042)

DRYWELL VENT EXHAUST BYPASS VALVES OPEN, (654-002)

DRWL/TORUS N 2 M/U 2 INCH ISOL VALVES OPEN, (654-035)

Opens 2T48-F335A and/or 2T48-F335B

Opens 2T48-F336A and/or 2T48-F336B using 2T48-R615A and/or R615B, Drywell Flow Controller for F336A and/or F336B

Monitors DW pressure

Confirms Drywell and Torus O 2 concentration is <4%, on 2P33-R603,Pri Cnmt Oxygen Recorder (P602) OR by lab sample

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 6 Page 17 of 28 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump A seal leakage causes DW leakage & pressure increase.

Pump is secured and isolated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator; As the operator checking DW leakage, report:

DW Equipment drain leakage is stable at 1.7 gpm

Floor drain leakage has increased from 0.8 gpm to 12.1 gpm.

Directs operator to SHUTDOWN and isolate Recirc pump A

Enters Tech Specs:

3.4 Reactor Coolant System

3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating

Condition: 3.4.1.A, Requirements of the LCO not met.

(i.e. single loop operations)

Required Action: Satisfy requirements of the LCO.

Completion time: 24 hrs.

SRO

Condition: 3.4.4.A, Unidentified leakage not within limit OR total leakage not within limit.

Required Action: Reduce leakage to within limits.

Completion time: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Condition 3.4.4.B, Unidentified leakage increase not within limit.

Required Action: Reduce leakage increase to within limits.

Completion time: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Notifies STA or Reactor Engineering that new limits apply for APLHGR, MCPR, LHGR, and APRMs Simulated Thermal power - New Setpoints are required within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 6 Page 18 of 28 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump A seal leakage causes DW leakage & pressure increase.

Pump is secured and isolated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Per (602-116) and 34SO-B31-001-2, Recirc System, Performs one of the following to secure the Reactor Recirc Pump:

Either (actions for Immediate Shutdown)

Places the ASD A control switch in Pull to Lock (P602)

Depresses the ASD A Shutdown pushbutton (P602)

OR (Actions for Shutdown in a Timely Manner)

Depresses the ASD A Shutdown pushbutton (P602)

Confirms ASD A speed ramps to ~370 RPM (2B31-R660) or 22%

(2B31-R661)

Confirms Recirc Pump A goes to 0 RPM (2B31-R660) or 22%

ATC (2B31-R661) and drive coasts to 0 gpm (2B31-R614 or R617)

Confirms ASD A Start pushbutton illuminates

Places ASD A control switch 2B31-S002A to Pull-To-Lock (P602)

Closes 2B31-F031A, Reactor Recirc A Pump Disch Vlv

Closes 2B31-F023A, Reactor Recirc A Pump Suction Vlv

Dispatches SO to close Seal Injection To Pump A Header Isolation Valve, 2B31-F008A.

Enters 34AB-B31-001-2 Reactor Recirculation Pump(s) TRIP, Recirc Loops Flow mismatch, Or ASD Cell Bypass.

Notifies Plant Management and Load Dispatcher

Receives and Acknowledges the following Annunciators:

RECIRC LOOP A OUT OF SERVICE, (602-127)

ASD A TRIP WARNING, (602-101)

ASD A TROUBLE, (602-108)

ATC

ASD A FATAL FAULT, (602-102)

RBM DOWNSCALE, (603-211)

ROD OUT BLOCK, (603-238)

HEATER TROUBLE ALARM, (650-135) (may come in and clear)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 6 Page 19 of 28 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump A seal leakage causes DW leakage & pressure increase.

Pump is secured and isolated.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator; AFTER the suction and discharge valves are closed for the 2A Recirc pump, an you are requested to close 2B31-F008, THEN:

MODIFY mfB31_45A (Final: 100 Ramp: 1000),Recirc A Outer Seal Failure."

AND THEN press (RB-11) to ACTIVATE:

rfB31_29, Recirc mini purge B31-F016A closure (simulates B31-F008A being closed)

mf60213160, Outer Seal A Leak Detection Flow High - Annunciator Off (602-116)

Simulator Operator; If another DW leakage check is requested, report:

Drywell floor drain leakage has decreased to 1.8 gpm.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 7 Page 20 of 28 Event

Description:

Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, at the direction of the Chief Examiners, ACTIVATES:

(RB-7), mfG31_242 RWCU Non-Isol Leak in Drywell (final 1.0, ramp 1000).

Recognizes increasing Containment Pressure from the following alarms:

PRIMARY CNMT HIGH PRESSURE TRIP, (603-106),

ALL

PRIMARY CNMT PRESSURE HIGH, (603-115),

DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH, (602-210).

NOTE: The SRO may direct the BOP to vent the Drywell, but there will NOT be time to complete the task before the LOCA signal is received.

With Drywell pressure increasing and alarms PRIMARY CNMT PRESSURE HIGH, (603-115) and DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH, (602-210), alarms being received, directs the ATC enter 34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure, and Scram the reactor.

SRO

Assigns the ATC to perform RC-1,

Assigns the BOP operator to perform RC-2 and RC-3,

Enters RC & PC EOP flow charts,

Assigns a RWL band between 3 and 50.

Simulator Operator, WHEN the reactor is scrammed, ENSURES ET-EGC71-12 MODIFIES mfG31_242 Final to 1.5 with a ramp of 1000 AFTER 180 seconds.

Performs RC-1 consisting of:

Inserts a manual scram.

Places the mode switch to SHUTDOWN.

Confirms all rods are inserted by observing full in lights, SPDS, or the RWM display.

Notifies SRO of rod position check.

ATC

Places SDV isolation valve switch to "isolate" & confirms closed.

If NOT tripped, places the Recirc pumps at minimum speed.

Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

Shifts recorders to read IRMS, when required.

Ranges IRMS to bring reading on scale.

Notifies the SRO when the above actions are complete.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 7 Page 21 of 28 Event

Description:

Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:

Confirms proper Level Control response:

Checks ECCS Injection Systems and secure as necessary.

BOP

Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value.

IF set down does NOT auto function, then manually reduces FW Master Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.

Controls HPCI operation for level control by performing one or more of the following:

Adjusts 2E41-R612, HPCI Flow Control, to the desired injection rate

Transfers the flow controller to manual and adjust its speed demand output to obtain the desired pump flow BOP

Shutdown HPCI by:

Depresses and holds the HPCI Turbine Trip pushbutton

When HPCI turbine has stopped, places 2E41-C002-3, HPCI Aux Oil Pump, in Pull-To-Lock

When HPCI TURBINE BRG OIL PRESS LOW alarm is received, releases the HPCI Turbine Trip push-button.

When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve (

1.5 mlbm/hr), then:

Opens 2N21-F125.

Confirms 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.

BOP

Closes 2N21-F110.

May attempt to restart the CRD pumps

May attempt maximize CRD flow IAW 34SO-C11-005-2

Controls RWL with the HPCI/FW System.

Notifies SRO if RWL gets outside assigned band.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 7 Page 22 of 28 Event

Description:

Leak in Drywell causes High Drywell pressure scram.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE to EXAMINER: SRVs actuate in LLS at 1120 psig and then control pressure between 850 - 990 psig.

Performs RC-3 consisting of:

Monitors RPV pressure.

If necessary, allows RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycles any BOP SRV to initiate LLS.

If necessary, verifies LLS actuates at 1120 psig

Maintains RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig.

Notifies SRO of pressure control system operation.

NOTE: The SRO will select a reactor pressure band which will lower the driving head of the leak while maintaining EOP limits.

As time allows, may; Direct the ATC to decrease reactor pressure to reduce the driving head of SRO the leak using EHC pressure set, Remove RWCU from service IAW 34AB-T23-002-2, Small Pipe Break in Primary Containment.

Enters Attachment 11 of 34SO-N30-001-2, Main Turbine, or 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown, and at the DEHC panel computer, performs ONE of the following:

1. Throttle Pressure Set

Selects the Control psi- load screen

Selects the *Ramp Rate* button ATC

Enters a ramp rate

Selects the *Pressure* button

Enters desired target pressure

2. Bypass Valve Jack Positioning

Control BPV position by intermittently using the *Raise* /

Lower* buttons until BYPASS VALVE JACK STATUS changes to *ACTIVE* AND desired cooldown rate is established ATC Notifies the SRO that Rx pressure is at the target psig.

Simulator Operator PROCEEDS to the next event at the Chief Examiners direction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 8 Page 23 of 28 Event

Description:

1st RHR 2E11-F016A/B Containment Spray Valve causes associated RHR pumps to trip.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Per the PC flowchart, verifies Torus level is <285 inches and directs an SRO operator to place Torus Sprays in service.

Sprays the Torus per 34SO-E11-010-2 placard on the 2H11-P601 Panel as follows:

Places Cnmt Spray Vlv Cntl switch in the MANUAL position.

ATC

Starts RHR pump(s) in loop A/B, if NOT already running.

Opens 2E11-F028A/B.

Throttles Open 2E11-F027A/B.

Notifies SRO that RHR is in Torus Sprays.

(One loop of RHR will be placed in Torus Sprays. The flow is only 700 gpm, so it may be difficult to see flow indication from a distance.)

When Torus pressure exceeds 11 psig, verifies that Torus Level is <215 inches, in the safe area of Graph 8 (DWSIL) and Directs an operator to:

SRO

Place all DW cooling fans to OFF

Place both Recirc pumps to PTL OFF

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 8 Page 24 of 28 Event

Description:

1st RHR 2E11-F016A/B Containment Spray Valve causes associated RHR pumps to trip.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Places both Recirc pumps to the PTL Off on panel 2H11-P602.

Places the following DW cooling fans control switches in the OFF position.

2H11-P654:

2T47-B007B

2T47-B008B

2T47-B009B

2T47-B0010B ATC

2T47-C001B

2T47-C002B

2H11-P657:

2T47-B007A

2T47-B008A

2T47-B009A

2T47-B0010A

2T47-C001A

2T47-C002A

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-02 Event No.: 8 Page 25 of 28 Event

Description:

1st RHR 2E11-F016A/B Containment Spray Valve causes associated RHR pumps to trip.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: If the operator starts with the B Loop of RHR to spray the DW, the 2E11-F016B valve will open AND BOTH RHR pumps in the B Loop will trip, requiring the operator to transition to the A Loop of RHR.

If the operator starts with the B Loop of RHR to spray the DW, the 2E11-F016B valve will open AND BOTH RHR pumps in the B Loop will trip, requiring the operator to transition to the A Loop of RHR.

Simulator Operator, ENSURE Event Triggers EGE11-11 & ET-EGE11-12 trips both RHR pumps in the ASSOCIATED Loop.

Notifies the SRO that all Drywell cooling fans are off.

Notifies the SRO that both Recirc pumps are off.

Sprays the Drywell using 34SO-E11-010-2 placard at the 2H11-P601 panel.

Places Cnmt Spray A/B Vlv Cntl switch in the MANUAL position.

Confirms RHR pump(s) in loop A/B, are running.

Opens 2E11-F021A or B.

Opens 2E11-F016A or B (1st VALVE OPEN WILL TRIP BOTH RHR LOOP PUMPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 1st 2E11-F016 OPENED).

Informs SRO that the RHR Loop A or B pumps tripped.

Opens 2E11-F021A or B

Throttles Open 2E11-F016A(B) (Critical Task) to >5000 gpm

Confirms Drywell pressure is reducing

Notifies SRO that RHR is in Drywell Sprays

May dispatch SO/Maint to investigate both RHR Loop A (B) pumps tripping, if SRO has not already performed.

As time allows, directs an operator to perform 31EO-EOP-114-2.

SRO

May dispatch SO/Maint to investigate both RHR Loop A (B) pumps tripping, if ATC has not already performed.

Simulator Operator, After the crew is spraying the Drywell AND with Chief Examiners permission, Terminate the scenario.

Page 26 of 28 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-02 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initiating Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 75%RTP.

Turnover Hydrogen Seal Oil System is currently aligned with the Emergency Seal Oil pump in service. After turnover restore to Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup starting at step 7.3.3.2.5 of 34SO-N42-001-2. Once Hydrogen Seal Oil is returned to Normal lineup, increase reactor power to 82% RTP using the Recirculation System.

Summary:

Event 1: Normal; The BOP will return Hydrogen Seal Oil to a Normal lineup IAW the system operating procedure.

Event 2: Reactivity; The ATC will raise Reactor power to ~82% RTP.

Event 3: Component/TS; 4160 V Emergency Bus 2F will de-energize causing a loss of 2B CRD pump. The SRO addresses Tech Specs for inoperable AC electrical distribution subsystem.

BOP will restore cooling water to the running EDG.

Event 4: Component/TS; Loss of CRD due to power failure. The ATC will address loss of CRD and start the A CRD pump.

Event 5: Instrument; Feedwater pump 2B cooling water controller will fail requiring the ATC to maintain cooling water manually. Time Compression repair & return the controller to automatic.

Event 6: Component/TS; 2A Reactor Recirculation pump seals will sequentially develop a failure that results in reactor coolant leaking into the Drywell (DW). Initially, only the Number 1 seal fails, followed a few minutes later by a Number 2 Seal failure. The ATC operator will trip and isolate the 2A Reactor Recirc pump prior to exceeding the DW pressure LOCA signal.

(Critical Task) The SRO will address TS for coolant leakage and single Recirc loop operation.

Event 7: Major; The plant experiences a RWCU pipe leak in Drywell causing a High Drywell pressure scram.

Event 8: Component; The 1st RHR 2E11-F016A/B Containment Spray Valve to be opened will trip the associated Loop RHR pumps requiring the operator to transition to the other loop of RHR to spray the Drywell. (Critical Task)

Page 27 of 28 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-02 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Critical Tasks

2A Reactor Recirculation pump seals will sequentially fail resulting in exceeding the capacity of the CAD loop vents requiring the ATC to trip and isolate the 2A Reactor Recirc pump prior to exceeding the Drywell pressure LOCA signal. (Event 6)

The 1st RHR 2E11-F016A/B Containment Spray Valve to be opened will trip the associated Loop RHR pumps requiring the operator to transition to the other loop of RHR to spray the Drywell.

(Event 8)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items

1. Total Malfunctions 5-8 6 1. 4160V 2F de-energizes (Event 3)

2. Loss of CRD due to power failure (Event 4)

3. 2B RFPT Clg water controller fails (Event 5)

4. 2A Recirc Seal failure (Event 6)

5. RWCU pipe leak LOCA (Event 7)

6. Loop RHR pumps trip (Event 8)

2. Malfunctions After 1-2 1 1. Loop RHR pumps trip (Event 8)

EOP Entry

3. Abnormal Events 2-4 3 1. 4160V 2F de-energizes (Event 3)

2. Loss of CRD due to power failure (Event 4)

3. 2A Recirc Seal failure (Event 6)

4. Major Transients 1-2 1 1. RWCU pipe leak LOCA (Event 7)

5. EOPs entered, 1-2 2 1. 31EO-EOP-010, RC-Non ATWS (Event 7) requiring substantive 2. 31EO-EOP-012, PC (Event 7) actions

6. EOPs contingencies 0-2 0 1.

requiring substantive actions

7. Critical Tasks 2-3 2 1. 2A Recirc Seal failure (Event 6)

2. Loop RHR pumps trip (Event 8)

ILT 9 NRC FINAL Scenario 2 SHIFT TURNOVER Safety Focus UNIT 1 STATUS Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Plant Conditions: Activities in progress: 34SV-P41-001-1, Plant Service Water Pump Operability.

UNIT 2 STATUS Plant Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 75% RTP.

Protected Train: EOOS:

Division I Green Orange Division II Yellow Red Hydrogen Seal Oil System is currently aligned with the Emergency Seal Oil pump in service. After turnover restore to Normal Hydrogen Seal Oil System Lineup starting at step Scheduled evolutions: 7.3.3.2.5 of 34SO-N42-001-2.

Once Hydrogen Seal Oil is returned to Normal lineup, increase reactor power to 82% RTP using the Recirculation System.

Surveillances due this None shift:

Inop Equipment: None Active tagouts: None Rod Configuration: See RWM

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-03 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 2 is operating at 59% RTP.

Turnover: RFPT 2A is operating at ~1000 rpm. Continue startup and place the RFPT 2A in service, starting at step 7.1.11.2.7 of 34SO-N21-007-2. Once RFPT 2A is in service increase reactor power to 65% RTP using the Recirc System. 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description Continue startup and place the RFPT 2A in service, starting at step 1 N/A N (BOP) 7.1.11.2.7 of 34SO-N21-007-2.

2 N/A R (ATC) Raise reactor power with Recirc to 65% power.

mfE41_249 svoE41072 C (ATC) HPCI Steam Line breaks in the Rx bldg.

3 svoE41073 TS (SRO) HPCI isolation valves fail to auto close (Critical Task)

EGE41-3 EGE41-4 4 mf70022416 (ON) C (BOP) Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi - swap Prefilters.

C (ATC) Recirc Pump 2B High Vibration requiring reducing reactor power 5 mfB31_41B TS (SRO) in an attempt to clear alarm. Alarm remains in until pump is tripped.

mfN43_148A mfN43_158B loN43-S47A3 Stator Cooling Pump 2B (simulate sheared shaft) 6 C (BOP) loN43-S47G1 Standby Stator Cooling pump 2A fails to start (manually started) loN43-S47R2 EGN43-01 mfB21_247A mfB21_247B Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Reactor Auto scram fails but Manual 7 M (ALL) mfC71_241A scram works.

mfC71_241B 2B SRV fails open, must pull fuses (Critical Task); 2B SRV 8 mfB21_286B C (ATC) tailpipe with fails requiring Torus Spray or Emergency Depressurization to maintain safe region PSP curve. (Critical Task)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 26 Event

Description:

Placing the 2A RFPT in service, starting at step 7.1.11.2.9 of 34SO-N21-007-2.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 SRO Orders Operator to place 2A RFPT in service Mins BOP

Enters 34SO-N21-007-2 at step 7.1.11.2.7.

Increases speed with the Speed Setter switch to 2100 rpm (+ 100 rpm)

Confirms M/A station permissive light illuminates and that the M/A station is tracking actual Speed Setter (RFPT) speed

Places the TMR Mode switch to M/A

Confirms the M/A Station green light illuminates

Slowly changes the M/A station to match input and output while BOP monitoring RWL, RFPT 2A discharge pressure and RFPT 2A & 2B speed.

Alarm RFP C005A DISCH FLOW LOW, (656-039), will clear when RFPT 2A is placed into service. Alarms HEATER TROUBLE, (650-135), 2H11-P657 SYSTEM TROUBLE, (650-224) and MULTIPOINT TEMP RCDR 2T47-R611 TEMP HIGH, (657-072) may come in and clear. All are expected for this plant condition. If dispatched to RFPT area, SIMULATOR OPERATOR, wait 2 minutes, NOTIFY BOP there are no steam leaks in the RFPT area.

Places M/A station for RFPT 2A in AUTO

As required, adjusts RFP 2A Speed Control Bias Setting to maintain BOP RFPT 2A and 2B speed within 100 RPM

Confirms RFPT 2A Min Flow valve, 2N21-F117A, closes

Informs SRO that the 2A RFPT is in service in Automatic control.

SRO

Informs ATC to increase power with Recirc to 65% power.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 26 Event

Description:

Use Recirc to raise reactor power to approximately 65%.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 5

SRO Directs the ATC to increase Rx Power to 65% using Recirc.

Mins NOTE: May get the RBM UPSCALE, (603-202) and ROD OUT BLOCK, (603-238) alarm, if a peripheral control rod is NOT selected. This is expected and the operator may select a peripheral rod at this time.

May also get Alarm HEATER TROUBLE, 650-135 alarm. This is expected at this power level.

IAW 34SO-B31-001-2, the ATC increases Recirc pump speed, NOT to exceed ATC 10 MWE per minute by depressing the RAISE SLOW or RAISE MEDIUM pushbuttons on the Master or Individual controls until reactor power is 65%.

Complies with 34SO-B31-001-2 Limitation 5.2.15 which states:

WHEN changing Recirc pumps speed while in Two Loop operation maintain pump speeds to limit recirculation loop jet pump mismatch within the following limits:

ATC

< 10% of rated core flow (7.7 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating < 70% of rated core flow; AND

< 5% of rated core flow (3.85 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating at > 70% of rated core flow.

ATC Notifies the SRO that reactor power has been increased to 65%.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction OR after power has been increased by 5%, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 26 Event

Description:

HPCI Steam Line breaks in the Rx bldg. with failure to auto isolate the HPCI steam line requiring manual closure of isolation valves Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator operator, ENTER (RB-3) 10 Min mfE41_249, HPCI Steam Line, break 0.75/100.

Receives the following annunciators:

DRYWELL/TORUS RCDR R627 TEMP HIGH, (650-204)

MULTIPOINT TEMP RCDR 2T41-R620 TEMP HIGH, (654-004)

MULTIPOINT TEMP RCDR 2T41-R626 TEMP HIGH, (657-025)

Receives the following ~45 seconds later:

ALL

LEAK DET DIFF TEMP HIGH, (601-321)

HPCI TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED, (601-109)

HPCI ISOLATION TRIP LOGIC A INITIATED, (601-115)

HPCI ISOL TIMER INITIATED, (601-105)

HPCI ISOLATION TRIP LOGIC B INITIATED, (601-121)

SEC SYSTEM AUTO INITIATION SIGNAL PRESENT, (650-234)

Responds to the following annunciators:

HPCI STEAM LINE DIFF PRESS HIGH, (601-104)

HPCI TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED, (601-109)

HPCI ISOLATION TRIP LOGIC A INITIATED, (601-115)

Time:_____________

Responds to failure of HPCI Auto Isolation:

ATC

Places 2E41-F002 control switch to CLOSE.

Places 2E41-F003 control switch to CLOSE (Critical Task) is to position 2E41-F002 control switch to close within 5 minutes of receiving 601-115 and/or 601-121 listed above OR may close before alarms are received).

Time:_____________

Informs SRO of failure of 2E41-F003 to close.

Dispatches operator/Maintenance to investigate the leak.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 26 Event

Description:

HPCI Steam Line breaks in the Rx bldg. with failure to auto isolate the HPCI steam line requiring manual closure of isolation valves Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Orders BOP to evaluate leak detection alarms on 2H11-P601.

Orders HPCI to be isolated.

SRO

Orders ATC/BOP to evacuate the Reactor Building.

May notify Maintenance for assistance in closing HPCI valve if ATC/BOP does NOT.

Reviews TS 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves, Condition A.1 and A.2 and determines:

2E41-F003 INOP

2E41-F002 must be closed and deactivated within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months AND

2E41-F002/F003 penetration must be verified ISOLATED every 31 days.

As time allows, contacts the Shift Support Supervisor to draft a Danger SRO Tagout for 2E41-F002.

Reviews TS 3.5.1, ECCS/RCIC.

IAW TS 3.5.1 Condition C,

Declares HPCI inoperable,

Must verify within one hour that RCIC is operable by administrative means

Must restore HPCI to operable status within 14 days SIMULATOR OPERATOR; At Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 4 Page 6 of 26 Event

Description:

Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi - swap Prefilters.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator at direction of the lead examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-4) 7 Mins malfunction mf70022416 - Window 25 INSTRU AIR PREFLTR D103A DIFF PRESS HIGH (ANNUNCIATOR ON)

The following annunciators are received:

All

PANEL 2H11-P700 SYSTEM TROUBLE, (650-225)

INSTR AIR PREFLTR D103A DIFF PRESS HIGH, (700-225)

Acknowledges 2H11-P700 panel alarm on 2H11-P650

Acknowledges INSTR AIR PREFLTR D103A DIFF PRESS HIGH, (700-225) on 2H11-P700 and notifies the SRO of the alarm BOP

Dispatches an SO locally to determine Prefilter dP on 2P52-dPIS-N301A, look for air leaks on the filter and to verify that the instrument isolation valve is open.

Simulator Operator: 2 minutes after being dispatched to check Prefilter dP, inform the BOP that 2P52-dpis-N301A indicates 6 psid and that no air leaks exist.

Notifies Maintenance (if BOP has NOT) to change out the Prefilter SRO cartridge and initiates a condition report.

Directs the BOP to swap Prefilters IAW 34AR-700-225-2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 26 Event

Description:

Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi - swap Prefilters.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, WHEN the BOP swaps Prefilters, ENSURES EVENT TRIGGER EGP52-1 & EGP52-2 ACTIVATES: deleting malfunction mf70022416 - Window 25 INSTRU AIR PREFLTR D103A DIFF PRESS HIGH (ANNUNCIATOR ON) and simulates correct light arrangement.

At 2H11-P700:

Places control switch to ON for Turb Bldg Inst Air PreFltr/Afterfilter 2P52-D103B/2P52-D102B Inlet Isol, 2P52-F002B/2P52-F011B.

BOP

Places control switch to OFF for Turb Bldg Inst Air PreFltr/Afterfilter 2P52-D103A/2P52-D102A Inlet Isol, 2P52-F002A/2P52-F011A.

Notifies the SRO that the Prefilter has been swapped from A to B.

700-225 alarm clears.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 5 Page 8 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 2B High Vibration requiring reducing reactor power in an attempt to clear alarm. Alarm remains in until pump is tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 18 SIMULATOR OPERATOR; At Chief Examiners direction, press (RB-5) to Min activate: mfB31_41B, Recirc Pump B High Vibration ALL

Receives PUMP MOTOR B VIBRATION HIGH, (602-204) alarm ATC

Enters 602-204

Depresses the Hi vibration reset pushbutton and determines that the alarm does NOT clear.

Notifies the SRO that the vibration alarm did NOT clear.

Notifies the SRO that the ARP requires reducing Recirc flow and attempting to reset the alarm again.

AFTER five minutes has elapsed, if Recirc Pump B is still operating, SIMULATOR OPERATOR; At Chief Examiners direction, press (RB-9) to activate: mfB31_40B, Recirc Pump B Motor High Temp.

Receives PUMP MOTOR B WINDING COOLING WATER FLOW LOW, (602-218)

Confirms RBCCW System is in operation as indicated by 2P42-R603, RBCCW Flow to Drwl indicator at 2H11-P650 panel.

ATC

Confirms winding temperatures are <240°F, on 2B31-R601, Recirc Pump Temp recorder at 2H11-P614.

IF the winding temperatures cannot be maintained < 240°F, Performs Abnormal SHUT DOWN of the ASD B per 34SO-B31-001-2, subsection 7.2.1.4, Reactor Recirculation System.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 5 Page 9 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 2B High Vibration requiring reducing reactor power in an attempt to clear alarm. Alarm remains in until pump is tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Directs the operator to reduce Rx power with Recirc per 34GO-OPS-005 and 34SO-B31-001-2, section 7.1.6, Two Loop Operation From Rated To Minimum Speed, exceeding 10 MWE/minute if necessary.

Reminds the operator that entry into the Immediate Exit Region of the SRO Power to Flow map is allowed.

Notifies Plant Management, Load Dispatcher, and Engineering that the power increase has been halted pending investigation of Recirc Pump 2B high vibration condition.

Enters the following procedures

34GO-OPS-005-2, Power Changes

34SO-B31-001-2, Recirculation System

IAW 34SO-B31-001-2, the ATC decreases Recirc pump speed by depressing the Slow, Medium or Fast LOWER pushbuttons on the Master or Individual controls.

Monitors power decrease by observing APRM and generator output indications.

ATC

Stops power reduction periodically and depresses the High vibration reset pushbutton.

The alarm will NOT remain clear until the pump is tripped.

Continues to decrease BOTH Recirc pump speeds until minimum

Notifies SRO when BOTH Recirc Pumps are at minimum.

Notifies the SRO that the vibration alarm DID NOT clear after reducing BOTH Recirc pumps.

Notifies SRO that the Region of Potential Instabilities/Immediate Exit Region of Power to Flow Map was NOT entered.

Notifies chemistry of 15% power change in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months IAW 34GO-OPS-005-2, BOP Power Changes, Step 5.2.13.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 2B High Vibration requiring reducing reactor power in an attempt to clear alarm. Alarm remains in until pump is tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: HEATER TROUBLE ALARM, (650-135) may alarm due to plant conditions.

NOTE: 15% power change sample required IAW limitation 5.2.13, 34GO-OPS-005-2.

Directs the ATC operator to shutdown the B ASD IAW 34SO-B31-001-2 section 7.2.1.4, Abnormal Recirc Pump/ASD B Shutdown.

SRO

As time allows, directs the BOP operator to secure one Condensate and one Condensate Booster Pump plus one RFPT.

Places ASD B control switch 2B31-S002B to Pull to Lock OR depresses the ASD B Shutdown pushbutton and places ASD B control switch to Pull to Lock on panel 2H11-P602.

ATC

Enters 34AB-B31-001-2, Reactor Recirculation Pump(s) Trip, Recirc Loops Flow Mismatch, Or ASD Cell Bypass, for single Recirc pump trip.

Confirms operating Recirc Pump flow is

<100% rated flow, (45,200 gpm is rated flow) AND

Core Flow to <38.5 Mlb/hr

________

Closes 2B31-F031B, Pump Discharge Valve.

TIME

________

Within 5 minutes, throttles 2B31-F031B, Pump Disch Valve OPEN TIME

Acknowledges the following annunciators:

ASD B TRIP WARNING, (602-201)

ASD B FATAL FAULT, (601-202)

ASD B TROUBLE, (601-208)

RECIRC LOOP B OUT OF SERVICE, (601-227)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 2B High Vibration requiring reducing reactor power in an attempt to clear alarm. Alarm remains in until pump is tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: IAW 34AB-B31-001-2, During single loop operation, WHEN the speed of the running pump decreases below approximately 35%

speed, positive flow through the idle pump loop due to natural circulation overcomes the negative flow due to reverse flow. The total core flow summing circuitry will continue to subtract this positive idle loop flow from the running loop flow AND give a misleading LOW core flow indication. Total core flow can be calculated by adding the JET PUMP LOOP "A" AND the JET PUMP LOOP "B" flows.

Has the operator determine if the plant is in the analyzed region of the SRO Power to Flow map.

Determines that the plant is NOT in the Immediate Exit Region of the ATC Power to Flow map.

Simulator Operator, WHEN the crew determines that the plant is NOT in the Immediate Exit Region of the Power to Flow map, with Chief Examiners permission, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Simulator Operator, IF the crew makes a conservative decision to shut down the Reactor, with Chief Examiners permission, PROCEEDS to the next event.

References Tech Spec 3.4.1.A.1 and has 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to meet requirements for SRO Single Loop Operation.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 2B High Vibration requiring reducing reactor power in an attempt to clear alarm. Alarm remains in until pump is tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Removes condensate pumps (CP & CBP) from service prior to CBP discharge pressure < 525 psig OR power <70% OR as soon as practical.

For removal of CBP

If 2C is to be removed, removes the Hydrogen Injection System from service

Sends SO to closed selected pumps discharge valve BOP

Prior to discharge valve being full closed, trips pump and places control switch in Auto or PTL

Has SO complete the procedure

Removal of CP

Sends SO to closed selected pumps discharge valve

Trips pump and places control switch in Auto or PTL

If pump left in Standby, has SO reopen discharge valve NOTE: IAW 34GO-OPS-005-2, WHEN Feedwater flow is less than 7 mlbm/HR AND two Reactor Feed Pumps are running, one Reactor Feed Pump MAY be shutdown Enters 34SO-N21-007-2, Condensate And Feedwater System, section 7.2.1, BOP First Reactor Feed Pump Shutdown and Leaving in Standby.

Confirms Feedwater Flow is less than 7 Mlbm / hr.

Confirms RFPT 2A AND RFPT 2B are in Automatic control on 2C32-R600, Master Controller.

Places 2C32-R601A (2C32-R601B), RFP A (B) M/A Station, in Manual, by depressing the 'M' pushbutton until it illuminates, panel 2H11-P603.

Slowly decrease RFPT 2A (2B) speed with RFP A (B) M/A Station until the other RFP is controlling reactor vessel level.

NOTE: At this point the operator may stop here with the RFPT NOT injecting and continue with this section as time allows.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump 2B High Vibration requiring reducing reactor power in an attempt to clear alarm. Alarm remains in until pump is tripped.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

When the other RFP has control of water level, slowly decrease RFPT 2A (2B) speed with RFP A (B) M/A Station until no speed decrease is observed AND/OR place the RFPT A (B) TMR switch to SS AND confirm Speed Setter yellow light illuminates.

Slowly lower RFPT 2A (2B) Speed Setter switch until RFPT speed is at 1000 rpm, at 2H11-P650.

IF desired, reduce the RFPT 2A (2B) speed to minimum AND allow the RFPT to windmill, provided seal water, steam seals, AND lube oil systems remain in service.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 26 Event

Description:

Stator Cooling Pump 2B (simulate sheared shaft)

Standby Stator Cooling pump 2A fails to start (manually started)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator operator, INSTRUCT the ATC operator by phone to stay on the line until told to hang up. THEN ENTER:

8 Min (RB-6) to ACTIVATE: (mfN43_158B, mfN43_148A, loN43-S47A3 (Off),

loN43-S47G1 (Off) & loN43-S47R2 (On).

When Stator Water Cooling pump 2B is tripped, responds to the following alarms:

GENERATOR INLET FLOW LOW, (651-201)

GENERATOR INLET PRESS LOW, (651-202)

BOP

GENERATOR OUTLET TEMP HIGH, (651-204)

STATOR CLG TANK WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW, (651-205)

GENERATOR PROTECTION CIRCUIT ENERGIZED, (651-206)

MAIN GENERATOR TEMPERATURE, (651-161)

TURBINE TROUBLE, (650-105)

Acknowledges the alarms and informs the SRO that the Stator Cooling system pressure and flow is low and that the 2A Stator Cooling pump BOP did NOT auto start. (2A Stator Cooling may be started manually prior to recognizing failure to auto start.) (There is NOT an obvious reason for the pressure and flow being low.)

The BOP may enter the following ARPs in any order:

Enters 651-201, Generator Inlet Flow Low, and performs the following:

Dispatches SO locally to 2N43-R303, Flow Indicator at 2N43-P001

Manually starts the 2A Stator Cooling pump BOP (May NOT pull procedure until after the pump has been started.)

Monitors for increasing system flow by 651-201 clearing.

Dispatches SO/Maint to investigate the cause of Generator Inlet Flow Low.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 26 Event

Description:

Stator Cooling Pump 2B (simulate sheared shaft)

Standby Stator Cooling pump 2A fails to start (manually started)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior The BOP may NOT enter the following once the standby pump is started.

Enters 651-202, Generator Inlet Press Low, and performs the following:

Dispatches SO locally to 2N43-R301, Pressure Indicator at 2N43-P001

Manually starts the 2A Stator Cooling pump BOP (May NOT pull procedure until after the pump has been started.)

Monitors for increasing system pressure by 651-202 clearing.

Dispatches SO/Maint to investigate the cause of Generator Inlet Pressure Low.

The BOP may NOT enter the following once the standby pump is started.

Enters GENERATOR OUTLET TEMP HIGH, (651-204) and performs the following:

Monitors Stator Cooling Outlet temp on EHC Control System monitor BOP on 2H11-P650 panel

Dispatches SO/Maint to investigate GENERATOR OUTLET TEMP HIGH alarm.

The BOP may NOT enter the following once the standby pump is started.

Enters STATOR CLG TANK WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW, (651-202)

BOP and dispatches a SO locally to determine Tank level.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 26 Event

Description:

Stator Cooling Pump 2B (simulate sheared shaft)

Standby Stator Cooling pump 2A fails to start (manually started)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior The BOP may NOT enter the following once the standby pump is started.

Enters GENERATOR PROTECTION CIRCUIT ENERGIZED, (651-206) and performs the following:

Starts 2N43-C001A Stator Clg Wtr Pump 2A BOP

IF a Main Turbine Bypass Valve begins opening, enters 34AB-C71-001-2, Scram Procedure, and SCRAM the reactor.

(NOT expected to be required)

SRO

Directs the operator to place the Stator Cooling Pump 2B pump to Trip.

Simulator Operator: ENSURE EVENT TRIGGER ET-EGN43-01 is ACTIVATED, THEN; After 3 minutes of being sent to investigate the Stator Cooling system low flow and pressure AND after the BOP has started 2A Stator Cooling pump, REPORT that the 2B Stator Cooling pump motor is running, but the pump shaft is NOT turning.

Places 2N43-C001B control switch to Trip position and reports this to the BOP SRO.

Simulator Operator, at Chief Examiners direction, starts the Major event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 26 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Reactor Auto scram fails but Manual scram works.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: At the direction of the Chief Examiner, ACTIVATES:

8 (RB-7)

Mins

mf60321350

mf60321350 Recognizes annunciators and plant conditions:

ALL

Group 1 System A/B Trip - Full Group 1, MSIV isolation

Full reactor scram REQUIRED

Assigns the ATC to perform RC-1.

Assigns the BOP operator to perform RC-2 and RC-3.

If time allows assigns TC-1 to be performed.

SRO

Enters the RC EOP flow chart, 31EO-EOP-010-2, for a scram condition AND when RWL decreases below 3 inches.

Directs RWL Band of 3 to 50 inches.

Performs RC-1 consisting of:

Inserts a manual scram.

Places the mode switch to SHUTDOWN.

Confirms all rods are inserted by observing full in lights, SPDS, or the RWM display.

Notifies SRO of rod position check.

ATC

Places SDV isolation valve switch to "isolate" & confirms closed.

If NOT tripped, places the Recirc pumps at minimum speed.

Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

Shifts recorders to read IRMS, when required.

Ranges IRMS to bring reading on scale.

Notifies the SRO when the above actions are complete.

ATC/BOP

Places MSIV switches to close on 2H11-P602 and P601 panels.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 26 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Reactor Auto scram fails but Manual scram works.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:

Confirms proper Level Control response:

Checks ECCS Injection Systems (HPCI will be ISOLATED from previous steam line break)

Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value

If Set down does NOT auto function, manually reduces FW Master Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.

When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve (

BOP 1.5 mlbm/hr), then:

Confirm/Opens 2N21-F125.

Confirms 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.

Closes 2N21-F110.

Will control RWL and with SRO permission will raise RWL to 32 to 42 inches.

When RFPTs are no longer available, will transition to RCIC to control RWL.

Starts RCIC HPCI for level control by performing the following:

BOP

RCIC, at 2H11-P602 panel:

Depresses RCIC Manual Initiation P/B

Confirms/Opens 2E51-F046

Confirms/Starts Barom Cndsr Vac Pump

Confirms/Opens 2E51-F045

Confirms/Opens 2E51-F019

Confirms/Closes 2E51-F019 at flow > 79.3 gpm

Confirms/Opens 2E51-F013

Adjusts controller for desired flow and with SRO permission will raise RWL to 32 to 42 inches

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 7 Page 19 of 26 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Reactor Auto scram fails but Manual scram works.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator When the 2B SRV is open, ENSURE EVENT TRIGGER EGB21-3 activates mfB21_128B, mfB21_130B and mfB21_286B.

Performs RC-3 consisting of:

Monitoring RPV pressure.

Confirms proper operation of pressure control system (SRVs, LLS, etc.) by performing one or more of the following:

At 2H11-P602 panel, manually cycles SRVs to maintain reactor BOP pressure within band of 1074 psig to 800 psig.

If necessary, allows RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycles any SRV to initiate LLS.

Maintains RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig until a different band is directed.

Notifies SRO of pressure control system operation.

Directs operator to enter 34AB-B21-003-2, Failure of Safety/Relief Valves.

SRO Directs operators to verify that the SRV 2B is closed, after the fuses are pulled.

NOTE: The operator may not perform some of the below steps since they are dependent on the status of 2B SRV red light when the operator addresses the open SRV.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 7 Page 20 of 26 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Reactor Auto scram fails but Manual scram works.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Notifies SRO the 2B SRV failed to close.

Enters 34AB-B21-003-2, Failure of Safety/Relief Valves.

Determines SRV 2B is cycling open then close

Cycles the SRV 2B Control Switch several times

May depress the ADS Logic A Timer Reset pushbutton (2B21-S2A)

May depress the ADS Logic B Timer Reset pushbutton (2B21-S2B)

BOP

May depress the LLS Channel A / C Reset pushbutton (2B21-S15A)

May depress the LLS Channel B / D Reset pushbutton (2B21-S15B)

Informs SRO that SRV 2B is still open and the fuses will have to be pulled.

Notifies the SSS to pull the fuses for SRV 2G. (Critical Task)

Critical Task is to remove the fuses for 2B SRV prior to exceeding >100°F/hr cooldown rate or the unsafe region of the PSP Curve.

Simulator Operator, assuming that a request was made to pull fuses for SRV 2B, wait 4 minutes, then ENTER the following:

ENTER Event Trigger EGB21-6 which will DELETE mfB21_128B and mfB21_130B AND DEPRESSES (RB-8), rfB21_301, to simulate pulling the fuses for SRV 2B.

THEN, Notify the crew that the fuses have been pulled for SRV 2B.

Confirms that SRV 2B is closed by monitoring one or more of the following:

SRV tailpipe temperature decrease on P614 panel.

Torus level stabilizing

Torus Temp stabilizing

Rx pressure returns to the pre-event level BOP

Resets the SRV leak detection by placing the Leak Detection Logic A Reset keylock switch and Leak Detection Logic B Reset keylock switch to RESET position and back to NORMAL position

Confirms that the Amber SRV indicating lights have extinguished.

SAFETY BLOWDOWN PRESSURE HIGH, (602-311), clears.

Informs the SRO that SRV 2B is closed.

Simulator Operator, at Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 7 Page 21 of 26 Event

Description:

Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Reactor Auto scram fails but Manual scram works.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 8 Page 22 of 26 Event

Description:

2B SRV tailpipe fails requiring Torus Spray or Emergency Depressurization to maintain safe region PSP curve.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Recognize increasing Containment Pressure from the following alarms:

ALL

PRIMARY CNMT HIGH PRESSURE TRIP, (603-106)

PRIMARY CNMT PRESSURE HIGH, (603-115)

SRO

Enters 31EO-EOP-012-2, Primary Containment flow chart.

At panel 2H11-P601, Confirms 4 RHR pumps and 2 Core Spray pumps are BOP running.

Per the PC flowchart, verifies Torus level is <285 inches and directs an SRO operator to place Torus Sprays in service (Critical Task) - Torus Spray is initiated or the Reactor Emergency Depressurized prior to exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure, Graph 7.

Sprays the Torus per 34SO-E11-010-2 placard on the 2H11-P601 Panel as follows:

Places Cnmt Spray Vlv Cntl switch in the Manual position.

Verifies RHR pump(s) in loop A (B) running.

Opens 2E11-F028A or B ATC

Opens 2E11-F027A or B

Throttles Open 2E11-F027A(B)

Notifies SRO that RHR is in Torus Sprays (The flow is only 700gpm, so it may be difficult to see flow indication from a distance.)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-03 Event No.: 8 Page 23 of 26 Event

Description:

2B SRV tailpipe fails requiring Torus Spray or Emergency Depressurization to maintain safe region PSP curve.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE TO EVALUATOR: It is NOT expected that an Emergency Depressurization will be required.

If Torus pressure cannot be maintained below Pressure Suppression SRO Pressure (PSP) Limits, directs ATC to Emergency Depressurize (ED).

When directed, places 7 ADS valve switches to the OPEN position on ATC panel 2H11-P602.

If Emergency Depressurized, direct BOP to ensure RHR and CS injection SRO valves open and injection occurs.

When directed, monitors RHR and CS and verifies that systems inject BOP when reactor pressure decreases below the system discharge head.

Simulator Operator:

After the crew is spraying the Torus OR Emergency Depressed for PSP concerns AND with Chief Examiners permission, TERMINATE the scenario.

Page 24 of 26 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-03 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initiating Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 56% RTP.

Turnover RFPT 2A is operating at ~1000 rpm. Continue startup and place the RFPT 2A in service, starting at step 7.1.11.2.7 of 34SO-N21-007-2. Once RFPT 2A is in service increase reactor power to 65% RTP using the Recirc System. 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Summary:

Event 1: Normal; The 2A RFPT will be placed into service.

Event 2: Reactivity; After the 2A RFPT is in service, the ATC operator will raise reactor power using the Recirc system to approximately 65% power.

Event 3: Component/TS; A HPCI steam line will break outside of Primary Containment. The outboard isolation valve is failed open and cannot be closed. Both isolation valves fail to automatically close on an automatic isolation signal and must be manually closed. (Critical Task) The SRO addresses Tech Specs for inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Valve &

ECCS.

Event 4: Component; Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi - swap Prefilters.

The operator will dispatch an SO locally to determine dP. Report back will require BOP swapping Prefilters to restore normal system flow/pressure. (OE)

Event 5: Component/TS; Recirc Pump 2B will experience high vibration requiring reducing reactor power in an attempt to clear the alarm. Alarm remains in until pump is tripped. The SRO addresses TS for an inoperable Recirc pump. The plant will NOT be operating in the Immediate Exit Region of the Power-to-Flow map.

Event 6: Component; Stator Cooling Pump 2B will experience a sheared shaft and the standby Stator Cooling pump will NOT automatically start. The operator will manually start the standby Stator Cooling pump to restore system flow/pressure to normal.

Event 7: Major; Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Auto fails to close MSIVs but Manual works.

Event 8: Component; A broken SRV B tailpipe causes Torus Pressure to increase with the failed open SRV. Torus Spray is initiated or the Reactor Emergency Depressurized prior to exceeding Pressure Suppression Pressure. (Critical Task)

Page 25 of 26 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-03 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Critical Tasks

Manually isolate the HPCI isolation valves within 5 minutes of receiving 601-115 and 601-121.

(Event 3)

Pull fuses to SRV 2B. (Event 8)

Spray the Torus or Emergency Depressurize before exceeding Primary Containment Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) curve. (Event 8)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items

1. Total Malfunctions 5-8 6 1. HPCI steam line break (Event 3)

2. Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi (Event 4)

3. Recirc Pump 2B high vibration (Event 5)

4. Stator Cooling Pump 2B sheared shaft/standby failure to start (Event 6)

5. Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Auto fails to close MSIV (Event 7)

6. Broken SRV B tailpipe (Event 8)

2. Malfunctions After 1-2 1 1. Broken SRV B tailpipe (Event 8)

EOP Entry

3. Abnormal Events 2-4 3 1. HPCI steam line break (Event 3)

2. Instrument Air System Prefilter dP Hi (Event 4)

3. Recirc Pump 2B high vibration (Event 5)

4. Major Transients 1-2 1 1. Inadvertent Group 1 Isolation, Auto fails to close MSIV (Event 7)

5. EOPs entered, 1-2 2 1. 31EO-EOP-010-2, RC Non ATWS, (Event 7) requiring substantive 2. 31EO-EOP-012-2, PC, (Event 7) actions

6. EOPs contingencies 0-2 0 1. None requiring substantive actions

7. Critical Tasks 2-3 3 1. HPCI steam line break (Event 3)

2. Pull fuses to SRV 2B. (Event 8)

3. Broken SRV B tailpipe, spray Torus (Event 8)

ILT 9 NRC FINAL Scenario 3 SHIFT TURNOVER Safety Focus UNIT 1 STATUS Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Plant Conditions: Activities in progress: 34SV-P41-001-1, Plant Service Water Pump Operability.

UNIT 2 STATUS Plant Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 59% RTP.

Protected Train: EOOS:

Division I Green Orange Division II Yellow Red RFPT 2A is operating at ~1000 rpm. Continue startup and place the RFPT 2A in service, starting at step 7.1.11.2.7 of Scheduled evolutions: 34SO-N21-007-2.

Once RFPT 2A is in service increase reactor power to 65% RTP using the Recirc System.

Surveillances due this None shift:

Inop Equipment: 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Active tagouts: 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Rod Configuration: See RWM

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-04 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 2 is operating at 65% RTP making preparations to remove 2A RFPT from service.

Turnover: Reduce reactor power to 60% RTP for RFPT 2A removal. Leave RFPT 2A operating at ~1000 RPM.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description 1 N/A R (ATC) Reduce reactor power to 60% for RFPT 2A removal.

2 N/A N (BOP) Remove 2A RFPT from service and leave operating at ~1000 RPM.

mf60131136 aoE21R600A 2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve C (BOP) 3 leakage). When 2E21-F004A is reopened, the valve breaker trips loE21-F004AG1 TS (SRO) when control switch placed to open.

loE21-F004AR2 CRD 2A pump experiences a Suction Filter hi dP requiring swapping 4 mf60311308 C (ATC) to standby pump.

C (BOP) RCIC Room fire.

5 N/A TS (SRO)

I (ATC) 6 mfB21_131 ADS Inadvertent initiation/Inhibit used. (Critical Task)

TS (SRO)

Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in Reactor Building requiring a Reactor 7 mfE41_249 M (ALL)

Manual scram. HPCI Group 3 signal failure.

M (ALL) Emergency Depress when Max Safe exceeded in more than one area.

8 N/A (Critical Task)

SULCV fails closed. Core Spray & RHR Logic failure requiring mfN21_99 manual actions for pumps/valves to inject. RPV level will be 9 mfE11_202B C (BOP) controlled either by throttling open 2N21-F110, or by using Core mfE21_202A Spray and/or RHR Systems. (Critical Task)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 27 Event

Description:

Reduce reactor power to 60% for RFPT 2A removal.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Directs ATC to decrease reactor power to 60%, to achieve a Feedwater 15 flow <7 mlbm/hr for RFPT removal, by decreasing Recirc flow. Power SRO Mins decreases should be made as recommended by the STA/Reactor Engineering at a rate NOT to exceed 10 MWe/min.

IAW 34SO-B31-001-2, the ATC decreases Recirc pump speed, NOT to exceed 10 MWE per minute by depressing the LOWER SLOW or LOWER MEDIUM pushbuttons on the Master or Individual controls until reactor power is 60%. Monitors power decrease by observing APRM and ATC generator output indications.

Monitors Total Feedwater flow to achieve Feedwater flow <7 mlbm/hr on 2C32-R604A, 2C32-R604B, and 2C32-R607.

Notifies SRO when Feedwater flow is <7 mlbm/hr.

Complies with 34SO-B31-001-2 , Limitation 5.2.15, which states:

WHEN changing Recirc pumps speed while in Two Loop operation maintain pump speeds to limit recirculation loop jet pump mismatch within the following limits:

ATC

<10% of rated core flow (7.7 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating

< 70% of rated core flow; AND

<5% of rated core flow (3.85 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating at

> 70% of rated core flow.

NOTE: May get the RBM UPSCALE, (603-202) and ROD OUT BLOCK, (603-238) alarm, if a peripheral control rod is NOT selected. This is expected and the operator may select a peripheral rod at this time.

May also get Alarm HEATER TROUBLE, 650-135 alarm. This is expected at this power level.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction OR after power has been decreased by 5%, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 2 Page 3 of 27 Event

Description:

Remove 2A RFPT from service and leave at approximately 1000 rpm.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10

Directs the BOP to remove the 2A RFPT from service IAW SRO Mins 34SO-N21-007-2, Section 7.2.1.

Confirms Feedwater Flow is less than 7 Mlbm / hr.

Confirms RFPT 2A AND RFPT 2B are in Automatic control on 2C32-R600, Master Controller.

Depresses setpoint increase button on 2C32-R600, Master Controller and raises RWL setpoint to 39 inches.

Places 2C32-R601A, RFP A M/A Station, in Manual, by depressing the

'M' pushbutton until it illuminates, panel 2H11-P603.

Slowly decreases RFPT 2A speed until RFP 2B is controlling reactor vessel level.

BOP

RFP COO5A DISCH LOW FLOW, (656-039) will alarm and is expected.

Depresses setpoint decrease button on 2C32-R600, Master Controller and lowers RWL setpoint to 37 inches.

Slowly decreases RFPT 2A speed until no speed decrease is observed and places RFPT A TMR switch to SS and confirms SPEED SETTER yellow light illuminates.

Slowly lowers RFPT 2A Speed Setter switch until RFPT speed is at 1000 rpm, at 2H11-P650.

Dispatches SO to confirm open OR open RFPT 2A drain valves on Local panel 2H21-P244 (steps 7.2.1.9).

Simulator Operator, if dispatched to confirm RFPT 2A drains, after 5 minutes, report all drain valves per step 7.2.1.9 are open.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 27 Event

Description:

2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve leakage). When 2E21-F004A is reopened, the valve breaker trips when control switch placed to open.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator enters (RB-3) malfunction mf60131136 Window 28 Core Spray A Disch Pipe Press High 5 Mins (ON) and aoE21-R600A to 465 psig. ENSURE Event Trigger EGE21-1 activates when 2E21-F004A is placed to open position.

ALL Receives CORE SPRAY A DISCH PIPE PRESS. HIGH, (601-328)

Enters CORE SPRAY A DISCH PIPE PRESS. HIGH, (601-328)

Confirms validity of alarm using Disch Press indicator, 2E21-R600A

(~465 psig)

Confirms the following valves are CLOSED

2E21-F037A, Testable Check Bypass Vlv

2E21-F005A, Inbd Discharge Vlv

Closes 2E21-F004A, Outbd Discharge Vlv

Opens 2E21-F005A BOP

Closes 2E21-F005A, to reseat

Places 2E21-F004A to open and alarm CORE SPRAY SYSTEM I VALVES OVERLOAD, (601-316), is received.

Notifies SRO of alarm (601-316) and that the lights for 2E21-F004A are extinguished.

Notifies SRO of the following TS 3.5.1 TS 3.5.2 TS 3.6.1.3

Directs operator to enter 601-316 ARP SRO

Reviews TS 3.5.1

Reviews TS 3.6.1.3.A

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 27 Event

Description:

2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve leakage). When 2E21-F004A is reopened, the valve breaker trips when control switch placed to open.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Enters CORE SPRAY SYSTEM I VALVES OVERLOAD, (601-316)

BOP

Dispatches SO/Maint. to reset the thermal overload for 2E21-F004A at MCC 2R24-S011, Frame 13A Simulator Operator, wait 4 minutes, then as an SO, report that the breaker for 2E21-F004A will NOT reset.

If asked/directed to manually break 2E21-F004A off the closed seat, report this valve will NOT move with the handwheel.

Enters TS 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, and determines:

SRO TS 3.5.1.A requires the ECCS pump to restored to operable status in 7 days.

NOTE: If addressed, 2E21-F004A is NOT a PCIV and TS 3.6.1.3 for PCIVs is not needed.

Simulator Operator, ENSURE Event Trigger EGE21-2 activates when 2E21-F015A is placed to open position. This will clear CS A Disch Press High alarm & return 2E21-R600A to normal.

IAW ARP 601-328, may perform the following:

Slightly opens 2E21-F015A to lower CS Discharge pressure

Confirms 601-328 clears BOP

When pressure is approximately 100 psig, closes 2E21-F015A.

If CORE SPRAY A JOCKEY PUMP SYS WATER LEVEL LOW, (601-303), is received directs an SO to vent the A Loop of Core Spray IAW 34SV-SUV-017-2.

Monitors Core Spray A Loop pressure for subsequent increases.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 27 Event

Description:

2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve leakage). When 2E21-F004A is reopened, the valve breaker trips when control switch placed to open.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: If pressure is NOT relieved, then a follow-up question on PCIV leakage TS 3.6.1.3.D may be appropriate.

NOTE: If pressure IS relieved on Core Spray Loop A, and pressure is NOT monitored, then a follow-up question on a high pressure condition of the inner system piping may be appropriate.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 4 Page 7 of 27 Event

Description:

CRD 2A pump experiences a Suction Filter hi dP requiring swapping to standby pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator ENTERS (RB-4) 10 Min mf60311308, CRD Pump A Suction Filter Diff Press Hi, alarm.

Receives CRD PUMP A SUCTION FILTER DIFF PRESS HIGH, (603-120), alarm.

ATC

Confirms CRD system flow is < 59 gpm.

Dispatches SO locally to check 2C11-dPIS-N015A indicates higher than 9.0 psi Simulator Operator, AFTER 3 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO/ATC, as an SO, that 2C11-dPIS-N015A indicates 12.0 psi.

Simulator Operator, AFTER giving report to SRO/ATC, IF SRO directs shifting CRD suction filters INSTEAD of swapping CRD pumps, THEN as Shift Manager, DIRECT the SRO to swap CRD pumps.

Dispatches Maintenance to investigate 2A CRD Suction Filter dP high.

SRO

After SO report, directs ATC to shift CRD pumps IAW 34SO-C11-005-2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 27 Event

Description:

CRD 2A pump experiences a Suction Filter hi dP requiring swapping to standby pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: The ATC may direct the CRD pump room coolers to be swapped or may elect to leave the 2T41-B001B cooler in service. Both are acceptable.

Simulator Operator, After being dispatched to confirm valves listed in step 7.1.3.1.2 are open, report valves are open.

IAW 34SO-C11-005-2, 7.1.3, Shifting CRD Pumps, performs the following:

Dispatches SO to confirm cooling water valves listed in step 7.1.3.1.2 are open.

Confirms a CRD Room Cooler is in operation per 34SO-T41-002-2, CRD Pump Room Ventilation System by performing the following:

Confirms 2T41-B001B is in Run (may direct BOP to confirm)

ATC OR

Places control switch for 2T41-B001A, in Run (P657)

(may direct BOP to perform).

Places 2T41-B001B, CRD Pump Room Cooler, in Off (P654)

(may direct BOP to perform).

Places 2T41-B001B, CRD Pump Room Cooler, in Auto (P654)

(may direct BOP to perform).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 27 Event

Description:

CRD 2A pump experiences a Suction Filter hi dP requiring swapping to standby pump.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, when dispatched to open the below valves and to vent the 2B CRD pump, wait 3 minutes and notify the ATC the below valves are open and the 2B CRD pump has been vented and the vent valves are closed. If asked, INFORM the operator 2C11-F006 is closed.

Also ENSURE Event Trigger EGC11-5 DELETES 2A CRD Suction Filter dP High alarm when 2A CRD pump is secured.

Dispatches SO to confirm open the following valves and to vent the 2B CRD pump:

2C11-F118B, CRD Pump 2B Suction Valve

2C11-F114B, Suction Filter 2B Outlet Isolation

2C11-F115B, Suction Filter 2B Inlet Isolation

Starts 2C11-C001B, 2B CRD Pump, at P603.

Confirms flow control valve responds properly by controlling system flow ATC between 30 gpm to 50 gpm.

Stops 2C11-C001A, 2A CRD Pump, at P603.

Dispatches SO to confirm closed 2C11-F117, CRD Suction Crosstie.

Confirms system parameters are in their normal ranges per NOTE in System Startup section of 34SO-C11-005-2.

May receive MULTIPOINT TEMP RCDR 2T41-R620 TEMP HIGH, (654-004). This is expected for this plant condition and will subsequently clear.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR; At Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC Room fire.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator 11 With Chief Examiners direction, NOTIFY the Shift Supervisor, as the SO on Mins rounds, that smoke is coming from the Unit 2 RCIC room and you cannot see what is actually burning. You are leaving the area.

Directs BOP to enter 34AB-X43-001-2, Fire Procedure and make the SRO announcement.

Enters 34AB-X43-001-2, Fire Procedure and performs the following:

Sounds the fire alarm (SIREN) over the plant PA system, (repeats 2 times - may get U1 operator to handle repeats).

BOP

Notifies Rad Waste Control room that Reactor Building floor drain sump pumps are in Automatic.

Notifies Radiation Protection to respond to the fire area.

Transitions to section 8.0 for Fire in Reactor Bldg.

Stops the following equipment at Panels 2H11-P654 & P657:

2T41-C001A, Rx Bldg Supply Fan.

2T41-C001B, Rx Bldg Supply Fan.

2T41-C007A, Rx Bldg Exhaust Fan.

2T41-C007B, Rx Bldg Exhaust Fan.

2T41-C002A, Refuel Flr Vent Supply Fan.

BOP

2T41-C002B, Refuel Flr Vent Supply Fan.

2T41-C005A, Refuel Flr Vent Exh Fan.

2T41-C005B, Refuel Flr Vent Exh Fan.

Acknowledges annunciators at Panels 2H11-P654 & P657:

REFUELING FLOOR OUTSIDE AIR DIFF PRESS LOW, (657-001)

RB INSIDE TO OUTSIDE AIR DIFF PRESS LOW, (654-001)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC Room fire.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Transitions to section 8.3 for Fire in North Half of Reactor Bldg below 185 ft.

Transitions to section 8.3.4 for Fire in RCIC Corner Room

Places 2T41-B004A RCIC Pump Rm Cooler in Off, P657.

BOP

Places 2T41-B004B RCIC Pump Rm Cooler in Off, P654.

Closes the following RCIC Valves on P602

2E51-F007

2E51-F008 Simulator Operator, ONCE the above RCIC valves are closed, NOTIFY the Shift Supervisor that the fire in the RCIC room is OUT. Various RCIC components are severely damaged. Ventilation can be restored to normal EXCEPT for the RCIC Room Coolers.

Announces to the crew the fire is out.

Refers to TS for RCIC inoperability;

3.5 ECCS and RCIC System

3.5.3 RCIC System SRO Enters a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months RAS per TS 3.5.3.A.1 to verify by admin means HPCI is operable and per TS 3.5.3.A.2 to restore RCIC to operable status within 14 days.

As time allows, Refers to TRM 3.7.2.D.1, ECCS and RCIC Room Coolers and immediately declares RCIC INOP.

Directs BOP to start Rx Bldg Ventilation System and RF Floor Ventilation SRO System.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 5 Page 12 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC Room fire.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Starts Rx Bldg Ventilation IAW 34SO-T41-005-2, Section 7.1

Momentarily Depresses the following pushbuttons:

BOP

2T41-SR1, Rx Bldg Supply Fans Reset.

2T41-SR3, Rx Bldg Recirc Fan 2T41-B017 Reset at 2H11-P657.

2T41-D005, Reactor Building Filter, Deluge reset at 2H11-P657.

Requests Unit 1 operator to depress:

1T41/2T41, Rx Bldg/Rf Flr Isol Dmpr Reset A pushbutton, at BOP 1H11-P657.

1T41/2T41, Rx Bldg/Rf Flr Isol Dmpr reset B pushbutton, at 1H11-P654.

Confirms OPEN the following dampers:

2T41-F028, Rx Bldg Vent Filter D005 Inlet Damper at 2H11-P657.

2T41-F044A, Rx Bldg Inboard Isol Dampers Inaccessible Areas Exhaust Fans Disch at 2H11-P657.

2T41-F044B, Rx Bldg Outboard Isol Dampers Inaccessible Areas BOP Exhaust Fans Disch at 2H11-P654.

Places in RUN 2T41-C007A, Rx Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan at 2H11-P657.

Places in STBY 2T41-C007B, Rx Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan at 2H11-P657.

Confirms:

in RUN 2T41-B017, Fan 1(Fan 2) Rx Bldg Recirc at 2H11-P657.

in STBY 2T41-B017, Fan 2(Fan 1) Rx Bldg Recirc at 2H11-P657.

BOP

OPEN/OPEN 2T41-F011A, Rx Bldg Inboard Isol Dampers Supply Fans Disch at 2H11-P657.

OPEN/OPEN 2T41-F011B, Rx Bldg Outboard Isol Dampers Supply Fans Disch, at 2H11-P654.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 5 Page 13 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC Room fire.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Aligns fan in:

RUN 2T41-C001A OR 2T41-C001B, Rx Bldg Supply Fan.

STBY 2T41-C001B OR 2T41-C001A, Rx Bldg Supply Fan.

BOP

Verifies Rx Bldg Vent Exhaust Flow approximately 6.5 KCFM as indicated by the green pen on 2T41-R618 located on 2H11-P657.

Verifies Rx Bldg Vent Supply Flow approximately 5.3 KCFM as indicated by the red pen on 2T41-R618, flow recorder, located on 2H11-P657.

Verifies flow is maintaining 0.25 inches water pressure on BOP 2T46-DPR-R604A&B.

Sends SO to verify setpoints of local temperature controllers.

Verifies in RUN fan:

2T41-B007, Rx Bldg Cooler Working Floor EL 130 North

2T41-B008, Rx Bldg Cooler Working Floor EL 130 South

2T41-B026, Rx Bldg Primary Cooler Mn Steam Pipe Chase

2T41-B010, Rx Bldg Cooler Equip Room EL 164

2T41-B011, Rx Bldg Cooler Operating Floor EL 185

2T41-B014, Rx Bldg Cooler RWCU Pmp/Hx EL 158

2T41-B015, Rx Bldg Cooler Operating Floor EL 185

2T41-B016, Rx Bldg Cooler Working Floor EL 203

Verifies in AUTO 2T41-B009, Rx Bldg Secondary Cooler Mn. Steam Pipe Chase.

Starts RF Floor Ventilation IAW 34SO-T41-006-2, Section 7.1

Requests Unit 1 operator to depress:

1T41/2T41, Rx Bldg/Rf Flr Isol Dmpr Reset A pushbutton, at 1H11-BOP P657.

1T41/2T41, Rx Bldg/Rf Flr Isol Dmpr reset B pushbutton, at 1H11-P654.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 5 Page 14 of 27 Event

Description:

RCIC Room fire.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Momentarily Depresses the following pushbuttons:

2T41-SR2, RF Floor Vent Reset.

BOP

2T41-PB2, Refueling Floor Exh Fil Train 2T41-D007, Deluge reset

2T41-PB3, Refueling Floor Exh Fil Train 2T41-D008, Deluge reset

Dispatches SO to perform steps 7.1.5 through 7.1.9.

Confirms OPEN 2T41-F004A, Spent Fuel Pool Area Damper

OPENS 2T41-F004C, Refuel Floor Area Damper.

Confirms OPEN the following dampers:

BOP

2T41-F023A, Flr Isol Dmprs Exhaust Fans Suction, at 2H11-P657.

2T41-F023B, Flr Isol Dmprs Exhaust Fans Suction, at 2H11-P654.

2T41-F003A, Refuel Flr Isol Dmprs Supply Fans Disch, at 2H11-P657.

2T41-F003B, Refuel Flr Supply Fans Disch Outboard Isol Damper, at 2H11-P654.

Places in RUN 2T41-C005A, Refuel Flr Vent Exh Fan at 2H11-P657.

Places in RUN 2T41-C002A, Refuel Flr Vent Supply Fan at 2H11-P657.

Places in STBY 2T41-C005B, Refuel Flr Vent Exh Fan at 2H11-P657.

Places in STBY 2T41-C002B, Refuel Flr Vent Supply Fan at BOP 2H11-P657.

Verifies RF Vent Exhaust Flow approximately 30.0 KCFM as indicated by the purple pen on 2T41-R618 located on 2H11-P657.

Verifies RF Vent Supply Flow approximately 5.3 KCFM as indicated by the blue pen on 2T41-R618, flow recorder, located on 2H11-P657.

Verifies flow is maintaining 0.25 inches water pressure on 2T46-DPR-R604A&B.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 27 Event

Description:

ADS Inadvertent initiation/Inhibit used.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator, phone the BOP and 10 instruct the BOP operator to stay on the line until told to hang up, THEN Mins enters (RB-6) malfunction mfB21_131 Inadvertent ADS Initiation.

Identifies ADS is about to initiate and observe the following alarms:

ALL

AUTO BLOW DOWN TIMERS INITIATED, (602-306)

AUTO BLOW DOWN RELAYS ENERGIZED, (602-318)

ATC

Acknowledges the alarms and reports them to the SRO.

May observe the ADS timer on SPDS begin counting down.

Directs ATC to enter the following:

SRO

AUTO BLOW DOWN TIMERS INITIATED, (602-306)

AUTO BLOW DOWN RELAYS ENERGIZED, (602-318)

34AB-E10-001-2, Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS/RCIC NOTE: The SRO may direct the ATC to inhibit ADS prior to pulling the 34AB-E10-001-2, Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS/RCIC.

Enters 34AB-E10-001-2

Monitors plant parameters to determine extent of ECCS/RCIC ATC actuations.

At SRO direction, inhibits ADS using 2B21C-S7A & S7B, ADS Auto Logic Inhibit Switches, on 2H11-P602.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 27 Event

Description:

ADS Inadvertent initiation/Inhibit used.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO

Directs ATC to inhibit ADS

If ADS Timer on SPDS is approaching Zero (0), the ATC may depress the ADS Logic Timer pushbuttons prior to inhibiting ADS.

ATC

Places ADS Inhibit switches to INHIBIT prior to the valves opening to prevent exceeding >100°F cooldown rate. (Critical Task)

SRO

Dispatches Maintenance to determine problem with ADS logic.

NOTE: The SRO may enter TS 3.3.5.1. F & G and declare all ADS valves inoperable if the ADS instrumentation is NOT repaired in one hour.

Without more information on failed instruments, a follow-up question to the SRO may be required to determine this TS call.

While determining the extent of ADS failures, enters TS 3.3.5.1-1 Item 4 and:

SRO

Enters TS 3.5.1.E and declares ALL ADS valves inop immediately.

With all ADS valves inop, be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and <150 psig Rx press in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 27 Event

Description:

Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in the Reactor Building.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 10 At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator operator, ENTER (RB-7)

Min mfE41_249, HPCI Steam Line, break 20/1.

Receives the following annunciators (~40 seconds):

PANEL 2H11-P654 SYSTEM TROUBLE, (650-214)

DRYWELL/TORUS RCDR R627 TEMP HIGH, (650-204)

MULTIPOINT TEMP RCDR 2T41-R620 TEMP HIGH, (654-004)

MULTIPOINT TEMP RCDR 2T41-R626 TEMP HIGH, (657-025)

ALL

Receives the following ~60 seconds later:

LEAK DET DIFF TEMP HIGH, (601-321)

HPCI TURBINE TRIP SOLENOID ENERGIZED, (601-109)

HPCI ISOLATION TRIP LOGIC A INITIATED, (601-115)

HPCI ISOL TIMER INITIATED, (601-105)

HPCI ISOLATION TRIP LOGIC B INITIATED, (601-121)

Orders BOP to evaluate leak detection alarms on 2H11-P601.

Orders HPCI to be isolated.

SRO

Orders BOP to evacuate the Reactor Building.

May notify Maintenance for assistance in closing HPCI valves if ATC/BOP does NOT.

Responds to HPCI alarms

Observes HPCI Isolation valves have failed to close.

Places 2E41-F002, HPCI Isolation valve switch to Close.

ATC/BOP

Places 2E41-F003, HPCI Isolation valve switch to Close.

Notifies SRO of HPCI valve failures.

May notify Maintenance for assistance in closing HPCI valves if SRO does NOT.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 27 Event

Description:

Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in the Reactor Building.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Respond to annunciator LEAK DET DIFF TEMP HIGH, (601-321).

Addresses 2G31-R604 OR 2G31-R608 on 2H11-P614.

Identifies the following points on R604 increasing:

109, HPCI EMER AREA CLR is ~115°F

111, RCIC AREA CLR is ~ 89°F

113, TORUS NW WALL is ~ 92°F

114, TORUS SE WALL is ~ 118°F

115, TORUS VENT AIR DIFF is ~ 12°F

116, TORUS VENT AIR DIFF is ~ 38°F

117, HPCI PIPE PEN RM ~ 135°F BOP

Identifies the following points on R608 increasing:

109, HPCI PMP RM is ~110°F

110, HPCI EMER AREA CLR is ~ 110°F

115, TORUS WEST WALL is ~ 95°F

116, TORUS NE WALL is ~ 120°F

117, TORUS VENT AIR DIFF is ~ 15°F

118, TORUS VENT AIR DIFF is ~ 38°F

121, HPCI PIPE PEN RM ~ 140°F

Reports temperatures to the SRO.

Enters the SC flow chart.

Progresses down each path.

Proceeds down the SC/T path, directing:

All available area coolers are operated SRO

Operate the refueling floor ventilation

Operate the reactor building ventilation

Isolate all systems discharging into the area except those needed for ACC, shutdown the reactor, suppress a fire, maintain primary containment

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 7 Page 19 of 27 Event

Description:

Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in the Reactor Building.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Orders the reactor shutdown due to Max Safe operating temperatures or SRO delta temps since a primary system (HPCI) is discharging into Secondary Containment.

Assigns the ATC to perform RC-1.

Assigns the BOP operator to perform RC-2 and RC-3.

SRO

Enters 31EO-EOP-010-2, RC EOP flow chart if RWL decreases below 3 inches or if any area exceeds Max Safe.

Directs RWL Band of 3 to 50 inches.

Performs RC-1 consisting of:

Inserts a manual scram.

Places the mode switch to SHUTDOWN.

Confirms all rods are inserted by observing full in lights, SPDS, or the RWM display.

Notifies SRO of rod position check.

ATC

Places SDV isolation valve switch to "isolate" & confirms closed.

If NOT tripped, places the Recirc pumps at minimum speed.

Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

Shifts recorders to read IRMS, when required.

Ranges IRMS to bring reading on scale.

Notifies the SRO when the above actions are complete.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 7 Page 20 of 27 Event

Description:

Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in the Reactor Building.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:

Confirms proper Level Control response:

Checks ECCS Injection Systems (will NOT be in service if RWL >-35 inches)

Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value

If Set down does NOT auto function, manually reduces FW Master BOP Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.

When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve

( 1.5 mlbm/hr), then:

Confirms/Opens 2N21-F125.

Confirms/places 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.

Closes 2N21-F110.

If RFPTs are no longer available, will transition to CBPs.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 7 Page 21 of 27 Event

Description:

Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in the Reactor Building.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Performs RC-3 consisting of:

Monitoring RPV pressure.

Confirms proper operation of pressure control system (TBV, LLS, etc.), at 2H11-P650 panel, by confirming TBVs are responding to control reactor pressure at the desired pressure setpoint.

Maintains RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig until a different band is directed.

Notifies SRO of pressure control system operation.

If SRO orders a lower reactor pressure band, enters Attachment 11 of 34SO-N30-001-2, Main Turbine, or 34GO-OPS-013-2, Normal Plant Shutdown, and at the DEHC panel computer, performs ONE of the following:

1. Throttle Pressure Set

Selects the Control psi- load screen

Selects the *Ramp Rate* button

Enters a ramp rate

Selects the *Pressure* button BOP

Enters desired target pressure

2. Bypass Valve Jack Positioning

Control BPV position by intermittently using the *Raise* /

Lower* buttons until BYPASS VALVE JACK STATUS changes to *ACTIVE* AND desired cooldown rate is established

If SRO orders Anticipate Emergency Depress, then the operator will perform the following:

At P650 HMI screen,

Selects Control

Selects Bypass Valve

Inserts Ramp Rate of 100 then OK

Inserts BPV position of 100 then OK

Ensures Bypass Valve Jack Status is Active (controlling)

Notifies SRO that Bypass Valves are opening NOTE: Event 8 CRITICAL TASK will be considered MET if the reactor is depressurized through Anticipating Emergency Depress.

May order a lower than 800 psig Reactor pressure band.

SRO

May direct an operator to perform Rx Power, Level, and Pressure control, so that the other operator can address Secondary Containment parameters.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 8 Page 22 of 27 Event

Description:

Emergency Depress when Max Safe exceeded in more than one area.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Provides periodic updates on temperature readings and delta temp readings to the SRO (~14 minutes).

Reports R604 points 109 & 114 are above Max Safe.

ATC

Reports R608 points 109 & 116 are above Max Safe.

When a second temperature or delta temp exceeds Max Safe levels, informs the SRO.

May order a lower Reactor pressure band to reduce the driving head.

SRO

Transitions to CP-1 and orders 7 ADS valves open for Emergency Depress.

Places the switches for 7 ADS valves in the open position.

(Critical Task - Open 7 SRVs when Max Safe exceeded in more than one area. Critical task is met when at least 5 SRVs have been opened).

This Critical task will be considered met if the reactor is depressurized through Anticipating Emergency Depress from Event 7.

The amber lights for the SRVs will NOT illuminate if pressure has been reduced to below approximately 300 psig. In this case the ATC/BOP operator must use 2H11-P614 recorder indication to monitor tail pipe temperatures for the SRVs to verify the valves actually opened (Recorder 2B21-R614).

Depending on Reactor Water Level prior to opening ADS valves, RWL may swell to above 60 inches, requiring the operator to enter 34AB-C32-001-2, Reactor Water Level Above 60 inches.

Operator secures all injection other than CRD.

Simulator Operator, the NEXT event will be activated as Reactor pressure decreases.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 9 Page 23 of 27 Event

Description:

SULCV fails closed. RPV level will be controlled either by throttling open 2N21-F110, or by using a Core Spray and/or a Residual Heat Removal systems.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, At the Chief Examiners direction AND AFTER the ADS valves have been opened (Event 8); when Reactor pressure is < 500 psig, ENSURE ET-EGB21-5 INSERTS mfN21_99, SULCV fails closed.

(Critical Task) - Throttle open 2N21-F110 for vessel injection to maintain RWL greater than -185 inches.

If 2N21-F110 is NOT used, then a NEW Critical Task will be to align RHR/Core Spray systems for vessel injection to maintain RWL greater than

-185 inches.

EITHER IS ACCEPTABLE.

The BOP recognizes the SULCV has failed closed.

Performs ONE or MORE of the following to inject water into the reactor.

BOP

Throttles open Condensate System, 2N21-F110, and injects water into the reactor (Critical Task).

NOTE: mfE11_202A (LOCA Signal failure) inserted at beginning.

BOP will start 2B Core Spray due to Event 3.

OR

Starts 2B Core Spray Pump. (Critical Task)

Confirm discharge pressure >265 psig.

Confirm 2E21-F031B closes when flow >950 gpm.

Confirm a CS and RHR room cooler automatically starts.

When RPV pressure is <425 psig, throttles open 2E21-F005B.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-04 Event No.: 9 Page 24 of 27 Event

Description:

SULCV fails closed. RPV level will be controlled either by throttling open 2N21-F110, or by using a Core Spray and/or a Residual Heat Removal systems.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: mfE11_202B (LOCA Signal failure) inserted at beginning.

OR

At panel 2H11-P601, Confirms the 4 RHR pumps did NOT auto start and ONLY 2 Core Spray pumps are running.

Notifies SRO of RHR pump logic failure and starts (Critical Task) is met if one RHR pump is started) the 4 RHR pumps.

When RPV pressure is <425 psig, throttles open 2E11-F015A (B).

Reports SULCV problem to the SRO.

With Chief Examiners Permission, the Scenario will be terminated when reactor water is being controlled following the Emergency Depressurization, with reactor pressure below 50 psig or as directed by the Chief Examiner.

Page 25 of 27 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-04 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initiating Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 65% RTP making preparations to remove 2A RFPT from service.

Turnover Reduce reactor power to 60% RTP for RFPT 2A removal. Leave RFPT 2A operating at ~1000 RPM.

Summary:

Event 1: Reactivity: The ATC will reduce reactor power to ~60% RTP via Recirc to achieve

<7 mlbm/hr for 2A RFPT removal from service.

Event 2: Normal; After reactor power is reduced, the BOP will remove the 2A RFPT from service and leave rotating at approximately 1000 rpm.

Event 3: Component/TS; 2A Loop of Core Spray experiences high discharge pressure (valve leakage). When 2E21-F004A control switch is placed to open, the valve breaker trips causing the 2A CS Loop to be inop.

Event 4: Component; The CRD 2A pump experiences a Suction Filter dP High requiring swapping to standby pump IAW System Operating procedure.

Event 5: Component/TS; RCIC Room fire.

Event 6: Instrument/TS; The ADS System will experience an inadvertent initiation which will require the ATC to place the ADS Inhibit switches to INHIBIT prior to the valves opening to prevent exceeding >100°F cooldown rate. (Critical Task) ADS will be inop.

Event 7: Major; Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in Reactor Building requiring a Reactor Manual scram.

Event 8: Major; Since a HPCI Group 3 signal failure exists an Emergency Depress when > Max Safe in more than one area. (Critical Task)

Event 9: Component; SULCV fails closed. Core Spray & RHR Logic failure. RPV level will be controlled either by throttling open 2N21-F110, or by using a Core Spray and/or a RHR Systems. (Critical Task)

Page 26 of 27 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-04 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Critical Tasks

The ADS System will experience an inadvertent initiation which will require the ATC to place the ADS Inhibit switches to INHIBIT prior to the valves opening to prevent exceeding >100°F cooldown rate. (Event 6)

Emergency Depress when > Max Safe in more than one area. (Event 8)

SULCV fails closed. RPV level will be controlled either by throttling open 2N21-F110, or by using a Core Spray and/or a RHR Systems. (Event 9)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items

1. Total Malfunctions 5-8 6 1. CS press high/breaker tripped (Event 3)

2. CRD 2A Suction Filter dP High (Event 4)

3. RCIC Room fire. (Event 5)

4. ADS System inadvertent initiation (Event 6)

5. Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in RB (Event 7)

6. SULCV fails closed. Core Spray & RHR Logic failure (Event 9)

2. Malfunctions After 1-2 1 1. SULCV fails closed. Core Spray & RHR Logic EOP Entry failure (Event 8)

3. Abnormal Events 2-4 3 1. RCIC Room fire. (Event 5)

2. ADS System inadvertent initiation (Event 6)

3. Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in RB (Event 7)

4. Major Transients 1-2 2 1. Unisolable HPCI Steam leak in RB (Event 7)

2. Emergency Depress when > one area Max Safe (Event 8)

5. EOPs entered, 1-2 2 1. 31EO-EOP-014-2. SC/RR (Event 7) requiring substantive 2. 31EO-EOP-010-2, RC Non ATWS (Event 7) actions

6. EOPs contingencies 0-2 1 1. 31EO-EOP-015-2, CP-1 (Event 8) requiring substantive actions

7. Critical Tasks 2-3 3 1. ADS System inadvertent initiation (Event 6)

2. Emergency Depress when > one area Max Safe (Event 8)

3. SULCV fails closed. Core Spray & RHR Logic failure (Event 9)

ILT 9 NRC FINAL Scenario 4 SHIFT TURNOVER Safety Focus UNIT 1 STATUS Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Plant Conditions:

Activities in progress: Maintaining Rated Thermal Power UNIT 2 STATUS Unit 2 is operating at 65% RTP making preparations to remove Plant Conditions:

2A RFPT from service.

Protected Train: EOOS:

Division I Green Orange Division II Yellow Red Reduce reactor power to 60% RTP for RFPT 2A removal.

Scheduled evolutions:

Leave RFPT 2A operating at ~1000 RPM.

Surveillances due this None shift:

Inop Equipment: None Active tagouts: None Rod Configuration: See RWM

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-05 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 2 is operating at 70% RTP. RHR Loop B is operating in Torus Cooling Mode due to a recently performed HPCI surveillance. 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Turnover: IAW 34SO-E11-010-2, lower Torus water level to 147.5 inches, and then increase reactor power to 75%.

Event Malf. No. Event Event No. Type* Description N/A N (BOP) Lower Torus level to 147.5 inches using RHR Loop 2B 1 TS (SRO) IAW 34SO-E11-010-2, Step 7.4.5.1.

2 N/A R (ATC) Raise Reactor power to 75% using Recirc.

CRD Flow Controller fails in Auto requiring manual operation to re-3 mfC11_299 C (ATC) establish CRD flow.

C (BOP) SRV 2B21-F013G opens. The SRV will close after the ATC cycles 4 mfB21_130G TS (SRO) the control switch IAW AB section. (Critical Task)

N/A C (ATC) System Operator reports Condensate Booster pump B has an oil 5 leak, Standby pump must be started, B shutdown.

mfR25_186 C (BOP) Instrument Bus 2B breaker trips open, crosstie to return to service.

6 TS (SRO) mfC71_59 Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS (Power/Level Control, insert control 7 M (ALL) mfC11_211 rods and injecting SBLC. (Critical Task) 8 mfC41_240A C (ALL) SBLC first pump fails to inject, second pump works.

mfC41_240B diE51_S33 RCIC Manual Initiation PB fails mfE51_109 9 C (BOP) RCIC/HPCI fails to Auto start on low level/hi DW pressure. Manual mfE41_235A actions required for injection. (Critical Task) mfE41_235B

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 29 Event

Description:

Lower Torus level to 147.5 inches using RHR Loop 2B IAW 34SO-E11-010-2, Step 7.4.5.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 12

Directs the operator to lower Torus water level to 147.5 using B loop of SRO Min RHR.

Simulator Operator, when requested, INFORM as the Radwaste Operator that the Waste Surge Tank level is 6% and is available to receive Torus water level.

Enters 34SO-E11-010-2, Residual Heat Removal System, at step 7.4.5.1.

Confirms Radwaste is capable of receiving the water to be transferred.

Confirms the RHR discharge water temperature is < 200°F, 2T47-R627, point 3.

Opens 2E11-F049, RHR to Radwaste Valve.

BOP

Monitors Torus level on 2T48-R607A (B), 2H11-P602 (2H11-P654).

Throttles OPEN, 2E11-F040, RHR to Radwaste Valve.

Notifies SRO to refer to:

SPECIAL REQUIREMENT 4.3.2 of 34SO-E11-010-2 and TS 3.5.1, 3.6.2.3, 3.6.2.4, & 3.6.2.5.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 1 Page 3 of 29 Event

Description:

Lower Torus level to 147.5 inches using RHR Loop 2B IAW 34SO-E11-010-2, Step 7.4.5.1.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Reviews SPECIAL REQUIREMENT 4.3.2 of 34SO-E11-010-2 and TS 3.5.1, 3.6.2.3, 3.6.2.4, & 3.6.2.5.

SRO Declares RHR Loop 2B inoperable since 2E11-F040 & 2E11-F049 are open.

Reviews TS 3.5.1, ECCS/RCIC.

IAW TS 3.5.1 Condition A,

Declares one low pressure ECCS inoperable (Loop 2B), and must restore to operable status within 7 days.

IAW 3.6.2.3 Condition A,

Declares one RHR Suppression pool cooling system inoperable (Loop 2B), and must restore to operable status within 7 days.

SRO

IAW 3.6.2.4 Condition A,

Declares one RHR Suppression pool spray system inoperable (Loop 2B), and must restore to operable status within 7 days.

IAW 3.6.2.5 Condition A,

Declares one RHR drywell spray system inoperable (Loop 2B), and must restore to operable status within 7 days.

Once 2E11-F040 & 2E11-F049 are closed, exits the above RAS.

Monitors Torus water level and once level has been lowered to approximately 147.5 secures the flow path.

Closes 2E11-F040, RHR to Radwaste Valve.

Closes 2E11-F049, RHR to Radwaste Valve.

BOP

Notifies SRO 2E11-F040 & 2E11-F049 are now closed.

Reports to the SRO that Torus water level has been lowered to 147.5.

As time allows, notifies Radwaste Operator that Torus lowering is complete.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 2 Page 4 of 29 Event

Description:

Raise Reactor power to 75% using Recirc.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Directs ATC to increase reactor power to 75% by increasing Recirc flow.

10 Min SRO Power increases are NOT to exceed 10 MWe/min.

NOTE: May get the RBM UPSCALE, (603-202) and ROD OUT BLOCK, (603-238) alarm, if a peripheral control rod is NOT selected. This is expected and the operator may select a peripheral rod at this time.

May also get Alarm HEATER TROUBLE, (650-135), alarm. This is expected at this power level.

IAW 34SO-B31-001-2 (step 7.1.5) & 34GO-OPS-005-2, the ATC increases Recirc pump speed, NOT to exceed 10 MWE per minute by depressing the RAISE SLOW or RAISE MEDIUM pushbuttons on the Master (P603 panel) or Individual controls (P602 panel) until reactor power is 75%.

ATC

If using Individual Controls, pump speed increases will alternate between the A & B Recirc pumps to prevent excessive flow mismatches.

Monitors power increase by observing APRM and generator output indications.

Complies with 34SO-B31-001-2 , Limitation 5.2.15, which states:

WHEN changing Recirc pumps speed while in Two Loop operation maintain pump speeds to limit recirculation loop jet pump mismatch within the following limits:

ATC

<10% of rated core flow (7.7 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating

< 70% of rated core flow; AND

<5% of rated core flow (3.85 E6 lbm/hr) WHEN operating at

> 70% of rated core flow.

ATC Notifies the SRO that reactor power has been increased to 75%.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 3 Page 5 of 29 Event

Description:

CRD Flow Controller fails in Auto requiring manual operation to re-establish CRD flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior At the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator Operator ENTERS (RB-3) 10 Min mfC11_299, CRD Flow Control Fails Low.

Receives CRD HYD TEMP HIGH, (603-140) alarm.

Determines that the CRD Flow Control Valve A has closed.

Determines 2C11-R600, CRD Flow Controller, output is at minimum and ATC has failed downscale.

Notifies SRO that the CRD Flow Controller has failed downscale.

Notifies I & C (if SRO does NOT) to investigate 2C11-R600.

Enters:

CRD HYD TEMP HIGH, (603-140)

34AB-C11-001-2, Loss Of CRD System ATC

Places 2C11-R600 controller in Manual.

Increases output of controller until CRD flow is approximately 50 gpm.

Dispatches I & C to investigate 2C11-R600.

SRO

Dispatches a SO to monitor CRD drive temperatures.

Directs operator to perform actions of the ARP and 34AB-C11-001-2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 3 Page 6 of 29 Event

Description:

CRD Flow Controller fails in Auto requiring manual operation to re-establish CRD flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, if asked, AFTER 3 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO, as an SO, that 2C11-R600 FCV does NOT have any air leaks and appears to be functioning properly.

Simulator Operator, if asked, AFTER 5 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO, as I&C, that 2C11-R600 FCV appears to be functioning properly with a zero signal going to the FCV and the FCV is closed.

Simulator Operator, if asked to swap FCV, AFTER 5 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO, as I&C, that 2C11-R600 FCV is receiving a zero signal from the controller and it appears the flow controller is malfunction.

Simulator Operator, if ATC has placed after 5 minutes from being dispatched, report to the SRO, as I&C, that 2C11-R600 controller has malfunctioned and will need repair.

When requested and if the CRD HYD TEMP HIGH, (603-140) alarm is still illuminated, Simulator Operator, as SO checking CRD Temps, reports that 2 CRD drives are >250°F. 30-11 at 260°F, 22-35 at 265°F and some others are slowly increasing.

If CRD HYD TEMP HIGH, (603-140) alarm is NOT illuminated, Simulator Operator, as SO checking CRD Temps, reports that 2 CRD drives had been

>250°F but are now below 250°F and trending down.

Simulator Operator, with Chief Examiners permission, PROCEEDS to Event 4 to run in parallel with Event 3.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 3 Page 7 of 29 Event

Description:

CRD Flow Controller fails in Auto requiring manual operation to re-establish CRD flow.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ONCE Event 4 is complete, DELETE mfC11_299 and notify the SRO that 2C11-R600 is now repaired and as Shift Manager, grant permission to return controller to automatic mode.

SRO

Directs ATC to return 2C11-R600 to Automatic operation.

Returns CRD System to normal configuration by performing step 7.1.2.29 of 34SO-C11-005-2 or by performing step 4.9 of 34AB-C11-001-2:

Manually adjusts 2C11-R600 to match setpoint

Places 2C11-R600 to Auto ATC

Confirms system parameters are normal

Confirms 603-140, CRD Hyd Temp High, alarm is clear

Reports to SRO that CRD flow controller has been restored to normal configuration.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners request, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 4 Page 8 of 29 Event

Description:

SRV 2G Opens and closes after ATC cycles switch.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: To insure the BOP operator gets the next malfunction, as Shift Manger, request the ATC to get some Offgas panel reading (Stack Flow)

OR with Chief Examiners permission, perform the following.

8 Min Simulator Operator: At the direction of the Chief Examiner, ACTIVATE:

(RB-4) mfB21_130G.

Recognize annunciators:

ALL

SAFETY BLOWDOWN VALVE LEAKING, (602-311)

SAFETY BLOWDOWN PRESSURE HIGH, (603-122)

Directs operator to enter 34AB-B21-003-2, Failure of Safety/Relief valves SRO

Enters a RAS for TS LCO 3.6.1.6.A for 2 or more LLS valves inop, which requires the unit to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and Mode 4 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

The ATC may enter the abnormal procedure first before addressing the ARPs.

Enters 602-311 and 603-122 annunciators

Confirm which safety relief valve has opened using the amber valve BOP leakage indicator

Confirms green light is OFF

Checks back panel tail pipe temperatures

Confirm 2G is leaking using the indication on 2B21-R614, Auto BOP Blowdown/Safety Vlv Temps recorder.

Reports to the SRO and ATC operator that 2G SRV is open

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 4 Page 9 of 29 Event

Description:

SRV 2G Opens and closes after ATC cycles switch.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator: When the operator cycles the control switch, ENSURE Event Trigger EGB21-11 activates.

Executes 34AB-B21-003-2 steps;

Confirms the green AND amber lights are illuminated for 2G SRV

Cycles the 2G SRV control switch several times between Open/Close (Critical Task)

BOP

Notifies SRO that SRV 2G closed when control switch was cycled.

May request the SSS to pull the fuses for SRV 2G. (SIMULATOR OPERATOR, If requested, wait 4 minutes, DEPRESSES RB-9, rfB21_306, SRV G Fuses) to pull fuses.

When SRV closes confirms;

Torus water level increase has stopped.

Torus temperature increase has stopped.

Reactor Power is at its original value BOP

SRV tailpipe temperature decreasing

Resets the SRV leak detection AMBER SRV indicating lights.

Notifies SRO the Torus-Drywell Vacuum Breaker surveillance needs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

Notifies Chemistry to increase monitoring of vessel moisture carryover.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event AFTER Event 3 & 4 are complete.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 5 Page 10 of 29 Event

Description:

System Operator reports Condensate Booster pump B has an oil leak, A must be started, B shutdown.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, as a System Operator (SO), reports on rounds, that the 2B Condensate Booster pump has an oil leak.

12 When questioned about the size of the oil leak, report as the SO that the CBP MIN still has ample oil to operate, but should be shut down as soon as possible.

NOTE: The following is written to start the 2A CBP.

Directs Operator to place 2A Condensate Booster pump (CBP) in service SRO and shutdown the 2B Condensate Booster pump.

ATC

Enters 34SO-N21-007-2 at step 7.3.6 and performs the following:

Has SO:

Verify that 2A CBP Oil Reservoir and motor bearing oil levels are WITHIN normal level marks.

Throttle 2P41-F364A outlet valve as necessary to maintain the oil temperature between 50°F and 115°F.

Confirm / Place CBP 2A Oil Pump control switch in Auto and Confirm pump is running.

Confirm Closed/Close 2N21-F020A, Standby CBP Discharge Valve.

Simulator Operator does NOT have to enter the remote function for closing the discharge valve for the CBP, because it has to be throttled prior to pump start and we do NOT have throttle capability.

Simulator Operator, as SO, reports that CBP 2A oil levels are normal, oil temperature is at 95°F, the oil pump is running in Auto and that the 2N21-F020A is closed.

Directs SO to:

Throttle Open 2N21-F020A, CBP Discharge Valve, for 15 seconds ATC

Observe for indication of a stuck open / leaking discharge check valve as evidenced by increasing pressure on the pump side of the discharge check valve.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 5 Page 11 of 29 Event

Description:

System Operator reports Condensate Booster pump B has an oil leak, A must be started, B shutdown.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, as SO, reports that the 2N21-F020A is opened 15 seconds and the discharge check valve does NOT indicate leakage. (Verify that rfN21_60A is in Open.)

Starts Condensate Booster Pump 2A, by placing the control switch to Start.

ATC

Has SO throttle open the Discharge valve and maintain oil temp by throttling PSW to the oil cooler.

Simulator Operator, as SO, reports that the discharge valve is now full open for CBP 2A, and that oil temp is being maintained at 95°F

When condensate and Feedwater flows and pressures have stabilized, ATC directs the SO to close 2N21-F020B.

Simulator Operator, ACTIVATE: (RB-8): rfN21_61 (CBP B Disch valve close), then as the SO, reports that the discharge valve for CBP 2B is started closed.

Places CBP 2B control switch to stop within 90 seconds of being told the discharge valve has started closing.

ATC

Reports to SRO that 2A CBP is operating and that the 2B CBP has been secured. May ask SRO if it is desired to place the 2B CBP in standby. If so the CBP 2B control switch will be placed in Auto.

May direct the operator to place CBP 2C in PTL Off or Standby and leave SRO oil pump in off.

Simulator Operator, If requested to re-open the discharge valve, TOGGLE:

rfN21_61 (CBP B Disch valve Open) and as SO report that the discharge valve for CBP 2B is Open.

Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 6 Page 12 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Bus 2B breaker trips open, crosstie to return to service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior 15 Simulator Operator, at direction of the lead examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-6)

Mins malfunction mfR25_186, Loss Of Instrument Bus 2B.

ALL Various alarms indicating Instrument Bus 2B has lost power.

Directs BOP to enter 34AB-R25-002-2, Loss Of Instrument Buses, for loss of SRO Instrument Bus 2B.

Enters 34AB-R25-002-2, Loss of Instrument Buses, and performs the following at Panel 2H11-P654,

Opens 2T46-F001A

Opens 2T46-F003A

Places SBGT Fan 2A control switch to "RUN."

Receives 2A SBGT SWITCH NOT IN AUTO, (657-091), alarm

Confirms 2T46-F002A OPENS

Confirms SBGT Heater red light illuminates.

BOP

Places 2B SBGT Fan control switch to OFF

Dispatches SO to confirm CLOSE Instrument Bus 2B supply breaker 28 on 2R25-S037, Essential Cabinet 2B by dispatching a SO locally.

Dispatches SO to confirm Essential Cabinet 2B 2R25-S037 is energized by NO other alarms illuminated at 2H11-P651.

Per step 4.4, dispatches Maintenance to check fuses R25F209 F01, R25F210 F02, and R25F211 F03, in fuse panel 2R20N P002 located next to Essential Cabinet 2B (power supply to 2R25 S065, Instrument Bus 2B 6).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 6 Page 13 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Bus 2B breaker trips open, crosstie to return to service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: The BOP may consult with the SRO and decide not perform steps 7.2.1.1 through 7.2.4 since these fans only circulate air in Secondary Containment.

Secures Rx Bldg Ventilation per 34SO-T41-005-2, Step 7.2.1 by performing the following; (steps 7.2.1.1 through 7.2.4)

May place the following in the STOP position:

Places 2T41-B007, Rx Bldg Cooler Working Floor El 130 North

Places 2T41-B008, Rx Bldg Cooler Working Floor El 130 South

Places 2T41-B026, Rx Bldg Primary Cooler Mn Steam Pipe Chase

Places 2T41-B010, Rx Bldg Cooler Equip Room El 164

Places 2T41-B011, Rx Bldg Cooler Operating Floor El 185

Places 2T41-B014, Rx Bldg Cooler RWCU Pmp/Hx El 158

Places 2T41-B015, Rx Bldg Cooler Operating Floor El 185

Places 2T41-B016, Rx Bldg Cooler Working Floor El 203 NOTE: If fans 2T41-B026 and 2T41-B009 are secured, delay proceeding to the next event to evaluate if the SRO will restart Rx Bldg Ventilation BOP or if the Group I signal from High Steam Chase Temperature will be received.

May place the following in the OFF position:

2T41-B017, Fan 2 or Fan 1, Rx Bldg Recirc

2T41-B017, Fan 1 or Fan 2, Rx Bldg Recirc

2T41-B009, Rx Bldg Secondary Cooler Mn. Steam Pipe Chase Performs the following:

Places in OFF 2T41-C001B, Rx Bldg Supply Fan

Places in OFF 2T41-C001A, Rx Bldg Supply Fan

Places in OFF 2T41-C007B, Rx Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan

Places in OFF 2T41-C007A, Rx Bldg Vent Exhaust Fan

Closes 2T41-F028, Rx Bldg Vent Filter D005 Inlet Damper.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 6 Page 14 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Bus 2B breaker trips open, crosstie to return to service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Secures Refuel Flr Ventilation per 34SO-T41-006-2 by performing the following,

Places 2T41-C002B Refuel Flr Vent Supply Fan, control switch, in OFF.

Places 2T41-C002A, Refuel Flr Vent Supply Fan, control switch, in OFF.

Places 2T41-C005B, Refuel Flr Vent Exh Fan, control switch, in OFF.

Places 2T41-C005A, Refuel Flr Vent Exh Fan, control switches, in BOP OFF.

Closes 2T41-F004C, Refuel Floor Area Damper.

Dispatches a SO locally to perform the following:

Place 2T41-B024C, Refueling Floor Unit Heater Fan, control switch, in OFF.

Place 2T41-B024B, Refueling Floor Unit Heater Fan, control switch, in OFF.

Place 2T41-B024A, Refueling Floor Unit Heater Fan, control switch, in OFF.

Simulator Operator, Once Tech Specs have been addressed, Call the control room, as an Electrician, and report that Instrument Bus 2B supply breaker 28 on 2R25-S037, Essential Cabinet 2B, is damaged and must be replaced. If asked, inform Control Room it will take approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months to replace.

Simulator Operator, when directed, ACTIVATE: (RB-9), rfR25_166, Instrument Bus 2B Powered from 2A, THEN NOTIFIES SRO that Instrument Bus 2B is powered from Instrument Bus 2A.

Addresses TS 3.8.7, Distribution Systems - Operating and determines that Condition C exists requiring Instrument Bus 2B returned to operable status in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months .

SRO Addresses TS 3.4.5. B, requiring grab samples of primary containment atmosphere once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months and restore within 30 days.

After report on local actions, directs the BOP to re-energize Instrument Bus 2B by cross tying with Instrument Bus 2A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 6 Page 15 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Bus 2B breaker trips open, crosstie to return to service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: The following steps may be performed out of order, AFTER placing Group Isolation Reset Switch to the Group 1 and Group 2/5 positions, on P601.

Directs SO to crosstie Instrument Buses per step 4.5.

Once Instrument Bus 2B is energized, continues at step 4.7 and performs the following:

Following confirmation of any group isolation(s),

RESET isolation(s) by placing Group Isolation Reset Switch to the BOP Group 1 and Group 2/5 positions, on P601.

Opens the following Fission Product Monitoring isolation valves, panel P700:

2D11-F052

2D11-F053

2D11-F072

Opens 2B31-F020, Rx Wtr Sample Otbd Isol AOV, on P602.

IT IS NOT INTENDED FOR THE CREW TO RESTORE ALL OF THE LOADS ASSOCIATED WITH INSTRUMENT BUS 2B.

AFTER THE OPERATOR RESTORES 2D11-F052, F053 & F072, AT THE CHIEF EXAMINERS DIRECTION, SIMULATOR OPERATOR PROCEEDS TO THE NEXT EVENT.

Resets and return Rx Bldg. Ventilation to normal per 34SO-T41-005-2.

Resets and return R/F Ventilation to normal per 34SO-T41-006-2

Secures Standby Gas Treatment System and place in standby per 34SO-T46-001-2.

BOP

Restores Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain Sumps per 34SO-G11-009-2.

Returns Steam Packing Exhauster to service per 34SO-N33-001-2.

Notifies Unit 1 NPO to restore Control Room ventilation to the desired mode of operation per 34SO-Z41-001-1.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 6 Page 16 of 29 Event

Description:

Instrument Bus 2B breaker trips open, crosstie to return to service.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

At SRO direction returns Rx Water Level Control to 3 element control per 34AR-603-132-2, Feedwater Control System Trouble.

Restores the Drywell Cooling Fans to normal alignment per 34SO-T47-001-2.

Alarm 650-204, Drywell/Torus RCDR R627 Temp High, may be received if Drywell Cooling Fans are not restored to a pre-event lineup.

It is NOT intended for the crew to restore all of the loads associated with INSTRUMENT BUS 2B.

AFTER the operator restores 2D11-F052, F053 & F072, AT the Chief Examiners direction, Simulator operator PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 7 Page 17 of 29 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS (Power/Level Control, insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator, at direction of the lead examiner, ACTIVATE: (RB-7) malfunction mfC71_59, Spurious Reactor Scram.

Directs ATC to scram the reactor:

Enters RC or RCA EOP Flowcharts.

Directs ATC to perform RC-1 placard.

Directs BOP to perform RC-2 and RC-3 placards.

SRO

If time allows assigns TC-1 to be performed.

Enters the RCA EOP flow chart, 31EO-EOP-011-2, for a scram condition and reactor power above 5%.

Enters CP-3 EOP flow chart, 31EO-EOP-017-2, for ATWS level control.

Directs ATC to:

Confirm the reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown.

SRO

Confirm ARI Initiation.

Confirm Recirc runback to minimum/tripped.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 7 Page 18 of 29 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS (Power/Level Control, insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: Event Trigger C71-15 INSERTS; aiC11-R607-1, CRD Cooling Water dP Controller Failure (f: 25, r: 1000), svoN37225 &

svoN37226 when the Rx Mode Switch is placed to SHUTDOWN.

Manually SCRAMs the Reactor using the SCRAM pushbuttons.

Places Rx Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN.

Initiates Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) by rotating the button collars and depressing both ARI pushbuttons at the same time when directed by the SRO.

Uses the Full Core Display and Rod Worth Minimizer to determine that all control rods are NOT inserted past position 02.

Informs the SRO that all rods are NOT fully inserted (ATWS).

ATC

Inserts IRMs and SRMs.

(Placard)

May attempt to inject SBLC depending on RWL/power level (if power is above 5%, the ATC is directed to inject SBLC IAW the RC-1 placard).

NOTE: See Event 8 for SBLC Failures.

Places SDV Isol Vlv Switch to ISOL and verifies closed.

Confirms Recirc at minimum speed and since power is above 5%, the ATC trips Recirc IAW the RC-1 placard).

Reports to the SRO that:

The Reactor Mode Switch is in the SHUTDOWN position.

ATC

ARI has been initiated (ATC may initiate ARI at this time).

Recirc is at minimum speed (if power is above 5%, the ATC is directed to trip Recirc IAW the RC-1 placard).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 7 Page 19 of 29 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS (Power/Level Control, insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Performs actions of placards RC-2 and RC-3 after Reactor SCRAM.

Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:

Confirms proper Level Control response:

Checks ECCS Injection Systems

Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value BOP

When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve (

(Placard) 1.5 mlbm/hr), then:

Confirms Open 2N21-F125.

Confirms 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.

Closes 2N21-F110.

Will control RWL at 9 inches.

Performs RC-3 consisting of:

Monitors RPV pressure.

Confirms proper operation of pressure control system (TBV, LLS, etc.).

BOP

If necessary, allow RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycle any SRV (Placard) to initiate LLS.

Maintain RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig.

Notify SRO of pressure control system operation.

SRO

May direct BOP operator to lower reactor pressure to <845 psig.

BOP

If directed, lowers pressure setpoint to <845 psig using the DEHC system (Placard) as described on the following graphic.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 7 Page 20 of 29 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS (Power/Level Control, insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

Notifies SRO that Pressure set has been reduced to <845 psig.

SRO

Directs ATC to report reactor power or observes reactor power on SPDS.

Directs ATC to Reset ARI and insert control rods IAW 31EO-EOP-103-2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 7 Page 21 of 29 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS (Power/Level Control, insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: If asked, STA will direct the ATC to start in the center of the core and spiral out in a black and white pattern.

SIMULATOR OPERATOR: Once ARI is in TEST & ALL Reactor Scrams signals have been jumpered out, DELETES malfunction mfC71_59, Spurious Reactor Scram.

ATC

Enters 31EO-EOP-103-2, EOP Control Rod Insertion Methods, section 3.7, Driving Control Rods at panel 2H11-P603.

Confirms ARI initiation signals are clear and Then depresses ARI Reset pushbutton OR dispatches an operator to place ARI System Test switch, to TEST, on panel 2C11-P001

Check annunciator ARI INITIATED,603-304, clear

Attempts to drive rods by:

Places Reactor Mode switch to REFUEL.

Places Rod Worth Minimizer bypass switch to BYPASS.

Obtain recommendations from STA

Verifies adequate CRD drive water pressure for driving rods and may operate 2C11-R600, CRD Flow Control, to achieve higher drive water DP.

May start second CRD pump

Drives rods to at least 02 using the Emerg In or IN (Critical Task)

ATC

Enters 31EO-EOP-103-2, EOP Control Rod Insertion Methods, section 3.3, Repeating Manual Scram at panel 2H11-P603.

Bypasses scram discharge volume high level trip at 2H11-P603.

Dispatches operator to install jumpers to override all automatic scram signals.

Places Discharge Volume Isolation Test switch to Norm at 2H11-P603.

Resets Scram when notified that jumpers have been installed.

Confirm all SDV Vent and Drain Valves are open.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 7 Page 22 of 29 Event

Description:

Spurious Reactor scram/ATWS (Power/Level Control, insert control rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE: 2C11-R607, Press Control Vlv F127, controller is failed to allow only ~25% valve position. A valve position of 25% will NOT allow control rods to insert from Cooling Water DP.

Enters 31EO-EOP-103-2, EOP Control Rod Insertion Methods, section 3.8, Increasing CRD Cooling Water Dp at panel 2H11-P603.

Places 2C11-R607, Press Control Vlv F127 Controller, in MAN

Increases output of 2C11-R607 to 100% at 2H11-P603

Confirms open OR fully opens 2C11-F003

Places 2C11-R600, CRD Flow Control, in MANUAL

Increases output of 2C11-R600 to 100%

Closes 2C11-F005, Return To Vessel Flow Control Simulator Operator, at the Chief Examiners direction, PROCEEDS to the next event.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 8 Page 23 of 29 Event

Description:

SBLC first pump fails to inject, second pump works.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator; ENSURE malfunctions ENSURE EVENT TRIGGERS (EGC41-1 &EGC41-2) THAT WILL PREVENT THE FIRST PUMP STARTING BUT NOT THE SECOND are inserted. They were inserted from the beginning.

ATC

Injects SBLC (power >5%)

Unlocks and places SBLC pump select switch in Start Sys A or Start Sys B position.

Confirms Squib Valve Ready Lights are extinguished.

Confirms SBLC Loss of Continuity to Squib Valve annunciator is alarmed.

Recognizes that the selected SBLC pump DID NOT start.

Places SBLC pump select switch in Start Sys B or Start Sys A position. (The pump not attempted first.)

Confirms the selected second SBLC pump started.

Confirms closed 2G31-F004 (RWCU Isolation Valve).

Reports to SRO, SBLC is injecting IAW 34SO-C41-003-2 and the first pump selected failed to start.

Simulator operator proceeds to the next event at the Chief Examiners direction.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 9 Page 24 of 29 Event

Description:

RCIC & HPCI fails to auto start with the RCIC manual pushbutton failing.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SRO Directs an operator to INHIBIT ADS.

ATC/BOP

2H11-P602, Places the following switches to INHIBIT:

ADS Channel A / C Auto Logic Inhibit switch (2B21C-S7A)

ADS Channel B / D Auto Logic Inhibit switch (2B21C-S7B)

NOTE: Simulator Operator, ENSURE Event Trigger ET-EGB21-7, trips both RFPTs when RWL is <-40.

SRO

Directs BOP control RWL -60 inches to -90 inches.

As time allows, directs BOP to verify Isolations and ECCS initiations.

BOP

Reports failure of HPCI and RCIC to auto initiate at - 35.

Reports failure of both RFPTs.

Reduces injection to control RWL -60 inches to -90 inches.

If HCPI was manually started, the operator will reduce controller output to lower RWL.

If HCPI was in standby, places 2E41-C002-3, HPCI Aux. Oil Pump, in PULL-TO-LOCK.

If RCIC were manually started, the operator may depress the RCIC turbine trip push-button or reduce controller output.

BOP Controls RWL -60 inches to -90 inches using RCIC and/or HPCI.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 9 Page 25 of 29 Event

Description:

RCIC & HPCI fails to auto start with the RCIC manual pushbutton failing.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP IF RCIC injection is attempted AND RCIC was manually tripped:

IF RWL is <-35 inches, recognizes and informs the SRO that RCIC failed to auto start

Transfers 2E51-R612, Turbine Controller, to manual and adjust output to 50%.

Closes 2E51-F524, Trip & Throttle Valve.

Opens 2E51-F045, Stm to Turb Valve.

Opens 2E51-F046, Turb Clg Water Valve.

Starts 2E51-C002-2, Barom Cndsr Vac Pump.

Throttle opens 2E51-F524, Trip & Throttle Valve, AND concurrently opens 2E51-F013, Pump Discharge Valve

Confirms 2E51-F019, Min Flow Valve, Opens, AND subsequently closes, when system flow is greater than 79.3 gpm.

Continues to throttle 2E51-F524 Open, until turbine speed is limited by 2E51-R612, Turbine Controller, then perform the following:

Fully opens 2E51-F524, Trip & Throttle Valve.

Increases 2E51-R612, Turbine Controller, output to achieve 3000 to 4000 rpm.

Transfers 2E51-R612, Turbine Controller, to auto and adjust to desired flow rate.

Maintains level -60 to -90 BOP IF RCIC injection is attempted and RCIC has NOT been tripped:

Depresses RCIC Manual Initiation P/B (failed)

Opens 2E51-F046

Starts Barom Cndsr Vac Pmp

Opens 2E51-F045

Confirms open 2E51-F019

Confirms closed 2E51-F019 at flow > 79.3 gpm

Opens 2E51-F013

Adjusts controller for desired flow

Maintains level -60 to -90

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Scenario No.: 9-05 Event No.: 9 Page 26 of 29 Event

Description:

RCIC & HPCI fails to auto start with the RCIC manual pushbutton failing.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP If HPCI injection is attempted the operator:

IF RWL is <-35 inches, recognizes and informs the SRO that HPCI failed to auto start

Opens 2E41-F059, Lube Oil Clg Wtr Valve.

Starts 2E41-C002-2, Barom Cndsr Vacuum Pump.

Opens 2E41-F001, Turb Steam Supply Valve.

Take 2E41-C002-3, Aux Oil Pump, control switch to the START position.

Open 2E41-F006, Pump Discharge Valve.

Confirm 2E41-F012, Min Flow Valve, CLOSES at flow > 790 gpm.

CONTINUOUS RECHECK:

Simulator Operator, when the following conditions exist:

1. Scram is RESET,

2. RWL is controlled between -60 and -90 inches, WITH CHIEF EXAMINERS DIRECTION, the scenario may be terminated.

Page 27 of 29 Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-05 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Examiners: Operators: SRO RO BOP Initiating Conditions: Unit 2 is operating at 70% RTP. RHR Loop B is operating in Torus Cooling Mode due to a recently performed HPCI surveillance. 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Turnover Lower Torus level to 147.5 inches, and then increase reactor power to 75%.

Summary:

Event 1: Normal; Lower Torus level to 147.5 inches using RHR Loop 2B IAW 34SO-E11-010-2, Step 7.4.5.1.

Event 2: Reactivity; The ATC will raise Reactor power to ~75% RTP.

Event 3: Component; The CRD Flow Controller fails closed causing a loss of normal CRD flow. The ATC will place the controller in manual and restore CRD flow.

Event 4: Component/TS; SRV 2G opens. The ATC operator will attempt to close the SRV IAW the abnormal procedure for an electrically open SRV. After the ATC operator cycles the SRV control switch, the SRV will close. (Critical Task) If Torus temperature exceeds 95°F, the BOP operator will place RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling. SRO addresses TS for inoperable SRV.

Event 5: Component; System Operator reports Condensate Booster pump B has an oil leak, Standby pump must be started, B shutdown.

Event 6: Component/TS; Instrument Bus 2B supply breaker from Essential 2B will trip open de-energizing subsequent loads. Once investigated, Instrument Bus 2B will be energized from Instrument Bus 2A and the BOP will return loads to service.

Event 7: Major; A Spurious Turbine trip will cause a Reactor scram and subsequent ATWS.

The SRO will direct/ensure the ATC inserts control rods within 20 minutes of the scram and inject SBLC prior to leaving RC-1. (Critical Task)

Event 8: Component; The first SBLC pump fails to start, second pump works injecting SBLC prior to the ATC leaving RC-1.

Event 9: Component; RCIC and HPCI fail to auto start. RCIC must be manually aligned and started to maintain RWL -60 to -90. (Critical Task)

Page 28 of 29 Critical Tasks NRC FINAL Facility: E. I Hatch Scenario No.: 9-05 Op-Test No.: 2015-301 Critical Tasks

Cycles the SRV control switch to close SRV (Event 4)

Begins inserting control rods within 20 minutes of scram/injects SBLC before leaving RC-1.

(Event 7/8)

RCIC/HPCI must be manually aligned and started to maintain RWL -60 to -90 (Event 9)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items

1. Total Malfunctions 5-8 7 1. ATC uses controller in manual to restore CRD flow (Event 3)

2. SRV 2G opens (Event 4)

3. Condensate Booster pump B oil leak, Standby pump must be started, B shutdown (Event 5)

4. Instrument Bus 2B breaker fails (Event 6)

5. Spurious Reactor scram/ ATWS (Event 7)

6. SBLC Pump 2A & 2B start failure (1st pump)

(Event 8)

7. RCIC/HPCI Auto start failure (Event 9)

2. Malfunctions After 1-2 2 1. SBLC Pump 2A & 2B start failure (1st pump)

EOP Entry (Event 8)

2. RCIC/HPCI Auto start failure (Event 9)

3. Abnormal Events 2-4 3 1. ATC uses controller in manual to restore CRD flow (Event 3)

2. SRV 2G opens (Event 4)

3. Instrument Bus 2B breaker fails (Event 6)

4. Major Transients 1-2 1 1. Spurious Reactor scram/ ATWS (Event 7)

5. EOPs entered, 1-2 1 1. 31EO-EOP-011, RCA, (Event 7) requiring substantive actions

6. EOPs contingencies 0-2 1 1. 31EO-EOP-017, CP-3, (Event 7) requiring substantive actions

7. Critical Tasks 2-3 3 1. SRV 2G opens (Event 4)

2. Control Rods & SBLC injection (Event 7/8)

3. RCIC/HPCI Auto start failure (Event 9)

ILT 9 NRC FINAL Scenario 5 SHIFT TURNOVER Safety Focus UNIT 1 STATUS Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Plant Conditions: Activities in progress: 34SV-P41-001-1, Plant Service Water Pump Operability.

UNIT 2 STATUS Unit 2 is operating at approximately 70% RTP.

Plant Conditions:

Activities in progress: RHR Loop B is operating in Torus Cooling Mode due to a recently performed HPCI surveillance..

Protected Train: EOOS:

Division I Green Orange Division II Yellow Red Lower Torus level to 147.5 inches.

Scheduled evolutions:

After Torus level is lowered increase reactor power to 75%.

Surveillances due this None shift:

Inop Equipment: 2D LLS valve is inop for LLS Function only.

Active tagouts: 2D LLS valve.

Rod Configuration: See RWM

ML15176A543

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