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| issue date = 10/08/1992
| issue date = 10/08/1992
| title = Draft Rochester Gas & Electric Corp Ginna Station Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual 1992 Plume Exposure Emergency Preparedness Exercise.
| title = Draft Rochester Gas & Electric Corp Ginna Station Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual 1992 Plume Exposure Emergency Preparedness Exercise.
| author name = BACKUS W H, POLFLEIT P S
| author name = Backus W, Polfleit P
| author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
| author affiliation = ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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{{#Wiki_filter:THEROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION GZNNASTATIONEMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISEMANUAL1992PLUMEEXPOSUREEMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISEOctober8,1992PrearedBy:PeteS.PolfleitWeyH.BackusReviewedBy:RichardJ.WattsApprovedBy:RarJ.Beldue(Emergency PlnningMilestone Committee)
{{#Wiki_filter:THE ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION GZNNA STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE MANUAL 1992 PLUME EXPOSURE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE October 8, 1992 Pre ared By:
COIROLLRD COPYKO~9212220177 920722PDRADOCK05000244FPDRI-1 SCOPE~()ggpgyyypg J
Pete  S. Polfleit We    y H. Backus Reviewed By:
1~0SCOPEANDONSITEOBJECTIVES PLUMEEXPOSUREPATHWAY'~1~8aoeThe1992Emergency Preparedness PlumeExposurePathwayExercisewillsimulateaccidenteventsculminating inaradiological accidentresulting intheactivation ofonsiteandoffsitefacilities.
Richard J. Watts Approved By:
TheExercisewillinvolveeventsthattesttheeffectiveness oftheGinnaStationEmergency Preparedness Programandtheintegrated capabilities ofcertainelementsoftheStateofNewYork,WayneCountyandMonroeCountyemergency organizations.
R    ar J. Beldue (Emergency Pl nning Milestone Committee)
TheExercisewillincludethepartialmobilization ofstateandlocalresources toadequately verifytheircapability torespondtoanaccidentattheGinnaNuclearPowerPlant.1~2OnsiteOb'ectives forthe1992GinnaEvaluated PlumeExosurePathwaExercise1~2~11~2~21~2~31'+41~2~51~2~61~2~7Themajorobjective oftheExerciseistodemonstrate theresponsecapabilities oftheRochester GasandElectricCorporation Emergency Organization.
COIROLLRD COPY KO ~
Withinthisoverallobjective, numerousindividual objectives arespecified asfollows:Demonstrate theabilitytomobilize, staffandactivateEmergency ResponseFacilities promptly.
9212220177 920722 PDR  ADOCK 05000244 F              PDR I-1
Demonstrate theabilitytofullystafffacilities andtomaintainstaffingonanaround-the-clock basisgf-$throughtheuseofreliefshiftrosters(limitedshiftchangesmayoccurtoallowforoperational restrictions).
Demonstrate theabilitytomakedecisions andtocoordinate emergency activities.
Demonstrate theadequacyoffacilities anddisplaysandtheutilization ofprocedures tosupportemergency operations.
Demonstrate theabilitytocommunicate withallappropriate locations, organizations, andfieldpersonnel.
Demonstrate theabilitytomobilizeanddeployRadiation SurveyTeams.Demonstrate theappropriate equipment andprocedures forthedetermination ofambientradiation levels.


1~2~81~2~91~2~101~2~11Demonstrate theproperuseofappropriate equipment andprocedures formeasurement ofairborneradioiodine concentrations aslowas1.0E-7uCi/ccinthepresenceofnoblegases.Demonstrate theabilitytoprojectdosagetothepublicviaplumeexposure, basedonPlantandfielddata,andtodetermine appropriate protective
SCOPE ~ ()ggpgyyypg J
: measures, basedonplantconditions, Protective ActionGuidelines, available shelter,evacuation timeestimates, expectedreleaseduration, andotherappropriate factors.Demonstrate theabilitytonotifyoffsiteofficials andagencieswithin15minutesofdeclaration ofanemergency.
1~0    SCOPE AND ONSITE OBJECTIVES    PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY'
Demonstrate theabilitytoperiodically updateoffsiteofficials andagenciesofthestatusoftheemergency basedondataavailable atGinnaStation.1~2~121+21312~141~2~151~216Demonstrate theabilitytonotifyemergency supportpoolsasappropriate (i.e.,INPO,ANI,etc.).Demonstrate theabilitytonotifyonsitepersonnel usingplantalarmsandpublicaddresssystems.Demonstrate theorganization's abilitytoassessplantparameters andsymptomsindicative ofdegrading plantconditions, andrelatesuchsymptomstoprescribed Emergency ActionLevels.Demonstrate theorganization's abilitytoproperlyclassifyemergency conditions.
  ~ ~8ao e The 1992 Emergency Preparedness  Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise  will simulate accident events culminating in a radiological accident resulting in the activation of onsite and offsite facilities. The Exercise        will involve events that test the effectiveness of the Ginna Station Emergency Preparedness Program and  t integrated capabilities of certain elements of the h    e State of New York, Wayne County and Monroe County emergency organizations. The Exercise will include the partial mobilization of state and local resources adequately verify their capability to respond to an t  o accident at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
Demonstrate theorganizational abilityandresources necessary tomanageanaccountability ofpersonnel withintherestricted area.1~2~171~2181~219Demonstrate theorganizational abilityandresources necessary tocontrolaccesstothesite.Demonstrate theabilitytocontinuously monitorandcontrolemergency workers'xposure.
1~2     Onsite Ob'ectives for the 1992 Ginna Evaluated Plume Ex osure Pathwa    Exercise The major  objective of the Exercise is to demonstrate the response capabilities of the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Emergency Organization. With n this overall objective, numerous individual objectives i
Demonstrate theadequacyoffacilities anddisplaystosupporttheJointEmergency NewsCenteroperations.
are specified as follows:
/
1~2~Demonstrate the ability to mobilize, staff and activate Emergency Response Facilities promptly.
1~2~201~2.211~2~22Demonstrate theabilitytobriefthemediainaclear,accurate, andtimelymanner.Demonstrate theabilitytoprovideadvancedcoordination ofinformation releasedtothepublic.Demonstrate theabilitytoestablish andoperaterumorcontrolinacoordinated fashion.1''31~2~241~2~25Demonstrate theadequacyofin-plantpost-accident samplingtechniques andanalysis.
1~2~2   Demonstrate the ability to fully staff facilities and to maintain staffing on an around-the-clock basis          gf-$
Demonstrate theabilitytodeveloppreliminary short-term andlong-term actionstosupportplantrecovery.
through the use of relief shift rosters (limited shift changes may      occur    to allow for operational restrictions).
Demonstrate theproperuseofback-upcommunications intheeventofselectedcommunications equipmentmalfunction.
1~2 ~Demonstrate   the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
1~2~26Demonstrate theabilitytomobilizeprincipal portionsofthelicenseeemergency organization onanoff-hours, unannounced basis.TobeerformedasamusterindrilldurinNovember19921''7Demonstrate theabilitytoconductapost-exercise critiquewhichadequately characterizes licenseeperformance baseduponcontroller andobserverassessments.
1 '+4  Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays and the utilization of procedures to support emergency operations.
13SummarofPropseudActivities Table1.1providesalistofproposedRGEEactivities.  
1 ~ 2~5 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate    locations, organizations,   and  field personnel.
1~2~Demonstrate   the ability to mobilize and deploy Radiation Survey Teams.
1~2~7  Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the determination of ambient radiation levels.


TABLE1~11992GINNASTATIONEMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISEPLUMEEXPOSUREPROPOSEDONSITEACTIVITIES RGSENotification ofAgenciesCallUpofPersonnel ActivateOrganization MaintainSecurityConduct.DoseAssessment protective ActionRecommendations OperateJointNewsCenterDispatchFieldSurveyTeamsObtainPASSSampleActualActual*Actual>>ActualActualActualActualActual-3**
1~2~8      Demonstrate the proper use of appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 1.0 E-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.
ActualCallupofpersonnel andfacilityactivation willbeperformed insequence.
1~2~9      Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on Plant and  field data, and to determine appropriate protective  measures, Action based on Guidelines, plant conditions, Protective time  estimates, expected available shelter, evacuation              factors.
Aseparate, off-hours mustering drillwillbeconducted duringtheweekofNovember9,1992.Fieldteamswillbedeployedandwilldemonstrate appropriate fieldmonitoring techniques andcommunications withrespective emergency responsefacilities.
release duration, and  other appropriate 1 ~ 2 ~ 10 Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite officials and agencies within 15 minutes of declaration of an emergency.
Aminimumof1onsiteand2offsiteteamswillbedeployed.
1 ~ 2 ~ 11 Demonstrate the ability to periodically update offsite officials and agencies of the status  of the emergency based on data available at Ginna Station.
SIMULATIONS oRespiratory protection andprotective clothingwillbesimulated byonsite/offsite surveyteams.In-Plantteam-willdonrespiratory protection andprotective clothingprescribed byHealthPhysicsandChemistry personne1according topostulated scenarioplantconditions.
1 ~ 2 ~ 12 Demonstrate the ability to notify emergency support pools as appropriate (i.e., INPO, ANI, etc.).
oIngeneral,Exerciseparticipants shouldfollowapplied&plantprocedures ascloselyaspossible, andwillbestoppedbyControllers beforeactualequipment ismanipulated (exceptPASS).Simulated repairsandothercorrective actionsshouldbedescribed toController-
1+2 13    Demonstrate the ability to notify onsite personnel using plant alarms and public address systems.
/Evaluators asfullyaspossible.
1 2 ~ 14  Demonstrate the organization's ability to assess plant parameters and symptoms indicative of degrading plant conditions, and relate such symptoms to prescribed Emergency Action Levels.
SUMMARYOFPROPOSEDOFFSITEACTIVITIES Itisanticipated thatWayneandMonroeCountiesandNewYorkStatepersonnel willparticipate toperformthefollowing minimumfunctions:
1 ~ 2 ~ 15 Demonstrate  the organization's  ability to properly classify emergency conditions.
1.CommandandControl2.DoseAssessment 3.JointNewCenterStaffing4.Protective ActionDecisionmaking 5.Communications EXERCISESCENARIO GINNASTATION1992EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISEINITIALCONDITIONS 1~2~TheR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantisoperating atapproximately 974ratedthermalpower.ThePlanthasbeenoperating atthispowerlevelcontinuously forapproximately 150days.The"A"SteamGenerator (S/G)primarytosecondary leakrateincreased approximately 5daysagotoacalculated 60cc/min.
1 ~ 2 16  Demonstrate the organizational  ability  and resources necessary  to manage an accountability of personnel within the restricted area.
Atapproximately 0630hoursthismorningtheprimarytosecondary leakratehasagainincreased significantly asindicated byasubstantial increaseinradiation monitorR-15(AirEjector).
1 ~ 2 ~ 17 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to the site.
Radiation monitorR-19(S/GBlowdown) hasalsoindicated anincreaseinactivity.
1 ~ 2 18  Demonstrate  the ability to  continuously monitor and control emergency workers'xposure.
TheHealthPhysics/Chemistry Department isintheprocessofanalyzing samplestodetermine thecalculated leakrate.3~4~5.6.7~Equilibrium PrimaryCoolantIsotopicactivityasof0300hours(10/8/92isprovidedintable9.2ofscenarioSection9.3.Totalactivityis2.56microcuries/gram.
1 ~ 2 19  Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays to support the Joint Emergency News Center operations.
Chemistry LogSheet,available fromtheController.
                                /
TheReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)totalleakageis0.361GPMasof0400hoursthismorningandhasbeenincreasing.
Identified RCSLeakageis0.073GPM.Generalweatherconditions arepartlycloudywithnocurrentprecipitation.
ForpurposesoftheExercise, additional meteorological information intheSimulator ControlRoomshouldbeobtainedfromthePlantProcessComputerSystem(PPCS).ThePrimaryWaterTreatment Plantissecuredformajormaintenance thatwilltakeapproximately 3days.the100,000GallonOutsideCondensate StorageTankisat20%Level.ADemineralizer Trailerhasbeenorderedandisscheduled toarriveat1300hourstoday.TheHouseHeatingBoilerisinserviceandNuclearSteamissecured.
GINNASTATION1992EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISEONSITESEQUENCEOFEVENTSAPPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIMETIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION 070007150730UNUSUALEVENT-00/1500/0000/15InitialConditions established Announcement toCommenceAnnualEmergency ExerciseTheHealthPhysics/Chemistry Department informstheControlRoomthatthe"A"S/Gcalculated leakrateisapproximately 450cc/min (i.e.,=0.125gpm).ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomOperators shouldbeginperforming theapplicable actionsofOperating Procedure 0-6.10(PlantOperations withSteamGenerator TubeLeakIndication).
AnorderlyPlantshutdownshouldcommencetobeinHotShutdownwithin6hoursandtobelessthan350'FintheRCSwithinthenext6hoursasrequiredbyPlant,Technical Specification.
AnUnusualEventshouldbedeclaredinaccordance withEPIP1-0,"GinnaStationEventEvaluation andClassification,"
EAL:SteamGenerator TubeRupture(SGTR);SteamGenerator TubeLeakage>.1GPMasidentified bysampling.
Appropriate offsitenotifications shouldbemadeperEPIP1-5.IfanUnusualEventnotdeclaredinapproximately 15minutes,acontingency messageshouldbegivenouttodeclareit.
APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIMETIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION 075500/40The"A"S/GARVpopsopenandcannotbeclosedfromtheControlRoom.081000/55ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomShouldsendanAuxiliary OperatortotheSteamHeaderAreatoclosetheIsolation Valveonthe"A"S/GARV.Operators performing theapplicable actionsof0-2.1.Technical SuortCenterThePlantManager,Operations Assessment Manager,andDutyEngineershouldbemanningtheTSCforOffsiteCommunications Assistance perEPIP1-5.TheAuxiliary Operatorsenttoisolatethe"A"S/GARVreportstotheControlRoomthatthe"A"S/GARVisisolated, buthehasnoticedasteamleakonthe"B"S/GARV,betweentheARVandtheARVIsolation Valve.ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomShouldinformpeoplemanningtheTSCofthe"B"S/GARVLinesteamleak.MayrequestAuxiliary Operatortoisolatethe"B"S/GARV.Operators performing theapplicable actionsof0-2.1.ShouldinformthepeoplemanningtheTSCofthe"A"S/GARVproblemandisolation.
APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIMETIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION 081501/00Technical SuortCenterMayrequestthatthe"B"S/GARVbeisolatedormaywaituntilMaintenance personnel haveinspected it.MayinformControlRoomthattheywilltakeactionstohaveMaintenance personnel inspectforthe"A"And"B"S/GARVproblems.
Annunciator G-22(ADFCSSystemTrouble)alarms.ANTICIPATED RESULTS084001/25ControlRoomOperators performtheapplicable actionsofAR-G.22.Operators shouldchecktheS/Glevelstoensureproperlevelcontrol.Operators shouldinformthepeoplemanningtheTSCandI&CDepartment oftheADFCSproblem.TheCCWSurgeTankLoLevelAlarm(AR-A-13) annunciates andtheCCWlevelindicates itisdecreasing.
ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomOperators performtheapplicable actionsofAlarmResponseProcedure AR-A-13(CCWSurgeTankLoLevel41.24).Operators shouldsendanAuxiliary OperatorintotheAuxiliary BuildingtoidentifytheCCWLeak.ShouldinformthepeoplemanningtheTSCoftheCCWleak.


APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIMETIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION 0850Ol/35Auxiliary OperatorcheckingtheCCWleakinAuxiliary BuildinginformsControlRoomthatthelACCWPumpMechanical Sealisleakingandsprayingonthepumpmotor.Therunning1ACCWPumptripsoutonovercurrent andannunciator (AR-A-17) alarms.Thestandby1BCCWpumpstartsautomatically anddeliverers requiredflow.ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoom0855090501/4001/45Operators performtheapplicable actionsofabnormalprocedure AP-CCW.2(LossofCCWduringpoweroperation).
1 ~ 2 ~ 20 Demonstrate the    ability to brief    the media in  a clear, accurate,   and timely    manner.
Operators requesttheAuxiliary OperatorsenttoidentifytheCCWleakintheAuxiliary
1 ~ 2.21  Demonstrate the    ability to provide advanced coordination of information released to the public.
: Building, toisolatethesuctionanddischarge ofthe1ACCWPumpandrackoutitselectrical breaker.Operators shouldinformthepeoplemanningtheTSCofthe1ACCWPumpproblems.
1 ~ 2 ~ 22 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.
TheADFCSproblemwiththeMFWRegulating Valvesisrepaired.
1 '  '3  Demonstrate the adequacy of in-plant post-accident sampling techniques and analysis.
ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomOperators continueshuttingPlantdownper0-2.1.Auxiliary Operatorisolating the1ACCWPumpinformsControlRoomthattheSuctionandDischarge Valvesareclosedandtheelectrical breakerisrackedout.NTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomOperators shouldensurethat1ACCWPumpControlSwitchisinpullstopandCCWSurgeTanklevelhasreturnedtonormal.
1 ~ 2 ~ 24 Demonstrate the ability to develop preliminary short-term and long-term actions to support plant recovery.
APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIMETIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION 0915ALERT02/00Thefollowing eventsoccursimultaneously:
1 ~ 2 ~ 25 Demonstrate the proper use of back-up communications in the event of selected communications e q u i p m e n t malfunction.
~Pressurizer levelandpressuredecreases uncontrollably.
1 ~ 2 ~ 26 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize principal portions of the licensee emergency organization on an off-hours, unannounced basis.       To be erformed as a musterin drill durin November 1992 1'   '7  Demonstrate the ability to conduct a post-exercise critique which adequately              characterizes    licensee performance      based      upon  controller    and  observer assessments.
~Areactortripoccursautomatically fromlowpressurizer pressureorismanuallyactivated bytheoperator.
1 3       Summar  of Pro  pseud  Activities Table 1.1 provides      a  list of proposed  RGEE  activities.
~Asafetyinjection occursautomatically fromlowpressurizer pressureorismanuallyactivated bytheoperator.
~The<<A"S/Gwaterlevelincreases uncontrollably.
~Allsafeguards equipment requiredisoperating.
ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoom094502/30Operators performing theimmediate actionsofE-0(Reactortriporsafetyinjection).
AnALERTshouldbedeclaredinaccordance withEPIP1-0,"GinnaStationEventEvaluation andClassification,"
EAL:SteamGenerator TubeRupture(SGTR):SGRT>100GPM.Appropriate onsiteandoffsitenotifications shouldbemadeperEPIP1-5.IfandALERTisnotdeclaredinapproximately 15minutes,acontingency messageshouldbegivenouttodeclareit.Operators transition toE-3(SteamGenerator TubeRupture)andstartperforming itsapplicable actions.AccidentResponseandEvaluation continues.
ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomOperators performing theapplicable actionsofE-3(SteamGenerator TubeRupture)tostabilize thePlant.
0, APPROPRIATE TIMESCENARIOTIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION Technical SuortCenteTheTSCshouldbenearingoperational readiness oftheEmergency ResponseOrganization.
TheTSC,whenoperational, shouldsendrepairteamsintotheAuxiliary Buildingtoevaluatethe1ACCWPumpandmotorproblems.
TheTSC,whenoperational shouldsendrepairteamsouttoevaluatethe>>A>>and>>B>>S/GARVproblemsifnotalreadydone.Emerenc0erationsFacilit100002/45EOFmaybeactivating atthistimeduetoPlantconditions.
Accidentresponseandevaluation continues.
TICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomOperators performing theapplicable actionsofE-3(SteamGenerator TubeRupture)tostabilize thePlant.Technical SuortCenter101503/00TheTSCshouldbeassumingcommandandcontrol.Annunciator J-9(Safeguard BreakerTrip)Alarms.ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomWhenoperators checktheBoard,the>>A>>SWPumpSwitchindicates awhitedisagreement lightandthe>>A>>SWPumpindicates tripped.Operators/TSC shouldsendanAuxiliary OperatortotheScreenHousetocheckon>>A>>SWpump.Operators shouldinformtheTSCofthe>>A>>SWPumpproblem.
APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIMETIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION 1030SITEAREAEMERGENCY 03/15TheAuxiliary OperatorsenttotheScreenHousetocheckthe"A"SWPumpreportstotheControlRoom/TSCthathecanfindnothingwrongwiththe"A"SWPumpbuthehassmelledthestrongodorofgasthrough-outthebuildingwiththestrongest odorintheBasement.
ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomShouldrequestthattheAuxiliary OperatorfindtheshutoffvalvesforthenaturalgasandpropanegastotheScreenHouseandclosethem.ShouldinformtheTSCofthegasproblemintheScreenHouse.Ifnotalreadyisolated, shouldsendanAuxiliary Operatortoisolatethe"B"S/GARVwhenrequested todo.Technical SuortCenterTheTSC,afterassessing Plantconditions, should:DeclareaSITEAREAEMERGENCY inaccordance withEPIP1-0,"GinnaStationEventEvaluation
'andClassification,"
EAL:Hazardsbeingexperienced orprojected; entryofuncontrolled flammable gasesintovitalareas.Appropriate notifications ofoffsiteagenciesshouldbemadeperEPIP1-5.IfaSiteAreaEmergency isnotdeclaredinapproximately 15minutes,acontingency messageshouldbegiventodeclareit.TSCshouldinformtheEOFofPlantconditions andtheSiteAreaEmergency Declaration.
ASiteEvacuation shouldbecommenced ifitisdetermined necessary.
APPROPRIATE TIMESCENARIOTIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION ReairTeams104503/30RepairteamsentouttochecktheCCWPumpshouldreportthatthe1ACCWPumpMechanical sealneedsreplacing andthatthe1ACCWPumpmotorneedstobecleanedanddried.Theyreportthiswilltakeapproximately 8hours.Theyalsoreportthatthe1BCCWPumpMechanical Sealisleakingasmallamount.RepairTeamsentouttocheckthe"A"S/GARVcontrolproblemshouldreportthattheARV'sMercoidcontroller needstobereplaced.
Theyreportthatitwilltakeapproximately 1hourtodo.Ifnotdoneearlier,theRepairTeamsentouttocheckthe"B"S/GARVSteamleakrequestthatitbeisolated.
Accidentresponseandevaluation continues.
Ifnotdoneearlier,theAuxiliary Operatorsentouttoisolatethe"B"S/GARVsteamleakreportsbackthatitisisolated.
ANTICIPATED RESULTSCotrolRoomOperators performing theactionsofE-3(SteamGenerator TubRupture)shouldhavestabilized thePlantatapproximately thistimeandbeawaitingdetermination bytheTSCastowhatpostSGTRcooldownprocedure touse.Ifnotdoneearlier,shouldinformtheTSCofthe"B"S/GARVsteamleakisolation.
Technical SuortCenterTheTSCshouldbeevaluating theflammable gasproblemintheScreenHouseandbetakingcorrective actionsrequiredtoreturntheScreenHousetoasafecondition.
TheTSCDoseAssessment shouldcalculate andquantifyanyreleasepathstotheenvironment.
TSCshouldhavedetermined andinformedtheControlRoomtouseES-3.1(Post-SGTR CooldownusingBackfill).
APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIMETIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION 110003/45ReairTeamsRepairTeamsentouttocheckthe"B"S/GARVsteamleakreportsthatitappearsthatthesteamleakwasfroma>-inchholedrilledalmostthroughthepipe,andalsothataflangeisleaking.Theyreportthatitwilltakeapproximately oneandahalfhourstorepairtheleak.Condensate StorageTank(CST)levelsdecreaseto5feet.ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomOperators shouldrefertoER-AFW.1(Alternate WaterSupplytoAFWPumps)perfoldoutpageofES-3.1,Statement 4,whichstates,"IfCSTleveldecreases tolessthan5feet,thenswitchtoalternate AFWsupply(RefertoER-AFW.1, Alternate WaterSupplytoAFWPumps)andperformapplicable actions.ShouldinformTSCofthelowlevelintheCSTs.TECHNICAL SUPPORTCENTERTSCevaluating Plantconditions andtakingactionwhererequired.
TSCshouldinformsecurityoftheasfoundcondition ofthe"B"S/GARVsteamleak.TSCDoseAssessment performing offsitedosecalculations asrequired.
TSCshouldbeexpediting therepairoftheS/GARVsbecauseoftheiruseduringsucheventsaslossofcondenser andPlantcooldown.
TSCshouldsendaRepairTeamtocheckoutthe"A"SWPumpproblemwhentheScreenHouseisdeclaredsafeforentry.TSCshouldinformEOFofPlantstatusandproblems.  


APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIME.TIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION
TABLE 1 ~ 1 1992 GINNA STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE PLUME EXPOSURE PROPOSED  ONSITE ACTIVITIES RGSE Notification of  Agencies                        Actual Call Up of Personnel                              Actual*
~eecuritShouldbeevaluating thedrilledholeinthe"B"S/GARVpipe.Emerenc0erationFacilit112004/05TheEOF,afteritismanned,shouldstartassessing Plantconditions andtakeactionasrequired.
Activate Organization                            Actual>>
The"A"S/GARVMercoidisrepairedandreadyforreturntoservice.ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRoomOperators performing applicable actionsofES-3.1(Post-SGTR CooldownusingBackfill).
Maintain Security                                Actual Conduct. Dose Assessment                          Actual protective Action Recommendations                Actual Operate Joint News Center                        Actual Dispatch Field Survey Teams                      Actual-3**
Operators performing applicable actionsER-AFW.1.
Obtain  PASS Sample                              Actual Call up of personnel    and  facility activation will be performed  in  sequence. A  separate, off-hours mustering  drill will be November 9, 1992.
Operators shouldreturnthe"A"S/GARVtoserviceifrequested bytheTSC.Technical SuortCenterTSCevaluating Plantconditions andtakingactionswhererequired.
conducted during the week of Field teams  will be    deployed and  will demonstrate appropriate    field    monitoring techniques      and communications with respective emergency response facilities. A minimum of 1 onsite and 2 offsite teams  will be  deployed.
TSCDoseAssessment performing offsitedosecalculations asrequired.
TSCmayrequesttheControlRoomtoreturnthe"A"S/GARVtoservice.~SecuritShouldbeevaluating thedrilledholeinthenB"S/GARVpipe.Emerenc0erationsFacilitEOFshouldbeassessing Plantconditions andtakingactionasrequired.
APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTIMETIMEEVENTDESCRIPTION EOFDoseAssessment shouldbeperforming offsiteDoseAssessment, asrequired, inparallelwiththeTSCDoseAssessment.
TheEOFshouldbeassumingcommandandcontrolatapproximately thistime.ReairTeams114504/30Performing actionsasrequiredtoreturnequipment toserviceassoonaspossible.
The>>B>>S/GARVsteamleakisrepairedandreadyforreturntoservice.ANTICIPATED RESULTSControlRooOperators shouldbeperforming theapplicable actionsoftheES-3.1(Post-SGTR CooldownusingBackfill).
Technical SuortCenterTSCevaluating Plantconditions andtakingactionasrequired.
EOFevaluating Plantconditions andtakingactionasrequired.
=1230<<131505/1506/00TSCshouldrequestControlRoomtoreturnthe>>B>>S/GARVtoservice.Recover/Re-entry discussions shouldcommence.
Thisshouldincludepreliminary discussions aboutshorttermandintermediate termconcerns, including preliminary designation oftheRecoveryOrganization.
Stateandcountiesmayalsoconductparalleldiscussions.
Recovery/Re-entry interface betweenTSC/EOFandoffsiteagenciesshouldbedemonstrated astimeallows.AfterallExerciseObjectives havebeendemonstrated, theExercisewillbeterminated.  


RADIOLOGICAL SRY 9.1RadioloicalSummarASourceTermTheradiological sourcetermassumedforthisscenariowasselectedtoincludeappropriate quantities ofnoblegasandradioiodine resulting fromthepostulated accidentscenario.
SIMULATIONS o Respiratory protection and protective clothing will be simulated by onsite/offsite survey teams. In-Plant team-will don respiratory  protection and protective clothing prescribed by Health Physics and Chemistry p e r s on n e 1 according to postulated scenario plant conditions.
Protective actionrecommendations i.e.,sheltering orevacuation forcertainEmergency ResponsePlanningAreas(ERPAs)willnotberequiredbasedupontheanticipated declaration ofaSiteAreaEmergency andplantconditions.
o In general, Exercise participants should follow applied&
Asaresultofaccidentreleaserates,theprojected wholebodyandthyroiddoseswillnotexceedEPAProtective ActionGuidesbeyondtheSiteBoundary.
plant procedures as closely as possible, and will be stopped    by  Controllers before actual        equipment is manipulated (except PASS). Simulated repairs and other corrective actions should be described to Controller-
Theassumednoblegasandradioiodine releasequantities areshowninFigure9.1asafunctionoftime.ThescenarioinvolvestworeleasepointswhichisfromtheAirEjectorandthe"A"Atmospheric ReliefValve(ARV).Thisoccursasfollows:Pre-Steam Generator TubeRuptureTime0700-0915ReleasePointAirEjectorReleaseRateC'ec1.77E-3(NobleGas)2.24E-8(Radioiodine)
  /Evaluators as fully as possible.
Thenoblegas-to-radioiodine ratioassumedis7.89E4:1duringthisperiodofrelease.Time0755-0810ReleasePointReleaseRateCisec8.32E-3(NobleGas)1.76E-9(Radioiodine)
Thenoblegas-to-radioiodine ratioassumedis7.89E4:1duringthisperiodofrelease.SteamGenerator TubeRuptureTime8ReleaseRateCisec0915-0935AirEjector5.24E-1(NobleGas)2.55E-4(Radioiodine)
Thenoblegas-to-radioiodine ratioassumedis2000:1duringthisperiodofrelease.Isotopicbreakdowns ofassumednoblegas,radioiodine andparticulate releasequantities areprovidedinTable9.1.
Time0935-0955ReleasePointAirEjectorReleaseRateCisec6.23E-2(NobleGas)3.12E-5(Radioiodine)
Thenoblegas-to-radioiodine ratioassumedis2000:1duringthisperiodofrelease.Isotopicbreakdowns ofassumednoblegas,radioiodine andparticulate releasequantities areprovidedinTable9.1.B.InteratedOffsiteDosesDuetoPlumeEosureThedownwindintegrated dosesfromthescenarioreleaseareasfollows:TimeReleasePointInteratedDoseRem0700-09150755-0810F0915-09350936-0955AirEjectorAirEjectorAirEjector1.25E-4(WholeBody)8.75E-7(ChildThyroid)6.S2E-5(WholeBody)7.63E-9(ChildThyroid)5.34E-3(WholeBody)1.48E-3(ChildThyroid)6.S1E-4(WholeBody)1.81E-4(ChildThyroid)TotalWholeBodyDose(at8iteBoundary)
=6.13E-3RemTotalChildThyroidDose(at8iteBoundary)
=1.66E-3RemC.PrincialPlantRadioloicalIndications Figures9.1through9.3providetrendplotsforkeyplantradiological indications, including plantventconcentration, letdownmonitorlevel,containment radiation levelandreactorcoolantconcentration.
TABLE9Theassumedreleasequantities fortheGinnaExerciseScenarioaresummarized asfollovs:Time:0915-0935 hrNuclideCurieSecTotalCuriesReleasedKr-85Kr-85mKr-87Kr-88Xe-131mXe-133Xe-133mXe-135Xe-135mXe-138TotalNobleGas4.0E-041.3E-021'E-022'E-024.9E-033'E-014.9E-024.9E-021.6E-026'E-025~2E-014.8E-011.7E+012.3E+012.5E+015.9E+004.0E+025.9E+015.9E+011.9E+017.6E+016'E+02I-131I-132I-133I-134I-1357.5E-054.9E-054.6E-054'E-054'E-059'E-025'E-025.5E-025.0E-025'E-02TotalRadioiodine 2~6E-043~1E-01Long-Lived Particulate 1+2E-091~5E-06


TABLE9.1(continued)
==SUMMARY==
Theassumedreleasequantities fortheGinnaExerciseScenarioaresummarized asfollows:NuclideTime:09360955hrCurieSecTotalCuriesReleasedKr-85Kr-85mKr-87Kr-88Xe-131mXe-133Xe-133mXe-135Xe-135mXe-138TotalNobleGas4.8E-051.5E-032.1E-032.5E-035.8E-043.9E-025.8E-035.8E-031.9E-037.5E-036'E025'E-021.8E+002.5E+003.0E+007.0E-014.7E+017.0E+007.0E+002.3E+009.0E+007~5E+01I-131I-132I-133l-134I-1358.9E-065.8E-065.5E-065.0E-065.1E-06F1E-027.0E-036'E-036'E-036'E-03TotalRadioiodine 3~1E-053'E-02Long-Lived Particulate 1~4E-10i+7E07 FIGURE9.1ASSUMEDSOURCETERMSI/SECC1.0E+00--;.1.0E-011.0E-021.0E-031.0E-041.0E-051.0E-061.0E-071.0E-081.0E-091.0E-101.0E-1111111111111177788888999999000011112222 34501134013345013401340134 05500505050656050505050505CLOCKTIME~NOBLEGASCI/SEC~RADIOIODINE CI/SEC FIGURE9.2AIREJECTORVENTCONCENTRATIONS U1.0E+011.0E+001.0E-011.0E-021.0E-031.0E-041.0E-051.0E-061.0E-071.0E-081.0E-091.0E-101.0E-11CI/CC111111111111778888999999000011112222340134013345013401340134050505050555050505050505OLOCKTIMENOBLEGAS~RADIOIODINE FIGURE9.3RCSCONCENTRATIONS VSTIME+02UCI/GM1.0E1.0E+011.0E+001.0E-01111111111111778888999900001111222234013401340134013401340505050505050505050505CLOCKTIMETOTALGAS~TOTALIODINE
OF PROPOSED  OFFSITE ACTIVITIES It is anticipated that Wayne and Monroe Counties and New York State  personnel will participate to perform the following minimum functions:
: 1. Command and Control
: 2. Dose Assessment
: 3. Joint New Center Staffing
: 4. Protective Action Decisionmaking
: 5. Communications


METEOROLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS
EXERCISE SCENARIO GINNA STATION 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INITIAL CONDITIONS 1~  The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant is operating at approximately 974 rated thermal power. The Plant has been operating at this power level continuously for approximately 150 days.
2 ~ The "A" Steam Generator (S/G) primary to secondary leak rate increased approximately 5 days ago to a calculated 60cc/min. At approximately 0630 hours this morning the primary to secondary leak rate has again increased significantly as indicated by a substantial increase in radiation monitor R-15 (Air Ejector). Radiation monitor R-19 (S/G Blowdown) has also indicated an increase in activity. The Health Physics/ Chemistry Department is in the process of analyzing samples to determine the calculated leak rate.
3 ~ Equilibrium Primary Coolant Isotopic activity as of 0300 hours (10/8/92 is provided in table 9.2 of scenario Section 9.3. Total activity is 2.56 microcuries/gram.
Chemistry Log Sheet, available from the Controller.
4 ~ The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) total leakage is 0.361 GPM as of 0400 hours this morning and has been increasing.
Identified RCS Leakage is 0.073 GPM.
: 5. General  weather conditions are partly cloudy with no current precipitation. For purposes of the Exercise, additional meteorological information in the Simulator Control Room should be obtained from the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS).
: 6. The Primary Water Treatment Plant is secured for major maintenance that will take approximately 3 days. the 100,000 Gallon Outside Condensate Storage Tank is at 20%
Level. A Demineralizer Trailer has been ordered and is scheduled to arrive at 1300 hours today.
7~  The House Heating  Boiler is in service  and Nuclear Steam is secured.


Meteorolo icaConditions BasisThemeteorological conditions forthisscenariowerebaseduponhistorical meteorological datarecordedbytheGinnaprimaryweathertowerandtheNationalWeatherServiceonAuust221988.Minoredittingwasperformed onthedatatoprovidethewinddirection andatmospheric stability conditions requiredbythescenarioduringtheperiodofrelease.NationalWeatherServiceandotherExercisecontrollers willprovideExerciseparticipants weatherforecastsummaries basedonthemeteorological dataandothersupporting information available fromthehistorical record.Thegoalofthisapproachistoprovideparticipants withmorerealistic forecastinformation.
GINNA STATION 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE ONSITE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME      TIME    EVENT DESCRIPTION 0700    -00/15  Initial Conditions  established 0715      00/00  Announcement  to  Commence  Annual Emergency Exercise 0730      00/15  The Health Physics/Chemistry Department informs the Control Room that the "A" S/G UNUSUAL            calculated leak rate is approximately EVENT              450cc/min (i.e., = 0.125 gpm).
ScenarioAssumtionsThescenariobeginswithlight,southerly windswhichshiftandbecomenortheasterly bymid-morning.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators should begin performing the applicable actions of Operating Procedure 0-6.10 (Plant Operations with Steam Generator Tube Leak  Indication).
DuringtheperiodofreleaseduetotheSteamGenerator TubeRupture(0915-0955 hr),theaveragemeteorological conditions areasfollows:WindSpeedWindDirection 5mph(at33ft)50degrees(at33ft;windfrom)PasquillStability
An  orderly Plant shutdown should commence to be  in Hot Shutdown within 6 hours and to be less than 350'F in the RCS within the next 6 hours as required by Plant, Technical Specification.
=E FIGURE40.1DIRECTION OFTHEPlUME/cetvoee/Otet SIChoonoootheIoLe-~ejSeog.-55.;O'.t".:-/piI'JtCCIecIttcovooetoIvtc)4orCIIIaeehee4ochN~ocINSIoioooo Boothw~i~/I'tetoecetne SI(tWT~tr~nogitnvSs.,I~''rfkth~oe("~MfeWebiter.-'ltig
An Unusual Event  should be declared in accordance with EPIP 1-0, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Classification," EAL:
~ttetO~~cte~O(t-rr~.'ItStone~WeletteteIOII//tttt/ii///octItoSS4I/-CMt'(~~.'~~~~:~-~rl/''pltc'gh:I>n~JM~IrSehtOWTRoclsee@It;oQ-~ti,OtItt/tt(leor~I~I~WIIVccWeetWolwonhOrattOettvt4e4eottOtveo4eo~4/t4tooc~>>.kwoI)~XU;~(=ado/Cteie(/eoce(~OooVIC5CtIA.'IcclCSteOsClFhhetoI~'not4,~IIII'~~t87I/tctNTA0CO4loeootoo OiIIrC!I)IeSCAM1:100000ICCOItxtttcettn ateTicetcoogttgcsctcts I<~~II/0/IOCtotetsesoIS'stslotesISttcXI":I@a~i}}
Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR); Steam Generator Tube Leakage >
                      .1 GPM as identified by sampling.
Appropriate offsite notifications should be made  per EPIP 1-5.
If  an Unusual Event not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message should be given out to declare    it.
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME      TIME    EVENT DESCRIPTION 0755      00/40  The "A" S/G ARV pops open and cannot be closed from the Control  Room.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Should send an Auxiliary Operator to the Steam Header Area to close the Isolation Valve on the "A" S/G ARV.
Operators performing the applicable actions of 0-2.1.
Technical  Su ort Center The Plant Manager, Operations Assessment Manager, and Duty Engineer should be manning the TSC for Offsite Communications Assistance per EPIP 1-5.
0810      00/55  The Auxiliary Operator sent to isolate the "A" S/G ARV reports to the Control Room that the "A" S/G ARV is isolated, but he has noticed a steam leak on the "B" S/G ARV, between the ARV and the ARV Isolation Valve.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Should inform people manning the  TSC of the "B" S/G ARV Line steam leak.
May  request Auxiliary Operator to isolate the "B" S/G ARV.
Operators performing the applicable actions of 0-2.1.
Should inform the people manning the TSC of the "A" S/G ARV problem and isolation.
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME      TIME  EVENT DESCRIPTION Technical  Su  ort Center May  request that the "B"    S/G ARV be  isolated or may  wait until  Maintenance personnel have inspected  it.
May  inform Control Room that they will take actions to have Maintenance    personnel inspect for    the "A" And  "B" S/G ARV problems.
0815      01/00  Annunciator G-22    (ADFCS System  Trouble) alarms.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators perform the applicable actions of AR-G.22.
Operators should check the S/G levels to ensure proper level control.
Operators should inform the people manning the TSC and I & C Department of the ADFCS problem.
The CCW Surge Tank Lo Level Alarm (AR-A-13) 0840      01/25 annunciates and the CCW level indicates        it is decreasing.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators perform the applicable actions of Alarm Response Procedure AR-A-13 (CCW Surge Tank Lo Level 41.24).
Operators should send an Auxiliary Operator into the Auxiliary Building to identify the CCW  Leak.
Should inform the people manning the      TSC  of the  CCW leak.
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME      TIME    EVENT DESCRIPTION 0850      Ol/35  Auxiliary Operator checking the CCW leak in Auxiliary Building informs Control Room that the lA CCW Pump Mechanical Seal is leaking and spraying on the pump motor.
The running 1A CCW Pump trips out on overcurrent and annunciator (AR-A-17) alarms. The standby 1B CCW pump starts automatically and deliverers required flow.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators perform the applicable actions of abnormal procedure AP-CCW.2 (Loss of CCW during power operation).
Operators request the Auxiliary Operator sent to identify the CCW leak in the Auxiliary Building, to isolate the suction and discharge of the 1A CCW Pump and rack out its electrical breaker.
Operators should inform the people manning the TSC of the 1A CCW Pump problems.
0855      01/40  The ADFCS problem with the MFW Regulating Valves is repaired.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators continue shutting Plant down per 0-2.1.
0905      01/45  Auxiliary Operator isolating the 1A CCW Pump informs Control Room that the Suction and Discharge Valves are closed and the electrical breaker is racked out.
NTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators should ensure that 1A CCW Pump Control Switch is in pull stop and CCW Surge Tank level has returned to normal.
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME      TIME  EVENT DESCRIPTION 0915      02/00  The  following events occur simultaneously:
                        ~  Pressurizer level and pressure decreases ALERT                  uncontrollably.
                        ~  A reactor trip occurs automatically from low pressurizer pressure or is manually activated by the operator.
                      ~  A safety injection occurs automatically from low pressurizer pressure or is manually activated by the operator.
                      ~  The <<A" S/G water level increases uncontrollably.
                      ~  All safeguards equipment required is operating.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators performing the immediate actions of E-0 (Reactor trip or safety injection).
An ALERT  should be declared in accordance with  EPIP 1-0, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Classification," EAL: Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR): SGRT >
100 GPM. Appropriate onsite and offsite notifications should be made per EPIP 1-5.
If  and ALERT is not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message  should be given out to declare  it.
Operators transition to E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) and start performing its applicable actions.
0945      02/30  Accident Response and Evaluation continues.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators performing the applicable actions of E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) to stabilize the Plant.
 
0
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME        TIME  EVENT DESCRIPTION Technical Su ort Cente The TSC should be nearing operational readiness of the Emergency Response Organization.
The TSC, when operational, should send repair teams into the Auxiliary Building to evaluate the 1A CCW Pump and motor problems.
The TSC, when    operational should send repair teams out  to evaluate the >>A>> and >>B>> S/G ARV  problems  if not  already done.
Emer enc    0  erations Facilit EOF may be activating at this time due to Plant conditions.
1000      02/45  Accident response and evaluation continues.
TICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators performing the applicable actions of E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) to stabilize the Plant.
Technical Su ort Center The TSC should be assuming command and control.
1015      03/00  Annunciator J-9 (Safeguard Breaker Trip)
Alarms.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room When operators check the Board, the >>A>> SW Pump Switch indicates a white disagreement light and the >>A>> SW Pump indicates tripped.
Operators/TSC should send an Auxiliary Operator to the Screen House to check on    >>A>>
SW  pump.
Operators should inform the    TSC of the >>A>>
SW Pump problem.
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME      TIME  EVENT DESCRIPTION 1030      03/15  The Auxiliary Operator    sent to the Screen House to check the "A"    SW Pump reports to SITE AREA          the Control Room/TSC that    he can find EMERGENCY          nothing wrong with the "A" SW Pump but he has smelled the strong odor of gas through-out the building with the strongest odor in the Basement.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Should request    that the Auxiliary Operator find the shutoff valves for the natural gas and propane gas to the Screen House and close them.
Should inform the    TSC of the gas problem in the Screen House.
If  not already isolated, should send Auxiliary Operator    to isolate the  "B" an S/G ARV when    requested to do.
Technical Su ort Center The TSC,    after assessing Plant conditions, should:
Declare  a SITE AREA EMERGENCY  in accordance with EPIP 1-0,    "Ginna Station Event Evaluation 'and Classification,"    EAL:
Hazards being experienced or projected; entry of uncontrolled flammable gases into vital  areas.
Appropriate notifications of offsite agencies should be made per EPIP 1-5.
If a Site Area Emergency is not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message should be given to declare it.
TSC should inform the EOF of Plant conditions and the Site Area Emergency Declaration.
A is Site Evacuation should determined necessary.
be commenced  if it
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME        TIME  EVENT DESCRIPTION Re  air  Teams Repair team sent out to check the CCW Pump should report that the 1A CCW Pump Mechanical seal needs replacing and that the 1A CCW Pump motor needs to be cleaned and dried. They report this will take approximately 8 hours. They also report that the 1B CCW Pump Mechanical Seal is leaking a small amount.
Repair Team sent out to check the "A" S/G ARV control problem should report that the ARV's Mercoid controller needs to be replaced. They report that approximately 1 hour to do.
it will take If not done earlier, the Repair Team sent out to check the "B" S/G ARV Steam leak request that    it  be isolated.
1045      03/30  Accident response and evaluation continues.
If  not done earlier, the Auxiliary Operator sent out to isolate the "B" S/G ARV steam leak reports back that      it  is isolated.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Co  trol  Room Operators performing the actions of E-3 (Steam Generator Tub Rupture) should have stabilized the Plant at approximately this time and be awaiting determination by the TSC as to what post SGTR cooldown procedure to use.
If  not of the done  earlier, should inform the TSC "B" S/G  ARV steam leak isolation.
Technical Su ort Center The TSC should be      evaluating the flammable gas problem    in the Screen House and be taking corrective actions required to return the Screen House to a safe condition.
The TSC Dose Assessment should calculate and quantify any release paths to the environment.
TSC  should have determined and informed the Control    Room to use ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown using Backfill).
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME      TIME    EVENT DESCRIPTION Re  air  Teams Repair          sent out to check the "B" S/G Team ARV steam leak reports that        it the steam leak was from a >-inch hole appears that drilled almost through the pipe, and also that a flange is leaking.
They report that one and a half it hours will take approximately to repair the leak.
1100      03/45  Condensate Storage Tank (CST) levels decrease  to  5  feet.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators should      refer to ER-AFW.1 (Alternate Water Supply      to AFW Pumps) per foldout page of ES-3.1, Statement 4, which states, "If CST level decreases to less than 5 feet, then switch to alternate AFW supply (Refer to ER-AFW.1, Alternate Water Supply to AFW Pumps) and perform applicable actions.
Should inform      TSC  of the low level in the CSTs.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER TSC  evaluating Plant conditions and taking action where required.
TSC should inform security of the as found condition of the "B" S/G ARV steam leak.
TSC Dose  Assessment performing      offsite  dose calculations      as required.
TSC  should be expediting the repair of the S/G ARVs because      of their use during such events as loss of condenser and Plant cooldown.
TSC  should send      a Repair Team to check out the "A"  SW  Pump    problem when the Screen House  is declared safe for entry.
TSC should inform      EOF  of Plant status  and problems.
 
APPROPRIATE  SCENARIO TIME    . TIME    EVENT DESCRIPTION
                      ~eecurit Should be evaluating the    drilled hole in the "B" S/G ARV pipe.
Emer enc    0  eration Facilit The EOF, assessing after  it is manned, should Plant conditions and take start action as required.
1120        04/05  The "A" S/G ARV Mercoid      is repaired  and ready  for return to service.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Room Operators performing applicable actions of ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown using Backfill).
Operators performing applicable actions ER-AFW.1.
Operators should return the "A" S/G      ARV  to service  if  requested by the TSC.
Technical  Su    ort Center TSC  evaluating Plant conditions and taking actions where required.
TSC Dose Assessment performing offsite dose calculations as required.
TSC may request the Control Room to return the "A" S/G ARV to service.
                      ~Secur it Should be evaluating the nB" S/G ARV drilled hole in the pipe.
Emer enc    0  erations  Facilit EOF should be assessing Plant conditions        and taking action as required.
 
APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME      TIME  EVENT DESCRIPTION EOF Dose  Assessment  should be performing offsite Dose Assessment, as required, in parallel with the TSC Dose Assessment.
The EOF should be assuming command and control at approximately this time.
Re  air Teams Performing actions as required to return equipment  to service  as soon as possible.
1145      04/30  The >>B>> S/G ARV steam leak is repaired and ready for return to service.
ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control  Roo Operators should be performing the applicable actions of the ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown using Backfill).
Technical Su ort Center TSC  evaluating Plant conditions and taking action as required.
EOF evaluating Plant conditions and taking action as required.
TSC should request Control Room to return the >>B>> S/G ARV to service.
  =1230      05/15  Recover/Re-entry discussions should commence. This should include preliminary discussions about short term and intermediate term concerns, including preliminary designation of the Recovery Organization.
State and counties may also conduct parallel discussions. Recovery/Re-entry interface between TSC/EOF and offsite agencies should be demonstrated as time allows.
  <<1315      06/00  After all Exercise Objectives have been demonstrated, the Exercise will be terminated.
 
RADIOLOGICALS RY 9.1 Radiolo  ical  Summar A  Source Term The  radiological source term assumed for this scenario was selected to include appropriate quantities of noble gas and radioiodine resulting from the postulated accident scenario.
Protective action recommendations          i.e., sheltering or evacuation for certain Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) will not be required based upon the anticipated declaration of a Site Area Emergency and plant conditions. As a result of accident release rates, the projected whole body and thyroid doses will not exceed EPA Protective Action Guides beyond the Site Boundary.
The assumed noble gas and radioiodine release quantities are shown in Figure 9.1 as a function of time. The scenario involves two release points which is from the Air Ejector and the "A" Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV). This occurs as follows:
Pre-Steam Generator Tube Rupture Time              Release Point        Release Rate      C'ec 0700-            Air Ejector          1.77 E-3 (Noble Gas) 0915                                    2.24 E-8 (Radioiodine)
The noble  gas-to-radioiodine ratio  assumed  is  7.89 E4:1 during this period of release.
Time              Release Point        Release Rate      Ci sec 0755-                                  8.32 E-3 (Noble Gas) 0810                                    1.76 E-9 (Radioiodine)
The noble  gas-to-radioiodine ratio    assumed  is  7.89 E4:1 during this period of release.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Time            8                    Release Rate      Ci sec 0915-            Air Ejector            5.24 E-1 (Noble Gas) 0935                                    2.55 E-4 (Radioiodine)
The noble gas-to-radioiodine ratio assumed is 2000:1            during this period of release. Isotopic breakdowns of assumed noble gas,    radioiodine  and  particulate    release    quantities    are provided in Table 9.1.
 
Time              Release Point          Release Rate    Ci sec 0935-              Air Ejector            6.23 E-2 (Noble Gas) 0955                                      3.12 E-5 (Radioiodine)
The noble    gas-to-radioiodine ratio assumed is      2000:1 during this period of release. Isotopic breakdowns of          assumed noble gas,    radioiodine    and  particulate    release  quantities are provided in Table 9.1.
B.      Inte rated Offsite  Doses Due  to  Plume  E osure The downwind integrated      doses from the scenario release are as follows:
Time                Release Point          Inte rated  Dose  Rem 0700-              Air Ejector            1.25 E-4 (Whole Body) 0915                                      8.75 E-7 (Child Thyroid) 0755-                                      6.S2 E-5 (Whole Body) 0810                                      7.63 E-9 (Child Thyroid)
F 0915-              Air Ejector            5.34 E-3 (Whole Body) 0935                                      1.48 E-3 (Child Thyroid) 0936-              Air Ejector            6.S1 E-4 (Whole Body) 0955                                      1.81 E-4 (Child Thyroid)
Total Whole Body Dose (at 8ite Boundary) = 6.13 E-3 Rem Total Child Thyroid Dose (at 8ite Boundary) = 1.66 E-3 Rem C.      Princi al Plant Radiolo ical Indications Figures 9.1 through 9.3 provide trend plots for key plant radiological indications, including plant vent concentration, letdown monitor level, containment radiation level and reactor coolant concentration.
 
TABLE 9 The  assumed  release  quantities for the    Ginna Exercise Scenario  are summarized as  follovs:
Time:      0915-0935 hr Nuclide                    Curie Sec                Total Curies Released Kr-85                      4. 0 E-04                      4.8  E-01 Kr-85m                    1.3 E-02                        1.7 E+01 Kr-87                      1'  E-02                      2.3  E+01 Kr-88                      2 '  E-02                      2.5  E+01 Xe-131m                    4.9  E-03                      5.9  E+00 Xe-133                    3'  E-01                      4.0  E+02 Xe-133m                    4.9  E-02                      5.9  E+01 Xe-135                    4.9  E-02                      5.9  E+01 Xe-135m                    1.6  E-02                      1.9  E+01 Xe-138                    6'  E-02                      7.6  E+01 Total Noble Gas                  5~2  E-01                      6 '  E+02 I-131                      7.5  E-05                      9 '  E-02 I-132                      4.9  E-05                      5'  E-02 I-133                      4.6  E-05                      5.5 E-02 I-134                      4'  E-05                      5.0 E-02 I-135                      4'  E-05                      5'  E-02 Total Radioiodine                2~6  E-04                      3~1  E-01 Long-Lived Particulate                1+2 E-09                        1~5  E-06
 
TABLE    9.1 (continued)
The  assumed  release  quantities for the Ginna Exercise Scenario are summarized as  follows:
Time :      0936 0955 hr Nuclide                    Curie Sec                Total Curies Released Kr-85                      4.8  E-05                      5'  E-02 Kr-85m                    1.5  E-03                      1.8  E+00 Kr-87                      2.1  E-03                    2.5  E+00 Kr-88                      2.5  E-03                    3.0  E+00 Xe-131m                    5.8  E-04                    7.0  E-01 Xe-133                    3.9  E-02                    4.7  E+01 Xe-133m                    5.8  E-03                    7.0  E+00 Xe-135                    5.8  E-03                    7.0  E+00 Xe-135m                    1.9  E-03                    2.3  E+00 Xe-138                    7.5  E-03                    9.0  E+00 Total Noble Gas                  6 '  E 02                    7 ~ 5 E+01 I-131                      8.9  E-06                    F 1  E-02 I-132                      5.8  E-06                    7.0  E-03 I-133                      5.5  E-06                    6'    E-03 l-134                      5.0  E-06                    6'    E-03 I-135                      5.1  E-06                    6'    E-03 Total Radioiodine                3~1  E-05                    3 '  E-02 Long-Lived Particulate                1 ~ 4 E-10                    i+7  E 07
 
FIGURE 9.1 ASSUMED SOURCE TERMS C I/SEC 1.0E+00  - -; .
1.0E -01 1.0E -02 1.0E-03 1.0E -04 1.0E-05 1.0E-06 1.0E -07 1.0E-08 1.0E-09 1.0E-10 1.0E-11 77788888999999000011112222  1  1 1 1 1 1 1  1  1 1 1 1 34501134013345013401340134 0 5 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 6 5 6 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0    5 CLOCK TIME
                ~ NOBLE GAS CI/SEC ~  RADIOIODINE CI/SEC
 
FIGURE 9.2 AIR EJECTOR VENT CONCENTRATIONS U CI/CC 1.0E+01 1.0E+00 1.0E -01 1.0E -02 1.0E -03 1.0E -04 1.0E -05 1.0E -06 1.0E -07 1.0E -08 1.0E -09 1.0E -10 1.0E-11 1 1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7  7  8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0  1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 3 4 5 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 5 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 OLOCK TIME NOBLE GAS  ~  RADIOIODINE
 
FIGURE 9.3 RCS CONCENTRATIONS VS TIME UCI/GM 1.0E +02 1.0E+01 1.0E+00 1.0E -01 1 1 1 1  1  1 1  1 1 1 1 1 7 7  8 8 8 8  9 9  9 9 0 0 0 0  1  1 1  1 2 2 2 2 3 4  0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 CLOCK TIME TOTAL GAS  ~ TOTAL IODINE
 
METEOROLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS
 
Meteorolo ica    Conditions Basis The  meteorological conditions for this scenario were based upon historical meteorological data recorded by the Ginna primary weather tower and the National Weather Service on Au ust 22 1988. Minor editting was performed on the data to provide the wind direction        and  atmospheric  stability conditions required by the scenario during the period of release.
National Weather Service and other Exercise controllers will provide Exercise participants weather forecast summaries based on the meteorological data and other supporting information available from the historical record.
The goal of this approach is to provide participants with more realistic forecast information.
Scenario Assum tions The scenario begins with light, southerly winds which        shift and become northeasterly by mid-morning.
During the period of release      due  to the  Steam  Generator Tube Rupture    (0915-0955 hr), the average        meteorological conditions are as follows:
Wind Speed                5 mph  (at  33  ft)
Wind  Direction          50 degrees    (at  33 ft; wind  from)
Pasquill Stability    =   E
 
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Latest revision as of 10:41, 4 February 2020

Draft Rochester Gas & Electric Corp Ginna Station Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual 1992 Plume Exposure Emergency Preparedness Exercise.
ML17262B109
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/08/1992
From: Backus W, Polfleit P
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17262B108 List:
References
NUDOCS 9212220177
Download: ML17262B109 (42)


Text

THE ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION GZNNA STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE MANUAL 1992 PLUME EXPOSURE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE October 8, 1992 Pre ared By:

Pete S. Polfleit We y H. Backus Reviewed By:

Richard J. Watts Approved By:

R ar J. Beldue (Emergency Pl nning Milestone Committee)

COIROLLRD COPY KO ~

9212220177 920722 PDR ADOCK 05000244 F PDR I-1

SCOPE ~ ()ggpgyyypg J

1~0 SCOPE AND ONSITE OBJECTIVES PLUME EXPOSURE PATHWAY'

~ 1 ~8ao e The 1992 Emergency Preparedness Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise will simulate accident events culminating in a radiological accident resulting in the activation of onsite and offsite facilities. The Exercise will involve events that test the effectiveness of the Ginna Station Emergency Preparedness Program and t integrated capabilities of certain elements of the h e State of New York, Wayne County and Monroe County emergency organizations. The Exercise will include the partial mobilization of state and local resources adequately verify their capability to respond to an t o accident at the Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

1~2 Onsite Ob'ectives for the 1992 Ginna Evaluated Plume Ex osure Pathwa Exercise The major objective of the Exercise is to demonstrate the response capabilities of the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation Emergency Organization. With n this overall objective, numerous individual objectives i

are specified as follows:

1~2~1 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize, staff and activate Emergency Response Facilities promptly.

1~2~2 Demonstrate the ability to fully staff facilities and to maintain staffing on an around-the-clock basis gf-$

through the use of relief shift rosters (limited shift changes may occur to allow for operational restrictions).

1~2 ~3 Demonstrate the ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

1 '+4 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays and the utilization of procedures to support emergency operations.

1 ~ 2~5 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.

1~2~6 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize and deploy Radiation Survey Teams.

1~2~7 Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the determination of ambient radiation levels.

1~2~8 Demonstrate the proper use of appropriate equipment and procedures for measurement of airborne radioiodine concentrations as low as 1.0 E-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.

1~2~9 Demonstrate the ability to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on Plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, Action based on Guidelines, plant conditions, Protective time estimates, expected available shelter, evacuation factors.

release duration, and other appropriate 1 ~ 2 ~ 10 Demonstrate the ability to notify offsite officials and agencies within 15 minutes of declaration of an emergency.

1 ~ 2 ~ 11 Demonstrate the ability to periodically update offsite officials and agencies of the status of the emergency based on data available at Ginna Station.

1 ~ 2 ~ 12 Demonstrate the ability to notify emergency support pools as appropriate (i.e., INPO, ANI, etc.).

1+2 13 Demonstrate the ability to notify onsite personnel using plant alarms and public address systems.

1 2 ~ 14 Demonstrate the organization's ability to assess plant parameters and symptoms indicative of degrading plant conditions, and relate such symptoms to prescribed Emergency Action Levels.

1 ~ 2 ~ 15 Demonstrate the organization's ability to properly classify emergency conditions.

1 ~ 2 16 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an accountability of personnel within the restricted area.

1 ~ 2 ~ 17 Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to the site.

1 ~ 2 18 Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency workers'xposure.

1 ~ 2 19 Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities and displays to support the Joint Emergency News Center operations.

/

1 ~ 2 ~ 20 Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.

1 ~ 2.21 Demonstrate the ability to provide advanced coordination of information released to the public.

1 ~ 2 ~ 22 Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

1 ' '3 Demonstrate the adequacy of in-plant post-accident sampling techniques and analysis.

1 ~ 2 ~ 24 Demonstrate the ability to develop preliminary short-term and long-term actions to support plant recovery.

1 ~ 2 ~ 25 Demonstrate the proper use of back-up communications in the event of selected communications e q u i p m e n t malfunction.

1 ~ 2 ~ 26 Demonstrate the ability to mobilize principal portions of the licensee emergency organization on an off-hours, unannounced basis. To be erformed as a musterin drill durin November 1992 1' '7 Demonstrate the ability to conduct a post-exercise critique which adequately characterizes licensee performance based upon controller and observer assessments.

1 3 Summar of Pro pseud Activities Table 1.1 provides a list of proposed RGEE activities.

TABLE 1 ~ 1 1992 GINNA STATION EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE PLUME EXPOSURE PROPOSED ONSITE ACTIVITIES RGSE Notification of Agencies Actual Call Up of Personnel Actual*

Activate Organization Actual>>

Maintain Security Actual Conduct. Dose Assessment Actual protective Action Recommendations Actual Operate Joint News Center Actual Dispatch Field Survey Teams Actual-3**

Obtain PASS Sample Actual Call up of personnel and facility activation will be performed in sequence. A separate, off-hours mustering drill will be November 9, 1992.

conducted during the week of Field teams will be deployed and will demonstrate appropriate field monitoring techniques and communications with respective emergency response facilities. A minimum of 1 onsite and 2 offsite teams will be deployed.

SIMULATIONS o Respiratory protection and protective clothing will be simulated by onsite/offsite survey teams. In-Plant team-will don respiratory protection and protective clothing prescribed by Health Physics and Chemistry p e r s on n e 1 according to postulated scenario plant conditions.

o In general, Exercise participants should follow applied&

plant procedures as closely as possible, and will be stopped by Controllers before actual equipment is manipulated (except PASS). Simulated repairs and other corrective actions should be described to Controller-

/Evaluators as fully as possible.

SUMMARY

OF PROPOSED OFFSITE ACTIVITIES It is anticipated that Wayne and Monroe Counties and New York State personnel will participate to perform the following minimum functions:

1. Command and Control
2. Dose Assessment
3. Joint New Center Staffing
4. Protective Action Decisionmaking
5. Communications

EXERCISE SCENARIO GINNA STATION 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE INITIAL CONDITIONS 1~ The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant is operating at approximately 974 rated thermal power. The Plant has been operating at this power level continuously for approximately 150 days.

2 ~ The "A" Steam Generator (S/G) primary to secondary leak rate increased approximately 5 days ago to a calculated 60cc/min. At approximately 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br /> this morning the primary to secondary leak rate has again increased significantly as indicated by a substantial increase in radiation monitor R-15 (Air Ejector). Radiation monitor R-19 (S/G Blowdown) has also indicated an increase in activity. The Health Physics/ Chemistry Department is in the process of analyzing samples to determine the calculated leak rate.

3 ~ Equilibrium Primary Coolant Isotopic activity as of 0300 hours0.00347 days <br />0.0833 hours <br />4.960317e-4 weeks <br />1.1415e-4 months <br /> (10/8/92 is provided in table 9.2 of scenario Section 9.3. Total activity is 2.56 microcuries/gram.

Chemistry Log Sheet, available from the Controller.

4 ~ The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) total leakage is 0.361 GPM as of 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> this morning and has been increasing.

Identified RCS Leakage is 0.073 GPM.

5. General weather conditions are partly cloudy with no current precipitation. For purposes of the Exercise, additional meteorological information in the Simulator Control Room should be obtained from the Plant Process Computer System (PPCS).
6. The Primary Water Treatment Plant is secured for major maintenance that will take approximately 3 days. the 100,000 Gallon Outside Condensate Storage Tank is at 20%

Level. A Demineralizer Trailer has been ordered and is scheduled to arrive at 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> today.

7~ The House Heating Boiler is in service and Nuclear Steam is secured.

GINNA STATION 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE ONSITE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION 0700 -00/15 Initial Conditions established 0715 00/00 Announcement to Commence Annual Emergency Exercise 0730 00/15 The Health Physics/Chemistry Department informs the Control Room that the "A" S/G UNUSUAL calculated leak rate is approximately EVENT 450cc/min (i.e., = 0.125 gpm).

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators should begin performing the applicable actions of Operating Procedure 0-6.10 (Plant Operations with Steam Generator Tube Leak Indication).

An orderly Plant shutdown should commence to be in Hot Shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to be less than 350'F in the RCS within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> as required by Plant, Technical Specification.

An Unusual Event should be declared in accordance with EPIP 1-0, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Classification," EAL:

Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR); Steam Generator Tube Leakage >

.1 GPM as identified by sampling.

Appropriate offsite notifications should be made per EPIP 1-5.

If an Unusual Event not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message should be given out to declare it.

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION 0755 00/40 The "A" S/G ARV pops open and cannot be closed from the Control Room.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Should send an Auxiliary Operator to the Steam Header Area to close the Isolation Valve on the "A" S/G ARV.

Operators performing the applicable actions of 0-2.1.

Technical Su ort Center The Plant Manager, Operations Assessment Manager, and Duty Engineer should be manning the TSC for Offsite Communications Assistance per EPIP 1-5.

0810 00/55 The Auxiliary Operator sent to isolate the "A" S/G ARV reports to the Control Room that the "A" S/G ARV is isolated, but he has noticed a steam leak on the "B" S/G ARV, between the ARV and the ARV Isolation Valve.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Should inform people manning the TSC of the "B" S/G ARV Line steam leak.

May request Auxiliary Operator to isolate the "B" S/G ARV.

Operators performing the applicable actions of 0-2.1.

Should inform the people manning the TSC of the "A" S/G ARV problem and isolation.

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION Technical Su ort Center May request that the "B" S/G ARV be isolated or may wait until Maintenance personnel have inspected it.

May inform Control Room that they will take actions to have Maintenance personnel inspect for the "A" And "B" S/G ARV problems.

0815 01/00 Annunciator G-22 (ADFCS System Trouble) alarms.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators perform the applicable actions of AR-G.22.

Operators should check the S/G levels to ensure proper level control.

Operators should inform the people manning the TSC and I & C Department of the ADFCS problem.

The CCW Surge Tank Lo Level Alarm (AR-A-13) 0840 01/25 annunciates and the CCW level indicates it is decreasing.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators perform the applicable actions of Alarm Response Procedure AR-A-13 (CCW Surge Tank Lo Level 41.24).

Operators should send an Auxiliary Operator into the Auxiliary Building to identify the CCW Leak.

Should inform the people manning the TSC of the CCW leak.

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION 0850 Ol/35 Auxiliary Operator checking the CCW leak in Auxiliary Building informs Control Room that the lA CCW Pump Mechanical Seal is leaking and spraying on the pump motor.

The running 1A CCW Pump trips out on overcurrent and annunciator (AR-A-17) alarms. The standby 1B CCW pump starts automatically and deliverers required flow.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators perform the applicable actions of abnormal procedure AP-CCW.2 (Loss of CCW during power operation).

Operators request the Auxiliary Operator sent to identify the CCW leak in the Auxiliary Building, to isolate the suction and discharge of the 1A CCW Pump and rack out its electrical breaker.

Operators should inform the people manning the TSC of the 1A CCW Pump problems.

0855 01/40 The ADFCS problem with the MFW Regulating Valves is repaired.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators continue shutting Plant down per 0-2.1.

0905 01/45 Auxiliary Operator isolating the 1A CCW Pump informs Control Room that the Suction and Discharge Valves are closed and the electrical breaker is racked out.

NTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators should ensure that 1A CCW Pump Control Switch is in pull stop and CCW Surge Tank level has returned to normal.

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION 0915 02/00 The following events occur simultaneously:

~ Pressurizer level and pressure decreases ALERT uncontrollably.

~ A reactor trip occurs automatically from low pressurizer pressure or is manually activated by the operator.

~ A safety injection occurs automatically from low pressurizer pressure or is manually activated by the operator.

~ The <<A" S/G water level increases uncontrollably.

~ All safeguards equipment required is operating.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators performing the immediate actions of E-0 (Reactor trip or safety injection).

An ALERT should be declared in accordance with EPIP 1-0, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation and Classification," EAL: Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR): SGRT >

100 GPM. Appropriate onsite and offsite notifications should be made per EPIP 1-5.

If and ALERT is not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message should be given out to declare it.

Operators transition to E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) and start performing its applicable actions.

0945 02/30 Accident Response and Evaluation continues.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators performing the applicable actions of E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) to stabilize the Plant.

0

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION Technical Su ort Cente The TSC should be nearing operational readiness of the Emergency Response Organization.

The TSC, when operational, should send repair teams into the Auxiliary Building to evaluate the 1A CCW Pump and motor problems.

The TSC, when operational should send repair teams out to evaluate the >>A>> and >>B>> S/G ARV problems if not already done.

Emer enc 0 erations Facilit EOF may be activating at this time due to Plant conditions.

1000 02/45 Accident response and evaluation continues.

TICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators performing the applicable actions of E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture) to stabilize the Plant.

Technical Su ort Center The TSC should be assuming command and control.

1015 03/00 Annunciator J-9 (Safeguard Breaker Trip)

Alarms.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room When operators check the Board, the >>A>> SW Pump Switch indicates a white disagreement light and the >>A>> SW Pump indicates tripped.

Operators/TSC should send an Auxiliary Operator to the Screen House to check on >>A>>

SW pump.

Operators should inform the TSC of the >>A>>

SW Pump problem.

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION 1030 03/15 The Auxiliary Operator sent to the Screen House to check the "A" SW Pump reports to SITE AREA the Control Room/TSC that he can find EMERGENCY nothing wrong with the "A" SW Pump but he has smelled the strong odor of gas through-out the building with the strongest odor in the Basement.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Should request that the Auxiliary Operator find the shutoff valves for the natural gas and propane gas to the Screen House and close them.

Should inform the TSC of the gas problem in the Screen House.

If not already isolated, should send Auxiliary Operator to isolate the "B" an S/G ARV when requested to do.

Technical Su ort Center The TSC, after assessing Plant conditions, should:

Declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY in accordance with EPIP 1-0, "Ginna Station Event Evaluation 'and Classification," EAL:

Hazards being experienced or projected; entry of uncontrolled flammable gases into vital areas.

Appropriate notifications of offsite agencies should be made per EPIP 1-5.

If a Site Area Emergency is not declared in approximately 15 minutes, a contingency message should be given to declare it.

TSC should inform the EOF of Plant conditions and the Site Area Emergency Declaration.

A is Site Evacuation should determined necessary.

be commenced if it

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION Re air Teams Repair team sent out to check the CCW Pump should report that the 1A CCW Pump Mechanical seal needs replacing and that the 1A CCW Pump motor needs to be cleaned and dried. They report this will take approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. They also report that the 1B CCW Pump Mechanical Seal is leaking a small amount.

Repair Team sent out to check the "A" S/G ARV control problem should report that the ARV's Mercoid controller needs to be replaced. They report that approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to do.

it will take If not done earlier, the Repair Team sent out to check the "B" S/G ARV Steam leak request that it be isolated.

1045 03/30 Accident response and evaluation continues.

If not done earlier, the Auxiliary Operator sent out to isolate the "B" S/G ARV steam leak reports back that it is isolated.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Co trol Room Operators performing the actions of E-3 (Steam Generator Tub Rupture) should have stabilized the Plant at approximately this time and be awaiting determination by the TSC as to what post SGTR cooldown procedure to use.

If not of the done earlier, should inform the TSC "B" S/G ARV steam leak isolation.

Technical Su ort Center The TSC should be evaluating the flammable gas problem in the Screen House and be taking corrective actions required to return the Screen House to a safe condition.

The TSC Dose Assessment should calculate and quantify any release paths to the environment.

TSC should have determined and informed the Control Room to use ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown using Backfill).

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION Re air Teams Repair sent out to check the "B" S/G Team ARV steam leak reports that it the steam leak was from a >-inch hole appears that drilled almost through the pipe, and also that a flange is leaking.

They report that one and a half it hours will take approximately to repair the leak.

1100 03/45 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) levels decrease to 5 feet.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators should refer to ER-AFW.1 (Alternate Water Supply to AFW Pumps) per foldout page of ES-3.1, Statement 4, which states, "If CST level decreases to less than 5 feet, then switch to alternate AFW supply (Refer to ER-AFW.1, Alternate Water Supply to AFW Pumps) and perform applicable actions.

Should inform TSC of the low level in the CSTs.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER TSC evaluating Plant conditions and taking action where required.

TSC should inform security of the as found condition of the "B" S/G ARV steam leak.

TSC Dose Assessment performing offsite dose calculations as required.

TSC should be expediting the repair of the S/G ARVs because of their use during such events as loss of condenser and Plant cooldown.

TSC should send a Repair Team to check out the "A" SW Pump problem when the Screen House is declared safe for entry.

TSC should inform EOF of Plant status and problems.

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME . TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION

~eecurit Should be evaluating the drilled hole in the "B" S/G ARV pipe.

Emer enc 0 eration Facilit The EOF, assessing after it is manned, should Plant conditions and take start action as required.

1120 04/05 The "A" S/G ARV Mercoid is repaired and ready for return to service.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Room Operators performing applicable actions of ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown using Backfill).

Operators performing applicable actions ER-AFW.1.

Operators should return the "A" S/G ARV to service if requested by the TSC.

Technical Su ort Center TSC evaluating Plant conditions and taking actions where required.

TSC Dose Assessment performing offsite dose calculations as required.

TSC may request the Control Room to return the "A" S/G ARV to service.

~Secur it Should be evaluating the nB" S/G ARV drilled hole in the pipe.

Emer enc 0 erations Facilit EOF should be assessing Plant conditions and taking action as required.

APPROPRIATE SCENARIO TIME TIME EVENT DESCRIPTION EOF Dose Assessment should be performing offsite Dose Assessment, as required, in parallel with the TSC Dose Assessment.

The EOF should be assuming command and control at approximately this time.

Re air Teams Performing actions as required to return equipment to service as soon as possible.

1145 04/30 The >>B>> S/G ARV steam leak is repaired and ready for return to service.

ANTICIPATED RESULTS Control Roo Operators should be performing the applicable actions of the ES-3.1 (Post-SGTR Cooldown using Backfill).

Technical Su ort Center TSC evaluating Plant conditions and taking action as required.

EOF evaluating Plant conditions and taking action as required.

TSC should request Control Room to return the >>B>> S/G ARV to service.

=1230 05/15 Recover/Re-entry discussions should commence. This should include preliminary discussions about short term and intermediate term concerns, including preliminary designation of the Recovery Organization.

State and counties may also conduct parallel discussions. Recovery/Re-entry interface between TSC/EOF and offsite agencies should be demonstrated as time allows.

<<1315 06/00 After all Exercise Objectives have been demonstrated, the Exercise will be terminated.

RADIOLOGICALS RY 9.1 Radiolo ical Summar A Source Term The radiological source term assumed for this scenario was selected to include appropriate quantities of noble gas and radioiodine resulting from the postulated accident scenario.

Protective action recommendations i.e., sheltering or evacuation for certain Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) will not be required based upon the anticipated declaration of a Site Area Emergency and plant conditions. As a result of accident release rates, the projected whole body and thyroid doses will not exceed EPA Protective Action Guides beyond the Site Boundary.

The assumed noble gas and radioiodine release quantities are shown in Figure 9.1 as a function of time. The scenario involves two release points which is from the Air Ejector and the "A" Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV). This occurs as follows:

Pre-Steam Generator Tube Rupture Time Release Point Release Rate C'ec 0700- Air Ejector 1.77 E-3 (Noble Gas) 0915 2.24 E-8 (Radioiodine)

The noble gas-to-radioiodine ratio assumed is 7.89 E4:1 during this period of release.

Time Release Point Release Rate Ci sec 0755- 8.32 E-3 (Noble Gas) 0810 1.76 E-9 (Radioiodine)

The noble gas-to-radioiodine ratio assumed is 7.89 E4:1 during this period of release.

Steam Generator Tube Rupture Time 8 Release Rate Ci sec 0915- Air Ejector 5.24 E-1 (Noble Gas) 0935 2.55 E-4 (Radioiodine)

The noble gas-to-radioiodine ratio assumed is 2000:1 during this period of release. Isotopic breakdowns of assumed noble gas, radioiodine and particulate release quantities are provided in Table 9.1.

Time Release Point Release Rate Ci sec 0935- Air Ejector 6.23 E-2 (Noble Gas) 0955 3.12 E-5 (Radioiodine)

The noble gas-to-radioiodine ratio assumed is 2000:1 during this period of release. Isotopic breakdowns of assumed noble gas, radioiodine and particulate release quantities are provided in Table 9.1.

B. Inte rated Offsite Doses Due to Plume E osure The downwind integrated doses from the scenario release are as follows:

Time Release Point Inte rated Dose Rem 0700- Air Ejector 1.25 E-4 (Whole Body) 0915 8.75 E-7 (Child Thyroid) 0755- 6.S2 E-5 (Whole Body) 0810 7.63 E-9 (Child Thyroid)

F 0915- Air Ejector 5.34 E-3 (Whole Body) 0935 1.48 E-3 (Child Thyroid) 0936- Air Ejector 6.S1 E-4 (Whole Body) 0955 1.81 E-4 (Child Thyroid)

Total Whole Body Dose (at 8ite Boundary) = 6.13 E-3 Rem Total Child Thyroid Dose (at 8ite Boundary) = 1.66 E-3 Rem C. Princi al Plant Radiolo ical Indications Figures 9.1 through 9.3 provide trend plots for key plant radiological indications, including plant vent concentration, letdown monitor level, containment radiation level and reactor coolant concentration.

TABLE 9 The assumed release quantities for the Ginna Exercise Scenario are summarized as follovs:

Time: 0915-0935 hr Nuclide Curie Sec Total Curies Released Kr-85 4. 0 E-04 4.8 E-01 Kr-85m 1.3 E-02 1.7 E+01 Kr-87 1' E-02 2.3 E+01 Kr-88 2 ' E-02 2.5 E+01 Xe-131m 4.9 E-03 5.9 E+00 Xe-133 3' E-01 4.0 E+02 Xe-133m 4.9 E-02 5.9 E+01 Xe-135 4.9 E-02 5.9 E+01 Xe-135m 1.6 E-02 1.9 E+01 Xe-138 6' E-02 7.6 E+01 Total Noble Gas 5~2 E-01 6 ' E+02 I-131 7.5 E-05 9 ' E-02 I-132 4.9 E-05 5' E-02 I-133 4.6 E-05 5.5 E-02 I-134 4' E-05 5.0 E-02 I-135 4' E-05 5' E-02 Total Radioiodine 2~6 E-04 3~1 E-01 Long-Lived Particulate 1+2 E-09 1~5 E-06

TABLE 9.1 (continued)

The assumed release quantities for the Ginna Exercise Scenario are summarized as follows:

Time : 0936 0955 hr Nuclide Curie Sec Total Curies Released Kr-85 4.8 E-05 5' E-02 Kr-85m 1.5 E-03 1.8 E+00 Kr-87 2.1 E-03 2.5 E+00 Kr-88 2.5 E-03 3.0 E+00 Xe-131m 5.8 E-04 7.0 E-01 Xe-133 3.9 E-02 4.7 E+01 Xe-133m 5.8 E-03 7.0 E+00 Xe-135 5.8 E-03 7.0 E+00 Xe-135m 1.9 E-03 2.3 E+00 Xe-138 7.5 E-03 9.0 E+00 Total Noble Gas 6 ' E 02 7 ~ 5 E+01 I-131 8.9 E-06 F 1 E-02 I-132 5.8 E-06 7.0 E-03 I-133 5.5 E-06 6' E-03 l-134 5.0 E-06 6' E-03 I-135 5.1 E-06 6' E-03 Total Radioiodine 3~1 E-05 3 ' E-02 Long-Lived Particulate 1 ~ 4 E-10 i+7 E 07

FIGURE 9.1 ASSUMED SOURCE TERMS C I/SEC 1.0E+00 - -; .

1.0E -01 1.0E -02 1.0E-03 1.0E -04 1.0E-05 1.0E-06 1.0E -07 1.0E-08 1.0E-09 1.0E-10 1.0E-11 77788888999999000011112222 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 34501134013345013401340134 0 5 5 0 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 6 5 6 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 CLOCK TIME

~ NOBLE GAS CI/SEC ~ RADIOIODINE CI/SEC

FIGURE 9.2 AIR EJECTOR VENT CONCENTRATIONS U CI/CC 1.0E+01 1.0E+00 1.0E -01 1.0E -02 1.0E -03 1.0E -04 1.0E -05 1.0E -06 1.0E -07 1.0E -08 1.0E -09 1.0E -10 1.0E-11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 3 4 5 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 5 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 OLOCK TIME NOBLE GAS ~ RADIOIODINE

FIGURE 9.3 RCS CONCENTRATIONS VS TIME UCI/GM 1.0E +02 1.0E+01 1.0E+00 1.0E -01 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 1 3 4 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 CLOCK TIME TOTAL GAS ~ TOTAL IODINE

METEOROLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS

Meteorolo ica Conditions Basis The meteorological conditions for this scenario were based upon historical meteorological data recorded by the Ginna primary weather tower and the National Weather Service on Au ust 22 1988. Minor editting was performed on the data to provide the wind direction and atmospheric stability conditions required by the scenario during the period of release.

National Weather Service and other Exercise controllers will provide Exercise participants weather forecast summaries based on the meteorological data and other supporting information available from the historical record.

The goal of this approach is to provide participants with more realistic forecast information.

Scenario Assum tions The scenario begins with light, southerly winds which shift and become northeasterly by mid-morning.

During the period of release due to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture (0915-0955 hr), the average meteorological conditions are as follows:

Wind Speed 5 mph (at 33 ft)

Wind Direction 50 degrees (at 33 ft; wind from)

Pasquill Stability = E

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