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{{#Wiki_filter:DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT ATTACHMENT NO. 1 TO AEP:NRC:0894F TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DESCRIPTIONS Chan e No. 1 Unit  No. 1:    Page 3/4 1-11; Section 3.1.2.3, 4.1.2.3.2 Page 3/4 4-3; Section 3.4.1.3 Page 3/4 4-3d; Section 4.4.1.4.2 Page 3/4 4-31; Section 3.4.9.3 Page 3/4 5-7; Section 3.5.3 Page 3/4 5-8; Section 4.5.3.2 Page 3/4 4-1; Section 3/4.4.1 Page B 3/4 4-11; Section 3/4 4.9 Page B 3/4 5-2; Section 3/4 5.2 and 3/4 5.3 Page B 3/4 1-3 Section 3/4.1.2 The above listed pages reflect the revised limits for cold overpressurization which were computed based on the revised heatup'-cooldown curves forwarded to the NRC in our letter no. AEP:NRC:0894E dated July 18, 1985.
The proposed change constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications and complies with changes in the federal regulations. We believe that the of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria since they
                                                                                'esults are the direct result of an evaluation using methods previously accepted by the NRC. Therefore  we  believe the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration    as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.
8507260241'50719 PDR," ADOCK"-:
P 05000315
                        .iPDR~,
 
ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:0894F
 
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP    - SHUTG$ 5 LIMITING CONOITION      FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump fn the boron fnjectfon flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of befng powered from              an OPERABLE    emergency bus.
APPLICABILITY:      MOOES 5  and 6.
ACTION:
: a. Mfth no charging    pump OPERABLE,    suspend  all  operations involving  CORE ALTERATIONS  or positive reactivity.
: b. fifth more than  one charging pump OPERABLE or with a safety fnjectfon pump(s) OPERABLE when the temperature of any RCS cold leg fs less than or equal to 170'g unless the reactor vessel head fs removed, remove the additional charging pump(s) and the safety injection pumpl',s) motor circuit breakers from the electrical power circuit within one hour.
: c.  'he    provisions of Specification 3.0.3 ar not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS
: 4. 1.2.3.1 The above required charging        pump  shall  be demonstrated  OPERABLE  at least once per 31 days by:
: a. Starting (unless already operating) the      pump  from the  control room,
: b. Verifying, that on recirculation flow, the      pump  develops a discharge pressureiof > 2390 psig,
: c. Verifying pump operation for at least      15 mfnutes, and
: d. Verifying that the    pump is aligned to receive electrical power from an OPERABLE emergency    bus.
: 4. 1.2.3.2 All charging pumps and safety injection pumps, excluding the above requi~ed OPERABLE charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits at least once per 12 hours, except when:
: a. The  reactor vessel  head  is removed, or
: b. The  temperature of  all  RCS cold legs fs greater than      170'P
: 0. C. COOK  - UNIT 1                    3/4 1-11              Aiendment No.
 
r I
 
REACTOR COOLANT S SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION          FOR OPERATION
                      ~  ~
3,4. 1.3    ae  At 1east be of the coolant loops listed below shall            be OPERABLK:
Reactor Coolant Loop 1 and  fts  associated  stean generator and reactor coolant P.+VI
: 2. Reactor Coolant Loop 2 and  fts associated    steam generator and reactor coolant puap,>>
: 3. Reactor Coolant Loop 3 and  fts associated    stean generator and reactor coolant pNlp g*
: 4. Reactor Coolant Loop 4 and  its  associated  steam generator and reactor coolant pump,>>
: 5. Resfdual Heat Removal  - East,>>>>
: 6. Resfdual Heat Removal  - Rest,>>>>
: b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operatfon.>>>>>>
APPL. CABILITY'/OOKS 4 and        5 ACT lON:
: a. Mfth less than the above required loops OPKRABLK, imnedfftely inftfate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; be in COLO SHUTOCMH with-in 20 hours.
: b.  <lith no coolant loop in. operation, suspend aII operations in-volving    a reduction in boron concentration of :;".e Reactor Cool-ant Systan and immedfately ini-iate corrective a "..on to retu~
the required coolant loop to operation.
  ~A  reactor  coo ant pump    shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold Ieg temperatures less than or equal to 170 oF unless I) the pressurizer water volume is less th'an S2.00% of span or 2) the secondary wacer temperature of each steam generator is less than SO oF above each of the RCS cold leg temper-atures. Operability of a reactor coolant loop(s) does not require an QPKRASLK auxiliary feedwater      system.
'he    normal or anergency power source may be inoperable in          NOOK  5, AII reactor coolant pumps and residual heat removal. pumps may be de-energiz o cr up .to I hour prov '.ed >) io operant ons -;re ge!~itteo that wou,d "muse dilution of the reac.or cooIant system boron concentration, and Iiet temperature is ;,.sintained at least iO      F  below saturxt'.on ii  core cut-tmoeratur e.
O. C. Cook      Vnft I                        3/4 4-3                      Amendment No.
 
REaCTOa    Caput    SVSTe ACTION    Contf nued Below    P 7:N
: a. Startup and Power operation below P-7 may proceed provfded at lease two reactor coolant loops and associated pmps are in operation.
: b. Hot standby, hot shutdown, and cold shutdown operation may proceed provfded at least one reactor coolant'oop fn operatfon with an assocfated reactor coolant or residual heat r'emoval pump; however, operatfon for up to 15 minutes with no pump fn operation fs permfssfble to accoamodate transftfon between residual heat removal pump and reactor coolant pump oper ation.
: c. The  provfsions of Specfffcatfons 3.0.3 and        3.0.4're  not applfcable.
SURVEILLANCE REOUI    REAGENTS 4,4.1.4.1      Nth  one  reactor coolant loop  and  associated  pump not in operation, at least    once  per  7 days  determine that:
The  applicable reactor trip system and/br ESF actuation system instrumentation channels specified in the. ACTION statements above have been placed in their tripped conditions, and I
: b. If  P-8  fnterlock setpoint has been reset for      3  loop operation,  its setpoint is c 76K of RATEO THERNAL POSER.
4.4.1.4.2 Within 30 minutes prior to the start of a reactor coolant              pump when any  RCS cold leg temperature        is <170 F, verify that:
: a. The  temperature of the secondary water of each steam gener ator is
            <  50'F above the temoer ature of each of the RCS cold legs, or
: b. The  pressurizer water volume is less than 111& cubic feet, equivalent to less than    62K indicated on the wide range. level indica-or.
A  reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures'ess than or equal to17Q F unless 1) the pressurizer
~ater volume is less than 111& cubic feet        (62'f    span or 2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 504F above each of ter RCS cold leg temperatures.
D. C. Cook      - Unit    1                3/4 4-36                    Amendment Ho.
 
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE        PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONOITION        FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3    At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:
: a. Two power      operated relief valves (PORVs) with a  lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig, or
: b. One power      operated relief valve  (PORV) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig and the RHR safety      valve with a lift setting of less than or equal to 450 psig; or
: c. A    reactor coolant system vent of greater than or equal to    2 square ddd',dd t,dddiinches.
APPLICABILITY: When the temperature ACTION:
of one  or more of the  RCS cold legs is d:
: a. With two PORV's inoperable or with one PORV inoperable and the RHR safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV(s) or RHR safety valve to OPFRABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through an at least 2 square inch vent(s) within the next 8 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve has been restored to OPERABLE status.
: b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through an at least, 2 square inch vent(s) within 8 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs or one PORV and the RHR safety valve have been restored to OPERABLE status.
C.      In the event either the PORVs, the RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action neet;ssary to prevent recurrence.
The  provisions of Specificatioh 3.0.4 are not applicable.
O.C. COOK    -  UNIT 1                  3/4 4-31                      Amendment No.
 
~ ~
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS
                        - T      < 350 F I
LIMITIHG COHOITION      FOR OPERATION 3.5.3    As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem        comprised  of the following shall  be OPERABLE:
: a. One OPERABLE    centrifugal charging    pump,P
: b. One OPERABLE    residual heat removal heat exchanger,
: c. One OPERABLE    residual heat removal    pump, and
: d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.
APPLICABILITY:      MODE  4.
ACTION:
: a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.
: b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the residual heat removal heat exchanger or residual heat removal pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPFRABLE status or main-tain the Reactor Coolant System T            less than 3504F by use of alternate heat removal methods.
c      With more than one charging pump OPERABLE or with a safety injection pump(s) OPERABLE when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 170op, remove the additional charging pump(s) and safety injection pump{s) motor circuit breakers from the                'he electrical power circuit within 1 hour.
: d. In the event the    ECCS  is actuated  and  injects water into the'Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and'ubmitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within'90 days describ-ing the circumstances of the. actuation and the total accumulated actuation cyc1es to data.
4A maximum    of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE and both safety injection pumps shall be inoperable whenever the temperature of              one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than ol equal to77Q+F .
: 0. C. COOK    UHIT 1                    3/4 5-7                    Amendment No.
 
EMERGENCY CORE CGGLIN(s SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE UIR91EHTS 4.5.3.X The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated  OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.
4.5.3.2  All charging pumps and safety infection pumps, except the above required OPERABLE  charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits, at, least once per K hours whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 170"F as determined at least. once per hour when any RCS cold leg temperature is between! 170 F and 200 F.
: 0. C. COOK  UNIT 1                3/4 5-8                  Amendment No.
 
845KS CTCf              LOdPS
        >~e  plant fs desfgned to operate wfQl all reac -r coolant loots in o era ion, and eafnafn ORBS aoove I 30 during all norrlal operatfons and a;rtf cf oated  transf  ents    Wf th  one  reactor  cool ant loop rnot f n operatf on, TwReL P$ 4N is          reetrfctact  to  c  51  percent  of RATN THEROL, PSRR untf1 the trip  is                              ensur'es that the CNSR wf ll be gyes arrrOerature mafntafned if operatfng aoove aoove 4T 1.30.
P-7 A
(11 reset.
1oss  .of percent Either flee of fn RATS
                                                        ~
action loops THBNL wf11 cause a reac.or trip PS'ER) whf1 ~ a loss fn one loop will cause 4 reactor trip ff operating above P 8 (SZ percent of'low of  RA-EO THER<PL PC'~ER).
tn MOOE 3, a sfngle reactor coolant loop provfdes sufffcfent. heat, removal capability for crowing decay heat; however, sfngle faflure consfderatfons r
requiri that two loops be OPERABLE.
tn          4 and    5, a  single reactor coolant loop        or      loop provides NOOES sufi'fcfent heat      removal    capability      i'r removfng            RHR decay heat; but single i'af lure consfderatfons.require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus,                      ff the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this- speci ffcatfon requires two RHR 1oops to be OPERABLE.
The operatfon of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mfxfng, prevent stratfffcatfon and, produce gradual reactfvfty changes during boron concentration reductions fn the Reactor Coolant Systerrr.
The reaCtfVfty Change rate aSSOCfated Wfth bOrOn reduCtfOn ~f11, therefOre, be
~i:hin the caaabflfty of operator recognition and contro1.
The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump below P-7                with one or  more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 170 F are provided to                  prevent RCS  pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure              transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into or (2) by restricting starting of the RCP's to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50 F above each of the RCS  cold leg temperatures.
3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3        SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS Erom being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any over-pressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop , connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.
: 0. C. COOK    UNIT  1                  B  3/441                        Aneneaont No.        7B
 
Th>>  shift in RT~ of      the vessel material vill be established periodically    during  operation    by removing and evaluating, in accord-ance with  ASTM  E185-73,  reactor  vessel material irradiation surveillance    specimens  installed  near the inside wa11 of the reactor vessel in  the  core  area. Since  the  neutron spectra at. the irradiation samples  and  vessel  inside  radius  are  essentially identical/ the transi-tion  shift  for a  sample  can  be  applied  with confidence to the adjacent section of the reactor vessel. The heatup and cooldown curves mat be recalculated when the 4 RT          determined from the surveillance capsule is different from the calcuRaed 4 RT          NDT for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.
The  pressure-temperature      limit. lines shown on tiguze 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and    for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been pro vided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requizeaentN            of Appendix 0 to 10    CFR  50.
The number    of reactor vessel irzadiation surveillance 'specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in Table 4.4-5 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CPR  Part 50.
s The limitations imposed on pressurizer heatup and cooldown and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated vithin the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.
The OPKRASlLITY of two PORYs, one PORV and the RHR safety valve, or an RCS  vent opening of greater than or equal to 2 square inches ensures that the RCS  w)11 be protected free pressure trans)ants which could exceed the ill)ts of Append)x G to 10 CFR Part $0 when one or ONE of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 170 F. Either PORV or RHR safety valve has adequate relieving capah)lfty to protect the RCS free overpressurlzatkon when the transfent fs 1<afte(s to ~ steer (1)'ha start of en 141 ~ Rcp eath the satan(Nry ((star teaeera-ture of the steaa generator less than or equal to 544f above the RCS cold leg taiperatures or (2) the start of a charging puap an4 its )nfectton into a water col )d RCS.
De Ca  COOK~ZT 1                        I 3/4  4 11                Aaendaent Ho.
 
~ ~
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES Nth the    RCS  temperature below-350 F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem fs acceptable without single failure con'sfderatfon on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and safety injec-tion pumps, except the required OPERABLE charging pump, to be inoperable below 170~F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.
The  Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures  that at a minimum, the assumptions used fn the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY fs maintained.      Surveillance requfrements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained fn the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the pfpfng system to each injection point fs necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout condi-tions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points fn accordance with the assump-tions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an. acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
3/4. 5.4  BORON  INJECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY    of the boron injection system  as part of the  ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent    depressurization,  a loss-of-coolant accident or  a steam line rupture.
The  limits  on injection tank minimum contained volume and boron concentration ensure  that the assumptions used fn the steam line break analysis are met.
The OPERABILITY    of the redundant heat tracing channels associated with the boron injection system ensure that the solubility of the boron solution will .be maintained above the solubility limit of 135 F at 21000 ppm boron.
: 0. C. COOK  -  UNIT 1              8  3/4 5-2              Aaandment No.
 
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORATION SYSTEMS      Conti nued  .
With the RCS average temperature above 2004F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change fn the event the single injection sy'tem becomes inoperable.
The  limitation for  a maximum  of one centrifugal charging  pump  to be OPERABLE and  the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps      and  safety injec-tion pumps, except the required OPERABLE charging pump, to be inoperable below 170'F, unless the reactor vessel head fs removed, provides assurance that a mass addftion pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.
The  boratfon capability required below 2004F fs sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN    of IX 4k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 2004F to 1404F.
This condition requires either 835 gallons of 20,000 ppm borated water from the borfc acid storage tanks of 9690 gallons of 1950 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.
3/4. 1.3    MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod ejection accident.
OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators fs required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion      limits.
The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors, or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restric-tions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. The reactivfty worth of a misaligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used fn the accident nnalysi's for a-rod ejection accident.
The maximum rod drop    time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used  in the accident analyses. Measurement with T  > 541'F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.
: 0. C. COOK - UNIT 1                  B 3/4 1-3              Aaendment No.
 
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Latest revision as of 01:32, 4 February 2020

Proposed Tech Spec Changes,Reflecting Revised Cold Overpressurization Limits for Heatup & Cooldown Curves
ML17321A731
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 07/19/1985
From:
INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17321A730 List:
References
NUDOCS 8507260241
Download: ML17321A731 (16)


Text

DONALD C. COOK NUCLEAR PLANT ATTACHMENT NO. 1 TO AEP:NRC:0894F TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE DESCRIPTIONS Chan e No. 1 Unit No. 1: Page 3/4 1-11; Section 3.1.2.3, 4.1.2.3.2 Page 3/4 4-3; Section 3.4.1.3 Page 3/4 4-3d; Section 4.4.1.4.2 Page 3/4 4-31; Section 3.4.9.3 Page 3/4 5-7; Section 3.5.3 Page 3/4 5-8; Section 4.5.3.2 Page 3/4 4-1; Section 3/4.4.1 Page B 3/4 4-11; Section 3/4 4.9 Page B 3/4 5-2; Section 3/4 5.2 and 3/4 5.3 Page B 3/4 1-3 Section 3/4.1.2 The above listed pages reflect the revised limits for cold overpressurization which were computed based on the revised heatup'-cooldown curves forwarded to the NRC in our letter no. AEP:NRC:0894E dated July 18, 1985.

The proposed change constitutes an additional limitation, restriction or control not presently included in the Technical Specifications and complies with changes in the federal regulations. We believe that the of the change are clearly within all acceptable criteria since they

'esults are the direct result of an evaluation using methods previously accepted by the NRC. Therefore we believe the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10 CFR 50.92.

8507260241'50719 PDR," ADOCK"-:

P 05000315

.iPDR~,

ATTACHMENT 2 TO AEP:NRC:0894F

A ~

~

I

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP - SHUTG$ 5 LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump fn the boron fnjectfon flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of befng powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MOOES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

a. Mfth no charging pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity.
b. fifth more than one charging pump OPERABLE or with a safety fnjectfon pump(s) OPERABLE when the temperature of any RCS cold leg fs less than or equal to 170'g unless the reactor vessel head fs removed, remove the additional charging pump(s) and the safety injection pumpl',s) motor circuit breakers from the electrical power circuit within one hour.
c. 'he provisions of Specification 3.0.3 ar not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS

4. 1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by:
a. Starting (unless already operating) the pump from the control room,
b. Verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge pressureiof > 2390 psig,
c. Verifying pump operation for at least 15 mfnutes, and
d. Verifying that the pump is aligned to receive electrical power from an OPERABLE emergency bus.
4. 1.2.3.2 All charging pumps and safety injection pumps, excluding the above requi~ed OPERABLE charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except when:
a. The reactor vessel head is removed, or
b. The temperature of all RCS cold legs fs greater than 170'P
0. C. COOK - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 Aiendment No.

r I

REACTOR COOLANT S SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

~ ~

3,4. 1.3 ae At 1east be of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLK:

Reactor Coolant Loop 1 and fts associated stean generator and reactor coolant P.+VI

2. Reactor Coolant Loop 2 and fts associated steam generator and reactor coolant puap,>>
3. Reactor Coolant Loop 3 and fts associated stean generator and reactor coolant pNlp g*
4. Reactor Coolant Loop 4 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,>>
5. Resfdual Heat Removal - East,>>>>
6. Resfdual Heat Removal - Rest,>>>>
b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operatfon.>>>>>>

APPL. CABILITY'/OOKS 4 and 5 ACT lON:

a. Mfth less than the above required loops OPKRABLK, imnedfftely inftfate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; be in COLO SHUTOCMH with-in 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
b. <lith no coolant loop in. operation, suspend aII operations in-volving a reduction in boron concentration of :;".e Reactor Cool-ant Systan and immedfately ini-iate corrective a "..on to retu~

the required coolant loop to operation.

~A reactor coo ant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold Ieg temperatures less than or equal to 170 oF unless I) the pressurizer water volume is less th'an S2.00% of span or 2) the secondary wacer temperature of each steam generator is less than SO oF above each of the RCS cold leg temper-atures. Operability of a reactor coolant loop(s) does not require an QPKRASLK auxiliary feedwater system.

'he normal or anergency power source may be inoperable in NOOK 5, AII reactor coolant pumps and residual heat removal. pumps may be de-energiz o cr up .to I hour prov '.ed >) io operant ons -;re ge!~itteo that wou,d "muse dilution of the reac.or cooIant system boron concentration, and Iiet temperature is ;,.sintained at least iO F below saturxt'.on ii core cut-tmoeratur e.

O. C. Cook Vnft I 3/4 4-3 Amendment No.

REaCTOa Caput SVSTe ACTION Contf nued Below P 7:N

a. Startup and Power operation below P-7 may proceed provfded at lease two reactor coolant loops and associated pmps are in operation.
b. Hot standby, hot shutdown, and cold shutdown operation may proceed provfded at least one reactor coolant'oop fn operatfon with an assocfated reactor coolant or residual heat r'emoval pump; however, operatfon for up to 15 minutes with no pump fn operation fs permfssfble to accoamodate transftfon between residual heat removal pump and reactor coolant pump oper ation.
c. The provfsions of Specfffcatfons 3.0.3 and 3.0.4're not applfcable.

SURVEILLANCE REOUI REAGENTS 4,4.1.4.1 Nth one reactor coolant loop and associated pump not in operation, at least once per 7 days determine that:

The applicable reactor trip system and/br ESF actuation system instrumentation channels specified in the. ACTION statements above have been placed in their tripped conditions, and I

b. If P-8 fnterlock setpoint has been reset for 3 loop operation, its setpoint is c 76K of RATEO THERNAL POSER.

4.4.1.4.2 Within 30 minutes prior to the start of a reactor coolant pump when any RCS cold leg temperature is <170 F, verify that:

a. The temperature of the secondary water of each steam gener ator is

< 50'F above the temoer ature of each of the RCS cold legs, or

b. The pressurizer water volume is less than 111& cubic feet, equivalent to less than 62K indicated on the wide range. level indica-or.

A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures'ess than or equal to17Q F unless 1) the pressurizer

~ater volume is less than 111& cubic feet (62'f span or 2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 504F above each of ter RCS cold leg temperatures.

D. C. Cook - Unit 1 3/4 4-36 Amendment Ho.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONOITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig, or
b. One power operated relief valve (PORV) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 400 psig and the RHR safety valve with a lift setting of less than or equal to 450 psig; or
c. A reactor coolant system vent of greater than or equal to 2 square ddd',dd t,dddiinches.

APPLICABILITY: When the temperature ACTION:

of one or more of the RCS cold legs is d:

a. With two PORV's inoperable or with one PORV inoperable and the RHR safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV(s) or RHR safety valve to OPFRABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through an at least 2 square inch vent(s) within the next 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve has been restored to OPERABLE status.
b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through an at least, 2 square inch vent(s) within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs or one PORV and the RHR safety valve have been restored to OPERABLE status.

C. In the event either the PORVs, the RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent(s) on the transient and any corrective action neet;ssary to prevent recurrence.

The provisions of Specificatioh 3.0.4 are not applicable.

O.C. COOK - UNIT 1 3/4 4-31 Amendment No.

~ ~

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

- T < 350 F I

LIMITIHG COHOITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One OPERABLE centrifugal charging pump,P
b. One OPERABLE residual heat removal heat exchanger,
c. One OPERABLE residual heat removal pump, and
d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the centrifugal charging pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the residual heat removal heat exchanger or residual heat removal pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPFRABLE status or main-tain the Reactor Coolant System T less than 3504F by use of alternate heat removal methods.

c With more than one charging pump OPERABLE or with a safety injection pump(s) OPERABLE when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 170op, remove the additional charging pump(s) and safety injection pump{s) motor circuit breakers from the 'he electrical power circuit within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

d. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the'Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and'ubmitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within'90 days describ-ing the circumstances of the. actuation and the total accumulated actuation cyc1es to data.

4A maximum of one centrifugal charging pump shall be OPERABLE and both safety injection pumps shall be inoperable whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than ol equal to77Q+F .

0. C. COOK UHIT 1 3/4 5-7 Amendment No.

EMERGENCY CORE CGGLIN(s SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE UIR91EHTS 4.5.3.X The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 All charging pumps and safety infection pumps, except the above required OPERABLE charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits, at, least once per K hours whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 170"F as determined at least. once per hour when any RCS cold leg temperature is between! 170 F and 200 F.

0. C. COOK UNIT 1 3/4 5-8 Amendment No.

845KS CTCf LOdPS

>~e plant fs desfgned to operate wfQl all reac -r coolant loots in o era ion, and eafnafn ORBS aoove I 30 during all norrlal operatfons and a;rtf cf oated transf ents Wf th one reactor cool ant loop rnot f n operatf on, TwReL P$ 4N is reetrfctact to c 51 percent of RATN THEROL, PSRR untf1 the trip is ensur'es that the CNSR wf ll be gyes arrrOerature mafntafned if operatfng aoove aoove 4T 1.30.

P-7 A

(11 reset.

1oss .of percent Either flee of fn RATS

~

action loops THBNL wf11 cause a reac.or trip PS'ER) whf1 ~ a loss fn one loop will cause 4 reactor trip ff operating above P 8 (SZ percent of'low of RA-EO THER<PL PC'~ER).

tn MOOE 3, a sfngle reactor coolant loop provfdes sufffcfent. heat, removal capability for crowing decay heat; however, sfngle faflure consfderatfons r

requiri that two loops be OPERABLE.

tn 4 and 5, a single reactor coolant loop or loop provides NOOES sufi'fcfent heat removal capability i'r removfng RHR decay heat; but single i'af lure consfderatfons.require that at least two loops be OPERABLE. Thus, ff the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this- speci ffcatfon requires two RHR 1oops to be OPERABLE.

The operatfon of one Reactor Coolant Pump or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mfxfng, prevent stratfffcatfon and, produce gradual reactfvfty changes during boron concentration reductions fn the Reactor Coolant Systerrr.

The reaCtfVfty Change rate aSSOCfated Wfth bOrOn reduCtfOn ~f11, therefOre, be

~i:hin the caaabflfty of operator recognition and contro1.

The restrictions on starting a Reactor Coolant Pump below P-7 with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 170 F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the secondary system, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either (1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the primary coolant to expand into or (2) by restricting starting of the RCP's to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50 F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

3/4.4.2 and 3/4.4.3 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS Erom being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve set point. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any over-pressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop , connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

0. C. COOK UNIT 1 B 3/441 Aneneaont No. 7B

Th>> shift in RT~ of the vessel material vill be established periodically during operation by removing and evaluating, in accord-ance with ASTM E185-73, reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens installed near the inside wa11 of the reactor vessel in the core area. Since the neutron spectra at. the irradiation samples and vessel inside radius are essentially identical/ the transi-tion shift for a sample can be applied with confidence to the adjacent section of the reactor vessel. The heatup and cooldown curves mat be recalculated when the 4 RT determined from the surveillance capsule is different from the calcuRaed 4 RT NDT for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

The pressure-temperature limit. lines shown on tiguze 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been pro vided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requizeaentN of Appendix 0 to 10 CFR 50.

The number of reactor vessel irzadiation surveillance 'specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in Table 4.4-5 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CPR Part 50.

s The limitations imposed on pressurizer heatup and cooldown and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated vithin the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPKRASlLITY of two PORYs, one PORV and the RHR safety valve, or an RCS vent opening of greater than or equal to 2 square inches ensures that the RCS w)11 be protected free pressure trans)ants which could exceed the ill)ts of Append)x G to 10 CFR Part $0 when one or ONE of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 170 F. Either PORV or RHR safety valve has adequate relieving capah)lfty to protect the RCS free overpressurlzatkon when the transfent fs 1<afte(s to ~ steer (1)'ha start of en 141 ~ Rcp eath the satan(Nry ((star teaeera-ture of the steaa generator less than or equal to 544f above the RCS cold leg taiperatures or (2) the start of a charging puap an4 its )nfectton into a water col )d RCS.

De Ca COOK~ZT 1 I 3/4 4 11 Aaendaent Ho.

~ ~

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES Nth the RCS temperature below-350 F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem fs acceptable without single failure con'sfderatfon on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and safety injec-tion pumps, except the required OPERABLE charging pump, to be inoperable below 170~F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used fn the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY fs maintained. Surveillance requfrements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained fn the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the pfpfng system to each injection point fs necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout condi-tions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points fn accordance with the assump-tions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an. acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4. 5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The limits on injection tank minimum contained volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used fn the steam line break analysis are met.

The OPERABILITY of the redundant heat tracing channels associated with the boron injection system ensure that the solubility of the boron solution will .be maintained above the solubility limit of 135 F at 21000 ppm boron.

0. C. COOK - UNIT 1 8 3/4 5-2 Aaandment No.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES BORATION SYSTEMS Conti nued .

With the RCS average temperature above 2004F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity change fn the event the single injection sy'tem becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps and safety injec-tion pumps, except the required OPERABLE charging pump, to be inoperable below 170'F, unless the reactor vessel head fs removed, provides assurance that a mass addftion pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The boratfon capability required below 2004F fs sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of IX 4k/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 2004F to 1404F.

This condition requires either 835 gallons of 20,000 ppm borated water from the borfc acid storage tanks of 9690 gallons of 1950 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.

3/4. 1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is main-tained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod ejection accident.

OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators fs required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors, or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restric-tions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. The reactivfty worth of a misaligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used fn the accident nnalysi's for a-rod ejection accident.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the accident analyses. Measurement with T > 541'F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.

0. C. COOK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Aaendment No.

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