ML19316A624

LER 78-007/01T-0:on 780427,reactor Bldg Purge Filters Exceeded Tech Spec 4.14 Surveillance Requirements.Caused by Failure to Verify Filter Operability.Fuel Movement Suspended Until Filters Tested & Procedures Reviewed

ML19316A624
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	05/11/1978
From:	Ken Wilson DUKE POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19316A623	List: ML19316A622 ML19316A624
References
LER-78-007-01T, LER-78-7-1T, NUDOCS 8001130138
Download: ML19316A624 (2)

Text

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O DUEE PO*.4EE COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 Report Number: R0-270/78-7 Report Date: May 11, 1978 Occurrence Date: April 27, 1978 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina Fuel movement with Spent Fuel Pool purge Identification of Occurrence: filters declared inoperable Conditions Prior to occurrence: 90% Full Power Description of Occurrence:

At 2315, on Apr il 24, 1978, the Unit 2 Reactor Building Purge Filters were declared inoperable due to f ailure to meet surveillance requirements given in Technical Specification 4.14. (The ninimum test frequency had not been met.) The purge f ilters are required for the operation of the spent fuel ventilation system, therefore the filter inoperability removed both trains Thus, the requirements of Techni-of the ventilation system f rom service.be met and fuel movement was suspended.

cal Specification 3.8.12b could notfuel movement was resumed due to a misunderstanding that On April 27, 1978, At 1200 it was determined that the filters had passed the required test.

two assemblica had been moved in violation of the Technical Specifications and movenent operations were again suspended until the test was success-fully completed on May 1, 1978.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this incident was inaccurrate verbal communications between various personnel involved.

Analysis of Occurrence _:

The Reactor Building Purge Filttrs are used in conjunction with the Spent Fuci Pool Ventilation System to reduce of f-site dose levels during postu-However, in the event of a fuel handling accident lated accident situations.

with the filters inoperable, the off-site dose levels are still within the Additionally, the results of the tests guidelines established in 10CFR100.

verified the functional capability of the filters. Therefore, public health and safety were not endangered by this incident.

Corrective Action:

All fuel movement was promptly suspended. Performance test PT/0/A/0110/05C has been revised to require operations personnel to be informed, in writing, when the filters are declared operable.

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