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| | issue date = 04/28/2015 | | | issue date = 04/28/2015 |
| | title = IR 05000443/2015007; 3/2/2015 to 3/19/2015; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Permanent Plant Modifications Engineering Team Inspection | | | title = IR 05000443/2015007; 3/2/2015 to 3/19/2015; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Permanent Plant Modifications Engineering Team Inspection |
| | author name = Krohn P G | | | author name = Krohn P |
| | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2 | | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB2 |
| | addressee name = Curtland D | | | addressee name = Curtland D |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD., SUITE 100 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406 | | {{#Wiki_filter:ril 28, 2015 |
| -2713 April 28, 2015 Mr. Dean Curtland Vice President, Seabrook Station c/o Mr. Michael Ossing NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 626 Lafayette Rd.
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| Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1
| | ==SUBJECT:== |
| - NRC EVA L UA T ION OF CHANG E S, TESTS, AND E X P ERIM ENTS AND PERMAN EN T PLANT MODIFICA TIONS TEAM INSPECT I ON REPORT 05000443/2015007 | | SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2015007 |
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| ==Dear Mr. Curtland:== | | ==Dear Mr. Curtland:== |
| On March 1 9 , 201 5 , the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C o mmi s sion (NRC) completed an inspection a t Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 | | On March 19, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on March 19, 2015, with you and other members of your staff. |
| . The enclosed inspec t i o n report documents the inspec t i o n results, which were discussed on March 19, 201 5 , with you and other members of your staff. The inspec ti on examin e d activities conducted u nder your license as they relate to sa fety and compliance with the Commission's rules and re gulations and with the c onditions of y our licens e. In conducti n g the inspection, the te a m reviewed selected pr o cedures, c alculations a n d records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel. | | |
| | The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. |
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| | In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel. |
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| Based on the results of the inspection, no findings were identified. | | Based on the results of the inspection, no findings were identified. |
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| In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading | | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). |
| -rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | |
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| Sincerely, | | Sincerely, |
| /RA/ Paul G. Kr o hn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety SUNSI Rev i e w Non-Sensiti v e Sensiti v e Pub l ic l y Ava i l able Non-P ub l ic l y Avail a b l e OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME JLilliendahl GDentel/RB PKrohn DA T E 4/17/15 4/21/15 4/28/15 Mr. Dean Curtland Vice President, Seabrook Station c/o Mr. Michael Ossing NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 626 Lafayette Rd. | | /RA/ |
| | Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety |
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| | Mr. Dean Curtland Vice President, Seabrook Station c/o Mr. Michael Ossing NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 626 Lafayette Rd. |
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| Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 | | Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2015007 |
| - NRC EVA L UA T ION OF CHANG E S, TESTS, AND E X P ERIM ENTS AND PERMAN EN T PLANT MODIFICA TIONS TEAM INSPECT I ON REPORT 05000443/2015007 | |
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| ==Dear Mr. Curtland:== | | ==Dear Mr. Curtland:== |
| On March 19, 201 5 , the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory C o mmi s sion (NRC) completed an inspection a t Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 | | On March 19, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on March 19, 2015, with you and other members of your staff. |
| . The enclosed inspec t i o n report documents the inspec t i o n results, which were discussed on March 19, 201 5 , with you and other members of your staff. The inspec ti on examin e d activities conducted u nder your license as they relate to sa fety and compliance with the Commission's rules and re gulations and with the c onditions of y our licens e. In conducti n g the inspection, the te a m reviewed selected pr o cedures, c alculations a n d records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel. | | |
| | The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. |
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| | In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel. |
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| Based on the results of the inspection, no findings were identified. | | Based on the results of the inspection, no findings were identified. |
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| In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading | | In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). |
| -rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | |
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| Sincerely, | | Sincerely, |
| /RA/ Paul G. Kr o hn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Distribution: See Next Page DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRS\Plant Support Branch 2\Lilliendahl | | /RA/ |
| \Seabrook MODS 2015007.docxADAMS ACC ESSION NUMBER: ML15119A056 Docket No. 50 | | Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Distribution: See Next Page DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRS\Plant Support Branch 2\Lilliendahl\Seabrook MODS 2015007.docx ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML15119A056 Non-Sensitive Publicly Available SUNSI Review Sensitive Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME JLilliendahl GDentel/RB PKrohn DATE 4/17/15 4/21/15 4/28/15 Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86 |
| -443 License No: NPF | | |
| -86 Enclosure: | | ===Enclosure:=== |
| | Inspection Report No. 05000443/2015007 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information |
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| Inspection Report No. 05000443/2015007 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Distribution w/encl:
| | REGION I== |
| (via e-mail) D. Dorman, RA (R1ORAMAIL Resource)
| | Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86 Report No.: 05000443/2015007 Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1 Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Inspection Period: March 2 through March 19, 2015 Inspectors: J. Lilliendahl, Senior Emergency Response Coordinator, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Team Lead S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS Approved By: Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety i Enclosure |
| D. Lew, DRA (R1ORAMAIL Resource)
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| H. Nieh, DRP (R1DRPMAIL Resource
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| ) M. Scott, DRP (R1DRPMAIL Resource)
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| R. Lorson, DRS (R1DRSMAIL Resource)
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| J. Trapp, DRS (R1DRSMAIL Resource)
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| G. Dentel, DRP R. Barkley, DRP M. Draxton, DRP C. Highley, DRP P. Cataldo, DRP, SRI C. Newport, DRP, RI A. Cass, DRP, Resident AA J. Lilliendahl, DRS P. Krohn, DRS K. MorganButler, RI, OEDO RidsNrrPMSeabrook Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl1
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| -2 Resource ROPreports Resource
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| i Enclosure U.S. N U C L EAR R EG ULATORY COMMI SSION REG I ON I Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86 Report No.: 05000 443/201 5 007 Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1 Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Inspection Period: March 2 through March 19 , 201 5 Inspectors:
| | =SUMMARY OF FINDINGS= |
| J. Lilliendahl, Senior Emergency Response Coordinator, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Team Lead S. Pindale, S enior Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Schoppy
| | IR 05000443/2015007; 3/2/2015 - 3/19/2015; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Permanent Plant |
| , Senior Reactor Inspecto r , DRS Approved By: Paul G. Kr o hn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
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| i i Enclosure SUMMARY OF FIND INGS IR 05000 443/201 5007; 3/2/201 5 - 3/1 9/201 5; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Permanent Plant Modific ations Engin eering Team Inspection.
| | Modifications Engineering Team Inspection. |
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| This report covers a 2 week on-site inspection of the evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments and permanent plant modificatio n s. T he inspec tion was co nducted by three region-based engineering inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG | | This report covers a 2 week on-site inspection of the evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by three region-based engineering inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, |
| -1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 5. | | Revision 5. |
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| No findings were identified. | | No findings were identified. |
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| Enclosure RE PORT DETAILS 1. REAC T OR SAFETY Cornersto n es: Initiating Events, Mitigating S ystems, and Barrier Int egrity 1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Perma n ent Plant Modificatio n s (IP 71111.17 T) .1 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (23 sa mples) a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed six safety evalu ations to evaluate whet h er the chan g es to the facility or p rocedures, a s describ e d in the Updated Final Sa fety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59 requirements.
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| In additi o n, the team evaluated whether NextEra had been required to ob tain U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) a pproval prior to implemen ting the changes.
| | =REPORT DETAILS= |
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| T he team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting info rmation including calculations, analyses, design change documentation, proced ures, the UFSAR, T echnical Sp e cifica tions, and plant drawings to assess t h e adequacy of the safety evaluations. The team compared the safety evaluations and supporting documents to the guida n ce and methods provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations,"
| | ==REACTOR SAFETY== |
| Revision 1, as endors e d by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implem entation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiment s ," to determine the ade quacy of the safety evaluations.
| | Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity |
| | {{a|1R17}} |
| | ==1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications== |
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| The team also reviewed a sample of seventeen 10 CFR 50.59 screeni n gs for which NextEra had concluded t hat a safety evaluation was not requi red. These reviews were performed to assess whether NextEra's threshold for performing safety evaluations was consist e nt with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample incl uded design changes, c alculatio n s , a nd procedure changes. The team reviewed the safety evalu ations and screenings th a t NextEra had performed and approved during the time period covered by this insp e c ti o n not previously review e d by NRC inspectors. The samples selected were based on the safety significanc e , risk signific ance, and c omplexity of t he change t o the facility. I n addition, t he team compared NextEra's adm inistrative procedures used to control the screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to evaluate whether the procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The reviewed safety evalu ations and screenings are listed in the Attachment.
| | (IP 71111.17T) |
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| 2 Enclosure b. Findings No findings were identified.
| | ===.1 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (23 samples)=== |
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| .2 Permanent Plant Modifications (10 sa mples) .2.1 Installation of Oil Sample Ports on the | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| 'A' and 'B' Containment Building Spray Pump and Motor Bearings a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed engineering change (EC) 144978 which installed oil sample ports on the containment building spray (CBS) pump and motor bearings. NextEra performed the modification to provide more effective oil sampling through the collection of a representative and repeatable sample to determine oil and component condition. The modification affected eight locations, two on each CBS pump and two on each CBS motor.
| | The team reviewed six safety evaluations to evaluate whether the changes to the facility or procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59 requirements. In addition, the team evaluated whether NextEra had been required to obtain U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval prior to implementing the changes. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting information including calculations, analyses, design change documentation, procedures, the UFSAR, Technical Specifications, and plant drawings to assess the adequacy of the safety evaluations. The team compared the safety evaluations and supporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations, Revision 1, as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluations. |
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| The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the CBS system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new oil sample ports and installed configuration met design and licensing requirements. | | The team also reviewed a sample of seventeen 10 CFR 50.59 screenings for which NextEra had concluded that a safety evaluation was not required. These reviews were performed to assess whether NextEra's threshold for performing safety evaluations was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample included design changes, calculations, and procedure changes. |
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| The team reviewed post maintenance test (PMT) results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification | | The team reviewed the safety evaluations and screenings that NextEra had performed and approved during the time period covered by this inspection not previously reviewed by NRC inspectors. The samples selected were based on the safety significance, risk significance, and complexity of the change to the facility. |
| . The team also reviewed CBS pump and motor oil analysis reports, trend data, and the CBS system health report to assess the oil and bearing conditions. The team performed several walkdowns of all eight CBS oil sample ports to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety
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| -related structures, systems, and components (SSC) located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action condition reports (CR) and the CBS system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification.
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| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | In addition, the team compared NextEras administrative procedures used to control the screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to evaluate whether the procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The reviewed safety evaluations and screenings are listed in the |
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| b. Findings No findings were identified. | | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
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| .2.2 Service Water Piping Replacement for the Diesel Generator and Primary Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger s a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed EC 274172 which replaced degraded Plastisol-lined service water (SW) piping on the supply and return of the | | ===.2 Permanent Plant Modifications (10 samples)=== |
| 'A' and 'B' emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchangers and degraded cement
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| 'A' primary component cooling water (PCCW) heat exchanger. NextEra performed the modification to
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| 3 Enclosure replace degraded SW piping with a corrosion resistant material to ensure long
| | ===.2.1 Installation of Oil Sample Ports on the A and B Containment Building Spray Pump and Motor=== |
| -term system pressure boundary integrity. NextEra replaced the carbon steel lined piping with AL
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| -6XN, an austenitic stainless steel material, suitable for seawater service without the need for internal lining or protective coating.
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| The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDG, PCCW, and SW systems had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new SW piping met design and licensing requirements. Additionally, the team reviewed non-destructive examination (NDE)
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| results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification
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| . The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the replaced SW piping, including a walkdown during a prolonged
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| 'A' EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained pressure boundary integrity and configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety
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| -related SSCs located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG, PCCW, and SW system health reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification.
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| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed engineering change (EC) 144978 which installed oil sample ports on the containment building spray (CBS) pump and motor bearings. NextEra performed the modification to provide more effective oil sampling through the collection of a representative and repeatable sample to determine oil and component condition. The modification affected eight locations, two on each CBS pump and two on each CBS motor. |
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| b. Findings No findings were identified.
| | The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the CBS system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new oil sample ports and installed configuration met design and licensing requirements. The team reviewed post maintenance test (PMT) results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team also reviewed CBS pump and motor oil analysis reports, trend data, and the CBS system health report to assess the oil and bearing conditions. The team performed several walkdowns of all eight CBS oil sample ports to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC)located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action condition reports (CR) and the CBS system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
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| .2.3 Diesel Generator Turbocharger Jacket Cooling Water Outlet Piping Replacement a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed EC 274318 which replaced the majority of the turbocharger small | | ====b. Findings==== |
| -bore jacket water (JW) outlet piping on the
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| 'A' EDG. NextEra performed the modification to eliminate four of the six non
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| -standard piping flanges, and to replace all of the DURLON 8500 gasket material installed in October 2003.
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| Industry operating experience (OE) from Callaway Nuclear Station indicated that the gasket material installed in 2003 was susceptible to age-related failure.
| | ===.2.2 Service Water Piping Replacement for the Diesel Generator and Primary Component=== |
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| Callaway had experienced a leak from a 2
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| -bolt rectangular flange on their EDG turbocharger JW outlet piping that resulted in unplanned EDG unavailability. In addition to replacing all of the susceptible gasket material, the Seabrook modification included
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| fabricating new 8
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| -bolt plates for the turbocharger casing. NextEra machined the new plates with socket weld fittings which allow ed welding of the piping directly to the plate. For the remaining two 2 | | The team reviewed EC 274172 which replaced degraded Plastisol-lined service water (SW)piping on the supply and return of the A and B emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchangers and degraded cement-lined SW piping on the supply side of the A primary component cooling water (PCCW) heat exchanger. NextEra performed the modification to replace degraded SW piping with a corrosion resistant material to ensure long-term system pressure boundary integrity. NextEra replaced the carbon steel lined piping with AL-6XN, an austenitic stainless steel material, suitable for seawater service without the need for internal lining or protective coating. |
| -bolt flange s , NextEra installed new gaskets, new higher torque bolting , and locking devices. | |
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| The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDG's JW cooling system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new piping and flanges met design and licensing requirements. Additionally, the team reviewed NDE results and associated maintenance 4 Enclosure work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification | | The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDG, PCCW, and SW systems had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new SW piping met design and licensing requirements. |
| . The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the replaced JW piping and the JW expansion tanks, including a walkdown during a prolonged
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| 'A' EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained pressure boundary integrity and configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety
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| -related EDG components located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification.
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| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | Additionally, the team reviewed non-destructive examination (NDE) results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the replaced SW piping, including a walkdown during a prolonged A EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained pressure boundary integrity and configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related SSCs located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG, PCCW, and SW system health reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
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| b. Findings No findings were identified. | | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
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| .2.4 Chemical and Volume Control System Control Valve Air Supply Modification a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed EC 270448 which modified the airline piping material for two air-operated valves (AOV) | | ===.2.3 Diesel Generator Turbocharger Jacket Cooling Water Outlet Piping Replacement=== |
| 1-CS-HCV-182 and 1-CS-FCV-121) in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). NextEra performed the modification in response to a sheared airline caused by the use of improperly annealed red brass piping. NextEra implemented the modification to upgrade the material for the piping and selected fittings to stainless steel to provide a more robust and reliable piping configuration. Valve 1-CS-HCV-182 is an air-operated, fail
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| -open, modulating control valve.
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| Its design function is to control and direct charging pump flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops via the normal charging path. By controlling the charging path flow, the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection flow is also controlled. Valve 1
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| -CS-FCV-121 is an air | | The team reviewed EC 274318 which replaced the majority of the turbocharger small-bore jacket water (JW) outlet piping on the A EDG. NextEra performed the modification to eliminate four of the six non-standard piping flanges, and to replace all of the DURLON 8500 gasket material installed in October 2003. Industry operating experience (OE) from Callaway Nuclear Station indicated that the gasket material installed in 2003 was susceptible to age-related failure. Callaway had experienced a leak from a 2-bolt rectangular flange on their EDG turbocharger JW outlet piping that resulted in unplanned EDG unavailability. In addition to replacing all of the susceptible gasket material, the Seabrook modification included fabricating new 8-bolt plates for the turbocharger casing. NextEra machined the new plates with socket weld fittings which allowed welding of the piping directly to the plate. For the remaining two 2-bolt flanges, NextEra installed new gaskets, new higher torque bolting, and locking devices. |
| -operated, fail
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| -open, modulating control valve. It is used to control the charging flow rate to the RCS when either of the centrifugal charging pumps is used for normal charging operations. | |
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| The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the CVCS system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and airline specifications to determine if the new piping and fittings met design and licensing requirements. Additionally, the team reviewed PMT results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team performed walkdowns of both AOVs to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related SSCs located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the CVCS and plant air system health reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. | | The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDGs JW cooling system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new piping and flanges met design and licensing requirements. Additionally, the team reviewed NDE results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the replaced JW piping and the JW expansion tanks, including a walkdown during a prolonged A EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained pressure boundary integrity and configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related EDG components located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
|
| |
|
| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
| | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
|
| |
|
| 5 Enclosure b. Findings No findings were identified
| | ===.2.4 Chemical and Volume Control System Control Valve Air Supply Modification=== |
| . .2.5 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Header O
| |
| -Ring Material Substitution a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed EC 274150 which evaluated and approved a material substitution for the O-rings installed in the cylinder JW headers on the EDGs. NextEra performed the modification because t he diesel engine original equipment manufacturer (OEM) recommended the substitute material (Viton) for the EDG cooling water system application. The O-rings, which are installed in the mechanical joints of the JW supply and return headers, provide a soft sealing element to prevent fluid leakage. The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDG's JW cooling system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and material specifications to determine if the new O-rings met design and licensing requirements. Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of EDG surveillances, including a 24
| |
| -hour loaded run on the
| |
| 'A' EDG, and associated maintenance work orders that installed the new O-rings to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification and to assess the leak tightness of the JW piping mechanical joints
| |
| . The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the JW supply and return header mechanical joints and the JW expansion tanks, including a walkdown during a prolonged
| |
| 'A' EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, minimized JW leakage, and properly maintained JW system inventory. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification.
| |
|
| |
|
| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed EC 270448 which modified the airline piping material for two air-operated valves (AOV) 1-CS-HCV-182 and 1-CS-FCV-121) in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). NextEra performed the modification in response to a sheared airline caused by the use of improperly annealed red brass piping. NextEra implemented the modification to upgrade the material for the piping and selected fittings to stainless steel to provide a more robust and reliable piping configuration. Valve 1-CS-HCV-182 is an air-operated, fail-open, modulating control valve. Its design function is to control and direct charging pump flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops via the normal charging path. |
|
| |
|
| b. Findings No findings were identified
| | By controlling the charging path flow, the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection flow is also controlled. Valve 1-CS-FCV-121 is an air-operated, fail-open, modulating control valve. It is used to control the charging flow rate to the RCS when either of the centrifugal charging pumps is used for normal charging operations. |
| . .2.6 Replacement of 1
| |
| -CB S-V-2 Motor Operator a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed modification EC 272397 that replaced the motor for motor-operated valve (MOV) | |
| 1-CBS-V-2, which is a containment building spray suction valve from the refueling water storage tank. The motor's existing magnesium rotor was replaced with an aluminum rotor to address an industry operating experience concern where oxidation and corrosion of the magnesium rotor components resulted from exposure to high humidity and temperatures.
| |
|
| |
|
| 6 Enclosure The team reviewed the modification to evaluate whether NextEra's analysi s of the change was adequate to maintain the design bases, licensing bases, and design margins of the MOV. The team verified that NextEra properly translated design inputs into the associated design bases and procedures. The team also reviewed the PMT and performed a walkdown of the MOV and adjacent equipment to assess whether NextEra adequately maintained configuration control. The team reviewed associated CRs to assess NextEra's ability to evaluate and correct problems. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification.
| | The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the CVCS system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and airline specifications to determine if the new piping and fittings met design and licensing requirements. |
|
| |
|
| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | Additionally, the team reviewed PMT results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team performed walkdowns of both AOVs to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related SSCs located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the CVCS and plant air system health reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
|
| |
|
| b. Findings No findings were identified. | | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
|
| |
|
| .2.7 Revise Emergency Feedwater High Flow Isolation Setpoint a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed modification EC 274551 that increased the emergency feedwater (EFW) high flow isolation setpoint to ensure that two intact steam generators would be available with a single failure following a postulated faulted steam generator condition. NextEra determined that this modification was necessary following a plant transient in 2008 (plant trip due to 345 kV bus fault) in which EFW flow was automatically isolated from two steam generators due to high EFW flo w. NextEra determined that increasing the high flow isolation setpoint would provide additional margin to reaching the high flow trip while maintaining the design and licensing bases intact. The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the EFW system had been degraded by the high flow isolation setpoint modification. The team reviewed calculations, drawings, and procedure s to verify that the EFW system would function in accordance with design assumptions. | | ===.2.5 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Header O-Ring Material Substitution=== |
|
| |
|
| The team reviewed the associated work order instructions, PMT results, and other documentation to verify that the modification was implemented as designed. The team also performed walkdowns of accessible portions of the EFW system to verify that NextEra had maintained configuration control and to assess the material condition of affected components. Additionally, the team reviewed corrective action reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed EC 274150 which evaluated and approved a material substitution for the O-rings installed in the cylinder JW headers on the EDGs. NextEra performed the modification because the diesel engine original equipment manufacturer (OEM)recommended the substitute material (Viton) for the EDG cooling water system application. |
|
| |
|
| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | The O-rings, which are installed in the mechanical joints of the JW supply and return headers, provide a soft sealing element to prevent fluid leakage. The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDGs JW cooling system had been degraded by the modification. |
|
| |
|
| b. Findings No findings were identified.
| | The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and material specifications to determine if the new O-rings met design and licensing requirements. |
|
| |
|
| 7 Enclosure .2.8 Valve Modifications to Prevent Pressure Locking for 1
| | Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of EDG surveillances, including a 24-hour loaded run on the A EDG, and associated maintenance work orders that installed the new O-rings to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification and to assess the leak tightness of the JW piping mechanical joints. The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the JW supply and return header mechanical joints and the JW expansion tanks, including a walkdown during a prolonged A EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, minimized JW leakage, and properly maintained JW system inventory. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
| -SI-V-138 and 1-SI-V-139 a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed modification EC 275419 that provided a vent path from the bonnet cavity of high head safety injection valves 1 | |
| -SI-V-138 and 1-SI-V-139 (parallel cold leg injection valves). This modification was necessitated by reduced margin for overcoming the calculated loads associated with pressure locking. Although the valves remained capable of performing their design functions under postulated conditions, this modification improved the operating margin.
| |
|
| |
|
| The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the high head safety injection system had been degraded by the valve modification. The team reviewed calculations, drawings, and procedure s to verify that the safety injection system would function in accordance with design assumptions.
| | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
|
| |
|
| The team reviewed the associated work order instructions, PMT results, and other documentation to verify that the modification was implemented as designed. The team also performed walkdowns of accessible portions of the modified valves and associated accessible equipment to verify that NextEra had maintained configuration control and to assess the material condition of affected components. Additionally, the team reviewed corrective action reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification.
| | ===.2.6 Replacement of 1-CBS-V-2 Motor Operator=== |
|
| |
|
| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed modification EC 272397 that replaced the motor for motor-operated valve (MOV) 1-CBS-V-2, which is a containment building spray suction valve from the refueling water storage tank. The motors existing magnesium rotor was replaced with an aluminum rotor to address an industry operating experience concern where oxidation and corrosion of the magnesium rotor components resulted from exposure to high humidity and temperatures. |
|
| |
|
| b. Findings No findings were identified.
| | The team reviewed the modification to evaluate whether NextEras analysis of the change was adequate to maintain the design bases, licensing bases, and design margins of the MOV. The team verified that NextEra properly translated design inputs into the associated design bases and procedures. The team also reviewed the PMT and performed a walkdown of the MOV and adjacent equipment to assess whether NextEra adequately maintained configuration control. The team reviewed associated CRs to assess NextEra's ability to evaluate and correct problems. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
|
| |
|
| .2.9 Seabrook Substation Reliability Upgrade Project a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed modification EC 145280 that upgraded several breakers in the Seabrook substation and redesigned the substation layout to improve reliability. | | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
|
| |
|
| The upgraded substation added three new breakers and replaced two of the original breakers. The new configuration addresses breaker obsolescence and provides dedicated breakers for the reserve auxiliary transformers and generator ste p-up transformer. This configuration improves the redundancy for power sources during offsite line losses and outages.
| | ===.2.7 Revise Emergency Feedwater High Flow Isolation Setpoint=== |
|
| |
|
| The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of the substation had been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the completed work order and documentation to verify that the modification was installed as designed and the team reviewed the associated PMT results to ensure that NextEra specified appropriate tests and acceptance criteria, and that the test results confirmed satisfactory performance. Additionally, the team interviewed design engineers | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed modification EC 274551 that increased the emergency feedwater (EFW)high flow isolation setpoint to ensure that two intact steam generators would be available with a single failure following a postulated faulted steam generator condition. NextEra determined that this modification was necessary following a plant transient in 2008 (plant trip due to 345 kV bus fault) in which EFW flow was automatically isolated from two steam generators due to high EFW flow. NextEra determined that increasing the high flow isolation setpoint would provide additional margin to reaching the high flow trip while maintaining the design and licensing bases intact. |
|
| |
|
| and reviewed CR s to determine if the modification corrected performance issues associated with substation reliability and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues 8 Enclosure created from the modification. The team also reviewed affected drawings and maintenance procedures to ensure that they were properly updated and walked down the substation to assess the mat erial condition and configuration. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification.
| | The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the EFW system had been degraded by the high flow isolation setpoint modification. The team reviewed calculations, drawings, and procedures to verify that the EFW system would function in accordance with design assumptions. The team reviewed the associated work order instructions, PMT results, and other documentation to verify that the modification was implemented as designed. The team also performed walkdowns of accessible portions of the EFW system to verify that NextEra had maintained configuration control and to assess the material condition of affected components. |
|
| |
|
| The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | Additionally, the team reviewed corrective action reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
|
| |
|
| b. Findings No findings were identified. | | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
|
| |
|
| .2.10 1-SW-V-4 Running Current Change a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed modification EC 277469 that adjusted the thermal overload (TOL) setpoint for 1 | | ===.2.8 Valve Modifications to Prevent Pressure Locking for 1-SI-V-138 and 1-SI-V-139=== |
| -SW-V-4, which is an MOV credited with isolating safety-related portions of the service water system from non-safety portions of the system | |
| . When MOV s are initially installed at Seabrook, their TOL is set based upon the initial full load amps (FLA) for the motor. After maintenance is performed on the motors, the valves occasionally draw more current than the initial FLA. With an increase in current, there is a potential for inadvertently tripping the TOL. 1
| |
| -SW-V-4 was found to draw more current than the initial FLA so the associated TOL setting was increased to prevent spurious tripping. | |
|
| |
|
| The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of the MOV, associated motor control center, and associated EDG had been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the completed work order and documentation to verify that the modification was installed as designed and the team reviewed the associated PMT results to ensure that NextEra specified appropriate tests and acceptance criteria, and that the test results confirmed satisfactory performance. Additionally, the team interviewed design engineers and reviewed CRs to determine if the modification corrected the inadequate TOL sizing and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues created from the modification. The team also reviewed affected calculations and maintenance procedures to ensure that they were properly update. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modificatio n. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. | | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed modification EC 275419 that provided a vent path from the bonnet cavity of high head safety injection valves 1-SI-V-138 and 1-SI-V-139 (parallel cold leg injection valves). This modification was necessitated by reduced margin for overcoming the calculated loads associated with pressure locking. Although the valves remained capable of performing their design functions under postulated conditions, this modification improved the operating margin. |
|
| |
|
| b. Findings No findings were identified.
| | The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the high head safety injection system had been degraded by the valve modification. The team reviewed calculations, drawings, and procedures to verify that the safety injection system would function in accordance with design assumptions. The team reviewed the associated work order instructions, PMT results, and other documentation to verify that the modification was implemented as designed. The team also performed walkdowns of accessible portions of the modified valves and associated accessible equipment to verify that NextEra had maintained configuration control and to assess the material condition of affected components. Additionally, the team reviewed corrective action reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
|
| |
|
| 9 Enclosure 4. OTH E R A CTIVITIES 4OA2 Identifica t i o n and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152) a. Inspection S c ope The team reviewed a sample of CRs associ ated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plant modification issues to evaluate w hether NextEra was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and cor recting problems associ ated with these areas, a n d whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.
| | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
|
| |
|
| I n addition, t he team rev iewed CRs written on issu e s i dentified during the insp e ction to veri f y NextEra adequately described t h e problem and incorpor ated the iss u e into their corrective ac tion system. The CRs reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
| | ===.2.9 Seabrook Substation Reliability Upgrade Project=== |
|
| |
|
| b. Findings No findings were identified.
| | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed modification EC 145280 that upgraded several breakers in the Seabrook substation and redesigned the substation layout to improve reliability. The upgraded substation added three new breakers and replaced two of the original breakers. |
|
| |
|
| 4OA6 Meetings, i ncluding Exit The team presented the inspection results to Mr. Dean Curtland, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff at an exit meeting on March 1 9 , 201 5. The team returned the proprie tary informat i on reviewed during the inspection a nd verified that this rep ort does not c ontain propri etary informa tion.
| | The new configuration addresses breaker obsolescence and provides dedicated breakers for the reserve auxiliary transformers and generator step-up transformer. This configuration improves the redundancy for power sources during offsite line losses and outages. |
| | |
| | The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of the substation had been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the completed work order and documentation to verify that the modification was installed as designed and the team reviewed the associated PMT results to ensure that NextEra specified appropriate tests and acceptance criteria, and that the test results confirmed satisfactory performance. Additionally, the team interviewed design engineers and reviewed CRs to determine if the modification corrected performance issues associated with substation reliability and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues created from the modification. The team also reviewed affected drawings and maintenance procedures to ensure that they were properly updated and walked down the substation to assess the material condition and configuration. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
| | |
| | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
| | |
| | ===.2.10 1-SW-V-4 Running Current Change=== |
| | |
| | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed modification EC 277469 that adjusted the thermal overload (TOL)setpoint for 1-SW-V-4, which is an MOV credited with isolating safety-related portions of the service water system from non-safety portions of the system. When MOVs are initially installed at Seabrook, their TOL is set based upon the initial full load amps (FLA) for the motor. After maintenance is performed on the motors, the valves occasionally draw more current than the initial FLA. With an increase in current, there is a potential for inadvertently tripping the TOL. 1-SW-V-4 was found to draw more current than the initial FLA so the associated TOL setting was increased to prevent spurious tripping. |
| | |
| | The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of the MOV, associated motor control center, and associated EDG had been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the completed work order and documentation to verify that the modification was installed as designed and the team reviewed the associated PMT results to ensure that NextEra specified appropriate tests and acceptance criteria, and that the test results confirmed satisfactory performance. |
| | |
| | Additionally, the team interviewed design engineers and reviewed CRs to determine if the modification corrected the inadequate TOL sizing and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues created from the modification. The team also reviewed affected calculations and maintenance procedures to ensure that they were properly update. |
| | |
| | Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
| | |
| | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
| | |
| | ==OTHER ACTIVITIES== |
| | {{a|4OA2}} |
| | ==4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)== |
| | |
| | ====a. Inspection Scope==== |
| | The team reviewed a sample of CRs associated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plant modification issues to evaluate whether NextEra was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas, and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. In addition, the team reviewed CRs written on issues identified during the inspection to verify NextEra adequately described the problem and incorporated the issue into their corrective action system. The CRs reviewed are listed in the Attachment. |
| | |
| | ====b. Findings==== |
| | No findings were identified. |
| | {{a|4OA6}} |
| | ==4OA6 Meetings, including Exit== |
|
| |
|
| A-1 Attachment ATTACHMENT SUPPL E M ENTAL IN FORMAT I ON KEY P OIN T S OF C ON T ACT Licensee P ersonnel D. Curtland, Site Vice President V. Brown, Senior Licensing Engineer R. Dean, Principal Engineer T. Glowacky, Principal Engineer K. Harper, System Engineer (Charging System
| | The team presented the inspection results to Mr. Dean Curtland, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff at an exit meeting on March 19, 2015. The team returned the proprietary information reviewed during the inspection and verified that this report does not contain proprietary information. |
| ) J. Klempa, System Engineer (EDGs)
| |
| B. Matte, Electrical Design Engineer D. McGonigle, Jr., Design Engineering Supervisor V. Patel, Senior Engineer N. Pietrantonio, Mechanical Design Engineer J. Sweeney, Principal Engineer C. Thomas, Mechanical Design Engineer LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED Open and Closed None LIST OF DOCUM E N T S REVIE W E D 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations 10-001, EC 144992 Revision 4, EDG Engine Temperature Control Upgrade, 5/11/12 12-001, EC-271261: MSO Resolution: RWST Valve Circuit on VCT Valve Closure Circuit , Revision 0 12-002, EC-271262: MSO Resolution: ASDV Circuit Changes, Revision 0 12-003, EC-250048: Steam Generator Feed Pump Turbine Digital Upgrade Project 12-004, EC-271259: MSO Resolution: SW & CC MOV Circuit Changes, Revision 0 13-0 02, UFSAR Documentation Only Modification for NSAL 07
| |
| -10, dated 9/26/14 10 CFR 50.59 Screenings and/or Applicability Determinations 11-219, EC 271074 Replacement of GE Sync Check Relay, dated 6/4/14 12-119 , Bases Change 12
| |
| -04, Bases Change Regarding Deactivated Automatic Containment Isolation Valves, dated 5/15/12 12-210 , A&B ESWGR Floor Drain Debris Above 10% Criterion, dated 9/17/12 12-234, EC 277476, 1810
| |
| -SG-23, Shim Modification, dated 10/7/12 12-302 , UFCR 12-03 UFSAR Corrections Related to Electrical Manhole Waterproofing, dated 12/12/12 12-311, EC 278085 Documentation Update Supporting Revision 15 of Battery Sizing Calculation 9763
| |
| -3-ED-00-14-F, dated 12/24/12
| |
|
| |
|
| A-2 Attachment 13-002, Change to Technical Requirement 2 for Service Water Response Time, dated 1/3/13 13-004, EC 278153 Repair of SW
| | ATTACHMENT |
| -P-41-A Corroded Feeder Cable Conduit, dated 1/4/13 13-038, AR 1813880 Doors D300, D305, D306 Flood Protection Weather Stripping, dated 2/25/13 13-049, B3/4.6.5.1 and B3/4.6.5.2, Bases Change to Support Amendment for LAR 10
| |
| -02, Change to Technical Specifications for Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System, dated 2/19/13 13-077, Aligning DG 1A Controls for Auto Start, dated 3/16/13 13-085, Post-Accident Monitoring Monthly Channel Checks, dated 4/1/13 13-099, EC 278993 Breaker 11 Trip Circuit Monitoring Updates, 4/15/13 13-103, E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, dated 4/17/13 13-187, EC 279700, 1
| |
| -DG-P-116-A/B Inner/Outer Pump Bearing Substitution, dated 8/6/13 13-207, Setpoint Change for CST Level High Alarm (1
| |
| -CO-LB-4079), dated 8/29/13 13-266, Reactor Coolant System Evacuation and Fill, OS 1000.14, dated 12/15/13 Assessments and Nuclear Oversight Reports AR 2018950
| |
| , Self-Assessment of Station Readiness for the 2015 NRC Inspection Pertaining to Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications , dated 1/16/15 SBK 12-021, System Engineering Nuclear Oversight Report, dated 1/23/13 SBK 13-003, Engineering Design Nuclear Oversight Report, dated 2/28/13 SBK 14-016, Modification Process Nuclear Oversight Report, dated 9/10/14
| |
|
| |
|
| Calculations 4.3.08.72F, SW System Steady State Analysis, Revision 10 9763-3-ED-0 0-02-F, Voltage Regulation, Revision 13 9763-3-ED-00-28-F, Motor Control Circuit Protection, Revision 7 9763-3-ED-00-83, Diesel Generator Loading, Revision 9 C-S-1-20801, Emergency Feedwater System Flow Study, Revision 1 C-S-1-45583, Piping Qualification for SI
| | =SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION= |
| -V-138/139 Motor Replacement, Revision 1 C-S-1-45695, EDG Turbocharger Cooling Water Piping Replacement Qualification, Revision 5 C-S-1-45718, Service Water Supply Piping to CC
| |
| -E-17-A & B Qualification, Revision 8 C-S-1-45886, Service Water Return Piping to CC
| |
| -E-17-A & B Qualification, Revision 3 Corrective Action Condition Reports 0017633 0019714 0021206 0168599 0191440 0196950 0202362 0219394 0219494 0222005 0573043 0581373 0584768 0585586 1650365 1659623 1682547 1718445 1754260 1760200 1765186 1770242 1779206 1801499 1803056 1808261 1808389 1809068 1813767 1813793 1813880 1817113 1818771 1849796 1880301 1913363 1920896 1922271 1940612 1941330 1999416 2009457 2013363 2018509 2024046 2025203 2028824 2029298*
| |
| A-3 Attachment 2029685 2030014* 2030264* 2030483* 2030485* 2030920* 2031368 2031564 2031771* 2031901* 2031915* 2032623* 2032740* 2033002* 2033127* 2033292* 2033452* 2033687* (* denotes NRC identified during this inspection)
| |
| Design and Licensin g Documents 1-NHY-250000, Data Sheets for Motor and Air Operated Valves and Dampers, Revision 79 1-NHY-300219 , Service Environment Chart , Revision 28 DBD-PB-01, Plant Barriers Design Basis/Requirements, Revision 3 DBD-SW-01, Service Water System Design Basis Document, Revision 7 MMOD 91-0596, Penetration Seal Revisions, dated 10/28/91 SBK-L-14179, 10 CFR 50.59 Report, Revision 16 to the Seabrook Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 13 to Appendix R, "Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Capability," Revision 14 to Appendix A, "Evaluation and Comparison to BTP APCSB 9.5
| |
| -1," and Revision 142 to the Technical Requirements Manual, dated 10/21/14 SBU-20417, Seabrook Station
| |
| - Units 1 & 2 Cooling Tower Actuation, dated 8/10/78 SBU-99309, Seabrook Station Technical Specifications ESFAS Response Times, dated 5/1/86 TP-7, Moderate Energy Line Break Study, Revision 5 Drawings 1-CC-B20207, Primary Component Cooling Loop
| |
| 'A' Detail, Revision 12 1-CS-B20722, Chemical & Volume Control System Heat Exchangers Detail, Revisi on 14 1-CS-B20725, Chemical & Volume Control Charging System Detail, Revision 28 1-DG-B20461, Diesel Generator Cooling Water System Train
| |
| 'A' Detail, Revision 22 1-DG-D20460, Diesel Generator Starting Air System Train 'A' Detail, Revision 23 1-DG-D20461, Diesel Generator Cooling Water System Train 'A' Detail, Revision 19 1-DG-F20461, DG Cooling Water System Train A Detail Functional Test Limits , Revision 9 1-NHY-250000, Data Sheets for Motor and Air Operated Valves/Dampers, Revision 80 1NHY-506403, DG-1A Engine Air Cooler Water Control Loop Diagram, Revision 14 1NHY-506404, DG
| |
| -1A Engine Jacket Cooling Water Control Loop Diagram, Revision 20 1-NHY-BD-2042, Primary Auxiliary Building Elev. 25', Revision 5 1-SI-B20447, SI System, High Head Injection System Detail, Revision 18 1-SI-D20447, SI System, High Head Injection System Detail, Revision 16 1-SI-F20447, SI System, High Head Injection System Detail, Functional Test Limits, Revision 5 1-SW-B20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail , Revision 42 1-SW-F20795, Service Water System Nuclear Detail Functional Test Limits , Revision 21 309825, 345KV Switching Station Equipment Single Line Diagram, Sheet 1, Revision 25 309825, 345KV Switching Station Equipment Single Line Diagram, Sheet 2, Revision 3 EC1 44978-SK-2000, Add Oil Sample Ports for 1
| |
| -CBS-P-9-A/B (Pump Bearings), Revision 1 EC144978-SK-2001, Add Oil Sample Ports for 1
| |
| -CBS-P-9-A/B (Motor Bearings), Revision 1 EC270448-SK-5001, Air Supply Modification for Valves 1
| |
| -CS-HCV-182 &1-CS-FCV-121 , Revisio n 0 EC274318-SK-2000, Modify Turbocharger Piping Train 'A'
| |
| - Left Bank, Revision 2 EC274318-SK-2004, Fabrication Detail Plate 4
| |
| - Right Bank Socket Weld Connection, Revision 1 A-4 Attachment FP20594, Jacket Coolant Schematic, Revision 15 FP22574, Operation and Maintenance Manual Emergency Diesel Generator Systems (Colt-11-206086), Revision 43 FP22788, Second Emergency Diesel Generator Unit Test Report, Revision 1 FP23694, Pressures
| |
| & Temperatures DG Systems, Revision 1 SK-EC274172- 2000, SW Piping Replacement 1-DG-E-42A PID Mark Up, Revision 0 SK-EC274172- 2004, Replace SW 180 Elbow 1-CC-E-17-A Inlet, Revision 0 SK-EC274172- 2032, Service Water Diesel Generator Piping Replacement, Revision 1 Evaluations 1880301, CS
| |
| -F-121-CAL-2 ERPM Level II Evaluation, dated 12/5/13 AR 191440-03, "B" Diesel Generator Right Bank Turbocharger Coolant Outlet Flange Leak Root Cause Analysis Report, dated 5/28/09 AR 191440-41, DG Jacket Water Gasket Replacement Evaluation, dated 9/30/10 AR 222005-01, Failure of 1-CS-HCV-182 due to Broken Airline MRFF-MPFF Determination, dated 5/26/10 AR 222005-03, Failure of 1-CS-HCV-182 due to Broken Airline Apparent Cause Evaluation Report, dated 6/15/10 CR 1803056, A&B ESWGR Floor Drain Debris Above 10% Criterion Prompt Operability Determination, dated 9/17/12 EC281495, Equivalent Design Package (EDP) Evaluation, Revision 0 HUPE 1801499
| |
| -02, Human Performance Evaluation, dated 10/2/12 MA 10.3A, 1
| |
| -CS-HCV-182 Boric Acid Leak Screening, dated 2/12/15 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Improvement Plan for Charging System AOV Tubing Failures, Revision 5 PCR 1856095, MS0539.37, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine Cylinder Head Maintenance, dated 3/13/13 PCR 1861395, OX1456.19 , Post-Accident Monitoring Monthly Channel Checks, dated 4/1/13 Preliminary Assessment of Callaway Emergency Diesel Cooling Jacket Flange Leak, dated 4/21/09 Stock Code 018893, Commercial Grade Dedication Verification, dated 5/3/99 Stock Code 442594, Commercial Grade Dedication Verification, Revision 0 Miscellane o us 1-CS-F-121-CAL-2, Charging Pumps 2A and 2B Header Flow Control Valve 1
| |
| -CS-FCV-121 and I/P Calibration, performed 11/3/09 1-CS-H-182-CAL-1, Charging Header Flow Control Calibration, performed 4/12/11 40043761-01, FME Multiple Initial and Closeout Inspection Signature Form, dated 5/2/12 40043762-01, FME Multiple Initial and Closeout Inspection Signature Form, dated 12/15/11 40044911-03, FME Initial and Closeout Inspection Signature Form, dated 10/2/12 8019, Emergency Diesel Mechanical Instructor Guide, Revision 0 AR 2031368, DG
| |
| -E-42-A Heat Exchanger Inlet and Outlet Inspections, performed 3/10/15 CBS Pump Motor SOMS Data (Equipment Operator Logs), dated 1/25/15
| |
| - 2/1/15 DBD-ED-02, Design Basis Document: Motor Operated Valves with Thermal Overload Protection Devices, Revision 2 DG-SKD-7-A-M17, Cylinder Liner O
| |
| -Ring Replacement, dated 3/3/15 FME Plan for OR15 DGA Outage, dated 8/17/12 LTR-TA-10-214, Westinghouse Letter, Operability Assessment for Seabrook, dated 11/8/10 A-5 Attachment MS0539.37, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine Cylinder Head Maintenance, performed 3/27/13 MS0599.20, Fire Barrier Wrap Installation and Repair, performed 5/29/14 MS0599.27, Flexible Boot Fabrication, Installation and Repair, performed 4/19/14 MX0539.28, A
| |
| -EDG Coolant Recirculation, Draining, and Refilling, performed 10/5/12 MX0539.50, Emergency Diesel Generator Engine 24
| |
| -Month Preventive Maintenance, performed 3/12/13 & 3/27/13 NEI 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, Revision 1 NSAL-07-10, Loss-of-Normal Feedwater/Loss
| |
| -o f-Offsite AC Power Analysis PORV Modeling Assumptions, 11/7/07 ORD5700, Parker O
| |
| -Ring Handbook, 2007 Edition SBK NLO N4022C, N4022C DG Digital Temperature Controller, Revision 0 SBN-300, Letter, Response to Requests for Additional Information from Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, dated 7/27/82 SBN-321, Letter, Seabrook Station EFW System Design Changes, dated 9/7/82 Seabrook Licensee Event Report 2008
| |
| -001-00, dated 3/17/08 Tech Spec and Commitment Logs (RMD), dated 3/2/15
| |
| - 3/5/15 Modification Packages EC 144978, Installation of Oil Sample Ports for A and B CBS Pump and Motor Bearings, Revision 0 EC 145280, Seabrook Substation Reliability Upgrade Project Phase II, Revision 5 EC 270448, 1-CS-HCV-182 &1-CS-FCV-121 Air Supply Modification, Revision 0 EC 272397, Replacement of 1
| |
| -CBS-V-2 Motor Operator, Revision 2 EC 274150, Diesel Generator Cooling Water Header O
| |
| -ring Material Substitution, Revision 0 EC 274172, OR15 SW Piping Modifications: Replacement of SW DGHX Piping and A PCCW Piping with AL
| |
| -6XN, Revision 0 EC 274318, DG-A Turbocharger Jacket Water Cooling Outlet Piping Replacement, Revision 0 EC 274551, Revise EFW High Flow Isolation Setpoint, Revision 1 EC 275419, Valve Mods to Prevent Pressure Locking for 1
| |
| -SI-V-138 and 1-SI-V-139, Revision 7 EC 277469, 1
| |
| -SW-V-4 Running Current Change, Revision 0 EC-250048, Steam Generator Feed Pump Turbine Digital Upgrade Project, Revision 11 EC-271259, MSO Resolution: SW & CC MOV Circuit Changes, Revision 7 EC-271261, MSO Resolution: RWST Valve Auto Circuit on VCT Valve Closure Circuit , Revision 6 EC-271262, MSO Resolution: ASDV Circuit Changes, Revision 5 Procedures D6080, DG 'B' Water Jacket Temperature Control Trouble, Revision 0 D7044, DG 'A' Air Manifold Temperature Control Trouble, Revision 1 D7747, DG 'A' Water Jacket Temperature Control Trouble, Revision 1 D8295, DG 'B' Air Manifold Temperature Control Trouble, Revision 0 DG-CP-75 UA-9558, Local Alarm Responses, Revision 55 DG-CP-76 UA-9568, Local Alarm Responses, Revision 58 DG-CP-76A UA-9568, Panel DG
| |
| -CP-76A UA-9568 Local Alarm Responses, Revision 58 EN-AA-100, Design Control Program, Revision 2 EN-AA-100-1002 , Design Verification, Revision 1 E N-A A-203-1201, 10 CFR Applicability and 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Reviews, Revision
| |
|
| |
|
| A-6 Attachment E N-A A-203-1202 , 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation, Revision 0 E N-A A-20 5-1 1 03, Equivalent Design Package, Revision 1 ES1807.020, Machinery Oil Analysis, Revision 2 ES1850.003, Motor Operated Valve Performance Monitoring, Revision 9 F5280, Steam Generator 'A' EFW Flow High, Revision 5 F5281, Steam Generator 'B' EFW Flow High, Revision 5 F5449, Steam Generator 'C' EFW Flow High, Revision 5 F5453, Steam Generator 'D' EFW Flow High, Revision 5 F6587, DG Train 'A' Emergency Power Inoperable, Revision 8 F6637, DG Train 'B' Emergency Power Inoperable, Revision 6 IS0603.901, Fabrication of Instrument Air Flex Hose , Revision 4 IS0603.902, Installation/Repair of Instrument Tubing/Fittings/Clamps , Revision 2 LS0569.01, Inspection and Testing of Limitorque Valve Actuators, Revision 2 MGDI, Maintenance Group Standards and Expectations, Revision 42 MS 05 17.03, Flange Maintenance, Revision 24 MS0523.18 , Bingham-Willamette Containment Building Spray Pump Maintenance, Revision 7 ODI.28, Proper Journal and Log Maintenance; Channel Checks , Revision 27 ON1242.01, Loss of Instrument Air , Revision 13 ON1242.02, Loss of Containment Instrument Air , Revision 12 OS1005.05, Safety Injection System Operation, Revision 26 OS10 05.05 , Safety Injection System Operation , Revision 26 OS1026.11, Operating DG 1B Jacket Cooling Water System, Revision 10 OS1056.03, Containment Penetrations, Revision 13 OS1090.05, Component Configuration Control, Revision 59 OS1200.02A, Remote Safe Shutdown Control
| | ==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT== |
| - Train A, Revision 18 OS1200.02B, Remote Safe Shutdown Control
| |
| - Train B, Revision 18 OS1238.02 , Turbine Building Flooding
| |
| , Revision 5 OX1406.02, Containment Spray Pump and Valve Quarterly Operability, 18 Month Position Indication and Comprehensive Pump Testing, Revision 18 OX1 4 2 6.18 , Aligning DG 1A Controls for Auto Start, Revision 5 PEG-10, System Walkdowns, Revision 21 Surveillance and Modifications Acceptance Tests FW-F-4214-2, Steam Generator 'A' Emergency Feedwater Flow Indication and Valve Auto Closure Calibration (IX1640.121), performed 10/18/12 FW-F-4224-2, Steam Generator 'B' Emergency Feedwater Flow Indication and Valve Auto Closure Calibration (IX1640.122), performed 10/18/12 FW-F-4224-4, Steam Generator 'A' Emergency Feedwater Flow Valve Auto Closure Verification (IX1640.111), performed 10/18/12 FW-F-4224-4, Steam Generator 'D' Emergency Feedwater Flow Indication Auto Closure Verification (IX1640.114), performed 10/18/12 FW-F-4234-2, Steam Generator 'C' Emergency Feedwater Flow Indication Auto Closure Verification (IX1640.113), performed 10/18/12 OX1406.02, Containment Spray Pump and Valve Quarterly Operability, 18 Month Position Indication and Comprehensive Pump Testing (Train A), performed 1/12/15 OX1406.02, Containment Spray Pump and Valve Quarterly Operability, 18 Month Position Indication and Comprehensive Pump Testing (Train B), performed 11/25/14 OX1426.01, DG 1A Monthly Operability Surveillance, performed 2/10/15
| |
|
| |
|
| A-7 Attachment OX1426.05, DG 1 B Monthly Operability Surveillance, performed 1/29/15 OX1426.22, Diesel Generator 1A 24 Hour Load Test and Hot Restart, performed 11/12/14 OX1456.19 , Post-Accident Monitoring Monthly Channel Checks, performed 2/28/15 Non Destructive Examinations 40092941-03, VT-2 Visual Examination, performed 10/8/12 40116507-03, VT-2 Visual Examination, performed 10/8/12 40116507-04, VT-2 Visual Examination, performed 10/8/12 40116507-0 5, VT-3 Visual Examination, performed 10/
| | ===Licensee Personnel=== |
| 2/12 40116507-0 6, VT-3 Visual Examination, performed 10/
| | : [[contact::D. Curtland]], Site Vice President |
| 2/12 4 0118861-03, VT-2 Visual Examination, performed 4/15/14 40118861-04, VT-2 Visual Examination, performed 4/15/14 40176790-01, VT-2 Visual Examination, performed 10/17/12 40176790-0 4, VT-2 Visual Examination, performed 10/
| | : [[contact::V. Brown]], Senior Licensing Engineer |
| 20/12 40 214257-0 1 , EC274172 UT on SW
| | : [[contact::R. Dean]], Principal Engineer |
| -1813-01 Elbow, performed 2/27/13 EC274172 UT on SW
| | : [[contact::T. Glowacky]], Principal Engineer |
| -1813-01 Elbow, performed 2/27/13 EC274318-SK-2000 Joint F135, F136, F149, & F185 Weld Traveler, dated 9/23/12 EC274318-SK-2000 Joint F137
| | : [[contact::K. Harper]], System Engineer (Charging System) |
| - F148 Weld Traveler, dated 10/2/12 EC274318-SK-2007 Joint F156, F164, F165, & F178 Weld Traveler, dated 9/23/12 EC274318-SK-2007 Joint F166
| | : [[contact::J. Klempa]], System Engineer (EDGs) |
| - F177 Weld Traveler, dated 10/1/12 SK-EC274172-2001 Joint F020 Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 7/24/12 SK-EC274172-2001 Joint F023 Weld Traveler, dated 8/15/12 SK-EC274172-2001 Joint F024 Weld Traveler, dated 3/14/12 SK-EC274172-2001 Joint F025 Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 8/6/12 SK-EC274172-2002 Joint F028 Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 6/4/12 SK-EC274172-2003 Joint F0908 Weld Traveler, dated 6/19/12 SK-EC274172-2003 Joint F0909 Weld Traveler, dated 6/19/12 SK-EC274172-2003 Joint F0910 Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 3/28/12 SK-EC274172-2004 Joint F0908 Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 6/13/12 SK-EC274172-2004 Joint F0909 Liquid Penetrant Examination, performed 6/13/12 System Health Reports and Trending Chemical and Volume Control System Health Report, 10/1/14
| | : [[contact::B. Matte]], Electrical Design Engineer |
| - 12/31/14 Containment Spray System Health Report, 10/1/14
| | : [[contact::D. McGonigle]], Jr., Design Engineering Supervisor |
| - 12/31/14 Diesel Generator System Health Report, 10/1/14 - 12/31/14 PEG-94, Service Water Inspection and Repair Trending, Revision 3 Plant Air System Health Report, 10/1/14
| | : [[contact::V. Patel]], Senior Engineer |
| - 12/31/14 Primary Component Cooling Water System Health Report, 10/1/14
| | : [[contact::N. Pietrantonio]], Mechanical Design Engineer |
| - 12/31/14 Service Water System Health Report, 10/1/14
| | : [[contact::J. Sweeney]], Principal Engineer |
| - 12/31/14 V1304129 , 1-CBS-P-9B Pump Outboard Bearing Oil Analysis Report, dated 12/18/14 V13041 30 , 1-CBS-P-9B Pump Inboard Bearing Oil Analysis Report, dated 12/17/14 V13041 33 , 1-CBS-P-9B Motor Outboard Bearing Oil Analysis Report, dated 12/17/14 V13041 34 , 1-CBS-P-9B Motor Inboard Bearing Oil Analysis Report, dated 12/17/14 V13 10254 , 1-CBS-P-9 A Pump Outboard Bearing Oil Analysis Report, dated 1/30/15 V13 10255 , 1-CBS-P-9 A Pump Inboard Bearing Oil Analysis Report, dated 1/30/15 V13 10256 , 1-CBS-P-9 A Motor Outboard Bearing Oil Analysis Report, dated 1/30/15 V13 10257 , 1-CBS-P-9 A Motor Inboard Bearing Oil Analysis Report, dated 1/30/15
| | : [[contact::C. Thomas]], Mechanical Design Engineer |
|
| |
|
| A-8 Attachment Vendor Technical Manuals FP21603, Design Specification for Cooling Water System, Revision 7 FP26187, Technical Specification
| | ==LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED== |
| - Tightening Table, Revision 0 FP52764, Containment Spray Pumps Instruction Manual, Revision 22 Specification No.
| |
|
| |
|
| 9763-006-128-1, General Specification for Alternating Current Induction Motors, Revision 5 Specification No.
| | Open and |
| | ===Closed=== |
|
| |
|
| 9763-006-248-1, Shop Fabrication of Pipe, Revision 14 Specification No.
| | None |
|
| |
|
| 9763-006-46-1, Instrumentations Installations, Revision 13 S-S-1-E-0009, Station Requirements for Torque and Bolting Material Substitution, Revision 10 Work Orders 00 62867 6 00628677 01168258 01203624 01208906-01 01208906-01 01208907-01 01778094 40043761 40043762 40044911 40048638 40074441 40092941 40094392 40104897-01 40107427 40116507 40118861 40139617 40139966-01 40162216 40165785 40176790 40177023 40183575 40209347-01 40209347-02 40209348-01 40214257 40233615 40236831 40306569 LIST OF A C RO NYMS ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Managem e nt System AOV Air Operated Valve CBS Containment Building Spray CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System DRS Division of Reactor Safety EC Engineering Change EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EFW Emergency Feedwater FLA Full Load Amps JW Jacket Water MOV Motor Operated Valve NDE Non-Destructive Examination NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PARS Publicly Available Reco r ds OE Operating Experience OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer PCCW Primary Component Cooling Water PMT Post Maintenance Test RCP Reactor Coolant Pump
| | ==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED== |
|
| |
|
| A-9 Attachment RCS Reactor Coolant System SSC Structure, System and Component SW Service Water TOL Thermal Overload UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
| |
| }} | | }} |
|
---|
Category:Inspection Report
MONTHYEARIR 05000443/20234032023-11-0707 November 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000443/2023403 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 07200063/2023401 IR 05000443/20230032023-11-0606 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2023003 IR 05000443/20230102023-10-19019 October 2023 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000443/2023010 IR 05000443/20234012023-09-0808 September 2023 Cybersecurity Inspection Report 05000443/2023401 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000443/20234202023-09-0505 September 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000443/2023420 IR 05000443/20230052023-08-31031 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Seabrook Station (Report 05000443/2023005) IR 05000443/20233022023-08-16016 August 2023 Operator Licensing Retake Examination Report 05000443/2023302 IR 05000443/20230022023-08-0808 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2023002 IR 05000443/20233012023-05-15015 May 2023 Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000443/2023301 IR 05000443/20230012023-05-11011 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2023001 IR 05000443/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Seabrook Station (Report 05000443/2022006) IR 05000443/20234022023-02-21021 February 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000443/2023402 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000443/20220042023-01-30030 January 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2022004 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Inspection Report 07200063/2022001 ML22339A2312022-12-19019 December 2022 Review of the Fall 2021 Steam Generator Tube Inspections IR 05000443/20220102022-12-15015 December 2022 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000443/2022010 IR 05000443/20220032022-11-22022 November 2022 Reissued Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2022003 ML22304A1002022-11-0101 November 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2022003 IR 05000443/20225022022-09-28028 September 2022 Emergency Preparedness Inspection Report 05000443/2022502 IR 05000443/20220052022-08-31031 August 2022 Updated Inspection Plan for Seabrook Station (Report 05000443/2022005) IR 05000443/20220022022-08-11011 August 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2022002 IR 05000443/20224012022-07-0707 July 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000443/2022401 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000443/20225012022-05-13013 May 2022 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000443/2022501 IR 05000443/20220012022-05-0202 May 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2022001 IR 05000443/20220112022-03-22022 March 2022 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000443/2022011 IR 05000443/20210062022-03-0202 March 2022 Annual Assessment Letter for Seabrook Station, Unit 1 (Report 05000443/2021006) IR 05000443/20210042022-02-10010 February 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2021004 IR 05000443/20210032021-11-10010 November 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2021003 IR 05000443/20210052021-09-0101 September 2021 Updated Inspection Plan for the Seabrook Station (Report 05000443/2021005) IR 05000443/20215012021-08-24024 August 2021 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000443/2021501 IR 05000443/20214022021-08-23023 August 2021 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000443/2021402 (Letter Only) IR 05000443/20210022021-08-11011 August 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2021002 IR 05000443/20210012021-05-0404 May 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2021001 IR 05000443/20210102021-04-20020 April 2021 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Programs) Inspection Report 05000443/2021010 IR 05000443/20214012021-04-0606 April 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000443/2021401 (Letter Only) IR 05000443/20200062021-03-0303 March 2021 Annual Assessment Letter for Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Report 05000443/2020006) IR 05000443/20200042021-02-0202 February 2021 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2020004 IR 05000443/20210132021-01-20020 January 2021 Information Request to Support Triennial Baseline Design-Basis Capabilities of Power-Operated Valves Inspection; Inspection Reportt 05000443/2021013 IR 05000443/20200102020-12-0101 December 2020 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000443/2020010 IR 05000443/20204202020-11-10010 November 2020 Security Inspection Report 05000443/2020420 FOF Report IR 05000443/20200032020-11-0505 November 2020 Integrated International Report 05000443/2020003 SBK-L-20127, Generator Tube Inspection Report2020-10-20020 October 2020 Generator Tube Inspection Report IR 05000443/20203012020-09-17017 September 2020 Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000443/2020301 IR 05000443/20200052020-08-31031 August 2020 Updated Inspection Plan (Inspection Report 05000443/2020005) IR 05000443/20200012020-04-29029 April 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2020001 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Report No. 07200063/2020001 IR 05000443/20204012020-03-10010 March 2020 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000443/2020401 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Security Inspection Report 07200063/2020401(Letter Only) IR 05000443/20190062020-03-0303 March 2020 Annual Assessment Letter for Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Report 05000443/2019006) IR 05000443/20190042020-02-0505 February 2020 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2019004 IR 05000443/20194032019-11-25025 November 2019 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000443/2019403 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000443/20190032019-11-0505 November 2019 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2019003 IR 05000443/20190052019-08-28028 August 2019 Updated Inspection Plan (Inspection Report 05000443/2019005) 2023-09-08
[Table view] Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24009A1152024-01-29029 January 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L 2023 LLE-0043 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) L-2024-010, Point Units 3 and 4, Seabrook, Duane Arnold, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)2024-01-25025 January 2024 Point Units 3 and 4, Seabrook, Duane Arnold, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3) ML24022A0652024-01-22022 January 2024 Senior Reactor and Reactor Operator Initial License Examinations L-2024-003, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC - 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System LBLOCA 30-Day Report2024-01-11011 January 2024 NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC - 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System LBLOCA 30-Day Report ML23312A1822023-12-22022 December 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 172 Revision to Cooling Tower Service Water Loop or Cell Requirements L-2023-173, Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 30 Update2023-12-15015 December 2023 Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 30 Update L-2023-180, Submittal of Changes to the Technical Specification Bases2023-12-13013 December 2023 Submittal of Changes to the Technical Specification Bases L-2023-177, Supplement to Seabrook Exemption Request Regarding Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Final Rule2023-11-29029 November 2023 Supplement to Seabrook Exemption Request Regarding Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Final Rule L-2023-155, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-06542023-11-28028 November 2023 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, L-2023-160, Part 73 Exemption Request Regarding Enhanced Weapons, Firearms, Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Final Rule2023-11-16016 November 2023 Part 73 Exemption Request Regarding Enhanced Weapons, Firearms, Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Final Rule ML23318A0772023-11-14014 November 2023 Request for Information and Notification of Conduct of IP 71111.21.N.04, Age-Related Degradation, Reference Inspection Report 05000443/2024011 IR 05000443/20234032023-11-0707 November 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000443/2023403 and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation 07200063/2023401 IR 05000443/20230032023-11-0606 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2023003 IR 05000443/20230102023-10-19019 October 2023 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000443/2023010 ML23346A1322023-10-0606 October 2023 Communication from C-10 Research & Education Foundation Regarding NextEra Common Emergency Fleet Plan License Amendment Request and Related Documents Subsequently Published ML23275A0522023-10-0202 October 2023 Requalification Program Inspection IR 05000443/20234012023-09-0808 September 2023 Cybersecurity Inspection Report 05000443/2023401 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000443/20234202023-09-0505 September 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000443/2023420 IR 05000443/20230052023-08-31031 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Seabrook Station (Report 05000443/2023005) L-2023-114, Proposed Turkey Point Units 6 and 7; Seabrook Station; Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Official Service List Update2023-08-17017 August 2023 Proposed Turkey Point Units 6 and 7; Seabrook Station; Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Official Service List Update IR 05000443/20233022023-08-16016 August 2023 Operator Licensing Retake Examination Report 05000443/2023302 IR 05000443/20230022023-08-0808 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2023002 L-2023-098, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, Revision 22023-08-0707 August 2023 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, Revision 2 ML23201A0872023-08-0303 August 2023 Audit Plan in Support of Review of License Amendment L-2023-104, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-08-0303 August 2023 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations L-2023-103, Inservice Inspection Examination Report2023-08-0303 August 2023 Inservice Inspection Examination Report ML23192A0782023-07-11011 July 2023 Operator Licensing Retake Examination Approval L-2023-087, Florida Power & Light/Nextera Energy, Results of the Safety Culture Program Effectiveness Review, March 20, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22340A452)2023-06-29029 June 2023 Florida Power & Light/Nextera Energy, Results of the Safety Culture Program Effectiveness Review, March 20, 2023 (ADAMS Accession No. ML22340A452) SBK-L-23053, Radiological Emergency Plan (Ssrep), Revision 802023-06-22022 June 2023 Radiological Emergency Plan (Ssrep), Revision 80 ML23157A0722023-06-0606 June 2023 Notification of Conduct of a Fire Protection Team Inspection L-2023-074, Addendum to 2021 Decommissioning Funding Status Reports / Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Ctsfsi) Financial Assurance Update2023-06-0202 June 2023 Addendum to 2021 Decommissioning Funding Status Reports / Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Ctsfsi) Financial Assurance Update L-2023-071, NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 29 and Florida Power and Light Company Quality Assurance Program Description for 10 CFR Part 52 Licenses (FPL-2) Revision 11, Annual Submittal2023-05-22022 May 2023 NextEra Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 29 and Florida Power and Light Company Quality Assurance Program Description for 10 CFR Part 52 Licenses (FPL-2) Revision 11, Annual Submittal IR 05000443/20233012023-05-15015 May 2023 Initial Operator Licensing Examination Report 05000443/2023301 L-2023-064, License Amendment Request 23-01, Revision 1, Update the Period of Applicability (Poa) for the Pressure-Temperature Limits (PTL) and Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (L Top) Curves2023-05-11011 May 2023 License Amendment Request 23-01, Revision 1, Update the Period of Applicability (Poa) for the Pressure-Temperature Limits (PTL) and Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (L Top) Curves IR 05000443/20230012023-05-11011 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000443/2023001 ML23129A0312023-05-0909 May 2023 Reactor Operator Retake License Examination ML23117A3652023-05-0404 May 2023 Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Amendment Request to Remove Period of Applicability from PTL and Low Temperature Over Pressure Protection Curves SBK-L-23044, 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-04-28028 April 2023 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report SBK-L-23031, 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-04-28028 April 2023 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report SBK-L-23033, 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report2023-04-11011 April 2023 2022 Annual Environmental Operating Report L-2023-053, Core Operating Limits Report for Cycle 232023-04-0505 April 2023 Core Operating Limits Report for Cycle 23 ML23088A1522023-03-29029 March 2023 Summary of Meeting Between Nrc/Region I and C-10 - Questions Regarding Seabrook 4Q2022 Inspection Report L-2023-021, Units, 1 and 2, Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, Seabrook Station and Point Beach, Units 1 and 2 - Decommissioning Funding Status Reports / Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Financial Assurance Update2023-03-28028 March 2023 Units, 1 and 2, Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, Seabrook Station and Point Beach, Units 1 and 2 - Decommissioning Funding Status Reports / Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Financial Assurance Update L-2023-028, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Reporting of Changes to, or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Models or Applications2023-03-27027 March 2023 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Reporting of Changes to, or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Models or Applications ML23073A1562023-03-23023 March 2023 Relief Request 4RA-22-01, Relief from the Requirements of the ASME Code L-2023-012, License Amendment Request 23-01, Remove Period of Applicability (Poa) from Pressure Temperature Limits (PTL) and Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (L Top) Curves2023-03-15015 March 2023 License Amendment Request 23-01, Remove Period of Applicability (Poa) from Pressure Temperature Limits (PTL) and Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (L Top) Curves L-2023-025, Fleet Relief Request (Frr) 23-01, Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Authorizing Implementation of ASME Code Case N-752-12023-03-15015 March 2023 Fleet Relief Request (Frr) 23-01, Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Authorizing Implementation of ASME Code Case N-752-1 L-2023-029, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)2023-03-10010 March 2023 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3) L-2023-023, Revised Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-03-0303 March 2023 Revised Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23020A1002023-03-0303 March 2023 OEDO-22-00419 - 2.206 Petition for Seabrook Station Structure Concrete Concerns (EPID L-2022-CRS-0000)- Closure Letter 2024-01-29
[Table view] |
Text
ril 28, 2015
SUBJECT:
SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2015007
Dear Mr. Curtland:
On March 19, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on March 19, 2015, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.
Based on the results of the inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety
Mr. Dean Curtland Vice President, Seabrook Station c/o Mr. Michael Ossing NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC 626 Lafayette Rd.
Seabrook, NH 03874 SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS TEAM INSPECTION REPORT 05000443/2015007
Dear Mr. Curtland:
On March 19, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on March 19, 2015, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
In conducting the inspection, the team reviewed selected procedures, calculations and records, observed activities, and interviewed station personnel.
Based on the results of the inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Distribution: See Next Page DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DRS\Plant Support Branch 2\Lilliendahl\Seabrook MODS 2015007.docx ADAMS ACCESSION NUMBER: ML15119A056 Non-Sensitive Publicly Available SUNSI Review Sensitive Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME JLilliendahl GDentel/RB PKrohn DATE 4/17/15 4/21/15 4/28/15 Docket No. 50-443 License No: NPF-86
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000443/2015007 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I==
Docket No.: 50-443 License No.: NPF-86 Report No.: 05000443/2015007 Licensee: NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC Facility: Seabrook Station, Unit No.1 Location: Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874 Inspection Period: March 2 through March 19, 2015 Inspectors: J. Lilliendahl, Senior Emergency Response Coordinator, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), Team Lead S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS Approved By: Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety i Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000443/2015007; 3/2/2015 - 3/19/2015; Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1; Permanent Plant
Modifications Engineering Team Inspection.
This report covers a 2 week on-site inspection of the evaluations of changes, tests, and experiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by three region-based engineering inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 5.
No findings were identified.
ii
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications
(IP 71111.17T)
.1 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments (23 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed six safety evaluations to evaluate whether the changes to the facility or procedures, as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), had been reviewed and documented in accordance Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59 requirements. In addition, the team evaluated whether NextEra had been required to obtain U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval prior to implementing the changes. The team interviewed plant staff and reviewed supporting information including calculations, analyses, design change documentation, procedures, the UFSAR, Technical Specifications, and plant drawings to assess the adequacy of the safety evaluations. The team compared the safety evaluations and supporting documents to the guidance and methods provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations, Revision 1, as endorsed by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, to determine the adequacy of the safety evaluations.
The team also reviewed a sample of seventeen 10 CFR 50.59 screenings for which NextEra had concluded that a safety evaluation was not required. These reviews were performed to assess whether NextEra's threshold for performing safety evaluations was consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The sample included design changes, calculations, and procedure changes.
The team reviewed the safety evaluations and screenings that NextEra had performed and approved during the time period covered by this inspection not previously reviewed by NRC inspectors. The samples selected were based on the safety significance, risk significance, and complexity of the change to the facility.
In addition, the team compared NextEras administrative procedures used to control the screening, preparation, review, and approval of safety evaluations to the guidance in NEI 96-07 to evaluate whether the procedures adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The reviewed safety evaluations and screenings are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2 Permanent Plant Modifications (10 samples)
.2.1 Installation of Oil Sample Ports on the A and B Containment Building Spray Pump and Motor
Bearings
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed engineering change (EC) 144978 which installed oil sample ports on the containment building spray (CBS) pump and motor bearings. NextEra performed the modification to provide more effective oil sampling through the collection of a representative and repeatable sample to determine oil and component condition. The modification affected eight locations, two on each CBS pump and two on each CBS motor.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the CBS system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new oil sample ports and installed configuration met design and licensing requirements. The team reviewed post maintenance test (PMT) results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team also reviewed CBS pump and motor oil analysis reports, trend data, and the CBS system health report to assess the oil and bearing conditions. The team performed several walkdowns of all eight CBS oil sample ports to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSC)located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action condition reports (CR) and the CBS system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.2 Service Water Piping Replacement for the Diesel Generator and Primary Component
Cooling Water Heat Exchangers
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed EC 274172 which replaced degraded Plastisol-lined service water (SW)piping on the supply and return of the A and B emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchangers and degraded cement-lined SW piping on the supply side of the A primary component cooling water (PCCW) heat exchanger. NextEra performed the modification to replace degraded SW piping with a corrosion resistant material to ensure long-term system pressure boundary integrity. NextEra replaced the carbon steel lined piping with AL-6XN, an austenitic stainless steel material, suitable for seawater service without the need for internal lining or protective coating.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDG, PCCW, and SW systems had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new SW piping met design and licensing requirements.
Additionally, the team reviewed non-destructive examination (NDE) results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the replaced SW piping, including a walkdown during a prolonged A EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained pressure boundary integrity and configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related SSCs located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG, PCCW, and SW system health reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.3 Diesel Generator Turbocharger Jacket Cooling Water Outlet Piping Replacement
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed EC 274318 which replaced the majority of the turbocharger small-bore jacket water (JW) outlet piping on the A EDG. NextEra performed the modification to eliminate four of the six non-standard piping flanges, and to replace all of the DURLON 8500 gasket material installed in October 2003. Industry operating experience (OE) from Callaway Nuclear Station indicated that the gasket material installed in 2003 was susceptible to age-related failure. Callaway had experienced a leak from a 2-bolt rectangular flange on their EDG turbocharger JW outlet piping that resulted in unplanned EDG unavailability. In addition to replacing all of the susceptible gasket material, the Seabrook modification included fabricating new 8-bolt plates for the turbocharger casing. NextEra machined the new plates with socket weld fittings which allowed welding of the piping directly to the plate. For the remaining two 2-bolt flanges, NextEra installed new gaskets, new higher torque bolting, and locking devices.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDGs JW cooling system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and calculations to determine if the new piping and flanges met design and licensing requirements. Additionally, the team reviewed NDE results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the replaced JW piping and the JW expansion tanks, including a walkdown during a prolonged A EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained pressure boundary integrity and configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related EDG components located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.4 Chemical and Volume Control System Control Valve Air Supply Modification
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed EC 270448 which modified the airline piping material for two air-operated valves (AOV) 1-CS-HCV-182 and 1-CS-FCV-121) in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). NextEra performed the modification in response to a sheared airline caused by the use of improperly annealed red brass piping. NextEra implemented the modification to upgrade the material for the piping and selected fittings to stainless steel to provide a more robust and reliable piping configuration. Valve 1-CS-HCV-182 is an air-operated, fail-open, modulating control valve. Its design function is to control and direct charging pump flow to the reactor coolant system (RCS) loops via the normal charging path.
By controlling the charging path flow, the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal injection flow is also controlled. Valve 1-CS-FCV-121 is an air-operated, fail-open, modulating control valve. It is used to control the charging flow rate to the RCS when either of the centrifugal charging pumps is used for normal charging operations.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the CVCS system had been degraded by the modification. The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and airline specifications to determine if the new piping and fittings met design and licensing requirements.
Additionally, the team reviewed PMT results and associated maintenance work orders to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification. The team performed walkdowns of both AOVs to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, maintained configuration control, and had not impacted the function of other safety-related SSCs located in the vicinity. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the CVCS and plant air system health reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed EC 274150 which evaluated and approved a material substitution for the O-rings installed in the cylinder JW headers on the EDGs. NextEra performed the modification because the diesel engine original equipment manufacturer (OEM)recommended the substitute material (Viton) for the EDG cooling water system application.
The O-rings, which are installed in the mechanical joints of the JW supply and return headers, provide a soft sealing element to prevent fluid leakage. The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, or performance capability of the EDGs JW cooling system had been degraded by the modification.
The team interviewed design engineers and reviewed design drawings and material specifications to determine if the new O-rings met design and licensing requirements.
Additionally, the team reviewed a sample of EDG surveillances, including a 24-hour loaded run on the A EDG, and associated maintenance work orders that installed the new O-rings to determine if NextEra appropriately implemented the modification and to assess the leak tightness of the JW piping mechanical joints. The team performed several walkdowns of the accessible portions of the JW supply and return header mechanical joints and the JW expansion tanks, including a walkdown during a prolonged A EDG run on March 5, 2015, to verify that NextEra had adequately implemented the modification, minimized JW leakage, and properly maintained JW system inventory. The team also reviewed corrective action CRs and the EDG system health report to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.6 Replacement of 1-CBS-V-2 Motor Operator
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification EC 272397 that replaced the motor for motor-operated valve (MOV) 1-CBS-V-2, which is a containment building spray suction valve from the refueling water storage tank. The motors existing magnesium rotor was replaced with an aluminum rotor to address an industry operating experience concern where oxidation and corrosion of the magnesium rotor components resulted from exposure to high humidity and temperatures.
The team reviewed the modification to evaluate whether NextEras analysis of the change was adequate to maintain the design bases, licensing bases, and design margins of the MOV. The team verified that NextEra properly translated design inputs into the associated design bases and procedures. The team also reviewed the PMT and performed a walkdown of the MOV and adjacent equipment to assess whether NextEra adequately maintained configuration control. The team reviewed associated CRs to assess NextEra's ability to evaluate and correct problems. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.7 Revise Emergency Feedwater High Flow Isolation Setpoint
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification EC 274551 that increased the emergency feedwater (EFW)high flow isolation setpoint to ensure that two intact steam generators would be available with a single failure following a postulated faulted steam generator condition. NextEra determined that this modification was necessary following a plant transient in 2008 (plant trip due to 345 kV bus fault) in which EFW flow was automatically isolated from two steam generators due to high EFW flow. NextEra determined that increasing the high flow isolation setpoint would provide additional margin to reaching the high flow trip while maintaining the design and licensing bases intact.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the EFW system had been degraded by the high flow isolation setpoint modification. The team reviewed calculations, drawings, and procedures to verify that the EFW system would function in accordance with design assumptions. The team reviewed the associated work order instructions, PMT results, and other documentation to verify that the modification was implemented as designed. The team also performed walkdowns of accessible portions of the EFW system to verify that NextEra had maintained configuration control and to assess the material condition of affected components.
Additionally, the team reviewed corrective action reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.8 Valve Modifications to Prevent Pressure Locking for 1-SI-V-138 and 1-SI-V-139
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification EC 275419 that provided a vent path from the bonnet cavity of high head safety injection valves 1-SI-V-138 and 1-SI-V-139 (parallel cold leg injection valves). This modification was necessitated by reduced margin for overcoming the calculated loads associated with pressure locking. Although the valves remained capable of performing their design functions under postulated conditions, this modification improved the operating margin.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the high head safety injection system had been degraded by the valve modification. The team reviewed calculations, drawings, and procedures to verify that the safety injection system would function in accordance with design assumptions. The team reviewed the associated work order instructions, PMT results, and other documentation to verify that the modification was implemented as designed. The team also performed walkdowns of accessible portions of the modified valves and associated accessible equipment to verify that NextEra had maintained configuration control and to assess the material condition of affected components. Additionally, the team reviewed corrective action reports to determine if there were reliability or performance issues that may have resulted from the modification. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.9 Seabrook Substation Reliability Upgrade Project
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification EC 145280 that upgraded several breakers in the Seabrook substation and redesigned the substation layout to improve reliability. The upgraded substation added three new breakers and replaced two of the original breakers.
The new configuration addresses breaker obsolescence and provides dedicated breakers for the reserve auxiliary transformers and generator step-up transformer. This configuration improves the redundancy for power sources during offsite line losses and outages.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of the substation had been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the completed work order and documentation to verify that the modification was installed as designed and the team reviewed the associated PMT results to ensure that NextEra specified appropriate tests and acceptance criteria, and that the test results confirmed satisfactory performance. Additionally, the team interviewed design engineers and reviewed CRs to determine if the modification corrected performance issues associated with substation reliability and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues created from the modification. The team also reviewed affected drawings and maintenance procedures to ensure that they were properly updated and walked down the substation to assess the material condition and configuration. Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2.10 1-SW-V-4 Running Current Change
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed modification EC 277469 that adjusted the thermal overload (TOL)setpoint for 1-SW-V-4, which is an MOV credited with isolating safety-related portions of the service water system from non-safety portions of the system. When MOVs are initially installed at Seabrook, their TOL is set based upon the initial full load amps (FLA) for the motor. After maintenance is performed on the motors, the valves occasionally draw more current than the initial FLA. With an increase in current, there is a potential for inadvertently tripping the TOL. 1-SW-V-4 was found to draw more current than the initial FLA so the associated TOL setting was increased to prevent spurious tripping.
The team reviewed the modification to determine if the design basis, licensing basis, and performance capability of the MOV, associated motor control center, and associated EDG had been degraded by the modification. The team reviewed the completed work order and documentation to verify that the modification was installed as designed and the team reviewed the associated PMT results to ensure that NextEra specified appropriate tests and acceptance criteria, and that the test results confirmed satisfactory performance.
Additionally, the team interviewed design engineers and reviewed CRs to determine if the modification corrected the inadequate TOL sizing and to determine if there were reliability or performance issues created from the modification. The team also reviewed affected calculations and maintenance procedures to ensure that they were properly update.
Additionally, the team reviewed the 10 CFR 50.59 screen and engineering evaluation associated with this modification. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152)
a. Inspection Scope
The team reviewed a sample of CRs associated with 10 CFR 50.59 and plant modification issues to evaluate whether NextEra was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with these areas, and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. In addition, the team reviewed CRs written on issues identified during the inspection to verify NextEra adequately described the problem and incorporated the issue into their corrective action system. The CRs reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
The team presented the inspection results to Mr. Dean Curtland, Site Vice President, and other members of the Seabrook Station staff at an exit meeting on March 19, 2015. The team returned the proprietary information reviewed during the inspection and verified that this report does not contain proprietary information.
ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- D. Curtland, Site Vice President
- V. Brown, Senior Licensing Engineer
- R. Dean, Principal Engineer
- T. Glowacky, Principal Engineer
- K. Harper, System Engineer (Charging System)
- J. Klempa, System Engineer (EDGs)
- B. Matte, Electrical Design Engineer
- D. McGonigle, Jr., Design Engineering Supervisor
- V. Patel, Senior Engineer
- N. Pietrantonio, Mechanical Design Engineer
- J. Sweeney, Principal Engineer
- C. Thomas, Mechanical Design Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Open and
Closed
None
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED