Information Notice 1990-06, Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 29, 1990 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 90-06: POTENTIAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 29, 1990
                                                                      SHUTDOWN COOLING


FOR LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING WHILE AT LOW REACTOR COOLANT LEVELS
NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-06: POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF COOLANT LEVELS
 
WHILE   AT   LOW REACTOR


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All holders of operating
                                                                              nuclear power


licenses or construction
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for


permits for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This information
:
                                                                      to a potential problem


notice is intended to alert addressees
This information notice is intended to alert addressees (RHR) system during


to a potential
affecting the operability of the residual      heat  removal


problem affecting
is expected that re- operating conditions involving mid-loop operation. It to their facilities


the operability
-cipients will review the information for applicability problems. However, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar constitute NRC


of the residual heat removal (RHR) system during operating
suggestions contained in this information notice do not


conditions
response is required.


involving
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written


mid-loop operation.
==Description of Circumstances==
:
                                                                        the residual heat


It is expected that re--cipients
On July 18, 1989, at Comanche Peak Unit 1, train 'Al ofloading. The air


will review the information
removal system was in operation  prior  to  initial  fuel


for applicability
being used to


to their facilities
operated RHR heat exchanger flow control valve (FCV) was water level was


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
maintain system flow below 2000  gpm.   The    reactor  vessel


However, suggestions
legs.


contained
being maintained slightly abpve the center line of the hot


in this information
FCV failed. The loss


notice do not constitute
The inverter supplying power to the controller for the to its emergency core


NRC requirements;
of power to the controller resulted in the FCV failing            open valve caused
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description


of Circumstances:
cooling system (ECCS) position of being fully open. The                    flow caused
On July 18, 1989, at Comanche Peak Unit 1, train 'Al of the residual heat removal system was in operation


prior to initial fuel loading. The air operated RHR heat exchanger
an increase in system flow to 4400  gpm.   This  sudden,  increased


flow control valve (FCV) was being used to maintain system flow below 2000 gpm. The reactor vessel water level was being maintained
the RHR pipe con- conditions where vortexing was expected at the suction of


slightly abpve the center line of the hot legs.The inverter supplying
nection to the RCS.


power to the controller
to an alternate


for the FCV failed. The loss of power to the controller
The power supply for the controllers was manually transferred


resulted in the FCV failing to its emergency
terminating    the   event.


core cooling system (ECCS) position of being fully open. The open valve caused an increase in system flow to 4400 gpm. This sudden, increased
source and the FCV was throttled, thus


flow caused conditions
Discussion:
                                                                              flow through the


where vortexing
The FCV is manually throttled to maintain a desired rate of              to control the


was expected at the suction of the RHR pipe con-nection to the RCS.The power supply for the controllers
RHR heat exchanger. The heat exchanger    flow  rate  is adjusted


was manually transferred
to  the vessel.      Total  system flow is


to an alternate source and the FCV was throttled, thus terminating
temperature of the water being returned                                        with the


the event.Discussion:
regulated by throttling the heat exchanger bypass valve coincident
The FCV is manually throttled


to maintain a desired rate of flow through the RHR heat exchanger.
adjustment of the FCV.


The heat exchanger
001230175  Z                                                                  ((
                                                                                ' D*1 IC,
eo uachr


flow rate is adjusted to control the temperature
IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications of pump air ingestion. However, the increased system flow corresponded to the rate at which vortexing had


of the water being returned to the vessel. Total system flow is regulated
been calculated to occur based on the existing RCS level. The licensee had


by throttling
previously determined maximum permitted flow rates for various reduced levels


the heat exchanger
of the RCS to prevent the possibility of vortexing and air entrainment into


bypass valve coincident
the RHR pump.


with the adjustment
Although RHR pump operation was never actually impaired, the potential existed


of the FCV.001230175 Z ( (' D*1 IC, eo uachr
for air to be introduced to the pump's suction. This concern is exacerbated by


IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications
*  the fact that the heat exchanger FCVs for both trains of RHR are powered from


of pump air ingestion.
the same inverter. Since the FCVs open fully on a loss of power, both trains


However, the increased
of RHR could become inoperable on a loss of power during mid-loop operation.


system flow corresponded
(A loss of instrument air would also cause the FCVs to fail to the full open


to the rate at which vortexing
position and could also result in the loss of both trains of the RHR system).


had been calculated
During most modes of operation, having the FCVs go -fully open on loss of


to occur based on the existing RCS level. The licensee had previously
power or instrument air is not a safety concern because having the valves


determined
fully open does not normally prevent the system from performing its safety


maximum permitted
function. However, having the valves go fully open while at mid-loop could


flow rates for various reduced levels of the RCS to prevent the possibility
result in the loss of decay heat removal capability. This loss could persist


of vortexing
until electrical power or instrument air is restored and air is vented from


and air entrainment
the RHR system.


into the RHR pump.Although RHR pump operation
The licensee has revised procedures for mid-loop operation to require manually


was never actually impaired, the potential
positioning the cold leg injection isolation valves to limit the maximum flow


existed for air to be introduced
through the system, even with the FCVs fully open. This lineup will be used


to the pump's suction. This concern is exacerbated
whenever the unit is at mid-loop and protects against the consequences of


by* the fact that the heat exchanger
failure of either electrical power or instrument air.


FCVs for both trains of RHR are powered from the same inverter.
Several generic communications have been issued informing licensees of the


Since the FCVs open fully on a loss of power, both trains of RHR could become inoperable
consequences of the loss of residual (decay) heat removal and the operating


on a loss of power during mid-loop operation.(A loss of instrument
conditions under which the probability of a loss increases; i.e., reduced


air would also cause the FCVs to fail to the full open position and could also result in the loss of both trains of the RHR system).During most modes of operation, having the FCVs go -fully open on loss of power or instrument
inventory conditions. The most recent publications include Generic Letter


air is not a safety concern because having the valves fully open does not normally prevent the system from performing
(GL) No. 87-12, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal While the Reactor Coolant System


its safety function.
is Partially Filled;" GL No. 88-17, *Loss of Decay Heat Removal;" NRC In- formation Notice (IN)87-23, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor


However, having the valves go fully open while at mid-loop could result in the loss of decay heat removal capability.
Coolant Level Operation;" IN 88-36, 'Possible Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory


This loss could persist until electrical
During Low Coolant Level Operation;" and IN 89-67, "Loss of Residual Heat


power or instrument
Removal Caused by Accumulator Nitrogen Injection." The event described


air is restored and air is vented from the RHR system.The licensee has revised procedures
above introduces a subtle failure scenario which licensees may not have


for mid-loop operation
considered.


to require manually positioning
IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


the cold leg injection
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


isolation
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.


valves to limit the maximum flow through the system, even with the FCVs fully open. This lineup will be used whenever the unit is at mid-loop and protects against the consequences
Charles E. Rossi,   irector


of failure of either electrical
Division of Operational Events Assessment


power or instrument
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


air.Several generic communications
Technical Contacts:  Nick Fields, NRR


have been issued informing
(301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV


licensees
(817) 897-1500
Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


of the consequences
I


of the loss of residual (decay) heat removal and the operating conditions
IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications of pump air ingestion                                            However


under which the probability
the increased system flow enrraenan~nA n~                                          -~              neto.      Hwvr


of a loss increases;  
Attachment    ~
i.e., reduced inventory
                                    q    )                                    sx 90-06 Jasmary 2§ 1990
                                                                                Page I of I


conditions.
LIST OF RECEITLT ISSUED


The most recent publications
NIR INFORtAT1011 OTICES


include Generic Letter (GL) No. 87-12, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal While the Reactor Coolant System is Partially
JCW  --
                      lnfonation                                      Issuance Issued te


Filled;" GL No. 88-17, *Loss of Decay Heat Removal;" NRC In-formation
Notice No.     SubJect


Notice (IN) 87-23, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor Coolant Level Operation;" IN 88-36, 'Possible
90-05          Inter-System Discharge of     1/26/9O  All holders of ULs


Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant Level Operation;" and IN 89-67, "Loss of Residual Heat Removal Caused by Accumulator
Reactor Coelant                          or Ch for nuclear


Nitrogen Injection." The event described above introduces
power reactors.


a subtle failure scenario which licensees
90-04          Cracking of the Upper Shall-  1/26/90  All holders of OLs


may not have considered.
to-Transition Cone Girth                or CPs.for Westinghouse.


IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information
Melds Is Steam Generators              designed and Combustion


notice requires no specific action or written response.
Engineering-disigned
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, irector Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts:
Nick Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV (817) 897-1500 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
I IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications
 
of pump air ingestion
 
However the increased
 
system flow enrraenan~nA
 
n~ -~ neto. Hwvr Attachment
 
~q ) sx 90-06 Jasmary 2§ 1990 Page I of I LIST OF RECEITLT ISSUED NIR INFORtAT1011 OTICES JCW --lnfonation
 
Notice No.90-05 90-04 SubJect Inter-System
 
Discharge
 
of Reactor Coelant Issuance 1/26/9O Cracking of the Upper Shall- 1/26/90 to-Transition


===Cone Girth Melds Is Steam Generators===
nuclear power reactors.
Issued te All holders of ULs or Ch for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs.for Westinghouse.


designed and Combustion
90-03            malfunction of Borg-Varner    1/23/90  All holders of OLs


Engineering-disigned
SBlted Sonnet Check Valves              or CPs for uclewr


nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for uclewr power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for Slis.All holders of NRC materials
Causd by Failure of the                power reactors.


licenses.90-03 malfunction
Swing Arm


of Borg-Varner
90-02          Potential Degradation of       1/29D    All holders of OLs


SBlted Sonnet Check Valves Causd by Failure of the Swing Arm 90-02 Potential
Secondary Contaient                    or CPs for Slis.


Degradation
90-01            lIportace of Proper            1/12/90  All holders of NRC


of Secondary
Response to Self-Identifted            materials licenses.


Contaient 90-01 lIportace
Violations by Licensees


of Proper Response to Self-Identifted
89-90            Pressurizer Safety Valv        12/28/84 All holder of OMs


Violations
Lift Setpoint Shift                    or Ch for Pilb.


by Licensees 89-90 Pressurizer
89-8            Event Notificatton            12/26/89 All holders of CLs


Safety Valv Lift Setpoint Shift 89-8 Event Notificatton
Workshents                              or en for nuclear


Workshents
powerreactors.


89-88 Recent XRC-Sponsored
89-88           Recent XRC-Sponsored           12/26189 All holders of Ots


Testing of motor-Operated
Testing of motor-Operated               or CPsfor nutlear


Valves 8647 Disablilg
Valves                                 poer reactors.


of Emergency Diesel Generators
8647            Disablilg of Emergency         12/19189 All helders of OLs


by Their Neutral Ground-Fault
Diesel Generators by                   or CVs for nuclear


Protection
Their Neutral Ground-Fault              power reactors.


Circuitry 8945. etalclad.
Protection Circuitry


Lou-Voltage
8945.            etalclad. Lou-Voltage         12/IS/19 All holders of OLs


Supp. 2 Power Circuit Dreakars Refurbished
Supp. 2         Power Circuit Dreakars                 or CPsfor nuclear


with Substandard
Refurbished with                       power reactors.


Parts 1/23/90 1/29D 1/12/90 12/28/84 All holder of OMs or Ch for Pilb.12/26/89 All holders of CLs or en for nuclear power reactors.12/26189 All holders of Ots or CPs for nutlear poer reactors.12/19189 All helders of OLs or CVs for nuclear power reactors.12/IS/1 9 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL*OpitunceS
Substandard Parts


-_CV s Construction
OL*OpitunceS                      -                         _
                        CV s Construction Permit


Permit UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
IPOSTAGE & FEES PAOID


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. 8300 IPOSTAGE & FEES PAOID ISNiRC 1 IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                                                                                              ISNiRC      1 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS


notice requires no specific action or written response.
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. 8300


If you have any questions
IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


about the information
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Charles E. Rossi, Director


NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Division of Operational Events Assessment


===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:  Nick Fields, NRR


Contacts: Nick Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV (817) 897-1500 Attachment:
(301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
(817) 897-1500
Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


EAB:NRR*NFields:
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
db 1/12/90 TECH:EDITOR


*BCalure 1/13/90 EAB:NRR C:EAB:NRR*DCFischer
EAB:NRR     TECH:EDITOR EAB:NRR    C:EAB:NRR   C:OGCB:NRR    NRR:SRXB


*CJHaughney
*NFields: db *BCalure    *DCFischer *CJHaughney *CHBerlinger *RJones


1/16/90 1/16/90 C:OGCB:NRR
1/12/90      1/13/90    1/16/90   1/16/90       1/17/90      1/23/90
1/Z3'90


*CHBerlinger
K)j                                V%2IN 90-
                                                        January , 1990 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


1/17/90 NRR:SRXB*RJones 1/23/90 1 /Z3'90
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical
K)j V%2IN 90-January , 1990 No specific action or written response is required by this information


If you have any questions
contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional


about this matter, please contact one of the contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
office.


of the appropriate
Charles E. Rossi, Director


office.notice.technical regional Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Division of Operational Events Assessment


===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:   Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500
 
Attachment:   List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Contacts: Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500 Attachment:  
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
EAB:NRR*NFields:db


/ /90 D:DOEA:NRR
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE


CERossi/ /90 TECH:EDITOR
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IN 90-January , 1990%...Z'age


3 of 3 No specific action or written response is required by this infornation
/ /90


notice. If you have any questions
IN 90-
                                                                  January , 1990
                                                              %...Z'age 3 of 3 No specific action or written response is required by this


about this matter, please contact the technical
infornation notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contact listed below or the Regional


contact listed below or the Regional Administrator
Administrator of the appropriate regional office.


of the appropriate
Charles E. Rossi, Director


regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Division of Operational Events Assessment


===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical Contacts:       Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500
 
Attachment:    List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Contacts: Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500 List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices Attachment:
AJF EAB:NRR NFields:db
 
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{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 04:02, 24 November 2019

Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels
ML031130325
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date: 01/29/1990
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-006, NUDOCS 9001230175
Download: ML031130325 (7)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 29, 1990

SHUTDOWN COOLING

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-06: POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF COOLANT LEVELS

WHILE AT LOW REACTOR

Addressees

nuclear power

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for

reactors.

Purpose

to a potential problem

This information notice is intended to alert addressees (RHR) system during

affecting the operability of the residual heat removal

is expected that re- operating conditions involving mid-loop operation. It to their facilities

-cipients will review the information for applicability problems. However, and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar constitute NRC

suggestions contained in this information notice do not

response is required.

requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

Description of Circumstances

the residual heat

On July 18, 1989, at Comanche Peak Unit 1, train 'Al ofloading. The air

removal system was in operation prior to initial fuel

being used to

operated RHR heat exchanger flow control valve (FCV) was water level was

maintain system flow below 2000 gpm. The reactor vessel

legs.

being maintained slightly abpve the center line of the hot

FCV failed. The loss

The inverter supplying power to the controller for the to its emergency core

of power to the controller resulted in the FCV failing open valve caused

cooling system (ECCS) position of being fully open. The flow caused

an increase in system flow to 4400 gpm. This sudden, increased

the RHR pipe con- conditions where vortexing was expected at the suction of

nection to the RCS.

to an alternate

The power supply for the controllers was manually transferred

terminating the event.

source and the FCV was throttled, thus

Discussion:

flow through the

The FCV is manually throttled to maintain a desired rate of to control the

RHR heat exchanger. The heat exchanger flow rate is adjusted

to the vessel. Total system flow is

temperature of the water being returned with the

regulated by throttling the heat exchanger bypass valve coincident

adjustment of the FCV.

001230175 Z ((

' D*1 IC,

eo uachr

IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications of pump air ingestion. However, the increased system flow corresponded to the rate at which vortexing had

been calculated to occur based on the existing RCS level. The licensee had

previously determined maximum permitted flow rates for various reduced levels

of the RCS to prevent the possibility of vortexing and air entrainment into

the RHR pump.

Although RHR pump operation was never actually impaired, the potential existed

for air to be introduced to the pump's suction. This concern is exacerbated by

  • the fact that the heat exchanger FCVs for both trains of RHR are powered from

the same inverter. Since the FCVs open fully on a loss of power, both trains

of RHR could become inoperable on a loss of power during mid-loop operation.

(A loss of instrument air would also cause the FCVs to fail to the full open

position and could also result in the loss of both trains of the RHR system).

During most modes of operation, having the FCVs go -fully open on loss of

power or instrument air is not a safety concern because having the valves

fully open does not normally prevent the system from performing its safety

function. However, having the valves go fully open while at mid-loop could

result in the loss of decay heat removal capability. This loss could persist

until electrical power or instrument air is restored and air is vented from

the RHR system.

The licensee has revised procedures for mid-loop operation to require manually

positioning the cold leg injection isolation valves to limit the maximum flow

through the system, even with the FCVs fully open. This lineup will be used

whenever the unit is at mid-loop and protects against the consequences of

failure of either electrical power or instrument air.

Several generic communications have been issued informing licensees of the

consequences of the loss of residual (decay) heat removal and the operating

conditions under which the probability of a loss increases; i.e., reduced

inventory conditions. The most recent publications include Generic Letter

(GL) No. 87-12, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal While the Reactor Coolant System

is Partially Filled;" GL No. 88-17, *Loss of Decay Heat Removal;" NRC In- formation Notice (IN)87-23, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor

Coolant Level Operation;" IN 88-36, 'Possible Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory

During Low Coolant Level Operation;" and IN 89-67, "Loss of Residual Heat

Removal Caused by Accumulator Nitrogen Injection." The event described

above introduces a subtle failure scenario which licensees may not have

considered.

IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, irector

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Nick Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV

(817) 897-1500

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

I

IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications of pump air ingestion However

the increased system flow enrraenan~nA n~ -~ neto. Hwvr

Attachment ~

q ) sx 90-06 Jasmary 2§ 1990

Page I of I

LIST OF RECEITLT ISSUED

NIR INFORtAT1011 OTICES

JCW --

lnfonation Issuance Issued te

Notice No. SubJect

90-05 Inter-System Discharge of 1/26/9O All holders of ULs

Reactor Coelant or Ch for nuclear

power reactors.

90-04 Cracking of the Upper Shall- 1/26/90 All holders of OLs

to-Transition Cone Girth or CPs.for Westinghouse.

Melds Is Steam Generators designed and Combustion

Engineering-disigned

nuclear power reactors.

90-03 malfunction of Borg-Varner 1/23/90 All holders of OLs

SBlted Sonnet Check Valves or CPs for uclewr

Causd by Failure of the power reactors.

Swing Arm

90-02 Potential Degradation of 1/29D All holders of OLs

Secondary Contaient or CPs for Slis.

90-01 lIportace of Proper 1/12/90 All holders of NRC

Response to Self-Identifted materials licenses.

Violations by Licensees

89-90 Pressurizer Safety Valv 12/28/84 All holder of OMs

Lift Setpoint Shift or Ch for Pilb.

89-8 Event Notificatton 12/26/89 All holders of CLs

Workshents or en for nuclear

powerreactors.

89-88 Recent XRC-Sponsored 12/26189 All holders of Ots

Testing of motor-Operated or CPsfor nutlear

Valves poer reactors.

8647 Disablilg of Emergency 12/19189 All helders of OLs

Diesel Generators by or CVs for nuclear

Their Neutral Ground-Fault power reactors.

Protection Circuitry

8945. etalclad. Lou-Voltage 12/IS/19 All holders of OLs

Supp. 2 Power Circuit Dreakars or CPsfor nuclear

Refurbished with power reactors.

Substandard Parts

OL*OpitunceS - _

CV s Construction Permit

UNITED STATES

IPOSTAGE & FEES PAOID

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ISNiRC 1 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. 8300

IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Nick Fields, NRR

(301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV

(817) 897-1500

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB:NRR TECH:EDITOR EAB:NRR C:EAB:NRR C:OGCB:NRR NRR:SRXB

  • NFields: db *BCalure *DCFischer *CJHaughney *CHBerlinger *RJones

1/12/90 1/13/90 1/16/90 1/16/90 1/17/90 1/23/90

1/Z3'90

K)j V%2IN 90-

January , 1990 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional

office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB:NRR TECH:EDITOR EAB:NRR C:EAB:NRR C:OGCB:NRR N R B

  • DCFischer *CJHaughney* *CHBerlinger RJV es
  • NFields:db *BCalure

/ /90 / /90 / /90 / /90 / /90 I j:/90

D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi

/ /90

IN 90-

January , 1990

%...Z'age 3 of 3 No specific action or written response is required by this

infornation notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contact listed below or the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contacts: Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500

Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

C0Wvtn Au t

AJF VIU46x1 4fhire0rAtU rAI CV

EAB:NRR TECH:EDITOR EAB:NRR C:EAB:NRR C:OGCB:NRR D:DOEA:NRR

NFields:db DCFischer CJHaughney CHBerlinger CERossi

Jr //,/90 I /11/SQ , /14/90 I /14/90 / 117/90 / /90


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