IR 05000387/2014004

IR 05000387-14-004, 05000388-14-004; 07/01/2014 - 09/30/2014; Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (Sses), Units 1 and 2; Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

ML14318A169
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	11/14/2014
From:	Ho Nieh Division Reactor Projects I
To:	Rausch T Susquehanna
Bower F
References
EA-14-093 IR 2014004
Download: ML14318A169 (47)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:ber 14, 2014

SUBJECT:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2014004 AND 05000388/2014004 AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Dear Mr. Rausch:

On September 30, 2014, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 9, 2014, with Mr. Jeffrey Helsel and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green). If you contest the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at SSES. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at SSES.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed Unresolved Item 05000387/2012007-01, 05000388/2012007-01, which raised a concern as to whether PPLs method for testing the secondary containment boundary and the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) complied with the existing design and licensing bases. Following additional review of this concern, NRC staff concluded that this issue constituted a violation of NRC requirements, in that your implementation of the surveillance requirements of the plant technical specifications for Unit 1 and Unit 2 did not adequately demonstrate: (1) the quality of the secondary containment; and (2) that the limiting conditions for operation were met as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.36(c)(3). However, the NRC concluded that the cause of the issue of concern was not reasonably within PPLs ability to foresee and correct. Therefore, no performance deficiency associated with the violation was identified. The NRC performed a risk evaluation of the issue and determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green). Based on these facts, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Regional Administrator, to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.5 of the Enforcement Policy, and refrain from issuing enforcement for this violation.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, /RA/ Ho K. Nieh Division Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-387; 50-388 License Nos. NPF-14, NPF-22

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000387/2014004 and 05000388/2014004 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION I== Docket Nos: 50-387, 50-388 License Nos: NPF-14, NPF-22 Report Nos: 05000387/2014004 and 05000388/2014004 Licensee: PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL) Facility: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Berwick, Pennsylvania Dates: July 1, 2014 through September 30, 2014 Inspectors: J. Greives, Senior Resident Inspector T. Daun, Resident Inspector E. Burket, Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. Cherubini, Senior Physical Security Inspector C. Graves, Health Physicist B. Lin, Project Engineer A. Turilin, Project Engineer Approved By: Fred L. Bower, III, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000387/2014004, 05000388/2014004; 07/01/2014 - 09/30/2014; Susquehanna Steam

Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2; Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections performed by regional inspectors. One self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), dated June 2, 2011.

Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, Aspects Within Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 19, 2013. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 5.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green.

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) for inadequately implementing work instructions for the installation and calibration of the reactor recirculation pump (RRP)motor-generator (MG) set motor winding cooling air outlet temperature switch was self-revealed when the Unit 1 B RRP tripped on August 27, 2014, requiring a rapid unplanned downpower and transition to single loop operation. The cause of the RRP trip was a calibration error made on May 7, 2014, in which the alarm and trip setpoints were reversed such that the pump trip occurred at expected temperatures for the plant conditions. PPLs immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR-2014-27243 and correcting the calibration error.

The inspectors determined that PPLs failure to implement a work order (WO) as written or make changes as required by station procedures was a performance deficiency (PD) that was within PPLs ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected its objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations.

Specifically, inadequate implementation of work instructions as directed resulted in the incorrect calibration of the B RRP MG set high temperature trip setpoint so that it was reached during normal operations, resulted in a trip of the B RRP, that required an unplanned rapid downpower to approximately 30 percent, and establishment of single loop operating conditions. The inspectors evaluated the finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "SDP for Findings At-Power," Exhibit 1 for the Initiating Events cornerstone.

The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not cause a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment. This finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Field Presence, because PPL did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors and supplemental personnel. Specifically, supervisory oversight of the calibration activity, including work package development, review of work performed and work package closeout, was insufficient to ensure that the changes made to the work package were processed in accordance with station procedures and did not result in a new deficiency being introduced [H.2]. (Section 4OA3)

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent rated thermal power. On August 27, 2014, the 1 B RRP tripped unexpectedly, resulting in an unplanned power reduction to approximately 30 percent power. The pump was restarted on August 29, 2014, and power was returned to 100 percent on September 1, 2014. Unit 1 ended the inspection period at or near 100 percent power.

Unit 2 began the inspection period in Mode 4. Following the completion of the turbine outage maintenance activities, operators commenced a reactor startup on July 7, 2014. On July 24, 2014, operators lowered power on Unit 2 to 85 percent for planned condensate demineralizer maintenance. Power was returned to 100 percent on July 27, 2014. On August 8, 2014, operators lowered power on Unit 2 to 85 percent for a planned rod pattern adjustment and additional condensate demineralizer maintenance. Power was returned to 100 percent on August 11, 2014. On September 5, 2014, operators commenced a reactor shutdown on Unit 2 for a planned maintenance outage. Following the completion of the maintenance activities, operators commenced a reactor startup on September 13, 2014. Power was restored to 100 percent on September 20, 2014, and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

==1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial System Walkdowns

==

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: Unit 2, A train residual heat removal (RHR) during B train RHR system outage window on August 5, 2014 Unit 1, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) while reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) inoperable on August 19, 2014 Unit 2, control rod drive system during startup on September 17, 2014 The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the Reactor Safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Technical Specifications (TSs), WOs, condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.

The inspectors also reviewed whether PPL staff had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance characterization.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Full System Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On August 15, 2014, the inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of accessible portions of the Unit 2 RCIC to verify the existing equipment lineup was correct. The inspectors reviewed operating procedures, surveillance tests, drawings, equipment line-up check-off lists, and the UFSAR to verify the system was aligned to perform its required safety functions. The inspectors also reviewed electrical power availability, component lubrication and equipment cooling, hanger and support functionality, and operability of support systems. The inspectors performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sample of related CRs and WOs to ensure PPL appropriately evaluated and resolved any deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. ==1R05 Fire Protection