ML14218A488: Difference between revisions

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3.0 cont.
3.0 cont.
[42]  Routine Report - NRC reports that are generated at a fixed frequency or as required by regulations except for 1OCFR50.55, 50.72, and 50.73. For example, 1OCFR50.46 reports of ECCS performance modeling errors of insufficient magnitude to trigger a report under other regulations are considered routine.
[42]  Routine Report - NRC reports that are generated at a fixed frequency or as required by regulations except for 10CFR50.55, 50.72, and 50.73. For example, 10CFR50.46 reports of ECCS performance modeling errors of insufficient magnitude to trigger a report under other regulations are considered routine.
[43]  Safeguards Condition Report - A Condition Report documenting a Safeguard condition.
[43]  Safeguards Condition Report - A Condition Report documenting a Safeguard condition.
The condition description contains as much information as possible to ensure proper prioritization within the corrective action program by the CRG without providing any safeguards information. Where additional (safeguards) information is required to describe the condition, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified and referenced safeguards document. The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]
The condition description contains as much information as possible to ensure proper prioritization within the corrective action program by the CRG without providing any safeguards information. Where additional (safeguards) information is required to describe the condition, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified and referenced safeguards document. The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]
Line 3,289: Line 3,289:
(d)    Employees and contractors are encouraged to write CRs for a broad range of problems.
(d)    Employees and contractors are encouraged to write CRs for a broad range of problems.
Problems reported must include, but are not limited to, Adverse Conditions. Examples of Adverse Conditions requiring initiation of a CR are provided in Attachment 9.2.
Problems reported must include, but are not limited to, Adverse Conditions. Examples of Adverse Conditions requiring initiation of a CR are provided in Attachment 9.2.
If an employee is not satisfied with classification of a CR or if the actions are inadequate to alleviate their concern, the employee may choose to utilize Entergy's Open Door Policy and discuss the concern with higher levels of management. Employees may also choose to report their concern through the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). While the Corrective Action Process is the preferred method of reporting problems, the ECP may be utilized at any time. Neither this nor any other company policy alters an individual's right to address their concerns directly to the NRC per 1OCFR19 Identifying problems within the CA Program is a Protected Activity as defined in EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program. [CR-PLP-2007-1243]
If an employee is not satisfied with classification of a CR or if the actions are inadequate to alleviate their concern, the employee may choose to utilize Entergy's Open Door Policy and discuss the concern with higher levels of management. Employees may also choose to report their concern through the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). While the Corrective Action Process is the preferred method of reporting problems, the ECP may be utilized at any time. Neither this nor any other company policy alters an individual's right to address their concerns directly to the NRC per 10CFR19 Identifying problems within the CA Program is a Protected Activity as defined in EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program. [CR-PLP-2007-1243]


5.211] cont (e)    Employees are required to initiate CRs for adverse conditions, and are encouraged to write CRs whenever conditions warrant.
5.211] cont (e)    Employees are required to initiate CRs for adverse conditions, and are encouraged to write CRs whenever conditions warrant.
Line 3,745: Line 3,745:
[22] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.1  P24842 SI
[22] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.1  P24842 SI
[23] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.2  P24843 S2
[23] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.2  P24843 S2
[24] GGNS 1OCFR21.21.A.1          P17819
[24] GGNS 10CFR21.21.A.1          P17819
[25] GGNS 1OCFR21.21.A.2          P17820
[25] GGNS 10CFR21.21.A.2          P17820
[26] GGNS UFSAR 8.3.1.1.4.1.2.314, P21886, P21887, P21888
[26] GGNS UFSAR 8.3.1.1.4.1.2.314, P21886, P21887, P21888
               $15, $16
               $15, $16
Line 3,911: Line 3,911:
* Is otherwise deemed to meet one of the "significant" definitions by the CRG, including an Adverse QA Finding and/or a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality (SCAQ).
* Is otherwise deemed to meet one of the "significant" definitions by the CRG, including an Adverse QA Finding and/or a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality (SCAQ).
: 2. Severity Level 2 - Condition that does not meet Severity Level 1 criteria, but does:
: 2. Severity Level 2 - Condition that does not meet Severity Level 1 criteria, but does:
* Result in a reportable event pursuant to 1OCFR21, 50.72, 50.73, or other NRC reporting criteria
* Result in a reportable event pursuant to 10CFR21, 50.72, 50.73, or other NRC reporting criteria
     "    Identify a Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures condition
     "    Identify a Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures condition
     "    Result in unplanned events or failure impacting the function of a structure, system, or component
     "    Result in unplanned events or failure impacting the function of a structure, system, or component
Line 3,966: Line 3,966:
     "  Lost or missing licensed radioactive material
     "  Lost or missing licensed radioactive material
     "  Unplanned radioactive release
     "  Unplanned radioactive release
     "  Violations of procedures or policies or regulations that are intended to satisfy 1OCFR1 9, 1OCFR20 or other applicable federal regulations
     "  Violations of procedures or policies or regulations that are intended to satisfy 10CFR1 9, 10CFR20 or other applicable federal regulations
* Abnormally high radiation or airborne radioactivity levels
* Abnormally high radiation or airborne radioactivity levels
: 3. Security Conditions
: 3. Security Conditions
Line 4,763: Line 4,763:


3.0 cont.
3.0 cont.
[42]  Routine Report - NRC reports that are generated at a fixed frequency or as required by regulations except for 1OCFR50.55, 50.72, and 50.73. For example, 1OCFR50.46 reports of ECCS performance modeling errors of insufficient magnitude to trigger a report under other regulations are considered routine.
[42]  Routine Report - NRC reports that are generated at a fixed frequency or as required by regulations except for 10CFR50.55, 50.72, and 50.73. For example, 10CFR50.46 reports of ECCS performance modeling errors of insufficient magnitude to trigger a report under other regulations are considered routine.
[43]  Safeguards Condition Report - A Condition Report documenting a Safeguard condition.
[43]  Safeguards Condition Report - A Condition Report documenting a Safeguard condition.
The condition description contains as much information as possible to ensure proper prioritization within the corrective action program by the CRG without providing any safeguards information. Where additional (safeguards) information is required to describe the condition, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified and referenced safeguards document. The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]
The condition description contains as much information as possible to ensure proper prioritization within the corrective action program by the CRG without providing any safeguards information. Where additional (safeguards) information is required to describe the condition, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified and referenced safeguards document. The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]
Line 4,865: Line 4,865:
(d)    Employees and contractors are encouraged to write CRs for a broad range of problems.
(d)    Employees and contractors are encouraged to write CRs for a broad range of problems.
Problems reported must include, but are not limited to, Adverse Conditions. Examples of Adverse Conditions requiring initiation of a CR are provided in Attachment 9.2.
Problems reported must include, but are not limited to, Adverse Conditions. Examples of Adverse Conditions requiring initiation of a CR are provided in Attachment 9.2.
If an employee is not satisfied with classification of a CR or if the actions are inadequate to alleviate their concern, the employee may choose to utilize Entergy's Open Door Policy and discuss the concern with higher levels of management. Employees may also choose to report their concern through the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). While the Corrective Action Process is the preferred method of reporting problems, the ECP may be utilized at any time. Neither this nor any other company policy alters an individual's right to address their concerns directly to the NRC per 1OCFR19 Identifying problems within the CA Program is a Protected Activity as defined in EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program. [CR-PLP-2007-1243]
If an employee is not satisfied with classification of a CR or if the actions are inadequate to alleviate their concern, the employee may choose to utilize Entergy's Open Door Policy and discuss the concern with higher levels of management. Employees may also choose to report their concern through the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). While the Corrective Action Process is the preferred method of reporting problems, the ECP may be utilized at any time. Neither this nor any other company policy alters an individual's right to address their concerns directly to the NRC per 10CFR19 Identifying problems within the CA Program is a Protected Activity as defined in EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program. [CR-PLP-2007-1243]


5.2[11 cont (e)    Employees are required to initiate CRs for adverse conditions, and are encouraged to write CRs whenever conditions warrant.
5.2[11 cont (e)    Employees are required to initiate CRs for adverse conditions, and are encouraged to write CRs whenever conditions warrant.
Line 5,318: Line 5,318:
[22] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.1  P24842 S1
[22] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.1  P24842 S1
[23] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.2  P24843 S2
[23] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.2  P24843 S2
[24] GGNS 1OCFR21.21.A.1          P17819
[24] GGNS 10CFR21.21.A.1          P17819
[25] GGNS 1OCFR21.21.A.2          P17820
[25] GGNS 10CFR21.21.A.2          P17820
[26] GGNS UFSAR 8.3.1.1.4.1.2.S14, P21886, P21887, P21888
[26] GGNS UFSAR 8.3.1.1.4.1.2.S14, P21886, P21887, P21888
               $15, $16
               $15, $16
Line 5,401: Line 5,401:
Significant classification is the highest and most important. In most cases, significant events are the result of multiple barrier failures or programmatic breakdowns. There is considerably more investigation into the cause of the identified condition.
Significant classification is the highest and most important. In most cases, significant events are the result of multiple barrier failures or programmatic breakdowns. There is considerably more investigation into the cause of the identified condition.
* Category A - An adverse condition classified as significant and requires a Root Cause and actions to preclude repetition.
* Category A - An adverse condition classified as significant and requires a Root Cause and actions to preclude repetition.
Condition meets one of the "significant" definitions. Typically, the condition is viewed as applicable to 1OCFR50, requiring cause determination, correction of adverse condition and corrective actions to preclude repetition.
Condition meets one of the "significant" definitions. Typically, the condition is viewed as applicable to 10CFR50, requiring cause determination, correction of adverse condition and corrective actions to preclude repetition.
Root Cause Evaluations should be completed within 30 days.
Root Cause Evaluations should be completed within 30 days.
  -For Human Performance/Process issues:
  -For Human Performance/Process issues:
Line 5,416: Line 5,416:
Non-Significant condition reports document problems for which a repeat occurrence (while always undesirable) can be tolerated.
Non-Significant condition reports document problems for which a repeat occurrence (while always undesirable) can be tolerated.
* Category B - An adverse condition classified as non-significant and assigned to a Responsible Manager for documentation of apparent cause, corrective actions taken to correct the condition and to address the apparent cause(s). This CR will require an Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) which is performed as either Higher Tier or Lower Tier type as determined by the CRG.
* Category B - An adverse condition classified as non-significant and assigned to a Responsible Manager for documentation of apparent cause, corrective actions taken to correct the condition and to address the apparent cause(s). This CR will require an Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) which is performed as either Higher Tier or Lower Tier type as determined by the CRG.
Condition does not meet the "significant" definition. Usually, Category B conditions are "Conditions Adverse to Quality" and 10CFR50 applicable. However, since they are not significant, 1OCFR50 only requires prompt identification and correction. Notwithstanding, the CRG views a Category B condition to be more than a "broke-fix" issue. In addition to correcting the identified deficiency, the Category B Condition Report should:
Condition does not meet the "significant" definition. Usually, Category B conditions are "Conditions Adverse to Quality" and 10CFR50 applicable. However, since they are not significant, 10CFR50 only requires prompt identification and correction. Notwithstanding, the CRG views a Category B condition to be more than a "broke-fix" issue. In addition to correcting the identified deficiency, the Category B Condition Report should:
: 1. Determine and document the apparent cause of deficiency.
: 1. Determine and document the apparent cause of deficiency.
: 2. Determine and document the action plan to eliminate identified causes of the condition thereby reducing likelihood of condition repetition.
: 2. Determine and document the action plan to eliminate identified causes of the condition thereby reducing likelihood of condition repetition.

Revision as of 06:33, 11 November 2019

FOIA/PA-2014-0024 - Resp 3 - Partial. Group B (Records Being Released in Their Entirety)
ML14218A488
Person / Time
Site: Arkansas Nuclear  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/30/2014
From:
Office of Information Services
To:
Shared Package
ML14218A512 List:
References
FOIA/PA-2014-0024
Download: ML14218A488 (576)
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Text

Group 8 FOIA/PA NO: 204 Wox4 RECORDS BEING RELEASED IN THEIR ENTIRETY

Savoy, Carmel From: Brock, Kathryn Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 2:20 PM To: Savoy, Carmel

Subject:

FW: ANO info From: Brock, Kathryn Sent: Wednesday, April 03, 2013 9:59 AM To: WittIck, Brian; Merzke, Daniel; Huyck, Doug Cc: Cubbage, Amy

Subject:

ANO Info Hi. Amy from Commissioner Ostendorff's office called and was wondering if you could provide her the latest info on the ANO incident and I wasn't positive which one of you has the lead for this. She is looking for more info about the cause of the accident and she wondered if there were any plans to have any communications from the NRC to the public. Whatever you give to Amy, please also share with the other offices.

Thanks.

D--c2--

Procedure Contains NMM REFUB Forms: YES N] NO L7 Effective Procedure Owner: Mike Reno Governance Owner: Sam Stewart Date Title: Maint Mgr Title: Fleet Maint Mgr 02/14/2013 Site: JAF Site: HQN Exception Site Site Procedure Champion Title Date*

ANO Darrell Perkins Maintenance Manager N/A BRP N/A CNS Jim O'Conner Maintenance Manager GGNS William Runion Maintenance Manager IPEC David Williams Maintenance Manager JAF Loiann Pickett Maintenance Project Manager PLP Greg Heisterman Maintenance Manager PNPS James Taormina Maintenance Manager 03/30/2013 RBS James Boulanger Maintenance Manager VY Paul Paradise Maintenance Manager W3 Brian Lindsey Maintenance Manager N/A NP N/A HQN Site and NMM Procedures Canceled or Superseded By This Revision Process Applicability Exclusion: All Sites:

Specific Sites: ANO [3 BRP E] GGNS E] IPECID JAF [I PLP 0 PNPSN RBS El VY EL W3 EL Change Statement Non-Editorial Changes:

1. Deleted reference to SOP-CM-7 from Attachment 9.2 IPEC Unit 3 (CR-HQN-2011-00110 CA 7).
2. Changed Definition of Advanced Rigger
3. Changed weight limit in Definition of Basic Rigger
4. Removed requirement to complete Attachment 9.15 in Section 5.5.6
5. Added - Attachment 9.15 can be used as a tool to aid in working through a JSHA, BUT is not required to be filled out to Section 5.5.8. (CR-HQN-2012-01249 CA 2 and CA 3).
6. Corrected NEIL definition of Critical Lift by adding "Provided that any of the above conditions are met, such lifts include, but are not limited to:" section 3.20.(c) (CR-HQN-2012-01249 CA 9)
7. Added "carts and pallet jacks" to section 1.1 PURPOSE.
8. Separate definitions for Signal Person and Spotter. (CR-HQN-01249)
9. Separate Responsibilities for Signal Person and Spotter. (CR-HQN-01249)
10. Listed Attachments and use into body of procedure (CR-HQN-2012-01249 CA 8)

. Attachment 9.7 Rigging Checklist section 4.7.3 (CR-HQN-2011-00110 CA 9 and 15 as well)

Material Handling Program

  • Attachment 9.10 Typical Lift Plan Checklist section 4.6.10 (CR-HQN-2011-00110 and CA 9 and 15 as well)
  • Attachment 9.11 Forklift Initial Daily Preoperational Inspection section 4.8.15
  • Attachment 9.12 Conduct Of Crane Operations Appendix section 4.6.14, 4.7.9, and 4.8.13

" Attachment 9.13 Conduct Of Powered Industrial Truck Operational Appendix section 4.8.14

  • Attachment 9.14 Personnel Lifting Appendix section 4.6.15, 4.7.10, and 4.8.16

" Attachment 9.15 Cart Use / Non-Suspended Loads material handling Checklist section 5.5.8

  • Attachment 9.16 Equipment Movement Checklist Appendix section 4.8.12
  • Attachment 9.18 Equipment Signage Appendix to attachment 9.16
11. Added NOTE for Heavy Load Cribbing/Supports above section 5.4.8 (CR-HQN-2012-01249CA6)
12. Added NOTE: Number of spacers or washer should be minimized to seat shouldered eye bolts below section 5.2.[6].(a) (CR-HQN-2011-00110 CA 34)
13. Added stand alone definition for Critical Lift section 3.6 and removed Critical Lift from section 3.21 (Non-Standard Lift)
  • Requires justification for the exception

_E__ NUCLEAR QUALITYRELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 30F85 Reference Use MANUAL Material Handling Program TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Paqe 1.0 P UR P O S E ....................................................................................... ..5 2.0 R E FE R E NCE S .................................................................................. 5 3.0 DE FIN ITIONS ................................................................................... 7 4.0 R E S PO NS IBILITIE S ............................................................................ 13 4.1 GENERAL MANAGER, PLANT OPERATIONS ................................. 13 4.2 MAINTENANCE MANAGER ........................................................ 13 4.3 MATERIAL HANDLING PROGRAM COORDINATOR ................... 13 4.4 DEPARTMENT MANAGERS, SUPERINTENDENTS, SUPERVISORS AND PROJECT MANAGERS .............................. 14 4.6 PERSON-IN-CHARGE (PIC) ......................................................... 14 4.7 BASIC/ADVANCED RIGGER ...................................................... 16 4.8 CRANE OPERATOR ................................................................... 16 4.9 S PO TT E R .................................................................................. . . 18 4.10 SIG NA L PER SO N........................................................................ 18 5 .0 DE TA ILS ........................................................................................... 19 5.1 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ................................................. 19 5.2 LOAD HANDLING EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS ........................... 19 5.3 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS PROGRAM (NUREG-0612) .............. 24 5.4 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS ...................................................... 24 6 .0 INT E R FA C E S ...................................................................................... 32 7 .0 R E CO R D S ........................................................................................... 32 8.0 SITE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS .................................................... 32 9.0 ATTAC HM ENTS .............................................................................. 32 ATTACHMENT 9.1 STANDARD HOISTING SIGNALS ................................... 34 ATTACHMENT 9.2 SITE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES AND CRS ....................... 37 ATTACHMENT 9.3 DESIGNATED LOCATIONS ...................................... 41 ATTACHMENT 9.4 EVALUATION FOR NON-STANDARD LIFT FORMS ............. 45 ATTACHMENT 9.5 CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED OR RENTED CRANES FOR MS ................................................................ 47 ATTACHMENT 9.6 RIGGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST ............................ 50 ATTACHMENT 9.7 RIGGING CHECKLIST ............................................. 56

ATTACHMENT 9.8 MOBILE CRANE (TELESCOPIC BOOM) PRIOR TO USE DAILY CHECKLIST ........................................... 58 ATTACHMENT 9.9 OVERHEAD AND GANTRY CRANES PRIOR TO USE DAILY C HECKLIST ..................................................... 60 ATTACHMENT 9.10 TYPICAL LIFT PLAN CHECKLIST ............................... 62 ATTACHMENT 9.11 FORKLIFT INITIAL DAILY PREOPERATIONAL INSPECTION ......................................................... 66 ATTACHMENT 9.12 CONDUCT OF CRANE OPERATIONS APPENDIX .............. 67 ATTACHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK O PERATIONS APPENDIX ............................................ 71 ATTACHMENT 9.14 PERSONNEL LIFTING APPENDIX .................................. 79 ATTACHMENT 9.15 NON-SUSPENDED LOADS APPENDIX ........................... 81 ATTACHMENT 9.15 NON-SUSPENDED LOADS APPENDIX ........................ 82 ATTACHMENT 9.16 EQUIPMENT MOVEMENT CHECKLIST APPENDIX ............ 83 ATTACHMENT 9.17 EQUIPMENT OPERATOR/SPOTTER CHECKLIST A PPENDIX ............................................................. 84 ATTACHMENT 9.18 EQUIPMENT SIGNAGE APPENDIX ................................ 85

_ Ene__ NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-1 19 REV. 16

- nerg MANAGEMENT PAGE 5OF85 MANUAL I REFERENCE USE I I Material Handling Program 1.0 PURPOSE

[1] This procedure provides the program requirements and recommendations for handling and moving loads with carts, pallet jacks, cranes, hoists, industrial trucks and rigging equipment at all Entergy sites.

[2] Fuel Handling Equipment governed by other site approved procedures is excluded from the scope of this procedure. Attachment 9.2 lists site specific procedures.

[3] For situations where there are sufficient instructions contained within procedures and training programs to cover the limited use of rigging/lifting and pre-determined lifting using hoists and other devices that are not modifiable, they may be excluded from the requirements of this procedure for those lifts (e.g. operations personnel lifting a resin barrel with a pre-approved lifting device and hoist).

2.0 REFERENCES

[1] 29CFR17, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Code of Federal Regulations

[2] NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants

[3] NUREG-0554, Single Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants

[4] ASME B30.9, American National Standard Safety Requirements for Slings

[5] ASME B30.10, American National Standard Safety Requirements for Hooks

[6] ASME B30.16, American National Standard Safety Requirements for Overhead Hoists (Under-hung)

[7] ANSI/ISEA 107-1999 standards for maximum high-visibility protection

[8] ANSI N14.6, Special Lifting Devices for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 pounds (4500 Kg) or more for Nuclear Materials

[9] ANSI 45.2.15, Hoisting, Rigging and Transporting Items for Nuclear Power Plants

[10] ASME B30.1 1, American National Standard Safety Requirements for Monorails and Under hung Cranes

[11] ANSI/AWS D1.1-88, Structural Welding Code - Steel

2. 0 cont.

[12] ANSI/AWS D14.1-85, Specifications for Welding of Industrial and Mill cranes and Other Material Handling Equipment

[13] ASME B30.2, Overhead Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder)

[14] ASME B30.17, Overhead and Gantry Crane (Top Running Bridge, Single Girder, Under hung Hoist)

[15] ASME B30.21, Manually Lever Operated Hoists

[16] ASME B30.5, Mobile and Locomotive Cranes

[17] ASME B30.20, Below the Hook Lifting Devices

[18] ASME B56.1, Powered Industrial Trucks

[19] 29CFR1910.6, Incorporation by Reference

[20] Title 29 CFR 1910.179, Overhead and Gantry Cranes

[21] Title 29 CFR 1910.180, Crawler Locomotive and Truck Cranes

[22] Title 29 CFR 1910.184 Slings

[23] Title 29 CFR 1926.201 Signaling

[24] Title 29 CFR 1910.251 Definitions

[25] Title 29 CFR 1926.550 Cranes and Derricks

[26] Title 29 CFR 1910.178, Powered Industrial Trucks

[27] Construction Safety Association of Ontario - Rigging Manual

[28] Newberry Handbook for Riggers

[29] Crane Manufacturer's Association of America (CMAA) 70 and 74

[30] NMAC Riggers Handbook ,1009706

[31] EPRI Report, Lifting, Rigging, and Small Hoist Usage Guide, 1007914

[32] EN-IS-120, Vehicle Safety

2. 0 cont.

[33] EN-IS-1 11, General Safety Requirements

[34] EN-MA-126, Control of Supplemental Personnel

[35] EN-OP-102, Protective and Caution Tagging

[36] EN-MA-131, Lockout Tagout of Non Plant Related Equipment

[37] EN-TQ-205, Training Exemptions

[38] EN-NS-112, Medical Program

[39] EN-IS-123, Electrical Safety

[40] EN-IS-124, Job Safety Hazard Analysis

[41] EN-LI-1 02, Corrective Action Process

[42] EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding

[43] SOER 06-1, Rigging, Lifting and Material Handling

[44] MIOSHA Section R 408.41016a(1) and a(12) for Personnel Lifting

[45] CR-RBS-2010-3594, CR-RBS-2010-1153

[46] EN-RP-308, Operation and Calibration of Gamma Scintillation Tool Monitors

[47] EN-MA-1 19-01, Control, Storage, and Inspection of Lifting Equipment (used in Section 5.2) 3.0 DEFINITIONS

[1] Advanced Rigger - An individual who is qualified to perform lifts for loads that are equal to or greater than the site specific heavy load weight. Must be PIC qualified or have PIC present when moving heavy loads over plant safety related equipment.

[2] Anemometer - a device for measuring wind speed.

[3] Basic Rigger - An individual who is qualified to perform standard lifts for loads that are less than the site specific heavy load weight. Does not qualify individual to invert or transfer loads.

3. 0 cont.

[4] Below the Hook Lifting Devices - Lifting devices other than slings that are used for attaching loads to a hoist - includes structural and mechanical lifting devices (spreader beams, plate clamps, drum turners, vacuum lifting devices, magnetic lifting devices, and material handling grapples. These items are considered part of the load.

[5] Blind Lift - Any lift that requires hand signals to be relayed through more than one person to the crane operator.

[6] Critical Lift - (per NEIL) Lift involves equipment and/or materials which, if failure or personnel errors were to occur, could cause physical or consequential damage in excess of $500,000, an outage longer than ten (10) weeks, or could cause a significant spread of contamination or uncontrolled radioactive release to the environment. Provided that any of the above conditions are met, such lifts include, but are not limited to:

a) Lifts involving the handling of large primary coolant system components; primary containment system components; turbine / generator components; fuel elements; large radiation shielded shipping casks; equipment or supplies handled over spaces in which high value or safety-related equipment or systems are located.

b) Loads greater than 85% of the crane's rated capacity, including consideration of load radius and / or rigging equipment where applicable.

c) Load is to be lifted by more than one crane simultaneously

[7] Cone of Protection - A safe distance maintained from the load, to include potential load swing or drop in the case of rigging failure.

[8] Dynamic Loading - A sudden change in the speed of the lift and attachments, such as sudden stopping, snatching the load, or swingout.

[9] Engineering Support Personnel (ESP) - Trained individuals who provide specialized support of rigging operation.

[10] Frequent Inspection - Visual examinations by the end user or other designated personnel with records not required.

3.0 cont.

[11] Heavy Load -. Any load, carried in any given area of a plant that weighs more than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool for the specific plant in question.

2000 pounds (ANO) & (IPEC) 1500 pounds (WF3) & (PNPS) 1300 Pounds (PLP) 1200 pounds (RB) 1140 pounds (GG) 750 pounds (JAF) 700 pounds (VY)

[12] Hoist - Lifting devices air or electrically powered or manually operated. This group of devices shall include manual lever hoists, chain falls, temporary jib hoists, monorails which are not attached to overhead cranes, portable or fixed hoists and under hung traveling hoists. Except for hoists that are an integral part of an overhead crane, hoists and monorails are governed by ASME B30.11, B30.16, and B30.21

[13] Hoist Operator - individual who operates a hoist must either be basic or advanced rigging qualified, based on load weight or work under the direction of an individual who is basic or advanced rigging qualified.

[14] Load Weight Determination - Methods to determine the weight of a load to include but not limited to the following: shipping papers, data plate, dynamometer (or other weight measures), technical manuals, drawings or engineering evaluations.

[15] Major Plant Equipment - equipment that is being lifted as a Complete Assembly such as feed water heaters, circulating water pumps, steam generators, transformers, etc.

[16] Manlift - An aerial lift device that is telescoping or articulated (hinged), or both, which is used to position personnel.

[17] Manual Lifting Device - A manual device used to lift, lower, or pull a load and to apply or release tension.

[18] Material Handling Program Coordinator - Person(s) designated by the Maintenance Manager as the site program owner. The individual designated should be knowledgeable of advanced rigging practices, overhead and mobile crane operations.

-_-_"/ NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV.16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 10 OF 85 MANUAL JREFERENCE USE Material Handling Program 3.0 cont.

[19] Mobile Cranes - These cranes are maneuverable self-propelled with crawler tracks, rubber tires, locomotive mounted with either rotating or fixed superstructures with adjustable or fixed boom length. Pedestal cranes designed from the upper works of a mobile crane mounted on a fixed platform or pedestal come under the same standards as mobile cranes. Mobile cranes are governed by ASME B30.5. Some examples are rough terrain, truck mounted, crawler or locomotive cranes.

[20] Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) - Insures domestic and international nuclear utilities for the cost associated with interruptions, damages, decontaminations and related nuclear risk.

[21] Non-Standard Lift:

(a) Loads greater than 20,000 lbs and does NOT have specific procedural or vendor instructions for the rigging that is to be used, OR (b) Heavy loads carried outside of a predefined safe load path, OR (c) The load weight is greater than:

2000 pounds (ANO) & (IPEC) 1500 pounds (WF3) & (PNPS) 1300 pounds (PLP) 1200 pounds (RB) 1140 pounds (GG) 750 pounds (JAF) 700 pounds (VY)

And any of the following conditions are present:

  • The load does not have designed rigging lift points or configuration (such as pad eyes, eye bolts, lifting brackets, approved rigging configuration drawing, etc.)

" The load passes over Safety Related equipment and does NOT have specific procedural instructions for the rigging that is to be used.

" The load passes over operating equipment on the Turbine Deck and does NOT have specific procedural or vendor instructions for the rigging that is to be used.

__ NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16

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The load or the method of handling the load lacks stability (such as possibility of load shifting, indeterminate center of gravity, etc.).

  • The lift requires multiple lifting devices (other than leveling devices) such as two or more crane hooks, cranes, tuggers, chain falls, etc.
  • Sling angle is less than 30 degrees.

The lift is a blind lift.

[22] Non-suspended Load - A load moved with carts, dolly's, pallet jacks, etc., that, due to a high center of gravity, is inherently unstable when not at rest. The weight and center of gravity need to be considered to ensure appropriate actions are taken for personnel protection (Refer to Attachment 9.15 for loads over 100 Ibs)

[23] Overhead and Gantry Cranes - Overhead and gantry cranes have top running bridges of single or multiple girder construction and top running or under hung trolleys. These cranes are governed by ASME B30.2 and B30.17.

[24] Overhead and Mobile Crane Inspector - A competent person that has had the training and skills necessary to perform periodic and engineered lift crane inspections. This is not required for all periodic inspections.

[25] Periodic Inspections - Visual inspection of the equipment in place by a designated person making records of apparent conditions to provide the basis for a continuing evaluation.

[26] Person-In-Charge (PIC) - A qualified person appointed to be responsible for the safe handling of non-standard loads and/or any loads lifted over safety-related equipment that exceed the heavy load limit and are lifted by overhead cranes, mobile cranes, or manual lifting devices.

[27] Plant Site - all areas, both the protected area and plant property.

[28] Point Loading - Undesirable practice of using end of forks on a fork lift to lift a load.

[29] Rated Capacity/Rated Load - The manufacturer's rated capacity. The maximum hook load which a piece of hoisting equipment is designed to or other rigging equipment is designed to safely carry.

[30] Rigging Hardware - is rigging attachments such as rings, links, swivels, eyebolts, shackles, turnbuckles, pad eyes, hoist rings, wire rope clips, wedge sockets, and rigging blocks.

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Material Handling Program 3.0 cont.

[31] Safe Load Path - A path defined for transport of a heavy load that will minimize adverse effects if the load is dropped, in terms of releases of radioactive materials and damage to safety systems.

[32] Slings - An assembly used for lifting when connected to a lifting mechanism.

[33] Special Lifting Device (SLD) (per ANSI 14.6):

(a) Lifting fixtures designed to lift shipping containers weighing 10,000 pounds or more for Nuclear Materials.

(b) A lifting device that is designed specifically for handling a certain load, or loads such as the lifting rings for reactor vessel head or vessel internals, or for a spent fuel cast.

(c) Any special lifting device attached to the hook of the crane is considered a load.

[34] Spotter- A designated individual who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings during the movement of carts, forklifts, trucks, etc. The spotter is responsible to aid operator in safe, collision-free movement of equipment.

(no special qualification required)

[35] Signal Person - A designated individual that directs the movement of any load moved with overhead and mobile cranes. The signal person is responsible to aid the equipment operator in safe, collision-free movement of the load. (special qualification required)

[36] Softener - Devices used to increase the radius or decrease angle of a corner so that sling capacity is not reduced and protects the slings, and/or loads from damage.

Softeners can be Engineered, wood cribbage, metal, sections of pipe, etc.

[37] Structural Load Evaluator (SLE) - Designated individual/s with appropriate training and experience who is responsible for evaluating structural capabilities for lifting (Civil or Structural Engineering Degree OR 5 years experience in construction and/or industrial maintenance with the ability to perform and interpret results from numerical calculations to determine rigging loads on beams, floor loading, etc. and as a minimum, be familiar with AISC Steel Construction Manual, Structural Steel Drawings and Live Load Drawings).

3.0 cont.

[38] Suspended Load - Anything that is hanging or attached to the hook and is hoisted or under tension even if the load has not moved from its position. A suspended load shall not be left unattended or moved over personnel. An approved Job Safety Hazard Analysis (JSHA) is required prior to performing any work activities under a suspended load per EN-IS-124.

[39] Tagline - A restraining line to control positioning and movement of a load.

[40] Test Load - A test load is normally composed of two components, the test load lifting assembly and the test weights.

[41] Training / Physical - Training and physical requirements established by Entergy Management to develop or maintain skills of craft personnel involved with rigging and lifting process.

[42] Truck or Approved Industrial Truck - means a truck that is listed or approved for fire safety purposes for the intended use by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, using nationally recognized testing standards. Refer to 1910.155(c)(3)(iv)(A) for definition of nationally recognized testing laboratory.

[43] Unattended - A condition in which the operator of the lifting device is not at the operating controls.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 4.1 GENERAL MANAGER, PLANT OPERATIONS

[1] The General Manager, Plant Operations has the overall responsibility for ensuring implementation of this procedure.

4.2 MAINTENANCE MANAGER

[1] Maintains overall responsibility for the lifting and rigging program implementation at each site.

4.3 SITE MATERIAL HANDLING PROGRAM COORDINATOR (SMHPC)

[1] Coordinates program issues through points of contact at other Entergy sites.

[2] Participating in the review of site-specific and fleet-wide lifting and rigging procedures, including vendor procedures.

[3] Supports resolution of field lifting and rigging issues.

0_ NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-1 19 REV.16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 14 OF 85 REFERENCE USE MANUAL Material Handling Program 4.0 cont.

[4] Supports program assessments.

[51 Participates in lifting and rigging training development and in industry peer groups.

4.4 DEPARTMENT MANAGERS, SUPERINTENDENTS, SUPERVISORS AND PROJECT MANAGERS

[1] Ensuring the requirements of this procedure is adequately understood by the personnel in their department.

[2] Ensuring that personnel in their department that could be engaged in rigging, hoisting and load handling are trained and qualified.

[3] Selecting and qualifying personnel that perform Person-In-Charge (PIC) duties.

[4] Use the Rigging Observation Checklist (Attachment 9.6) as a guide to observe rigging and lifting activities with the intent to recognize deficiencies and observe safe rigging and lifting practices 4.5 ENGINEERING SUPPORT PERSONNEL (ESP)

[1] Trained individuals who provide specialized expertise in support of rigging operations, but typically do not assume overall responsibility for the rigging operation. For example, Engineering Support Personnel may provide approval of a requested "pull point" on plant structures or equipment, provide a safe heavy load path, provide floor loading evaluation and cribbing recommendations, or provide an evaluation of the acceptability of lifting a load over operable safety equipment.

4.6 PERSON-IN-CHARGE (PIC)

[1] Provides oversight of the lift, including the machine location and making the lift.

[2] Works with the First Line Supervisor to ensure the rigging crew is qualified.

[3] Ensures that the equipment and accessories specified in the rigging plan are available.

[4) Surveys the lift site for hazardous and unsafe conditions.

4.6 cont.

[5] Ensures the load is properly rigged. This includes challenging the qualified rigger on the following key elements:

  • Weight of load
  • Center of gravity
  • Load stability
  • Current rigging inspections and personnel qualifications
  • Use of conservative rigging
  • Understanding proper use of softeners, sling angles, and side pull
  • Understanding equipment in the area and consequences of a load drop
  • Adequate measures to control the load in the air
  • Proper set up of lay down areas
  • Appropriate contingency plans established in the event of crane or rigging problems / back out actions

[6] Coordination and notifications of load movements and load paths, i.e., obtaining heavy load permits, etc.

[7] Obtains or verifies the correct weight of the load and informs the operator.

[8] Conducts pre-lift crew briefings.

[9] Ensures completion of evaluations for non-standard lifts (Attachment 9.4).

[10] Ensures completion of the Typical Lift Plan Checklist (Attachment 9.10) for all non-standard lifts, and considers completing a Typical Lift Plan Checklist for standard lifts based on complexity of the task.

[11] Designates the signal person and informs the operator.

[12] Controls the movements of all personnel required to work within the area affected by the lift.

[13] Ensures that all required safety precautions are taken. Ensures required notifications are made if an accident or injury occurs.

[14] Shall be familiar with the Conduct of Crane Operation Appendix (attachment 9.12)

[15] Refers to and follows Personnel Lifting Appendix (attachment 9.14) prior to using crane for personnel lifting.

Ent-rgy II NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT QUALITY RELATEDREV.

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[1] Verify Rigger Qualifications are current.

[2] Responsible for evaluating a standard load with an unknown weight and as a minimum has determined the weight of the load by the methods taught in basic or advanced rigging training.

[3] Responsible for understanding and applying the Rigging Checklist (Attachment 9.7) attributes for all lifts. At least one Rigging Checklist should be completed weekly per Rigger (prior to the first lift that a Rigger performs that week) to ensure the Rigger's familiarity with the Rigging Checklist attributes. This frequency can be increased for individual sites, at the discretion of that site's Maintenance Manager.

[4] Determine the proper rigging and rigging hardware to be used.

[5] Ensure the rigging has sufficient capacity and is in safe working condition.

[6] Inspect the rigging prior, during, and after (post) lift.

[7] Responsible for the safety of rigging crew and other personnel as they are affected by the rigging operation.

[8] Responsible for notification of personnel when a load is to pass over buildings, cargo containers, or other structures/areas where people may be working, ensure people are removed and clear from under the load path.

4.8 CRANE OPERATOR / POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCKS

[1] Verify crane operator qualifications are current.

[2] Ensure that the crane is within its periodic inspection frequency.

[3] Ensuring crane operates within its capacity and limitations of the equipment operation manual.

[4] Knowing Safe Load Paths according to NUREG-0612 requirements

[5] Preventing crane damage

[6] Ensuring standard hand signals (Attachment 9.1), communication, and speed are agreed upon during the pre-job briefing.

[7] Ensuring that a reference copy of the Standard Hand Signals (Attachment 9.1) has been posted conspicuously in the work area.

a e y NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 PAGE 17 OF 85 REV. 16 REFERENCE USE MANUAL I I Material Handling Program 4.8 cont.

[8] Resolving any concern prior to and during the lift. If necessary, stopping the lift to correct the concern.

[9] Performing daily inspections of the (mobile and overhead) cranes (attachment 9.8 or 9.9) prior to each use or at the beginning of each shift.

[10] Never using the crane's limit switches as an operating control unless it is specifically designed for such use.

NOTE The spotter is always required when moving cranes on site. The spotter requirement can be waived for other Equipment Operations if the JSHA / Walk down identified no overhead equipment hazards.

[11] When traveling, the boom should be completely retracted and lowered to the travel position. All appropriate cab swing brakes should be applied.

i.e. For Dresser Cranes, boom angle is "0" degrees. For Grove 130 ton mobile cranes, boom angle is 20 degrees maximum.

[12] Completes the "Equipment Movement Checklist" per Attachment 9.16 (if required)

UNLESS a JSHA/walk down identified no overhead equipment hazards.

[13] Shall be familiar with the Conduct of Crane Operation Appendix (attachment 9.12)

[141 Shall be familiar with the Conduct of Powered Industrial Truck Operations Appendix (attachment 9.13)

[15] Responsible for performing the Forklift Initial Daily Preoperational Inspection (attachment 9.11)

[16] Will follow Personnel Lifting Appendix (attachment 9.14) prior to using crane for personnel lifting.

4.9 SPOTTER

[1] Refers to Attachments 9.17 and 9.18 and implements when required. (no qual required)

NOTE More than one Spotter may be required when backing a vehicle into a building or if Spotter is unable to keep full view of potential obstructions or overhead equipment hazards at any given time.

[2] Maintain visible contact or continuous communications with the equipment operator by means of hand signals, two-way radios, or audible warning devices (i.e.; air horns)

When driver does not have clear visibility during movement. This includes moving objects on carts and equipment with mounted wheels.

[31 Use required standard hand signals or communication methods NOTE Equipment/vehicles or loads being moved from one location to another that are NOT >

15ft tall and/or a JSHA has been documented for the specific work DO NOT require the use of Attachment 9.16 Equipment Movement Checklist.

(4] When moving mobile equipment onsite, a spotter shall walk with the equipment from beginning to end of travel identifying any and all hazards to the Operator.

[5) Spotters shall wear designated clothing (as agreed upon in pre job brief) identifying them as performing spotter duties.

4.10 SIGNAL PERSON

[1] Verify Signal person qualification is current

[2] Maintain visible contact or continuous communications with the crane / hoist operator during the lift.

[3] Use required standard hand signals (Attachment 9.1) or communication methods during lifting evolutions

[4] The primary Signal Person shall wear an orange colored vest to be easily identified by the Operator and anyone in the area

5.0 DETAILS 5.1 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

[1] Traveling overhead cranes with access over an FMEZ (Foreign Material Exclusion Zone) should be restricted from moving over the FMEZ unless the crane has been inspected for potential sources of Foreign Material and the foreign material has been removed (if present).

[2] Unbalanced or top heavy loads are required to be tied to the mast of forklifts during transportation. CR-RBS-2010-5286

[3] A suspended load shall never be left unattended or moved over personnel.

[4] Additional handling requirements for RP equipment and monitors are contained in EN-RP-308 procedure and MUST be followed.

5.2 LOAD HANDLING EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

[1] Slings (a) All slings are required to be maintained and periodically inspected per control, storage and inspection procedure EN-MA-1 19-01, or equivalent site procedure(s) if that site has a current exception date to EN-MA-1 19-01.

(b) Only slings that meet the requirements of ASME B30.9 shall be purchased for use at all Entergy Nuclear sites.

[2] Vendor-Supplied Rigging Equipment and Hardware (a) All vendor-supplied rigging equipment and hardware used on site is required to meet the same codes and standards that apply to all Entergy Nuclear sites.

[3] Manual Lifting Devices (a) All manual lifting devices are required to be maintained and periodically inspected in accordance with control, storage and inspection procedure EN-MA-1 19-01, or equivalent site procedure(s) if that site has a current exception date to EN-MA-1 19-01.

(b) Only manual lifting devices that meet the requirements of ASME B30.21 shall be purchased for use at all Entergy Nuclear sites.

5.2 cont.

[4] Overhead Hoist (Under hung)

(a) All overhead hoists (under hung) are required to be maintained and inspected in accordance with control, storage and inspection procedures.

(b) Only overhead hoists (under hung) that meet the requirement of ASME B30.16 shall be purchased for use at all Entergy Nuclear sites.

[5] Below the Hook Lifting Devices (a) All below the hook lifting devices (other than slings and special lifting devices) are required to be purchased, constructed and inspected in accordance with ASME B30.20.

(b) Spreader and equalizer beams shall be designed according to specifications within the AISC or ASME, as applicable. Maximum safe working loads shall not exceed either 20% of the ultimate strength of the base material or a minimum design factor of three, based on the yield strength of the base material. Where these specifications cannot be met, the designer shall establish and justify criteria to assure adequate material fracture toughness per ASME BTH-1 -2005.

[6] Rigging Hardware (a) Rigging hardware should be manufactured from forged alloy steel; however, other alloys may be used for special applications. Refer to the manufacturer's load rating charts.

NOTE

.Number of spacers or washer should be minimized to seat shouldered eye bolts (b) Fabrication or modification of eyebolts, shackles, rings, links, swivels and turnbuckles requires a load test and approval of ESP.

5.2[6] cont.

(c) All rigging hardware is required to be visually inspected prior, during, and after each use. Rigging hardware shall be removed from service if visual inspection reveals any of the following discrepancies:

" Missing or illegible manufacturer's name or trademark and/or rated load identification.

  • Evidence of unauthorized welding or modification.
  • Bent, twisted, distorted, stretched elongated or cracked.
  • Excessive thread damage or wear (d) Any purchased, modified or site-fabricated rigging hardware is required to meet the applicable manufacturing and fabrication standards/regulations.

[7] Temporary Hoisting Assemblies NOTE These are general requirements for temporary hoisting assemblies typically used at Entergy sites. Specially designed lifting devices, for specific applications, may be designed and tested to other approved standards (a) Site fabricated and vendor supplied gin poles, lifting frames, temporary overhead cranes or supports, winch-driven hoisting or swinging equipment, and other assemblies (except scaffolding equipment) are required to be designed or approved by ESP. The design is required to be supported by detailed drawings, specifications, evaluations, and/or certifications.

(b) The assembly shall be designed for at least 125 percent of the projected hook load and should be load tested and held for at least five minutes at 125 percent of the actual load rating before initial use. The assembly shall be load tested in all configurations for which it will be used.

(c) All critical (load bearing) welds are required to be magnetic particle (MT) or liquid penetrant (PT) inspected before and after the load test for detectable changes in weld characteristics or distortion.

(d) Existing temporary lifting devices must have the load rating permanently affixed prior to use, OR if the device is serialized, then verify documentation supports the lift for which it will be used.

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Material Handling Program 5.2[7] cont.

(e) All site fabricated devices used for lifting shall have the following information permanently affixed. These include frames, etc. (above the hook) and spreader beams, etc. (below the hook):

  • Manufacturer name and address
  • Serial number / Design document number a Lifter weight, if over 100 lbs Rated load.

(f) Rigging from scaffolding equipment requires one of the following:

  • Site specific procedure for previously evaluated Lifts from scaffolding

" A documented evaluation for loads that exceed 500 pounds (400 pounds -

VY) or could be lifted above operable safety related equipment.

" The responsible maintenance or modifications Supervisor has authorized rigging from scaffolding for loads 500 pounds (400 pounds - VY) or less.

[8] Softeners (a) For heavy loads, use metal or manufacture-rated softeners or equivalent for sling protection.

(b) Ensure all sharp corners or rough surfaces of the load that come into contact with slings are properly softened to prevent damage to the slings during the lift.

(c) When softeners are used, stop when the load is lifted for the rigger to inspect the softeners and rigging to ensure no damage is occurring. IF damage appears on either the sling or the softener, STOP and REVALUATE the use of a different type of softener or slings to prevent further damage and the possibility of dropping the load.

[9] Rigging from Plant Structures (a) When available, equipment/material shall be rigged from pad eyes; structural embeds, monorails, etc.

(b) If proper rigging points are not available, a Supervisor shall be notified & an evaluation shall be made by ESP to insure proper rigging support points are used.

5.2 cont.

[10] Rigging From Plant Equipment (a) Rigging loads from plant equipment (components, piping, or their supports) requires Structural Load Evaluator or ESP approval.

(b) ESP shall evaluate the particular plant equipment being used as a pull point.

[11] Rigging From Building Structural Steel (a) Loads that exceed 1000 pounds (500 pounds - WF-3) or could be lifted above operable safety related equipment requires documented approval by a Structural Load Evaluator or as directed by site specific procedures. All SLE documents should be retained within the work package or as directed by site specific procedures.

(b) Any person who is Advanced Rigging qualified may authorize rigging from building structural steel if the load weighs 1000 pounds or less and will not be lifted above operable safety related equipment or as directed by site specific procedures. Documentation of approved rigging is not required.

[12] Overhead and Gantry Cranes NOTE Existing plant cranes that were installed prior to 1967 are not required to be retrofitted to meet the latest revision ASME B30.2. However, if a crane or component of the crane is modified in a way that substantially changes its performance, then the crane or component should be brought up to the latest revision of ASME B30.2 or be consistent with plant-specific licensing basis.

(a) All overhead and gantry cranes are required to be inspected and maintained in accordance with the crane manufacturer's requirements as prescribed by OSHA 29 CFR 1910.179,1926.550 and ASME B30.2.

(b) Only Overhead and Gantry Cranes that meet the requirements of ASME B30.2 shall be purchased for use at all Entergy Nuclear sites.

(c) Refer to Attachment 9.12 for conduct of crane operations.

__ )e NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 24 OF 85 MANUALMANUALREFERENCE USE Material Handling Program 5.2 cont.

[13] Powered Industrial Trucks (a) Refer to Attachment 9.13 for the conduct of powered industrial truck operations (Attachment 9.3 provides designated location information.)

(b) Forklift daily inspections are performed using Attachment 9.11.

[14] Special Lifting Devices (SLD) for Shipping Containers Weighing 10,000 Pounds (4500 kg) or more for Nuclear Materials.

(a) All Special Lifting Devices (SLD) are required to be maintained and inspected in accordance ANSI N14.6.

5.3 CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS PROGRAM (NUREG-0612)

[1] Site specific procedures (see Attachment 9.2) for "Control of Heavy Loads" prescribes the requirements for handling heavy loads over Nuclear Safety Related equipment and systems.

5.4 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS NOTE Rigging publications such as, the Newberry Handbook for Riggers, NMAC Riggers Handbook 1009706, Construction Safety Association of Ontario Rigging Manual, etc. is acceptable for aiding in selecting and evaluating rigging.

[1] Person-in-Charge (PIC)

(a) All loads that are to be lifted with an overhead or mobile crane and meet any of the following criteria are required to be supervised and under the direction of a Person-ln-Charge(PIC).

(1) Any load, lifted over safety-related equipment, that weighs more than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool for the specific plant in question.

rL-JLI JEneg NUCLEAR jMANAGEMENT QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 PAGE 25OF85 REV.16 MANUAL

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2000 pounds (ANO) & (IPEC) 1500 pounds (WF3) & (PNPS) 1300 pounds (PLP) 1200 pounds (RB) 1140 pounds (GG) 750 pounds (JAF) 700 pounds (vY)

(2) The lift is a non-standard lift.

(3) Personnel are to be lifted.

(4) Blind Lift.

(b) It is recommended that the Person-In-Charge (PIC) for the lift not be the Crane Operator. The Crane Operator does not always have the best vantage point for watching the load movement or the ability to move quickly from one location to another. It is acceptable for the PIC to be the Signal Person.

[2] Non-standard lifts are required to be evaluated and documented on Attachment 9.4 unless previously evaluated and the following criteria are met:

0 The weight is less than or equal to the evaluated load.

The evaluated rigging configuration is the same.

0 The evaluated method of rigging is the same.

The load does not pass over Safety Related Equipment, operating equipment on the turbine deck, or lifting personnel.

[3] Approval from Engineering Support Personnel is required for modifications or major repairs to any load handling equipment.

[4] The hoist chain or hoist rope must be free from kinks or twists and must not be wrapped around the load.

[5] Cranes or Rigging equipment that is rejected or damaged (suffers a challenge or failure) shall be immediately removed from service and shall not be used until inspections or repairs are performed. A Condition Report should be generated.

5.4 cont.

161 Below-the-hook lifting devices are required to be labeled with an identifying number (traceable to the manufacture) and the rated capacity of the device. Load lifting devices with lost or illegible identification tags or numbers shall not be used without ESP approval.

[7] The following practices apply to the use of slings and wire rope:

(a) Pre-use sling inspections (Documentation is not required)

(1) Prior to use visually check wire rope slings for signs of anything causing them to be unsafe such as: broken wires, excessive wear, kinking or twisting, chemical or heat damage.

(2) Prior to use visually check synthetic slings for signs of anything causing them to be unsafe such as: fraying, cuts, tell-tell red thread, chemical or heat damage, mildew.

(3) Prior to use visually check hooks for signs of anything causing them to be unsafe such as; deformity, excessive wear (particularly in the throat area), properly operating or missing hook latches (as required).

(4) Prior to each daily use visually check chain slings for signs of anything causing them to be unsafe such as: worn or deformed links, deformed rings, chemical or heat damage.

(b) During Use Inspections (Documentation is not required)

(1) Lift the load just enough to suspend the load and hold.

(2) Ensure the load is stable.

(3) While holding the load, listen for unusual noises. IF noises are heard, THEN immediately stop with the lift until all rigging has been re-inspected.

(4) Ensure rigging is installed properly and not damaged.

(5) Ensure softeners are installed properly and not damaged.

(6) Ensure load is properly balanced.

5.4[7](b) cont.

(7) Ensure slings are loaded equally as possible.

(8) Ensure crane brakes will hold on load being lifted.

(c) Post use inspection (Documentation is not required)

(1) Visually check wire rope slings for signs of anything causing them to be unsafe such as: broken wires, excessive wear, kinking or twisting, chemical or heat damage.

(2) Visually check synthetic slings for signs of anything causing them to be unsafe such as: fraying, cuts, tell-tail red thread, chemical or heat damage, mildew.

(3) Visually check hooks for signs of anything causing them to be unsafe such as: deformity, excessive wear (particularly in the throat area),

properly operating or missing hook latches.

(4) Visually check chain slings for signs of anything causing them to be unsafe such as: worn or deformed links, deformed rings, chemical or heat damage.

(d) Slings should be long enough to provide the maximum practical angle between the sling leg and the horizontal. The use of an angle less than 30 degrees is not acceptable without prior evaluation.

(e) Slings shall not be shortened with knots, rope clips, bolts or other unapproved methods.

(f) Protection of Components from Slings - Stainless steel and corrosion resistant-alloy surfaces or components should be protected from direct contact with slings and other handling accessories, except where such contact can be limited to lifting eyes or trunnions provided for hoisting and handling..

(1) Sharp corners shall be padded or protected to prevent slings from being cut or damaged by using softeners.

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Material Handling Program 5.4[7] coot.

(g) When U-bolt wire rope clips are used to form eyes in wire rope, the U-bolt clips must have the U-bolt section on the dead or short end of the wire rope and the saddle on the live or long end of the wire rope.

NOTE Rigging designed and approved by OEM or ESP is exempt from next step below.

(h) Multiple-leg hitches may consist of two, three or more legs. Calculations should always assume that only two legs are carrying the load and the other leg(s) are only balancing the load.

(i) Multiple part lines must not be twisted around each other.

(j) Eye Bolts of the shouldered or swivel hoist ring design should be used whenever possible and tightened (even if shims are used). Straight Shank eye bolts shall not be exposed to angle or side lifts.

NOTE Cribbing/supports for Heavy Loads MUST be evenly loaded prior to removing rigging.

Additional blocking may be used if personnel are required to work under the load once it has been set on cribbing/supports. Requirement will be documented in JSHA if required.

[8] Determine the safest load path prior to the lift and stage cribbing/supports if required.

[9] Hoist rope(s) and softeners if used, should be checked after the slack is taken out of the rigging and just before the load is lifted to ensure the load is centered and correctly balanced.

[10] Hoisting should be stopped when the load is suspended to check the position and condition of the rigging and softeners, if used.

5.4 cont.

[11] During hoisting or moving of loads, care should be taken to ensure that:

(a) There is no sudden acceleration or deceleration of the load.

(b) The load is only lifted high enough to clear obstructions.

(c) No work activity should be performed under a suspended load. IF working under a suspended load is required, a JSHA shall be completed in accordance with EN-IS-124.

CAUTION Loads may hang up during lifting caused by tight dowel pins, seal surface adhesion, guide rod binding or catching on items that are not intended to be lifted.

[12] Loads with Tight Clearances, Suspect Load Values or Potential to Bind / Drag (a) All rigging lifts that are greater than 1,000 pounds and have potential interferences, suspect load values or the potential to bind / drag, such as concrete blocks, shield walls, etc. must utilize a load cell with a safety factor of at least 5 to 1 to prevent excessive stress which could inadvertently load equipment above its rated capacity., OR (b) IF the configuration of the lift is not conducive to the use of a load cell THEN develop and implement a rigging plan that utilizes appropriate means to alleviate excessive stress from the allowable concentrated load areas such as:

(1) Increasing the rigging capacity by at least 100%.

(2) Mechanically agitating, lubricating, heating, hydraulically jacking, and / or prying loose from the at-rest point prior to the lift.

(3) Placing indicators or precision levels to visually verify if the load is moving correctly (i.e., horizontal / vertical).

[13] Cranes should not be used for side pulls unless property evaluated.

(141 Tag line(s) should be used on all overhead lifts unless the tag line creates a hazard for personnel and plant equipment.

[15] Employees utilizing taglines should ensure that they are not under the load at any time.

ENUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED MANAGEMENT PAGE 30 OF 85 MANUAL REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program 5.4 cont.

[16] Do not lift a load of"unknown weight" unless a "load weight determination" has been performed, (i.e., shipping papers, data plate, dynamometer or other weight measures, technical manuals, drawings or engineering evaluation).

(a) The weight of a component should be documented by the PIC or Rigger after the weight has been determined. If the component has potential volumetric changes (dry or liquid), mark both the empty and full weights. Documenting the weight of a load should be by, but not limited to, one of the following methods:

(1) Label/stencil components, (2) Enter weight to component data base additional info screen, (3) Adding to Tech Manual, drawings, etc.

(4) Using approved work package and procedure feedback processes.

[17] Employees shall not work under loads on the forks of a forklift, suspended from cranes or supported by the use of air/hydraulics. If an exception is needed, an approved JSHA in accordance with EN-IS-124 is required.

[18] Personnel Lifting shall be performed in accordance with Attachment 9.14.

5.5 Non-Suspended Loads CAUTION Non-suspended Loads with high centers of gravity have a tendency to overturn when moved over surfaces that result in unexpected drag, tilting and or shifting of the load.

[1] Precautions should include keeping personnel out of the path of the load, ensuring the understanding of the evolution and its hazards, and following standard rigging practices to control the load. If line of sight is not practical, a spotter should be used to assist the material transfer.

[2] A walk-down of the travel path shall be performed to identify areas that should not be traversed, such as: uneven surfaces, ramps, holes, carpets/mats, etc.

[3] Do not move a load of "unknown weight" unless a "load weight determination" has been performed, (i.e., shipping papers, data plate, dynamometer or other weight measures, technical manuals, drawings or engineering evaluation).

NUCLEAR

  • __ QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-1 19 REV. 16 Enfrg MANAGEMENT PAGE 31OF85 I

MANUAL I REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program 5.5 cont.

[4] The weight of a component should be documented after the weight has been determined. Documenting the weight of a load should be by, but not limited to, one of the following methods:

(a) Label/stencil components, (b) Enter weight to component data base additional info screen, (c) Adding to Tech Manual, drawings, etc.

(d) Using approved work package and procedure feedback processes.

[5] Carts and pallet jacks should be inspected prior use to ensure there are no defects that would prevent safe operation, such as:

" missing bolts/nuts

  • poorly inflated tires, etc.
  • Cart shall be rated for the weight of the load

[6] Workers should be aware of the personnel hazards involved with conducting relatively routine equipment handling activities or non-suspended loads. This should include the limitations of carts and pallet jacks for moving loads The worker shall:

(a) Use a cart that has both the rated capacity AND the lowest profile available.

(b) Ensure the center of gravity is located over the center of the cart.

(c) Secure the load to the cart, if not stable.

[7] The weight and center of gravity need to be considered to ensure appropriate actions are taken for personnel protection. Special safety precautions may be needed when moving non-suspended objects weighing greater than 100 pounds or objects whose center of gravity is more than 3 feet above the base.

[8] A JSHA (per EN-IS-124) should be prepared and approved prior to transporting non-suspended loads over 100 lbs with a center of gravity of more than 3 feet above the base that could injure personnel if moved incorrectly. Attachment 9.15 can be used as a tool to aid in working through a JSHA, BUT is not required to be filled out.

5.5 cont.

[9] Weights of the objects shall be known. Weights shall be marked on portable objects mounted on wheels and weigh greater than 100 pounds.

Stationary loads weighting greater than 100 pounds (eg- radiation protection tool monitors, frisker caves, etc.) should be mounted on permanent structures or immobilized to prevent inadvertent or unauthorized movement.

6.0 INTERFACES None 7.0 RECORDS None 8.0 SITE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS None 9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 STANDARD HOISTING SIGNALS 9.2 SITE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES AND CRs 9.3 DESIGNATED LOCATIONS 9.4 EVALUATION FOR NON-STANDARD LIFTS FORM 9.5 CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED OR RENTED CRANES FORM 9.6 RIGGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST 9.7 RIGGING CHECKLIST 9.8 MOBILE CRANE (TELESCOPIC BOOM) PRIOR TO USE CHECKLIST 9.9 OVERHEAD BRIDGE CRANE PRIOR TO USE CHECKLIST 9.10 TYPICAL LIFT PLAN CHECKLIST

_ , NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 I MANAGEMENT I PAGE 33 OF 85 REFERENCE USE

_MANUAL Material Handling Program 9.11 FORKLIFT INITIAL DAILY PREOPERATIONAL INSPECTION 9.12 CONDUCT OF CRANE OPERATIONS APPENDIX 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX 9.14 PERSONNEL LIFTING APPENDIX 9.15 CART USE / NON-SUSPENDED LOAD MATERIAL HANDLING CHECKLIST 9.16 EQUIPMENT MOVEMENT CHECKLIST APPENDIX 9.17 EQUIPMENT / OPERATOR SPOTTER CHECKLIST APPENDIX 9.18 EQUIPMENT SIGNAGE APPENDIX

ATTACHMENT 9. STANDARD HOISTING SIGNALS Sheet I of 3 Overhead and Gantry Crane Signals (sample posting)

HOIST. W" *~. C-f...O-'w -r ft pomne -p =r .

' dlrlvc.

herd LOWER. Win. .m. .. TO~i.d UIDGE TRAVEL m in em. hg=incfl. dolq. down, move hOOd I

HAd o-. fgr MO2 ,

h.i so Onv y meoUn .50..5 aid Io.

op

05. h t.d modoobo. In oW.
  • lgmI~,,I.0'Oi. = ehowoarnsfhiOgrhtl*mte DOcONETE. ar

- -.a.... On.a ATTACHM of 3 O IANIARDMIJ rll I N0 ,O*,NA.5l.

Sheet 2 Af 3 Mobile and Locomotive Crane Signals (sample posting)

EN-MA-119 REV.16

- n____

I Enfei"gy NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT QUALITY RELATED PAGE 36 OF 85 MANALREFERENCE MANUAL_____________________ USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.1 STANDARD HOISTING SIGNALS Sheet 3 of 3 Mobile and Locomotive Crane Signals (Continued)

(sample posting)

I I

__E_ te NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 37 OF 85 REFERENCE USE MANUAL I Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.2 SITE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES AND CRS Sheet 1 of 4 Site Specific Procedures ANO ANO Procedure 1005.002, Control of Heavy Loads.

ANO Procedure 1000.128, Industrial Safety and Occupational Health.

ANO Procedure 1402.131, Operation of the Containment Polar Crane (L2).

ANO Procedure 1402.132, Operation of the Intake Structure Crane (L7).

ANO Procedure 1402.133, Operation of the Spent Fuel Crane L-3 Units 1 & 2.

ANO Procedure 1402.080, Load Testing of the Containment Polar Cranes (L2 and 2L2).

ANO Procedure 1306.024, Periodic Test of Slings.

ANO Procedure 2402.079, Operation of the Containment Polar Crane (2L2).

ANO Procedure 2402.080, Operation of the Unit 2 New Fuel Handling Crane (2L35).

ANO Procedure 2402.045, Operation of the Unit II MSIV Crane (2L10).

ANO Procedure 1402.091, Visual Inspection of Special Lifting Devices.

ANO Procedure 1402.081, Load Testing of Crane L3, Unit 1 Aux Fuel, 2L35, L7.

ANO Procedure 1402.080, Load Testing of the Containment Polar Cranes (L2 & 2L2).

ANO Procedure 1306.004, Periodic Testing and Inspection of Manual Lifting Devices.

ANO Procedure 1402.232, Operation of the Unit 1 Containment Building Pedestal Crane (L-37).

COPD-024, Risk Assessment Guidelines GG GG Procedure 07-S-05-300, Control and Use of Cranes and Hoists GG Procedure 07-S-05-305, Qualification/Certification of Crane and Hoist Operators GG Procedure 07-S-05-310, Operation of Containment Polar Crane GG Procedure 07-S-05-325, Control, Operation and Maintenance of Portable Hoists GG Procedure 07-S-05-330, Control and Use of Crane and Hoist Rigging GG Procedure 07-S-05-335, Operation of The New Spent Fuel Cask Crane GG Procedure 07-S-05-336, Operation of New Fuel Bridge Crane GG Procedure 07-S-14-177, Inspection and Lubrication of Hand Chain Powered Hoists GG Standard GGNS-CS-15, Civil Standard For Temporary Rigging GG Standard GGNS-CS-20, Standard For Heavy Loads and Special Lifting Devices

A___nt NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 38OF85 REFERENCE USE MANUAL _1 1_1 Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.2 SITE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES AND CRS Sheet 2 of 4 Site Specific Procedures PLP MSM-M Lifting Equipment, Rigging and Tackle Inspection MSM-M-1 3A - Reactor Building Polar Crane L-1 Periodic Inspection MSM-M-1 3B -Turbine Building Crane L-2 Periodic Inspection MSM-M-13C - Spent Fuel Pool Crane L-3 Periodic Inspection CLP-M Inspection of Heavy Load Lift Devices MSM-M Containment Boom Crane and Containment Hatch Crane Mechanical Inspection and Lubrication MSM-M Load Carrying Vehicle Operational Inspection MSM-M Movement of Heavy Loads in the Turbine Building FHS-M Movement of Heavy Loads in the Fuel Pool FHS-M Movement of Heavy Loads in the Containment Building ORM BASES - Operating Requirements Manual RB GMP-0014 - Control Of Load Lifting Equipment EDS-ME-006 - Control Of Temporary Rigging EDS-CS-001 - Rigging Scaffold Installation And Removal - Safety Related MLP-7500 - Operation Of The Spent Fuel Cask Crane MLP-7501 - Operation Of The Fuel Building Bridge Crane MLP-7506 - Operation Of The Auxiliary Platform MLP-7507 - Pre-Operational Check Of The Inclined Fuel Transfer System MLP-7508 - Operation And Inspection Of The Fuel Preparation Machine MLP-7509 - Operation Of The Polar Crane MLP-7510 - Operation Of Monorail Cranes MLP-7514 - Operation Of Mobile Cranes MLP-7515 - Operation Of Bridge & Gantry Cranes WF-3 UNT-007-008 - Control of Loads and Lifting

___ e ( NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED 0.' MANAGEMENT PAGE 39 OF 85 MANUAL j REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.2 SITE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES AND CRS Sheet 3 of 4 Site Specific Procedures JAF MP-088.01 - Load Handling MP 088.02 - Reactor Building Crane Inspection MDSO Control of Lifting Equipment PNPS 3.M. 1-12 -Turbine Building Crane Preventive Maintenance 3.M.1-12.1 - Reactor Building Crane Preventive Maintenance 3.M.1 Heavy Load Hand line Operations 3.M.7 Lifting Equipment 3.M.4 Operation of the Reactor and Turbine Building Cranes 3.M.4-48.2 - Opening and Closing of the Reactor Pressure Vessel, Disassembly 3.M.4-48.3 - Opening and Closing of Reactor Pressure Vessel, Reassembly VY PP 7206 - Use of Lifting Systems PP 7023 - Control of Heavy Loads Program OP 5240 - Turbine & Reactor Building Bridge Crane Inspection and Maintenance OP 5241 - Lifting Fixtures and Equipment OP 2200 - Operation of Reactor and Turbine Building Bridge Cranes AP 0205 - Controlled Use of Monorails IPEC UNIT 2 / UNIT 3 PROCEDURES 0-MD-415 - Hoisting and Rigging Equipment Control 0-CRA-401-GEN - Containment Polar Crane Inspection 0-CRA-402-GEN - Plant Monorail / Jib Crane Inspection 0-CRA-403-RCS - Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Lifting Assembly Inspection 0-CRA-405-RCS - Reactor Vessel Head Lifting Rig and Sling Assembly Inspection 0-CRA-406-RCS - Internals Lifting Rig and Sling Assembly Inspection 0-CRA-408-TUR - Turbine Hall Crane Inspection 0-CRA-413-GEN - Breaker Lifting Device Inspection and Preventive Maintenance 0-MS-426 - Polar Crane Operation IP-SMM-MA-120 - Heavy Loads 0-CRA-GEN-408 - On Site Storage Cask Lifting Rig and Duratek Liner Grapple Tool Inspection ENN-EE-S-005-IP - Electrical Equipment Grounding Installation Standard

___ NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 40 OF 85 REFERENCE USE MANUAL I _I Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.2 SITE SPECIFIC PROCEDURES AND CRS Sheet 4 of 4 Site Specific Procedures IPEC (cont.)

UNIT 2 RW-SQ-4.51 0 - Crane Operation and Rigging for Rad Waste 2-SOP-1 7.30 - Manipulator Crane Operations 2-SOP-29.8.2 - Fuel Storage Building Crane Operation SOP 29.8.4 - Heater Bay Cranes Operation 2-DCS-016-GEN - DCSS Special Lifting Devices Inspection 2-DCS-026-GEN - FSB 110 Ton X-SAM Gantry Crane Operation 2-DCS-027-GEN - FSB 110 Ton X-SAM Gantry Crane Preventive Maintenance UNIT 3 3-MD Rigging Loads From Permanent Plant Structures and Components 3-MD Turbine Hall Crane Operation CRA-008-GEN - Chain fall and Hoist Tester Operation CRA-010-GEN - Fuel Storage Building Crane Inspection CRA-01 1-GEN - Fuel Transfer System and Spent Fuel Pit Bridge Crane PM SOP-CM-003 - Spent Fuel Pit Bridge Crane Operation 3-SOP-CM-002 - Fuel Storage Building Crane Operation 3-SOP-CM-005 - Heater Bay Cranes Operation SOP-CM Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Building Monorail Operation

ATTACHMENT 9.3 DESIGNATED LOCATIONS Sheet I of 4 Designated Locations

[1] Power-operated industrial trucks shall not be used in atmospheres containing hazardous concentration of acetylene, butadiene, ethylene oxide, hydrogen (or gases or vapors equivalent in hazard to hydrogen, such as manufactured gas), propylene oxide, acetaldehyde, cyclopropane, diethyl ether, ethylene, isoprene, or unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH).

[2] Power-operated industrial trucks shall not be used in atmospheres containing hazardous concentrations of metal dust, including aluminum, magnesium, and their commercial alloys, other metals of similarly hazardous characteristics, or in atmospheres containing carbon black, coal or coke dust except approved power-operated industrial trucks designated as EX may be used in such atmospheres.

[3] In atmospheres where dust of magnesium, aluminum or aluminum bronze may be present, fuses, switches, motor controllers, and circuit breakers of trucks shall have enclosures specifically approved for such locations.

[4] Only approved power-operated industrial trucks designated as EX may be used in atmospheres containing acetone, acrylonitrile, alcohol, ammonia, benzene, benzol, butane, ethylene dichloride, gasoline, hexane, lacquer solvent vapors, naphtha, natural gas, propane, propylene, styrene, vinyl acetate, vinyl chloride, or xylenes in quantities sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures and where such concentrations of these gases or vapors exist continuously, intermittently or periodically under normal operating conditions or may exist frequently because of repair, maintenance operations, leakage, breakdown or faulty operation of equipment.

__ NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 42 OF 85 MANUAL

__

j REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.3 DESIGNATED LOCATIONS Sheet 2 of 4 Designated Locations

[5] Power-operated industrial trucks designated as DY, EE, or EX may be used in locations where volatile flammable liquids or flammable gases are handled, processed or used, but in which the hazardous liquids, vapors or gases will normally be confined within closed containers or closed systems from which they can escape only in case of accidental rupture or breakdown of such containers or systems, or in the case of abnormal operation of equipment; also in locations in which hazardous concentrations of gases or vapors are normally prevented by positive mechanical ventilation but which might become hazardous through failure or abnormal operation of the ventilating equipment; or in locations which are adjacent to Class I, Division 1 locations (Ref.

OSHA Standard 1910.178), and to which hazardous concentrations of gases or vapors might occasionally be communicated unless such communication is prevented by adequate positive-pressure ventilation from a source of clear air, and effective safeguards against ventilation failure are provided.

[6] In locations used for the storage of hazardous liquids in sealed containers or liquefied or compressed gases in containers, approved power-operated industrial trucks designated as DS, ES, GS, or LPS may be used. This classification includes locations where volatile flammable liquids or flammable gases or vapors are used, but which, would become hazardous only in case of an accident or of some unusual operating condition. The quantity of hazardous material that might escape in case of accident, the adequacy of ventilating equipment, the total area involved, and the record of the industry or business with respect to explosions or fires are all factors that should receive consideration in determining whether or not the DS or DY, ES, EE, GS, LPS designated truck possesses sufficient safeguards for the location. Piping without valves, checks, meters and similar devices would not ordinarily be deemed to introduce a hazardous condition even though used for hazardous liquids or gases.

Locations used for the storage of hazardous liquids or of liquefied or compressed gases in sealed containers would not normally be considered hazardous unless subject to other hazardous conditions also.

EN-MA-119 REV. 16 Entergy NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT QUALITY RELATED PAGE 43 OF 85

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USE _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.3 DESIGNATED LOCATIONS Sheet 3 of 4 Designated Locations

[7] ' Only approved power operated industrial trucks designated as EX shall be used in atmospheres in which combustible dust is or may be in suspension continuously, intermittently, or periodically under normal operating conditions, in quantities sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures, or where mechanical failure or abnormal operation of machinery or equipment might cause such mixtures to be produced.

[8] The EX classification usually includes the working areas of grain handling and storage plants, room containing grinders or pulverizes, cleaners, graders, scalpers, open conveyors or spouts, open bins or hoppers, mixers, or blenders, automatic or hopper scales, packing machinery, elevator heads and boots, stock distributors, dust and stock collectors (except all-metal collectors vented to the outside) and all similar dust producing machinery and equipment in grain processing plants, starch plants, sugar-pulverizing plants, malting plants, hay grinding plants, and other occupancies of similar nature; coal pulverizing plants (except where the pulverizing equipment is essentially dust tight); all working areas where metal dusts and powders are produced, processed, handled, packed, or stored (except in tight containers); and other similar locations where combustible dust may, under normal operating conditions, be present in the air in quantities sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures.

[9] Only approved power-operated industrial trucks designated as DY, EE, or EX shall be used in atmospheres inwhich combustible dust will not normally be in suspension in the air or will not be likely to be thrown into suspension by the normal operation of equipment or apparatus in quantities sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures but where deposits or accumulations of such dust may be ignited by arcs or sparks originating in the truck.

[10] Only approved power-operated industrial trucks designated as DY, EE, or EX shall be used in locations, which are hazardous because of the presence of easily ignitable fibers or flyings but in which such fibers or flyings are not likely to be in suspension in the air in quantities sufficient to produce ignitable mixtures.

EN-MA-119 REV. 16 EI

--- En°'r* NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT QUALITY RELATED PAGE 44 OF 85

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REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.3 DESIGNATED LOCATIONS Sheet 4 of 4 Designated Locations

[11] Only approved power-operated industrial trucks designated as DS, DY, ES, EE, EX, GS, or LPS shall be used in locations where easily ignitable fibers are stored or handled, including outside storage, but are not being processed or manufactured.

Industrial trucks designated as E, which have been previously used in these locations may be continued in use.

[12] On piers and wharves handling general cargo, any approved power-operated industrial truck designated as D, E, G, or LP may be used, or trucks which conform to the requirements for these types may be used.

[13] If storage warehouses and outside storage locations are hazardous only the approved power-operated industrial truck specified for such locations in this paragraph (c) (2) shall be used. If not classified as hazardous, any approved power-operated industrial truck designated as Type D, E, G, or LP may be used, or trucks, which conform to the requirements for these types, may be used.

[14] If general industrial or commercial properties are hazardous, only approve power-operated industrial trucks specified for such locations in this paragraph (c) (2) shall be used. If not classified as hazardous, any approved power-operated industrial truck designated as Type D, E, G, or LP may be used, or trucks which conform to the requirements of these types may be used.

ATTACHMENT 9.4 EVALUATION FOR NON-STANDARD LIFT FORMS Sheet I of 2 Initiator Date Description of the item to be lifted:

1. Is the load a major piece of plant equipment that is being lifted as a complete assembly such as feedwater heaters, circulating water pumps, steam generators, transformers, etc.

YeslJ NoEj N/AE-

2. Weight of the load including the rigging. lbs.
3. Safe lifting capacity (load rating) of rigging configuration used. lbs
4. Does the load have sharp corners or areas that could damage the rigging? YesO Nor' NIA[

If yes, describe the method to be used to protect the rigging:

5. Does the sling angle or distance computed before making the lift result in a sling angle of less than 30 deg.? YesE- No[] N/A[
6. Has required crane type, rigging, or capacity been determined? YesE- NoEl N/AD
7. Will the load pass over Safety Related Equipment? YesEr] NoEl N/AE]

(If yes, comply with the requirements of site specific procedures)

8. Will the load pass over operating equipment on the turbine deck? YesE- No[] N/A[-]

(If yes, attach a load path sketch approved by operations)

NOTE Chain falls and come-a-longs used for load leveling are not considered to be multiple lifting devices

9. Are multiple lifting devices required (such as cranes, hooks, tuggers, chain falls, etc.)? Yes[- NoEl N/AU]

ATTACHMENT 9.4 EVALUATION FOR NON-STANDARD LIFT FORMS Sheet 2 of 2

10. Is the load unstable by the nature of its contents or configuration?

Yesl NoEl N/Ar-(Ifyes, describe and/or provide sketch of the rigging equipment and its configuration.)

NOTE A Blind Lift is any lift that requires hand signals to be relayed through more than one person to the crane operator. Ifradios are used to communicate signals to the crane operator Then the lift is not a blind lift.

11. Is this a blind lift? YesEl No[] N/A[

Person In Charge (PIC):_

Material Handling Coordinator:

Structural Load Evaluator:

EN-MA-119 REV. 16

-- Energ NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED MANAGEMENT PAGE 47 OF 85

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Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.5 CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED OR RENTED CRANES FORMS Sheet I of 3 Crane owned or supplied by Identifying Number or Serial Number of the Crane Type of Crane & Manufacturer Qualified Crane Inspector Date Certification ID #

1. Ifpossible, review the maintenance logs of the crane. Sat[] Unsat C_-N/AC
2. Check that all exposed moving parts are guarded or protected. Sat[] Unsal CI N/ACJ
3. Check that high voltage warning signs are displayed on the exterior of the crane. SatE] Unsat'C N/AEC
4. Visually inspect each component of the crane used in lifting, swinging, or lowering the load or boom for any defects that might result in unsafe operation. Sat'- UnsatC- N/AC-
5. Inspect all wire rope (including standing ropes) for the following: SatE"] UnsatCl N/AC'-
  • Any broken wires.
  • Wear of one-third of the original diameter of outside individual wires.
  • Kinking, crushing, bird caging, and corrosion, or any other damage resulting in distortion of the rope structure.
  • Evidence of any heat damage from any cause.
  • Reductions from nominal diameter of more than:

ROPE DIAMETER MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE REDUCTION up to and including 5/16" 1/64" 3/8" to and including 1/2" 1/32" 9/16" to and including 3/4" 3/64" 7/8" to and including 1-1/8" 1/16" 1-1/4" to and including 1-1/2" 3/32"

  • In standing ropes, more than two broken wires in one lay in sections beyond end connections or more than one broken wire at an end connection.
  • Wire rope safety factors are required to be in accordance with ASME B30.5 and SAE J959-1966.
6. Check for freedom of movement of rotation of all swivels. SatCl Unsatr- N/AC
7. Inspect tires for cuts, tears, breaks, and proper inflation. Sat[] UnsatE[ N/AC
8. Check exhaust pipes for guards or insulation in accessible areas. SatE- UnsatE- N/AC

ATTACHMENT 9.5 CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED OR RENTED CRANES FORMS Sheet 2 of 3

9. Inspect the crane for excessive fluid leaks in lines, tanks, valves, pumps and other part of fuel, air or hydraulic lines. Sat[] Unsat[' N/AE]
10. Visually check that the crane is properly lubricated.

The hydraulic oil reservoirs should be at an acceptable level. SatE] Unsat[- N/A[-

11. Inspect sheaves, drums, rigging, hardware and attachments. SatE- Unsat[- N/AC"

" Any hook that is deformed, cracked, or shows evidence of excessive wear must be removed from service.

" Throat Opening. Any distortion causing an increase in throat opening Of 5%, not to exceed % in. (or as recommended by the manufacture).

  • Wear. Any wear exceeding 10% (or as recommended by the manufacturer).
12. Check all other functional operating mechanisms such as locking mechanisms, limit switches, safety devices, hydraulic cylinders, instruments and lights. Sat[] Unsat[] N/AC-
13. Visually inspect the turntable connections for weld cracks and loose or missing bolts. SatEr UnsatE'] N/AC"
14. Ensure all cranes are inspected for loose objects, debris or interferences prior to use. SatC-Unsatr-] N/A[C BOOM AND JIB
1. Visually inspect the boom and jib for straightness and any evidence of physical damage, such as cracking, bending or any other deformation of the welds. SatEl Unsat- N/AC
2. Look for corrosion under any attachments that are connected to the cords and lacing. SatC- Unsatr- N/AC-'
3. On lattice booms, look for bent lacing. Sat[] Unsat[- N/AC-
  • When lacing is bent, the ends also tend to draw together which pulls the main cords out of shape.

" This inspection is especially important on tubular booms where every component must be straight and free from dents.

- NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATEO EN-MA-119 REV.16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 49 OF 85 MANUAL REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.5 CONTRACTOR SUPPLIED OR RENTED CRANES FORMS Sheet 3 of 3 OUTRIGGERS

1. Check outriggers to ensure that neither the beams nor the cylinders are distorted or cracked. SatE[ Unsat-] N/A[-
2. Visually check that the welds are not cracked and that both the beams and cylinders extend and retract smoothly and hold the load. SatE] Unsatl N/AD
3. Check the condition of the floats. SatE[ Unsat- N/AD All Deficiencies are required to be corrected prior to use or evaluated by a Qualified crane inspector.

Deficiencies not corrected:

Justification to use crane with deficiencies:

Crane Inspector Approval Date The form will be retained by the Material Handling Program Coordinator for the duration of the Job at which time the form may be discarded.

NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-1 19 REV. 16 S MANAGEMENT PAGE 50 OF 85

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REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.6 RIoGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST Sheet 1 of 6 RIGGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST SAFETY:

NO WORK ACTIVITY SHOULD BE PERFORMED UNDER A SUSPENDED LOAD.

IF work under a suspended load is required, THEN a Job Safety Hazard Analysis (JSHA) shall be completed in accordance with EN-IS-1 24.

Slings, Manual lifting Device (chain-fallslcom-a-long):

WVerify periodic inspection date on tag is current prior to use.

WVisual Inspection for physical damage prior to use by the user

  • Frayed slings

" Missing or illegible ID tag

  • Abrasion or cuts to the outer jacked
  • Tattle tail not visible
  • Red Thread

" Mildew

" Indication of heat damage

  • Sharp edges require softeners
  • Broken wires
  • Kinking or twisting
  • Excessive wear
  • Hooks that are twisted
  • Deformity

" Excessive wear in throat area

  • Broken or missing safety latch

__EL*_// NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16

,MANAGEMENT PAGE 51OF85 REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.6 RIGGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST Sheet 2 of 6 WVendor supplied rigging shall meet program requirements as stated in EN-MA-119 Material Handling Program.

  • Should Receive a full inspection and is properly marked with an expiration tag same as Entergy.

W Rigging hardware shall have a visual inspection performed prior to use.

Fork Trucks:

WHandle only loads within the capacity of the truck

  • Handle only stable or safely arranged loads WKnow the load capacity of your machine.

WUnderstand the load/capacity charts.

WOnly trained authorized operators shall be permitted to operate powered industrial truck.

WUse both forks to lift a load.

W- Point loading should only be used for positioning a load prior to actually lifting.

Cranes:

WAll mobile and overhead cranes used on site shall meet program requirement as stated in EN-MA-119 (Material Handling Program)

WAll mobile cranes shall have a current periodic inspection verified prior to use.

0 Sticker/paperwork is located in or on the cab of the machine.

EnFrn NUCLEAR QUALTY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 EnfeW MANAGEMENT PAGE 52 OF 85 MANUAL I REFERENCE USE I I Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.6 RIGGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST Sheet 3 of 6 WAll crawler, truck or locomotive (Mobile) cranes brought on site for specific project are required to be inspected in accordance with Attachment 9.5 prior to the first use.

  • Inspection performed by a qualified crane inspector.
  • Site fabricated devices shall have the, (1) load rating, (2) design document & special lifting instruction if they apply.

Below The Hook Lifting Devices (other than slings and special design lifting devices)

" Structure & mechanical, vacuum, and magnets

  • Marking shall have the, (1) manufacturer name & address, (2) serial number/engineering document number, (3) lifter weight, if over 100 lbs. &

(4) rated load A PIC is required when:

1. All loads that are to be lifted with an overhead or mobile crane and meet any of the following criteria are required to be supervised and under the direction of a Person-In-Charge (PIC).

(1) Any load, lifted over safety-related equipment, that weighs more than the combined weight of a single spent fuel assembly and its associated handling tool for the specific plant in question.

2000 pounds (ANO) & (IPEC) 1500 pounds (WF3) & (PNPS) 1300 pounds (PLP) 1200 pounds (RB) 1140 pounds (GG) 750 pounds (JAF) 700 pounds (VY)

(2) The lift is a non-standard lift.

(3) Personnel are to be lifted.

(4) Blind Lift.

2. It is recommended that the Person-In-Charge (PIC) for the lift not be the Crane Operator.

The Crane Operator does not always have the best vantage point for watching the load movement or the ability to move quickly from one location to another. It is acceptable for the PIC to be the Signal Person.

ATTACHMENT 9.6 RIGGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST Sheet 4 of 6 Riggers Responsibilities

  • Responsible for rigging any load, must have as a minimum, basic rigging training or work under the direction of a lead that has a minimum, basic rigging training.

PIC Responsibilities:

  • Supervise the lift.
  • Verify qualification of crew.
  • Ensure the load is properly rigged.
  • Coordination and notification of load movements and load paths.
  • Obtain or verify the correct weight of the load and inform the operator.
  • Conduct pre-lift crew briefings.
  • Contingency planning.
  • Ensures completion of evaluation for non-standard lifts.
  • Designates the signal person and inform the operator.
  • Control the movements of all personnel required to work within the lift area.
  • Ensure that all required safety precautions are taken.

General LiftinglSafety Requirement

" Tag lines should be used on all overhead lifts unless the tag line creates a hazard.

  • Lift zone/area should be flagged off prior to performing the lift.

" When loads are lifted greater than chest high this should include extra distance due to the potential for the load to swing or bounce if it falls. Personnel should also avoid being in the "line of fire" of rigging equipment in case of rigging failure.

" Crane operation should be suspended when steady wind speeds exceed 20 MPH.

-EnIerm, I MANAGEMENT Mr QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 PAGE 54 OF 85 REV. 16

____ MANUAL REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.6 RIGGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST Sheet 5 of 6 General Lifting/Safety Requirement (Cont.)

" Crane operation should be suspended when thunderstorms are in close proximity to the plant.

" A signal person should be used when the equipment operator vision is impaired.

  • A signal person should be used when traveling with a load when vision is impaired.

" All rigging hardware and slings should be checked for proper alignment after tension has been put on the load just prior to making the lift.

  • When traveling, the boom should be completely retracted and lowered to the travel position. All appropriate cab swing brakes should be applied. (CR-RBS-2010-1153)

I.E. For Dresser Cranes, boom angle is "0" degrees. For Grove 130 ton mobile cranes, boom angle is 20 degrees maximum.

" Riggers, signal persons, and crane operators know the location of the crane power disconnect.

  • A clear line of communication is established between the signal person and the crane operator.

" Tension is placed on the slings, brought to a taut condition, and inspected for safe configuration and any deficiencies.

" A "lift and hold" technique is employed to ensure the rigging hardware and rigging setup is correct. This specifically verifies the center of gravity of the load and the stability of the rigging.

  • Rigging is observed to watch for signs of imminent failure.

ATTACHMENT 9.6 RIGGING OBSERVATION CHECKLIST Sheet 6 of 6

& Rigging from plant equipment (components, piping or their supports) requires Engineer Support Personnel approval for use as a pull point. The authorization does not require formal documentation approval of pull points for rigging of loads up to 500 pounds.

  • When rigging from building structure steel and the load exceeds 1000 lbs. (500 -

WF-3) or could be lifted above safety related equipment, the rigging must be approved by a Structural Load Evaluator.

0 Prior to use of mobile equipment, i.e. cranes, forklifts, extend-a-booms, the operator is to ensure that his clothes do not and cannot interfere with the operation of the equipment and cause and inadvertent control manipulation. (CR-RBS-2010-3594)

ATTACHMENT 9.7 RIGGING CHECKLIST Sheet I of 2 RIGGING CHECKLIST YES NO N/A

1. Are you a qualified rigger for the level of rigging you will perform? El El El
2. Have you been pre job briefed about the lift? El El El
a. Did pre-job brief include a review of industry operating experience 0l 0l El
3. Does everyone understand stop-work conditions? El El El
4. Have you considered self/check peer/check for error likely situations? [E El [E
5. Have you determined this to be a heavy load? El El El
6. Do you understand the Load Path (Safe Load Path NUREG 0612 Lift)? El 0 El
a. Has the load path or Safe Load Path been walked down for obstructions and sharp objects that could damage slings? l El] El
7. Have you determined how the rigging will be attached to the load? 0 El ll
a. Does the load have any contents that can shift when lifted? E El El
b. Have you considered any lift height restrictions? El El El
c. Is the rigging selected rating adequate for the lift including appropriate Working Load Limits (WLL) de-ratings for sling angle and dynamic loading based on hook speeds? El [ l]
d. If using a 3 or more part pick, can two slings hold the weight of the load including the de-rating due to sling angle and dynamic loading? El El El
e. If weight of the load is in doubt, have you considered using a load monitoring device. El l l
f. If you are unsure about any of these issues, STOP and contact your supervisor El l l

ATTACHMENT 9.7 RIGGING CHECKLIST Sheet 2 of 2 YES NO NIA

8. Does the load have any sharp comers that require softeners or padding? 11 El 11
a. Are the softeners strong enough for the geometry and the weight of the load? EEI] l
b. Have you considered that heavy loads and increased sling angles require the use of heavier softener material (metal or engineered softeners marked with the load rating)? 13 11 []
c. Do the softeners provide adequate D/d for the slings used? El El El
d. If in doubt as to softener selection, have you contacted an Advanced Rigger? El l l
9. Have you inspected the rigging? 1 0 [El
10. Are you aware that outdoor crane operations should be suspended at awind speed of 20 mph? 11 11EJ

ATTACHMENT 9.8 MOBILE CRANE (TELESCOPIC BOOM) PRIOR TO USE DAILY CHECKLIST Sheet I of 2 CAUTION Failure of the upper limit switches could cause a two-block event, severely damage the crane, drop the hook load block and cause personnel injury Mfg. Model # Serial # Date: / /

Check the appropriate box: S= Satisfactory U = Unsatisfactory NA = Not Applicable Conditions IS U NA Number item for reference remarks below FLUID LEVELS / LEAKS

1. Crankcase Oil
2. Coolant
3. Hydraulic Oil CAB(S)
4. Electrical System
5. Service / Parking Brake
6. Swing Brake / House Lock
7. Gauges
8. Housekeeping
9. Fire Extinguisher(s)
10. Load Chart
11. Windows Mirrors FUNCTIONS
12. Travel
13. Steering
14. Outriggers
15. Boom Up I Down
16. Boom In / Out
17. Hoist(s) Up / Down
18. Swing

ATTACHMENT 9.8 MOBILE CRANE (TELESCOPIC BOOM) PRIOR TO USE DAILY CHECKLIST Sheet 2 of 2 Check the appropriate box: S= Satisfactory U = Unsatisfactory NA = Not Applicable Conditions FSU ST NA I Number item for reference remarks below SAFETY DEVICES

19. Anti-Two-Block
20. LMI / Load Wt. Indicator
21. Boom Length Indicator
22. Boom Angle Indicator
23. Radius Indicator
24. Warning Lights / Buzzers
25. Back-Up Alarm / Horn BOOMS, JIBS &ACCESSORIES
26. Load Block / Ball / Hook(s)
27. Safety Latches
28. Wedge Socket(s)
29. Sheaves
30. Wire Rope Retainers
31. Main Boom
32. Jig / Extension
33. Lift Cylinder(s)

LOWER WORKS

34. Tires / Inflation
35. Carrier
36. Outriggers UPPER WORKS
37. Machine Guards.
38. Hoist Brakes (s)
39. Hoses / Tubing
40. Hoist(s) 41, Wrapping on Drum(s)
42. Rope Reeving
43. Wire Rope
  • Consult operator's manual for additional inspection items.

" Do not operate crane until unsafe conditions are corrected.

Operator Signature Supervisor Signature

ATTACHMENT 9.9 OVERHEAD AND GANTRY CRANES PRIOR TO USE DAILY CHECKLIST Sheet I of 2 CAUTION Failure of the upper limit switches could cause a two-block event, severely damage the crane, drop the hook load block and cause personnel injury Date: / / Operator Location Make Type Capacity Check the appropriate box: S= Satisfactory U = Unsatisfactory NA = Not Applicable Conditions F S U NA Number item for reference remarks below CAB

1. Fire Extinguisher
2. Housekeeping
3. Lighting
4. Windows
5. Gauges
6. Service / Parking Brake
7. Power Source FUNCTIONS
8. Hoist
9. Lower
10. Trolley Left
11. Trolley Right
12. Bridge Forward
13. Bridge Reverse
14. Magnet Disconnected
15. Pendant Control
16. Remote Control
17. Hoist Brakes (s)

SAFETY DEVICES

18. Upper Limit Switch
19. Lower Limit Switch
20. Load Limiter
21. Load Weight Indicator
22. Warning Device

ATTACHMENT 9.9 OVERHEAD AND GANTRY CRANES PRIOR TO USE DAILY CHECKLIST Sheet 2 of 2 Check the appropriate box: S= Satisfactory U = Unsatisfactory NA = Not Applicable Conditions -FS 7UNA Number item for reference remarks below BRIDGE

23. Proximity Sensor
24. Girder(s)
25. Electrical Equipment
26. End Trucks
27. Guards
28. Rail Sweeps
29. Hydraulic/Air System HOISTING EQUIPMENT & DEVICES
30. Hoist(s)
31. Wraps on Drum(s)
32. Rope Reeving
33. Wire Rope
34. Upper Sheaves
35. Load Block(s)
36. Hook(s) &Latches
37. Hoist Chain SUPPORT STRUCTURE
38. Beams
39. Columns
40. Rails
41. Fasteners
42. End Stops
  • Consult operators manual for additional inspection items.

" Do not operate crane until unsafe conditions are corrected.

Operator Signature

ATTACHMENT 9.10 TYPICAL LIFT PLAN CHECKLIST Sheet I of 4 I NOTE Lift plan details should be commensurate with the complexity of the task.

1. Component ID and/or Noun Name for item being Lifted
2. Weight of the Load IF the answer to any of these questions is "yes",fill in the weight and proceed to part 3.

If all of the answers to these questions are "'no", the lift cannot proceed without approval from a PlC.

YES NO NIA (a) Is the weight marked on the load? El 0U E (b) Is the weight of the load shown on a drawing? EU EU U Record drawing number:

(c) Can the weight of the Load be accurately calculated by a PIC? U 0 EU (record the weight)

(d) Can a test lift be made with a load-weighing device? U U U Weight of the load = Lb / Tons circle one)

Weight of rigging =

Total Weight =

3. Nature of the Load IF the answer to any of these questions is "no"consult a PIC for further information before proceeding.

YES NO N/A (a) Is the center of gravity of the load known or easily identified? U3 U] Ul (b) Can the rigging be adjusted to accommodate an uncertain center of U] Ul U gravity or a known imbalance?

(c) Can the hoist hook be positioned over the center of gravity of the load? U U U (d) Can the load be lifted without side loading the hoist'? Ul U U3

ATTACHMENT 9.10 TYPICAL LIFT PLAN CHECKLIST Sheet 2 of 4

4. Capacity of the Crane and Rigging IF the answerto any of these questions is "no"or "unknown"the lift may not proceed until all concerns are addressed.

(a) List slings, shackles, eyebolts, and other rigging hardware needed for this lift.

(b) Equipment number or tool number, and capacity of the crane or hoist intended to be used:

YES NO NIA (c) Does the crane have the capacity to make the lift? El l [D

]

(d) Are the capacities of ALL the rigging components, in their intended El El El configuration greater than the weight of the load?

(e) Are all of the rigging components and the crane "in date"? 0l El El

5. Operator, Communications, Load Path, and Environmental Concerns YES NO NIA (a) Is the operator aware of the requirement to complete pre-use checks El El El on the crane or hoist?

(b) Is the operator qualified to operate the crane or hoist? El El El (c) What is the primary method of communication between the crane operator and the rigger?

Choose one: Voice El Radio El Hand Signals [E (d) Are there personnel in the load path? El l l (e) Is the intended load path over offices, shops, or other work locations? El El El (f) Is the intended load path over live equipment (electrical, steam, El El El pressurized fluids)?

___t,[ g NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 Enterg MANAGEMENT PAGE 64OF85 MANUAL REFERENCE USE

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Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.10 TYPICAL LIFT PLAN CHECKLIST Sheet 3 of 4 YES NO N/A (g) Are there weather hazards (wind, rain, snow, or cold, for example) that El El El may adversely affect the completion of the Lift?

(h) Are effective barriers in place on roads or walkways to alert passersby 1- El El of the lift?

If the answer to any of (d)-(h) is "yes" describe how the effect of conditions will be eliminated, controlled, or reduced:

6. Comments:

ATTACHMENT 9.10 TYPICAL LIFT PLAN CHECKLIST Sheet 4 of 4 If needed provide a sketch of the load path; lay down areas, roped off safe areas, potential interferences, and critical equipment in potential load drop areas.

7. Signatures (a) We agree that the information on his form is correct. The lift may proceed according to the requirements of EN-MA-1 19.

(Print- sign, and date.)

Person In Charge (PIC):

Crane Operator:

Rigger/Signal Person:

ATTACHMEINT .1 FORKLIFT INITIAL DAILY PREOPERATIONAL INSPECTION Sheet I of IT.11FRLFIIIADALPROEAIALNPEIN Forklift Initial Daily Preoperational Inspection (Sample Form)

Priorto initialoperation of the forklift (once per shift) check condition of all the items on the checklist as applicable. Check for leaks, defects or any condition adversely affecting the safety of the vehicle.

KEY OFF Procedures KEY ON Procedures

  • Capacity plate limits Check the gauges
  • Overhead guard " Hour meter
  • Mast assembly
  • Battery discharge indicator
  • Lift chains and rollers " Fuelgauge
  • Forks Service/parking brakes
  • Tires Test the standard equipment
  • Safety door " Backup alarm
  • LPG tank and locator pin
  • Horn
  • LPG tank hose
  • Steering
  • Radiator water level
  • Brakes
  • Battery condition
  • Brake light
  • Hydraulic fluid level
  • Head, tail, and brake lights
  • Seat belt
  • Gas Dieselgauge
  • Engine oil level Check the operation of load-handling attachments
  • Hydraulic cylinders & hoses

" Hydraulic controls

" Raise / Lower forks

  • Tilt Mast

" Move forks side to side Unbalanced or top heavy loads are required to be tied to the mast of forklifts during transportation.

CR-RBS-2010-5286. I If at any time a forklift is in need of repair, is defective, or shows any condition adversely affecting the safety of the vehicle, the condition should be reported immediately to your Supervisor. The unit should be taken out of service until it has been restored to safe-operating condition.

Print Name Date

ATTACHMENT 9.12 CONDUCT OF CRANE OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet I of 4

[1) A Pre-Job brief is required for all Non-Standard Lifts per EN-MA-101.

[2] Crane Operators are required to perform inspections of the mobile or overhead crane, including vendor-supplied or rented cranes, prior to each use or at the beginning of each shift (See Prior to Use Checklist Attachments 9.8 &9.9). This inspection is a visual examination by the Operator and does not require documentation unless performed under the direction of a site specific plant procedure. All deficiencies will have to be repaired or evaluated for use as is by Engineering Support Personnel or a Qualified Crane Inspector.

[3] Persons boarding or leaving any crane should do so only at authorized and designated entrances.

[4] The Operator shall not engage in any practice that could divert attention while actually engaged in operating the crane.

[5] When physically or otherwise unfit, an Operator shall not engage in the operation of the crane.

(6] Signals to the Crane/Hoist Operator shall be in accordance with the standards prescribed in Attachment 9.1 unless radio communication equipment is used. Approved hand signals should be posted or available. The Crane Operator must ensure that a reference copy of the standard approved hand signals has been posted CONSPICUOUSLY in the work area.

[7] The appointed Signal Person is required to be in constant communication with the crane operator, either visually with hand signals or audibly by radio throughout the lift.

(a) The Operator is required to respond to signals from the appointed signal person.

However, the Operator is required to obey a stop signal at all times no matter who gives it.

(b) Where loads are picked up at one point and lowered at another, two signal persons may be used, one to direct the lift and one to direct the descent.

(c) Blind Lifts should be avoided whenever possible. Using radio communications is the preferred method of communicating with the crane operator.

ATTACHME; NT9.12 CONDUCT OF CRANE OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 2 of 4

[8] Each Operator is responsible for those operations under the Operator's control. Whenever there is doubt as to safety, the Operator shall consult with the Person-In-Charge (PIC) or the supervisor before handling the load.

[9] If the crane is equipped with a warning device, the Operator is required to activate the warning before starting any bridge or trolley motion and intermittently during travel of the crane when approaching persons in the load path.

(10] The Operator should never leave his position unattended while a load is suspended unless radiological or other safety hazards dictate an immediate departure from the area.

[11] Working under suspended loads requires the following:

(a) Load paths for suspended loads should ensure that no employee is required to work directly below a suspended load.

(b) An approved Job Safety Hazard Analysis (JSHA) is required prior to performing any work activities under a suspended load per EN-IS-1 24.

[12] Lockout and tagout requirements for crane maintenance and protection of personnel shall be conducted according to EN-OP-1 02 or EN-MA-1 31. For functional testing and inspecting, the Operator shall not close (energize) the main switch until the Operator is certain that no worker is on or in the path of the crane.

(a) Before closing the main switch, the Operator shall be sure that all controllers are in the off position.

(b) If the power goes off during operation, the Operator is required to place all controllers in the off position.

[13] When not in use, cranes shall be secured lAW site procedures, i.e., rail locks in place, controller is in the off position, the hook(s) raised high enough to clear all obstacles in its path, etc.

d_ NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 MANAGEMENT PAGE 69 OF 85 MANUAL REFERENCE USE Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.12 CONDUCT OF CRANE OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 3 of 4 NOTE As a matter of good practice, mobile crane booms should not be left in an upright position when the crane is not occupied or in use for an extended period of time (i.e. overnight, weekends, etc.).

[14] Crane operators are required to monitor wind speed when operating outside gantry and mobile type cranes (a) Crane operations should be suspended and boom lowered when:

(1) Steady wind speeds exceed 20 MPH.

(2) Thunderstorms are in close proximity to the plant.

(3) Ice build-up exists on lifting equipment or extreme temperatures are encountered.

[15] All parts of mobile cranes, rigging, and loads shall maintain specified clearances from energized power lines (Reference EN-IS-123).

[16] Contacts with runway stops or other cranes should be avoided.

[17] Crawler, Truck or Locomotive (Mobile) Cranes (a) Prior to mobile crane operations, notify the Operations Department of any plant equipment that will be within the radius of the crane boom, so risk to equipment can be assessed.

NOTE The following inspection may be waived with documentation if the owner can prove that the crane is maintained and inspected in accordance with OSHA 1926.550, 1910.180 and ASME B30.5.

(b) All plant crawler, truck or locomotive cranes are required to be inspected and maintained in accordance with the crane manufacturer's requirements as prescribed by OSHA 1926.550,1910.180 and ASME B30.5.

ATTACHMEI 4T9.12 CONDUCT OF CRANE OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 4 of 4 (c) All crawlers, truck or locomotive cranes brought on site for short specific projects by contractors, leased or rented are required to have a vendor-provided current periodic inspection. If there is no current periodic inspection documentation, prior to use inspect using Attachment 9.5 and forward completed form to the Material Handling Program Coordinator.

(d) All deficiencies found are required to be corrected or use of the crane will have to be approved by a Qualified crane inspector.

(e) Signal person or Spotter should be used when transporting cranes on site to ensure thati mobile crane components do not interact with plant structures, equipment, or components including overhead power lines.

(f) Cranes positioned beneath energized power lines shall be electrically grounded per site grounding requirements.

(g) Cranes and heavy loads should follow approved transport routes to ensure that underground utilities are not damaged.

ATTACHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet I of 8

[1] Fork Truck Designations - there are eleven different designations of industrial trucks or tractors as follows:

D diesel powered units having minimum acceptable safeguard against inherent fire hazards.

DS diesel powered units provided with additional safeguards to the exhaust, fuel and electrical systems.

DY diesel powered units that have all the safeguards of the DS units and in addition do not have any electrical equipment including the ignition and are equipped with temperature limitation features.

E electrically powered units that have minimum acceptable safeguards against inherent fire hazards.

ES electrically powered units that, in addition to all of the requirements for the E units, are provided with additional safeguards to the electrical system to prevent emission of hazardous sparks and to limit surface temperatures.

EE electrically powered units that have, in addition to all of the requirements for the E and ES units, the electric motors and all other electrical equipment completely enclosed.

EX electrically powered units that differ from the E, ES, or EE units in that the electrical fittings and equipment are so designed, constructed, and assembled that the units may be used in certain atmospheres containing flammable vapors or dusts.

G gasoline powered units having minimum acceptable safeguards against inherent fire hazards.

GS gasoline powered units that are provided with additional safeguards to the exhaust, fuel, and electrical systems.

LP unit is similar to the G unit except that liquefied petroleum gas is used for fuel instead of gasoline.

LPS liquefied petroleum gas powered units that are provided with additional safeguards to the exhaust, fuel, and electrical system.

ATAHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 2 of 8

[2] Powered Industrial Trucks NOTE This section contains requirements for the use of fork trucks, tractors, platform lift trucks, motorized hand trucks, and other specialized industrial trucks powered by electric motors or internal combustion engines. This section does not apply to compressed air or nonflammable compressed gas-operated industrial trucks, or to farm vehicles, or to vehicles intended primarily for earth moving or over-the-road hauling.

(a) All new powered industrial trucks acquired and used by an employer shall meet the design and construction requirements for powered industrial trucks established in the "American National Standard for Powered Industrial Trucks, Part II,ASME B56.1-1969",

which is incorporated by reference as specified in Sec. 29CFR1910.6.

(b) Approved trucks shall bear a label or some other identifying mark indicating approval by the testing laboratory. See step 4.4 and paragraph 405 of "American National Standard for Powered Industrial Trucks, Part II,ASME B56.1-1969", which is incorporated by reference in step (a) of this section and which provides that if the powered industrial truck is accepted by a nationally recognized testing laboratory it should be so marked.

(c) Modifications and additions which affect capacity and safe operation shall not be performed by the customer or user without manufacturer's prior written approval.

Capacity, operation, and maintenance instruction plates, tags, or decals shall be changed accordingly.

(d) Ifthe truck is equipped with front-end attachments, other than factory installed attachments, the truck shall be marked to identify the attachments and show the approximate weight of the truck and attachment combination at maximum elevation with load laterally centered.

(e) Loading/Unloading trucks and railroad cars (1) The brakes of highway trucks shall be set and wheel chocks placed under the rear wheels to prevent the trucks from rolling while they are boarded with powered industrial trucks.

(2) Wheel stops or other recognized positive protection shall be provided to prevent railroad cars from moving during loading or unloading operations

E

-- n fergy NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 nter* MANAGEMENT PAGE 730F85

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Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 3 of 8 (3) Fixed jacks may be necessary to support a semi-trailer and prevent upending during the loading or unloading when the trailer is not coupled to a tractor.

(4) Positive protection shall be provided to prevent railroad cars from being moved while dock-boards or bridge plates are in position.

(f) Designated locations for Powered Industrial Trucks (1) The industrial trucks specified under Attachment 9.3 are the minimum types required. But industrial trucks having greater safeguards may be used if desired.

[3] Forklift Safety Precautions NOTE:

Equipment/vehicles or loads being moved from one location to another that are NOT >_15ft. tall and/or a JSHA has been documented for the specified work DO NOT require the use of Attachment 9.16 Equipment Movement Checklist.

(a) Only qualified individuals with documented training shall be authorized to operate forklifts as per OSHA 29 CFR 1910.178. Operators must be trained and qualified on the type/class of forklift they are to operate.

(b) Only approved industrial trucks shall be used in hazardous locations.

(c) When engaging wooden pallets with a fork lift, the length of the fork shall be taken in consideration to insure sufficient fork length is in contact with the load to adequately support the material prior to lifting.

(d) Forklifts shall be inspected prior to the initial daily/shiftily use, using the checklist in Attachment 9.11.

(e) An overhead guard shall be used as protection against falling objects.

NUCLEAR A QUALITY RELATED 1 nt MANAGEMENT PAGE 74 OF 85

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Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 4 of 8 (f) Any power-operated industrial truck not in safe operating condition shall be removed from service. All repairs shall be made by authorized personnel.

(g) Proper identification and warning signs shall be posted in the area where the batteries of the electric forklifts are being charged.

(h) Unbalanced or top heavy loads are required to be tied to the mast of forklifts during transportation. CR-RBS-2010-5286.

[4] Rules for Operating a Powered Industrial Truck NOTE:

Equipment/vehicles or loads being moved from one location to another that are NOT >_15ft. tall and/or a JSHA has been documented for the specified work DO NOT require the use of Attachment 9.16 Equipment Movement Checklist.

(a) Stunt driving and horseplay shall not be permitted.

(b) Operators must not engage in racing or other activity involving high speeds with forklifts.

(c) Arms or legs are prohibited from being placed between the uprights of the mast or outside the running lines of the truck.

(d) Riding on forklift trucks shall be restricted to the driver only.

(e) Drivers shall ensure that individuals are not allowed to stand or pass under the elevated portion of any truck, whether loaded or empty.

(f) A forklift shall not be used as a personnel elevator, except where approved man baskets are used.

(g) Trucks shall not be driven up to anyone standing in front of a bench or other fixed object.

(h) All traffic regulations shall be observed, including authorized site speed limits.

NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED 1 Entr MANAGEMENT PAGE 75OF85 REFERENCE USE

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Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 5 of 8 (i) Under all travel conditions the truck shall be operated at a speed that will permit it to be brought to a stop in a safe manner.

(j) While negotiating turns, speed shall be reduced to a safe level.

(k) A safe distance shall be maintained approximately three truck lengths from the truck ahead, and the truck shall be kept under control at all times.

(I) Fire aisles, access to stairways, and fire equipment shall be kept clear.

(m) The right of way shall be yielded in emergency situations.

(n) Running over loose objects shall be avoided.

(o) Railroad tracks shall be crossed diagonally wherever possible.

(p) Parking closer than 8 feet from the center of railroad tracks is prohibited.

(q) Dock-board or bridge-plates shall be properly secured before they are driven over.

(r) Dock-board or bridge-plates shall be driven over carefully and slowly and their rated capacity never exceeded.

(s) Spotter(s) must be used if the drivers view is obstructed or has potential to be come obstructed while moving loaded or unloaded.

[5] Forklift Operations NOTE:

Equipment/vehicles or loads being moved from one location to another that are NOT >15ft. tall and/or a JSHA has been documented for the specified work DO NOT require the use of Attachment 9.16 Equipment Movement Checklist.

(a) Operators should be aware of the weight of a load and the rated capacity of the forklift they are operating. Do not attempt to exceed the capacity of your forklift by carrying loads that are too heavy or unbalanced.

(b) Free rigging (the direct attachment of rigging onto the forks of a forklift for a "below the forks" lift) is not allowed without written approval from the forklift manufacturer or analysis and approval (in writing) by a qualified, registered professional engineer. Free rigging is considered a modification or an addition which could affect the capacity and safe operation of the forklift.

' NUCLEAR QUATYEN-MA-119 REV. 16 Eneg MANAGEMENT PAGE 76 OF 85 REFERENCE USE MANUAL _

Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 6 of 8 (c) Only forklift attachments (fork extensions or accessories) that are approved by the forklift manufacturer or by a qualified registered professional engineer (in writing) may be used. A forklift operating with an attachment shall be considered as partially loaded when not handling a load.

(d) Loading (1) "Point loading" should only be used for positioning a load prior to actually lifting.

(2) Only stable or safely arranged loads should be handled. Caution shall be exercised when handling off-center loads which cannot be centered.

(3) Only loads within the rated capacity of the truck shall be handled.

(4) Trucks equipped with attachments shall be operated as partially loaded trucks when not handling a load.

(e) Never lift a load with a forklift using only one fork without an engineering analysis.

(f) There shall be sufficient headroom under overhead installations, lights, pipes, sprinkler system, etc.

(g) When traveling, watch for low entrances and overhead obstructions or structures (i.e.,

sprinkler systems, electrical conduits, etc.).

(h) Loads shall not be carried in an elevated position. When in travel, the forks will be held at a level as low as practical from the floor to clear floor and yard obstructions with the mast tilted back (as applicable/practical) to prevent the load from sliding off the forks.

(i) Operators shall avoid sudden starts and stops and must wear seat belts (if the forklift is so equipped) while the forklift is in operation.

(j) A safe distance shall be maintained from the edge of ramps or platforms while on any elevated dock, or platform or freight car. Trucks shall not be used for opening or closing freight doors.

-A'* EFNUCLEAR QUALTY RELATED EN-MA-119 REV. 16 En fergyy_

__ MANAGEMENT PAGE 77 OF 85 REFERENCE USE MANUAL Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 7 of 8 (k) The driver shall be required to slow down and sound the horn at cross aisles, intersections, blind corners, and other locations where vision is obstructed. If the load being carried obstructs forward view, the driver shall be required to travel with the load trailing.

(I) Operators should face their destination. If unable to see over the load, the truck should be driven backwards.

(m) Grades shall be ascended or descended slowly.

(n) When ascending or descending grades in excess of 10 percent, the loaded forklift should be driven with the load upgrade.

(o) On all grades the load and load engaging means shall be tilted back if applicable, and raised only as far as necessary to clear the road surface.

(p) Forklifts when used during loading and unloading operations requiring physical access inside vans, trucks, etc., require special precautions. Never perform the loading/unloading operation until the wheels of the van, truck, etc. are chocked. In addition, the transport vehicle should be checked for safe parking (i.e., motor turned off, in gear, and brakes set "on").

(q) Brakes shall be set and wheel blocks shall be in place to prevent movement of trucks, trailers, or railroad cars while loading or unloading. Fixed jacks may be necessary to support a semi-trailer during loading or unloading when the trailer is not coupled to a tractor. The flooring of trucks, trailers, and railroad cars shall be checked for breaks and weakness before they are driven onto.

(r) Face the load squarely and enter pallets with forks level. A Spotter MUST be used to assist in placing or lifting loads when stacking or setting a load cannot be "seen over".

(s) Prior to entering elevators with Forklift, verify the elevator will support the weight of the Forklift and Load. Elevators shall be approached slowly, and then entered squarely after the elevator car is properly leveled. Once on the elevator, the controls shall be neutralized, power shut off, and the brakes set.

ATTACHMENT 9.13 CONDUCT OF POWERED INDUSTRIAL TRUCK OPERATIONS APPENDIX Sheet 8 of 8 (t) Motorized hand trucks must enter elevator or other confined areas with load end forward NOTE A powered industrial truck is unattended when the operator is 25 ft. or more away from the vehicle which remains in his view or whenever the operator leaves the vehicle and it is not in his view.

(u) When a powered industrial truck is left unattended, load engaging means shall be fully lowered, controls shall be neutralized, power shall be shut off, and brakes set. Wheels shall be blocked ifthe truck is parked on an incline.

(v) When the operator of an industrial truck is dismounted and within 25 ft. of the truck still in his view, the load engaging means shall be fully lowered, controls neutralized, and the brakes set to prevent movement.

(w) Park the forklift with forks on the ground, brakes set, and engine off before you walk away from it. Never park the forklift in an aisle or doorway or obstruct materials or equipment. If parked on an incline, wheel chocks should be used.

L nfter (7 T MANAGEMENT NUCLEAR QUAUTY RELATED R

EN-MA-119 I PAGE 79OF85 REV.16 I REFERENCE USE MANUAL I I I Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.14 PERSONNEL LIFTING APPENDIX Sheet I of 2 PERSONNEL LIFTING

[1] The use of a crane to hoist employees on personnel platforms is prohibited except when the erection, use and dismantling of conventional means of reaching the worksite, such as a personnel hoist, ladder, stairway, work platform or scaffold would be more hazardous or is not possible because of structural design or worksite conditions. (Ref. OSHA 1926.550 paragraph G)

[2] A documented pre-job brief is required to be performed with the crane Operator, signal person, Person-In-Charge (PIC) and the employee(s) being lifted prior to the beginning of the task.

Document the pre-job brief in the Work Order package or file with the Industrial Safety Department.

[3] Verify the annual rigging inspection is current for the personnel basket. The inspection shall include any fixed rigging attachments or bridles contained on the basket.

[4] A trial lift is required to be performed prior to lifting personnel:

(a) Load the personnel platform to a weight 2 times the maximum intended load. Travel the personnel platform to each location that work is to be performed from the platform.

(b) Just prior to hoisting personnel, lift the platform to a suspended position for at least 5 minutes and inspect the rigging for deficiencies.

[5] Personnel platforms may only be used to lift personnel and not for other purposes such as handling materials.

[6] All materials and tools for use during a personnel lift are required to be secured to prevent dropping.

[7] It is important to evenly distribute materials and tools for use during personnel lift to prevent an unbalanced load.

[8] Employees should keep all parts of the body inside the platform during hoisting and positioning of the platform.

[9] The personnel platform should be tied off or secured when entering or exiting a suspended platform.

[10] Tag lines are required unless their use creates an unsafe condition.

ATTACHMEI NT9.14 PERSONNEL LIFTING APPENDIX Sheet 2 of 2

[11] Fall protection is required for personnel working from the platform. The lanyard(s) for the fall protection should be connected to the load block or to a structural member of the platform capable of supporting a fall impact.

[12] Hoisting of the personnel platform is required to be performed in a slow, cautious manner.

PERSONNEL LIFTING EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS

[1] Personnel Platform Crane Rigging Requirements (a) Load and boom hoist drum brakes, swing brakes, and locking devices such as pawls or dogs shall be engaged when the occupied personnel platform is in a stationary working position.

(b) The hoist rope drum shall have a system or device on the power train, other than the load hoist brake, which regulates the lowering rate of speed of the hoist mechanism.

Free fall is prohibited.

(c) Cranes equipped with outriggers shall have them all fully deployed following the crane manufacturer's specifications. The crane should be level and located on firm footing.

(d) The use of cranes that have live booms (booms in which lowering is controlled by a brake without the aid from other devices which slow the lowering speeds) is prohibited.

(e) Cranes and derricks with variable angle booms are required to be equipped with a boom angle indicator.

S(f) Cranes with telescoping booms are required to be equipped with a device that indicates to the Operator the boom's extended length or an accurate determination of the load radius to be used during the lift shall be made prior to lifting personnel.

(g) The crane is required to be equipped with a device that prevents two-blocking the hook load block.

ATTACHMENT 9.15 NON-SUSPENDED LOADS APPENDIX Sheet I of 2 CART USE I NON-SUSPENDED LOAD MATERIAL HANDLING CHECKLIST YES NO NIA

1. Perform a pre job brief prior to moving equipment P
a. Ensure the pre-job brief included a review of industry operating experience specific to material handling 11 El El
b. Equipment or item to be moved.
2. Ensure the weight is clearly marked or known on the equipment being moved (required for items greater then 100#) El El El
a. If weight of the load is in doubt ensure a load monitoring device is used (eg..dynamometer) or perform calculation. If guidance is still needed contact engineering for assistance.
b. Document weight of the load here 3 Is the Center of Gravity known or easily identified? El n El
  • a Is the Center of Gravity more then 3-feet above the base? El El El
  • b Could moving this load potentially injure personnel if moved incorrectly? ] Ell El
c. If "yes", A JSHA (per EN-IS-124) should be prepared and approved prior to transporting the load. E] El El
4. Ensure the cart, dolly, or pallet jack is rated to support the load and is properly marked for the rated load capacity El l l
a. Document rated load capacity of cart, dolly, or pallet jack used here 5 Ensure the cart, dolly, or pallet jack has been inspected prior to use to ensure there are no defects that would prevent safe operation: El El El
  • a Are there any cracked welds? Ell 1l
  • b Are there missing bolts/nuts? 0 El[
  • c Any poorly inflated tires or damage to the wheels? El El El

ATTACHMEI 2T9.15 NON-SUSPENDED LOADS APPENDIX Sheet 2 of 2 CART USE I NON-SUSPENDED LOAD MATERIAL HANDLING CHECKLIST YES NO NIA

6. Are the item(s) being moved Radiological Protection Equipment? (eg-radiation protection tool monitors, frisker caves, etc.) [1 12
  • a If "yes", refer to EN-RP-308 for guidance 12 12
7. Prior to moving the equipment:
a. Ensure all personnel moving equipment understand the Load Path
b. Ensure the Load Path has been walked down for obstructions, interferences uneven surfaces, ramps, holes, carpets/mats, etc. prior to moving equipment
c. Ensure the center of gravity of the load is located over the center of the cart. E1 0 1
d. Ensure the load is inspected for any sharp corners that require padding or rigging softeners
e. If necessary ensure the area is blocked off with proper signage to prevent people from walking through or interfering with the movement of equipment. 12 12 12
f. Ensure the load is secured to the cart. [] 12 12
8. SPOTTER El
a. When traveling with a load will vision be impaired at any time? 12 12
b. If "yes", a spotter IS required. 12 9 Are there any special PPE requirements? E1 E 01
  • If answer is "YES" to any of the questions marked with an asterisk (*) Contact your supervisor to discuss.

ATTACHME NT 9.16 EQUIPMENT MOVEMENT CHECKLIST APPENDIX Sheet 1 of I This checklist is to be installed in any equipment /vehicle with the ability to raise > 15ft. tall and be utilized when any equipment/vehicle is traveling from one location to another when any part of the equipment/vehicle or load being moved is > 15ft. tall. This checklist is to be completed daily or prior to movement of the equipment/vehicle (if required) or when work scope has changed requiring its use. If a JSHA has been documented covering the movement of specified equipment/vehicle or load from one location to another then the use of Attachment 9.16 is not required. (CR-RBS-2010-1153) Attachment 9.18 Equipment Signage Appendix is optional and may be used on Entergy and/or Rental equipment that requires attachment 9.16.

NOTE Manlifts are not applicable to the requirements of Attachment 9.16, Equipment Movement Checklist.

Requirements:

" A pre-job brief is required for movement from one location to another.

" Use of a "Job Site Review" card is required and will require a walk down of the travel path to identify all hazards, including overhead hazards.

  • The "EQUIPMENT / OPERATOR SPOTTER CHECKLIST" (att. 9.17) will be used to provide specific guidance to Operating personnel on the actions necessary prior to operating any applicable equipment onsite.

" When moving mobile equipment onsite, a spotter shall walk with the equipment from beginning to end of travel identifying any and all hazards to the Operator.

NOTE A spotter is always required when moving cranes on site (EN-MA-1 19).

  • Spotters shall wear designated clothing identifying them as performing spotter duties.

(determined in pre job brief)

  • The spotter shall maintain continuous contact/communications with the equipment operator by means of hand signals, two-way radios, or audible warning devices (e.g., air horns).

Equipment Operator Signature

ATTACHME NTf.1 EQuiPMENT OPERATORIS POTTER CHECKLIST APPENDIX El 9.17 Sheet I ofNT EQUIPMENT OPERATORISPOTTER CHECKLIST APPENDIX 1.) Ensure and strictly adhere to the guidelines and restrictions in the equipment operation manual. Additionally adhere to the equipment load chart for pick and carry operation.

2.) When traveling, any extendable portion of the vehicle (e.g. booms, beds, etc.) shall be completely retracted and lowered to the travel position unless approved via a JSHA.

3.) The Spotter will participate in the Equipment Operator pre-job brief and job site review.

Discuss the suitability of the proposed route and determine if any width, height or overhead obstructions or hazards exist.

4.) Spotters and Equipment Operators shall review and comply with EN-MA-1 19 requirements.

5.) Ensure air brakes are at operating pressure levels before movement.

6.) Drive carefully and adhere to all speed requirements.

7.) When machine is parked on a grade ensure parking brake is applied and wheels are chocked or one outrigger is in the down position if chocks are unavailable or impractical.

8.) Establish stop criteria for a new Brief and Job Site Review that considers changing route, new hazards identified, or other change in job scope

" J NUCLEAR MANAGEMENT QUALITY RELATED EN-MA-119 PAGE 85 OF 85 REV. 16

______ j MANALREFERENCE MANUAL j_ _

USE

_

Material Handling Program ATTACHMENT 9.18 EQUIPMENT SIGNAGE APPENDIX Sheet I of I NOTE The below signage is optional and may be used on Entergy and/or rental equipment that requires attachment 9.16 "Equipment Movement Checklist". This signage may be placed on magnetic backings for ease of movement from rental equipment.

Prior to operation of this equipment the requirements of EN-MA-1 19, Material Handling Program must be adhered to:

1. Operator must be qualified in Plateau
2. EN-MA-119 Att. 9.16 "Equipment Movement Checklist" must be completed.

SAFW TI VMS TO ULIV WVT

1. WATCH FOR OVERHEAD POWER LAWIN AND LOW SUCTUqtRUS.

S. AWARES Or VOUR SUIRDIUNDIN@1.

3. KNOW LOAD CAPACITY OP ThE MACMINE.
4. ALWAYS SECURE ANY LOAD* T*AI COULD SUP ON RNOLL MROM FORKS.

DRIVE

9. SAFIELY.

E aS.SArE SMART.

Entergy CONDITION REPORT CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Originator: Jackson,Peter Micheal Originator Phone: 5478 Originator Group: Operations Mgmt U2 ANO Operability Required: Y Reportability Required: Y Supervisor Name: Horton,Jeffrey S Discovered Date: 03/31/2013 07:50 Initiated Date: 03/31/2013 09:15 Condition

Description:

At 0750 on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit I Main Turbine Generator Stator (-500 tons), the Unit I Turbine Temporary Lift Device failed. The #1 and #2 EDG has started and are supplying A-3 4160V Switchgear and A-4 4160V Switchgear. P-4A Service Water pump and P-4C Service Water pump has been verified running. Unit I has entered 1202.007 Degraded Power, 1203.028 Loss of Decay Heat, and 1203.050 Spent Fuel Emergencies. Unit I is in MODE 6.

Entered TS 3.8.2 A.2 One Required Offsite Circuit inoperable. All required actions are complete.

The event caused a loss of Decay Heat Removal on Unit I which was restored in 3 minutes and 50 seconds.

Unit 2 Tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water was initiated on Unit 2 and Unit 2 is in 3.0.3 from 0817 to 0848 due to Emergency Feedwater. Unit 2 is being powered by off-site.

(CA&A has changed the Condition Description of this CR per attached email from CR originator located in this Admin Tab)

Immediate Action

Description:

Suggested Action

Description:

REFERENCE ITEMS:

Type Code Description CARB MEETING DATE 07/032013 CARB-ACCEPT 070313 CONDITION REPORT C-2013-0895 CONDITION REPORT 1-2013-0842 CONDITION REPORT 1-2013-1029 CONDITION REPORT 1-2013-1062 EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW LO-ANO-2013-0004, CA-7 and CA-8 TRENDING (For Reference Purposes Only):

Trend Type Trend Code KEYWORDS KW-EVENT EQ ESPE REPORT WEIGHT I KEYWORDS KW-CRANE INPO BINNING ERI HEP FACTOR E GRADE CARB RCE 22.5 CAUSAL FACTOR OP3A CAUSAL FACTOR OP2K DnA

+ý -41"&W - . --

Entergy CONDITION REPORT ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 TRENDING (For. Rarwns. P.Rp... Only Trend Type Trend Code NSC-NRC HA(C)

CAUSAL FACTOR MTIJ CAUSAL FACTOR DCIC Attachments:

Condition Description Email from CR Originator Summary Description Email from CR Originator Summary Description Original Admin Tab Cond Description Remarks Description CA-3 Original Remarks Description CA-2 Original Version

Entergy ADMIN CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Initiated Date: 3/31/2013 9:15 Owner Group : Eng Project Mgmt ANO Current Contact:

Current Significance: A Closed by:

Summary

Description:

At 0750 on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit I Main Turbine Generator Stator (-500 tons), the Unit I Turbine Temporary Lift Device failed. The #1 and #2 EDG has started and are supplying A-3 4160V Switchgear and A-4 4160V Switchgear. P-4A Service Water pump and P-4C Service Water pump has been verified running. Unit I has entered 1202.007 Degraded Power, 1203.028 Loss of Decay Heat, and 1203.050 Spent Fuel Emergencies. Unit I is in MODE 6.

Entered TS 3.8.2 A.2 One Required Offsite Circuit inoperable. All required actions are complete.

The event caused a loss of Decay Heal Removal on Unit I which was restored in 3 minutes and 50 seconds.

Unit 2 Tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water was initiated on Unit 2 and Unit 2 is in 3.0.3 from 0817 to 0848 due to Emergency Feedwater. Unit 2 is being powered by off-site.

(CA&A has changed the Condition Description of this CR per attached email from CR originator located in this Admin Tab)

Remarks

Description:

CA&A has changed the Condition Description of this CR per attached email from CR originator located in this Admin Tab. clh 04/01/13.

Multiple CAs have been revised including initial due dates based on the unique nature of the evaluation needed to support this CR. See attached original CAs. JRE. 04/04/13 Assignments from and to within Corrective Actions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and I1 changed from Eng Project Mgnt - Bauman to NSA Director - James at the direction of CRG on 04/15/13. Changes made and new workflow generated by JRE 04/16/13 Changed CA-19, 20, & 25 Assigned By Group per Imcc. Im 7/23/13 Closure

Description:

Attachment Header Document Name:

untitled Document Location ICondition Description Attach Title:

ýrmail from CR Originator

HUBBARD, CHRIS L From: JACKSON, PETER M Sent: Monday, April 01, 2013 12:33 PM To: HUBBARD, CHRIS L

Subject:

need modification to condition description of CR-C-13-888 I decided to send the info to you; CR-ANO-C-2013-888 needs the following modification to the condition description:

Present text for the first sentence:

The Unit 1 Turbine Building Orane failed at 0750 on 3/31/2013.

Required modifications:

At 0750 on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Generator Sator (-500 tons), the Unit 1 Turbine Temporary Uft Device failed.

Thiswill clarify the correct information. Rease email thisto someone who can change it.

Peter From: HUBBARD, CHRIS L Sent: Monday, April 01, 2013 12:08 PM To: BEWLEY, JAMES Q Birge, Bizabeth; BLACKARD, EDWARD PAUL; BOND, VI NCENT S; BURTON, GARY T; BUTLER, PAUL WAYNE, CALLOWAY, JAMES D; DERANCI SOO, MI CHAEL L; EDGELL DOUGLAS W; FARMIER, MI CHAEL B; GARBE, CHARLES R- Gillespie, RIchard D; GRACE, LORI R GREESON, WILLIAM Q HATHOOTE, JOHN CHRISTIAN; HUBBARD, CHRIS L; HUGHES, DANNY , JACKSON, PETERM; KENNAMORE, KBTHA; KEYS, JAMES R(ANO); KNIGHT, REXA; MARTI N, DONNI E; MARVEL, STANLEY D (RRPM-ANO); MCCARTY, LARRY A&MCCOLLUM, LARRY K; MKENNEY, DANA D N; MILLARD, SARAH E; MILLER W LUAM D; MORRIS, SUBRENA; MYERS, LILLIAN; New, Kevin; OLIVER, JASON R OWEV*,

ELIZABETH A, Palmer, Charles; PERKINS, DARRELL L; PHI LLI PS, DONALD R RUSSELL, KYLE K; Shurter, Tony; Stahl, Michael L; STARKEY, ROBERT G; STEPHENSON, GREGORY C; Stroud, L. Shane; SULLINS, GARY V; WARDLAW, ROGER W; WOODSON, TI MOTHY R

Subject:

CR Screening will be in the Common Area in TSB-2 at 1:00 pm.

All, The Video Conference Room will be occupied for the next several days so CR Screening will be held in the common area in the T1 -2nd Floor at our regular time of 1:00 pm.

Thanks Chris 1

Attachment Header Document Name:

untitled Document Location ISummary Description Attach Title:

Email from CR Originator

HUBBARD, CHRIS L From: JACKSON, PETER M Sent: Monday, April 01,2013 12:33 PM To: HUBBARD, CHRIS L

Subject:

need modification to condition description of CR-C-13-888 I decided to send the info to you; CR-ANO-C-2013-888 needs the following modification to the condition description:

Present text for the first sentence:

The Unit 1 Turbine Building Crane failed at 0750 on 3/31/2013.

Required modifications:

At 0750 on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Generator qator (-,500tons), the Unit 1 Turbine Temporary Uft Device failed.

Thiswill clarify the correct information. Rease email thisto someone who can change it.

Peter From: HUBBARD, CHRI S L Sent: Monday, April 01, 2013 12:08 PM To: BEWLEY, JAMES 0, Birge, Elizabeth; BLACKARD, EDWARD PAUL; BOND, VINCENT S; BURTON, GARY T; BUTLER_

PAUL WAYNE; CALLOWAY, JAMES D; DEFRANCI SOO, MI CHAEL L; EDGELL, DOUGLAS W; FARMvER MI CHAE_B; GARBE.

CHARLES R Gillespie, Richard D; GRACE, LORI R GREESON, WILLIAM CQHATHCOTE, JOHN CHRISTIAN; HUBBARD, CHRI S L; HUGHES, DANNY Q JACKSON, PETER M; KENNAMORE, KBI TH A; KEYSý JAMES R (ANO); KNI GHT, REX A; MARTI N, DONNI E; MARVEL, STANLEY D (RMfl-ANO); MCCARTY, LARIY A; MCCOLLUM, LARRY K MaKENNEY, DAVID N; MILLARD, SARAH E; MILLER, WlLUAM D; MORRIS, SUBRENA MYERS, LILLIAN; New, Kevin; OLIVER, JASON R OWEN, ELI ZABETH A4 Palmer, Charles; PE] NS, DARIEL L; PHI LLI PS DONALD R RUSSELL, KYLE K Shurter, Tony; Stahl, Michael L; STARKEY, ROBERT G; STEPHENSON, CREGORY C, Stroud, L. Shane; SULLI NS, GARY V; WARDLAW, ROGER W; WOODSON, TI MOTHY R

Subject:

CR Screening will be in the Common Area in TSB-2 at 1:00 pm.

All, The Video Conference Rom will be occupied for the next several daysso CRSreeningwill be held in the common area in the "- 2 nd Roor at our regular time of 1:00 pm.
Thanks, Chris 1

Attachment Header Document Name:

Iuntitled Document Location JSummary Description Attach Title:

ýOiginal Admin Tab Cond Description

Entergy ADMIN CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Initiated Date: 3/31/2013 9:15 Owner Site and Group: ANO Eng P&C Mgmt ANO Current Contact:

Current Significance: A Closed by:

Summary

Description:

The Unit I Turbine Building Crane failed at 0750 on 3/31/2013. This caused a loss of all offsite power on Unit I. The #1 and #2 EDG has started and are supplying A-3 4160V Switchgear and A-4 4160V Switchgear. P-4A Service Water pump and P-4C Service Water pump has been verified running. Unit I has entered 1202.007 Degraded Power, 1203.028 Loss of Decay Heat, and 1203.050 Spent Fuel Emergencies. Unit I is in MODE 6.

Entered TS 3.8.2 A.2 One Required Offsite Circuit inoperable. All required actions are complete.

The event caused a loss of Decay Heat Removal on Unit I which was restored in 3 minutes and 50 seconds.

Unit 2 Tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water was initiated on Unit 2 and Unit 2 is in 3.0.3 from 0817 to 0848 due to Emergency Feedwater. Unit 2 is being powered by off-site.

Remarks

Description:

Closure

Description:

Attachment Header Document Name:

Pantitled Document Location lRemarks Description Attach Title:

ICA-3 Original

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 3 Site Group J Name Assigned By: ANO Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Assigned To: ANO Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:20:41 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 04/09/2013 Initial Due Date: 04/09/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Complete RCE Pre Job Brief with CA&A. Responsible Manager, CA&A, and the Evaluator will attend the pre-job brief Responsible Managers may lead the pre-job brief with CA&A in attendance.

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Attachment Header Document Name:

Fntltled Document Location IRemarks Description Attach Title:

KA-2 Original Version

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION 1CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 2 Site G roup ] Name Assigned By: ANO Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Assigned To: ANO Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IMfA use only** 4/2/2013 11:19:48 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 04/05/2013 Initial Due Date: 04/05/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint:. NONE CA

Description:

CRG Briefing -Develop a Problem Statement for the CR in accordance with procedure guidance. Present the Problem Statement and list of team members to the CRG for approval. The following actions should be completed as part of this CA

1. A qualified RCA Evaluator (and RCA Team Lead, if required) is assigned AND;
2. A qualified O&P Advocate is assigned AND;
3. Initial guidance and coaching for the root cause evaluator is obtained from CA&A AND;
4. Initial review of the event is conducted, including the RCA Evaluator and/or Team Lead, AND;
5. Actions to identify and commit needed resources have been completed listing team Members, AND;
6. RCA process milestone dates have been established.

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy OPERABILITY CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 OperabilityVersion: I Operability Code: INOPERABLE Immediate Report Code: REPORTABLE- 4 HOUR Performed By: Davenport,David E 04/01/2013 16:58 Approved By: Schacht,Marcus 0 04/02/2013 05:01 Operability

Description:

This condition report was written to document the catastrophic failure of a vendor supplied crane while moving the Unit I Main Generator Stator to the Train Bay. Unit specific operability descriptions are included below.

UNIT I -

Unit I was in Mode 6 for refueling outage IR24 with the Decay Heat Removal System in service. The RCS was open with fuel in the core with RCS level >400 feet. All offsite power was lost to Unit I during the event resulting in both EDGs starting and supplying both 4160 vital buses. The Decay Heat System was subsequently restarted within -4 minutes.

Technical Specification 3.8.2 (AC Sources - Shutdown) requires "One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class I E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, (Distribution Systems - Shutdown)". The required qualified source was rendered INOPERABLE by the described event. Technical Specification 3.9.4 (Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level) requires one DHR loop to be OPERABLE and in operation in Mode 6 with water level >23 fRabove the top of the irradiated fuel seated in the reactor

  • pressure vessel. The required DHR Loop was not in operation as required per Tech Specs from the LOOP until manually restarted. The DHR Loop was successfully placed back in service and remains OPERABLE following the event.

UNIT 2 -

Unit 2 was in Mode I at 100% when the failure occurred.

Unit 2 entered the following Tech. Specs. for the following reasons:

TS 3.8. 1.1 action a due to inoperability of SU#3 (S/U #3 Lockout as documented in CR-ANO-2-2013-00565).

TS 3.7.1.2 due to EFW discharge valve alignment. Valve alignment was directed by procedure to support AFW feed through the EFW header.

TS 3.0.3 due to overriding EFW to align AFW through the Emergency Feed Water header TS 3.4.1.2 due to loss of all RCPs when S/U #3 Lockout occurred.

Unit 2 was being powered by off-site initially until the S/U #3 Lockout at which point, 2H I, 2H2 and 2A2 de-energized, 2A I swapped to S/U #2 and #2 EDG started and supplied 2A4.

Therefore, S/U #3, EFW and Reactor Coolant Loops were Inoperable due to this condition.

Unit 2 Operability performed by Rex A. Knight.

COMMON -

P-6A and P-6B Firewater Pumps were secured when failure of a pipe in the Train Bay resulted in significant leakage and spray onto electrical equipment. Unit I entered TRM 3.7.8 Condition B and Unit 2 entered TRM 3.7.1 Action B 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Time Clocks for Two high pressure fire water pumps non-functional. CR-ANO-C-2013-00891. Both required Firewater pumps are NON-FUNCTIONAL relative to the stated condition.

This condition was immediately reportable due to the following Unit 2 conditions:

4 hr - I0CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS actuation 4 hr - IOCFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) Offsite Notification 8 hr - I0CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) EFAS Actuation The fatality that occurred due to this condition and it's associated reportability are documented in CR-ANO-C-2013-00895.

Approval Comments:

Unit I SM concurs. SJW

Entergy OPERABILITY CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Attachments:

Opperability Description unit 2, 9.2 Opperability Description Unit I EN-OP-104 Attachment 9,2

Attachment Header Document Name:

untitled Document Location Opperability Description Attach Title:

lunit 2, 9.2

ATTACHMENT 9.2 IMMEDIATE DETERMINATION FOR DEGRADED OR NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS Sheet 1 of 2 A. Condition Report Number: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 B. Operability Version: 1 C. Work Request Number(s): 00303759 for S/U #3

0. Applicable Technical Specifications: lG. SSC Identification: (system or equipment name and E. TS 3.8. 1.1, TS 3.7.1.2, TS 3.0.3,. number) S/U #3 (2X-03), EFVV (2P-7N/B), RCS Loops.

F. TS 3.4.1.2 H. Specified Functions (cut and paste or page references from TS Bases or CLB):

See Tech. Spec. Bases for Tech Specs 3.8.1.1, 3.7.1.2 and 3.4.1.2.

I.

References:

Bases for the following Tech Specs.: 3.8.1.1, 3.7.1.2, 3.4.1.2 J. Operational Conditions in which SSC Operability is required and for which Operability has been determined:

E01 02 03 Z4 05 6 E] Other (specify)__

El Other (specify)___

K. Copy the Condition Number(s) and Condition(s) from Attachment 9.1 that are applicable and describe the SSC specific Degraded or Nonconforming Condition and its effect on ability of the SSC to perform its Specified Functions:

[1] The SSC is unable to perform its safety functions specified by its design, within the required range of physical conditions, initiation times and Mission Times due to obvious failure, damage, malfunction, or operational configuration.

L. Description of the extent of condition. If extent of condition determination is not complete, then reference the CA number that will document the extent of condition. Include CR numbers for the similarly affected SSCs, if known: SU#2 Transformer has been determined to not be affected by this condition, 2A-9 bus associated with the Alternate A/C Generator was damaged due to this condition. That condition is documented and evaluated in CR-ANO-C-2013-890.

EN-OP-104, Rev. 006

29of2 IMMEDIATE DETERMINATION FOR DEGRADED OR NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS ATAHMENT Sheet 2 of 2 A. Operability Classification: E] OPERABLE-DNC 0 INOPERABLE E- OPERABLE-OP EVAL El INOPERABLE-OP EVAL B. Complete this step only if the SSC is determined to be OPERABLE-DNC or OPERABLE-OP EVAL.,

otherwise N/A. Document the basis for the Reasonable Expectation of Operability by providing a basis for each of the following statements:

There is a high level of confidence, based on currently known facts, that:

(1). The condition would NOT prevent the SSC from performing its Specified Function(s) in all conditions.

BASIS: Describe the effect of the condition on the SSC's ability to perform its Specified Functions.

(2). All aspects of Operability based on the site specific TS definition of Operability are met.

BASIS:

(3). None of the Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions in Attachment 9.1 Table 1 that require the SSC to be declared INOPERABLE are applicable.

BASIS:

(4). All support SSCs required for the SSC to perform its Specified Functions are capable of performing their support functions.

BASIS:

(5). The SSC is in its required operational configuration for Operability.

BASIS:

(6). The condition does NOT invalidate the last successful surveillance test(s) for the SSC AND the surveillance test(s), if performed, would meet all TS requirements.

BASIS:

(7). Existing Degraded or Nonconforming conditions for other SSCs do not affect the capability of this SSC to perform its Specified Safety Functions.

BASIS: Describe the other Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions considered and any effects.

(N/A if entered and approved in PCRS) Print/Sign/Date Prepared By:

Approved Shift Manager:

EN-OP-104, Rev. 006

Attachment Header Document Name:

lPntitled Document Location

ýOpperability Description Attach Title:

PUnit 1 EN-OP-104 Attachment 9.2

ATTACHMENT 9.2 IMMEDIATE DETERMINATION FOR DEGRADED OR NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS Sheet 1 of 2 A. Condition Report Number: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 B. Operability Version: 1 C. Work Request Number(s): N/A D. Applicable Technical Specifications: 3.8.2 E. SSC Identification: (system or equipment name and number) Required Offsite Power Sources F. Specified Functions (cut and paste or page references from TS Bases or CLB):

The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown"; and
b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10.

G.

References:

None H. Operational Conditions in which SSC Operability is required and for which Operability has been determined:

I-i1 E-02 E-13 0]4 El Other (specify)__

- Other (specify)_

1. Copy the Condition Number(s) and Condition(s) from Attachment 9.1 that are applicable and describe the SSC specific Degraded or Nonconforming Condition and its effect on ability of the SSC to perform its Specified Functions: [1] The SSC is unable to perform its safety functions specified by its design, within the required range of physical conditions, initiation times, and Mission Times due to obvious failure, damage, malfunction, or operational configuration.

J. Description of the extent of condition. If extent of condition determination is not complete, then reference the CA number that will document the extent of condition. Include CR numbers for the similarly affected SSCs, if known: One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, (Distribution Systems - Shutdown)". The required qualified source was rendered INOPERABLE by the described event.

EN-OP-104, Rev. 006

QUALITY RELATED ENT INFORMATIONAL USE I

Operability Determination Process I -II Operability Determination Process ATrACHMENT 9.2 IMMEDIATE DETERMINATION FOR DEGRADED OR NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS Sheet 2 of 2 A. Operability Classification: E] OPERABLE-DNC Z INOPERABLE El OPERABLE-OP EVAL E] INOPERABLE-OP EVAL B. Complete this step only if the SSC is determined to be OPERABLE-DNC or OPERABLE-OP EVAL.,

otherwise N/A. Document the basis for the Reasonable Expectation of Operability by providing a basis for each of the following statements:

There is a high level of confidence, based on currently known facts, that:

(1). The condition would NOT prevent the SSC from performing its Specified Function(s) in all conditions.

BASIS: Describe the effect of the condition on the SSC's ability to perform its Specified Functions.

(2). All aspects of Operability based on the site specific TS definition of Operability are met.

BASIS:

(3). None of the Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions in Attachment 9.1 Table 1 that require the SSC to be declared INOPERABLE are applicable.

BASIS:

(4). All support SSCs required for the SSC to perform its Specified Functions are capable of performing their support functions.

BASIS:

(5). The SSC is in its required operational configuration for Operability.

BASIS:

(6). The condition does NOT invalidate the last successful surveillance test(s) for the SSC AND the surveillance test(s), if performed, would meet all TS requirements.

BASIS:

(7). Existing Degraded or Nonconforming conditions for other SSCs do not affect the capability of this SSC to perform its Specified Safety Functions.

BASIS: Describe the other Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions considered and any effects.

(N/A if entered and approved in PCRS) Print/Sign/Date 1 Prepared Prepared By:

Approved Approved Shift Manager:

EN-OP-104, Rev. 006

Entergy A S SI G N M E N T S CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Version: I Significance Code: A Classification Code: RCA Owner Group: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Performed By: Hubbard,Chris L 04/02/2013 11:29 Assignment

Description:

Bauman: w/Fleet Learing Actions

Entergy I REPORTABILITY I CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Reportability Version: I Report Number:

Report Code: REPORTABLE Boilerplate Code: REPORTABLE - EQU Performed By : Coffman,Steven L 04/02/2013 10:33 Reportability

Description:

This condition was reported as:

IOCFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification due to the ES actuation on both Unit I and Unit 2 10CFRS0.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification due to RPS actuation on Unit 2.

10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(xi) 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> notification due to Government Notification.

29CFRI904.39a 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> notification due to death on site.

These notifications were performed at 1250 EDT on 03/31/2013.

A followup Licensee Event Report is due within 60 days, which will be Thursday, May 30, 2013.

LAR-2013-104 has been issued to track the LER submittal.

Attachments:

Reportability Description Form 361 - Revised

Attachment Header Document Name:

flied Document Location PReportability Descdption Attach Title:

Form 361 - Revised

PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 361 (12.2000) REACTOR RA T RP PLANT NTOPERATIONS U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CENTER EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN 48869 NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY -- 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469", BACKUPS - list] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694%

[2nd] 301-415-0550 and [3rd) 301-415-0553 *Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers.

NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

1250 EDT ANO 1/2 Robert Clark 479-858-4663 EVENT TIME &ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 0750 CDT 03/31/2013 Ul 0%MODE 6/ Ul 0% MODE 6/

1 U2 100% MODE1 U2 0% MODE 3 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS 1-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) El (v)(A) Safe S/D Capatullily AINA EJ GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC I] TS Devlation ADEV El (v)(B) RHR Capability AINS SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/MAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) [] (v)(C) Control of Red Release AINC ALERT ALE/AAEC [] (i) TS Required SID ASHU (v)(D) AccIdent Mitigation AIND UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC Ej (iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS ACCS (kll) Offsite Medical AMED z 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columns) (iv)(B) RPS Actuation (scram) ARPS U (xii) Loss Comm/Asmt/Resp ACOM PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD (x.) Offaite Noiito APRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)

MATERIALEXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) El Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV U FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

ZOTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (see tastcolumn) I] (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA 29CFR1904.39a 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Death NONR I] INFORMATION ONLY NNF Civ)(A) Specified System Actuation AESF NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (Continue on back)

At 0750 on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Generator Stator (-500 tons), the Unit 1 Turbine Temporary Lift Device failed. This caused a loss of all off site power on Unit 1. The ANO Unit 1 #1 and #2 EDG has started and are supplying A-3 4160V Switchgear and A-4 4160V Switchgear. P-4A Service Water pump and P-4C Service Water pump has been verified running. Unit 1 has entered 1202.007 Degraded Power, 1203.028 Loss of Decay Heat, and 1203.050 Spent Fuel Emergencies. Unit 1 is in MODE 6.

ANO-1 Entered TS 3.8.2 A One Required Offsite Circuit Inoperable. All required actions are complete.

The event caused a loss of Decay Heat Removal on ANO Unit I which was restored in 3 minutes and 50 seconds.

Unit 2 Tripped and is in MODE 3. Emergency Feed Water initiated on Unit 2.

Unit 2 was In TS 3.0.3 from 0817 to 0848 due to Emergency Feedwater being procedurally overridden.

Unit 2 was initially being powered from off-site.

Unit 2 Startup 3 Lock out occurred at 0921. 2A1 is now on Startup 2, and 2A4 Is on #2 EDG.

10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) 4 hr notification due to the ES actuation on both Unit I and Unit 2.

10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) 4 hr notification due to RPS actuation on Unit 2.

10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(xi) 4 hr notification due to Government Notification.

29CFR1 904.39a 8hr notification due to Death on site.

At 1033 on 3/31/2013, Unit 2 entered a Notification of Unusual Event based on EAL HU4 due to damage in 2A1 switchgear. Notification of the NUE will be made lAW Emergency Plan requirements.

Followup notifications will be made as appropriate.

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR IN YES (Explain above) El NO NRC RESIDENT [] I [] NOT UNDERSTOOD?

STATE [] []

E DID ALL SYSTEMS 9 YES E] NO (Explain above)

LOCAL [] [] [ FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?

OTHER GOV AGENCIES U U U MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE C] E] UNTIL CORRECTED: RESTART DATE: []YES ONO NRC FORM 361 (12-2000)

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE 2 OF 2 RADIOLOGICAL RELEASES: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS (specific details/explanationsshould be covered in event description)

Cl LIQUID RELEASE E]GASEOUS RELEASE 5 UNPLANNED RELEASE [] PLANNED RELEASE 5 ONGOING 5 TERMINATED

[ MONITORED L]UNMONITORED 5 OFFSITE RELEASE E] T. S. EXCEEDED 5 RMALARMS 5 AREAS EVACUATED 5 PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED 51 OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED IState release path in description Release Rate (CIl/sec)  % T. S. LIMIT HOO GUIDE Total Activity (CI)  % T. S. LIMIT HOO GUIDE Noble Gas 0.1 Ci/sec 1000 Ci Iodine l0 uCi/sec 0.01 Ci Particulate I uCi/sec I mCi Liquid (excluding tritium and 10 uci/min 0.1 Ci dissolved noble gases)

Liquid (tritium) 0.2 Ci/min 5 Ci Total Activity PLANT STACK CONDENSERIAIR EJECTOR MAIN STEAM LINE SG BLOWDOWN OTHER RAD MONITOR READINGS ALARM SETPOINTS

% T. S. LIMIT (if applicable)

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (specific detailslexplanationsshould be covered In event description)

LOCATION OF THE LEAK (e.g.. SG #. valve, pipe, etc.)

LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY . PRIMARY SECONDARY AND UNITS:

LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (Continued from front)

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: I Group Name Assigned By: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO Chisum,Michael R Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To :

Originated By: ZzANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:18:27 Performed By: James,Dale E 7/27/2013 12:26:55 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Chisum,Michael R 7/29/2013 12:03:50 Current Due Date: 07/31/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/31/2013 CA T~ype: DISP - RCA CA Priority: I Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

NOTE: Extension of this action beyond 30 days requires VP approval.

CARB required per the CRG. This CR is Category "A", Significant - As the Responsible Manager evaluate this Condition Report in accordance with the guidance provided in "EN- LI-102" and "EN-LI-I 18". Provide CA&A a copy of the Report for scheduling of CARB. The Responsible Manager presents the report to the CARB.

Complete the following:

I. Initiate and code all CAs, CAPRs as applicable, and ensure CA wording and due dates match the CARB approved report

2. Verify that all CARB comments are incorporated and the final approved version of the report is attached to this CA prior to closing this action unless, a new action is issued by CARB for comment incorporation.

Response

The CARB approved the revised version of the root cause report on 6/22/13 with minor comment to the corrective action.

section. Those comments were incorporated and all actions issued. The report is considered to be confidential and is being maintained outside the PCRS system. Contact CA&A if you have a legitimate need to review the document. All CAs were properly coded prior to finalizing the document.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Response acceptable.

Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00001 Version: I Approved: -

Requested Duedate: 06/05/2013 Previous Duedate: 04/26/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 04/24/2013 Approved By: Chisum,Michael R 04/25/2013 Request

Description:

The root cause has been delay due to access to physical evidence due to safe access concerns. Also due to potential litigation, access to certain key individuals involved with this event outside Entergy has been hampered. These delays were not unexpected for this type of event. This extension is acceptable given ANO will not be deploying a similar lift assembly in the near future. It is anticipated that corrective actions from this root cause will be in place before a lift assembly is used to install the refurbished stator. This extension request has been discussed and agreed to by the ANO VP Operations.

Approved

Description:

DDE Approved. M. Chisum GMPO

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00001 Version: 2 Approved: F/

Requested Duedate: 07/02/2013 Previous Duedate: 06/05/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 06/03/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 06/03/2013 Request

Description:

Additional time is required to obtain comments from corporate stakeholders before completing product. Lessons learned have been provided to Projects for incorporation into plans for the next stator lift. No additional actions are necessary prior to the new due date. This extension has been approved by the ANO VP of Operations.

Approved

Description:

Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00001 Version: 3 Approved: F' Requested Duedate: 07/17/2013 Previous Duedate: 07/02/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 06/28/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 06/29/2013 Request

Description:

The draft of the root cause was provided to the CARB members on 6/24/13 for their review as well as additional stakeholders. Based on the number of comments additional time is required to resolve these comments. Comments received to date have not changed the root or contributing causes. An extent of condition action has been issued to Projects requiring lessons learned from the root cause be factored into the design and plans for the lift of the refurbished stator prior to the lift.

Based on the actions taken to ensure lessons learned are factored into the lift of the refurbished stator it is acceptable to extend the due date. This extension has been approved by the site Vice President.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00001 Version: 4 Approved: -

Requested Duedate: 07/31/2013 Previous Duedate: 07/17/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 07/15/2013 Approved By: Browning,Jeremy G 07/16/2013 Request

Description:

The root cause report has been reviewed by CARB and approved with comment. Additional comments have been received by stakeholders that require the document to be brought back to CARB. The additional comment will not result in any further substantive corrective actions and are expanding CCI into an additional root cause and two contributing causes. This will provide more precise descriptions of the the issues surrounding the decision not to load test. Lessons learned were factored into the successful lift of the refurbished stator and there are no other lifts planned within the Entergy system in the near term; therefore, delays in completing the root cause will not have a detrimental impact. This revised schedule and the need for a due date extension has been approved by the ANO site Vice President.

Approved

Description:

concur

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 2 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To :

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:19:48 Performed By: James,Dale E 4/29/2013 16:05:28 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: James,Dale E 4/29/2013 16:28:16 Current Due Date: 05/01/2013 Initial Due Date: 05/01/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

CRG Briefing - Develop the evaluation and document approval plan and present that to CRG for approval.

Plan to include timeline through CARB approval and details of required resources.

Develop a Problem Statement for the CR in accordance with procedure guidance. Present the Problem Statement and list of team members to the CRG for approval. The following actions should be completed as part of this CA I. A qualified RCA Evaluator (and RCA Team Lead, if required) is assigned AND;

2. A qualified O&P Advocate is assigned AND;
3. Initial guidance and coaching for the root cause evaluator is obtained from CA&A AND;
4. Initial review of the event is conducted, including the RCA Evaluator and/or Team Lead, AND;
5. Actions to identify and commit needed resources have been completed listing team Members , AND;
6. RCA process milestone dates have been established.

Response

CRG Briefing - Develop the evaluation and document approval plan and present that to CRG for approval.

Plan to include timeline through CARB approval and details of required resources.

Develop a Problem Statement for the CR in accordance with procedure guidance. Present the Problem Statement and list of team members to the CRG for approval. The following actions should be completed as part of this CA

1. A qualified RCA Evaluator (and RCA Team Lead, if required) is assigned AND;
2. A qualified O&P Advocate is assigned AND;
3. Initial guidance and coaching for the root cause evaluator is obtained from CA&A AND;
4. Initial review of the event is conducted, including the RCA Evaluator and/or Team Lead, AND;
5. Actions to identify and commit needed resources have been completed listing team Members , AND;
6. RCA process milestone dates have been established

Response

Problem statement and team list is attached and was presented and approved by the CARB on 4/15/13.

The qualified RCA evaluator and O&P advocagte are shown on the attached team list.

Initial guidance and coaching for the root cause evaluator was provided by the ANO CA&A manager.

Initial review of the event was conducted and included the RCA evaluator and team members.

All required team members have been obtained.

The following milestone dates have been established:

Root Cause will be provided to CA&A on or before May 29, 2013 in prepartation for a CARB reveiw on or before June 12, 2012.

Subresponse:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Closure Comments:

Attachments:

Response Description Root Cause Team Response Description Problem Statement

Attachment Header Document Name:

Puntitled Document Location IResponse Description Attach Title:

jRoot Cause Team

Corporate Event Response Team I

I~

Ounsel l~soon~Team B llM Mike Siannon, QGTB Bent aguire

- ----

Q~roor~e

\iOperationsSipport II - - - -

I r I Unit 2 Restart FRview SeveVeroelli, (brp Director Unit 1 Restart FPview Future- TED Cause Team Members Team Members

  • R3 JAmes Nadeau OperationsFRp - Darrell Qorbin
  • CO&PAdvocate: Bob Schenberger Maintenance Pep - Swn Stewart SME-Wety: Mike Larranaga, PID, 3*JL Chemistry Pep- Daryl Marse EME-Sructural: JeffTravi* Exponent EngineeringFRp - Rck Burroni Projects Ban Gresh S:CRFp- Ernie Harkness Engineering: Milton Huff Slety: DebreTisdale 0brp: Doug Perry

=FRequired by ENq-U-118 April 11, 2013

Attachment Header Document Name:

kunitled Document Location Iesponse Description Attach Title:

problem Statement

CR-ANO-C-2013-0888 Root Cause Problem Statement for CRG Approval At 0750 on 3/31/2013, during movement of the Unit 1 Main Turbine Generator Stator (~500 tons),

Temporary Lift Device failed resulting in loss of life, loss of off-site power to Unit 1, structural damage to the Turbine Building and physical injuries

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00002 Version: 1 Approved: [/

Requested Duedate: 05/01/2013 Previous Duedate: 04/18/2013 Requested By: Eichenberger,John R 04/16/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 04/16/2013 Request

Description:

It is acceptable to extend this action because the details of this action have largely been completed with the remaining portions to be completed in the next few days. This delay in completion of the specific portions of this action will not adversely impact the completion of the evaluation of this issue within this condition report.

The action requires the following to take place:

Develop a Problem Statement for the CR in accordance with procedure guidance. (Completed)

Present the Problem Statement and list of team members to the CRG for approval: (Completed 04/15/13)

The following actions should be completed as part of this CA :

I. A qualified RCA Evaluator (and RCA Team Lead, if required) is assigned AND; (Completed)

2. A qualified O&P Advocate is assigned AND; (Completed)
3. Initial guidance and coaching for the root cause evaluator is obtained from CA&A AND; (Not complete - root cause evaluator arriving at ANO 04/17/13)
4. Initial review of the event is conducted, including the RCA Evaluator and/or Team Lead, AND; (Completed)
5. Actions to identify and commit needed resources have been completed listing team Members , AND; (Completed)
6. RCA process milestone dates have been established. (Not yet completed)

It is necessary to extend this action to allow sufficient time for completion of the initial coaching of the root cause evaluator by CA&A and to provide sufficient time for the Root Cause Team Leader to establish the process milestones for the team.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 3 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To :

Originated By: ZzANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:20:41 Performed By: Eichenberger,John R 4/23/2013 14:38:59 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Eichenberger,John R 4/23/2013 15:58:36 Current Due Date: 04/23/2013 Initial Due Date: 04/23/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Complete RCE Pre Job Brief with CA&A. Responsible Manager, CA&A, and the Evaluator will attend the pre-job brief.

Responsible Managers may lead the pre-job brief with CA&A in attendance.

Response

Prejob Brief for Root Cause evaluation conducted on April 23 with Dale James (responsible manager), Jim Nadeau (root cause evaluator) and Bob Eichenberge (CA&A Manager) in attendance.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

CA Closed at the direction of NSA Director.

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00003 Version: I Approved:Y Requested Duedate: 04/23/2013 Previous Duedate: 04/18/2013 Requested By: EichenbergerJohn R 04/17/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 04/17/2013 Request

Description:

It is acceptable to extend this action because the responsibilities of the Responsible Manager have been covered with the RM by the CA&A Manager therefore the initial expectations for the investigation portion of the root cause team's work has been made clear to the RM. Additionally it is acceptable to extend this action because the Root Cause Analyst is also a CA&A Manager from another station and is very well versed in the requirements of the Entergy Root Cause Process and expectations It is necessary to extend this action to allow time for the Root Cause Evaluator who just arrived on site today to get site check-in activities completed and to provide time for scheduled this briefing with the RM and the RCE now that both are on site.

Approved

Description:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 4 Group Name Assigned By: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO Chisum,Michael R Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To :

Originated By: ZzANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:21:47 Performed By: James,Dale E 7/27/2013 12:23:41 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Chisum,Michael R 7/29/2013 12:04:20 Current Due Date: 07/31/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/31/2013 CA Type: CARB REVIEW CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

CARB required per the CRG. The Responsible Manager presents Report to CARB.

1. Verify all Report identified CAs have been issued.
2. If RCE is approved with comment then ensure CA&A issues a comment incorporation action - OR - Verify that all CARB comments are incorporated, all CARB directed actions are issue, and the final approved version of the Report is attached to the disposition CA prior to closing this action. Contact CAA for assistance in attaching completed report to disposition CA if necessary.

Response

The CARB approved the revised version of the root cause report on 6/22/13 with minor comment to the corrective action section. Those comments were incorporated and all actions issued. The report is considered to be confidential and is being maintained outside the PCRS system. Contact CA&A if you have a legitimate need to review the document.

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Response Accedptable.

Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00004 Version: I Approved: F-e Requested Duedate: 06/05/2013 Previous Duedate: 04/26/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 04/24/2013 Approved By: Chisum,Michael R 04/25/2013 Request

Description:

The root cause has been delay due to access to physical evidence due to safe access concerns. Also due to potential litigation, access to certain key individuals involved with this event outside Entergy has been hampered. These delays were not unexpected for this type of event. This extension is acceptable given ANO will not be deploying a similar lift assembly in the near future. It is anticipated that corrective actions from this root cause will be in place before a lift assembly is used to install the refurbished stator.

Approved

Description:

DDE approved. MC

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00004 Version: 2 Approved: 17 Requested Duedate: 07/02/2013 Previous Duedate: 06/05/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 06/03/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 06/03/2013 Request

Description:

Additional time is required to obtain comments from corporate stakeholders before completing product. Lessons learned have been provided to Projects for incorporation of plans for the next stator lift. No additional action on necessary prior to the new due date. This extension has been approved by the ANO VP of Operations.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ]CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action; CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00004 Version: 3 Approved: Y/

Requested Duedate: 07/17/2013 Previous Duedate: 07/02/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 06/28/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 06/29/2013 Request

Description:

The draft of the root cause was provided to the CARB members on 6/24/13 for their review as well as additional stakeholders. Based on the number of comments additional time is required to resolve these comments. Comments received to date have not changed the root or contributing causes. An extent of condition action has been issued to Projects requiring lessons learned from the root cause be factored into the design and plans for the lift of the refurbished stator prior to the lift.

Based on the actions taken to ensure lessons learned are factored into the lift of the refurbished stator it is acceptable to extend the due date. This extension has been approved by the site Vice President.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00004 Version: 4 Approved: 5-*

Requested Duedate: 07/31/2013 Previous Duedate: 07/17/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 07/15/2013 Approved By: Browning,Jeremy G 07/16/2013 Request

Description:

The root cause report has been reviewed by CARB and approved with comment. Additional comments have been received by stakeholders that require the document to be brought back to CARB. The additional comment will not result in any further substantive corrective actions and are expanding CCI into an additional root cause and two contributing causes. This will provide more precise descriptions of the the issues surrounding the decision not to load test. Lessons learned were factored into the successful lift of the refurbished stator and there are no other lifts planned within the Entergy system in the near term; therefore, delays in completing the root cause will not have a detrimental impact. This revised schedule and the need for a due date extension has been approved by the ANO site Vice President.

Approved

Description:

concur

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 5 Group Name Assigned By: NSA CA&A Mgmt ANO Eichenberger,John R Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To :

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:23:14 Performed By: EichenbergerJohn R 4/24/2013 12:16:30 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Eichenberger,John R 4/24/2013 12:16:30 Current Due Date: 04/30/2013 Initial Due Date: 04/30/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Provide the draft of an OE, with the assistance of the Site OE Coordinator to the Site OE Coordinator for release to the industry.

The "OE Reporting" template can be found in EN-FAP-OE-001; Attachment 7.5 & 7.6 (you need both)

Response

Preliminary OE was reported as OE-ICES-305245 on April 2 2013 with input from and approval by the NSA Director / Root Cause Responsible Manager. This Corrective Action was completed with that input.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00a88 CA Number: 6 Group Name Assigned By: NSA CA&A Mgmt ANO Eichenberger,John R Assigned To: Operating Experience Mgmt HQN Ettlinger,Alan A Subassigned To: Operating Experience Staff HQN MillerWilliamn D Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:24:32 Performed By: EttlingerAlan A 4/16/2013 15:21:41 Subperformed By: Miller,William D 4/16/2013 15:17:10 Approved By:

Closed By: Ettlinger,Alan A 4/16/2013 15:21:41 Current Due Date: 05/10/2013 Initial Due Date: 05/10/2013 CA Type: INPO INITIAL OE SUB CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Site OE Notification - Unless justification exists to not issue an OE, the Site OE Coordinator will obtain final approval from the GMPO or designee, then issue an Operating Experience (OE) Report to the Nuclear Industry.

Response

see sub response.

Subresponse :

OE-ICES-305245 was posted to INPO web page on April 02, 2013 in response to this event as a preliminary OE. This OE was reviewed by the Manager, CA&A, NSA Director, Licensing Manager and OCC. Final approval of this OE was obtained from the GMPO, Vice President and Corporate Emergency response group prior to posting.

Closure Comments:

Attachments:

Subresponse Description Preliminary OE Document sent to INPO

Attachment Header Document Name:

unititled Document Location ISubresponse Description Attach Title:

preliminary OE Document sent to INPO

Title: Significant Industrial Accident at Arkansas Nuclear One Caused by Failed Turbine Stator Lifting Equipment Device.

Abstract:

On Sunday March 31, 2013 at 0750, a significant industrial accident occurred at Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO). The accident occurred as the Unit 1 (ANO-1) generator stator was being lifted for transport out of the turbine building as part of a maintenance evolution associated with the 1R24 refueling outage.

CAUSE: A lifting device designed for heavy lifts failed causing the stator to drop onto the turbine deck floor and then fall into the train bay below. The special lifting device collapsed onto the turbine deck.

CONSEQUENCE: This resulted in one fatality and multiple additional non-life threatening injuries as well as substantially damaging plant equipment.

==

Description:==

Damage to the ANO-1 turbine building resulted in the loss of offsite power feeds to both safety and non-safety related busses. Both ANO- 1 emergency diesel generators automatically started and provided power to the safety related busses. At the time of the event ANO-1 was in mode 6 refueling with the reactor vessel head removed and the refuel canal completely filled with Refueling equipment check outs were ongoing. All fuel was in the core and shutdown cooling was momentarily lost while the emergency diesel generator came up to speed, tied onto the safety busses and the operators manually started the spent fuel cooling pumps. There was no noticeable rise in the refuel canal temperatures during this event. Power was lost to spent fuel pool cooling but was reestablished within four minutes. Fire water piping was damaged resulting in water spraying in the area of the accident and onto electrical busses.

The fire water system was taken out of service to isolate the water spray. The portions of the fire water system that were damaged have been isolated and a portion of the fire water system is now available.

ANO-1 is in a stable condition with power continuing to be provided by both safety related emergency diesel generators. Core decay heat is being removed by decay heat removal. Plans are underway to reestablish offsite power through alternate means. Additional diesel generator capability is being brought on site as a contingency.

Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO-2) automatically tripped following the event due to the loss of two Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) with a normal post trip response by the plant. At 0923 ANO-2 lost its feed from offsite startup 3 transformer to one of two safety busses and one of its two non-safety related busses resulting in a loss of power to the remaining two running RCPs and the remaining operating circulating water pump. This placed ANO-2 into a natural circulation mode and cool down was commenced using atmospheric dump valves to remove core decay heat. One of the two ANO-2 emergency diesel generators automatically started on the loss of offsite power to the safety bus and provided power to that bus. The redundant safety bus remained powered from offsite power through the Startup 2 Transformer and the redundant emergency diesel generator remains in standby. All safety related equipment maintained operability throughout the event. A Notification of Unusual Event was declared

at 1033 on ANO-2 following observation of damage to the ANO-2 switchgear. The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 1821 on March 31, 2013. ANO-2 reached mode 4 at 2355 on March 31, 2013 and initiated shutdown cooling utilizing the shutdown cooling pumps at 0300 on April 1, 2013.

Both units remain in a stable condition. No offsite radiological releases occurred as a result of this event.

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 7 Group Name Assigned By: NSA CA&A Mgmt ANO Eichenberger,John R Assigned To: Operating Experience Staff HQN Miller,William D Subassigned To :

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:26:54 Performed By: Miller,William D 4/4/2013 07:57:07 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Miller,William D 4/4/2013 07:57:07 Current Due Date: 04/17/2013 Initial Due Date: 04/17/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

The CRG/CARB has designated this CR's Evaluation for Fleet Learning per Internal Fleet OE Initiation for Fleet Learning and has directed that it be processed as "Code A2 - Priority 2: Potential Impact" The CRG/CARB has designated this CR's Evaluation for Fleet Learning per EN-LI-102 Attachment 9.5 and has directed that it be processed as "Code A2 - Priority 2: Potential Impact" Site subject matter expert is David Bauman ; Responsible Manager is David Bauman.

Actions to be taken (by OE Coordinator)

1. Request an HQNLO to review this Fleet Learning
2. Initiate corrective actions under the HQNLO for the Responsible Manager to determine fleet vulnerability by either assigning CAs for site evaluations or performing evaluation without site inputs.
3. Initiate corrective action under the HQNLO for the Responsible Manager to perform closure review and determination of aggregate impact to the fleet.

Response

Actions to be taken (by OE Coordinator)

I. Request an HQNLO to review this Fleet Learning - HQNLO-2013-00018 has been Generated to track this Fleet Learning

2. Initiate corrective actions under the HQNLO for the Responsible Manager to determine fleet vulnerability by either assigning CAs for site evaluations or performing evaluation without site inputs. - HQNLO-2013-00018 CA#1 has been issued to identified Responcible Manager to perform this action
3. Initiate corrective action under the HQNLO for the Responsible Manager to perform closure review and determination of aggregate impact to the fleet. - HQNLO-2013-00018 CA#2 has been issued to identified Responcible Manager to perform this action Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 8 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To :

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/2/2013 11:39:49 Performed By: James,Dale E 7/8/2013 17:38:46 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: James,Dale E 7/8/2013 17:39:03 Current Due Date: 07/11/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/11/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Per the CRG, CR-ANO-C-2013-0895 was Administratively Closed to this CR. As Responsible Manager for this CR, ensure that the condition documented in that CR is appropriately addressed within the scope of this CR's Corrective Action Plan.

CR Condition Summary:

The Bigge Crane collapsed while moving the Unit I Generator Stator resulting in several injuries and one fatality.

Response

This CR was included in the evaluation and corrective actions associated with the root cause evaluaiton of the temporary lift system and stator drop event. The Root Cause document was approved with comment on 7/3/13.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00008 Version: I Approved:

Requested Duedate: 05/30/2013 Previous Duedate: 04/17/2013 Requested By: EichenbergerJohn R 04/16/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 04/16/2013 Request

Description:

This Corrective Action is acceptable to extend because the causal analysis is underway and the condition identified in C-2013-0895 has been included in the initial scoping of the causal analysis for C-2013-0888.

It is necessary to extend this action because the action plan for C-2013-0888 is under development and is not complete.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00008 Version: 2 Approved: 1_

Requested Duedate: 07/11/2013 Previous Duedate: 05/30/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 05/24/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 05/24/2013 Request

Description:

This CR has been included in the root cause evaluation. The root cause report has been delayed and is scheduled to be reviewed by the CARB in mid-June. This due date is established considering this schedule and contingency for delays.

Approved

Description:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 9 Group Name Assigned By: Operations Mgmt U2 ANO Horton,Jeffrey S Assigned To: Operations Mgmt U2 ANO Jackson,Peter Micheal Subassigned To:

Originated By: Jackson,Peter Micheal 4/2/2013 16:10:19 Performed By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/14/2013 09:25:37 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/14/2013 09:26:22 Current Due Date: 05/30/2013 Initial Due Date: 05/30/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

This Corrective Action is to list the location for the completed Post Transient Review associated with the reactor trip from this issue. In the response, document the document name and location of the completed Post Transient Review PDF. This PDF will be put onto eBREFLIB.

This CA was initiated from OP-1015.037 Step 7.9.2:

Initiate Post Transient Review using PCRS action [this will be documented with Post Transient Review report (1015.037-ATT-B) and Attachment T]

Response

This action has been transferred by the Corrective Actions and Assessments Manager to CR-ANO-2-2013-0583 CA-I l which was written to contain the Unit 2 Reactor Trip related documention in CAP. JRE 04/14/13 Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Closed by CA&A Manager.

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 10 Group Name Assigned By: Operations Mgmt U2 ANO Williams,Patrick J Assigned To: Operations Mgmt U2 ANO Hathcote,John Christian Subassigned To :

Originated By: Jackson,Peter Micheal 4/2/2013 16:15:53 Performed By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/14/2013 09:29:09 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/14/2013 09:29:45 Current Due Date: 05/30/2013 Initial Due Date: 05/30/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION. CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Perform a Transient Snapshot Assessment IAW EN-OP-I 17 Step 5.4 for the transient discussed in this CR.

This CA was initiated from OP-1015.037 Step 7.10:

Perform Transient Snapshot Assessment Documentation Form (Attachment 9.2) of Operations Assessments (EN-OP-I 17).

Response

This action has been transferred by the Corrective Actions and Assessments Manager to CR-ANO-2-2013-0583 CA-12 which was written to contain the Unit 2 Reactor Trip related documention in CAP. JRE 04/14/13 Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Closed by CA&A Manager.

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION TCR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: II Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To:

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/3/2013 11:34:52 Performed By: James,Dale E 7/8/2013 17:41:31 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: James,Dale E 7/8/2013 17:41:53 Current Due Date: 07/11/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/11/2013 CA7Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Per the CRG, CR-ANO-l-2013-0842 was Administratively Closed to this CR. As Responsible Manager for this CR, ensure that the condition documented in that CR is appropriately addressed within the scope of this CR's Corrective Action Plan.

CR Condition Summary:

Post crane failure inspection of site seismic monitor cabinet and stand alone sensors outside of the Auxiliary Building revealed the following:

  • C529 SEISMIC NETWORK CONTROL CENTER; no events and no errors (this condition is supported by no reported Control Room annunciation at 0.01g).
  • XR-8007 UI SPENT FUEL POOL PEAK ACCELEROGRAPH (stand alone sensor in Unit I Computer Room) local display indicates I event, peak values of X=9.7 mg, Y=17.6 mg, Z=38.2 mg
  • XR-8009 SW PMPS PEAK RECORDER (stand alone unit in Intake structure near Booster Fire Pump) local display indicates 0 events, peak values of X=930 mg, Y=989 mg, Z=997 mg, ERROR - RED LED pulsing once every 5 seconds. Error light indicates recorder warning flag is set and maintenance required. Likely cause is loss of AC and back up batlery is something less than 100%. Expected capacity supports 100 hours4.167 days <br />0.595 weeks <br />0.137 months <br /> of operation on battery power.

Response

This condition report was included in the evaluation and corrective actions associate with the root cause evaluating the temporary lift system failure and stator drop event. The Root Cause report was approved by CARB on 7/3/13 with comments.

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-0001I Version: 1 Approved: IZ Requested Duedate: 05/30/2013 Previous Duedate: 04/17/2013 Requested By: EichenbergerJohn R 04/16/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 04/16/2013 Request

Description:

This Corrective Action is acceptable to extend because the causal analysis is underway and the condition identified in C-2013-0842 is appropriate for conclusion in the action plan and causal analysis for C-2013-0888. Delays in correcting the condition identified in C-2013-0842 while analysis is underway in C-2013-0888 will have no adverse affects.

It is necessary to extend this action because the action plan for C-2013-0888 is under development and is not complete.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION [CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00011 Version: 2 Approved: F-1 Requested Duedate: 07/11/2013 Previous Duedate: 05/30/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 05/24/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 05/24/2013 Request

Description:

This condition report has been addressed in the draft root cause report. A due date extension is required to accommodate the new schedule for completion of the root cause report that has been delayed.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 12 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To:

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/19/2013 10:39:49 Performed By: James,Dale E 7/8/2013 17:59:42 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: James,Dale E 7/8/2013 18:00:08 Current Due Date: 07/17/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/17/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Per the CRG, CR-ANO-1-2013-1029 was Administratively Closed to this CR. As Responsible Manager for this CR, ensure that the condition documented in that CR is appropriately addressed within the scope of this CR's Corrective Action Plan.

CR Condition Summary:

During the NRC Augmented Inspection Team (AlT) Debrief (Reference NRC IR 2013-011) on April 11, 2013, the following potential Unresolved Item (URIs) was debriefed:

Additional inspection may be required for the NRC team to determine compliance with EN-MA- 119, Material Handling Program.

This Condition Report is being issued for administrative purposes to track the potential URIs identified during the AIT.

Response

This condition was included in the evaluation and corrective actions associated with the root cause evaluation of the temporary lift assembly failure. The Root Cause report was approved with comment by the CARB on 7/3/13.

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CA DUEKDATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00012 Version: I Approved: 1-0 Requested Duedate: 06/12/2013 Previous Duedate: 05/16/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 05/08/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 05/08/2013 Request

Description:

This issue will be addressed by the root cause team. Due to delays in accessing evidence and personnel related to the event the root cause evaluation has been delayed. The new due date corresponds with current projection for completing the root cause.

Approved

Description:

Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00012 Version: 2 Approved: I, Requested Duedate: 07/03/2013 Previous Duedate: 06/12/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 06/11/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 06/11/2013 Request

Description:

Due to extensive comment resolution it is necessary to extend the due dates associated with the root cause report. This is an administrative requirement only. Lessons learned from the root cause team have been incorporated into the lift plan for the refurbished stator so there is no safety issue with delaying this actions.

Approved

Description:

Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION lCR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00012 Version: 3 Approved: I-Requested Duedate: 07/17/2013 Previous Duedate: 07/03/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 06/28/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 06/29/2013 Request

Description:

The draft of the root cause was provided to the CARB members on 6/24/13 for their review as well as additional stakeholders. Based on the number of comments additional time is required to resolve these comments. Comments received to date have not changed the root or contributing causes. An extent of condition action has been issued to Projects requiring lessons learned from the root cause be factored into the design and plans for the lift of the refurbished stator prior to the lift.

Based on the actions taken to ensure lessons learned are factored into the lift of the refurbished stator it is acceptable to extend the due date. This extension has been approved by the site Vice President.

Approved

Description:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 13 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To:

Originated By: Zz ANO CRG **IHEA use only** 4/23/2013 10:21:22 Performed By: James,Dale E 7/1/2013 17:06:26 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: James,Dale E 7/1/2013 17:10:31 Current Due Date: 07/10/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/10/2013 CAType: GENERALACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Per the CRG, CR-ANO-1-2013-1062 was Administratively Closed to this CR. As Responsible Manager for this CR, ensure that the condition documented in that CR is appropriately addressed within the scope of this CR's Corrective Action Plan.

CR Condition Summary:

It would appear that additional hand rail removal on the 386' elevation of the turbine building around the train bay opening was required during the attempt to transfer the old stator to the transporter in the train bay. Maintenance support had been requested to remove two sections of hand rail under WO 00254087 ( Task14 for the south side and Task 15 for the Norht side hand rail ) during the preparation phase. The prescribed hand rails were removed and all of the WO steps completed. It would appear that the project personnel that removed the additional protion of hand rail did not have a Work Order to remove the additional portion of hand rail.

Response

Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2013-1062 was Administratively Closed to CR-ANO-C-2013-0888 CA-13. Following a review of the referenced work order it was determined by the root causse team that this condition had no bearing on the event and was inappropriately closed to the root cause condition report. Condition report CR-ANO-2013-01743 was initiated to reenter this condition into the corrective action system. No further action under this condition report is necessary, this CA may be closed.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00013 Version: 1 Approved: Y/

Requested Duedate: 06/26/2013 Previous Duedate: 05/30/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 05/28/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 05/28/2013 Request

Description:

This CR was inappropriately closed to CR-ANO-C-2013-0888. A new condition report is being written to address this issue sperately. The extension is to allow time for the new CR to be written and to close this action to that CR.

Approved

Description:

Entergy I CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00013 Version: 2 Approved: F, Requested Duedate: 07/10/2013 Previous Duedate: 06/26/2013 Requested By: James,Dale E 06/24/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 06/24/2013 Request

Description:

The CARB for the root cause is scheduled for 6/27/13. Time past this date is need to address all administrative issues, Approved

Description:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION I CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 14 Group ] - Name J Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To : Restoration Project Mgmt ANO Goodson,Gary M Originated By: James,Dale E 6/27/2013 07:36:34 Performed By: Bauman,David N 7/5/2013 20:21:03 Subperformed By: Philpott,Franklin T 7/5/2013 02:50:30 Approved By:

Closed By: James,Dale E 7/5/2013 20:41:40 Current Due Date: 07/05/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/05/2013 CA Type: CAT A-EOC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Implement the following actions to address the engineering documentation and oversight for the design, testing and installation of the temporary lift assembly to be used for the upcoming rigging for the ANO-I refurbished stator:

?Develop Engineering Change package for the lift itself (Similar to WF3 EC 8432, & Palisades EC 7189)

?Specify applicable code for special designed lifting device and demonstrate their application

?Perform owner acceptance review of vendor design calculation

?Perform independent third party modeling of vendor lift assembly

?Specify load testing requirements

?(Load and Functional performance testing)

?Entergy engineering witness of load test

?Post load test inspection

?Installation verification

?Conduct management challenge meeting focused on risk mitigating aspects of the critical lift

?Vendor responsible for lift to implement exclusion zone and minimize to the extent possible individuals within the zone needed to support the lift.

Response

The CEM was held today 7/5 at 1400 to review the Sarens 30 procedure. Also note that for the action associated with the installation verification is a specific requirement/critical step in the Sarens P-3389-40 procedure for EeI Engneering. This completes all the actions identified and documented in subresponse below.

Subresponse :

All actions required by this CA have been completed with one exception, and are documented in the attached CA-14 Sub-response Writeup. The remaining action (item 10 in the attached writeup) concerns the completion of a Critical Evolutions Meeting (CEM) to review Sarens Procedure P-3389-30, which controls the stator lift. This meeting is scheduled for 1400 hours58.333 days <br />8.333 weeks <br />1.918 months <br /> on July 5, 2013. Once this meeting has been verified to have been held and the procedure cleared for performance by the CEM, all of the required actions will have been completed and this CA may be closed. This verification will be docmented under the response section of this CA.

Closure Comments:

Attachments:

Subresponse Description CA-14 Sub-response Writeup Subresponse Description Stator Lift Exclusion Plan Subresponse Description WO 254160 Task 41

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Attachments:

Subresponse Description WO 254160 Task 37 Subresponse Description D. Hughes Email Dated 7/4/13

Attachment Header Document Name:

Iuntitled Document Location jSubresponse Description Attach Title:

KCA- 14 Sub-response Writeup

CR-ANO-C-2013-0888 CA-14 Sub-response (Page 1 of 3)

The following actions were implemented to address the engineering documentation and oversight for the design, testing and installation of the temporary lift assembly to be used for the upcoming rigging for the ANO-1 refurbished stator:

1) Develop Engineering Change package for the lift itself (Similar to WF3 EC 8432, & Palisades EC 7189)

Response

EC-45035 (Stator Lift At Rewind Facility) has been approved.

EC-45037 (Sarens Lift Rig Assembly) has been approved.

(Response provided by D. Hughes in attached email dated 7/4/13.)

EC-44824 (Stator Lift) was approved on 7/4/13.

2) Specify applicable code for special designed lifting device and demonstrate their application.

Response

EC-44824 defines applicable codes and standards for special designed lifting device and validates these are appropriately applied in associated Sarens/RI documents.

(Response provided by D. Hughes in attached email dated 7/4/13.)

3) Perform owner acceptance review of vendor design calculation Resoonse:

EC-44824 documents the owner acceptance review of vendor design calculations and drawings.

(Response provided by D. Hughes in attached email dated 7/4/13.)

4) Perform independent third party modeling of vendor lift assembly

Response

Per Report A13262-R-O01 documented in the Chief Engineer's Report in EC-44824, Lucius Pitkin, Inc. performed an independent third party review of the vendor lift assembly calculations, finding the assembly adequate. Per their review methodology statement, a completely independent model was not developed but critical inputs and results were verified and simplified approach was used to the extent necessary to validate the RI model.

(Response provided by D. Hughes in attached email dated 7/4/13.)

5) Specify load testing requirements

Response

Pre-use load testing requirements were specified in Sarens load test certification LT-3389-510-

01. Load test methodology was reviewed in the previously mentioned Lucius Pitkln Inc. report.

(Response provided by D. Hughes in attached email dated 7/4/13.)

CR-ANO-C-2013-0888 CA-14 Sub-response (Page 2 of 3)

6) Load and Functional performance testing

Response

Assembled load test with partial functional testing was successfully performed on June 20, 2013 per the previously mentioned report.

(Response provided by D. Hughes in attached email dated 7/4/13.)

7) Entergy engineering witness of load test

Response

Entergy engineering witnessed load test on June 20, 2013.

(Response provided by D. Hughes in attached email dated 7/4/13.)

8) Post load test inspection

Response

Post load test inspections / NDE were performed on June 21, 2013 per LT-3389-510-01, with satisfactory results.

(Response provided by D.Hughes in attached email dated 7/4/13.)

9) Installation verification

Response

Installation verification is provided by signoff steps in the work order tasks used to erect the Stator Lift System in the Turbine Building, which are WO 00254160, Task 37 (Erection of Stator Lift System up to the point of installation of the Runway and Trolley assembly) and Task 41 (installation of the Stator Lift System Runway and Trolley assembly). Both tasks contain signoffs for "Responsible Entergy Oversight" (step 4.3) and "Responsible Engineer, or his designee" (step 5.1.3) to review the completed work and ensure that no deviations or non-conforming conditions exist (step 4.3) and that the Engineering Change requirements have been followed (step 5.1.3). The "Responsible Engineer" is specified by name in step 5.1.2 and is a member of the Recovery Project Engineering team. (A copy of each WO task is attached to this sub-response for information.)

10) Conduct management challenge meeting focused on risk mitigating aspects of the critical lift

Response

Management challenge meetings focused on risk mitigating aspects of the critical lift were held as follows:

July 2, 2013 - EQRT review of EC-44824 (Stator Lift)

July 3, 2013 - OSRC review of EC-44824 (Stator Lift)

July 3, 2013 - Critical Evolutions Meeting (CEM) review of Sarens Procedures P-3389-20-A and P-3389 B which control the erection of the Stator Lift System Additionally, a CEM review of Sarens Procedure P-3389-30, which controls the stator lift, is scheduled for 1400 hours58.333 days <br />8.333 weeks <br />1.918 months <br /> on July 5, 2013.

CR-ANO-C-2013-0888 CA-14 Sub-response (Page 3 of 3)

11) Vendor responsible for lift to implement exclusion zone and minimize to the extent possible individuals within the zone needed to support the lift,

Response

A detailed Main Generator Stator Lift Turbine Building Exclusion/Flagging Plan has been developed and approved by representatives of ANO Project Management, Siemens Project Management, Siemens Safety, Sarens/RI Project Management, Sarens/RI Safety, ANO Safety, ANO Security, ANO Fire Prevention, ANO Fire Watch, ANO Unit 1 Operations, ANO Unit 2 Operations, ANO Radiation Protection, and ANO Engineering. Among the details of this plan are assignment of specific responsibilities, specific actions, communications, area boundaries for danger flagging, and criteria for moving barriers. A copy of this plan is attached.

Prepared by:

Frank Philpott July 5, 2013

Attachment Header Document Name:

juntltled Document Location PSubresponse Description Attach Title:

Ptator Lift Exclusion Plan

Main Generator Stator Lift Turbine Building Exclusion /Flagging Plan Department Supervisor Contact Sitnature Sheet P /inDate Contact I ANO Project Manazer Siemens Project Manager Sarens/Ri Project Manager ANO Safety VI IS(00,A7-13 5033 Siemens Safety Sarens/RI Safety ANO Security Shift Commander ANO Fire Prevention

-33 ANO Fire Watch Supervisor

-Unit I Operations Shift Supervisor 2/$/, x

-Unlt2 Operations Shift Supervisor ANO Radiation Protection Supervisor -6,711'3K2LC Al

___ /3x ANO Engineering Representative

Main Generator Stator Lift

  • Access controls during lifting and assembling main generator stator from train bay to generator pedestal on turbine deck
  • Large area danger flagged during lift of runway girder and trolley assembly and stator
  • Plant announcements made prior to runway girder and trolley evolution in addition to stator lift

Stator Lift Items Prior to liftingthe runway assembly onto the columns, who is responsible for the following?

- Identifying no access areas, danger flaging

  • RCC/Siemens

- Map markup

- Name and Number on the dangersigns

. Entergy will have pre-made signs

- Method of contact person for entry

. Operations. Security, Fire Brigade-Contact Sarens person in charge (PIC). Bill Flake for Securityand Fire Brigade.

- Postthe danger flag barriers and signs

  • Siemens/SarensSafety

- CliLaborem

- Identify where hard barriersor a person will be stationed

  • Siemens Safety

- Map markup

- Walkdown barriers(PIC required action)

Designated bySarens project management

- Bounday Watch performssweepof areaand mus radiothe desinated persononcecompleceto verify

  • When will PIC walk down tape-

- After the Keyhole is placed on the Statortrunnions and priorto tens ionlrg riggingforthe lift.

  • Criteria to move barriers

- When the Stator isset in placeaccording tothe PIC and the liftsystem isnot undertensiorn

  • Identify who needs to have pre-approval to enter and requirements. You must attend the IPTE to enter the danger taped area.

- Electricians, carpentersandcranevendor. Theymust attend the IPTE. Boundary Watchwi11have copy of signed IPTE brief form

- Special entry badges given to approved entrants

  • Communications

- Concerns from observers, project supervisors, iron workersabout cond itionsand concerns from PiCor RI supervisor.-

. Sarens wildesignate a subject matterexpert(SME). All concernswillbe routed through the Sarens SME.

Congested Area & Lift Areas in the Turbine Building The Rigging International rigging equipment/transfer assembly for the Unit 1 main generatorstatoris beginning to arrive at AND. The equipment will be brought into the protected area, to the train bay, rigged, moved and assembled on the Unit 1 turbine deck. During these activities the train bay and turbine deck will be congested. Dangerflag barriers and signs will be posted during these activities as appropriate for the work. This could include access to control room extension, access in front of control room extension, access to operations block house, access around U2 exciter, all train bay access, machine shop area, RP support shop and U1/U2 switchgear area on elevation 372 During targeted Stator Replacement Project lifts, a large area will be flagged, restricting personnel access other than approved personnel "essential" to the lift evolution.

During lifts, please do not ask for access to the areas as a matterof taking a shortcut or avoiding a longer path. This is essential for controlling the area and maintaining accountability for who is in the affected area.

The flagging will be established in accordance with a specific flagging plan.

- Targeted liftsinclude:

" Installing and removing from columns Runway Girder andTrolley Assembly

" Main Generator Stator from train bay generator Pedestal

- Evacuated areas

" Control room extension and above control room extension

" U2 Turbine Deck 386 elevation (Exception:U1/U2 Contromoaccessis via northU2 Controlroomdoor)

" Operations block house, both levels and area westto control room extension

" Unit land Unit 2 4160/6900V switchgeararea on 372 elevation

" Train bay andentrancesto train bay. 354elevation

" Ul and U2bowlingalleyaccessneartrainbay

" RP supportshop, 354elevation north oftrain bay

" Machine shop,.354

" North end of U1 basement and South end of U2 basement, 335 elevation

Foot Traffic

  • Foot traffic will be restricted from using the stairwell just east of CAL. Personnel exiting CA1 will travel south and use one of two stairwells available south of CA-1 on the west side of the turbine building
  • Personnel exiting CA2 will travel north to use either the turbine building stairs near the chemistry lab, other available stairwells in Unit 2, or the maintenance facility stairs
  • No traffic will be allowed in front of the control room extension during lifts
  • Access to the U2 TB personnel elevatorwill blocked and not accessible except for project essential personnel's use in preparation for the lifts. During the lifts, the elevator will not be used.
  • Traffic will be restricted from the turbine deck to the basement level along the travel path during the above mentioned lifts
  • These areas will be clearly marked. The flaggingwill be removed as soon as practical after lifts are complete and in a safe condition Congested Areas after Assembly The area east of the control room extension will be congested once the equipment is staged. Control room extension doors open Into the pathway. The area will be flagged directing employees out of the area of hazard but keep in mind, walkway is still going to be much smaller Plan to use an alternate route if practical Use good practices and be considerate of pedestrian traffic passing by and any material or cart movement through this area Ask yourself. "what can you do to stay safe?"
  • Use alternate routes
  • Follow the postings
  • Do not loiter near the lift areas
  • Be aware that conditions, paths will be changing
  • Be patient; don't challenge/distract the workers in the lift areas unnecessarily by asking for permission to cut through areas.

O FIDE&TRO.LEY SYa11 I STAMRUFT FLAQGIWG PIM-JOCHECWUST Date: Shitl Job Oescripbon Supervisor PIC P eirequiisits Omer/Stalus

1. Identify no access areas, danger lagging, including ,

providing a map of for 1aggingtbarrier placement and boundary ifatch starlions EC 44824

2. Ensure pre-mnade danger signs are complete
  • 3 Purchase lights fordanger boundaries& Purchase vests for boundary vetches
4. Reviewthe plan ,Wth the Seurtiy Shit Supervisor, Fire RCC Protection and 0 perstions to determine any boundaries potentially impeaing posted or mving protectiv trces InProgress personnel Prior I Lift fti&tiLWDale
5. Approve Authorized Boundary Entrants kissue acceas SiemrensSarens badges during IPTE brief) 6- Post danger lag barriers and signs (Siemens*Sarens SiemensfSarens Saety and C,B.Laborers) 7 Pertr= radi'comm unication Wth boundary vitches SiemensfSawns
8. PIC vat dovy ofbarnes Sarena PIC
9. Perform final sveep of lagged areasto ensure no Siemens(Samns unapproved personnel are Wthrm the boundaries,

Tape off stairs Barrier Watch Barrier Watch Tape off elevator

. -... . And close gate Clear personnel and NO entry in 386' Elevation Control room extension or Danger Flagged Area Operations block house For Stator lift and runway

<ýEHI Barrier Watch Barrier Watch 2B 2A A B C D E F No Access in U1 or U2 4160 / 6900 Switchgear Area 372' Elevation Danger Flagged Area For Stator lift and runway

Barrier Watch I

Unit 2 Transformer Yard Unit 1 Transformer Yard NORTH Barrier Watch T-I .~1 a

CO C..

2 2 I

Barrier Watch _ 0 -

BarrierWatch 354' Elevation No access between Unit 1 and Unit 2 Danger Flagged Area No access to elevator No access in Train Bay or Train Bay entry For Stator lift and runway area

E.... ...... ,*,*

Barrier Watch

~r-Lr 335' Elevation Danger Flagged Area For Stator lift and runway

Attachment Header Document Name:

untitled Document Location Iubresponse Description Attach Title:

ýVO 254160 Task 41

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task # / Package Type 00254160-41 Level-I Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECTMANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22-2013 Kyle Jones(5661) on 07/01/2013 PLANNER / DATE ....

THIS TASK IS RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY FROM THE UNIT-1 STATOR DROP.

Table of Contents SECTION PAGE NO.

1. P U R P O SE A ND S C O P E ....................................................................................................................... 2
2. PRECAUTIO NS AND LIM ITATIO NS ................................................................................................ 2
3. P R E R E Q UIS ITE S ................................................................................................................................. 5
4. W O R K PLA N D E TA ILS ......................................................................................................................... 7
5. R E ST O R AT IO N ..................................................................................................................................... 8

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 1 of 8

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task # / Package Type 00254160-41 Level-1 Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22-2013

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1. This task is for installation of the Stator Lift System Runway and Trolley assembly in the Turbine Bldg lAW Sarens (RI) Procedure P-3389-20B and ECN-44824.

1.1.1. Removal and disassembly of the Runway and Trolley assembly and Lift System will be performed on Task 42 of this work order.

S COMPONENT HISTORY I LOCATION:

  • HISTORY:

N/A

  • LOCATION:

The area of maintenance for this work is within the Unit One Turbine building, elevation 386.

2. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

2.1. NOTES

The Lead Equipment (1 TURBINE-BLDG) is listed within the Equipment Data Base (EDB) as having:

Safety Classification is :NSR Seismic Classification is : Unknown, Contact Engineering Cleanliness Classification is:

Housekeeping level is : 4 Critical Equipment Indicator is: Exempt Guidelines for Material Handling (Rigging) are provided in Corporate Procedure EN-MA-1 19.

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 2 of 8

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task#/Package Type 00254160-41 Level-1 Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22-2013

2.2. PRECAUTIONS

2.2.1. SAFETY Concerns I Warnings:

2.2.1.1. Ensure compliance with the applicable "Entergy Industrial Safety Procedures, as personnel injury can result from unsafe work practices such as climbing on pipes, cable trays and equipment. Ensure that all required personal safety equipment is being properly worn and used.

2.2.1.2. Perform your job in such a manner as to ensure your personal safety as well as the safety of your co-workers. If unsafe conditions arise, stop work and make the proper notifications. Comply with the requirements set forth in all applicable plant procedures.

2.2.1.3. All work shall be performed in accordance with the appropriate Entergy industrial safety programs. The installation will require consideration for safety hazards such as high heat stress, limited space in work areas, working from scaffolding, and potential for dropped tools. Identification of specific hazards and means to mitigate shall be addressed in daily pre-job briefings with craftsmen stressing applicable OE.

Entergy shall ensure that the Safety Plan, Fire Watch/Combustible Control Plans, and Confined Space Entry requirements are implemented on the project and that appropriate coaching and field oversight are applied on a daily basis.

Job Safety Hazard Analysis (JSHA) shall be performed prior to any deviations to existing safety requirements.

2.2.2. Caution should be taken to avoid violating Transient Combustible Limits during the performance of this Task.

When non-exempt combustibles are constantly attended in Level 2 and Level 3 areas (including through breaks and shift changes), a Transient Combustible Evaluation and/or further Fire Protection evaluation is not required. [EN-DC-161]

  • Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 3 of 8

EN-WM-105 Arkansags Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task #/ Package Type 00254160-41 Level-I Package Work Item / Equipment K-1-GENERA Discipline PROJECTMANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22.2013

2.3. LIMITATIONS

2.3.1. In Accordance with EN-OP-116, Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions (IPTE) screening, IPTE controls ARE required.

2.3.1.1. Senior Line Manager MUST review and approve any Scope Changes or Additions that change the intent of this Work Package 2.3.1.2. A crew brief shall be prepared and presented using EN-OP-1 16, IPTE Attachments 9.4 and 9.5, IPTE Brief Preparation Checklist and IPTE Brief Presentation Checklist.

2.3.1.3. IF IPTE continues beyond one shift, THEN the oncoming shift shall be briefed.

2.3.2. Only the maintenance specified to be performed by this Task is allowed.

IF any additional maintenance is required, THEN a Scope Change Form AND Work Request should be submitted and approved before the added maintenance can proceed.

2.3.3. A vehicle can not be left unattended in the Train Bay and untreated wood cannot be located in Train Bay or Turbine Building over one shift without fire protection approving an evaluation per EN-DC-161.

Note: Roving Fire Watch established for 1R24 does not include leaving untreated wood in Train Bay or Turbine Building.

2.3.4. IF supplemental personnel (Contractor or Shared Resource Personnel) are used in the completion of this task, THE.N the requirements and controls of Nuclear Management Manual EN-MA-126 (Control of Supplement Personnel) must be observed.

Consideration needs to be given to re-planning the work if necessary.

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 4 of 8

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task # / Package Type 00254160-41 Level-I Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22-2013

3. PREREQUISITES

3.1. PREREQUISITES

3.1.1. AN IPTE review has been completed by the Responsible Department Manager (Senior Line Manager).

Reference the criteria of EN-OP-1 16, Attachment 9.2.

Signature Date 3.1.2. READ and understand task Instructions BEFORE the performance of any maintenance.

Signature Date 3.1.3. NOTIFY Unit 1 Operations as designated by the Control Room Communication field.

Signature Date 3.1.4. VERIFY Operations has notified load dispatcher.

Signature Date 3.1.1. VERIFY Operations' compensatory measures required by the Ops Impact are in place.

Signature Date 3.1.2. VERIFY the Crane Vendor Technician are available and On-site.

Signature Date 3.1.3. SITE GMPO permission required prior to installing girders onto the Lift System.

Signature Date

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 5 of 8

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task #/ Package Type 00254160-41 Level-1 Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22.2013 Note: The Implementation of EngineeringChange Document ECN#44824/

Base#22100 will constitute a ConfigurationChange.

3.1.4. NOTIFY the Responsible Engineer David Underwood # 5717, i.e., Phone, E-Mail, etc., during the walk-down process, or as far in advance of the performance, that this Engineering Change Document [ECN#44824/Base#22100] is to be implemented.

I Notified by Signature Date 3.1.5. ENSURE CEM (Critical Evolution Meeting) CHAIRMAN has SIGNED prior to performing this work activity.

CEM Chairman Date Signature

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 6 of 8

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task # /Package Type 00254160-41 Level-I Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22-2013 Note: Any "FieldRevisions" are to be made in accordancewith EN-WM-102, Attachment 9.3 (Field Revision to Work Order Task(s)) and EN-HU-106 (Procedureand Work Instruction Use and Adherence).

4. WORK PLAN DETAILS 4.1. Foreign Material Exclusion (FME).

4.1.1. The initial FME determination is that this activity DOES NOT REQUIRE any EN-MA-1 18 FME Zone controls for the maintenance area. However proper Housekeeping and Cleanliness controls still apply.

Note: The Stator will be lifted and installed under Task 39 of this work orderin accordance with Sarens Procedure P-3389-40.

4.2. INSTALLATION OF SARENS/RI RUNWAY ASSEMBLY ON THE STATOR LIFT SYSTEM:

NNote: Lifting Runway and Trolley assembly requires IPTE brief.

Note: Setting Runway girders on Turbine Deck requires GMPO Approval.I 4.2.1. INSTALL SARENS/RI RUNWAY and Trolley ASSEMBLY ON THE STATOR LIFT SYSTEM columns, lAW Sarens Procedure P-3389-20B, ECN-44824, Base EC-22100 and the directions of the Implementing Field Supervisor (IFS).

Signature Date Note: Reference EN-MA-126 (CONTROL OF SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONNEL), for necessary steps to ensure that critical elements of maintenance are verified to have been performed and no non-conformances exist.

4.3. Station personnel:

Perform review of completed work and ensure no deviations or non conforming conditions exist.

Responsible Entergy Oversight 4.4. ENSURE that any Temporary Services and Equipment used during the performance of this task were removed, along with their applicable tag(s)

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 7 of 8

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task # / Package Type 00254160-41 Level.I Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipfine PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22.2013

5. RESTORATION 5.1. Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) 5.1.1. ALL required Post Maintenance testing will be performed and documented on task 02 of this work order.

5.1.2. PRIOR to this Task being Closed:

Notify the Responsible Engineer David Underwood or Atwood Browning @ extension

  1. 5717, i.e. phone, E-mail, etc, that this Engineering Document

[ECN#44824, BASE EC#22100] has been implemented.

/

Notified by Signature Date 5.1.3. THE Responsible Engineer, or his designee has reviewed this Task, relative to the Engineering Change, to ensure that the Engineering Change requirements have been followed and concurs that this Task can be completed.

/

Responsible Engineer, or his designee Date

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 8 of 8

Attachment Header Document Name:

ntitled Document Location jSubresponse Description Attach Title:

ýWO 254160 Task 37

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 Work Order-Task # / Package Type 00254160-37 Level-I Package Work Item / Equipment K-1--GENERA Discipline PROJECTMANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22-2013 Andy Gay(5578) Kyle Jones(5661) on 06-22-2013 PLANNER / DATE ....

THIS TASK IS RELATED TO THE INVESTIGATION AND RECOVERY FROM THE UNIT-1 STATOR DROP.

Table of Contents SECTION PAGE NO.

1. PU R PO S E A ND S C O PE ....................................................................................................................... 2
2. PRECA UTIO NS A ND LIM ITATIO NS ................................................................................................ 2
3. PR E R E Q UIS ITE S ................................................................................................................................. 4
4. W O R K P LA N D ETA ILS ......................................................................................................................... 5
5. R E ST O RA T IO N ..................................................................................................................................... 6

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 1 of 6

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear OnQe Unit 1 Work Order-Task # / Package Type 00254160-37 Level-1 Package Work Item / Equipment K-I-GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22-2013

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 1.1. This task is for Erection of the Stator Lift System in the Turbine Bldg (up to the point of installation of the Runway and Trolley assembly) in accordance with Sarens (RI) Procedure P-3389-20A and ECN-45037.

1.1.1. Installation of the Runway and Trolley assembly will be performed on Task 41 of this work order.

COMPONENT HISTORY / LOCATION:

  • HISTORY:

N/A

  • LOCATION:

The area of maintenance for this work is within the Unit One Turbine building, elevation 386.

2. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

2.1. NOTES

The Lead Equipment (1 TURBINE-BLDG) is listed within the Equipment Data Base (EDB) as having:

Safety Classification is :NSR Seismic Classification is : Unknown, Contact Engineering Cleanliness Classification is:

Housekeeping level is : 4 Critical Equipment Indicator is: Exempt Guidelines for Material Handling (Rigging) are provided in Corporate Procedure EN-MA-i 19.

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 2 of 6

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nucleagr One@ Unit 1 Work Order-Task # /Package Type 00254160-37 Level- I Package Work Item / Equipment K-1-GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised onr 06-22-2013

2.2. PRECAUTIONS

2.2.1. SAFETY Concerns I Warnings:

2.2.1.1. Ensure compliance with the applicable "Entergy Industrial Safety Procedures, as personnel injury can result from unsafe work practices such as climbing on pipes, cable trays and equipment. Ensure that all required personal safety equipment is being properly worn and used.

2.2.1.2. Perform your job in such a manner as to ensure your personal safety as well as the safety of your co-workers. If unsafe conditions arise, stop work and make the proper notifications. Comply with the requirements set forth in all applicable plant procedures 2.2.1.3. All work shall be performed in accordance with the appropriate Entergy industrial safety programs, The installation will require consideration for safety hazards such as high heat stress, limited space in work areas, working from scaffolding, and potential for dropped tools. Identification of specific hazards and means to mitigate shall be addressed in daily pre-job briefings with craftsmen stressing applicable OE.

Entergy shall ensure that the Safety Plan, Fire Watch/Combustible Control Plans, and Confined Space Entry requirements are implemented on the project and that appropriate coaching and field oversight are applied on a daily basis.

Job Safety Hazard Analysis (JSHA) shall be performed prior to any deviations to existing safety requirements.

2.2.2. Caution should be taken to avoid violating Transient Combustible Limits during the performance of this Task.

When non-exempt combustibles are constantly attended in Level 2 and Level 3 areas (including through breaks and shift changes), a Transient Combustible Evaluation and/or further Fire Protection evaluation is not required. [EN-DC-161]

2.3. LIMITATIONS

2.3.1. Only the maintenance specified to be performed by this Task is allowed.

IF any additional maintenance is required, THEN a Scope Change Form AND Work Request should be submitted and approved before the added maintenance can proceed.

2.3.2. A vehicle can not be left unattended in the Train Bay and untreated wood cannot be located in Train Bay or Turbine Building over one shift without fire protection approving an evaluation per EN-DC-161.

INote: Roving Fire Watch estab/ished for 1R24 does not include leaving untreated wood in Train Bay or Turbine Building. I 2.3.3. IF supplemental personnel (Contractor or Shared Resource Personnel) are used in the completion of this task, THEN the requirements and controls of Nuclear Management Manual EN-MA-126 (Control of Supplement Personnel) must be observed.

Consideration needs to be given to re-planning the work ifnecessary.

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 -. Page 3 of 6

EN- WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit .

Work Order-Task # / Package Type 00254160-37 Level-I Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 08-22-2013

3. PREREQUISITES 3.1. READ and understand task Instructions BEFORE the performance of any maintenance.

Signature Date 3.2. NOTIFY Unit 1 Operations as designated by the Control Room Communication field.

I Signature Date Note: The Implementation of Engineering Change Document ECN#45037 /

Base#22100 will constitute a ConfigurationChange.

3.3. NOTIFY the Responsible Engineer David Underwood # 5717, i.e., Phone, E-Mail, etc., during the walk-down process, or as far in advance of the performance, that this Engineering Change Document [ECN#45037/Base#221001 is to be implemented.

I Notified by Signature Date Note: A CriticalEvolution Meeting (CEM) will be requiredfor this work. 1 3.3.1. CEM CHAIRMAN to SIGN after CEM is complete and prior to starting this work.

I CEM Chairman Date Signature 3.3.2. SITE GMPO permission required prior to setting girders on Turbine Deck.

/

Signature Date

'Date Printed. 7/4/2013 Page 4 of 6

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit I Work Order-Task# / Package Type 00254160-37 Level-1 Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECTMANAGEMENT Revised on 08-22.2013 Note: Any "FieldRevisions" are to be made in accordance with EN-WM-102, Attachment 9.3 (FieldRevision to Work Order Task(s)) and EN-HU- 106 (Procedureand Work Instruction Use and Adherence).

4. WORK PLAN DETAILS 4.1. Forelan Material Exclusion (FME).

4.1.1. The initial FME determination is that this activity DOES NOT REQUIRE any EN-MA-1 18 FME Zone controls for the maintenance area. However proper Housekeeping and Cleanliness controls still apply.

Note: The Runway and Trolley system will be lifted and installed under task 41 of this work order in accordance with Sarens Procedure P-3389-20B.

Note: The Stator will be lifted and installed under Task 39 of this work orderin accordance with Sarens ProcedureP-3389-40.

4.2. ERECT and ASSEMBLE Sarens/Rl Stator Lift System:

Note: Setting Runway girders on Turbine Deck requires GMPO Approval..

4.2.1. ERECT I ASSEMBLE the Sarens/RI Stator Lift System, in accordance with the steps of Sarens Procedure P-3389-20A, ECN-45037, Base EC-221 00 and the directions of the Implementing Field Supervisor (IFS).

Signature Date Note: Reference EN-MA-126 (CONTROL OF SUPPLEMENTAL PERSONNEL), for necessarysteps to ensure that criticalelements of maintenance are verified to have been performed and no non-conformances exist.

4.3. Station personnel:

Perform review of completed work and ensure no deviations or non conforming conditions exist.

Responsible Entergy Oversight 4.4. ENSURE that any Temporary Services and Equipment used during the performance of this task were removed, along with their applicable tag(s)

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 5 of 6

EN-WM-105 Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1 Work Order-Task #/ Package Type 00254160-37 Level-I Package Work Item / Equipment K-I--GENERA Discipline PROJECT MANAGEMENT Revised on 06-22-2013

5. RESTORATION 5.1. Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) 5.1.1. ALL required Post Maintenance testing will be performed and documented on task 02 of this work order.

5.1.2. PRIOR to this Task being Closed:

Notify the Responsible Engineer David Underwood or Atwood Browning @ extension

  1. 5717 (Dayshift contact) John McFarland (Nightshift Contact), i.e. phone, E-mail, etc., that this Engineering Document [ECN#45037, BASE EC#22100] has been implemented.

/

Notified by Signature Date 5.1.3. THE Responsible Engineer or his designee has reviewed this Task, relative to the Engineering Change, to ensure that the Engineering Change requirements have been followed and concurs that this Task can be completed.

/

Responsible Engineer, or his designee Date

'Date Printed: 7/4/2013 Page 6 of 6

Attachment Header Document Name:

untitled Document Location

ýSubresponse Description Attach Title:

ID.Hughes Email Dated 7/4/13

PHILPOTr, FRANKUN T From: HUGHES, DANNY C Sent: Thursday, July 04, 2013 1:40 AM To: PHILPOTT, FRANKLIN T; Bentley, Donald E; GOODSON, GARY M

Subject:

CR-ANO-C-2013-888-CA-14 Subresponse All items below except those in red were verified and entered in the subject CA subresponse by Danny Hughes. This email may be attached to the subresponse to document Hughes' input.

The following actions were implemented to address engineering documentation and oversight for the design, testing and installation of the temporary lift assembly to be used for the upcoming rigging for the ANO-1 refurbished stator:

EC-45035 (Stator Lift At Rewind Facility) has been approved.

EC-45037 (Sarens Lift Rig Assembly) has been approved.

!!VERIFY!! EC-44824 (Stator Lift) has been approved.

EC-44824 defines applicable codes and standards for special designed lifting device and validates these are appropriately applied in associated Sarens/RI documents.

EC-44824 documents the owner acceptance review of vendor design calculations and drawings.

Per Report A13262-R-001 documented in the Chief Engineer's Report in EC-44824, Lucius Pitkin, Inc performed an independent third party review of the vendor lift assembly calculations, finding the assembly adequate. Per their review methodology statement, a completely independent model was not developed but critical inputs and results were verified and simplified approach was used to the extent necessary to validate the RI model.

Pre-use load testing requirements were specified in Sarens load test certification LT-3389-510-01. Load test methodology was reviewed in the previously mentioned Lucius Pitkin Inc report.

Assembled load test with partial functional testing was successfully performed on June 20, 2013 per the previously mentioned report.

Entergy engineering witnessed load test on June 20, 2013.

Post load test inspections / NDE were performed on June 21, 2013 per LT-3389-510-01, with satisfactory results.

HVERIFY!! Installation verification was performed by XXXXX on XXXXXX

!!VERIFY!! Management challenge meetings focused on risk mitigating aspects of the critical lift were held: XXXX on June 28, 2013, EQRT on 07/02/13, and OSRC on 07/03/13.

!!VERIFY!! Vendor responsible for lift implemented an exclusion zone and minimized to the extent possible individuals within the zone needed to support the lift.

Danny C. Hughes, PE Engineering Supervisor Recovery Project Client Design DP Engineering, Ltd.

Cell: 479-970-4681 dannyhuahes@dpenaineerinq.com

- VILEGED AND CONFIDENTIA_

Attorney/Client e nunication At ork Pro Pr-epared at the Direction of Legal Counse--

2 Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00014 Version: 1 Approved: Y Requested Duedate: 07/02/2013 Previous Duedate: 06/30/2013 Requested By: Ridgel,Jerry A 06/29/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 06/29/2013 Request

Description:

It is necessary to extend this action due to additional information required to answer all elements of the action. It is acceptable as the action will be completed prior to lifting the new stator.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00014 Version: 2 Approved:

Requested Duedate: 07/05/2013 Previous Duedate: 07/02/2013 Requested By: Ridgel,Jerry A 07/01/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 07/01/2013 Request

Description:

It is necessary to extend this action due to delays in preparations for lifting the new stator. It is acceptable as the action will be completed prior to lifting the new stator.

Approved

Description:

DDE Approved

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 15 Group Name J Assigned By: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO Chisum,Michael R Assigned To: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO Pace,Robert D Subassigned To :

Originated By: Pace,Robert D 7/3/2013 10:16:50 Performed By: PaceRobert D 7/3/2013 10:22:52 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Chisum,Michael R 7/3/2013 16:13:57 Current Due Date: 07/05/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/05/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Develop a plan for recovery of the Unit I electrical system to the design configuration.

Verify the plan is approved by key stake holders.

Response

Action:

Develop a plan for recovery of the Unit I electrical system to the design configuration.

Verify the plan is approved by key stake holders.

Response

Theplan for Electrical System Recovery has been created and approved by key stake holders.

The plan is attached to this CA.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Acceptable to close. M. Chisum Attachments:

Response Description Electrical Recovery Plan

Attachment Header Document Name:

Pntited Document Location IResponse Description Attach Title:

PElectrical Recovery Plan

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE ANO Unit 1 Electrical System Recovery:

Returning 4160 volt busses to original design configuration 1500 Revision 7/2/2013 Engineering

.L ture Sign Operations Project Management Maintenance Licensing Planning, Scheduling and Outage Signature

Executive Summary:

This document outlines a plan to restore the power scheme for the 4160 V vital buses at ANO Unit I from the current temporary configuration to original design. The plan examines compliance with 1015.048 (Shutdown Operations Protection Plan), 1015.002 (Decay Heat System and LTOP Control), EN-OP- 119 (Protected Equipment Postings) and ANO- I Technical Specifications for each configuration change during restoration.

Defense-in-depth is scrutinized at each phase. Vital 4160 volt switchgear A3 and A4 remain available for required Decay Heat Removal (DHR) Systems at all times. As allowed by Technical Specifications and the SOPP, there will be periods when only one offsite power source is available powering both trains of vital switchgear. During these periods, appropriate measures will be in place to ensure reliability and protection of the single offsite power source. Activities are organized such that the time with reduced off-site power capability is minimized. In addition, both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG's) remain operable except for two brief periods where the associated output breaker temporary modifications are removed. This work will occur prior to draining the FTC. The Alternate AC Diesel Generator (AACDG) is restored as a functional power source early in the sequence. When the FTC is drained the EDG supporting the protected train will be aligned with auto-start, auto-connect capability.

During the restoration sequence, the non-protected vital 4160V bus will be de-energized to transfer between power sources; however, capability is maintained to immediately re-energize the bus from an operable power source using simple, procedurally controlled actions at electrical control panel C 1.0 in the Unit I Control Room. When a vital bus is de-energized to transfer between power sources, the associated Decay Heat Removal train will be declared inoperable (if the train is required to be operable for current plant conditions) and then immediately restored to an operable condition as the bus power is transferred.

Draining the Fuel Transfer Canal (FTC) below elevation 390 ft (23 feet above the fuel) requires both Decay Heat Removal trains operable. All potential interfaces between the non-vital switchgear being restored and the required off-site power sources have been reviewed to verify adequate barriers exist to ensure the reliability of the off-site power sources being used or required for anticipated plant conditions. This concept is also applied to the interfaces associated with non-vital and vital switchgear to prevent inadvertent loss of Decay Heat Removal from testing or configuration changes. These comprehensive reviews have considered both restoration and testing activities. Protected train concepts are supported by this plan as clear boundaries exist between protected equipment and equipment being restored and tested.

Restoration plans for the shared Off-Site power transformer, Startup #2 (SU2), include cross unit impact reviews and applicable risk identification and challenge processes for On-Line operation.

This plan provides defense in depth such that at no point can a single failure prevent Decay Heat Removal or Spent Fuel Pool cooling.

2

Current Temnorary Modifications As shown in Figure I, temporary modifications have been implemented to supply power from offsite power transformers SU I and SU2 to the A3 and A4 vital switchgear independent of non-vital switchgear A I and A2. Associated changes are as follows:

SU- I Temporary supply to the A310/A410 cross-tie This temporary modification provides qualified off-site power directly from the SU I transformer to the cross tie between 4160 volt vital switchgear A3 and A4 via temporary cables. The temporary cables are spliced into the AACDG normal supply cables that tie into the A3/A4 cross-tie breaker (A310). This modification will be removed in phase one.

SU2 Temporary supply to the A309/A409 off-site power supply breakers This temporary modification provides qualified off-site power from the SU2 transformer to each 4160 volt vital bus (A3 and A4) via temporary switchgear. The temporary switchgear feeds to each bus are spliced into the normal supply cables that tie the non-vital switchgear (AI and A2) via separate supply breakers (A309 and A409). This modification will complete removal in phase four.

Emergency Diesel Generator Output Breakers (A308 and A408)

These breakers currently have a temporary modification in place to preserve an interlock to trip open the EDG output breaker should a SU-2 lock out occur with the EDG paralleled to the grid. This feature was desired in the current mode of operation to allow full load testing of the EDG's via the temporary switchgear. During normal EDG full load testing, this trip is provided as a design function to prevent EDG overload conditions. This modification also provides a degree of separation between vital and non-vital switchgear by removing the same trip function from the Startup #1 and Unit Auxiliary transformers in our current configuration.

Removal of this T-Mod requires the EDG to be inoperable. Although practical to remove this Tmod in higher SOPP conditions, the plan is to remove this Tmod before the Fuel Transfer Canal (FTC) is drained below 390'. This is acceptable as the Tmod is only required to support EDG surveillances using the Temporary Switchgear.

Normal Supply Breakers to A3 and A4 from Al and A2 WA309 and A409)

There are two temporary modifications associated with each of these breakers. One allows closing the respective breaker with a corresponding supply bus (A I or A2) lockout. A supply bus lockoutcondition normally opens or prevents closure of the associated safety bus supply breaker. The other modification bypasses a sync check circuit to allow closing A309 and/or A409 without being in sync with the associated supply bus. This allows the Temporary Switchgear to feed the applicable vital bus via dead bus transfer. Removal and required testing of these modifications will be performed during the applicable restoration phase for the normal power configuration outlined later in this document.

3

SOPP and Technical Specification Requirements This document confirms the acceptability of proceeding with fuel transfer canal drain and RCS restoration as long as the electrical system configurations that prohibit operation in lowered inventory are performed prior to or after a lowered inventory condition.

The current configuration of off-site power supplies to the vital 4160 volt switchgear is very reliable and provides defense in depth beyond Technical Specification requirements for all plant configurations and beyond SOPP requirements for all plant configurations except Lowered Inventory. SOPP Lowered Inventory requirements for off-site power prevent removal of either source with Reactor Coolant System level at or below 376.5 ft (lowered Inventory).

SOPP Requirements: The following are the electrical requirements for each SOPP Condition:

  • Condition I (No fuel in vessel): At least I EDG and at least I Offsite Power Source available
  • Condition 2 (Fuel in vessel, no Refueling operations in progress, Canal>390'): At least 3 combined Onsite and Offsite Power Sources available, at least I EDG OPERABLE, at least I Offsite Power Source OPERABLE

" Condition 3 (Fuel in vessel, Refueling operations in progress, Canal >390'): At least 3 combined Onsite and Offsite Power Sources, at least I EDG OPERABLE, at least I Offsite Power Source OPERABLE

" Condition 4 (Fuel in vessel, RCS Intact, RCS level >376.5'): At least 3 combined Onsite and Offsite Power Sources available, at least I EDG OPERABLE and aligned for auto-start auto-load, at least I Offsite Power Source OPERABLE

" Condition 5 (Fuel in vessel, RCS open, FTC not flooded, RCS >376.5'): At least 3 combined Onsite and Offsite Power Sources available, at least I EDG OPERABLE and aligned for auto-start auto-load, at least I Offsite Power Source OPERABLE

  • Condition 6 (Fuel in vessel, RCS open, RCS <376.5'): At least 2 EDG's available, at least 2 Offsite Power Sources available, at least I EDG OPERABLE and aligned for auto-start auto-load, at least I Offsite Power Source OPERABLE.

15

Technical Specifications:

Applicable Technical Specifications include those for AC power sources and DHR as follows:

LCO 3.8.2 (AC Sources -Shutdown):

3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown LCO 3.8.2 The following AC electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems - Shutdown"' and
b. One diesel generator (DG) capable of supplying one train of the onsite Class 1E AC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS From the TS Bases, it is acceptable for trains to be cross tied during shutdown conditions, allowing a single offsite power circuit to supply the required equipment.

LCO 3.9.4 (Decay Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation- High Water Level):

3.9.4 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level LCO 3.9.4 One.DHR loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.

The required DHR loop may be removed from operation for s 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period, provided no operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the Reactor Coolant System, coolant with boron concentration less than that required to meet the minimum required boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level > 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel seated in the reactor pressure vessel.

6

LCO 3.9.5 (Decay Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation- Low Water Level:

3.9.5 Decay Heat Removal (DHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level LCO 3.9.5 Two DHR loops shall be OPERABLE, and one DHR loop shall be in operation.

1. All DHR pumps may be de-energized for 5 15 minutes when switching from one train to another provided:
a. The core outlet temperature is maintained > 10 degrees F below saturation temperature:
b. No operations are permitted that would cause a reduction of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration; and
c. No draining operations to further reduce RCS water volume are permitted.
2. One required DHR loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> for surveillance testing, provided that the other DHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level < 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel seated in the reactor pressure vessel.

LCO 3.4.8 (RCS Loops. MODE 5, Loops Not Filled 3.4.8 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled LCO 3.4.8 Two decay heat removal (DHR) loops shall be OPERABLE and one OPERABLE DHR loop shall be in operation.

NOTES--....................

1. All DHR pumps may be removed from operation for < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provided:
a. No operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the SOM of LCO 3.1.1: and
b. No draining operations to further reduce the RCS water volume are permitted.
2. One DHR loop may be inoperable for _< 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> for surveillance testing provided that the other DHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops not filled.

7

Restoration Plan The restoration plan sequences through restoration of power supplies such that defense in depth requirements are maintained. This is based on comparison of the various configurations to Technical Specification and SOPP requirements. Phases of the plan are described below and outlined in Table I.

Preparation Phase-The preparation phase occurs before removal of the SUI Tmod. This work de-energizes A3 to support cable pulls in a shared cable tray and pulls new cables to support future tie-ins. New cabling for the 2A9 feed to A3/A4 as well as new cabling from AI to A3 is pulled but not terminated. As part of this activity the feed from the Temporary Switchgear (TSG) to A3 is also removed.

Separate from the time that A3 is de-energized, the preparation phase also includes removal of the temporary modification associated with A308 EDG output breaker described above. With two offsite power sources available, the #1 EDG output breaker will be removed from service to remove this temporary modification. To maintain required minimum power sources per the SOPP, the Tmod associated with A408 EDG output breaker will be removed following restoration of AACDG availability in Phase 1.

During the preparation phase the FTC remains flooded with both DHR trains available.

This sequence represents no risk level above minimal risk.

Phase One-removes the Startup one transformer supply to A3 and A4 4160 volt vital switchgear and restores the Alternate AC Diesel Generator supply at the same location.

Defense in depth is reduced when SU I temporary modification is removed but is restored when the AACDG becomes available. During this period the FTC remains flooded with both DHR trains available. This sequence represents no risk level above minimal risk.

Lowered Inventory is not permitted during this phase.

Phase Two-restores the SUI supply to Al and A3. Defense in depth is enhanced when SIJ I is made available to A3. During this period the FTC remains flooded with both DHR trains available. The last step in Phase 2 is to remove the temporary modification associated with A408 EDG output breaker after A3 is powered from A I and the AACDG is available to both A3 and A4. This sequence represents no risk level above minimal risk. Lowered Inventory is not permitted during this phase. Lowered Inventory is permitted following this phase.

Phase Three-restores the SUI supply to A2 and A4. This requires removal of the SU2 supply to A4. Defense in depth is reduced when SU2 is isolated from A4 and is restored when SU I becomes available to A4. This sequence represents no risk level above minimal risk. Lowered Inventory is not permitted during this phase. Lowered Inventory is not permitted following this phase until completion of Phase four. SU2 remains unavailable as an off-site source until the completion of phase four.

8

Phase Four-restores the SU2 transformer to A] and A2. Removal of SU2 from service does not change defense in depth for Unit I and places Unit 2 in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time clock.

SU2 return to service restores Unit I to the design configuration.

The restoration and testing activities have been reviewed in detail to ensure each phase outlined above maintains defense in depth requirements.

9

Major Activities Power Sources Available to A3 Power Sources Available to A4 Protected Train Current N/A 9 SUI Transformer Via Temporary a SUI Transformer Via Temporary Either Red or Green Train Configuration Breaker Through A3 10 Breaker Through A4 10 Protected e SU2 Transformer Via Temporary e SU2 Transformer Via Temporary Switchgear Through A309 Switchgear Through A409 e #1 EDG e #2 EDG Preparation a Isolate SU#I feed to * #1 EDG available a SU2 Transformer Via Temporary a SU2 Transformer Phase (Cable A310/410 and TSG feed to

  • SU#1 feed to A3/A4 could be Switchgear Through A409
  • Temporary Switchgear Pulls to A3 Bus) A309 restored in an emergency as this e #2 EDG aligned with auto-start auto-
  • Green Train Components
  • Remove and replace cable circuit is not disturbed load capability from AI to A309 e Pull new cable segment from 2A9 to A3 switchgear room 9 Unisolate SU#1I feed to A3101A410 Preparation 9 Remove #IEDG output e SU#1 via A310
  • SU2 Transformer Via Temporary o SU2 Transformer Phase (A308 breaker A308 from service a SU#2 via A3 I0/A4 10 Switchgear Through A409 e Temporary Switchgear Tmod Removal) and remove control logic EDG via A3I/A410 **#2
  1. 2 EDG aligned with auto-start auto- e Green Train Components Tmod *load capability
  • SU I Transformer Via Temporary Breaker Through A4 10 Phase One o Isolate SU I Transformer a #1 EDG available 9 SU2 Transformer Via Temporary
  • SU2 Transformer
  • Remove SU I T-Mod Switchgear Through A409
  • Temporary Switchgear

" Restore SU11 Links to AI and * #2 EDG aligned with auto-starl auto-

  • Green Train Components A2 (No re-powering in this load capability phase)

" Restore 2A9 Supply to A310 and A) and perform applicable PMT 10

Major Activities Power Sources Available to A3 Power Sources Available to A4 Protected Train Phase Two o Power A3 from A4

  • SU2 Transformer Via Temporary
  • SU2 Transformer Via Temporary e SU2 Transformer a Remove T-Mods associated Switchgear Via A4 Through A409 Switchgear Through A409 9 Temporary Switchgear with A309 and perform and A410/310. a #2 EDG aligned with auto-starl auto- a Green Train Components applicable PMT * #1 EDG load capability
  • Energize AI from SUI o AACDG
  • AACDG Normal Supply e Al Live Bus Testing e Power A3 from AI (adds e SUI Transformer Via Al. 9 SUI Transformer Via AI to A3 Via second off-site source) A410/310.

Phase Two Final

  • Remove #2EDG output e SUI Transformer Via normal AI
  • SU#1 via A310/A410 - SUI Transformer Step (A408 breaker A408 from service supply e #1 EDG via A310/A4 10 9 A l Switchgear Tmod Removal) and remove control logic e #1 EDG e AACDG via A410
  • Red Train Components Tmod a AACDG via A310 Phase Three
  • Power A4 from A3 a SU I Transformer Via Al. o SU I Transformer Via AI to A3 Via
  • SU I Transformer o Disconnect Temp Switchgear * #I EDG aligned for auto-start A410/3 10.
  • Al Feeder Breaker from to A4 Cables auto-load capability * #2 EDG SU I
  • Reconnect A2 to A4 Cables
  • AACDG o AACDG
  • Red Train Components o Remove T-Mods associated with A409 and perform applicable PMT
  • Energize A2 from SU I Normal Supply o A2 Live Bus Testing
  • Power A4 from A2 I1

Major Activities Power Sources Available to A3 Power Sources Available to A4 Protected Train Phase Four a Transition Temporary Non- e SUI Transformer Via A I or A2 9 SUI Transformer Via A2 or A I Via

  • SUI Transformer Vital Loads to A I and A2 Via A3310410. A310/410. o Either A I or A2 Feeder from Temporary Switchgear * #1 EDG o #2 EDG Breaker from SUI
  • Isolaie SU2 Transformer
  • AACDG e AACDG o Either Red or Green e Remove T-Mod Associated Train Componients with SU2 Temporary Switchgear e Reinstall SU2 Buswork to ALI/A2 e Energize SU2 o Live Bus Testing With SU2 Note: Phase I and the first portion of Phase 2 may be worked concurrently.

12

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION [CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 16 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Subassigned To:

Originated By: James,Dale E 7/5/2013 17:18:01 Performed By: James,Dale E 7/5/2013 17:40:00 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: James,Dale E 7/5/2013 17:40:00 Current Due Date: 07/10/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/10/2013 CA Type: CAT A-CORRECT CA Priority: I Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Document lesson learned that the root cause team provided to Projects for their consideration in preparing for the lift of the refurbished stator.

Response

The lessons learned (interim corrective actions) were sent to the Projects organization for their input on the design review and testing of the new temporary lift assembly for the lift of the refurbished stator on May 23, 2013 (see attached).

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Attachments:

Response Description Attachment to email Response Description Email

Attachment Header Document Name:

Iuntitled Document Location Pesponse Description Attach Title:

Fttachment to email

Interim Action of ANO-1 Stator lift Actions to address the engineering documentation and oversight for the design and implementation for the upcoming rigging plan for the ANO-1 refurbished stator to include:

  • Develop Engineering Change package for the lift itself (Similar to WF3 EC 8432, & Palisades EC 7189)
  • Specify applicable code for special designed lifting device and demonstrate their application

" Perform owner acceptance review of vendor design calculation

  • Perform independent third party modeling of vendor lift assembly
  • Specify load testing requirements

" (Load and Functional performance testing)

" Entergy engineering witness of load test

  • Post load test inspection
  • Installation verification
  • Conduct management challenge meeting focused on risk mitigating aspects of the critical lift
  • Engineering to develop personnel exclusion zone (danger flagged area) considering the stator drop at any point during the lift and resultant building damage as well as the lift assembly failure

" Vendor responsible for lift to implement exclusion zone and minimize to the extent possible individuals within the zone needed to support the lift

Attachment Header Document Name:

Funtitled Document Location lResponse Description Attach Title:

FEmail

JAMES DALEE From: JAM ES, DALE E Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2013 9:37 AM To: HUFF, DANIEL M; AM ES, WIWAM (W MESl@entergy.com); GOODSON, GARY M Cc: Nadeau, James (jnadeal@entergy.com)

Subject:

Interim corrective actions from Rbot Cause Attachments. Interim corrective actions.docx Attached is the interim corrective action currently drafted in the Ibot Cause report to the ANO-1 stator lift.

Ifyou have questions please let me know.

Dale 1

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 17 Group Name Assigned By: P&S Outage Mgmt UI ANO WaltersJoe Randall Assigned To: P&S Outage Mgmt U I ANO WaltersJoe Randall Subassigned To:

Originated By: Walters,Joe Randall 7/13/2013 16:39:21 Performed By: WaltersJoe Randall 7/22/2013 18:57:13 Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By: Farmer,Michael B 7/23/2013 04:18:14 Current Due Date: 07/23/2013 Initial Due Date: 07/23/2013 CAType: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: 1R24 MISC CA

Description:

Add summary of decision section to "Critical Decision on ANO-I Power Recover" paper that was presented at fleet conference call challenge on 7/13/13. Attach the document to this corrective action along with a short narrative of decision process in the response section.

Response

This attached document is the one presented on the fleet challenge on 7/13/13. It does NOT contain the recovery option that became the final decision, and is only attached to comply ver batim with the action section of this CA. The document DOES contain a summary section that outlines the final decision. That summary is copied below.

Summary of Final Decision:

Fleet challenge call was conducted on 7/13/13 with participants from corporate executive management and Waterford 3 personnel. All actions from the fleet challenge were captured under OLA-012-0104, corrective actions 26-35.

Additional conference calls were conducted with site SRC representative, and INPO representatives, to obtain their perspective of the power recovery options.

Licensing input was previously obtained related to entry to Tech Spec 3.4.8.A during dead bus transfer of power to A-4 4160 KV bus. This input was challenged at the licensing CFAM level and determined to be sound.

Final decision was presented to the Shutdown Safety Manager (reference EN-OU-108) on 7/22/13. The final determination was to maintain protected train separation by having power aligned to A3 from A I via SU-I transformer; and to A4 via the temporary switchgear. This will provide redundancy in offsite power sources during the lowered inventory period while the RVCH is installed and tensioned. This change will necessitate a dead bus transfer of A-4 to A-3 after RVCH has been tensioned and RCS level raised out of lowered inventory. This will require entry into Tech Spec 3.4.8.A during the momentary interruption of power as the bus feeder is transferred from A-409 (temp swgr) to A-3 10/4 10 (crosstie from A3).

This transfer is necessary to transition A4 off of the Temporary Switchgear and back on to its normal A2 supply. This transfer should take -1 minute and will be accomplished by control room manipulation of feeder breakers. Specifically, opening A-409 to de-energize A4 followed by closing A-410 to re-energize the A4 bus from A3 (powered from SU-1). This configuration meets all SOPP requirements for the applicable SOPP condition.

Any deviations that are required from this option due to emergent issues or changing plant conditions will be subject to normal schedule risk assessment processes.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

The response is acceptable. the response has been reviewed by the outage risk manager and found to be acceptable. The action is complete and may be closed per the concurrence of the Unit I Outage Manager.

Attachments:

Response Description Power Recovery Sequence Decision

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Attachment Header Document Name:

1untitled Document Location IResponse Description Attach Title:

Power Recovery Sequence Decision

Critical Decision Paper on ANO-1 Power Recovery Summary of Final Decision:

Fleet challenge call was conducted on 7/13/13 with participants from corporate executive management and Waterford 3 personnel. All actions from the fleet challenge were captured under OLA-012-0104, corrective actions 26-35.

Additional conference calls were conducted with site SRC representative, and INPO representatives, to obtain their perspective of the power recovery options.

Licensing input was previously obtained related to entry to Tech Spec 3.4.8.A during dead bus transfer of power to A-4 4160 KV bus. This input was challenged at the licensing CFAM level and determined to be sound.

Final decision was presented to the Shutdown Safety Manager (reference EN-OU-108) on 7/22/13. The final determination was to maintain protected train separation by having power aligned to A3 from Al via SU-1 transformer; and to A4 via the temporary switchgear. This will provide redundancy in offsite power sources during the lowered inventory period while the RVCH is installed and tensioned. This change will necessitate a dead bus transfer of A-4 to A-3 after RVCH has been tensioned and RCS level raised out of lowered inventory. This will require entry into Tech Spec 3.4.8.A during the momentary interruption of power as the bus feeder is transferred from A-409 (temp swgr) to A-310/410 (crosstie from A3). This transfer is necessary to transition A4 off of the Temporary Switchgear and back on to its normal A2 supply. This transfer should take -1 minute and will be accomplished by control room manipulation of feeder breakers. Specifically, opening A-409 to de-energize A4 followed by closing A-410 to re-energize the A4 bus from A3 (powered from SU-1). This configuration meets all SOPP requirements for the applicable SOPP condition.

Any deviations that are required from this option due to emergent issues or changing plant conditions will be subject to normal schedule risk assessment processes.

ORIGINAL CRITICAL DECISION DOCUMENT AFTER THIS POINT!!!

OPTION - 1 Restore SU-1 to Al, then Al to A-3 prior to FTC drain. A-3 and A-4 will be cross tied prior to draining FTC. Available power supplies will be SU-1, #1 EDG, #2 EDG and the AACDG Positives:

  • Normal power alignment of one offsite and all emergency power supplies prior to FTC drain
  • Least schedule impact of the options considered
  • Improves point of discovery problems associated with plant equipment that may be impacted by extended shutdown (RCP seals, PMT on major equipment)
  • Improves point of discovery problems associated with stator replacement (vibration issues, ventilation test, etc.)

Negatives:

  • May require dead buss transfer of A4 from A3 power to A2 normal power ifOption 4 is not technically feasible, This will necessitate entry into Tech Spec 3.4.8.A due to inability to comply with SR 3.4,8.2 (copies of these Tech Specs along with the corresponding ANO-2 Tech Specs for comparison, are attached to the last three pages of this white paper).
  • Loss of SU-1 transformer in this configuration will result in a temporary loss of the running DHR pump until power is restored from an available source. (Time to 200° F is greater than 2.5 hours0.208 days <br />0.0298 weeks <br />0.00685 months <br />)

Recommendation:

RECOMMENDED - This option improves discovery of potential problems on the primary and secondary plant that may result in further extension of the outage and challenges to plant operating staff. The suggested details for implementing this option are explained over the next 3 pages (italicizedprint)

Recovery of electricalbusses per Option I is recommended in 4 phases.

Phase One: (FTC filled to normal refuelina level)

The first phase will consist of 3 major activities:

  • Removal of the temporarymodification associatedwith SU1 supply to A3 and A4.
  • Restoration of SU1 Transformernon segregatedbus to the Al and A2 Switchgear.
  • Restorationof AlternateAC Diesel Generator(2A9) to A3/A4 cross tie.

Phase Two: (FTC filled to normal refuelina level)

Restorationof Al to A3 (from SU-l):

Priorto commencing this work, tags will be clearedon A310/410. To maintainA4 and P34B DH pump operable, cross-tie capabilitymust be establishedbetween A3 and A4. During this configuration, one offslte power source remains operable (SU1 via Al to A3, subsequently to A4 through the cross tie breakersA310/410). Both EDG's remain operable. In addition,the AlternateAC Generatoris now an availablepower source to the safety system busses. This satisfies all SOPP Conditions.

Lowered Inventory would be permitted durina this configuration per SOPP requirements. Technical Specification LCO's 3.4.8 Is satisfied.

Phase Three: (RCS water level restoredabove lowered Inventory conditionfollowing RVCH tensioning)

Restoration of A2 to A4 (fromSU-1):

Prior to commencing this work, cross-tie capability will exist between A3 andA4 and will be the power supply to A4.

During this configuration, one off-site power source remains operable (SUI via Al to A3 through A309 and to A4 through A310/410). SU2 will no longerbe available to A3 and A4 via Temporary Switchgear. Both EDG's and the AACDG remain operable. This is the portion of the restorationsequence that will require a "dead buss" transfer if the capability to verify properphase alignment between A4 bus and the new cable comingfrom A201 is not technicallyfeasible (see option 4).

Lowered Inventory would be oermittedduring this confiaurationper SOPP requirements. TechnicalSpecification LWC's 3.4.8,A would NOT be satisfied if a "dead buss" transfer of A4 Is reguired. This would only be reauiredif properelectricalPhasealianment cannot be verified (see Option 4). This is due to the inability to complv with SR 3.4.8.2 for the time periodof the "deadbuss" electricalswitching ogerationto power A4 from A2.

Phase Four:(RCS water level restoredabove lowered inventory condition following RVCH tensioning)

Restorationof SU2 to A1/A2:

Priorto beginning this phase, required loads must be removed from the Temporary Switchgear and restored to normal. 5U2 Transformerwill be made unavailable to provide temporarypower. Also, SU2 will be inoperablefor Unit 2 during this phase,requiring entry into a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time clock. Priorto switching out and togging SU2, several steps need to be completed to reduce the amount of out of service time for SU2 to Unit 2. All repairsto SU2 bus work in the machine shop must be complete. All loads that were being supplied by the TemporarySwitchgear needed for shutdown operationneed to be aligned to their normal power source. Bus repairs associatedwith Al, A2, H1, and H2 and dead bus testing must be complete and the associatedbreakers ready for operation.All new permanent equipment supporting the SU2 differentialprotection circuitmust be in place with all pre-outage work complete.

SU2 Transformerneeds to be switched out by Entergy Arkansas and tagged. This will require entry into an LCO for Unit 2. Once SU2 is tagged, the leads for the Temporary Switchgear need to be disconnectedfrom the Current Limiting Reactor (CLR) and the CLR connections insulatedfor normal operation. The modified 4160 volt bus links to Al and A2 need to be reconnected. The 6900 volt bus segments will be reinstalled. Required testing (i.e. DLRO, megger, high potential,etc.) will be performed at this time. Once completed satisfactory, SU2 can be untaggedand returnedto servicefor Unit 2.

Priorto calling5U2 TransformeroperableforUnit 1, thefollowing Operationstest procedures will be conducted:

9 1305.029, Supplements i and 2 (Off-Site Power Undervoltageand Protective Relay Test)

  • 1305.005 (SU2 Load Shedding Test)

After successful completion of the above tests, 5U2 Transformer will be operable as an Off-Site Power Sourcefor Unit 1 per Technical Specification LCO 3.8.2. 2 Off-Site Power Sources can be considered operableper the SOPP and all conditions ore satisfied.

Summary The currentplanfor completing this restorationis to complete all actions through "Phase2" prior to draining the fuel transfer canal. This allows one DHR train to be made inoperableduring "dead" buss power transfers without entering any Tech Spec LCO.

Performing the restorationsequence through "Phase2" prior to draining the canal also allows Operationsto work through any potential issues, and gain experience at these evolutions to incorporateinto the plan for the necessary transfers during a mode of applicability"RCS Loops- Mode 5, Loops Not Filled", The goal is to minimize the vulnerability to regulatoryscrutiny associatedwith "dead"buss transfers when the Fuel Transfer Canal is not filled which will require entry into the "immediaterestore" required action of Tech Spec 3.4.8.A

OPTION - 2 Restore SU-1 to Al/A2, then Al/A2 to A3/A4 (respectively) prior to FTC drain Positives:

  • Normal power alignment of one offsite and all emergency power supplies prior to FTC drain
  • No potential for "dead buss" power transfers, therefore no Tech Spec entry.

Negatives:

  • 5 day schedule impact
  • Delays point of discovery on plant equipment that may be impacted by extended shutdown (RCP seals, PMT on major equipment)
  • Delays point of discovery on issues associated with stator replacement (vibration issues, ventilation test, etc.)
  • Longer period of time with only 1 offsite power supply (SU-1) available to ANO-1 Recommendation:

NOT RECOMMENDED - This option delays discovery of potential problems on the primary and secondary plant that may result in further extension of the outage and challenges to plant operating staff.

OPTION - 3 Restore SU-1 and SU-2 transformers to A1/A2, then AL/A2 to A3/A4 (respectively) prior to FTC drain. All offsite power would be restored to normal configuration.

Positives:

  • Normal power alignment of both offsite and all emergency power supplies prior to FTC drain
  • No potential regulatory exposure Negatives:
  • 7 day schedule impact
  • Delays point of discovery on plant equipment that may be impacted by extended shutdown (RCP seals, PMT on major equipment)
  • Delays point of discovery on issues associated with stator replacement (vibration issues, ventilation test, etc.)

Recommendation:

NOT RECOMMENDED - This option delays discovery of potential problems on the primary and secondary plant that may result in further extension of the outage and challenges to plant operating staff.

OPTION - 4 Restore SU-1 to Al then to A3 (same initial conditions as Option 1). Preclude dead bus transfer on A4 by performance of phase alignment check on 4160KV feed from A201 to A409 prior to closing A409. Following phase alignment verification, synchronize A2 feed to A4 and open A410 cross-tie breaker.

Positives:

  • A2 to A4 feeder cable phase verification prior to transfer would allow normal synchronization of power to A4 and preclude a dead buss transfer.
  • No regulatory exposure Negatives:
  • 4160KV phase verification equipment has not been validated to ensure it would allow phase checks to be performed.

Recommendation:

RECOMMENDED - This option is the first recommendation if phase check equipment is determined to be feasible with available equipment. Option 1 will be the second recommended option if this phase check equipment is not functional.

RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled 3.4.B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) 3.4.8 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled LCO 3.4.8 Two decay heat removal (DHR) loops shall be OPERABLE and one OPERABLE DHR loop shall be in operation.

-NOTES

1. All DHR pumps may be removed from operation for -."1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provided:
a. No operations are permitted that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the SDM of LCO 3.1.1: and
b. No draining operations to further reduce the RCS water volume are permitted.
2. One DHR loop may be inoperable for
  • 2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> for surveillance testing provided that the other DHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with RCS loops not filled.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One DHR loop inoperable. A.i Initiate action to restore DHR Immediately loop to OPERABLE status.

ANO-1 3.4.8-1 Amendment No. 215

RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled 3.4.8 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. No required DHR loop B. I Suspend operations that Immediately OPERABLE. would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with OR boron concentration less than required to meet SDM Required DHR loop not in of LCO 3.1. 1.

operation.

AND 6.2 Suspend all operations Immediately involving reduction in RCS water volume.

AND B.3 Initiate action to restore one Immediately DHR loop to OPERABLE status and operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.8. 1 Verify required DHR loop is in operation. 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br /> SR 3.4.8.2 --- NOTE-Not required to be performed until 24 hours1 days <br />0.143 weeks <br />0.0329 months <br /> after a required pump is not in operation.

Verify correct breaker alignment and indicated power 7 days available to each required DHR pump.

ANO-1 3.4.8-2 Amendment No. 215

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.3 a. At least two of the coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE:

1. Reactor Coolant Loop (A) and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump.
2. Reactor Coolant Loop (B) and its associated steam generator and at least one associated reactor coolant pump.
3. Shutdown Coding Loop (A) #.
4. Shutdown Cooling Loop (B) #.
b. At least one of the above coolant loops shall be in operation.*

APPLICABILITY: Modes 4 and 5.

ACTION.

a. With less than the above required coolant loops OPERABLE. immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible: be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 20 hours0.833 days <br />0.119 weeks <br />0.0274 months <br />.
b. With no coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required coolant loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.1.3.1 The required shutdown cooling loop(s) shall be determined OPERABLE per the Inservice Testing Program.

4.4.1.3.2 The required reactor coolant pump(s), if not in operation, shall be determined to be OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.3.3 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying the secondary side water level to be .>23% indicated level at least once per 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br />.

4.4.1.3.4 At least one coolant loop shall be verified to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours0.5 days <br />0.0714 weeks <br />0.0164 months <br />.

All reactor coolant pumps and decay heat removal pumps may be de-energized for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the reactor coolant system boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 1O0F below saturation temperature.

  1. The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in Mode 5.

ARKANSAS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-2a* Amendment No. 24.24,233

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Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION j CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 18 Group ] Name ]

Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To:

Originated By: McCartyLarry A 7/23/2013 13:22:26 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 10/09/2013 Initial Due Date: 10/10/2013 CA Type: CAT A-EOC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Identify any critical lifts to be performed with vendor specialty equipment in the fleet. Ensure lessons learned from the ANO event are factored into the review of the design and test plans.

Response

Actions have been issued in WT-2013-005 CA133-145) to all Project Managers in the fleet and to appropriate Project management personnel in the corporate offiece to identify any critical lifts to be performed with vendor specialty equipment in the fleet. Ensure lessons learned from the ANO event are factored into the review of the design and test plans.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy CA DUE DATE EXTENSION TCR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00018 Version: I Approved: W-Requested Duedate: 10/10/2013 Previous Duedate: 08/15/2013 Requested By: Gillespie,Richard D 07/25/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 07/27/2013 Request

Description:

Actions from the Fleet Director of Project Management have been issued in (WT-2013-005 CAI33-145) to all Project Managers in the fleet and to appropriate Project Management personnel in the corporate office to identify any critical lifts to be performed with vendor specialty equipment in the fleet and to ensure lessons learned from the ANO event are factored into the review of the design and test plans.

It is necessary to extend this action to support obtaining responses to the WT actions. It is acceptable to extend this because there is no plant operability issues related to this action. The action is to share lessons learned information from the ANO IR24 Stator Drop event. This DDE is being submitted at the request of the ANO Manager of Projects.

Approved

Description:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 19 Group I Name Assigned By: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Vice President Project Mgmt HQN Eubanks,Clifford Subassigned To : Vice President Project Mgmt HQN James Jr,William J Originated By: McCarty,LarryA 7/23/2013 13:29:58 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 09/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 10/01/2013 CA Type: CAPR CA Priority: I Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence (CAPR):

CAPR-l:Revise EN-DC-I 14, Project Management, to provide guidance in specifying contract language which will ensure detailed engineering calculations, quality requirements and standards are provided for internal and third party review, in accordance with revised EN-MA-1 19, Material Handling Program, when specially designed temporary lift assembles are to be used.

Annotate steps implementing this CAPR per EN-AD-1Ol-01 requirements. Example: [CAPR-1: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888]

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION TCR-ANO-C-2.013-00888 CA Number: 20 Group Name Assigned By: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Fleet Maintenance Mgmt HQN Stewart,Samuel Subassigned To:

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 13:38:28 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 08/29/20)3 Initial Due Date: 08/30/2013 CA Type: CAPR CA Priority: I Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

CAPR-2: Revise EN-MA-I 19, Material Handling Program, Section 5.2[7] to remove the Note and require a documented engineering response be developed, if not previously performed, to evaluation critical lifts if using:

i. Any specially designed temporary lifting device, or ii. Any lifting device that cannot be load tested per EN-MA- 119 criteria, or iii. Any lifting device without a certified load rating name plate rating affixed to it The engineering response will include the following:
  • An owner review in accordance with EN-DC-149, Acceptance of Vendor Documents, documenting the structural acceptance and testing of the assembly
  • Verification of a third party independent review of vendor calculations
  • Verification of appropriate code application including application of appropriate safety factors
  • Verification of 3D finite element analysis modeling performed if a load test < 125% of the projected hook load is not performed
  • Verification of Load Testing:
    • Load and Functional performance
    • Witness test
    • Specification of additional safety factors when load testing is not possible
  • Examination of critical welds post load test
  • Installation verification
  • Establishment of an exclusion zone considering the failure of the lift assembly and worst case load drop
  • Identification of Plant Equipment that could be damaged due to the lift assembly failure (Use WF3 EC 8432, & Palisades EC 7189 as examples)

Annotate steps implementing this CAPR per EN-AD- 10 1-01 requirements. Example: [CAPR-2: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888]

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 21 Group I Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Fleet Maintenance Mgmt HQN Stewart,Samuel Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 13:59:49 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 08/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 08/30/2013 CA Type: CARB REVIEW CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Include ANO CARB in review of changes to EN-MA-I 19 being made to address this root cause.

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

SEntergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 22 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:03:46 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 09/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 09/30/2013 CAType: CATA-CC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Reinforce EN-DC-1 14 standards for establishing vendor oversight plans for the purpose of ensuring execution of contract requirements.

  • Specifically address that significant changes to project scope requires a change to the plan
  • Project Management Responsibilities for establishing oversight of important contract provision.

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 23 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCartyLarry A 7/23J2013 14:06:12 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 09/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 09/30/2013 CA Type: CAT A-CC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Establish and implement a 'Will Sheet' for a one cycle period to monitor and provide feedbacks to ensure that project managers are implementing the EN-DC-I 14 process for vendor oversight.

This actions may be closed after development of the 'Will Sheet' and a formal way of insuring that the will sheet is completed for each project.

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

AEntergy 2 CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00848 CA Number: 24 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To:

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:10:00 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 03/04/2014 Initial Due Date: 03/05/2014 CA Type: CAT A-CC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Revise Root Cause Report based on completed Exponent Report addressing unlikely or possible failure modes.

  • Unlikely Failure Modes that need additional analysis are FM I - Material Failure and FM2 - Equipment Malfunction
  • Possible Failure mode FM3 - Crane Structure Overload needs additional analysis to support or refute if live loads also contributed to the design flaw.

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 25 Group I Name Assigned By: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCartyLarry A 7/23/2013 14:24:10 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 03/13/2014 Initial Due Date: 03/14/2014 CA Type: CARB REVIEW CA Priority: .4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Present to CARB the revised Root Cause Report based on completing the Exponent Report

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 26 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Fleet Maintenance Mgmt HQN Stewart,Samuel Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:25:44 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 09/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 09/30/2013 CA 1ype: CAT A-CC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Perform gap analysis on EN-MA-1 19 against SOER 06-01

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 27 Group I Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Vice President Project Mgmt HQN Gordon,Robert A Subassigned To : Vice President Project Mgmt HQN James JrWilliam J Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:28:44 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 10/28/2013 Initial Due Date: 10/30/2013 CA Type: ENHANCEMENT CA Priority: 5 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Consider implementing ANO 'Will Sheet' developed to monitor and provide feedback to Project Management on implementation of EN-DC- 114 process for vendor oversight at a fleet level.

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 28 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Vice President Project Mgmt HQN Eubanks,Clifford Subassigned To:

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:31:34 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 10/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 10/30/2013 CA Type: ENHANCEMENT CA Priority: 5 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Consider enhancing the guidance in Section 4.0[6](f) of EN-DC- 114, Project Management, to include in the consideration of team composition experience necessary to assess adequacy of associated decisions related to high consequence evolutions.

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION SCi.ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 29 Group Name Assigned By: Eng Outage Mgmt ANO McCoy,Jaime H Assigned To: Eng Outage Mgmt ANO Edgell,Douglas W Subassigned To: Eng Outage Mgmt ANO Butler,Paul Wayne Originated By: Butler,Paul Wayne 7/26/2013 14:39:13 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 08/02/2013 Initial Due Date: 08/02/2013 CAType: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Develop an integrated Start-up monitoring plan for Unit I as it exits IR24. Key elements of this plan will included structured monitoring of all critical plant parameters by Engineering, Operations, Chemistry, Maintenance, Stator the Rewind Project, and the Recovery Project. Document the plan, the actions that will be taken as Unit 1 starts up and any input from Entergy Senior Management.

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS April 29, 2013 Received FOIA from region.

Unit 1

- Mode: None

- RISK: GREEN

-SFP Temp: 89 F

- TTB: 12.3 hrs

- RCS Level: - 0.5 ft below vessel flange

- Both trains ECCS available

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SU1 supplying power to vital busses A3 and A4; both EDGs available Restoration All debris associated with the Bigge lift rig has been removed. Plan to remove stator from the train bay either Tuesday or Wednesday.

Plan to installed radiation shields over the reactor vessel opening today to reduce dose rates for work on DH-17 check valve.

As soon as the A3 bus is powered by SU2 through the temporary switchgear (should be complete tomorrow morning), the licensee will remove the B train EDG from service to commence Green train electrical maintenance.

Completed core offload at 1905 April 28.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 29%

- RISK: GREEN

- AC Power: Restored to normal configuration Restoration Holding at 29% power for feedwater iron cleanup. Should achieve 100% power some time tomorrow. Criticality achieved 0920 yesterday. Resident staff observed criticality operations for about 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br /> on Sunday.

No LCOs.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS April 30, 2013 Provided a hardcopy of the NSIR guidance on enforcement discretion for cyber security requirements to Stephenie Pyle.

Unit I

- Mode: Defueled

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 89 F

- TTB: 12.4 hrs

- RCS Level: Cold legs drained

- Both trains ECCS available

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SU1 supplying power to vital busses A3 and A4; both EDGs available Restoration Plan to remove stator from the train bay tomorrow.

Completed installing radiation shielding over the reactor vessel opening.

As soon as the A3 bus is powered by SU2 through the temporary switchgear (should be complete in a couple days), the licensee will remove the B train EDG from service to commence Green train electrical maintenance. Ultimately, the licensee plans to power nonvital busses from the temporary switchgear instead of the temporary diesel generators.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 98%

- RISK: GREEN, yellow later today due to work in the switchyard

- AC Power: Restored to normal configuration

- RCS Leakage: 0.009 gpm Restoration Holding at 98% for NI calibration, should achieve 100% shortly.

No LCOs.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS May 1, 2013 Unit 1

- Mode: Defueled

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 96 F

- TTB: 12.5 hrs

- RCS Level: Cold legs drained

- Both trains ECCS available

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SUW supplying power to A4; both EDGs available. A3 is currently deenergized to facilitate testing of temporary switchgear from SU2 to A3.

Restoration Plan to remove stator from the train bay Friday. Still waiting to have a regional call with the licensee

- on the details of the stator removal.

As soon as the A3 bus testing of SU2 through the temporary switchgear is completed, the licensee will remove the B train EDG from service to commence Green train electrical maintenance. The A3 bus will continue to be powered by SUL1 and SU2 will only be used if all other power sources are lost. The licensee plans to power nonvital busses from the temporary switchgear instead of the temporary diesel generators as soon as the EC is completed around the 6/7th.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 100%

- RISK: GREEN, yellow later today due to work in the switchyard

- AC Power: SU2 is inoperable due to testing of the temporary switchgear to A3

- RCS Leakage: 0.009 gpm Restoration RCP "C" middle seal is degraded. The current differential pressure is 503 psid (nominal is 715). An ODMI is being developed, but even if the seal completely failed, there is operating experience demonstrating that the plant could continue operation with 2 seals.

Entered a 72-hr LCO this morning at 0456 due to temporary switchgear testing. Should exit LCO today after testing is complete.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS May 2, 2013 Unit 1

- Mode: Defueled

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 98 F

- TTB: 12 hrs

- RCS Level: Cold legs drained

- Both trains ECCS available

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SUW supplying power to A3 and A4; both EDGs available.

Restoration Plan to remove stator from the train bay Friday. Still waiting to have a regional call with the licensee on the details of the stator removal.

As soon as the A3 bus testing of SU2 through the temporary switchgear is completed, the licensee will remove the B train EDG from service to commence Green train electrical maintenance. The A3 bus will continue to be powered by SUW and SU2 will only be used if all other power sources are lost. The licensee plans to power nonvital busses from the temporary switchgear instead of the temporary diesel generators as soon as the EC is completed around the 6/7th.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 100%

- RISK: Yellow

- AC Power: All onsite and offsite power sources are opperable

- RCS Leakage: 0.026 gpm Yellow risk due to work in the switchyard to replace the Pleasant Hill line insulators (line is deenergized).

Restoration RCP "C" middle stage seal differential pressure has remained stable. The current differential pressure is 503 psid (nominal is 715). An ODMI is being developed, but even if the seal completely failed, there is operating experience demonstrating that the plant could continue operation with 2 seals.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS May 3, 2013 Unit I

- Mode: Defueled

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 96 F

- TTB: 12 hrs

- RCS Level: Cold legs drained

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SUl supplying power to A3 and A4; EDG "A" available.

Restoration Plan to remove stator from the train bay Friday or Saturday. Completed cutting out interfering concrete on the west end. Residents attended 0900 IPTE for the stator move. Residents will be observing portions of the lift/removal this weekend as directed by regional management.

Began Green train electrical maintenance window, which includes (will include) maintenance on the A-4 vital bus, B-6 non-vital bus, D06 safety-related battery, and the B EDG.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 100%

- RISK: Yellow

- AC Power: All onsite and offsite power sources are opperable

- RCS Leakage: 0.019 gpm Yellow risk due to work in the switchyard to replace the Pleasant Hill line insulators (line is deenergized).

RCP "C" middle stage seal differential pressure has remained stable. The current differential pressure is approximately 500 psid (nominal is 715). The ODMI should be completed 5/7.

IDoc66 Procedure Contains NMM REFLIB Forms: YES [] NO C]

Effective Procedure Owner: J. R. Eichenberger Governance Owner: Alan Ettlinger Date Title: Mgr, CA&A Manager Title: Fleet Manager OE&CA 05/24/13 Site: ANO Site: HQN Exception Site Site Procedure Champion Title Date*

ANO J. R. Eichenberger Mgr, CA&A N/A BRP N/A N/A N/A CNS Linda R. Dewhirst GGNS James Nadeau Mgr, CA&A IPEC Ed Firth Mgr, CA&A JAF Ty Hunt Mgr, CA&A PNPS Ted Bordelon Mgr, CA&A PLP Andrew Notbohm Mgr, CA&A RBS Peg Lucky Mgr, CA&A VY Jon Bengtson Mgr, CA&A W3 William McKinney Mgr, CA&A N/A NP N/A N/A HQN Richard Courtney Mgr, CA&A Projects Site and NMM Procedures Canceled or Superseded By This Revision Process Applicability Exclusion: All Sites: Ui Specific Sites: ANO 0 BRP [I GGNS 0 IPECZ JAF 0 PLP 0Z PNPS N RBS 0 VY 0 W3 0 NP El Change Statement Editorial change to 5.9[2] to include obtaining prior concurrence for procedure changes required to address RCE causes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................ 03

2.0 REFERENCES

..................................................................................................................... 03 3.0 DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................................... 05 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................................................................ 12 5.0 DETAILS, ............................................................................................................................. 16 6.0 INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................... 44 7.0 RECORDS .......................................................................................................................... 45 8.0 SITE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ..................................................................................... 46 9.0 ATTACHMENTS ................................................................................................................. 49 ATTACHMENT 9.1 ..................................................... CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY 50 ATTACHMENT 9.2 ................................................................................ EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS 56 ATTACHMENT 9.3 ............................................................................................................ MANUAL CR INITIATION 59 ATTACHMENT 9.4 ................................................................. CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES 63 ATTACHMENT 9.5 ..................................................................... ENTERGY FLEET LEARNING REVIEW PROCESS 66 ATTACHMENT 9.6 GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF CRS ON LOWER LEVEL EQUIPMENT ISSUES 69 ATTACHMENT 9.7 ........................................................................................... TYPICAL NONCONFORMANCE TAG 70 ATTACHMENT 9.8 .............................................................................. CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM 71 ATTACHMENT 9.9 ..................................................................................................... LTCA CLASSIFICATION FORM 72 ATTAHCMENT 9.10 CR ASSIGNMENT AND LIFE CYCLE PROCESS MAP 73

1.0 PURPOSE

[1] This procedure provides instructions for the administration of Entergy (EN) Corrective Action process, including the identification, reporting, evaluation, and correction of a broad range of problems, areas for improvements, and standards performance deficiencies.

Issues addressed in the corrective action process must include Adverse Conditions and Conditions Adverse to Quality, and can include minor problems that may be precursors to more significant events, areas for improvement and standards performance deficiencies identified during assessments and other activities. [10 CFR 50], [JAFP-91-0834], [P32648], [P33542]

[2] This procedure provides management expectations and guidance for the implementation of the EN Condition Reporting Process.

NOTE Throughout the procedure, position titles are used but are not procedural obligations. The intent is to identify functional responsibilities only. Each site will implement the intended function according to its organizational structure and position titles.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 References (a) Title 10, Code Of Federal Regulation, Part 50, Appendix B (b) ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants (c) NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 9900, "Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions adverse to Quality or Safety" (d) ANSI 45.2.10, Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions (e) Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM)

(f) SOER 02-4 Rec 3, Rx Press Vessel Head Degradation at Davis-Besse (g) Nuclear Management Manual Procedure, EN-LI-104, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process (h) Nuclear Management Manual Procedure, EN-OE-100, Operating Experience Program (i) North American Electrical Reliability Corporation (NERC) Standards

2.1 cont (j) GGNS Procedure: 01-S-06-5, Reportable Events or Conditions (k) WF3 Procedures: UNT-006-010, Event Notification and Reporting (I) Nuclear Management Manual Procedure, EN-MA-1 23, Identification and Trending of Rework (m) Program Section CEP-R&R-001, ASME Section Xl, Division 1- Repairs and Replacements (n) Program Section CEP-CII-001, ASME Section Xl Repairs and Replacements of Containment Items (o) NRC Administrative Letter 98-10, "Dispositioning of Technical Specifications that are insufficient to Assure Plant Safety" (p) NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (q) NRC Information Notice 97-78, "Crediting Of Operator Actions In Place Of Automatic Actions And Modifications Of Operator Actions, Including Response Times" (r) SOER 10-2, "Engaged, Thinking Organizations", Rec 1 (s) CAPR CR-PLP-2009-05938 2.2 Obligations and Industry Standards Implemented Overall (a) 10CFR50 (b) CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060 (c) QAPM A.1 .d (Overall procedure implements)

(d) ANSI N18.7 5.2.11 (Overall procedure implements)

(e) ANSI N18.7 5.2.15 (Overall procedure implements)

(f) ANSI N18.7 5.3.2 (Overall procedure implements)

(g) ANSI N45.2.2 5.5 (Overall procedure implements)

(h) ANSI N45.2.12 4.4.5 (Overall procedure implements) 2.3 Obligations and Industry Standards Section Specific (a) Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM)

2.3 cont.

(b) ANSI N18.7 (c) ANSI N45.2.4 (d) ANSI N45.2.11 (e) ANSI N45.2.12 (f) ANSI N45.2.13 (g) 10 CFR 50.72 (h) 10 CFR 50.73 (i) 10 CFR 73.71 3.0 DEFINITIONS

[1] Administrative Corrective Action - A Corrective Action (CA) issued to facilitate moving the CR response and CA plan through the processes identified in LI-102. These actions typically have no direct impact on actions necessary to correct the identified condition, rather they document administrative steps involved in the process (i.e., an action issued by CA&A to direct closure review of a CR, an action issued to re-evaluate closure of a CR based upon issues identified by a CA&A closure review, etc.).

[2] Adverse Condition - An event, defect, characteristic, state or activity that prohibits or detracts from safe, efficient nuclear plant operation or a condition that could credibly impact nuclear safety, personnel safety, plant reliability or non-compliance with federal, state, or local regulations. Adverse conditions include non-conformances, conditions adverse to quality and plant reliability concerns. Examples of adverse conditions are contained in Attachment 9.2. [P3098]

(3] Adverse Trend - Undesirable change in frequency of occurrence of a parameter or undesirable level of occurrence of a parameter that warrants management attention or corrective action to improve the performance. This negative change in performance is undesirable because of the adverse impact on safety or reliability or because of the large (relative) number of similar performance problems in a bin that point to more significant future problems if not addressed.

[4] Apparent Cause - A likely cause for a condition that is determined by less rigorous means of evaluation than a root cause.

3.0 cont.

[5] ASME Section XI Boundary - The ASME Section Xl boundary includes those portions of systems, components, and their supports that are classified as In-service Inspection Class 1, 2, 3, MC (Metal Containment), or CC (Concrete Containment). The ASME Section Xl Boundaries are defined in site boundary drawings. With respect to ISI Classes 1, 2, and 3, these classifications include the following:

(a) ASME Classes 1, 2, and 3 (b) Quality Groups A, B, and C (c) Classes T2, T3, and T3/Critical (Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 only)

[6] CAR (Corrective Action Request) Condition Report - A type of Learning Organization document that can be written by the Supplier Quality Assurance group to document and track evaluations of vendor issues.

[7] Condition - An issue or discrete occurrence that warrants documentation using a Condition Report (CR).

[8] Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) - As described in IOCFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, such conditions include failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defects, and non-conformances. This is a condition of a System, Structure, Component or Software (SSC) that could potentially render the SSC degraded or inoperable.

[91 Condition Report (CR) - A computer generated or paper form used to document issues into the corrective action process.

[10] Condition Review Group (CRG) - A management group responsible for CR review, categorization and assignment of responsibilities. [P2993]

[11] Conditional Release - A controlled release of materials, parts, or components that have not been fully accepted under the Quality Assurance program. This type of release serves to identify and track an item until it becomes accepted or other disposition action is completed.

[12] Contributing Cause - An identified cause that, if corrected, would not by itself have prevented the event. This type of cause may have facilitated the event's occurrence, increased its severity, or lengthened the time to discovery.

[13] Corrective Action - Corrective Actions (CAs) include actions intended to preclude repetition of significant conditions (see CAPRs) and those intended to correct adverse conditions.

3.0 cont.

[14] Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition (CAPRs) - A type of Corrective Action (CA) intended to correct the root cause(s) of a condition and thereby preclude repetition.

[15] Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) - A group, consisting of a cross section of personnel familiar with a particular Condition Report, assembled for the purpose of review and approval of cause evaluations and corrective action plans. The CARB chairman ensures that adequate representation is in attendance at meetings in accordance with CARB quorum requirements. [P23035]

[16] Degraded Condition - A degraded condition is one in which the qualification of a structure, system or component or its functional capability is reduced. Examples of degraded conditions are failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, and defective material and equipment. Examples of conditions that can reduce the capability of a system are aging, erosion, corrosion, improper operation, and maintenance

[17] Department Performance Improvement Coordinators (DPIC) - departmental personnel as defined in ENOS/GOES to functionally perform and/or implement continuous improvement programs, including the Corrective Action Program (CAP), for their organizations.

[Chemistry, Engineering, Maintenance, Materials Purchasing & Contracts, Operations, Planning & Scheduling, Radiation Protection, Security, and Training]

[18] Deviation - A nonconformance or departure of a characteristic from specified requirements.

[19] Disposition - CR Disposition is the outcome of the review of a reported problem by the CR Owner, as designated by the CRG. The disposition includes (as appropriate) the cause of the condition as determined by the CA to perform an evaluation, the extent of condition, actions to address causes, and a plan for implementing those actions that is commensurate with the significance of the problem. Completion of CR Disposition does not require the completion of all corrective actions.

[20] Effectiveness Reviews - Performance based reviews undertaken to verify that an intended result was achieved. Effectiveness Reviews are normally assigned by CARB to the Responsible Manager, but may be assigned to another group for evaluation. [P23038]

[21] Employee Concerns Program (ECP) - A program implemented to support a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). The ECP provides an alternate means for any employee to report any type of problem or concern.

[22] Enhancements - Improvement items or actions that address conditions, which meet minimum acceptable criteria, or performance standards but may be less than optimum.

Enhancements should be identified in the CR response because they add value, but may or may not be tracked to completion by the CR process. The enhancement designation is not appropriate if the action is needed to correct the originally identified adverse condition or if the action is needed to address an identified cause.

3.0 cont.

[23] Extent of Condition - An evaluation/review to identify the total population of items that have or may have the same problem as identified in the original CR problem statement. The intent of the Extent of Condition review focuses on a determination of any potential impact to the operability/functionality of the similar components, equipment, systems, human performance traps/issues, or organizational processes/programs.

124] Inadequate Technical Specification - A specific Technical Specifications requirement (parameter value or action) that may not support safety assumptions or conclusions.

125] Industrial Safety Incident - An incident that results in either an OSHA Recordable or OSHA Reportable condition.

[26] Learning Organization (LO) - An organizational culture that embraces a never-ending drive for continuous improvement, as highlighted by people at every level in the organization continually increasing their capacity to produce good results and constantly learning from others as means to systematically and deliberately realize operational excellence.

[27] Learning Organization (LO) Documents - Documents written to provide a consolidated record of assessments, benchmark trips, CAPR effectiveness reviews, and other activities.

Learning Organization documents are not processed through the Control Room, Licensing, or the CRG. LO documents are governed by EN-LI-1 04, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process. (LO-WTs are NOT considered LO documents. They are ungoverned Work Tracking actions with no specific controls.)

(28] Long Term Condition Report (LTCR) - A CR that contains an approved Long Term CA.

[29] Long Term Corrective Action (LTCA) - Action(s) that cannot meet the timeframes established and approved in accordance with the Corrective Action Processing Guidelines (Attachment 9.4).

[30] Management - Defined as Supervisor and above (Supv, Supt., Manager, GMPO, V.P. etc.)

or as personnel recognized as having direct reports.

[31] A Nonconforming Condition is a condition of a System, Structure or Component (SSC) that involves a failure to meet the Current Licensing Basis (CLB) or a situation in which quality has been reduced because of factors such as improper design, testing, construction, or modification. The following are examples of nonconforming conditions:

  • An SSC fails to conform to one or more applicable codes or standards (e.g., the CFR, operating license, TSs, UFSAR, and/or licensee commitments).
  • An as-built or as-modified SSC does not meet the CLB.

" Operating experience or engineering reviews identify a design inadequacy.

  • Documentation required by NRC requirements'such as 10CFR50.49 is not available or deficient

3.0 cont.

[32] Non-Significant - A classification for condition reports (typically, B, C, D categories) that document problems or corrective actions for which a repeat occurrence, while always undesirable, can be tolerated.

[33] OPERABLE-Degraded or Nonconforming (Operable-DNC) - A condition where a TS SSC is OPERABLE but a Degraded or Nonconforming Condition exists that does not require Compensatory Measures.

[34] Owner - (Responsible Manager) The management position within the PCRS management group that was designated by the CRG to ensure the condition is corrected in accordance with the requirements of this procedure. The Owner may be a Superintendent or above position and is equal to the term "Responsible Manager' as used in this procedure.

[35] Paperless Condition Reporting System (PCRS) - A computer program that tracks actions resulting from the processes described within this procedure.

[36] Repair - The process of restoring a nonconforming characteristic to a condition such that the capability of an item to function reliably and safely is unimpaired, even though that item still may not conform to the original requirement.

[37] Repetitive Event - any significant condition adverse to quality that resulted from the same identified root cause as a previous event or nonconformance. This doesn't apply to conditions classified as significant due to the frequency of the event/condition (i.e., adverse trend).

[38] Responsible Manager (RM) - (Owner) The management position within the PCRS management group that is designated by the CRG to ensure the condition is corrected in accordance with the requirements of this procedure. The RM may be a Superintendent or above position and is equal to the term "Owner" as used in this procedure.

[39] Rework - From a plant maintenance efficiency perspective, rework is the re-performance of an assigned activity, in whole or in part, because the original problem/issue was not corrected the first time resulting in a loss of time, money or quality. From a quality perspective, rework is the process by which a nonconforming item is made to conform to a prior specified requirement by completion, re-machining, reassembling, or other corrective means.

[40] Root Cause - The most basic cause(s) for a failure or a condition that, if corrected or eliminated, will preclude repetition of the event or condition.

[41] Root Cause Analysis (RCA) - Structured, formatted process that documents the root cause(s) of a condition or event. The root cause is determined using recognized methodologies. RCAs are performed in accordance LI-1 18, "Root Cause Analysis Process."

RCAs are used for complex issues or those where the cause is not understood or readily known.

3.0 cont.

[42] Routine Report - NRC reports that are generated at a fixed frequency or as required by regulations except for 10CFR50.55, 50.72, and 50.73. For example, 10CFR50.46 reports of ECCS performance modeling errors of insufficient magnitude to trigger a report under other regulations are considered routine.

[43] Safeguards Condition Report - A Condition Report documenting a Safeguard condition.

The condition description contains as much information as possible to ensure proper prioritization within the corrective action program by the CRG without providing any safeguards information. Where additional (safeguards) information is required to describe the condition, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified and referenced safeguards document. The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

[44] Significance Determination Process (SDP) - A process by which a condition documented on a CR can be assessed in terms of its risk significance relative to objectives of reactor safety, radiation program effectiveness, emergency planning, & physical security program effectiveness.

[45] Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality (SCAQ) - Conditions such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material & equipment, and non-conformances which have resulted in, or could result in, a significant degradation or challenge to nuclear safety.

[46] Significant - A classification for CRs determined to meet one or more of the following:

[P5431]

Any Significant Condition Adverse to Quality. Conditions such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances which have resulted in, or could result in, a significant degradation or challenge to nuclear safety.

  • A problem recognized as having a greater than acceptable recurrence rate as determined by the CRG.
  • Any event or nonconformance that meets the definition of repetitive event.
  • A serious industrial safety incident as determined by CRG or a near miss occurred that in the judgment of the CRG could have resulted in a serious industrial safety incident.
  • A major breakdown in processes that implement QA Program Requirements as determined by the CRG.
  • Events or conditions designated as significant or considered important by management for reasons other than those that fall into the above categories.

3.0 cont.

[471 Site -The term "site" is used when referring to a specific Entergy nuclear plant or Headquarters (HQN).

[48] Structures, Systems or Components (SSC) Operability - Structures, Systems or Components, for Operability Determinations:

" Are those SSCs that are required to be operable by Technical Specifications (TSs).

These SSCs may perform required support functions for other SSCs required to be operable by TSs (e.g., emergency diesel generators and service water).

" Are those SSCs that are not explicitly required to be operable by TSs, but that perform required support functions (as specified by the TSs definition of operability) for SSCs that are required to be operable by TSs.

[49] Structures, Systems or Components (SSC) Functionality - Structures, Systems or Components, for Functionality Assessments are those that are not described in TSs, but which warrant programmatic controls to ensure that SSC availability and reliability are maintained.

" SSCs and related controls are included in programs related to Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, "Quality Standards and Records," and Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65).

" Additionally, SSCs warrant functionality assessments within the processes used to address degraded and nonconforming conditions because they perform specified functions described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), technical requirements manual, emergency plan, fire protection plan, regulatory commitments, or other elements of the current licensing basis (CLB).

[50] Trip Sensitive System - Any system or component that upon actuation or failure could cause a reactor trip. Trip Sensitive Systems may be specifically identified for each site.

[51] Use-As-Is - A disposition which may be imposed for a nonconformance when it can be established that the discrepancy will result in no adverse conditions and that the item under consideration meets all engineering functional requirements (performance, maintainability, fit and safety) originally specified or as otherwise determined to be acceptable under engineering evaluation.

[52] Verification of Acceptability Evaluation - An evaluation performed on a nonconforming item in the ASME Section XI Boundary to ensure that the proposed repair, rework, replacement, or modification activity appropriately corrects the nonconforming condition with due consideration to the cause of failure. This evaluation does not apply to non-conformances associated with the In-service Testing (IST) Program.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

[1] All personnel working at EN facilities are responsible for: [QAPM A.6.a]

(a) Identifying and reporting problems. [P22828]

(b) Documenting problems by initiating CRs in accordance with this procedure.

(c) Assigning a CA Type code and matching CA Priority in PCRS in accordance with the Corrective Action to CA Type table in Attachment 9.4 when initiating a CA in PCRS.

[2] EN Management (Supervisor and above) is responsible for: [QAPM A.6.a], [QAPM A.6.c]

(a) Ensuring that personnel are familiar with the requirements of this procedure.

(b) Ensuring that problems are reported.

(c) Ensuring recommendations on trend codes are provided for CRs assigned to their department prior to CRG. [QAPM A.6.e]

(d) Ensuring that required actions for Condition Reports are determined, implemented, and adequate to resolve the condition.

(e) Ensuring performance of Effectiveness Reviews when assigned.

(f) Ensuring that non-conforming items are segregated as appropriate and controlled as needed until dispositioning the item to be conforming or it is otherwise discarded after removal for testing/maintenance and through disposal or reinstallation (g) Ensuring keywords and problem codes are appropriate based on investigation results.

(h) (For Responsible Managers) Approving RCEs, ACEs and Analysis assigned to their Department. This responsibility should only be delegated when the Responsible Manager is not available and then it should be performed by the individual that is Acting for their position in their absence.

[31 Each Site's Manager, Corrective Actions and Assessment and the Manager CA&A Projects is responsible for: [QAPM A.2.G.7], [QAPM A.6.c]

(a) Administering the Corrective Action Program.

(b) Administering the Root Cause investigation and review process and performing effectiveness reviews for CAPRs when assigned by CARB.

[4] Each Site's Manager, Security and the Manager Security Operations is responsible for: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(a) Safeguards Condition Report requirements as follows:

(1) Ensuring when a uniquely identified safeguards document is needed that the CR references the uniquely identified safeguards document and that the safeguards document references the CR (2) Maintaining and controlling the uniquely identified safeguards document in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards procedural requirements

4.0 (4] cont (3) Retaining the uniquely identified safeguards document in accordance with the retention requirements of the Corrective Action Process at the individual site.

(4) Ensuring a representative of the Security Department, with Safeguards authorization is present at the CR Pre-Screening, if applicable, and at Condition Review Group (CRG).

(5) Determining when CRG and CARB members are required to be Safeguards qualified based on the nature of the CR being reviewed

[5] Each Safeguards Custodian is responsible for: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(a) Safeguards Condition Report requirements as follows:

(1) Maintaining and controlling the uniquely identified safeguards document in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards procedural requirements

[6] Each site's Manager, Licensing, or as assigned by management at off-site locations, is responsible for: [P21440]

(a) Reviewing CRs and administering the SDP in accordance with Section 5.5.

(b) Performing Reportability Reviews and documenting the results in PCRS.

(c) Issuing CAs for determinations and evaluations that are needed to determine reportability. This includes Past Operability/Functionality Determinations or Evaluations performed on identified conditions, potential or actual 10 CFR 21 conditions, and any other Indeterminate Reportability items.

(d) Issuing CAs to address NRC violations or findings and performing closure reviews of responses to such CAs.

[7] Each site's Manager, Planning and Scheduling / Outages is responsible for:

(a) Monitoring and reporting to CRG the status of WOs that have CRs/CAs closed to them.

[8] The Condition Review Group (CRG),is responsible for: [P2993], [P21440], [P21439]

(a) Reviewing CRs to classify, categorize, and assign responsibility. Categories are classified as per Attachment 9.1.

(b) Approving closure of CRs to other processes.

(c) Determining when to apply Attachment 9.5 Entergy Fleet Learning Review Process.

(d) Ensures appropriate operability/functionality reviews are performed per EN-OP-1 04.

(e) Oversight of Operable-Degraded or Nonconforming (Operable-DNC) or Operable-Comp Measures conditions (f) Determining when to apply CARB oversight responsibilities to Apparent Cause evaluations.

4.0 cont

[9] The Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) is responsible for: [P23035]

(a) Reviewing and approving Root Cause evaluations including their proposed corrective action plan. Reviewing selected Responsible Manager approved Apparent Cause evaluations and their action plans directing changes where needed.

(b) Assigning Effectiveness Reviews to the Responsible Manager, or appropriate group, for Category "A" CRs and management selected Category "B" CRs.

(c) Reviewing, and approving or disapproving Due Date Extension Requests for CARB approved CAPRs. The CARB Chairperson may approve Due Date Extension Requests for CARB approved CAPRs rather than convening the full board.

(d) Determining when to apply Attachment 9.5 Entergy Fleet Learning review process if not already applied by CRG.

(e) CARB members and their alternates complete a training Job Familiarization Guide, per EN-FAP-LI-003, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) process.

(f) Reviewing, and approving (or disapproving) requests to cancel CAPRs that may no longer be needed or that might need to be replaced.

[10] The Fleet Manager OE & CA is responsible for maintenance of this procedure.

[11] The Site NSA Director (or GM Fleet Operations Support for Headquarters) is responsible for evaluating Anonymous CRs for SCWE issues.

[12] Where assigned / used, Department Performance Improvement Coordinators (DPIC) are responsible for:

(a) Being the point of contact for the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and assisting with implementation of the requirements of EN-LI-102.

(b) Providing recommendations on CR assignment and significance classification prior to CRG.

(c) Providing recommendations on trend codes (system, equipment & component, reference items, etc.) for CRs assigned to their department prior to CRG. [QAPM A.6.e]

(d) Ensuring CRs involving human performance issues are properly identified and human performance trend data is entered into PCRS (e) Maintaining an awareness of the status of CRs & CAs owned by their department to ensure actions are completed by the due date or extended appropriately.

(f) Performing Responsible Manager closure reviews for Category 'C' CRs when designated by the Responsible Manager.

(g) Performing a final CR Quality check prior to electronic CR closure review for CRs assigned to their department as allowed by EN-LI-1 02 after all CR closure reviews are complete and documented. Ensure trend codes are accurately assigned including causal codes, PO&C, HU, Failure modes, etc.

(h) Acting as the cause analysis point of contact for their department.

4.0 [12] cont (i) Assisting others with PCRS and Corrective action program issues.

(j) Completing a training Job Familiarization Guide, FFAM-CAA-DPIC, Department Performance Improvement Coordinator (DPIC).

(k) Ensuring CAs initiated by their department has the proper CA Type code and matching CA Priority in accordance with Attachment 9.4.

5.0 DETAILS 5.1 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

[1] Safeguards information related to Safeguards CRs shall be handled in accordance with EN-NS-204; Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information, requirements.

[2] Proprietary documents are not to be attached to Condition Reports or Corrective Actions.

Contact Administrative Services or CA&A for guidance on proprietary documents.

5.2 CONDITION REPORT INITIATION (INPO93OE21TP3], [iNS938OTP2], [QAPM A.6.b]

[1] General Instructions (a) Notification to management prior to, or concurrent with, initiation of a Condition Report (CR) is encouraged but not required. However, due to the potential implications of safety, related issues, all conditions involving personnel and/or plant safety issues are expected to be communicated to management verbally to support timely resolution of the safety issue. These notification expectations are captured in 5.2 [1] (f) of this procedure.

(b) When documenting conditions on a CR, don't use names of personnel if at all possible.

If necessary for clarity of the condition, use of titles is acceptable unless the CR is related to a personnel injury or illness. For CRs related to a personnel injury or illness use generic terms such as "employee" or "contractor' to refer to the injured/ill person.

(c) Safeguards Information is not to be placed in Condition Reports. Contact Security for guidance on safeguards information.

(d) Employees and contractors are encouraged to write CRs for a broad range of problems.

Problems reported must include, but are not limited to, Adverse Conditions. Examples of Adverse Conditions requiring initiation of a CR are provided in Attachment 9.2.

If an employee is not satisfied with classification of a CR or if the actions are inadequate to alleviate their concern, the employee may choose to utilize Entergy's Open Door Policy and discuss the concern with higher levels of management. Employees may also choose to report their concern through the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). While the Corrective Action Process is the preferred method of reporting problems, the ECP may be utilized at any time. Neither this nor any other company policy alters an individual's right to address their concerns directly to the NRC per 10CFR19 Identifying problems within the CA Program is a Protected Activity as defined in EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program. [CR-PLP-2007-1243]

5.211] cont (e) Employees are required to initiate CRs for adverse conditions, and are encouraged to write CRs whenever conditions warrant.

(1) Ifthere is any doubt about the decision to initiate a condition report, then employees are encouraged to discuss the condition with appropriate management.

(2) Ifdoubt remains, employees should initiate the CR.

(f) Any individual, including corporate, shared resource, or contracted personnel, who discovers an Adverse Condition, is expected to ensure the following actions are taken.

[P5110], [P23978]

(1) Immediate actions are taken as necessary to minimize the consequence of the condition. Expected actions are commensurate with level of training, knowledge and expertise (e.g., extinguishing a fire, eliminating a safety hazard or correcting an adverse radiological condition).

(2) Appropriate site personnel are notified of the identified condition. If immediate action should be taken by Operations to ensure the safety of the plant or personnel, contact the Shift Manager/designee. The following information should be provided:

  • Originator's name, telephone number, and supervisor,
  • Brief description of the condition,
  • Equipment identification and location, and
  • Immediate corrective action taken, if any.

(3) The condition is promptly documented on a Condition Report.

(g) Nonconforming items are properly controlled to prevent their inadvertent test, installation, or use. When items are controlled by tagging, the tag is equivalent or similar to Attachment 9.7. [QAPM A.6.d SI], [QAPM Table 1.c.22], [QAPM B.13.b], [ANSI N18.7 5.2.14], [ANSI N45.2.4 2.6 S1 S2]

(1) When tags are used the stock shall be made from material which will not deteriorate during storage.

(h) Quality related nonconforming items installed in the plant, used in order to operate the plant or used to implement approved procedures requires a condition report be initiated, dispositioned and tracked per this procedure. [P22362]

5.2 [1] cont.

(i) For equipment, components, assemblies, sub-assemblies that maintenance removes from the plant systems AND meet the definition of Non-Conforming Material as defined in EN-MA-101-02, Control of Material Outside Facility Warehouse, require a condition report be initiated and tracked per this procedure until under warehouse control or until scraped. The Non-Conforming Material/Item is controlled in accordance with EN-MA-101-02. This includes a condition of a System, Structure or Component (SSC) that involves a failure to meet the Current Licensing Basis (CLB) or a situation in which quality has been reduced because of factors such as improper design, testing, construction, or modification. The following are examples of nonconforming conditions:

(1) An SSC fails to conform to one or more applicable codes or standards (e.g., the CFR, operating license, TSs, UFSAR, and/or licensee commitments).

(2) An as-built or as-modified SSC does not meet the CLB.

(3) Operating experience or engineering reviews identify a design inadequacy.

(4) Documentation required by NRC requirements such as 10CFR50.49 is not available or deficient (j) Nonconforming items within warehouse control shall be controlled and tagged in accordance EN-MP-120, Material Receipt or EN-MP-1 15, Material Issues and Returns. Tracking per this procedure is not required. Tracking per this procedure is not required except where a condition exits as describe in Attachment 9.2.

(k) All Safeguard conditions will be identified as a Safeguard condition report. The condition description should clearly identify the CR as being a Safeguards CR. The condition description shall contain as much information as possible to ensure proper prioritization within the corrective action program by the CRG without providing any safeguards information subject to the following: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(1) Where additional (safeguards) information is required to describe the condition, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified safeguards document (2) The Condition Report shall reference the uniquely identified safeguards document and the uniquely identified safeguards document shall reference the Condition report. It shall be the responsibility of the Security Department to ensure this cross reference is made.

(3) The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. The Security Department (Security Manager and Safeguards Custodian) shall be responsible for maintaining this safeguards file and for developing and maintaining procedures to control this file.

(4) The safeguards file shall be auditable and must meet retention requirements equivalent to those of the Corrective Action Process at the individual site.

5.2 cont

[2] Preparation (a) When initiating a CR, with potential operability/functionality or reportability issues, promptly contact the Shift Manager/designee to inform Operations of the condition.

[COMM-93-04786], [P22829]

(1) Direct notification of Operations personnel (via phone or face-to-face) is important to ensure details of the condition are sufficient and understood for the operability/functionality/immediate reportability determination. This notification is not performed using voicemail or e-mail because timeliness cannot be assured.

(b) Determine the applicable Site:

(1) A Site CR should be initiated for the Site(s) impacted by the Adverse Condition.

(2) Consider initiating a Headquarters (HQN) CR instead of a Site CR if there is no Site impact, an Operability or Reportability Review is not required, AND if the Adverse Condition is related to a corporate program, fleet procedure, common process, or HQN activity.

(3) Both a Site CR and a HQN CR may be required when the site impact is associated with an Adverse Condition in a corporate program, fleet procedure, common process, or HQN activity.

(c) Prepare the Condition Report using the PCRS application. PCRS is accessible to anyone with access to a PC containing the PCRS application.

(d) In the unlikely event of a PCRS system outage, follow the instructions provided in Attachment 9.3 (Manual CR Initiation).

(e) The condition description and any supporting documentation should be in sufficient detail to provide a clear understanding of the condition. Ifknown, include details on what impact the condition has on personnel or plant safety. This information is used to perform operability/functionality/immediate reportability and reportability determinations.

It is expected that the condition description identify any outside agency that identified the condition, when applicable. [P239781 (1) The condition description field should provide a brief, factual statement of what the deficiency, issue, or problem is and its impact to reliability and safety, and any additional information needed to provide complete and accurate identification of the problem. The additional information should include a summary of the facts with statements detailing what happened, when and where it happened, and if known, why the event occurred.

(2) Include any pertinent vendor information that will assist personnel in their operability and reportability determinations.

5.2 [2] (e) cont (3) Include any previous examples of the condition of which you are aware.

a. Ifyou know of previous CRs that documented the same issue, then include these in your description.
b. Include references to Industry OE where applicable.

(4) Include any pertinent trend information, such as "over the past three months, hydrogen concentration has been increasing from a value of to the current value of (f) The date &time of the occurrence are included in the Condition Description, if pertinent.

(g) Include any immediate / interim actions initiated / completed to either correct (Work Request, etc.) or to minimize the impact on plant equipment or personnel. In the case of industrial safety concerns, describe actions taken to prevent personnel from being injured until the industrial safety concern is corrected.

(h) Attach electronic copies of any documents needed to understand or clarify the condition (i.e., computer printouts, operating logs, survey records, etc.) in MS Word or PDF format. [P22829] [P23977]

(i) Save the Condition Report in PCRS using the "lnit CR" button. It is then automatically routed to the appropriate departments (Operations, Licensing, and CA&A) for operability/functionality, reportability, and processing as applicable.

(j) For equipment related CRs, ensure applicable equipment information is filled out in the "Equipment" tab of the CR in PCRS after CR initiation.

(k) Information regarding subsequent CR category classification, assignment, status, and proposed corrective actions is readily available in PCRS. CR initiators can review PCRS to maintain awareness of the status of CRs they have initiated.

(3] Original Condition Report Modification (a) Ifthe language in a condition report is deemed abusive by CA&A, it may be administratively removed without the initiator's concurrence. This includes the language is offensive, distasteful or inappropriate in nature. The original unedited version should be provided to Employee Concerns (b) In addition, ifthe name of an individual is provided in the CR, CA&A may substitute the individual's title or position for the individual's name without the initiator's concurrence. Confidential information (SSNs, medical details, disciplinary actions, etc.) and safeguards information may also be removed and substituted with appropriate wording without the initiator's concurrence.

(c) For CRs related to a personnel injury or illness CA&A may substitute generic terms such as "employee" or "contractor" to refer to the injured/ill individual as necessary.

(d) Changes should be noted inside brackets [ ] or an explanation of change provided.

(e) For information changed or removed without the initiator's concurrence the admin tab of the applicable CR must annotated to describe in general terms, the nature of the changes made and the reasons for the changes. The original full text version of the CR need only be retained as required by (a) above.

Corrective Action Process 5.3 OPERABILITY, FUNCTIONALITY, AND IMMEDIATE REPORTABILITY [NL-98-066-C024],

[ER20031761_02], [ANSI N18.7 Section 5.2.6 S20], [10 CFR 50,72(b)],, [10 CFR 73.71(a)(1) (b)(1) S1], [ANSI N18.7, Section 4.1]

[1] For Entergy Nuclear Plant CRs: [ER970230]

(a) When a CR is initiated, the CR initiator is tasked with screening the condition to determine if a potential operability/functionality and/or immediate reportability concern exists. The CR initiation screen has a checklist to assist in the screening. If a CR is checked as "Potential Operability - Yes," the CR is automatically routed to the site Operations Department for Operability/Functionality Determination and Immediate Reportability screening. If a CR initiator is unsure if a condition involves a Potential Operability/Functionality and/or Immediate Reportability concern, the "Potential Operability" button should be checked as "Yes."

(b) Those CRs flagged as "Potential Operability - No" by the CR initiator are reviewed by the CRG to verify that Operability Determination is not required. If the CRG determines that Operability/Functionality Determination is required, Operations is notified to perform the operability/functionality.

(c) Operability/ Functionality and Immediate Reportability reviews for CRs requiring review are performed in accordance with NMM EN-OP-1 04. The results of the reviews are entered into PCRS on the Operability/ Functionality screen. [Gentletr9118R1], [NL-98-066-C024], [INS9620004]

[2] For Headquarter (HQN) Nuclear CRs:

(a) When a HQN CR is initiated the CR initiator is tasked with screening the condition to determine if a potential operability/functionality and/or immediate reportability concern exists. The CR initiation screen has a checklist to assist in the screening. If a HQN CR is screened as having a Potential Operability/Functionality and/or Immediate Reportability concern, the CR initiator ensures a Site CR is written for the affected site(s) so an Operability/Functionality Determination can be performed.

5.4 REPORTABILITY [10 CFR 50.72(b)], [10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)], [10 CFR 73.71(a)(1) (b)(1) S1J, [ANSI N18.7, Section 4.1], [10 CFR 21, 21 A and C]

[1] When a CR is initiated where the PCRS Reportability Bypass feature is enabled, the CR initiator is tasked with screening the condition to determine if a condition is potentially reportable. The CR initiation screen has a checklist to assist in the screening. If a CR is checked as "Potential Reportability Yes", the CR is automatically routed to the site Licensing Department for a reportability review. If a CR initiator is unsure if a condition involves a Potential Reportability concern, the "Potential Reportability" button should be checked as "Yes"."

[2] The designated personnel for completing the reportability review will enter the appropriate information in PCRS within 5 working days of CR initiation.

5.4 cont

[3] Those CRs flagged as "Potential Reportability No" by the CR initiator are reviewed by the site Licensing Department in a timely manner to verify that a reportability review is not required. This may be performed by a Licensing Department representative during a CRG meeting where newly initiated CRs are reviewed. If the Licensing Department determines that reportability review is required, Licensing will perform the reportability review and enter the appropriate information in PCRS.

[4] Reportability Reviews are performed in accordance with EN-LI-1I08, Event Notification and Reportability and EN-LI-108-01, 10 CFR 21 Evaluations and Reporting.

5.5 SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS (SDP) [Gentletr9118Rl], [INS9620004]

[1] The Plant Licensing Group (or other group as assigned by plant management) reviews CRs to determine if a Significance Determination Process (SDP) review should be done to characterize the risk significance of the issue relative to the Reactor Oversight Program strategic areas (Reactor Safety, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, Physical Protection, Emergency Preparedness). The criteria used for this selection are:

  • CRs associated with NRC Findings which have been classified as potentially being more significant than green 9 CRs for which CRG has requested Risk Significance Determination
  • Other CRs as Plant Licensing deems necessary

[2] CAs are assigned in PCRS to the responsible groups to complete the SDP. Iffurther review of the condition or event necessitates additional responsibilities to complete the SDP for all affected SDP cornerstones, additional CAs are assigned in PCRS.

[3] SDP screening is performed and the results are entered into PCRS.

[4] SDP results are made available to the CRG.

5.6 CONDITION REVIEW GROUP (CRG) [NL-97-084-C17]. [P2993], [P13307], [P16529), [P20277], [P21439]

[P13363], [QAPM B.13.a]

[1] Corrective Action & Assessment (CA&A) or the initiating department provides recommendations to the CRG regarding the categorization and assignment of CRs per Attachment 9.1. [P9849]

[2] The Chairperson for the CRG at the sites is the GMPO or designee. The Chairperson for the CRG at Headquarters is determined by the VP - Operations Support. The Chairperson ensures that appropriate management representation is present.

5.6 cont

[3] CRG quorum, at a minimum, should consist of a Chairperson and management representing Maintenance, Operations, Engineering and the CA&A Manager (or designee).

Ifthe chairperson is in either the CA&A, Maintenance, Operations, or Engineering organization, then he/she can be counted as the management member for their organization for the purpose of meeting minimum quorum requirements.

(a) Ifa quorum is not met, then the meeting shall be canceled or postponed until such time as a quorum can be assembled.

(b) Ifcancellation is required due to not meeting quorum requirement, then a CR is generated to document the incident.

[4] Condition Reports are reviewed by the CRG in a timely manner.

[5] When a Condition Report includes Safeguards information a representative of the Security Department, with Safeguards authorization shall be present at the CR Pre-Screening if applicable and at Condition Review Group (CRG). [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(a) This Security Department representative shall provide any information to the CRG that is required to classify the condition report, subject to the requirements of 10CFR73.21 Protection of Safeguards Information and EN-NS-204; Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information.

(b) For some Safeguards CRs, CRG members may be required to be Safeguards qualified based on the nature of the CR being reviewed. Security shall make this determination (c) These requirements shall be applicable to each site and headquarters

[6] The CRG provides oversight of CR Operability/Functionality Determinations, Operable-Degraded or Nonconforming (Operable-DNC) or Operable-Comp Measures conditions.

(a) The primary responsibility for completeness and accuracy of the Operability/Functionality determinations lies with the Operations department.

(b) Operations ensures appropriate flags / codes are applied in PCRS to facilitate tracking of Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions.LNL-98-066-C024), [ER970230]

(c) Operations ensures that open Operable but Degraded or Nonconforming or Operable-Comp Measures conditions are tracked at the Site and presented through either the CRG or the Ops Focus meeting to meet timeliness expectations for resolution per EN-OP-104.

[7] The CRG reviews newly initiated CRs and determines/confirms the appropriate category assignments as identified in Attachment 9.1. [P5431]

[8] The CRG determines Responsible Manager assignments. Changes to the Responsible Manager assignment can be made without CRG approval as long as the previous Owner and new Owner both agree on the assignment change.

5.6 cont

[9] The CRG determines if an Adverse Trend classification is appropriate for a CR.

[10] The CRG assigns due dates for disposition and corrective action determination based on the CR category (see Attachment 9.4). The CRG may assign different due dates based on their deliberations.

[11] CRG members are encouraged to provide feedback to CR initiators from their respective technical disciplines regarding CR status, ownership, and proposed corrective actions.

[12] Feedback on Cat "D"closed CRs is provided to the initiating employee and their supervisor, when names are entered as recorded in PCRS, via the automatic e-mail extracted from PCRS. The email includes the closure description, closure date and individual performing the CR closure in PCRS. This informs the employee and supervisor that the CR has been closed so that if desired the originator/supervisor can review closure and if necessary request reconsideration based on new information or insight by initiation of a new CR.

[13] Ifadditional information becomes available during CR processing then the CR may be presented to the CRG for re-categorization. All changes in significance or category are approved by the CRG. Ifthe CR is re-categorized, then a new due date may be assigned based on significance of the condition.

[14] The CRG assigns any immediate or interim actions that may be required to minimize the consequences of a condition and/or to determine extent of a condition.

[15] In order to ensure appropriate oversight and independence, the Quality Assurance (QA) organization has the right to determine if a QA identified condition is a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) or a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality (SCAQ). In cases where the CRG does not concur that a QA identified condition is a SCAQ, the Director, Oversight has authority to overrule the CRG.

[16] The CRG determines if new CRs meet the criteria for application of Attachment 9.5 Entergy Fleet Learning Review Process.

5.7 CORRECTIVE ACTION REVIEW BOARD (CARB)

[1] The purpose of the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) is to review and approve the root cause and the proposed Corrective Action Plan for significant CRs.

[2] The Headquarters CARB membership will consist of manager- and director-level individuals as designated by the VP, Operations Support.

[3] The Site CARB membership will consist of the following personnel or their alternates:

" Chairperson - Director level (or higher) member of site staff

  • Director, Engineering

" Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

" Manager, Corrective Action & Assessment

  • Manager, Operations

" Manager, Maintenance

  • Manager, Training

[4] CARB quorum consists of:

(a) A Chairperson and:

  • At least one position designated member and
  • At least two additional position designated members or their alternates.

Alternates will be designated by the Chairperson (b) If a quorum is not met, then the meeting shall be canceled or postponed until such time as a quorum can be assembled.

(c) If cancellation is required due to not meeting quorum, then a CR is generated to document the incident.

[5] For any CARB voting process each representative of the quorum shall have one vote.

[6] For some Safeguards CRs, the CARB members may be required to be Safeguards qualified based on the nature of the CR being reviewed. Security shall make this determination. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

[7] CARB reviews proposed Root Cause CAPRs for sustainability.

[8] CARB reviews and approves (or disapproves) proposed cancellation or replacement of Root Cause CAPRs.

[9] CARB members and their alternates complete a training Job Familiarization Guide, per EN-FAP-LI-003, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) process.

5.7 cont

[10] In the event a previously CARB approved root cause report requires a revision and follow-up CARB review, the CARB (with CAA assistance) ensures follow-up actions are assigned to appropriate organizations to review the revision. This review is to ensure that if a report was made to an outside agency (or other departments) based on the original root cause, the original outside agency report remains valid, or requires a revision. Examples of reports to external agencies (or other impacted departments) include LER to NRC, reports to INPO, etc.

(a) Examples of reports to other departments include departments developing modifications, tracking materials being purchased, tracking vendor destructing testing, etc.

[11] For CRs assigned for CARB review, the CARB assigns Effectiveness Review actions to the CR Owner, or other groups as appropriate. This assignment is made based on significance, importance, or complexity of the documented event or condition. Effectiveness reviews may be tracked and documented through the initiation of a Learning Organization document.

5.8 CR DISPOSITION [NL-97-084-C07], [NL-97-084-C13], [ANSI N18/7, Section 5.2.7.1 S14, S15, S16], [ANSI N45.2.12, Section 4.5.1 S1-$5 (QAPM Table IN.10)], [QAPM B.13.a], [ANSI N45.2.13 9.2 Sla, b, c, d]

[1] General Instructions Caution New or revised Operability determinations / evaluations may indicate that the Reportability Review needs to be updated.

(a) Personnel involved with the investigation and disposition of CRs are responsible for:

[Gentletr9118R1], [INS9620004]

  • Informing the Shift Manager/designee immediately if a SSC previously evaluated as operable may be inoperable as determined from new information from the disposition investigation.
  • Informing the Shift Manager and Licensing Manager immediately if a condition previously thought to be not reportable is in fact reportable as determined from new information from the disposition investigation.
  • Initiating a new CR if new information or insight makes the current Operability and/or Reportability questionable or if a previous CR's identified cause is found to be incorrect.

" Contacting CA&A if the condition or event should be reevaluated by the CRG (b) Ifat any time after a CR has been initiated and screened, information becomes available that may change previous conclusions regarding present or past operability, notify the shift manager immediately and initiate a new condition report.

5. 8[11 cont (c) Ifa CR that had "Potential Operability" checked as "No" is later determined to need an Operability/Functionality Determination, the Shift Manager (SM) / designee and CA&A should be informed immediately. The SM/designee can perform an Operability/Functionality Determination even though it was originally, indicated as not required.

(d) Ifa CR that had "Potential Reportability" checked as "No" is later determined to need a Reportability Review, the Licensing Manager / designee and CA&A should be informed immediately. The Licensing Manager /designee can perform a Reportability Review even though it was originally indicated as not required.

(e) During the course of investigations or completion of corrective actions for open condition reports, a new condition report shall be initiated:

(1) Ifadditional issues beyond the scope of the initial problem description are identified during the problem evaluation of an event, an additional CR shall be initiated for these new issues.

(2) Ifadditional issues beyond the scope of the initial problem description are identified during the initiation of a proposed correction action or the completion of an actual corrective action of an event, an additional CR shall be initiated for these new issues.

(3) A separate CR may be required for the following even if an initial CR was written to perform the maintenance when:

a. Unexpected condition (signs of overheating, damage from overstress, etc.) are identified during maintenance on safety-related SSCs; non safety-related SSCs ranked as High Critical components
b. An abnormal or unexpected condition on an SSC that needs further evaluation (e.g., deviations (trends) in operating parameters from normal)

5.8[1] cont (f) For Safeguards CRs, the assigned Department shall be responsible for performing or overseeing the required Condition Report response to meet the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. Note that this may or may not be the Security Department (i.e., Modifications, Licensing, Engineering, etc.) This would include: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(1) Maintaining Root Cause Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation qualified individuals to perform such evaluations on CRs that are Safeguards related.

Such evaluations shall be performed in accordance with existing corrective action procedures.

(2) Maintaining qualified Department Performance Improvement Coordinators (DPICs) to perform close-out reviews of Condition Reports that are Safeguards related. These reviews shall be performed in accordance with existing Entergy corrective action procedures.

(3) Individuals will obtain Safeguards qualifications in accordance with applicable Security procedures as needed to meet these requirements.

(g) Corrective Action plans are reviewed / approved by management. [QAPM A.6.d S2], [QAPM A.7.a.1 S2]

(1) If an assignee or reviewer recognizes that a change in the intent of a Corrective Action plan is necessary, the change should be coordinated with the Responsible Manager (and CARB Chairperson, if CARB is applicable) and documented. Changes to Corrective Action plan due dates are controlled through the normal extension process described in this procedure. However, Due Date Extension Requests must be reviewed and approved/disapproved by the CARB chairperson for CAPRs that were generated as part of a CARB approved corrective action plan.

(2) For material related CRs, non-conforming items are reviewed for the need to classify as use-as-is, reject, repair, or rework. Items that are classified as use-as-is or repair are required to have a formal engineering evaluation with technical justification, augmented inspection and/or test requirements, and design reviews as appropriate. [QAPM B.13.b], [ANSI N18.7 5.2.14], [ANSI N45.2.4 2.6 S1 S2]

(3) Verification of Acceptability Evaluations are performed for the rework or repair of items within the ASME Section Xl boundary.

(h) Effectiveness Reviews are conducted per the guidance of EN-LI-1 18. An Effectiveness Review that reaches a conclusion that Corrective Actions / CAPRs were ineffective should result in the initiation of a new CR to determine the need to revise the cause determination, corrective action plan, effectiveness review plan and the need for additional CARB reviews. Also, consider an additional CR to explore the potential Corrective Action Program failure.

5.8 cont

[2] Category A- Evaluation and Corrective Action Plan [P24458], [P24500], [P32520], [P17726],

[P21887], [P21896]

All Significant Conditions are subjected to an evaluation to determine Root Cause. A Root Cause evaluation is performed and reviewed by qualified Root Cause Evaluators. Root Cause evaluations are performed in accordance with fleet Root Cause Analysis process procedures and guidance documents. In most cases, CAPRs are assigned for each Root Cause identified. The purpose of the action described in the CAPR is to preclude repetition. CAPRs receive an Effectiveness Review.

(a) Responsible Manager must:

(1) Ensure that a Root Cause Analysis is performed for Category "A" CRs utilizing NMM EN-LI-1 18, Root Cause Analysis Process, and that appropriate CAPRs are issued. [P21896], [P21887]

(2) Ensure formulation of a proposed CA Plan to correct the condition and to preclude repetition. The corrective action plan specifies the responsible departments and relevant due dates for completion of the corrective actions.

The Corrective Action Plan includes an action to perform an Effectiveness Review of the CAPRs.

(3) Approve the cause and corrective action plan that is submitted for CARB review/approval.

(4) Ensure the completed root cause and proposed corrective action plan are submitted to CA&A for review and for scheduling of CARB review/approval (as appropriate).

(5) Ensure implementation of Attachment 9.5 guidance for "Entergy Fleet Learning Review Process" specified by CRG/CARB.

(6) Ensure keywords and problem codes are appropriate based on investigation results

5.8 cont

[3] Category B - Evaluation and corrective action plan:

Category B CRs are assigned to the Responsible Manager for an Apparent Cause Evaluation as determined by the CRG. [P21886], [P21895]

(a) Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) are performed as either a Higher Tier or Lower Tier type, as assigned by CRG. Also, the CRG may direct a specific type of supporting cause analysis technique be performed in addition to ACE.

(b) Responsible Manager must:

(1) Ensure an Apparent Cause Evaluation is performed utilizing NMM EN-LI-1 19, Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process, AND when directed by the CRG, utilizing the specific type of supporting cause analysis process indicated.

(2) Ensure formulation of a CA Plan to both correct the condition and to address the causes that were identified.

(3) Approve the cause and corrective action plan.

(4) Ensure keywords and problem codes are appropriate based on investigation results (c) Effectiveness Reviews may be performed as determined by management for this category of CR. Effectiveness Review report format and performance guidance are contained in EN-LI-118.

(d) For Category B CRs the CRG may determine if a CARB review/approval is warranted.

CRG guidance on CARB assignment is provided in Attachment 9.1.

[4] Category C - Corrective action:

Category C condition reports are assigned to a Responsible Manager for resolution of problem assigned by the CRG. A Root Cause or an Apparent Cause Evaluation is not required.

(a) Responsible Manager must:

(1) Ensure actions are assigned as appropriate to correct the problem.

(2) Ensure the assigned corrective actions are appropriately completed within the prescribed time frame.

(3) If the disposition review determines that the problem is broader or more severe than initially assigned, present the information to the CRG for review and potential re-categorization.

(4) Obtain CRG approval before closing a CR or CA to a Work Order. This requirement is not applicable if the CA was issued to track an enhancement and documented as such in PCRS with a basis for the Enhancement designation.

(5) Ensure keywords and problem codes are appropriate based on investigation results

5.8[4] cont (b) Effectiveness Reviews may be performed as determined by management for this category of Condition Report. Effectiveness Review report format and performance guidance are contained in EN-LI-118.

[5] Category D - CRs are administratively closed as directed by the CRG. [P6919]

(a) When a CR is closed to an existing CR:

(1) The existing CR must have been reviewed by the appropriate CRG and assigned to a responsible manager.

(2) The CR being closed is the same or lower Category level as the existing CR.

(3) A corrective action is assigned by CA&A to the Owner of the existing CR stating that a new CR has been closed to the existing CR and must be addressed within the existing CR.

(4) If the Operability/Functionality or Reportability of the existing CR is impacted by the new condition information being added., the CR Owner must take action to ensure the Operability/Functionality or Reportability as applicable is re-evaluated. CRs with open Operability/Functionality or Reportability issues should not be closed to an existing CR at a different site or HQN until the open issues are satisfied at the affected site.

(5) In case of a duplicate issue, a new CA is not required.

(6) If immediate/interim actions are required at the site and the actions are not complete, then the CR should not be closed to an existing CR at a different site or HQN.

(b) For any CR closed as a Cat D based on actions already taken, a description of the actions taken is included within the CR or in the CR Closure Description field.

(c) CRs that identify conditions that do not rise to the level of an Adverse Condition as defined in 3.0[2] may be classified as follows:

(1) These CRs may be classified by the CRG as "Close Reference" referencing another process's tracking identifier (i.e. WR#, TEAR #, etc.), "Review Emerging Trend", or "Below Threshold" as appropriate.

(2) In some instances the CRG instead may choose to close these CRs to "Actions Taken" or "Condition Corrected" when supporting documentation is available or the CRG may choose to assign them for correction per their discretion.

5.8 cont.

[6] CR/CA Closure to Work Orders.

(a) CAPRs, Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions, and Category "A CR actions (except Enhancements), may not be closed to other processes and must remain open in the corrective action process until resolved.

(b) With CRG approval, CAs or CRs to correct Adverse Conditions, other than CAPRs and Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions and Category "A"CR actions may be closed to Work Orders with a Priority of 1, 2, 3 or 8.

(1) Additional guidance concerning classification of CRs on lower level equipment issues can be found in Attachment 9.6.

(c) To close a CR/CA to a Work Order the following must be completed:

(1) A Work Order (WO) has been generated and the WO number is listed in the CR using a site standardized format to support retrieval and tracking.

(2) Work Order scope or description is verified to adequately describe the issue identified in the CR/CA.

(3) Work Order Priority is determined to be either 1, 2, 3 or 8.

(4) The CR number is identified in the applicable Work Order's Attribute panel using the Fleet standardized format to support retrieval and tracking.

a. Add the Attribute, "CR Closed To This Item" to the applicable WO's Attribute Panel at the WO panel level.
b. The basis for the Fleet standardize format for the Attribute value is the CR number:
1. Y-SSS-N-YEAR-#####. Where Y=Yes, SSS=Station and N=Unit.

For example Y-ANO-1-2012-01234.

5.8[6] cont (d) When the CRG designates a CR to Close to a Work Order, the CR's assigned department will check that the WO Priority is 1, 2, 3 or 8 and notify CA&A so the CR can be closed.

(1) Ifthe applicable WO Priority is not a 1, 2, 3 or 8, then the CR's assigned department will ensure:

a. Per EN-WM-100, PS&O re-screens the challenged WRNVO for priority elevation.

(2) The CR's assigned department will Take Back to the CRG CRs who's WO(s) were not elevated to a Priority of 1, 2, 3 or 8 as a result of re-screening for final disposition by the CRG.

a. CRG may determine that the WO's Priority should be elevated, or the CR remains open to address the Adverse Condition, or that the problem does not meet the criteria for an Adverse Condition.
b. Ifthe CRG determines the problem does not meet the criteria for an Adverse Condition, then the guidance in step 5.8[5] (c) is followed to appropriately classify the CR.

(e) Responsibility for monitoring and reporting on the status of WOs that have CRs/CAs closed to them resides with the Planning and Scheduling/Outage organization (P&S/O).

This monitoring is to ensure timely correction of the originally identified condition.

(1) Periodically, typically at least monthly, P&S/O will report to the CRG the status of WOs with CRs/CAs closed to them. The focus of this report should be the monitoring for timely resolution of those WOs per EN WM-100. The CRG may require additional details for any WOs not completed in a timely manner.

(2) If the work originally scheduled to correct the condition is transferred to another WO, P&S/O will ensure the CR reference is added to the new WO.

(3) Before a WO which had a CR or CA closed to it can be canceled or closed with no work to be performed, the organization requesting cancellation will present the CR and WO to the. CRG for discussion. If necessary, another CR may be generated to track the issue. CRG approval is not required for canceling a WO if the work is to be performed under another WO and both WOs contain the appropriate reference to the CR.

5.8 cont

[7] Work Orders being Tracked by an Open CR/CA (a) Some CRs/CAs cannot be closed to a WO per 5.8[5] (6) (i.e. CAPRs and Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions and Category "A CR actions).

(b) When an Open CR/CA is tracking a WO as part of a corrective action plan, then the CR number is identified in the applicable Work Order's Attribute panel using the Feet standardized format to support retrieval and tracking.

(1) Add the Attribute, "CR Depends On This Item" to the applicable WO's Attribute Panel at the WO panel level.

(2) The Fleet standardize format for "CR Depends On This Item" Attribute value is:

a. The CR number; SSS-N-YEAR-###-$. Where SSS=Station and N=Unit and $=applicable CR's significance level. For example ANO 2012-01234-A.

(c) Ifthe work originally scheduled to correct the condition is transferred to another WO, P&S/O should ensure the CR reference is added to the new WO.

5.9 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS [ANSI N45.2.12, Section 4.5.1 S1-S5 (QAPM Table 1N.10)]

[1] General Instructions (a) Corrective Actions are assigned a CA Type code and matching CA Priority in PCRS in accordance with Attachment 9.4.

(b) Each corrective action should specify whether or not it is tracked as an operational constraint and which unit or Outage is affected.

(c) Any Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions not resolved prior to the completion of the next outage of sufficient duration shall be evaluated for continued operability into the next cycle of operation. This evaluation is reviewed and approved by the Onsite Safety Review Committee (OSRC) prior to startup from the outage.

[Gentletr9118R1], [INS9620004]

(d) For CAPRs that are credited as being implemented by procedure actions or requirements the applicable steps in the associated procedure should be annotated or flagged as commitments in accordance with EN-AD-1 01 and applicable site procedures.

5.9 [1] cont (e) Long Term Corrective Action (LTCA) designation is approved by GMPO/Director or Site VP.

(1) Once approved, the CR/CA is appropriately flagged as long term.

(2) CAs are eligible for LTCA designation if they cannot meet the timeframes established/approved in accordance with the Corrective Action Processing Guidelines (Attachment 9.4) AND if they meet any of the following criteria:

a. Includes work requiring a plant refueling outage, plant forced outage or planned long system/train/component outage to complete. This includes CAs, such as training or meetings, which cannot be completed until pre-outage staffing is complete.
b. Requires development of a modification and/or modification of an approved modification/design change.
c. Requires training that will take multiple requalification or training cycles to complete.
d. Includes initiatives dependent upon a Licensing submittal which requires NRC (or other state or governmental regulatory organization) response/approval.

(3) Attachment 9.9 is provided to facilitate the LTCA review and approval process.

Its use is desired. However, if the form is not used all points applicable must be addressed and the guidance of 5.9[1] (e), (1), (2) & (4) must be followed. The expectation is to capture the form or the discussion points of the form, and its approval, in the applicable CA that is marked as a LTCA or one of its DDE requests. Optionally the CA marked LTCA may reference the location of the form or documented discussion points in the applicable CR.

(4) The specific restriction preventing the timely completion of the item, resulting in the need to use the Long Term CA classification, must be documented in the CA or as otherwise referenced in the CA. Long Term CA classifications are normally assigned at time of CA initiation (vice changing to Long Term at the due date).

(f) CAs issued to track Enhancements as defined in 3.0[22], and documented as such in PCRS with a basis for the Enhancement designation, may be closed referencing other processes without CRG approval.

5.9 [1] cont (g) For each Corrective Action that contains safeguards information: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(1) Where additional safeguards information is required to describe information in the Corrective Action, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified safeguards document (2) The Corrective Action shall reference the uniquely identified safeguards document and the uniquely identified safeguards document shall reference the Condition Report and Corrective Action. It shall be the responsibility of the Security Department to ensure this cross reference is made.

(3) The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. The Security department shall be responsible for maintaining this safeguards file and for developing and maintaining procedures to control this file.

(4) The safeguards file shall be auditable and must meet retention requirements equivalent to those of the Corrective Action Process at the individual site.

(h) The Change Management Process, EN-PL-155, should be used as appropriate for corrective actions that meet the complexity and risk outlined in the policy.

[2] Corrective Action Initiation (a) Corrective Actions are initiated using PCRS for all actions identified in the action plan, not documented as complete.

(b) Corrective Action Due Dates should be selected with consideration given toward:

" The next potential occurrence of the problem and should ensure the action is complete prior to the next potential occurrence of the problem, if possible.

  • The potential impact to plant operation while the action completion is pending.
  • How much time is needed to complete the action
  • What are the resource availability issues that challenge the completion of the action?

(c) Corrective Action Due Dates should be assigned utilizing the guidance contained in Attachment 9.4. CA timeliness criteria are provided in Attachment 9.4. These criteria are to achieve CR age goals that are monitored via performance indicators. These are considered guidelines and not procedural requirements. Except as noted in Attachment 9.4 the CRG, CARB, or Responsible Manager can deviate from the criteria to appropriately manage resources. In some instances GMPO/Director or Site VP concurrence is required. Exceptions taken to the timeliness criteria do not relieve the CA/CR Owner from meeting performance indicator goals.

(d) Typically CA assignments to another department should be made at the management level in PCRS.

5.9 [2] cont (e) Typically CA assigners should notify assignees prior to assignment of an action.

(f) The corrective action content should be specific, actionable, measurable, timely, necessary, cost effective, and compatible, within the capability of management to implement and address the issue. Further guidance on each of these criteria can be found in EN-LI-118.

(g) Corrective Actions must address the cause or resolve the deficiency. Corrective action descriptions must be worded to ensure that the corrective action is tracked to completion. Cross references to other precursor or successor CAs may help ensure successful corrective action.

(h) Corrective Actions directing "consideration..." or "evaluation..." to resolve conditions, issues, or causes should be avoided where possible. If needed, then these corrective actions must also include the expectation for follow-up actions to be issued depending on the outcome of the review.

(i) Corrective Actions that require training or briefing, or that direct communicating expectations, requirements and information must specify the required audience for corrective actions.

(j) The CRG/CARB/OSRC or senior management or above may issue CAs for a CR without the concurrence of assigned or Responsible Manager.

(k) The Operations Shift Manager/SRO may issue corrective actions on a CR, for support of Operability/Functionality Determinations or Evaluations, without the concurrence of assigned or Responsible Manager.

(I) The CA&A group issues CAs at the direction of the CRG/CARB/OSRC or senior management or above and as required by this procedure.

(m) Plant Licensing may issue CAs for determinations and evaluations that are needed to determine Reportability, without concurrence of assigned or Responsible Manager. This includes Past Operability/Functionality Determinations or Evaluations performed on identified conditions, potential or actual 10 CFR 21 conditions, and any other Indeterminate Reportability items.

(n) Plant Licensing may issue CAs, without concurrence of assigned or Responsible Manager, to the assigned or Responsible Managers to ensure that potential or actual NRC violations or findings are adequately addressed in corrective actions. Licensing also performs a closure review of these corrective actions to ensure the finding was adequately addressed.

(o) The CA assigner has the option to review the Corrective Action response for closure, or to allow the CA assignee to close the action. The CA Assigner indicates that a required review is assigned by checking the "Concurrence Req'd for Closure" check box.

(p) The CA assigner has the option to oversee due date extensions for a given action or to allow the CA assignee the oversight to extend the due date. The CA Assigner indicates that due date extension approval oversight is required by CA Assigner by checking the "Require Extension Approval" check box (see 5.9 [3] for due date extension approval).

5.9 [2] cont (q) For site CRs initiated in response to an Industry Operating Experience notification, a CA is issued for the Operating Experience organization to perform a closeout on the CR.

(r) If it is believed that an action to change to a fleet procedure, policy, or document will sufficiently address the issue, obtain prior concurrence for the change from the fleet owner or assign two CA's:

(1) One CA to have the fleet owner to 'evaluate' the fleet need for the change and (2) Another CA to the site owner to monitor the fleet owner's CA and determine if additional site actions are required should the fleet owner reject the need for a change to the fleet procedure, policy, or document.

[3] CA Due Date Extensions (DDEs) [NL-81-A01-C15], [NL-98-025-C02], [ER960265_02]

(a) Corrective Action Due Dates are met.

(b) When needed, due date extension requests include a basis for why the extension is acceptable (i.e., interim controls are in place, the procedure will not be used until next refueling outage, etc.) and a basis for why the extension is necessary.

(c) CA timeliness criteria are provided in Attachment 9.4. These criteria are to achieve CR age goals that are monitored via performance indicators. These are considered guidelines and not procedural requirements. Except as noted in Attachment 9.4 the CRG, CARB, or Responsible Manager can deviate from the criteria to appropriately manage resources. In some instances GMPO/Director or Site VP concurrence is required. Exceptions taken to the timeliness criteria do not relieve the CA/CR Owner from meeting performance indicator goals.

(d) Corrective Action DDE Approval for all corrective action types should be in accordance with the guidance contained in Attachment 9.4.

(1) The "Assigned To" origination must ensure that, if the individual identified to approve the extension in PCRS is not at the authority level designated in Attachment 9.4 for approval, then additional discussion on how approval was obtained should be recorded in the DDE Request Description by the "Assigned To" organization (group). For example, "approval obtained from Director Eng" or

.approval obtained from General Manager," etc.

(e) When approving DDEs, impact to overall corrective action plan should be considered.

5.9 cont

[4] CA Closure (a) Upon completion of an action item, the CA assignee documents the response in PCRS.

CRG approval is required before closing the CR or a CA from the CR to a Work Order.

This requirement is not applicable if the CA was issued to track an Enhancement that was not needed to correct the original condition or was not needed to address an identified cause. The basis for the Enhancement designation should be documented in PCRS.

(b) The only process that a CA or (CR) can be closed to is a Work Order with a Priority of 1, 2, 3 or 8 (with CRG concurrence - reference 5.8[6]). The following additional guidance is provided concerning Training Evaluation Action Requests TEARs)

(1) When training performance or modification to training material is identified as corrective action in a condition report to address a cause or correct the identified condition, then the completion of the training or modification of training material must be documented in the condition report.

(2) When a CR/CA identifies training or training material modification as corrective action and a TEAR is written to accomplish the activity; if the TEAR process determines no training or modification is required, THEN the condition report action plan approval authority (CRG, CARB, or Responsible Manager) must approve the change to intent of the associated action plan. A new corrective action directing an alternate strategy to address the associated cause or correct the identified condition may be required.

(3) Performance of Training or modification to training material properly identified as an Enhancement, as defined in 3.0[22], may be addressed by referencing a TEAR and not followed to completion through the corrective action process. The Enhancement justification and TEAR number should be referenced in the closure to ensure traceability.

(c) When a procedure change is required per a CR's corrective action plan then the change should be tracked to completion in a CA. The procedure change is complete when the procedure is effective in eB RefLib or Merlin as applicable. This should be documented prior to CA/CR closure. With concurrence of the CR's RM a Priority 5 Enhancement CA may be closed referencing the process handling the change outside of CAP.

(d) CA Assigner or CA Assignee, when permitted as described in Step 5.9 [2] (o), reviews each completed action and verifies that the required action is complete and any additional actions are planned. This includes: [ANSI N45.2.12 Section 4.5.2.4], [ANSI N45.2.12, Section 3.3.7], [P7239], [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

  • Ensuring that the response is adequate, answers all aspects of the assigned action, and the intent of the action is met.

5.9[4] (d) cont

" If a change in intent of a Corrective Action plan is necessary, the change should be coordinated with the Responsible Manager (and CARB / CARB Chairperson, if CARB is applicable) and documented.

" Evaluation of the adequacy of the response to a CA shall be performed by safeguard qualified personnel when additional safeguards information is required to describe information in the CA.

  • Ensuring all the requirements of step 5.9[1] (g) are met when additional safeguards information is required to describe information in the CA.
  • Issuing, in PCRS, any follow-up or additional actions that are documented in the response or documenting why the recommendation is not needed.
  • Ensuring that CA closure is timely commensurate with safety significance of the identified issue
  • Ensuring that the CA is not closed to a "promise" of future action.
  • Ensuring that the CA is not closed to an unapproved process.

o CRG approval is required before closing a CA to a Work Order (reference 5.8[6]).

o CRG approval is not required if the CA was issued to track an Enhancement that was not needed to correct the original adverse condition or was not needed to address an identified cause. The Enhancement designation, with a basis should be documented in PCRS.

o CAPRs, actions to correct Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions, and Category "A" CR actions (except Enhancements), may not be closed to other processes and must remain in the corrective action process until resolved.

  • Ensuring any Effectiveness Review Learning Organization documents are initiated when applicable
  • Ensuring that electronic copies of any documents needed to understand, clarify, or validate completion of the corrective action responses are attached to the response. (Those attachments must be in either MS Word or PDF format.)

5.9[4] (e) cont (e) Ifthe action taken is adequate, the CA is closed in PCRS.

(1) Ifthe action taken is inadequate the response is revised until considered adequate for approval, or:

a. Process a Due Date Extension to allow sufficient time for resolution of the issues with the response or
b. NOTE in the closure of CA the identified changes to the response and issue a new CA to resolve the issues with the response at the appropriate management level.
c. Changes to actions should have the same level of review as the original actions (e.g., approval by CARB / CARB Chairperson). Once approved at the appropriate level additional actions may be issued, as needed, to complete the changes.

(2) If additional corrective actions are identified in the response, appropriate CAs are generated in PCRS.

(f) Closing an open CA in one CR to another CR should be handled as described in Step 5.10 [1] (h) and 5.10 [1] (i).

[5] CR Interim and Periodic Reviews [SOER 10-2 Rec 1]

(a) Each open CR associated with Safety Related equipment will be reviewed at approximately six months from initial assignment date. This review will be documented in a CA assigned to the CR owner and will include at least the following items:

(1) Verification that the action plan documented in PCRS will correct the condition (2) Document expected CR Closure date based on remaining needed actions, (3) Verification, for equipment related CRs that the documented operability/functionality position remains valid for the current condition of the equipment and is expected to remain valid for the duration of the action plan.

Initiate a new CR if the current operability/functionality position is questionable.

(4) Verification that administrative performance within the corrective action process has been acceptable to date. (Appropriate approval levels and justifications for DDEs are documented; LTCAs are appropriately flagged, etc.)

(5) Verification that the risk of not correcting the condition is acceptable for the duration of the action plan, (6) Approval of these reviews and approval for the CR to remain open beyond six months has been obtained and documented from a director level or above.

5.9[5] (a) cont (7) Attachment 9.8 is provided to facilitate the review and approval process. It can be used if desired. The expectation is to capture the discussion points of that form in a CA, DDE request or initial CA assignment as appropriate. The form itself need not be used, but all points applicable must be addressed and the guidance of 5.9[5] (a) and (b) must be followed as applicable.

(b) At least once per year, following the initial review, each open CR associated with Safety Related equipment will be reviewed. This review will be documented in a corrective action and will include as a minimum the same items as the interim review above, and may be accomplished by a documented verification of the previous review.

5.10 CONDITION REPORT CLOSURE [P15552], [P4669] [CAPR 00734434.01], [CAPR CR-PLP-2009-05938],

[ANSI N45.2.13 9.2 Sla, b, c, d]

[1] Condition Report Closure - Responsible Manager Closure Review [P9849]

(a) When all CR actions are complete the Responsible Manager (RM) shall approve the closure of all Category A and B CRs assigned to their department. While the department manager is ultimately accountable to ensure this closure activity is satisfactorily completed, he/she can delegate necessary tasks, as required, to support this closure to staff within their department.

(b) The RM or designee should perform CR closure review for Category C CRs.

(c) For Safeguards CRs, the Responsible Manager closure review shall be performed by safeguard qualified personnel. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(d) Accountability for a proper and complete CR response and CR closure review remains with the Responsible Manager.

(e) The closure review by the Responsible Manager (or designee for Category C CRs),

may be documented in the last CA closed from a CR. If the closure is not readily apparent and documented, then CA&A may notify the Responsible Manager that a closure review is necessary. This notification may be in the form of a CR Closure Review CA in PCRS. The Responsible Manager, or designee, reviews the CR to make a recommendation for closure using the following criteria as applicable: [P9849]

  • The root cause or apparent cause is valid.

" The specific condition is corrected or resolved.

  • Overall plant safety is not inadvertently degraded.

" Generic implications of the identified condition are considered, as appropriate, including generic applicability to other departments and Entergy Sites.

" Actions were taken to preclude repetition, as appropriate.

" Any potential operability/functionality or reportability issue(s) identified during the resolution of the condition has been appropriately addressed.

" All corrective action items are completed.

  • No safeguards information or proprietary documents are contained in the CR documentation.
  • Effectiveness Review actions have been initiated, when applicable.

5.10 [1] cont (f) Ifthe CR is not adequate for closure, the Responsible Manager will issue any additional actions needed to complete the corrective action plan. Minor clarifications and editorial corrections can be documented in the RM closure review response or comments. The issuance of additional actions will take the CR out of the closure process.

(g) If the condition report is adequate for closure the Responsible Manager recommends and documents final closure of the condition report.

(h) When an open CR is closed to another existing CR, the following requirements should be met:

" The CR being closed is the same or lower significance Category level than the existing CR. Otherwise CRG concurrence is required.

" The owner of the CR to be closed will obtain concurrence from the owner (Responsible Manager) of the CR to remain open that the open CR will be allowed to resolve the condition identified in the CR that will be closed.

  • The owner of the CR to be closed should ensure a CA is assigned to the owner of the CR remaining open stating that the CR has been closed to the CR remaining open and that the CR being closed must be addressed within the CR remaining open.

(i) Closing an open CA in one CR to another CR should be done as described in 5.10[1]

(h).

(j) An independent closure review is performed for all significant CRs prior to the CA&A closeout review (Quality Check) and CR closure. CA&A normally performs this independent closure review to the same standards/requirements applicable for the RM closure review, but a subject matter expert from a department (or Site) other than the Responsible Manager's may be assigned to complete this review if warranted (k) An independent closure review is not required for non-significant CRs prior to the DPIC /

CA&A closeout review (Quality Check) and CR closure. The documented RM closure review is adequate authorization for processing and closure of the CR by DPIC / CA&A as allowed per the requirements of this section

[2] Condition Report Closeout Review (CR Quality Check) and Closure (a) DPICs are allowed to perform the CR closeout review (CR Quality check) and electronically close Non-CARB "B- Lower Tier" and "C" level CRs. Otherwise CA&A performs this function (e.g. "A" and "B-Higher Tier level CRs as well as B-Lower Tier CRs that were approved by CARB). Also, CA&A may perform this function as a backup for DPICs as required. If an RM has completed a DPIC Familiarization guide, then the RM can perform the DPIC function for Non-CARB "B- Lower Tier" and "C" level CRs.

5.10 [2] cont (b) General requirements for CR closeout review and CR closure (1) For Safeguards CRs, closure / closeout reviews shall be performed by safeguard qualified personnel. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(2) Upon receipt of response from the Responsible Manager stating that the CR is ready for closure the Manager, CA&A (or Manager CA&A Projects at headquarters) or designee, or DPIC ensures any applicable independent review and closure reviews of the CR are performed as appropriate.

(3) If the CR closeout review determines that the condition report is adequate for closure, then the CR is electronically closed in PCRS.

(4) If the CR closeout review determines that the report is not adequate for closure, then a CA is issued using the "UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A" action type, with specific recommendations or identified discrepancies that need further review

a. Due dates for "UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A" actions are usually < 30 days from the date of issuance. "UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A" actions do not require the concurrence of the manager being assigned the action
b. "UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A" actions are issued to the Responsible Manager of the CR to evaluate the specific recommendations or identified discrepancies. Based on the evaluation results, additional actions are issued or a documented response is provided as to why no additional actions are necessary.
c. If a satisfactory response cannot be obtained for adequate closure of the CR then the issue is resolved at the appropriate level of management (c) During the closeout review process, the results of the root cause or apparent cause evaluation is reviewed and the associated trend codes are adjusted if necessary (d) If the CR was assigned to a Responsible Manager for correction of a condition, CRG approval is required before closing the CR or a CA in the CR to a Work Order (reference 5.8[6]). This requirement is not applicable if the CA was issued to track an Enhancement that was not needed to correct the original condition or was not needed to address an identified cause.

(1) CAPRs, actions to correct Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions, and Category "A CR actions (except Enhancements), may not be closed to other processes and must remain in the corrective action process until resolved.

[3] EN-LI-1i02-02, CR Closure Quality, is available as a closure review tool for Responsible Managers, CA&A, and DPICs.

NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-LI-102 REV. 21

  • Ento~rn ~~ MANAGEMENT

'-'5 MANUAL INFORMTIONAL USE PAGE 44 OF 72 Corrective Action Process 5.11 PROGRAM OVERSIGHT [NL-88-062-C02], [NL-97-134-C04], [NL-98-025-C02]

[1] CA&A reports status of the condition reporting process (e.g., the number of open condition reports, open corrective actions, late corrective actions) monthly. [P5085]

[2] A computerized reporting tool is provided with PCRS. This reporting tool provides up to date reports and queries that allow plant personnel to stay abreast of the status of their condition reports and corrective actions.

[3] The corrective action program is periodically evaluated through audit & assessment processes. A focused self-assessment is performed on Corrective Action Process approximately every two years. [P7237]

5.12 Senior Management may request a Fleet Challenge for an ACE or RCE. IF a Fleet Challenge is required, THEN:

[1] The site at which the event occurred may consider the addition of independent (not from the same site as the event) Senior Managers (VP, GMPO or NSA/Engineering Director) to provide independent oversight to the RCE Team.

[2] An independent RCE Evaluator (not from the same site as the event) should also be considered.

[3] The Fleet Challenge should follow the Site CARB review.

[4] The Site CARB Chair should present the RCE to the Fleet Challenge meeting.

5.13 Department Performance Improvement Coordinators(DPICs)

[1] DPICs complete a training Job Familiarization Guide, FFAM-CAA-DPIC, Department Performance Improvement Coordinator (DPIC).

6.0 INTERFACES

[1] NMM EN-DC-153, Preventive Maintenance Component Classification

[2] NMM EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program

[3] NMM EN-HU-101, Human Performance Procedure

[4] NMM EN-LI-1I02-02, CR Closure Quality (5] NMM EN-LI-1I08, Event Notification and Reportability (6] NMM EN-LI-1I08-01, 10 CFR 21 Evaluations and Reporting

[7] NMM EN-LI-1 18, Root Cause Evaluation Process [SOER 83-07, Recommendation 2],

[SOER 92-01 Recommended CA 4A]

(8] NMM EN-LI-1 19, Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process [SOER 83-07, Recommendation 2], [SOER 92-01 Recommended CA 4A]

[9] NMM EN-LI-119-01, Equipment Failure Evaluation

6. 0 cont

[10] NMM EN-LI-121, Entergy Trending Process

[11] NMM EN-MP-120, Material Receipt

[12] NMM EN-MP-115, Material Issues and Returns

[13] NMM EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process

[14] NMM EN-FAP-OP-009, Tagging Performance Indicator Program

[15] NMM EN-NS-204: Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information

[16] NMM EN-QV-109, Audit Process

[17] NMM EN-QV-1 06, Escalation of Quality Concerns

[18] NMM EN-QV-126, Oversight Follow-Up Procedure

[19] NMM EN-AD-101: Procedure Process

[20] EN-PL-155, Entergy Nuclear Change Management

[21] Significance Determination Process (SDP)

[22] NMM EN-FAP-LI-003, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process

[23] NMM EN-FAP-LI-001, Condition Review Group (CRG)

[24] NMM EN-MA-101-02, Control of Material Outside Facility Warehouse

[25] NMM EN-AD-1 03, Document Control and Records Management Programs 7.0 RECORDS

[1] CA&A transmits closed CRs for retention in accordance with EN-AD-103. After CRs are closed and entered into the permanent document management system, they should not be re-opened. However, a CR may be administratively re-opened in PCRS to add non Quality record related information for ease of future research, in the trend section, reference section, equipment section, CA Priority, CA Type or Administrative section. Only trend coding, reference items, CA Priority, CA Type or equipment identification information can be updated / corrected. Then the CR will be immediately re-closed. Otherwise, if information becomes available that indicates additional work is required for a CR in the permanent document storage system, a new CR should be initiated. [QAPM B.15.a], [10 CFR 73.71 A.5],

[P15297], [P757], [ANSI N45.2.12], [P14653]

8.0 SITE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS Step Site Document Commitment Number or Reference

[1] ANO Commitment P4997

[2] ANO Commitment P7531

[3] ANO Commitment P15552

[4] ANO Commitment P2993

[5] ANO Commitment P5431

[6] ANO Commitment P3098

[7] ANO Commitment P5085

[8] ANO Commitment P9849

[9] ANO Commitment P7239

[10] ANO Commitment P6919

[11] ANO Commitment P7237

[12] ANO Commitment P15414

[13] GGNS UFSAR 13.1.2.2 S3 P22828

[14] GGNS UFSAR 13.1.2.2 S4 P22829

[15] GGNS UFSAR 12.5.3.7 S5 P22638

[16] GGNS UFSAR 12.5.3.7 S6 P22639

[17] GGNS AECM 89/0162 P24458 89-17-02. Att I.IV.3

[18] GGNS AECM 90/0004 VII.A.1 P24500

[19] GGNS AECM 84/0062 83-43-03. P23977 Aft I.IV. (1)

[20] GGNS AECM 84/0062 83-43-03. P23978 Aft I.IV. (2)

[21] GGNS QDR 46-95 P32520

8.0 cont

[22] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.1 P24842 SI

[23] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.2 P24843 S2

[24] GGNS 10CFR21.21.A.1 P17819

[25] GGNS 10CFR21.21.A.2 P17820

[26] GGNS UFSAR 8.3.1.1.4.1.2.314, P21886, P21887, P21888

$15, $16

[27] GGNS UFSAR 8.3.1.1.4.2.13.S3, P21895, P21896, P21897 S4

[28] GGNS GIN92/03494 5.6 P33542

[29] GGNS GNRO 96/0056 96-06 P32648

[30] IP2 Commitment NL-81-AO1-C15

[31] IP2 Commitment NL-88-062-C02

[32] IP2 Commitment NL-97-084-C07

[33] IP2 Commitment NL-97-084-C13

[34] IP2 Commitment NL-97-137-C04

[35] IP2 Commitment NL-98-025-C02

[36] IP2 Commitment NL-98-066-C024

[37] IP2 Commitment NL-98-066-C040

[38] IP2 Commitment NL-98-066-C041

[39] IP2 Commitment PD-77-234-C02

[40] IP2 Commitment PD-88-028-C21

[41] IP2 Commitment PD-97-037-C03

[42] IP2 Commitment RA-78-A05-C06

[43] IP3 Commitment COMM-93-04786

8.0 cont.

[44] JAF Commitment JAFP-91-0834

[45] JAF SOER 83-07 Recommendation 2

[46] JAF SOER 92-01 Recommended Corrective Action 4A

[47] PLP Commitment CAPR 00734434.01

[48] PLP Commitment CR-PLP-2007-1243

[49] RBS Commitment P13307

[50] VY Commitment AUDIT RPT 9617-01

[51] VY Commitment ER960078_02

[52] VY Commitment ER960265_02

[53] VY Commitment ER970230

[54] VY Commitment ER20032022_01

[55] VY Commitment ER20031761_02

[56] VY Commitment ER20031910_12

[57] VY Commitment Gentletr9118R1

[58] VY Commitment INPO93OE21TP3

[59] VY Commitment INS938OTP2

[60] VY Commitment INS9620004

[61] VY Commitment TREND92TP4

[62] VY Commitment ER20031637_01

[63] VY Commitment INF9607_01

[64] WF3 Commitment P5110

[65] WF3 Commitment P15297

[66] WF3 Commitment P16529

8.0 cont.

[67] WF3 ANSI N13.6.1.7 P15005

[68] WF3 Commitment P17707

[69] WF3 Commitment P17726

[70] WF3 Commitment P20277

[71] WF3 Commitment P21439

[72] WF3 Commitment P21440

[73] WF3 10 CFR 21.21 A P21693

[74] WF3 10 CFR 21.21 C P21700

[75] WF3 Commitment P22593

[76] WF3 Commitment P23035

[77] WF3 Commitment P23038

[78] WF3 10 CFR 21.51 A P757

[79] WF3 Commitment P4669

[80] WF3 Commitment P22362 9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATION/CATEGORY 9.2 EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION 9.4 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES 9.5 ENTERGY FLEET LEARNING REVIEW PROCESS 9.6 GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF CRs ON LOWER LEVEL EQUIPMENT ISSUES 9.7 TYPICAL NONCONFORMANCE TAG 9.8 CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM 9.9 LTCA CLASSIFICATION FORM 9.10 CR ASSIGNMENT AND LIFE CYCLE PROCESS MAP

a NUCLEAR QUAUTY RELATED EN-LI-102 REV. 21

ýEntegy MANAGEMENT MANUAL INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 50 OF 72 Corrective Action Process ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY Sheet I of 6 [P5431), [P6919], [QAPM A.6.e], [ANSI N45.2.13 9.2 Sla, b, c, d]

Assignment of Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Oversight:

The Condition Review Group (CRG) is responsible for determining that a condition report (CR) contains an issue that warrants CARB oversight. The purpose of CARB oversight is to ensure the condition reports are evaluated in-depth and well documented. CARB oversight includes approval of the final cause determination and the corrective action plan. CARB oversight is assigned for all Category A, Significant CRs and may be assigned for Category B, Non-significant CRs. The following guidance is provided to assist CRG in the determination of CARB assignment:

  1. Condition reports with cross-disciplinary (across more than one department) aspects to them.
  • Condition reports with cross human performance aspects.
  1. Condition reports with cross organizational aspects.
  1. Condition reports important to nuclear, public, or personnel safety
  • OSHA Recordable and more severe injuries
  • Condition reports important to generation capability
  • Condition report events with generic implications
  • Condition reports on equipment reliability applicability items impacting:
  • Capability factor
  • Forced loss rate
  • Unplanned LCO entry

" Dose

" Maintenance rule functional failure

" Chronic system or component failure

  • CRs on training programs which are determined to meet the criteria for a 'Finding" per the Measures for Judgment" contained in the INPO Accreditation Evaluator Reference Manual. Note: A Fleet Training Assessment Challenge Board will be convened at the Training Director's discretion to review ACE or RCE results related to training assessment findings prior to their presentation to CARB.

The following classification guidance is subiect to CRG discretion. The CRG maintains the authority to deviate from this guidance, as warranted, so long as resolutions of Adverse Conditions are documented in the Corrective Action Program.

Significant classification is the highest and most important. In most cases, significant events are the result of multiple barrier failures or programmatic breakdowns. There is considerably more investigation into the cause of the identified condition.

  • Cateaorv A - An adverse condition classified as significant and requires a Root Cause and actions to preclude repetition.

Condition meets one of the "significant" definitions. Typically, the condition is viewed as applicable to 10CFR50, requiring cause determination, correction of adverse condition and corrective actions to preclude repetition.

Root Cause Evaluations should be completed within 30 days.

-For Human Performance/Process issues:

1. Does the identified problem meet the Human Performance Event Criteria? (see HU-101,Attachment 9.1) If yes then the CRG should consider classifying the CR as Significant.

-For Taagina Issues (Tagging error classification is defined in EN-FAP-OP-009)

1. Level I Tagging issue - Where no barriers were present and event is significant a Cat. "A" CR RCA may be applicable the CRG should consider classifying the CR as Significant.

-For Training issues:

1. Condition Reports for Training Assessment Standards Performance Deficiency (SPD as defined by EN LI-104) which are determined to meet the criteria for a "Finding" against objective criteria of ACAD 02-001, per the "Measures for Judgment" contained in the INPO Accreditation Evaluator Reference Manual should be evaluated through a root cause process.

doGNUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-LI-1 02 REV. 21

ýEntewm MANAGEMENT MANUAL INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 51 OF 72 Corrective Action Process ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY Sheet 2 of 6

-For Reactivity Manaaement Events

1. Reactivity Management Significant Classification Level 1 Events
2. Reactivity Management Significant Classification Level 2 Events (Specific Conditions may be downgraded to a CR Level 'B' if proper justification is provided).

Non-Significant condition reports document problems for which a repeat occurrence (while always undesirable) can be tolerated.

Cate-gory B - An adverse condition classified as non-significant and assigned to a Responsible Manager for documentation of apparent cause, corrective actions taken to correct the condition and to address the apparent cause(s). This CR will require an Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) which is performed as either Higher Tier or Lower Tier type as determined by the CRG.

Condition does not meet the "significant" definition. Usually, Category B conditions are 'Conditions Adverse to Quality" and IOCFR50 applicable. However, since they are not significant, I0CFR50 only requires prompt identification and correction. Notwithstanding, the CRG views a Category B condition to be more than a "broke-fix" issue. In addition to correcting the identified deficiency, the Category B Condition Report should:

1. Determine and document the apparent cause of deficiency.
2. Determine and document the action plan to eliminate identified causes of the condition thereby reducing likelihood of condition repetition.

Category B designation should be prudently used to ensure a value added resource expenditure. Apparent Cause Evaluations / Equipment Failure Evaluations should be done within 30 days.

The following guidance (for both Equipment Failure Evaluations and Human Performance/Process issues) is provided as a tool to further help differentiate "B"level CRs from "C"level CRs after a determination is made that the condition does not meet the criteria to be designated as a Significant CR ("A"). This information is only a tool and doesn't override authority of the CRG to make a final decision on classification of a CR's category.

- For Tagging Issues (Tagging error classification is defined in EN-FAP-OP-009)

1. Level I Tagging issue - Where no barriers were present requires a minimum Cat. "B"CR, Higher Tier ACE, based on significance of the event a Cat. "A"CR RCA may be applicable.
2. Level IItagging issue -Where one barrier was present requires a minimum a Cat. "B"CR, Lower Tier ACE based on significance of the event a Higher Tier ACE may be applicable.

-For Equipment Failure Evaluations:

1. For High Critical Component failures (as determined by EN-DC-345) a minimum Category "B"High Tier apparent cause and an EN-LI-119-01, Attachment 9.1 Equipment Failure Evaluation is recommended.
2. For Low Critical Component failures (as determined by EN-DC-345) a minimum Category "B"Lower Tier apparent cause and an EN-LI-119-01, Attachment 9.1 Equipment Failure Evaluation is recommended.

-Other Equipment Failures:

1. For an unexpected failure of safety related or important equipment a minimum Category "B"apparent cause is recommended. [ER20031910_12]
2. For equipment failures of a repeat nature ifthe CRG concludes it is prudent to determine why it failed and take action to preclude repetition a minimum Category "B"apparent cause is recommended.

-For INPO Area For Improvements:

1. Ajustification statement to support classification of a CR intended to address an INPO AFI is required if the CR is not classified Cat. B or higher.

-For Iniury CRs:

1. For Lost Time Accidents, hospitalizations, and severe injuries that are not classified as Category "A", a minimum Category "B"High Tier ACE with CARB review is required.
2. For all other OSHA Recordable injuries a minimum Category "B"Lower Tier ACE with CARB review is required.

-For HQN CRs:

1. Perform a causal analysis for fleet issues ifthere's an underlying corporate contributor identified in more than one site analysis that hasn't been addressed via the sites' CRs.

ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS ! CATEGORY Sheet 3 of 6

-For Human Performance/Process issues:

1. Does the identified problem meet the Human Error threshold? (see HU-1 01, Attachment 9.2)
2. Is the identified problem a repetitive issue that demands a more aggressive approach to eliminate the issue? Is continuing to treat a repetitive problem as a "broke/fix" still prudent?
3. Is it prudent to not only fix the identified problem, but also to determine/document cause(s) of the problem and determine/document an action plan to fix cause(s)?

-For Quality Assurance Issues:

1. B LT classification is the minimum required response to a:
  • Quality Assurance (QA) Findings (QAF) (as defined by EN-QV-109) o IF the QAF has elements of O&P, then a HT ACE is required
2. B HT classification is the minimum required response to a:

" QA Unsat. Follow-up (as defined by EN-QV-126)

-For Reactivity Management Events:

1. Reactivity Management Significant Classification Level 3 Events (Specific Conditions may be downgraded to a CR Level 'C' if proper justification is provided).
  • Cate-ory C - An adverse condition classified as non-significant or a non-adverse condition assigned to a Responsible Manager for investigation and correction. A condition that has or would have minimal effect on the safe or reliable operation of the plant or personnel. The safety significance of the occurrence is sufficiently minor that an ACE is not required. Required action need only return the equipment or process to an acceptable status. Conditions in this category are frequently referred to as "broke/fix". See Attachment 9.6.

A Category C condition does not meet definition of significant. However, it may be a "Condition Adverse to Quality" and 10CFR50 applicable (prompt identification and correction). The desired resolution is correction of the identified problem. While determination of cause is often required to fix a problem, no formal documentation of cause is required. Repeat occurrence of the problem is viewed as acceptable.

-For Equipment Failure Evaluations:

For High or Low Critical Component Failures (as determined by EN-DC-345) for which CRG determines NO causal analysis is required, a minimum Category "C"assignment and an EN-LI-119-01, Attachment 9.1 Equipment Failure Evaluation (EFE) is recommended Additional Significance classification guidance is provided in Attachment 9.6 for equipment related CRs that do not screen as Category "A" or "B"level CRs or "C" level CRs that do not require an EFE.

-For Reactivity Management Precursors:

1. Reactivity Management Significant Classification Level 4 Precursors (Specific Conditions may be downgraded to a CR Level 'D' if proper justification is provided).
  • Cate-ory D - No tracking of corrective actions is required and the CR may be closed. For example the condition has been corrected, closed to a Work Order, closed to an existing CR, or is below CR threshold.

Adverse Conditions (and Non-Adverse conditions at the discretion of the CRG) which would not exceed the criteria for a category "C" CR may be closed in one of the three following ways:

Category "D" Close to WMS Category "D" Close to CR Category "D" Condition Corrected (when supporting documentation is provided)

CRs identifying conditions which are below the level of Adverse Conditions as defined in 3.0[2] may be classified as Category "D"and closed in the following ways:

Category "D"- Actions Taken Category "D" - Close Reference Category "D" - Review for Emerging Trend Category "D"- Below Threshold

ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY Sheet 4 of 6 Note: In order to ensure appropriate oversight and independence, the Quality Assurance (QA) organization has the right to determine ifa QA identified condition is a Condition Adverse to Quality or a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality. In cases where the CRG does not concur that a QA identified condition is a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality, the Director, Oversight has the authority to overrule the CRG.

Standardize Siginificance Level and Classification Codes for CR Assiqnment Tab Sig c MA*kh N-CO* CLASSIFICATION DESt A RCA CRG Directs a Root Cause Analysis B HT-ACE CARB CRG Directs CARB Review B HT-ACE CRG Directs a Higher Tier ACE B LT-ACE CARB CRG Directs CARB Review B LT-ACE CRG Directs a Lower Tier ACE C CORRECT/ADDRESS CRG Directs Correct/Address Identified Conditions D CLOSE TO CR CRG Directs CR to Close to Another CR D CLOSE TO WMS RG Directs CR to Close to An Open Work Order D CONDITION CORRECTED RG Directs CR - Condition Corrected / Documented D ACTIONS TAKEN RG Directs CR to Close - Sufficient Actions Taken / Documented D REVIEW EMERG TREND RG Directs CR to Close - Still Reviewed As Part of Trending Process D CLOSE REFERENCE IRG Directs CR to Close - Listing # to Address the Item D BELOW THRESHOLD 3RG Directs CR to Close - No Condition IdentifiedlExists or Below

[Threshold D VOID/DUPLICATE CR PRG Directs CR to Close - Void (Cancel) or Duplicate of Another CR

CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY ATTACHMENT 9.1 ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS / CATEGORY Sheet 5 of 6 The following is a "guidance" tool for determining the CR Categorization. It allows for more consistency in Categorization of Condition Reports. To use this tool, first select the closest fit under Severity Levels, then choose the best fit under Frequency Levels. If more than one level fits select the higher level. Finally, use the matrix to find the recommended CR categorization, recognizing that CRG discretion may be needed in final determination.

Severity Levels

1. Severity Level 1 - Condition that:

" Is classified as a Significant (Level 1 or 2) Reactivity Management Event,

" Is classified as White, Yellow, or Red through the NRC Significance Determination Process,

  • Results in E-Plan declaration, regulatory intervention or significant public interest,
  • Results in an industrial related fatality, severe injury requiring transportation off site,
  • Results in major system, component, or structure damage or loss,
  • Affects more than one department,

" Is deemed a near miss to catastrophic consequences,

  • Results in a loss of production (>10%),

" Identifies a problem that meets the Human Performance Event Criteria, excluding injuries classified as events (see EN-HU-101 Attachment 9.1). When a CR identifies a Human Performance Event the CRG should consider classifying the CR as Significant.

2. Severity Level 2 - Condition that does not meet Severity Level 1 criteria, but does:
  • Result in a reportable event pursuant to 10CFR21, 50.72, 50.73, or other NRC reporting criteria

" Identify a Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures condition

" Result in unplanned events or failure impacting the function of a structure, system, or component

  • Identify errors that demonstrate fundamental misunderstandings of, or noncompliance with, procedural or regulatory requirements
  • Result in the loss of a High Risk Maintenance Rule function or in the failure of a High Critical or Low Critical component (as determined by EN-DC-345)

" Result in > 1 day delay of planned LCO,

  • Identify an equipment deficiency that adversely impacts NRC or WANO Performance Indicators
  • Result in a Green NCV, Green finding, violation, or traditional enforcement from the NRC
  • Result in a reportable event pursuant to NERC Standard EOP-004-1, Attachment 2 Table 1, Item 5

[consequential physical sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism to major electrical systems].

" Result in a reportable event pursuant to NERC Standard EOP-004-1, Attachment 2 Table 1, Item 6

[consequential cyber sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism.].

  • Result in an injury that is classified as an OSHA Recordable or lost time accident,

" Result in a Human Performance Clock reset (see EN-HU-101)

  • Result in an Adverse Trend designation by the CRG

" Identify an equipment failure of repetitive nature such that it is prudent to determine why

" Identify an Internal Oversight QA Finding (EN-QV-109, ANSI 18.7, and ANSI N45.2.12)

" Identify a Corporate or External AFI,

" May affect more than one department.

NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATED EN-LI-102 REV. 21 MANAGEMENT MANUAL INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 55 OF 72 Corrective Action Process ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY Sheet 6 of6

3. Severity Level 3 - Condition that does not meet Severity Level 1 or 2 criteria, but does:

" Result in minor system damage, minor injury, or other event generally confined to one department,

  • Identify a Corporate or External Negative Observation, or an Internal Self-Assessment Standards Performance Deficiency (SPD),
  • Result in a reportable event pursuant to NERC Standard EOP-004-1, Attachment 2 Table 1, Item 5 [non consequential physical sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism to major electrical systems].
  • Result in a reportable event pursuant to NERC Standard EOP-004-1, Attachment 2 Table 1, Item 5 [non consequential cyber sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism].

" Identify a problem that meets the Human Error threshold (see EN-HU-101 Attachment 9.2).

" Abnormal and/or long term unexplained plant conditions [SOER 2-04 Rec 3]

4. Severity Level 4 - Less than the above.

Frequency Levels Consider fleet implications that could indicate an Extent of Condition or Generic Implication review is needed when selecting the appropriate Frequency Level.

I. Likely to occur often or has occurred often during the life of an individual item, system, process or very often in operation of a large number of similar items.

I1.Likely to occur several times or has occurred several times inthe life of an individual item, system, process, or often in operation of a large number of similar items.

Ill. Likely or possible to occur sometime in the life of an individual item, system, process, or will likely or reasonably be expected to occur in the life of a large number of similar components.

IV.So unlikely to occur in the life of an individual item, system, or process, that it may be assumed not to be experienced, or it may be possible, but unlikely, to occur in the life of a large number of similar components.

CR Category Matrix Guideline CR Grade Freq. I Freq. II Freq. III Freq. IV Severity I A A A A Severity 2 A B B C Sevedty 3 B C* C* C*

Severity 4 C* D D D

  • Category 'D'is chosen ifthe condition is corrected and documented, and no further analysis or corrective actions are warranted.
  • Category 'D' is chosen for relatively straightforward conditions when it is appropriate to close them to a work order or another open condition report.
  • Attachment 9.6 contains additional guidance on when it is appropriate to close relatively straightforward equipment relate CRs to a work order OR when it is appropriate to just reference the work order.

ATTACHMENT 9.2 EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS Sheet I of 3 [P3098], [ANSI N45.2.11, Section 9.2], [P7531], [P15005], [P21693], [P21700] [P22638] [P22639]

[P24842] [P24843] [P17819] [P17820], [ANSI N45.2.11 9 $1-$4]

Examples of Adverse Conditions Employees are encouraged to report a broad range of problems and potential problems. However, adverse conditions are required to be documented on CRs. The conditions described in this attachment are examples of adverse conditions. This list is not necessarily all-inclusive. Any adverse condition as defined in Section 3.0 should be documented on a Condition Report.

1. Operational Conditions

" Plant transient (per INPO, WANO guidance documents)

" Unplanned actuation of RPS, ESF, or Emergency Power Systems

  • Declaration of any emergency class in the emergency plan 9 Potentially reportable conditions

" Events or conditions that could negatively impact reliability or availability

" Unplanned conditions or events that affect reactivity

" Unplanned entry or failure to enter a LCO (includes performance outside acceptance criteria)

  • Grid Disturbance including protective relay or equipment failures, or mis-operations
2. Radiological Conditions
  • Any exposures that exceed allowable administrative or regulatory limits.

" Lost or missing licensed radioactive material

" Unplanned radioactive release

" Violations of procedures or policies or regulations that are intended to satisfy 10CFR1 9, 10CFR20 or other applicable federal regulations

  • Abnormally high radiation or airborne radioactivity levels
3. Security Conditions
  • Potentially Reportable events (one hour report) per 10 CFR73.71
  • Programmatic failure(s), recurring events or human errors that require further management attention

" Other security events that could reduce the overall effectiveness of the security program

" Adverse trends in the number of Security events

  • Potential or confirmed tampering, terrorism, vandalism or sabotage.
4. Industrial Safety Conditions
  • Lost time accident
  • Near miss Incident
  • OSHA Recordable event

" Recurring minor injuries of similar cause judged to need further evaluation

" Conditions which could create a significant personnel safety hazard

5. Material Conditions (not installed)
  • Deficient components issued or ready-for-issue for which elements of the QA program have been applied.

Deficient components are those that have not met design or procurement specifications.

" Deficiency reported by vendor bulletin when confirmed that the product has been issued or is ready for issue at the station.

  • Conditional release of materials, parts, or components, for installation and testing, which have not been fully accepted under the Quality Assurance program.

ATTACHMENT 9.2 EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS Sheet 2 of 3

6. Structures, Systems or Components Conditions (Installed) [ER20031637_01], [QDR 200-95/RCDL 95-20, Long Term Action 2.a.1]

Conditions affecting a safety related, quality-related or trip sensitive system caused by a deficiency in characteristic, documentation or procedure that renders the quality of an item unacceptable or indeterminate.

Examples include, but may not be limited to:

" Recurring or generic failure

" Item has a defect as a result of design or manufacturing process that prevents or could have prevented the component from performing its intended function

" Any Degraded or Nonconforming Condition affecting an SSC within scope of the Operability Determination Process per EN-OP-1 04.

  • Item fails testing performed to prove environmental or seismic design conformance
  • Deviation from prescribed processing or inspection

" Documentation not available to confirm required inspections or tests

" Deficiency reported by vendor bulletin

" M&TE: A condition report is required when the non-conforming condition is related to the calibration of M&TE and the following conditions exist:

- The condition cannot be resolved through a record search.

- It cannot be verified that plant hardware or system performance is not affected and no further action is required.

  • Oil leaks or spills that could increase the potential for a plant fire or adversely affect equipment operation.

The Fire Prevention Coordinator, Fire Protection Engineer, or System Engineer should be consulted to evaluate the potential impact. This includes events such as, but not limited to: oil wetted/fouled insulation or equipment, and leaks and spills involving liquids such as fuel oil, lube oil, fluid, etc. [P1 5414]

  • Chemical or other leaks that could potentially impact plant operations or the environment.
  • Missed or late preventive maintenance task required to satisfy technical specifications, environmental qualification or station commitments.
  • Any code repairs on failed components that are performed to repair a component to operable status.

" Conditions where nuclear fuel defects exist or are suspected.

  • Maintenance Rule "Category Al'" items
  • Conditions that degrade the ability of a Regulatory required installed fire protection system or component to perform its intended function. This includes degraded fire barriers and their sub components (penetration seals, fire doors and dampers), and fire detection and suppression systems. Additional components include Appendix R fire wrap and emergency lighting, and any Reactor Coolant Pump (PWR) oil collection system.

[P15414]

7. Welding Related Conditions
  • Welds not made in accordance with applicable procedures

" Welds made by unqualified welders

  • Welds made with improper or undocumented filler material
  • Welds on which specified hold points are bypassed
  • Welds which do not meet applicable code or job specific requirements and on which the final weld inspection and NDE have been completed/accepted

ATTACHMENT 9.2 ExAmPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS Sheet 3 of 3

8. Deviations From Design/Licensing Basis Conditions
  • Functional inaccuracies in safety-related documents (procedures, technical manuals, work plans, drawings, etc.) which could degrade plant safety [P4997], [P22593]
  • Failure to comply with design or license basis commitments as described in the SAR, TS, TRM, etc.
  • Inadequate Technical Specifications
  • Conditions that may require written or telephone notifications to the NRC, excluding routine reports.
  • SSCs or physical conditions that deviate from Design / License basis assumptions
9. Administrative or Work Practice Conditions

" Performance of activities on the wrong equipment

" Mispositioned equipment

  • Errors or deficiency in the design process, including computer programs.

" Tagging errors

10. Engineering Related Conditions An error or omission in an engineering product which, if uncorrected could result in any of the following. These criteria apply even ifthe error was discovered before the product was finalized or issued for use.
  • significantly reduces the margin to safety as defined by Technical Specifications or the FSAR,
  • renders equipment important to safety inoperable or incapable of performing intended safety functions
  • reflects a significant procedural non-compliance or programmatic breakdown.
11. Regulatory Issues

" potential or actual NRC violations

  • potential or actual INPO Areas for Improvement (AFIs)
12. Training Issues
  • Any condition which adversely impacts training related regulatory compliance.
  • Any condition which has the potential to adversely impact training program accreditation.
  • Areas for Improvement, Standards Performance Deficiencies, Findings, or other weaknesses identified in self-assessments, QA audits, NRC inspections, or INPO evaluations.
  • Training procedure non-compliance.
  • Any adverse trends identified through routine monitoring of training-related data, condition reports, assessment findings, etc.
  • Loss of electrical power to the Training Center that impacts training.

" Unplanned fire system actuations that impact training.

  • Simulator downtime results in greater than 15 minutes of lost scheduled training time.

" Training facilities in disrepair for extended periods.

  • A human performance event or error that results in a reset of the Training Department Human Performance Clock, or the reset of another department's clock for training-related events (for example, student absence or tardiness).
  • Any condition that requires that commitments be made to an outside organization.
  • Any condition or event which adversely impacts the personnel safety of the training staff or students.
  • Work performed by an unqualified worker.
13. Other Issues
  • Abnormal plant conditions or indications that cannot be readily explained [SOER 2-04 Rec 3]

" Long-term unexplained plant conditions [SOER 2-04 Rec 3]

ATTACHMENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION Sheet 1 of 4 NOTE Sample forms used to implement this procedure are included in this attachment. It is not mandatory that the exact forms be used. Equivalent forms may be used, but they must contain the same or additional information. Any deletion of information must be accomplished by procedure revision.

This attachment provides a contingency method for generating, performing operability/functionality and immediate reportability determinations, and tracking Condition Reports when PCRS is not available. The Entergy Help Desk and CA&A staff should be called if a PCRS outage is experienced.

Manual operation of the Condition Reporting System is limited to the generation of Condition Reports and the documentation of operability/functionality and immediate reportability determinations/evaluations. Issuing and responding to Condition Report Corrective Actions will be postponed until PCRS is available. However, any actions required to place the plant in a safe condition, or any other emergency actions, can proceed.

1.0 Condition Report Generation (Form 1):

1.1 Any individual, who discovers a Condition, when PCRS is not available, should follow the steps of section 5.2 with the exception of writing the Condition report with PCRS.

1.2 The attached form should be used to document a Condition when PCRS is unavailable.

1.3 Take the completed form and any supporting documentation to the Control Room/Work Control Center, as appropriate. (Not applicable when generating Headquarters CRs. When generating Headquarters CRs manually, contact the Headquarters Corrective Action Coordinator).

2.0 Operability and Immediate Reportability Determinations (Form 3): (This section does not apply when generating CRs for offsite locations such as Headquarters. Results of Impact Applicability Reviews for CRs generated for offsite locations are documented on the Manual CR Continuation Form (Form 2)).

2.1 The Shift Manager/designee ensures that the manual CRs are maintained in the Control Room for periodic retrieval by CA&A and that CA&A is informed when manual CRs are ready for CA&A to pick up.

2.2 The Shift Manager/designee will perform the operability and immediate reportability.

2.3 Following the completion of the operability/functionality and immediate reportability determinations the Shift Manager/designee retains the Condition Report package for CA&A pick up.

3.0 Conversion of manual Condition Reports to PCRS:

3.1 CA&A picks up manual Condition Report packages and presents them to the CRG. CA&A communicates any immediate management actions to the affected parties.

3.2 When the PCRS becomes available, CA&A informs the Control Room and then CA&A enters the manual Condition Reports into PCRS. PCRS automatically assigns the next sequential CR number to each manual CR. The original forms are then scanned into PCRS.

ATTACHMENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION Sheet 2 of 4 CONDITION REPORT I Manual CR NO.

FORM 1 ManalRNO PAGE OF CONDITION IDENTIFICATION FORM (PRINT/TYPE, USE BLACK INK ONLY)

IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM For Operations Use Only (Please Print)

Originator: Ext.: Date Rec'd Organization: Time Rec'd Supervisor:

Date of Discovery: Time of Discovery:

CONDITION DESCRIPTION:

[Include information pertinent to operability/functionality determination.]

Work Document # (i.e., WRNVO, OD, etc.) Other:

IMMEDIATE ACTION DESCRIPTION:

AFFECTED EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENTSIMATERIAL:

Number/Description(s)

SUGGESTED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S):

o OperabilitylFunctionality in question? o Potentially reportable?

ATTACHMENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION Sheet 3 of 4 CONDITION REPORT CR NO.

FORM 2 1 PAGE OF CONDITION REPORT CONTINUATION FORM (PRINT/IYPE, USE BLACK INK ONLY)

CONTINUATION FORM:

ATTACHM ENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION Sheet 4 of 4 Note: This section replaces the "electronic PORS" operability/functionality section of the CR only. The operability/functionality determination process (EN-OP-104) is expected to be performed & attached to this manual CR formn as needed.

OPERABILITYIFUNCTIONALITY REVIEW & IMMEDIATE REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION - FORM 3 I. OPERABIUTYIFUNCTIONALITY REVIEW OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONAUTY EVALUATION REQUIRED El NO 0 YES IF NO - EXPLAIN WHY:

(IF NO THEN LEAVE OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY EVALUATION SECTION BLANK - COMPLETE REPORTABILITY SECTION AND SIGN AS APPROVER)

I1. OPERABIUTY DETERMINATION OPERABILITY CODE PLANT CONDITION/MODE:

EFFECT OF THIS CONDITION ON EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM/TRAIN OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY:

fl ADMIN- NA

[I OPERABLE - OP EVAL o3 EQUIPMENT FUNCTIONAL O NOT REQUIRED [o OPERABLE-DNC [I EQUIPMENT NON- FUNCTIONAL O OPERABLE ol OPERABLE-COMP MEASURES F1 INOPERABLE Ql INOPERABLE - OP EVAL Time Entered Operability Desc: enter or attach the required documentation per EN-OP-104 LCO ENTERED 0 NO C1 YES LCO NO. LCO ACTION TIME TECH SPEC/TRM ACTION STATEMENT # DATE ENTERED TIME ENTERED IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN:

IIl.IMMEDIATE REPORTABIlUTY DETERMINATION IS IMMEDIATE NRC NOTIFICATION REQUIRED? [I NO[] YES IF YES (Mark appropriate time requirement and complete this section) [I 1-HR RPTC 4-HR RPT

[o 8-HR RPTC 24-HR RPT DATE: AND TIME: OF REPORT.

NAME OF PERSON REPORT MADE TO:

CFR REQUIREMENT: NAME OF PERSON MAKING REPORT:

NRC EVENT NO.

REACTOR POWER:  % REACTOR PRESSURE: RX / RX COOLANT TEMP

[(BWR ONLY) CORE FLOW X 108 Ibm/HR REACTOR LEVEL in]

III. PERFORMANCE/APPROVAL PERFORMED BY: I DATE/TIME:

OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE APPROVAL: DATE/TIME:

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES ATTACHMENT 9.4 ATTACHMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES SHEET 1 OF 3 [AUDIT RPT 9617-01], [ER960078_02], [ER960265_02], [P16529]

NOTES:

1. These guidelines should be used when setting corrective action due dates and extension requests. The target for completion of all corrective actions and closure of the CR associated with an "A", B"or "C" Condition Report is 6 months (except for those with Long Term CAs). CA timeliness criteria are provided to achieve CR age goals that are monitored via performance indicators. These criteria are considered guidelines and not procedural requirements. The CRG, CARB, or Responsible Manager can deviate from these guidelines to appropriately manage resources, except as noted below. Exceptions taken to the timeliness criteria do not relieve the CA/CR Owner from meeting performance indicator goals,
2. Corrective Action Due Dates should be selected with consideration given toward:
a. The risk to plant imposed as a result of the action not being complete.
b. Due Date(s) should ensure the action is complete prior to the next potential occurrence of the problem, if possible.
3. Document GMPO, Director, Site VP, or CARB Chairperson approval in DDE request when that approval is required per this attachment &that position is not the authority level for approval in PCRS.
4. The "30 day clock" for Root Cause Analysis stops when the final Cat "A"Evaluation has been approved by CARB and the CAs have been issued.
a. When CARB approves with comments, the 30 day dock can stop IF the comments do not require bring back to CARB, CAs from the RCA have been issued AND a CA is initiated, not to exceed 4 working days, to track the comment incorporation and approval by the CARB Chairperson..
b. Extension of the action to incorporate comments and obtain approval by the CARB Chairperson beyond 4 working days requires initiation of a specific Condition Report documenting the lack of timely incorporation of the comments.
5. The 30 day clock for Apparent Cause Evaluations stops when the Responsible Manager approves the report and corrective actions have been entered in PCRS.
a. Apparent Cause Evaluations requiring CARB review are presented within 60 days of the disposition assignment.
b. CARB comments are addressed and report finalized within 7 working days of CARB approval. DDEs requiring time beyond 7 working days will be documented in a CR.
c. Apparent Cause Evaluations that receive an unsatisfactory CARB score will be revised and returned to CARB for re-review on a timeline determined appropriate by CARB.

Timeline will be determined commensurate with the significance of the changes required and the risk of potentially delaying any final required changes to action plan.

Corrective Action Type Corrective Action Due Date Guideline Due Date Extension (DDE) Approval

  • For Cat A: < 30 days from CR categorization (including CARB approval of RCE)
  • For Cat B: < 30 days from CR categorization The following DDE escalation requirements apply to any action issued in a Disposition (not including CARB approval of ACE) CR (all CA Types). Document appropriate concurrence in the DDE request ist: Supervisor
  • For Cat C: < 30 days from CR categorization 2nd : Responsible Manager/Superintendent 3rd: GMPO/Director

--- - -- --- - --- -4th- SV P

  • For Cat A, B, & C: -- 180 days from CR Note: Site VP approval is required for extensions that allow dispositionof Corrective Action categorization Significant Root Causes including CARB approval to extend beyond 30 days.

... ----.-.---.----.---------- .------

Note: CARB Chairpersonapproval requiredfor ANY CARB approved CAPR Long Term Actions 0 As approved by GMPO/Director/Site VP related extensions

...

. --------------------- Note: LTCA extensions require GMPO/Directoror Site VP approval Human Performance * < 7 days (Outage < 3 days) from CRG assignment Error Review (HPER) or from error classification

NUCLEAR E JeWEntergy MANAGEMENT MANUAL QUALITY RELATED EN-LI-102 REV. 21 INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 64 OF 72 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESS ATTACHMENT 9.4 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES SHEET 2 OF 3 TABLE: CORRECTIVE ACTION PRIORITY to CA TYPE PRIORITY I ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 1 Conduct Root Cause Analysis DISP-RCA *CA&A USE ONLY** Initial disposition action for CAT A CRs 1 Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition CAPR "RCA ACTIONS ONLY** Corrective Actions to Preclude Recurrence 1 Correct Condition- Category A CAT A- CORRECT *RCA ACTIONS ONLY* Corrective Actions to address Significant Condition identified in the CAT A CRs 1 Conduct Apparent Cause Analysis DISP-ACEIHT **CA&A USE ONLY** Initial Disposition action for CAT B Higher Tier.

1 Conduct Apparent Cause Analysis DISP-ACE/LT **CA&A USE ONLY" Initial Disposition action for CAT B Lower Tier.

PRIORITY 2 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 2 Correct Contributing Cause from Category A CR CAT A-CC Corrective Actions to address the contributing causes identified in the RCA 2 :orrect Extent of Condition/Cause Category A CR CAT A-EOC Corrective Actions to address the extent of condition identified in the RCA 2 Correct Apparent Cause Category B CAT B-AC Corrective Actions that address the apparent causes identified in the B Level CR 2 Correct Original Condition Category B CAT B-CORRECT Additional Corrective Actions that address the original condition excluding those that are addressing the apparent causes.

PRIORITY 3 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 3 Correct Contributing Cause Category B CAT B-CC CA to address contributing causes identified in B level CR 3 Correct Extent of Condition Category B CAT B-EOC Corrective Actions to address the extent of condition identified in the B level CR 3 Correct or Address Condition Category C DISP-CA *CA&A USE ONLY* Initial Disposition action for Cat C CRs.

3 Correct Original Condition Category C CAT C-CORRECT Corrective Actions to address Cat C conditions

ATTACHMENT 9.4 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES SHEET 3 OF 3 PRIORITY 4 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 4 Actions to move issues through PCRS which CARB REVIEW CARB review is required for this CA are not corrective in nature.

4 CR CLOSURE REVIEW Used in requesting a CR closure review 4 CA QUALITY UNSAT Tracks correction of unsatisfactory CA closures..

4 HUMAN PERF Action to perform HP fact finding/HPER.

4 INPO INITIAL OE SUB INPO Initial OE Submittal 4 OCMC Provides oversight of the correction of issues identified as Operable with Compensatory Measures 4 ODMI Action to develop an ODMI Action Plan (EN-OP-111]

4 ODNC Provides oversight of the correction of issues identified as Operable but Degraded or Non-conforming 4 OPERABILITY INPUT **OPS and Licensing Use Only* Provide current or past Operability Input.

4 REGULATORY Provides oversight of issues identified as having regulatory importance.

4 UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A *CA&N/DPIC only': Tracks correction of unsatisfactory CR closures.

4 GENERAL ACTION General Actions.

4 PERIODIC REVIEW Action to complete a interim or periodic review PRIORITY 5 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 5 Items meeting the definition of Enhancement ENHANCEMENT Actions that address improvement items or actions that from LI-102 (item could be tracked outside of address conditions, which meet minimum acceptable criteria.

CAP) This action should not be used to correct the odginally identified adverse condition or to address an identified cause.

ATTACHMENT 9.5 ENTERGY FLEET LEARNING REVIEW PROCESS Sheet I of 2 Purpose:

The Entergy Fleet Learning process enables the sharing of condition reports (CR) identifying internal significant conditions, events or issues that warrant focused sharing with other Entergy Nuclear Fleet stations using the Internal Fleet Learning Operating Experience (OE) process.

This attachment provides the Condition Review Group (CRG) and Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) the criteria and guidance for the identification of an internal significant condition, event, or issue for processing through the Internal Fleet Learning OE process.

The CRG or CARB may identify the CR for:

a. Immediate Sharinq - CRs which need to be shared in a timely manner. There should be sufficient information provided in the CR to allow other sites to understand, and if necessary, act on the condition.
b. Site Sharing - condition for which the causal analysis needs to be shared
c. Fleet Learning - condition for which the causal analysis is significant enough to assign a Responsible Manager to review and to determine fleet impact.

This may be done by CRG during CR classification/assignment or CARB during approval review of RCAs or ACEs.

2.0 Scope

2.1 The Fleet Learning process should include, as a minimum, the following issues identified at a Entergy Nuclear Station:

  • Each Area for Improvement (AFI) from INPO Evaluations or WANO Peer Reviews.

. Each Unsat SOER / IER from INPO Evaluations or WANO Peer Reviews.

  • All Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues.
  • All NRC violations characterized as greater then GREEN.
  • Significant events, typically Category A CRs, as deemed appropriate by CRG or CARB. Not all Category A CRs are expected to be shared using this process, however those with particularly significant consequences should be shared.
  • Other issues identified by CRG or CARB of significance. Each Training program FINDING level issue identified by an INPO Accreditation Team, or by an Entergy Self-Assessment Team.

2.2 The Site Sharing process should include, as a minimum, any of the following issues identified at a Entergy Nuclear Station if they are not designated for Fleet Learning:

e All green findings, violations, or traditional enforcement from the NRC.

2.3 Entergy's Condition Review Group (CRG) screens and classifies all condition reports and may select condition reports identifying internal significant condition, events or issues for internal fleet learning OE processing as immediate sharing and/or evaluation results sharing.

ATTACHMENT 9.5 ENTERGY FLEET LEARNING REVIEW PROCESS Sheet 2 of 2 2.4 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) reviews/approvals all Root Cause Reports and selected Apparent Cause Evaluations and may also identify one of these condition reports not previously identified by CRG for internal fleet learning or Site Sharing OE processing as evaluation results sharing.

3.0 Details

3.1 Internal Fleet OE Initiation for Fleet Learning 3.1.1 Once CRG or CARB has determined that a condition report (CR) should be processed through the internal fleet learning OE process, CA&A ensures a corrective action is issued within the identified CR, to the site OE Coordinator(s) as follows:

3.1.1.1 For CRs that require "Immediate Sharing" (at CR initiation) a corrective action is issued to the OE Coordinator with a due date of <14 days, unless otherwise directed by CRG. The OE Coordinator will normally process in accordance with EN OE-100 as Code "B"- "Useful for Site Awareness".

3.1.1.2 For CRs that require "SITE SHARING" a corrective action is issued to the OE Coordinator with a due date of <60 days, unless otherwise directed by CRG or CARB. The OE Coordinator will process in accordance with EN OE-100.

3.1.1.3 For CRs that require "FLEET LEARNING" a corrective action is issued to the OE Coordinator with a due date of<60 days, unless otherwise directed by CRG or CARB. The OE Coordinator will process in accordance with EN OE-100 as Code "A"-"Evaluation Required A2". When closed the CA will contain the following information (provided by CRG/CARB):

  • Site subject matter expert.
  • Identity of the Responsible Manager that will support the Internal Fleet OE through issuing review actions, performing closure review and determination of aggregate impact to the fleet..

ATTACHMENT 9.6 GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF CRS ON LOWER LEVEL EQUIPMENT ISSUES SHEET I OF I NOTE: This guidance reflects typical classification for equipment conditions that do not screen as category 'A' or 'B' level CRs.

However, it does not override the CRG's authority to apply management discretion when classifying these CRs.

IYesl I Is the equipment issue an Adverse Condition?

i Ln-4 Is the issue affecting Operability, Functionality, or Full Qualification of Safety/Quality Related Equipment?

No Does the issue constitute a risk to generation or an unplanned LCO?

I N I Is the failure related to equipment needed for emergency plan or site security or negatively affects an NRC PI? 1 Yes Is the failure an operations aggregate issue or corrective maintenance? Yes Eýl I Does the issue constitute a credible Industrial Safety threat?

The identified problem is an Adverse Condition and should be screened as higher than CAT "C" when other The identified problem is not an Adverse significance guidance in this procedure is applicable.

Condition. The condition report may be Otherwise, it should be screened as Cat "C". However, if screened as CAT "D""Close Reference" the completion of the Work Order (WO) is the only action Work Request number and/or Work Order needed, then the CR may be screened as CAT "D" subject number generated for repair. Additional to the requirements of Section 5.8[6] of this procedure.

tracking per this procedure is not required.

ATTACHMENT 9.7 TYPICAL NONCONFORMANCE TAG Sheet I of I

[ANSI N18.7 5.2.14] [ANSI N45.2.4 2.6 S1 S2]

Typical Nonconformance Tag CR N ambmn MARIP04101111 Equipment Number IDnsclwflant Nann~umtnein=

0 NONCONFORMANCE TAG 0 NONCONFORMING ITEM MAY NOT BE REMOVED WITHOUT AU'THORIZATIO N

ATTACHMENT 9.8 CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM SHEET I OF I [SOER 10-2 REC 1]

CR Interim and Periodic Review CR Number: Category Level A B _ C CR Owner Group:

CR

Description:

CR Review: (All No responses require explanation be included.)

1. Will the Interim actions taken to date adequately address the issue until all corrective actions are complete? Yes / No __
2. Will the existing corrective actions documented in the condition report, when completed, correct the condition report issue? Yes / No
3. What is the expected CR Closure date based on remaining needed actions? DATE:
4. Determine if a new condition currently exists that potentially requires a re-evaluation of operability/functionality? Yes / No /N/A If the answer is Yes, then initiate a new CR to document the concern; CR #
5. Are all LI-102 requirements for corrective action administration and control being met, i.e.

justifications for Due Date Extensions valid, Long Term Corrective Actions identified, CARB approved CAPRs identified, and appropriate approvals obtained for all?

Yes / No

6. What activity is "preventing" the condition report from being resolved and closed?
7. What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the action plan?

Review / Approval Required:

Director/GM Title: Date:

(Print name & Position title)

NOTE: The expectation is to capture the discussion points of this form in a CA. The form itself need not be used, but all points applicable must be addressed.

ATTACHMENT 9.9 LTCA CLASSIFICATION FORM SHEET I OF 1 LTCA Classification Form Long Term CA Classification:

CR Number:

CR Owner Group:

CA Number: LTCA Assigned to Group:

LTCA Classification (check ONLY one):

__ RFO/FOIPlanned Long ModlDesign Change Req'd System/Component Outage Req'd NRC Resp. Req'd Multi-cycle Training Req'd Provide specific details for LTCA classification selected above.

What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the action plan?

Explain impact to condition report timeliness.

Review / Approval Required:

Director/GM Title: Date:

(Print name & Position title)

NOTE: The expectation is to capture the discussion points of this form in a CA, DDE request or initial CA assignment as appropriate. The form itself need not be used, but all points applicable must be addressed.

ATTACHMENT 9.10 CR ASSIGNMENT AND LIFE CYCLE PROCESS MAP SHEET I OF 1 6/2412010 CR Assignment and Life Cycle &EnteW Yes

Doc,7 Miller, Geoffrey From: Schaup, William Sent: Friday, May 24, 2013 8:22 AM To: Miller, Geoffrey

Subject:

FW: Requested Information Geoff I believe this is the rest of the information you requested. Any questions please call.

Enjoy your week end From: McMahan, James [1]

Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2013 4:14 PM To: Schaup, William Cc: BAUMAN, DAVID N; Gresh, Evan; Marks Jr, Robert

Subject:

Requested Information William, Below is the requested information. Should you need anything else next week while I am gone please contact Evan Gresh 4386 (concerning information below) or Bob Marks 4408.

1. Bigge Crane assembly-start time (based on installation of pedestal column) 2/28/13 1300
2. Finish assembly 3/31/13 0049
3. Start time of lift 3/31/13 0639 James M. McMahan Sr Project Manager Arkansas Nuclear One VILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL Aeged-Cbmmunication Att ey Work Pr t prared at the Direction of Legal C~ouns +,

1

IDocg9 Baca, Bernadette From: Allen, Don Sent: Monday, June 17, 2013 10:44 AM To: Bradley, Dan; Melfi, Jim; Tindell, Brian

Subject:

FW: Region IV Drop In Agenda This is the licensee's agenda.

From: PYLE, STEPHENIE L [2]

Sent: Monday, June 17, 2013 8:57 AM To: Allen, Don

Subject:

Region IV Drop In Agenda Region IV Drop In Visit June 18, 2013

- Introductions

- Unit 1 Status

- Core Reload

- Restoration (Electrical/Structural)

- New Stator Move

- Plant Restart

- Stator Drop RCE

- AIT

- Site Challenges/Major Mods

- Concurrent NFPA 0805 and Fukushima Mods

- Cask Transfer Facility I

JDoc 11 Melfi, Jim From: Fairbanks, Abin Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2013 9:05 AM To: Allen, Don; Melfi, Jim; Bradley, Dan; Azua, Ray; Kalyanam, Kaly Cc: Tindell, Brian; Schaup, William; Hatfield, Gloria

Subject:

ANO Stator Lift Rig Assembly Attachments: IMG_1023.jpg; IMG_1024.jpg Pictures resent.

From: Fairbanks, Abin Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2013 8:36 AM To: Allen, Don; Melfi, Jim; Azua, Ray; Bradley, Dan; Kalyanam, Kaly Cc: Schaup, William; Hatfield, Gloria; Tindell, Brian

Subject:

ANO Stator Lift Rig Assembly The attached pictures show the vertical members (Unit 2 side of the train bay) of the Rigging International stator lift rig. Assembly of the lift rig should be complete Saturday; the stator is expected to be lifted into position on Sunday.

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............

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Melfi, Jim From: Fairbanks, Abin Sent: Thursday, June 27, 2013 9:08 AM To: Allen, Don; Bradley, Dan; Melfi, Jim; Azua, Ray; Kalyanam, Kaly Cc: Tindell, Brian; Schaup, William; Hatfield, Gloria

Subject:

ANO Stator Lift Rig Assembly Attachments: IMG_1029.jpg; IMG1030.jpg; IMG_1028.jpg The attached pictures show the lateral bracing between the vertical supports; the tripods, which will be bolted to steel plates on the turbine pedestal, are also shown.

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Melfi, Jim From: Fairbanks, Abin Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 8:09 AM To: Allen, Don; Bradley, Dan; Melfi, Jim; Azua, Ray; Kalyanam, Kaly Cc: Tindell, Brian; Schaup, William; Hatfield, Gloria

Subject:

ANO Stator Lift Rig Assembly Attachments: IMG_1070.jpg; IMG_1072.jpg IMG 1070 - Shows the tripods secured over the turbine pedestal and the west girder resting on the 386' level.

IMG 1072 - Shows the east girder in the train bay.

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Doc6141 Melfi, Jim From: Allen, Don Sent: Monday, July 01, 2013 7:05 AM To: Kennedy, Kriss Cc: Azua, Ray; Melfi, Jim; Bradley, Dan; Willoughby, Leonard

Subject:

FW: ANO 1 Stator Lift From: Tindell, Brian Sent: Monday, July 01, 2013 6:24 AM To: Allen, Don

Subject:

FW: ANO 1 Stator Lift FYI again.

From: PYLE, STEPHENIE L [mailto: SPYLEOentergy.com)

Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 5:27 PM To: Willoughby, Leonard; Tindell, Brian

Subject:

FW: ANO 1 Stator Lift FYI

Original Message -----

From: PORTER, JAMES W Sent: Friday, June 28, 2013 05:08 PM Central Standard Time To: ANO Supv. & Above

Subject:

ANO 1 Stator Lift All, The stator lift planned for Sunday dayshift is currently projected to occur on Monday. Additionally, the transfer of the refurbished stator into the protected area scheduled for Saturday will push to Sunday. Document review and approval is tracking to complete Sunday and, until that process completes ensuring quality of the products, the stator lift will be postponed. If your organization is somehow involved in the lift, please inform individuals contact the Recovery Control Center at 858-5666 for further direction. Thanks for your support and patience.

Bob Gordon Director, Project Management I

B/12-

Doc 15.

Melfi, Jim From: Tindell, Brian Sent: Monday, July 01, 2013 9:43 AM To: Allen, Don Cc: Melfi, Jim; Willoughby, Leonard; Fairbanks, Abin; Azua, Ray;, Bradley, Dan

Subject:

ANO Stator Lift Rig Attachments: Stator Lift Rig 004.jpg; Stator Lift Rig 006.jpg; Stator Lift Rig 003.jpg Don,

  1. 3 picture gives you an idea of the size and location of one of.the beams. It is on the turbine deck in front of the control room extension.
  1. 4 shows the other side of that beam, and a piece of the other beam to the right.
  1. 6 shows one of the tripods grouted in place next to the stator base Thanks, Brian 1

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Melfi, Jim From: Tindell, Brian Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2013 6:56 AM To: Allen, Don; Miller, Geoffrey; Melfi, Jim; Willoughby, Leonard

Subject:

FW: CARB FYI From: PYLE, STEPHENIE L [mailto: SPYLE()entergy.com]

Sent: Monday, July 01, 2013 4:31 PM To: Tindell, Brian

Subject:

CARB

Brian, The CARB for the stator event has been rescheduled for Wednesday at 1500.

Stephenie

D5oc1 717 Melfi, Jim From: Melfi, Jim Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2013 8:11 AM To: Tindell, Brian; Fairbanks, Abin; Azua, Ray; Young, Matt; Allen, Don Cc: Melfi, Jim; Bradley, Dan

Subject:

ANO Status ANO Unit 1 : Mode: 6/ Risk:

TS Action Statements: N/A Events/conditions of interest SFP Temp 97 F; TT 20OF- 29 hours1.208 days <br />0.173 weeks <br />0.0397 months <br />; RCS Temp 94F; TTB 19.2 hours0.0833 days <br />0.0119 weeks <br />0.00274 months <br /> RCS Level 400 Feet.

Day 100 of the outage. Green Train Protected. Both SF trains inservice.

Switchgear Recovery efforts ongoing. S/U 1 work. Statorcrane assembly ANO Unit 2 Mode: 1 / 100% Power Risk:

TS Action Statements: No short term LCOs Planned Maintenanceand Surveillances.

Condition(s) of Interest:

Licensee believes that stator lift will be on Friday (Maybe). They want to get S/U 1 back and ties from AAC generator, and believe they have enough time before stator lift occurs.

Because of NRC concerns the alternate shutdown capability, they have a continuous firewatch established in the Control Room until further notice.

1

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 18 Group I Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To:

Originated By: McCartyLarry A 7/23/2013 13:22:26 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 10/09/2013 Initial Due Date: 10/10/2013 CA Type: CAT A-EOC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Identify any critical lifts to be performed with vendor specialty equipment in the fleet. Ensure lessons learned from the ANO event are factored into the review of the design and test plans.

Response

Actions have been issued in WT-2013-005 CA133-145) to all Project Managers in the fleet and to appropriate Project management personnel in the corporate offiece to identify any critical lifts to be performed with vendor specialty equipment in the fleet. Ensure lessons learned from the ANO event are factored into the review of the design and test plans.

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy [ CA DUE DATE EXTENSION TCR-ANO-C-2013-00888 Corrective Action : CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA-00018 Version: 1 Approved:-

Requested Duedate: 10/10/2013 Previous Duedate: 08/15/2013 Requested By: Gillespie,Richard D 07/25/2013 Approved By: James,Dale E 07/27/2013 Request

Description:

Actions from the Fleet Director of Project Management have been issued in (WT-2013-005 CA133-145) to all Project Managers in the fleet and to appropriate Project Management personnel in the corporate office to identify any critical lifts to be performed with vendor specialty equipment in the fleet and to ensure lessons learned from the ANO event are factored into the review of the design and test plans.

It is necessary to extend this action to support obtaining responses to the WT actions. It is acceptable to extend this because there is no plant operability issues related to this action. The action is to share lessons learned information from the ANO 1R24 Stator Drop event. This DDE is being submitted at the request of the ANO Manager of Projects.

Approved

Description:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 19 Group I Name Assigned By: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Vice President Project Mgmt HQN Eubanks,Clifford Subassigned To : Vice President Project Mgmt HQN James Jr,William J Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 13:29:58 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 09/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 10/01/2013 CA Type: CAPR CA Priority: I Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence (CAPR):

CAPR-l:Revise EN-DC- 114, Project Management, to provide guidance in specifying contract language which will ensure detailed engineering calculations, quality requirements and standards are provided for internal and third party review, in accordance with revised EN-MA-1 19, Material Handling Program, when specially designed temporary lift assembles are to be used.

Annotate steps implementing this CAPR per EN-AD-101-01 requirements. Example: [CAPR-1: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888)

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION TCR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 20 Group Name Assigned By: VP-G MPO Mgmt ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Fleet Maintenance Mgmt HQN Stewart,Samuel Subassigned To:

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 13:38:28 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 08/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 08/30/2013 CAType: CAPR CA Priority: 1 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

CAPR-2: Revise EN-MA-I 19, Material Handling Program, Section 5.2[71 toremove the Note and require a documented engineering response be developed, if not previously performed, to evaluation critical lifts if using:

i. Any specially designed temporary lifting device, or ii. Any lifting device that cannot be load tested per EN-MA- 119 criteria, or iii. Any lifting device without a certified load rating name plate rating affixed to it The engineering response will include the following:
  • An owner review in accordance with EN-DC-149, Acceptance of Vendor Documents, documenting the structural acceptance and testing of the assembly
  • Verification of a third party independent review of vendor calculations
  • Verification of appropriate code application including application of appropriate safety factors
  • Verification of 3D finite element analysis modeling performed if a load test < 125% of the projected hook load is not performed
  • Verification of Load Testing:
    • Load and Functional performance
    • Witness test
    • Specification of additional safety factors when load testing is not possible
  • Examination of critical welds post load test
  • Installation verification
  • Establishment of an exclusion zone considering the failure of the lift assembly and worst case load drop
  • Identification of Plant Equipment that could be damaged due to the lift assembly failure (Use WF3 EC 8432, & Palisades EC 7189 as examples)

Annotate steps implementing this CAPR per EN-AD-101-01 requirements. Example: [CAPR-2: CR-ANO-C-2013-00888]

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION 1CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 2)

Group Name I Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Fleet Maintenance Mgmt HQN Stewart,Saniuel Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 13:59:49 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 08/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 08/30/2013 CAType: CARB REVIEW CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Include ANO CARB in review of changes to EN-MA- 119 being made to address this root cause.

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 22 Group Name -1 Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:03:46 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 09/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 09/30/2013 CA Type: CAT A-CC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Reinforce EN-DC-i 14 standards for establishing vendor oversight plans for the purpose of ensuring execution of contract requirements.

  • Specifically address that significant changes to project scope requires a change to the plan
  • Project Management Responsibilities for establishing oversight of important contract provision.

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 23 Group I Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:06:12 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 09/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 09/30/2013 CA Type: CAT A-CC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Establish and implement a 'Will Sheet' for a one cycle period to monitor and provide feedbacks to ensure that project managers are implementing the EN-DC- 114 process for vendor oversight.

This actions may be closed after development of the 'Will Sheet' and a formal way of insuring that the will sheet is completed for each project.

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION [ CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 24 Group I Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:10:00 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 03/04/2014 Initial Due Date: 03/05/2014 CA Type: CAT A-CC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Revise Root Cause Report based on completed Exponent Report addressing unlikely or possible failure modes.

  • Unlikely Failure Modes that need additional analysis are FM I - Material Failure and FM2 - Equipment Malfunction
  • Possible Failure mode FM3 - Crane Structure Overload needs additional analysis to support or refute if live loads also contributed to the design flaw.

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

EntergT CORRECTIVE ACTION CR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 25 Group Name Assigned By: VP-GMPO Mgmt ANO JamesDale E Assigned To: Eng Project Mgmt ANO Bauman,David N Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:24:10 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 03/13/2014 Initial Due Date: 03/14/2014 CA Type: CARB REVIEW CA Priority: .4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Present to CARB the revised Root Cause Report based on completing the Exponent Report

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 26 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO JamesDa1e E Assigned To: Fleet Maintenance Mgmt HQN Stewart,Samuel Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/20 13 14:25:44 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 09/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 09/30/2013 CA Type: CAT A-CC CA Priority: 2 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Perform gap analysis on EN-MA-1 19 against SOER 06-01

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 27 Group I Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Vice President Project Mgmt HQN Gordon,Robert A Subassigned To : Vice President Project Mgmt HQN James Jr,William J Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:28:44 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 10/28/2013 Initial Due Date: 10/30/2013 CA Type: ENHANCEMENT CA Priority: 5 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Consider implementing ANO 'Will Sheet' developed to monitor and provide feedback to Project Management on implementation of EN-DC-I 14 process for vendor oversight at a fleet level.

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy I CORRECTIVE ACTION ICR-ANO-C-2013-00888 CA Number: 28 Group Name Assigned By: NSA Director ANO James,Dale E Assigned To: Vice President Project Mgmt HQN Eubanks,Clifford Subassigned To :

Originated By: McCarty,Larry A 7/23/2013 14:31:34 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 10/29/2013 Initial Due Date: 10/30/2013 CA Type: ENHANCEMENT CA Priority: 5 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Consider enhancing the guidance in Section 4.0[6](0) of EN-DC-1 14, Project Management, to include in the consideration of team composition experience necessary to assess adequacy of associated decisions related to high consequence evolutions.

Response

Subresponse :

Closure Comments:

Entergy CA Number: 29 I CORRECTIVE ACTION IL7.;ANO-C-20,3-00888 Group I Name Assigned By: Eng Outage Mgmt ANO McCoyJaime H Assigned To: Eng Outage Mgmt ANO Edgel],Douglas W Subassigned To : Eng Outage Mgmt ANO Butler,Paul Wayne Originated By: Butler,Paul Wayne 7/26/2013 14:39:13 Performed By:

Subperformed By:

Approved By:

Closed By:

Current Due Date: 08/02/2013 Initial Due Date: 08/02/2013 CA Type: GENERAL ACTION CA Priority: 4 Plant Constraint: NONE CA

Description:

Develop an integrated Start-up monitoring plan for Unit I as it exits IR24. Key elements of this plan will included structured monitoring of all critical plant parameters by Engineering, Operations, Chemistry, Maintenance, Stator the Rewind Project, and the Recovery Project. Document the plan, the actions that will be taken as Unit I starts up and any input from Entergy Senior Management.

Response

Subresponse:

Closure Comments:

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS April 29, 2013 Received FOIA from region.

Unit I

- Mode: None

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 89 F

- TTB: 12.3 hrs

- RCS Level: - 0.5 ft below vessel flange

- Both trains ECCS available

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SUL1 supplying power to vital busses A3 and A4; both EDGs available Restoration All debris associated with the Bigge lift rig has been removed. Plan to remove stator from the train bay either Tuesday or Wednesday.

Plan to installed radiation shields over the reactor vessel opening today to reduce dose rates for work on DH-17 check valve.

As soon as the A3 bus is powered by SU2 through the temporary switchgear (should be complete tomorrow morning), the licensee will remove the B train EDG from service to commence Green train electrical maintenance.

Completed core offload at 1905 April 28.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 29%

- RISK: GREEN

- AC Power: Restored to normal configuration Restoration Holding at 29% power for feedwater iron cleanup. Should achieve 100% power some time tomorrow. Criticality achieved 0920 yesterday. Resident staff observed criticality operations for about 4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br /> on Sunday.

No LCOs.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS April 30, 2013 Provided a hardcopy of the NSIR guidance on enforcement discretion for cyber security requirements to Stephenie Pyle.

Unit 1

- Mode: Defueled

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 89 F

- TTB: 12.4 hrs

- RCS Level: Cold legs drained

- Both trains ECCS available

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SU1 supplying power to vital busses A3 and A4; both EDGs available Restoration Plan to remove stator from the train bay tomorrow.

Completed installing radiation shielding over the reactor vessel opening.

As soon as the A3 bus is powered by SU2 through the temporary switchgear (should be complete in a couple days), the licensee will remove the B train EDG from service to commence Green train electrical maintenance. Ultimately, the licensee plans to power nonvital busses from the temporary switchgear instead of the temporary diesel generators.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 98%

- RISK: GREEN, yellow later today due to work in the switchyard

- AC Power: Restored to normal configuration

- RCS Leakage: 0.009 gpm Restoration Holding at 98% for NI calibration, should achieve 100% shortly.

No LCOs.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS May 1, 2013 Unit 1

- Mode: Defueled

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 96 F

- TTB: 12.5 hrs

- RCS Level: Cold legs drained

- Both trains ECCS available

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SUW supplying power to A4; both EDGs available. A3 is currently deenergized to facilitate testing of temporary switchgear from SU2 to A3.

Restoration Plan to remove stator from the train bay Friday. Still waiting to have a regional call with the licensee

- on the details of the stator removal.

As soon as the A3 bus testing of SU2 through the temporary switchgear is completed, the licensee will remove the B train EDG from service to commence Green train electrical maintenance. The A3 bus will continue to be powered by SUW and SU2 will only be used if all other power sources are lost. The licensee plans to power nonvital busses from the temporary switchgear instead of the temporary diesel generators as soon as the EC is completed around the 6/7th.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 100%

- RISK: GREEN, yellow later today due to work in the switchyard

- AC Power: SU2 is inoperable due to testing of the temporary switchgear to A3

- RCS Leakage: 0.009 gpm Restoration RCP "C" middle seal is degraded. The current differential pressure is 503 psid (nominal is 715). An ODMI is being developed, but even if the seal completely failed, there is operating experience demonstrating that the plant could continue operation with 2 seals.

Entered a 72-hr LCO this morning at 0456 due to temporary switchgear testing. Should exit LCO today after testing is complete.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS May 2, 2013 Unit 1

- Mode: Defueled

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 98 F

- TTB: 12 hrs

- RCS Level: Cold legs drained

- Both trains ECCS available

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SU1 supplying power to A3 and A4; both EDGs available.

Restoration Plan to remove stator from the train bay Friday. Still waiting to have a regional call with the licensee on the details of the stator removal.

As soon as the A3 bus testing of SU2 through the temporary switchgear is completed, the licensee will remove the B train EDG from service to commence Green train electrical maintenance. The A3 bus will continue to be powered by SU1 and SU2 will only be used if all other power sources are lost. The licensee plans to power nonvital busses from the temporary switchgear instead of the temporary diesel generators as soon as the EC is completed around the 6/7th.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 100%

- RISK: Yellow

- AC Power: All onsite and offsite power sources are opperable

- RCS Leakage: 0.026 gpm Yellow risk due to work in the switchyard to replace the Pleasant Hill line insulators (line is deenergized).

Restoration RCP "C" middle stage seal differential pressure has remained stable. The current differential pressure is 503 psid (nominal is 715). An ODMI is being developed, but even if the seal completely failed, there is operating experience demonstrating that the plant could continue operation with 2 seals.

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE STATUS May 3, 2013 Unit I

- Mode: Defueled

- RISK: GREEN

- SFP Temp: 96 F

- TTB: 12 hrs

- RCS Level: Cold legs drained

- A and B trains of spent fuel pool cooling are running

- AC Power: SU1 supplying power to A3 and A4; EDG "A"available.

Restoration Plan to remove stator from the train bay Friday or Saturday. Completed cutting out interfering concrete on the west end. Residents attended 0900 IPTE for the stator move. Residents will be observing portions of the lift/removal this weekend as directed by regional management.

Began Green train electrical maintenance window, which includes (will include) maintenance on the A-4 vital bus, B-6 non-vital bus, 006 safety-related battery, and the B EDG.

Unit 2

- Reactor Power: 100%

- RISK: Yellow

- AC Power: All onsite and offsite power sources are opperable

- RCS Leakage: 0.019 gpm Yellow risk due to work in the switchyard to replace the Pleasant Hill line insulators (line is deenergized).

RCP "C" middle stage seal differential pressure has remained stable. The current differential pressure is approximately 500 psid (nominal is 715). The ODMI should be completed 5/7.

Procedure Contains NMM REFLIB Forms: YES Z NO []

Effective Procedure Owner: J. R. Elchenberger Governance Owner: Alan Ettlinger Date Title: Mgr, CA&A Manager Title: Fleet Manager OE&CA 05/24/13 Site: ANO Site: HQN Exception Site Site Procedure Champion Title Date*

ANO J. R. Eichenberger Mgr, CA&A N/A BRP N/A N/A N/A CNS Linda R. Dewhirst GGNS James Nadeau Mgr, CA&A IPEC Ed Firth Mgr, CA&A JAF Ty Hunt Mgr, CA&A PNPS Ted Bordelon Mgr, CA&A PLP Andrew Notbohm Mgr, CA&A RBS Peg Lucky Mgr, CA&A VY Jon Bengtson Mgr, CA&A W3 William McKinney Mgr, CA&A N/A NP N/A N/A HQN Richard Courtney Mgr, CA&A Projects Site and NMM Procedures Canceled or Sunerseded By This Revision Process Applicability Exclusion: All Sites: LI Specific Sites: ANO 0 BRP El GGNS Z IPECIO JAF E PLP N PNPS Z RBS Z VY Z W3 0Z NP [I Chanae Statement Editorial change to 5.9[21 to include obtaining prior concurrence for procedure changes required to address RCE causes.

TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page 1.0 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................ 03

2.0 REFERENCES

..................................................................................................................... 03 3.0 DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................................... 05 4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ............................................................................................................ 12 5.0 DETAILS .............................................................................................................................. 16 6.0 INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................... 44 7.0 RECORDS .......................................................................................................................... 45 8.0 SITE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ..................................................................................... 46 9.0 ATTACHMENTS ................................................................................................................. 49 ATTACHMENT 9.1 ..................................................... CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY 50 ATTACHMENT 9.2 ................................................................................ EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS 56 ATTACHMENT 9.3 ............................................................................................................ MANUAL CR INITIATION 59 ATTACHMENT 9.4 ................................................................. CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES 63 ATTACHMENT 9.5 ..................................................................... ENT ERGY FLEET LEARNING REVIEW PROCESS 66 ATTACHMENT 9.6 GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF CRS ON LOWER LEVEL EQUIPMENT ISSUES 69 ATTACHMENT 9.7 ........................................................................................... TYPICAL NONCONFORMANCE TAG 70 ATTACHMENT 9.8 .............................................................................. CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM 71 ATTACHMENT 9.9 ..................................................................................................... LTCA CLASSIFICATION FORM 72 ATTAHCMENT 9.10 CR ASSIGNMENT AND LIFE CYCLE PROCESS MAP 73

1.0 PURPOSE 11] This procedure provides instructions for the administration of Entergy (EN) Corrective Action process, including the identification, reporting, evaluation, and correction of a broad range of problems, areas for improvements, and standards performance deficiencies.

Issues addressed in the corrective action process must include Adverse Conditions and Conditions Adverse to Quality, and can include minor problems that may be precursors to more significant events, areas for improvement and standards performance deficiencies identified during assessments and other activities. [10 CFR 50], (JAFP-91-0834], [P326481, [P33542]

[2] This procedure provides management expectations and guidance for the implementation of the EN Condition Reporting Process.

NOTE Throughout the procedure, position titles are used but are not procedural obligations. The intent is to identify functional responsibilities only. Each site will implement the intended function according to its organizational structure and position titles.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 References (a) Title 10, Code Of Federal Regulation, Part 50, Appendix B (b) ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational Phase of Nuclear Power Plants (c) NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 9900, "Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions adverse to Quality or Safety" (d) ANSI 45.2.10, Quality Assurance Terms and Definitions (e) Entergy Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM)

(f) SOER 02-4 Rec 3, Rx Press Vessel Head Degradation at Davis-Besse (g) Nuclear Management Manual Procedure, EN-LI-104, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process (h) Nuclear Management Manual Procedure, EN-OE-100, Operating Experience Program (i) North American Electrical Reliability Corporation (NERC) Standards

2.1 cont (j) GGNS Procedure: 01-S-06-5, Reportable Events or Conditions (k) WF3 Procedures: UNT-006-010, Event Notification and Reporting (I) Nuclear Management Manual Procedure, EN-MA-123, Identification and Trending of Rework (m) Program Section CEP-R&R-001, ASME Section Xl, Division 1- Repairs and Replacements (n) Program Section CEP-CII-001, ASME Section Xl Repairs and Replacements of Containment Items (o) NRC Administrative Letter 98-10, "Dispositioning of Technical Specifications that are insufficient to Assure Plant Safety" (p) NRC Inspection Manual, Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (q) NRC Information Notice 97-78, "Crediting Of Operator Actions In Place Of Automatic Actions And Modifications Of Operator Actions, Including Response Times" (r) SOER 10-2, "Engaged, Thinking Organizations", Rec 1 (s) CAPR CR-PLP-2009-05938 2.2 Obligations and Industry Standards Implemented Overall (a) 10CFR50 (b) CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060 (c) QAPM A.1 .d (Overall procedure implements)

(d) ANSI N18.7 5.2.11 (Overall procedure implements)

(e) ANSI N18.7 5.2.15 (Overall procedure implements)

(f) ANSI N18.7 5.3.2 (Overall procedure implements)

(g) ANSI N45.2.2 5.5 (Overall procedure implements)

(h) ANSI N45.2.12 4.4.5 (Overall procedure implements) 2.3 Obligations and Industry Standards Section Specific (a) Quality Assurance Program Manual (QAPM)

2.3 cont.

(b) ANSI N18.7 (c) ANSI N45.2.4 (d) ANSI N45.2.11 (e) ANSI N45.2.12 (f) ANSI N45.2.13 (g) 10 CFR 50.72 (h) 10 CFR 50.73 (i) 10 CFR 73.71 3.0 DEFINITIONS

[1] Administrative Corrective Action - A Corrective Action (CA) issued to facilitate moving the CR response and CA plan through the processes identified in LI-102. These actions typically have no direct impact on actions necessary to correct the identified condition, rather they document administrative steps involved in the process (i.e., an action issued by CA&A to direct closure review of a CR, an action issued to re-evaluate closure of a CR based upon issues identified by a CA&A closure review, etc.).

[2] Adverse Condition - An event, defect, characteristic, state or activity that prohibits or detracts from safe, efficient nuclear plant operation or a condition that could credibly impact nuclear safety, personnel safety, plant reliability or non-compliance with federal, state, or local regulations. Adverse conditions include non-conformances, conditions adverse to quality and plant reliability concerns. Examples of adverse conditions are contained in Attachment 9.2. [P3098]

[3] Adverse Trend - Undesirable change in frequency of occurrence of a parameter or undesirable level of occurrence of a parameter that warrants management attention or corrective action to improve the performance. This negative change in performance is undesirable because of the adverse impact on safety or reliability or because of the large (relative) number of similar performance problems in a bin that point to more significant future problems if not addressed.

[4] Apparent Cause - A likely cause for a condition that is determined by less rigorous means of evaluation than a root cause.

3. 0 cont.

[5] ASME Section Xl Boundary - The ASME Section XI boundary includes those portions of systems, components, and their supports that are classified as In-service Inspection Class 1, 2, 3, MC (Metal Containment), or CC (Concrete Containment). The ASME Section Xl Boundaries are defined in site boundary drawings. With respect to ISI Classes 1, 2, and 3, these classifications include the following:

(a) ASME Classes 1,2, and 3 (b) Quality Groups A, B, and C (c) Classes T2, T3, and T3/Critical (Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 only)

[6] CAR (Corrective Action Request) Condition Report - A type of Learning Organization document that can be written by the Supplier Quality Assurance group to document and track evaluations of vendor issues.

[7] Condition - An issue or discrete occurrence that warrants documentation using a Condition Report (CR).

[8] Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) - As described in 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, such conditions include failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defects, and non-conformances. This is a condition of a System, Structure, Component or Software (SSC) that could potentially render the SSC degraded or inoperable.

[9] Condition Report (CR) - A computer generated or paper form used to document issues into the corrective action process.

[10] Condition Review Group (CRG) - A management group responsible for CR review, categorization and assignment of responsibilities. [P2993]

[11] Conditional Release - A controlled release of materials, parts, or components that have not been fully accepted under the Quality Assurance program. This type of release serves to identify and track an item until it becomes accepted or other disposition action is completed.

[12] Contributing Cause - An identified cause that, if corrected, would not by itself have prevented the event. This type of cause may have facilitated the event's occurrence, increased its severity, or lengthened the time to discovery.

[13] Corrective Action - Corrective Actions (CAs) include actions intended to preclude repetition of significant conditions (see CAPRs) and those intended to correct adverse conditions.

3. 0 cont.

[14] Corrective Actions to Preclude Repetition (CAPRs) - A type of Corrective Action (CA) intended to correct the root cause(s) of a condition and thereby preclude repetition.

[15] Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) - A group, consisting of a cross section of personnel familiar with a particular Condition Report, assembled for the purpose of review and approval of cause evaluations and corrective action plans. The CARB chairman ensures that adequate representation is in attendance at meetings in accordance with CARB quorum requirements. [P23035]

[16] Degraded Condition - A degraded condition is one in which the qualification of a structure, system or component or its functional capability is reduced. Examples of degraded conditions are failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, and defective material and equipment. Examples of conditions that can reduce the capability of a system are aging, erosion, corrosion, improper operation, and maintenance

[17] Department Performance Improvement Coordinators (DPIC) - departmental personnel as defined in ENOS/GOES to functionally perform and/or implement continuous improvement programs, including the Corrective Action Program (CAP), for their organizations.

[Chemistry, Engineering, Maintenance, Materials Purchasing & Contracts, Operations, Planning & Scheduling, Radiation Protection, Security, and Training]

[18] Deviation - A nonconformance or departure of a characteristic from specified requirements.

[19] Disposition - CR Disposition is the outcome of the review of a reported problem by the CR Owner, as designated by the CRG. The disposition includes (as appropriate) the cause of the condition as determined by the CA to perform an evaluation, the extent of condition, actions to address causes, and a plan for implementing those actions that is commensurate with the significance of the problem. Completion of CR Disposition does not require the completion of all corrective actions.

[20] Effectiveness Reviews - Performance based reviews undertaken to verify that an intended result was achieved. Effectiveness Reviews are normally assigned by CARB to the Responsible Manager, but may be assigned to another group for evaluation. [P23038]

[21] Employee Concerns Program (ECP) - A program implemented to support a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). The ECP provides an alternate means for any employee to report any type of problem or concern.

[22] Enhancements - Improvement items or actions that address conditions, which meet minimum acceptable criteria, or performance standards but may be less than optimum.

Enhancements should be identified in the CR response because they add value, but may or may not be tracked to completion by the CR process. The enhancement designation is not appropriate if the action is needed to correct the originally identified adverse condition or if the action is needed to address an identified cause.

3.0 cont.

[23] Extent of Condition - An evaluation/review to identify the total population of items that have or may have the same problem as identified in the original CR problem statement. The intent of the Extent of Condition review focuses on a determination of any potential impact to the operability/functionality of the similar components, equipment, systems, human performance traps/issues, or organizational processes/programs.

[24] Inadequate Technical Specification - A specific Technical Specifications requirement (parameter value or action) that may not support safety assumptions or conclusions.

[25] Industrial Safety Incident - An incident that results in either an OSHA Recordable or OSHA Reportable condition.

[26] Learning Organization (LO) - An organizational culture that embraces a never-ending drive for continuous improvement, as highlighted by people at every level in the organization continually increasing their capacity to produce good results and constantly learning from others as means to systematically and deliberately realize operational excellence.

[27] Learning Organization (LO) Documents - Documents written to provide a consolidated record of assessments, benchmark trips, CAPR effectiveness reviews, and other activities.

Learning Organization documents are not processed through the Control Room, Licensing, or the CRG. LO documents are governed by EN-LI-1 04, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process. (LO-WTs are NOT considered LO documents. They are ungoverned Work Tracking actions with no specific controls.)

[28] Long Term Condition Report (LTCR) - A CR that contains an approved Long Term CA.

[29] Long Term Corrective Action (LTCA) - Action(s) that cannot meet the timeframes established and approved in accordance with the Corrective Action Processing Guidelines (Attachment 9.4).

[30] Management - Defined as Supervisor and above (Supv, Supt., Manager, GMPO, V.P. etc.)

or as personnel recognized as having direct reports.

[31] A Nonconforming Condition is a condition of a System, Structure or Component (SSC) that involves a failure to meet the Current Licensing Basis (CLB) or a situation in which quality has been reduced because of factors such as improper design, testing, construction, or modification. The following are examples of nonconforming conditions:

" An SSC fails to conform to one or more applicable codes or standards (e.g., the CFR, operating license, TSs, UFSAR, and/or licensee commitments).

  • An as-built or as-modified SSC does not meet the CLB.
  • Operating experience or engineering reviews identify a design inadequacy.

" Documentation required by NRC requirements 'such as 10CFR50.49 is not available or deficient

NUCLEAR QUAUTY RELATED EN-LI-102 REV. 21 MANAGEMENT MANUAL INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 9 OF 72 Corrective Action Process 3.0 cont.

[32] Non-Significant - A classification for condition reports (typically, B, C, D categories) that document problems or corrective actions for which a repeat occurrence, while always undesirable, can be tolerated.

[33] OPERABLE-Degraded or Nonconforming (Operable-DNC) - A condition where a TS SSC is OPERABLE but a Degraded or Nonconforming Condition exists that does not require Compensatory Measures.

[34] Owner - (Responsible Manager) The management position within the PCRS management group that was designated by the CRG to ensure the condition is corrected in accordance with the requirements of this procedure. The Owner may be a Superintendent or above position and is equal to the term "Responsible Manager' as used in this procedure.

[35] Paperless Condition Reporting System (PCRS) - A computer program that tracks actions resulting from the processes described within this procedure.

[36] Repair - The process of restoring a nonconforming characteristic to a condition such that the capability of an item to function reliably and safely is unimpaired, even though that item still may not conform to the original requirement.

[37] Repetitive Event - any significant condition adverse to quality that resulted from the same identified root cause as a previous event or nonconformance. This doesn't apply to conditions classified as significant due to the frequency of the event/condition (i.e., adverse trend).

[38] Responsible Manager (RM) - (Owner) The management position within the PCRS management group that is designated by the CRG to ensure the condition is corrected in accordance with the requirements of this procedure. The RM may be a Superintendent or above position and is equal to the term "Owner" as used in this procedure.

[39] Rework - From a plant maintenance efficiency perspective, rework is the re-performance of an assigned activity, in whole or in part, because the original problem/issue was not corrected the first time resulting in a loss of time, money or quality. From a quality perspective, rework is the process by which a nonconforming item is made to conform to a prior specified requirement by completion, re-machining, reassembling, or other corrective means.

[40] Root Cause - The most basic cause(s) for a failure or a condition that, if corrected or eliminated, will preclude repetition of the event or condition.

[41] Root Cause Analysis (RCA) - Structured, formatted process that documents the root cause(s) of a condition or event. The root cause is determined using recognized methodologies. RCAs are performed in accordance LI-1i18, "Root Cause Analysis Process."

RCAs are used for complex issues or those where the cause is not understood or readily known.

3.0 cont.

[42] Routine Report - NRC reports that are generated at a fixed frequency or as required by regulations except for 10CFR50.55, 50.72, and 50.73. For example, 10CFR50.46 reports of ECCS performance modeling errors of insufficient magnitude to trigger a report under other regulations are considered routine.

[43] Safeguards Condition Report - A Condition Report documenting a Safeguard condition.

The condition description contains as much information as possible to ensure proper prioritization within the corrective action program by the CRG without providing any safeguards information. Where additional (safeguards) information is required to describe the condition, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified and referenced safeguards document. The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

[44] Significance Determination Process (SDP) - A process by which a condition documented on a CR can be assessed in terms of its risk significance relative to objectives of reactor safety, radiation program effectiveness, emergency planning, & physical security program effectiveness.

[45] Significant Conditions Adverse to Quality (SCAQ) - Conditions such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material & equipment, and non-conformances which have resulted in, or could result in, a significant degradation or challenge to nuclear safety.

[46] Significant - A classification for CRs determined to meet one or more of the following:

[P5431]

  • Any Significant Condition Adverse to Quality. Conditions such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances which have resulted in, or could result in, a significant degradation or challenge to nuclear safety.

" A problem recognized as having a greater than acceptable recurrence rate as determined by the CRG.

  • Any event or nonconformance that meets the definition of repetitive event.
  • A serious industrial safety incident as determined by CRG or a near miss occurred that in the judgment of the CRG could have resulted in a serious industrial safety incident.
  • A major breakdown in processes that implement QA Program Requirements as determined by the CRG.
  • Events or conditions designated as significant or considered important by management for reasons other than those that fall into the above categories.

3.0 cont.

[471 Site -The term "site" is used when referring to a specific Entergy nuclear plant or Headquarters (HQN).

[48] Structures, Systems or Components (SSC) Operability - Structures, Systems or Components, for Operability Determinations:

" Are those SSCs that are required to be operable by Technical Specifications (TSs).

These SSCs may perform required support functions for other SSCs required to be operable by TSs (e.g., emergency diesel generators and service water).

" Are those SSCs that are not explicitly required to be operable by TSs, but that perform required support functions (as specified by the TSs definition of operability) for SSCs that are required to be operable by TSs.

[49] Structures, Systems or Components (SSC) Functionality - Structures, Systems or Components, for Functionality Assessments are those that are not described in TSs, but which warrant programmatic controls to ensure that SSC availability and reliability are maintained.

  • SSCs and related controls are included in programs related to Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, "Quality Standards and Records," and Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65).

[50] Trip Sensitive System - Any system or component that upon actuation or failure could cause a reactor trip. Trip Sensitive Systems may be specifically identified for each site.

[51] Use-As-Is - A disposition which may be imposed for a nonconformance when it can be established that the discrepancy will result in no adverse conditions and that the item under consideration meets all engineering functional requirements (performance, maintainability, fit and safety) originally specified or as otherwise determined to be acceptable under engineering evaluation.

[52] Verification of Acceptability Evaluation - An evaluation performed on a nonconforming item in the ASME Section Xl Boundary to ensure that the proposed repair, rework, replacement, or modification activity appropriately corrects the nonconforming condition with due consideration to the cause of failure. This evaluation does not apply to non-conformances associated with the In-service Testing (IST) Program.

4.0 RESPONSIBILITIES

[1] All personnel working at EN facilities are responsible for: [QAPM A.6.a]

(a) Identifying and reporting problems. [P22828]

(b) Documenting problems by initiating CRs in accordance with this procedure.

(c) Assigning a CA Type code and matching CA Priority in PCRS in accordance with the Corrective Action to CA Type table in Attachment 9.4 when initiating a CA in PCRS.

[2] EN Management (Supervisor and above) is responsible for: [QAPM A.6.a], [QAPM A.6.c]

(a) Ensuring that personnel are familiar with the requirements of this procedure.

(b) Ensuring that problems are reported.

(c) Ensuring recommendations on trend codes are provided for CRs assigned to their department prior to CRG. [QAPM A.6.e]

(d) Ensuring that required actions for Condition Reports are determined, implemented, and adequate to resolve the condition.

(e) Ensuring performance of Effectiveness Reviews when assigned.

(f) Ensuring that non-conforming items are segregated as appropriate and controlled as needed until dispositioning the item to be conforming or it is otherwise discarded after removal for testing/maintenance and through disposal or reinstallation (g) Ensuring keywords and problem codes are appropriate based on investigation results.

(h) (For Responsible Managers) Approving RCEs, ACEs and Analysis assigned to their Department. This responsibility should only be delegated when the Responsible Manager is not available and then it should be performed by the individual that is Acting for their position in their absence.

[31 Each Site's Manager, Corrective Actions and Assessment and the Manager CA&A Projects is responsible for: [QAPM A.2.G.7], [QAPM A.6.c]

(a) Administering the Corrective Action Program.

(b) Administering the Root Cause investigation and review process and performing effectiveness reviews for CAPRs when assigned by CARB.

[4] Each Site's Manager, Security and the Manager Security Operations is responsible for: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(a) Safeguards Condition Report requirements as follows:

(1) Ensuring when a uniquely identified safeguards document is needed that the CR references the uniquely identified safeguards document and that the safeguards document references the CR (2) Maintaining and controlling the uniquely identified safeguards document in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards procedural requirements

4.0 [4] cont (3) Retaining the uniquely identified safeguards document in accordance with the retention requirements of the Corrective Action Process at the individual site.

(4) Ensuring a representative of the Security Department, with Safeguards authorization is present at the CR Pre-Screening, if applicable, and at Condition Review Group (CRG).

(5) Determining when CRG and CARB members are required to be Safeguards qualified based on the nature of the CR being reviewed

[5] Each Safeguards Custodian is responsible for: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(a) Safeguards Condition Report requirements as follows:

(1) Maintaining and controlling the uniquely identified safeguards document in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards procedural requirements

[6] Each site's Manager, Licensing, or as assigned by management at off-site locations, is responsible for: [P21440]

(a) Reviewing CRs and administering the SDP in accordance with Section 5.5.

(b) Performing Reportability Reviews and documenting the results in PCRS.

(c) Issuing CAs for determinations and evaluations that are needed to determine reportability. This includes Past Operability/Functionality Determinations or Evaluations performed on identified conditions, potential or actual 10 CFR 21 conditions, and any other Indeterminate Reportability items.

(d) Issuing CAs to address NRC violations or findings and performing closure reviews of responses to such CAs.

[7] Each site's Manager, Planning and Scheduling / Outages is responsible for:

(a) Monitoring and reporting to CRG the status of WOs that have CRs/CAs closed to them.

[8] The Condition Review Group (CRG),is responsible for: [P2993], [P21440], [P21439]

(a) Reviewing CRs to classify, categorize, and assign responsibility. Categories are classified as per Attachment 9.1.

(b) Approving closure of CRs to other processes.

(c) Determining when to apply Attachment 9.5 Entergy Fleet Learning Review Process.

(d) Ensures appropriate operability/functionality reviews are performed per EN-OP-104.

(e) Oversight of Operable-Degraded or Nonconforming (Operable-DNC) or Operable-Comp Measures conditions (f) Determining when to apply CARB oversight responsibilities to Apparent Cause evaluations.

4.0 cont

[9] The Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) is responsible for: [P23035]

(a) Reviewing and approving Root Cause evaluations including their proposed corrective action plan. Reviewing selected Responsible Manager approved Apparent Cause evaluations and their action plans directing changes where needed.

(b) Assigning Effectiveness Reviews to the Responsible Manager, or appropriate group, for Category "A" CRs and management selected Category "B"CRs.

(c) Reviewing, and approving or disapproving Due Date Extension Requests for CARB approved CAPRs. The CARB Chairperson may approve Due Date Extension Requests for CARB approved CAPRs rather than convening the full board.

(d) Determining when to apply Attachment 9.5 Entergy Fleet Learning review process if not already applied by CRG.

(e) CARB members and their alternates complete a training Job Familiarization Guide, per EN-FAP-LI-003, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) process.

(f) Reviewing, and approving (or disapproving) requests to cancel CAPRs that may no longer be needed or that might need to be replaced.

[10] The Fleet Manager OE & CA is responsible for maintenance of this procedure.

[11] The Site NSA Director (or GM Fleet Operations Support for Headquarters) is responsible for evaluating Anonymous CRs for SCWE issues.

[12] Where assigned / used, Department Performance Improvement Coordinators (DPIC) are responsible for:

(a) Being the point of contact for the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and assisting with implementation of the requirements of EN-LI-102.

(b) Providing recommendations on CR assignment and significance classification prior to CRG.

(c) Providing recommendations on trend codes (system, equipment & component, reference items, etc.) for CRs assigned to their department prior to CRG. [QAPM A.6.e]

(d) Ensuring CRs involving human performance issues are properly identified and human performance trend data is entered into PCRS (e) Maintaining an awareness of the status of CRs & CAs owned by their department to ensure actions are completed by the due date or extended appropriately.

(f) Performing Responsible Manager closure reviews for Category 'C' CRs when designated by the Responsible Manager.

(g) Performing a final CR Quality check prior to electronic CR closure review for CRs assigned to their department as allowed by EN-LI-1 02 after all CR closure reviews are complete and documented. Ensure trend codes are accurately assigned including causal codes, PO&C, HU, Failure modes, etc.

(h) Acting as the cause analysis point of contact for their department.

4.0 [12] cont (i) Assisting others with PCRS and Corrective action program issues.

(j) Completing a training Job Familiarization Guide, FFAM-CAA-DPIC, Department Performance Improvement Coordinator (DPIC).

(k) Ensuring CAs initiated by their department has the proper CA Type code and matching CA Priority in accordance with Attachment 9.4.

5.0 DETAILS 5.1 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

[1] Safeguards information related to Safeguards CRs shall be handled in accordance with EN-NS-204; Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information, requirements.

[2] Proprietary documents are not to be attached to Condition Reports or Corrective Actions.

Contact Administrative Services or CA&A for guidance on proprietary documents.

5.2 CONDITION REPORT INITIATION [INPO93OE21TP3], [INS93BOTP2], [QAPM A.6.b]

[1] General Instructions (a) Notification to management prior to, or concurrent with, initiation of a Condition Report (CR) is encouraged but not required. However, due to the potential implications of safety, related issues, all conditions involving personnel and/or plant safety issues are expected to be communicated to management verbally to support timely resolution of the safety issue. These notification expectations are captured in 5.2 [1] (f) of this procedure.

(b) When documenting conditions on a CR, don't use names of personnel if at all possible.

If necessary for clarity of the condition, use of titles is acceptable unless the CR is related to a personnel injury or illness. For CRs related to a personnel injury or illness use generic terms such as "employee" or "contractor" to refer to the injured/ill person.

(c) Safeguards Information is not to be placed in Condition Reports. Contact Security for guidance on safeguards information.

(d) Employees and contractors are encouraged to write CRs for a broad range of problems.

Problems reported must include, but are not limited to, Adverse Conditions. Examples of Adverse Conditions requiring initiation of a CR are provided in Attachment 9.2.

If an employee is not satisfied with classification of a CR or if the actions are inadequate to alleviate their concern, the employee may choose to utilize Entergy's Open Door Policy and discuss the concern with higher levels of management. Employees may also choose to report their concern through the Employee Concerns Program (ECP). While the Corrective Action Process is the preferred method of reporting problems, the ECP may be utilized at any time. Neither this nor any other company policy alters an individual's right to address their concerns directly to the NRC per 10CFR19 Identifying problems within the CA Program is a Protected Activity as defined in EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program. [CR-PLP-2007-1243]

5.2[11 cont (e) Employees are required to initiate CRs for adverse conditions, and are encouraged to write CRs whenever conditions warrant.

(1) If there is any doubt about the decision to initiate a condition report, then employees are encouraged to discuss the condition with appropriate management.

(2) Ifdoubt remains, employees should initiate the CR.

(f) Any individual, including corporate, shared resource, or contracted personnel, who discovers an Adverse Condition, is expected to ensure the following actions are taken.

[P5110], [P23978]

(1) Immediate actions are taken as necessary to minimize the consequence of the condition. Expected actions are commensurate with level of training, knowledge and expertise (e.g., extinguishing a fire, eliminating a safety hazard or correcting an adverse radiological condition).

(2) Appropriate site personnel are notified of the identified condition. Ifimmediate action should be taken by Operations to ensure the safety of the plant or personnel, contact the Shift Manager/designee. The following information should be provided:

  • Originator's name, telephone number, and supervisor,
  • Brief description of the condition,
  • Equipment identification and location, and
  • Immediate corrective action taken, if any.

(3) The condition is promptly documented on a Condition Report.

(g) Nonconforming items are properly controlled to prevent their inadvertent test, installation, or use. When items are controlled by tagging, the tag is equivalent or similar to Attachment 9.7. [QAPM A.6.d SI], [QAPM Table 1.c.221, [QAPM B.13.b], [ANSI N18.7 5.2.14], [ANSI N45.2.4 2.6 S1 S2]

(1) When tags are used the stock shall be made from material which will not deteriorate during storage.

(h) Quality related nonconforming items installed in the plant, used in order to operate the plant or used to implement approved procedures requires a condition report be initiated, dispositioned and tracked per this procedure. [P22362]

5.2 [1] cont.

(i) For equipment, components, assemblies, sub-assemblies that maintenance removes from the plant systems AND meet the definition of Non-Conforming Material as defined in EN-MA-101-02, Control of Material Outside Facility Warehouse, require a condition report be initiated and tracked per this procedure until under warehouse control or until scraped. The Non-Conforming Material/Item is controlled in accordance with EN-MA-101-02. This includes a condition of a System, Structure or Component (SSC) that involves a failure to meet the Current Licensing Basis (CLB) or a situation in which quality has been reduced because of factors such as improper design, testing, construction, or modification. The following are examples of nonconforming conditions:

(1) An SSC fails to conform to one or more applicable codes or standards (e.g., the CFR, operating license, TSs, UFSAR, and/or licensee commitments).

(2) An as-built or as-modified SSC does not meet the CLB.

(3) Operating experience or engineering reviews identify a design inadequacy.

(4) Documentation required by NRC requirements such as 10CFR50.49 is not available or deficient (j) Nonconforming items within warehouse control shall be controlled and tagged in accordance EN-MP-120, Material Receipt or EN-MP-1 15, Material Issues and Returns. Tracking per this procedure is not required. Tracking per this procedure is not required except where a condition exits as describe in Attachment 9.2.

(k) All Safeguard conditions will be identified as a Safeguard condition report. The condition description should clearly identify the CR as being a Safeguards CR. The condition description shall contain as much information as possible to ensure proper prioritization within the corrective action program by the CRG without providing any safeguards information subject to the following: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060J (1) Where additional (safeguards) information is required to describe the condition, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified safeguards document (2) The Condition Report shall reference the uniquely identified safeguards document and the uniquely identified safeguards document shall reference the Condition report. It shall be the responsibility of the Security Department to ensure this cross reference is made.

(3) The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. The Security Department (Security Manager and Safeguards Custodian) shall be responsible for maintaining this safeguards file and for developing and maintaining procedures to control this file.

(4) The safeguards file shall be auditable and must meet retention requirements equivalent to those of the Corrective Action Process at the individual site.

5.2 cont

[2] Preparation (a) When initiating a CR, with potential operability/functionality or reportability issues, promptly contact the Shift Manager/designee to inform Operations of the condition.

[COMM-93-04786], [P22829]

(1) Direct notification of Operations personnel (via phone or face-to-face) is important to ensure details of the condition are sufficient and understood for the operability/functionality/immediate reportability determination. This notification is not performed using voicemail or e-mail because timeliness cannot be assured.

(b) Determine the applicable Site:

(1) A Site CR should be initiated for the Site(s) impacted by the Adverse Condition.

(2) Consider initiating a Headquarters (HQN) CR instead of a Site CR if there is no Site impact, an Operability or Reportability Review is not required, AND if the Adverse Condition is related to a corporate program, fleet procedure, common process, or HQN activity.

(3) Both a Site CR and a HQN CR may be required when the site impact is associated with an Adverse Condition in a corporate program, fleet procedure, common process, or HQN activity.

(c) Prepare the Condition Report using the PCRS application. PCRS is accessible to anyone with access to a PC containing the PCRS application.

(d) In the unlikely event of a PCRS system outage, follow the instructions provided in Attachment 9.3 (Manual CR Initiation).

(e) The condition description and any supporting documentation should be in sufficient detail to provide a clear understanding of the condition. If known, include details on what impact the condition has on personnel or plant safety. This information is used to perform operability/functionality/immediate reportability and reportability determinations.

It is expected that the condition description identify any outside agency that identified the condition, when applicable. [P239781 (1) The condition description field should provide a brief, factual statement of what the deficiency, issue, or problem is and its impact to reliability and safety, and any additional information needed to provide complete and accurate identification of the problem. The additional information should include a summary of the facts with statements detailing what happened, when and where it happened, and if known, why the event occurred.

(2) Include any pertinent vendor information that will assist personnel in their operability and reportability determinations.

5.2 [2] (e) cont (3) Include any previous examples of the condition of which you are aware.

a. Ifyou know of previous CRs that documented the same issue, then include these in your description.
b. Include references to Industry OE where applicable.

(4) Include any pertinent trend information, such as "over the past three months, hydrogen concentration has been increasing from a value of to the current value of (f) The date & time of the occurrence are included in the Condition Description, if pertinent.

(g) Include any immediate / interim actions initiated / completed to either correct (Work Request, etc.) or to minimize the impact on plant equipment or personnel. In the case of industrial safety concerns, describe actions taken to prevent personnel from being injured until the industrial safety concern is corrected.

(h) Attach electronic copies of any documents needed to understand or clarify the condition (i.e., computer printouts, operating logs, survey records, etc.) in MS Word or PDF format. [P22829] [P23977]

(i) Save the Condition Report in PCRS using the "Init CR" button. It is then automatically routed to the appropriate departments (Operations, Licensing, and CA&A) for operability/functionality, reportability, and processing as applicable.

(j) For equipment related CRs, ensure applicable equipment information is filled out in the "Equipment" tab of the CR in PCRS after CR initiation.

(k) Information regarding subsequent CR category classification, assignment, status, and proposed corrective actions is readily available in PCRS. CR initiators can review PCRS to maintain awareness of the status of CRs they have initiated.

[3] Original Condition Report Modification (a) If the language in a condition report is deemed abusive by CA&A, it may be administratively removed without the initiator's concurrence. This includes the language is offensive, distasteful or inappropriate in nature. The original unedited version should be provided to Employee Concerns (b) In addition, ifthe name of an individual is provided in the CR, CA&A may substitute the individual's title or position for the individual's name without the initiator's concurrence. Confidential information (SSNs, medical details, disciplinary actions, etc.) and safeguards information may also be removed and substituted with appropriate wording without the initiator's concurrence.

(c) For CRs related to a personnel injury or illness CA&A may substitute generic terms such as "employee" or "contractor' to refer to the injured/ill individual as necessary.

(d) Changes should be noted inside brackets [ ] or an explanation of change provided.

(e) For information changed or removed without the initiator's concurrence the admin tab of the applicable CR must annotated to describe in general terms, the nature of the changes made and the reasons for the changes. The original full text version of the CR need only be retained as required by (a) above.

NUCLEAR QUALITY RELATEO EN-LI-102 REV. 21 MANAGEMENT MANUAL INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 20 OF 72 Corrective Action Process 5.3 OPERABILITY, FUNCTIONALITY, AND IMMEDIATE REPORTABILITY [NL-98-066-C024],

[ER20031761_02], [ANSI N18.7 Section 5.2.6 S20], [10 CFR 50.72(b)],, [10 CFR 73.71(a)(1) (b)(1) S1], [ANSI N18.7, Section 4.1]

[1] For Entergy Nuclear Plant CRs: [ER970230]

(a) When a CR is initiated, the CR initiator is tasked with screening the condition to determine if a potential operability/functionality and/or immediate reportability concern exists. The CR initiation screen has a checklist to assist in the screening. If a CR is checked as "Potential Operability - Yes," the CR is automatically routed to the site Operations Department for Operability/Functionality Determination and Immediate Reportability screening. If a CR initiator is unsure if a condition involves a Potential Operability/Functionality and/or Immediate Reportability concern, the "Potential Operability" button should be checked as "Yes."

(b) Those CRs flagged as "Potential Operability - No" by the CR initiator are reviewed by the CRG to verify that Operability Determination is not required. If the CRG determines that Operability/Functionality Determination is required, Operations is notified to perform the operability/functionality.

(c) Operability/ Functionality and Immediate Reportability reviews for CRs requiring review are performed in accordance with NMM EN-OP-1 04. The results of the reviews are entered into PCRS on the Operability/ Functionality screen. [Gentletr9118R1], [NL-98-066-C024], [INS9620004]

[2] For Headquarter (HQN) Nuclear CRs:

(a) When a HQN CR is initiated the CR initiator is tasked with screening the condition to determine if a potential operability/functionality and/or immediate reportability concern exists. The CR initiation screen has a checklist to assist in the screening. If a HQN CR is screened as having a Potential Operability/Functionality and/or Immediate Reportability concern, the CR initiator ensures a Site CR is written for the affected site(s) so an Operability/Functionality Determination can be performed.

5.4 REPORTABILITY [10 CFR 50.72(b)], [10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)], [10 CFR 73.71(a)(1) (b)(1) S1], [ANSI N18.7, Section 4.11, 110 CFR 21, 21 A and C]

[1] When a CR is initiated where the PCRS Reportability Bypass feature is enabled, the CR initiator is tasked with screening the condition to determine if a condition is potentially reportable. The CR initiation screen has a checklist to assist in the screening. If a CR is checked as "Potential Reportability Yes", the CR is automatically routed to the site Licensing Department for a reportability review. If a CR initiator is unsure if a condition involves a Potential Reportability concern, the "Potential Reportability" button should be checked as "Yes"."

[2] The designated personnel for completing the reportability review will enter the appropriate information in PCRS within 5 working days of CR initiation.

5.4 cont

[3] Those CRs flagged as "Potential Reportability No" by the CR initiator are reviewed by the site Licensing Department in a timely manner to verify that a reportability review is not required. This may be performed by a Licensing Department representative during a CRG meeting where newly initiated CRs are reviewed. If the Licensing Department determines that reportability review is required, Licensing will perform the reportability review and enter the appropriate information in PCRS.

[4] Reportability Reviews are performed in accordance with EN-LI-108, Event Notification and Reportability and EN-LI-1 08-01, 10 CFR 21 Evaluations and Reporting.

5.5 SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS (SDP) [Gentletr911R1], [INS9620004]

[1] The Plant Licensing Group (or other group as assigned by plant management) reviews CRs to determine if a Significance Determination Process (SDP) review should be done to characterize the risk significance of the issue relative to the Reactor Oversight Program strategic areas (Reactor Safety, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, Physical Protection, Emergency Preparedness). The criteria used for this selection are:

  • CRs associated with NRC Findings which have been classified as potentially being more significant than green 9 CRs for which CRG has requested Risk Significance Determination
  • Other CRs as Plant Licensing deems necessary

[2] CAs are assigned in PCRS to the responsible groups to complete the SDP. If further review of the condition or event necessitates additional responsibilities to complete the SDP for all affected SDP cornerstones, additional CAs are assigned in PCRS.

[3] SDP screening is performed and the results are entered into PCRS.

[4] SDP results are made available to the CRG.

5.6 CONDITION REVIEW GROUP (CRG) [NL-97-084-C17]. [P2993], [P13307], [P16529], [P20277], [P21439]

[P13363], [QAPM B.13.a]

[1] Corrective Action & Assessment (CA&A) or the initiating department provides recommendations to the CRG regarding the categorization and assignment of CRs per Attachment 9.1. [P9849]

[2] The Chairperson for the CRG at the sites is the GMPO or designee. The Chairperson for the CRG at Headquarters is determined by the VP - Operations Support. The Chairperson ensures that appropriate management representation is present.

5.6 cont

[3] CRG quorum, at a minimum, should consist of a Chairperson and management representing Maintenance, Operations, Engineering and the CA&A Manager (or designee).

Ifthe chairperson is in either the CA&A, Maintenance, Operations, or Engineering organization, then he/she can be counted as the management member for their organization for the purpose of meeting minimum quorum requirements.

(a) If a quorum is not met, then the meeting shall be canceled or postponed until such time as a quorum can be assembled.

(b) If cancellation is required due to not meeting quorum requirement, then a CR is generated to document the incident.

[4] Condition Reports are reviewed by the CRG in a timely manner.

[5] When a Condition Report includes Safeguards information a representative of the Security Department, with Safeguards authorization shall be present at the CR Pre-Screening if applicable and at Condition Review Group (CRG). [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(a) This Security Department representative shall provide any information to the CRG that is required to classify the condition report, subject to the requirements of 10CFR73.21 Protection of Safeguards Information and EN-NS-204; Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information.

(b) For some Safeguards CRs, CRG members may be required to be Safeguards qualified based on the nature of the CR being reviewed. Security shall make this determination (c) These requirements shall be applicable to each site and headquarters

[6] The CRG provides oversight of CR Operability/Functionality Determinations, Operable-Degraded or Nonconforming (Operable-DNC) or Operable-Comp Measures conditions.

(a) The primary responsibility for completeness and accuracy of the Operability/Functionality determinations lies with the Operations department.

(b) Operations ensures appropriate flags / codes are applied in PCRS to facilitate tracking of Operable-DNIC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions. [NL-98-066-C024], [ER970230]

(c) Operations ensures that open Operable but Degraded or Nonconforming or Operable-Comp Measures conditions are tracked at the Site and presented through either the CRG or the Ops Focus meeting to meet timeliness expectations for resolution per EN-OP-104.

[7] The CRG reviews newly initiated CRs and determines/confirms the appropriate category assignments as identified in Attachment 9.1. [P5431]

[8] The CRG determines Responsible Manager assignments. Changes to the Responsible Manager assignment can be made without CRG approval as long as the previous Owner and new Owner both agree on the assignment change.

5.6 cont

[9] The CRG determines if an Adverse Trend classification is appropriate for a CR.

[101 The CRG assigns due dates for disposition and corrective action determination based on the CR category (see Attachment 9.4). The CRG may assign different due dates based on their deliberations.

[11] CRG members are encouraged to provide feedback to CR initiators from their respective technical disciplines regarding CR status, ownership, and proposed corrective actions.

[12] Feedback on Cat "D"closed CRs is provided to the initiating employee and their supervisor, when names are entered as recorded in PCRS, via the automatic e-mail extracted from PCRS. The email includes the closure description, closure date and individual performing the CR closure in PCRS. This informs the employee and supervisor that the CR has been closed so that if desired the originator/supervisor can review closure and if necessary request reconsideration based on new information or insight by initiation of a new CR.

[13] If additional information becomes available during CR processing then the CR may be presented to the CRG for re-categorization. All changes in significance or category are approved by the CRG. If the CR is re-categorized, then a new due date may be assigned based on significance of the condition.

[14] The CRG assigns any immediate or interim actions that may be required to minimize the consequences of a condition and/or to determine extent of a condition.

[15] In order to ensure appropriate oversight and independence, the Quality Assurance (QA) organization has the right to determine if a QA identified condition is a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) or a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality (SCAQ). In cases where the CRG does not concur that a QA identified condition is a SCAQ, the Director, Oversight has authority to overrule the CRG.

[16] The CRG determines if new CRs meet the criteria for application of Attachment 9.5 Entergy Fleet Learning Review Process.

5.7 CORRECTIVE ACTION REVIEW BOARD (CARB)

[1] The purpose of the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) is to review and approve the root cause and the proposed Corrective Action Plan for significant CRs.

[2] The Headquarters CARB membership will consist of manager- and director-level individuals as designated by the VP, Operations Support.

[3] The Site CARB membership will consist of the following personnel or their alternates:

  • Chairperson - Director level (or higher) member of site staff
  • Director, Engineering
  • Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

" Manager, Corrective Acton & Assessment

" Manager, Operations

" Manager, Maintenance

  • Manager, Training

[4] CARB quorum consists of:

(a) A Chairperson and:

  • At least one position designated member and
  • At least two additional position designated members or their alternates.

Alternates will be designated by the Chairperson (b) If a quorum is not met, then the meeting shall be canceled or postponed until such time as a quorum can be assembled.

(c) If cancellation is required due to not meeting quorum, then a CR is generated to document the incident.

[5] For any CARB voting process each representative of the quorum shall have one vote.

[6] For some Safeguards CRs, the CARB members may be required to be Safeguards qualified based on the nature of the CR being reviewed. Security shall make this determination. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

[7] CARB reviews proposed Root Cause CAPRs for sustainability.

[8] CARB reviews and approves (or disapproves) proposed cancellation or replacement of Root Cause CAPRs.

[9] CARB members and their alternates complete a training Job Familiarization Guide, per EN-FAP-LI-003, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) process.

5. 7 cont

[10] In the event a previously CARB approved root cause report requires a revision and follow-up CARB review, the CARB (with CAA assistance) ensures follow-up actions are assigned to appropriate organizations to review the revision. This review is to ensure that if a report was made to an outside agency (or other departments) based on the original root cause, the original outside agency report remains valid, or requires a revision. Examples of reports to external agencies (or other impacted departments) include LER to NRC, reports to INPO, etc.

(a) Examples of reports to other departments include departments developing modifications, tracking materials being purchased, tracking vendor destructing testing, etc.

[11] For CRs assigned for CARB review, the CARB assigns Effectiveness Review actions to the CR Owner, or other groups as appropriate. This assignment is made based on significance, importance, or complexity of the documented event or condition. Effectiveness reviews may be tracked and documented through the initiation of a Learning Organization document.

5.8 CR DISPOSITION [NL-97-084-C07], [NL-97-084-C13], [ANSI N18/7, Section 5.2.7.1 S14, S15, S16], [ANSI N45.2.12, Section 4.5.1 S1-S5 (QAPM Table 1N.10)], [QAPM B.13.a], [ANSI N45.2.13 9.2 Sla, b, c, d]

[1] General Instructions Caution New or revised Operability determinations / evaluations may indicate that the Reportability Review needs to be updated.

(a) Personnel involved with the investigation and disposition of CRs are responsible for:

[Gentletr9l 18R1], [INS9620004]

  • Informing the Shift Manager/designee immediately if a SSC previously evaluated as operable may be inoperable as determined from new information from the disposition investigation.

" Informing the Shift Manager and Licensing Manager immediately if a condition previously thought to be not reportable is in fact reportable as determined from new information from the disposition investigation.

" Initiating a new CR if new information or insight makes the current Operability and/or Reportability questionable or if a previous CR's identified cause is found to be incorrect.

  • Contacting CA&A if the condition or event should be reevaluated by the CRG (b) If at any time after a CR has been initiated and screened, information becomes available that may change previous conclusions regarding present or past operability, notify the shift manager immediately and initiate a new condition report.

5.8[1] cont (c) If a CR that had "Potential Operability" checked as "No" is later determined to need an Operability/Functionality Determination, the Shift Manager (SM) / designee and CA&A should be informed immediately. The SM/designee can perform an Operability/Functionality Determination even though it was originally, indicated as not required.

(d) If a CR that had "Potential Reportability" checked as "No" is later determined to need a Reportability Review, the Licensing Manager / designee and CA&A should be informed immediately. The Licensing Manager/designee can perform a Reportability Review even though it was originally indicated as not required.

(e) During the course of investigations or completion of corrective actions for open condition reports, a new condition report shall be initiated:

(1) If additional issues beyond the scope of the initial problem description are identified during the problem evaluation of an event, an additional CR shall be initiated for these new issues.

(2) If additional issues beyond the scope of the initial problem description are identified during the initiation of a proposed correction action or the completion of an actual corrective action of an event, an additional CR shall be initiated for these new issues.

(3) A separate CR may be required for the following even if an initial CR was written to perform the maintenance when:

a. Unexpected condition (signs of overheating, damage from overstress, etc.) are identified during maintenance on safety-related SSCs; non safety-related SSCs ranked as High Critical components
b. An abnormal or unexpected condition on an SSC that needs further evaluation (e.g., deviations (trends) in operating parameters from normal)

5.8[1] cont (f) For Safeguards CRs, the assigned Department shall be responsible for performing or overseeing the required Condition Report response to meet the requirements of the Corrective Action Program. Note that this may or may not be the Security Department (i.e., Modifications, Licensing, Engineering, etc.) This would include: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(1) Maintaining Root Cause Analysis and Apparent Cause Evaluation qualified individuals to perform such evaluations on CRs that are Safeguards related.

Such evaluations shall be performed in accordance with existing corrective action procedures.

(2) Maintaining qualified Department Performance Improvement Coordinators (DPICs) to perform close-out reviews of Condition Reports that are Safeguards related. These reviews shall be performed in accordance with existing Entergy corrective action procedures.

(3) Individuals will obtain Safeguards qualifications in accordance with applicable Security procedures as needed to meet these requirements.

(g) Corrective Action plans are reviewed / approved by management. [QAPM A.6.d S2], [QAPM A.7.a.1 S2]

(1) If an assignee or reviewer recognizes that a change in the intent of a Corrective Action plan is necessary, the change should be coordinated with the Responsible Manager (and CARB Chairperson, if CARB is applicable) and documented. Changes to Corrective Action plan due dates are controlled through the normal extension process described in this procedure. However, Due Date Extension Requests must be reviewed and approved/disapproved by the CARB chairperson for CAPRs that were generated as part of a CARB approved corrective action plan.

(2) For material related CRs, non-conforming items are reviewed for the need to classify as use-as-is, reject, repair, or rework. Items that are classified as use-as-is or repair are required to have a formal engineering evaluation with technical justification, augmented inspection and/or test requirements, and design reviews as appropriate. [QAPM B.13.b], [ANSI N18.7 5.2.14], [ANSI N45.2.4 2.6 S1 S2]

(3) Verification of Acceptability Evaluations are performed for the rework or repair of items within the ASME Section XI boundary.

(h) Effectiveness Reviews are conducted per the guidance of EN-LI-1 18. An Effectiveness Review that reaches a conclusion that Corrective Actions / CAPRs were ineffective should result in the initiation of a new CR to determine the need to revise the cause determination, corrective action plan, effectiveness review plan and the need for additional CARB reviews. Also, consider an additional CR to explore the potential Corrective Action Program failure.

5.8 cont

[2] Category A- Evaluation and Corrective Action Plan [P24458], [P24500], [P32520], [P17726],

[P21887], [P21896]

All Significant Conditions are subjected to an evaluation to determine Root Cause. A Root Cause evaluation is performed and reviewed by qualified Root Cau se Evaluators. Root Cause evaluations are performed in accordance with fleet Root Cause Analysis process procedures and guidance documents. In most cases, CAPRs are assigned for each Root Cause identified. The purpose of the action described in the CAPR is to preclude repetition. CAPRs receive an Effectiveness Review.

(a) Responsible Manager must:

(1) Ensure that a Root Cause Analysis is performed for Category "A" CRs utilizing NMM EN-LI-1 18, Root Cause Analysis Process, and that appropriate CAPRs are issued. [P21896], [P21887]

(2) Ensure formulation of a proposed CA Plan to correct the condition and to preclude repetition. The corrective action plan specifies the responsible departments and relevant due dates for completion of the corrective actions.

The Corrective Action Plan includes an action to perform an Effectiveness Review of the CAPRs.

(3) Approve the cause and corrective action plan that is submitted for CARB review/approval.

(4) Ensure the completed root cause and proposed corrective action plan are submitted to CA&A for review and for scheduling of CARB review/approval (as appropriate).

(5) Ensure implementation of Attachment 9.5 guidance for "Entergy Fleet Learning Review Process" specified by CRG/CARB.

(6) Ensure keywords and problem codes are appropriate based on investigation results

5.8 cont

[3] Category B - Evaluation and corrective action plan:

Category B CRs are assigned to the Responsible Manager for an Apparent Cause Evaluation as determined by the CRG. [P21886], [P21895]

(a) Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) are performed as either a Higher Tier or Lower Tier type, as assigned by CRG. Also, the CRG may direct a specific type of supporting cause analysis technique be performed in addition to ACE.

(b) Responsible Manager must:

(1) Ensure an Apparent Cause Evaluation is performed utilizing NMM EN-LI-1 19, Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process, AND when directed by the CRG, utilizing the specific type of supporting cause analysis process indicated.

(2) Ensure formulation of a CA Plan to both correct the condition and to address the causes that were identified.

(3) Approve the cause and corrective action plan.

(4) Ensure keywords and problem codes are appropriate based on investigation results (c) Effectiveness Reviews may be performed as determined by management for this category of CR. Effectiveness Review report format and performance guidance are contained in EN-LI-1 18.

(d) For Category B CRs the CRG may determine if a CARB review/approval is warranted.

CRG guidance on CARB assignment is provided in Attachment 9.1.

[4] Category C - Corrective action:

Category C condition reports are assigned to a Responsible Manager for resolution of problem assigned by the CRG. A Root Cause or an Apparent Cause Evaluation is not required.

(a) Responsible Manager must:

(1) Ensure actions are assigned as appropriate to correct the problem.

(2) Ensure the assigned corrective actions are appropriately completed within the prescribed time frame.

(3) Ifthe disposition review determines that the problem is broader or more severe than initially assigned, present the information to the CRG for review and potential re-categorization.

(4) Obtain CRG approval before closing a CR or CA to a Work Order. This requirement is not applicable if the CA was issued to track an enhancement and documented as such in PCRS with a basis for the Enhancement designation.

(5) Ensure keywords and problem codes are appropriate based on investigation results

5.8[41 cont (b) Effectiveness Reviews may be performed as determined by management for this category of Condition Report. Effectiveness Review report format and performance guidance are contained in EN-LI-118.

[5] Category D - CRs are administratively closed as directed by the CRG. [P6919]

(a) When a CR is closed to an existing CR:

(1) The existing CR must have been reviewed by the appropriate CRG and assigned to a responsible manager.

(2) The CR being closed is the same or lower Category level as the existing CR.

(3) A corrective action is assigned by CA&A to the Owner of the existing CR stating that a new CR has been closed to the existing CR and must be addressed within the existing CR.

(4) If the Operability/Functionality or Reportability of the existing CR is impacted by the new condition information being added., the CR Owner must take action to ensure the Operability/Functionality or Reportability as applicable is re-evaluated. CRs with open Operability/Functionality or Reportability issues should not be closed to an existing CR at a different site or HQN until the open issues are satisfied at the affected site.

(5) In case of a duplicate issue, a new CA is not required.

(6) If immediate/interim actions are required at the site and the actions are not complete, then the CR should not be closed to an existing CR at a different site or HQN.

(b) For any CR closed as a Cat D based on actions already taken, a description of the actions taken is included within the CR or in the CR Closure Description field.

(c) CRs that identify conditions that do not rise to the level of an Adverse Condition as defined in 3.0[2] may be classified as follows:

(1) These CRs may be classified by the CRG as "Close Reference" referencing another process's tracking identifier (i.e. WR#, TEAR #, etc.), "Review Emerging Trend", or "Below Threshold" as appropriate.

(2) In some instances the CRG instead may choose to close these CRs to "Actions Taken" or "Condition Corrected" when supporting documentation is available or the CRG may choose to assign them for correction per their discretion.

5.8 cont.

[6] CR/CA Closure to Work Orders.

(a) CAPRs, Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions, and Category "A CR actions (except Enhancements), may not be closed to other processes and must remain open in the corrective action process until resolved.

(b) With CRG approval, CAs or CRs to correct Adverse Conditions, other than CAPRs and Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions and Category "A" CR actions may be closed to Work Orders with a Priority of 1, 2, 3 or 8.

(1) Additional guidance concerning classification of CRs on lower level equipment issues can be found in Attachment 9.6.

(c) To close a CR/CA to a Work Order the following must be completed:

(1) A Work Order (WO) has been generated and the WO number is listed in the CR using a site standardized format to support retrieval and tracking.

(2) Work Order scope or description is verified to adequately describe the issue identified in the CR/CA.

(3) Work Order Priority is determined to be either 1, 2, 3 or 8.

(4) The CR number is identified in the applicable Work Order's Attribute panel using the Fleet standardized format to support retrieval and tracking.

a. Add the Attribute, "CR Closed To This Item" to the applicable WO's Attribute Panel at the WO panel level.
b. The basis for the Fleet standardize format for the Attribute value is the CR number:
1. Y-SSS-N-YEAR-#####. Where Y=Yes, SSS=Station and N=Unit.

For example Y-ANO-1-2012-01234.

5.8[6] cont (d) When the CRG designates a CR to Close to a Work Order, the CR's assigned department will check that the WO Priority is 1, 2, 3 or 8 and notify CA&A so the CR can be closed.

(1) If the applicable WO Priority is not a 1, 2, 3 or 8, then the CR's assigned department will ensure:

a. Per EN-WM-1 00, PS&O re-screens the challenged WRIWO for priority elevation.

(2) The CR's assigned department will Take Back to the CRG CRs who's WO(s) were not elevated to a Priority of 1, 2, 3 or 8 as a result of re-screening for final disposition by the CRG.

a. CRG may determine that the WO's Priority should be elevated, or the CR remains open to address the Adverse Condition, or that the problem does not meet the criteria for an Adverse Condition.
b. Ifthe CRG determines the problem does not meet the criteria for an Adverse Condition, then the guidance in step 5.8[5] (c) is followed to appropriately classify the CR.

(e) Responsibility for monitoring and reporting on the status of WOs that have CRs/CAs closed to them resides with the Planning and Scheduling/Outage organization (P&S/O).

This monitoring is to ensure timely correction of the originally identified condition.

(1) Periodically, typically at least monthly, P&S/O will report to the CRG the status of WOs with CRs/CAs closed to them. The focus of this report should be the monitoring for timely resolution of those WOs per EN WM-100. The CRG may require additional details for any WOs not completed in a timely manner.

(2) Ifthe work originally scheduled to correct the condition is transferred to another WO, P&S/O will ensure the CR reference is added to the new WO.

(3) Before a WO which had a CR or CA closed to it can be canceled or closed with no work to be performed, the organization requesting cancellation will present the CR and WO to the. CRG for discussion. If necessary, another CR may be generated to track the issue. CRG approval is not required for canceling a WO if the work is to be performed under another WO and both WOs contain the appropriate reference to the CR.

5.8 cont

[7] Work Orders being Tracked by an Open CR/CA (a) Some CRs/CAs cannot be closed to a WO per 5.8[5] (6) (i.e. CAPRs and Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions and Category "A CR actions).

(b) When an Open CR/CA is tracking a WO as part of a corrective action plan, then the CR number is identified in the applicable Work Order's Attribute panel using the Feet standardized format to support retrieval and tracking.

(1) Add the Attribute, "CR Depends On This Item" to the applicable WO's Attribute Panel at the WO panel level.

(2) The Fleet standardize format for "CR Depends On This Item" Attribute value is:

a. The CR number; SSS-N-YEAR- -$. Where SSS=Station and N=Unit and $=applicable CR's significance level. For example ANO 2012-01234-A.

(c) Ifthe work originally scheduled to correct the condition is transferred to another WO, P&S/O should ensure the CR reference is added to the new WO.

5.9 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS [ANSI N45.2.12, Section 4.5.1 S1-$5 (QAPM Table 1N.10)]

[1] General Instructions (a) Corrective Actions are assigned a CA Type code and matching CA Priority in PCRS in accordance with Attachment 9.4.

(b) Each corrective action should specify whether or not it is tracked as an operational constraint and which unit or Outage is affected.

(c) Any Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions not resolved prior to the completion of the next outage of sufficient duration shall be evaluated for continued operability into the next cycle of operation. This evaluation is reviewed and approved by the Onsite Safety Review Committee (OSRC) prior to startup from the outage.

[Gentletr9118R1], [INS9620004]

(d) For CAPRs that are credited as being implemented by procedure actions or requirements the applicable steps in the associated procedure should be annotated or flagged as commitments in accordance with EN-AD-1 01 and applicable site procedures.

5.9 [1] cont (e) Long Term Corrective Action (LTCA) designation is approved by GMPO/Director or Site VP.

(1) Once approved, the CR/CA is appropriately flagged as long term.

(2) CAs are eligible for LTCA designation if they cannot meet the timeframes established/approved in accordance with the Corrective Action Processing Guidelines (Attachment 9.4) AND if they meet any of the following criteria:

a. Includes work requiring a plant refueling outage, plant forced outage or planned long systern/train/component outage to complete. This includes CAs, such as training or meetings, which cannot be completed until pre-outage staffing is complete.
b. Requires development of a modification and/or modification of an approved modification/design change.
c. Requires training that will take multiple requalification or training cycles to complete.
d. Includes initiatives dependent upon a Licensing submittal which requires NRC (or other state or governmental regulatory organization) response/approval.

(3) Attachment 9.9 is provided to facilitate the LTCA review and approval process.

Its use is desired. However, if the form is not used all points applicable must be addressed and the guidance of 5.9[1] (e), (1), (2) & (4) must be followed. The expectation is to capture the form or the discussion points of the form, and its approval, in the applicable CA that is marked as a LTCA or one of its DDE requests. Optionally the CA marked LTCA may reference the location of the form or documented discussion points in the applicable CR.

(4) The specific restriction preventing the timely completion of the item, resulting in the need to use the Long Term CA classification, must be documented in the CA or as otherwise referenced in the CA. Long Term CA classifications are normally assigned at time of CA initiation (vice changing to Long Term at the due date).

(f) CAs issued to track Enhancements as defined in 3.0[22], and documented as such in PCRS with a basis for the Enhancement designation, may be closed referencing other processes without CRG approval.

5.9 [1] cont (g) For each Corrective Action that contains safeguards information: [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(1) Where additional safeguards information is required to describe information in the Corrective Action, the additional information shall be contained in a uniquely identified safeguards document (2) The Corrective Action shall reference the uniquely identified safeguards document and the uniquely identified safeguards document shall reference the Condition Report and Corrective Action. It shall be the responsibility of the Security Department to ensure this cross reference is made.

(3) The uniquely identified safeguards document shall be maintained in a safeguards file in accordance with Safeguards requirements. The Security department shall be responsible for maintaining this safeguards file and for developing and maintaining procedures to control this file.

(4) The safeguards file shall be auditable and must meet retention requirements equivalent to those of the Corrective Action Process at the individual site.

(h) The Change Management Process, EN-PL-155, should be used as appropriate for corrective actions that meet the complexity and risk outlined in the policy.

[2] Corrective Action Initiation (a) Corrective Actions are initiated using PCRS for all actions identified in the action plan, not documented as complete.

(b) Corrective Action Due Dates should be selected with consideration given toward:

" The next potential occurrence of the problem and should ensure the action is complete prior to the next potential occurrence of the problem, if possible.

  • The potential impact to plant operation while the action completion is pending.
  • How much time is needed to complete the action

" What are the resource availability issues that challenge the completion of the action?

(c) Corrective Action Due Dates should be assigned utilizing the guidance contained in Attachment 9.4. CA timeliness criteria are provided in Attachment 9.4. These criteria are to achieve CR age goals that are monitored via performance indicators. These are considered guidelines and not procedural requirements. Except as noted in Attachment 9.4 the CRG, CARB, or Responsible Manager can deviate from the criteria to appropriately manage resources. In some instances GMPO/Director or Site VP concurrence is required. Exceptions taken to the timeliness criteria do not relieve the CA/CR Owner from meeting performance indicator goals.

(d) Typically CA assignments to another department should be made at the management level in PCRS.

5.9 [2) cont (e) Typically CA assigners should notify assignees prior to assignment of an action.

(f) The corrective action content should be specific, actionable, measurable, timely, necessary, cost effective, and compatible, within the capability of management to implement and address the issue. Further guidance on each of these criteria can be found in EN-LI-118.

(g) Corrective Actions must address the cause or resolve the deficiency. Corrective action descriptions must be worded to ensure that the corrective action is tracked to completion. Cross references to other precursor or successor CAs may help ensure successful corrective action.

(h) Corrective Actions directing "consideration..." or "evaluation..." to resolve conditions, issues, or causes should be avoided where possible. If needed, then these corrective actions must also include the expectation for follow-up actions to be issued depending on the outcome of the review.

(i) Corrective Actions that require training or briefing, or that direct communicating expectations, requirements and information must specify the required audience for corrective actions.

(j) The CRG/CARB/OSRC or senior management or above may issue CAs for a CR without the concurrence of assigned or Responsible Manager.

(k) The Operations Shift Manager/SRO may issue corrective actions on a CR, for support of Operability/Functionality Determinations or Evaluations, without the concurrence of assigned or Responsible Manager.

(I) The CA&A group issues CAs at the direction of the CRG/CARB/OSRC or senior management or above and as required by this procedure.

(m) Plant Licensing may issue CAs for determinations and evaluations that are needed to determine Reportability, without concurrence of assigned or Responsible Manager. This includes Past Operability/Functionality Determinations or Evaluations performed on identified conditions, potential or actual 10 CFR 21 conditions, and any other Indeterminate Reportability items.

(n) Plant Licensing may issue CAs, without concurrence of assigned or Responsible Manager, to the assigned or Responsible Managers to ensure that potential or actual NRC violations or findings are adequately addressed in corrective actions. Licensing also performs a closure review of these corrective actions to ensure the finding was adequately addressed.

(o) The CA assigner has the option to review the Corrective Action response for closure, or to allow the CA assignee to close the action. The CA Assigner indicates that a required review is assigned by checking the "Concurrence Req'd for Closure" check box.

(p) The CA assigner has the option to oversee due date extensions for a given action or to allow the CA assignee the oversight to extend the due date. The CA Assigner indicates that due date extension approval oversight is required by CA Assigner by checking the "Require Extension Approval" check box (see 5.9 [3] for due date extension approval).

5.9 [2] cont (q) For site CRs initiated in response to an Industry Operating Experience notification, a CA is issued for the Operating Experience organization to perform a closeout on the CR.

(r) If it is believed that an action to change to a fleet procedure, policy, or document will sufficiently address the issue, obtain prior concurrence for the change from the fleet owner or assign two CA's:

(1) One CA to have the fleet owner to 'evaluate' the fleet need for the change and (2) Another CA to the site owner to monitor the fleet owner's CA and determine if additional site actions are required should the fleet owner reject the need for a change to the fleet procedure, policy, or document.

[3] CA Due Date Extensions (DDEs) [NL-81-A01-C15], [NL-98-025-C02], [ER960265_02]

(a) Corrective Action Due Dates are met.

(b) When needed, due date extension requests include a basis for why the extension is acceptable (i.e., interim controls are in place, the procedure will not be used until next refueling outage, etc.) and a basis for why the extension is necessary.

(c) CA timeliness criteria are provided in Attachment 9.4. These criteria are to achieve CR age goals that are monitored via performance indicators. These are considered guidelines and not procedural requirements. Except as noted in Attachment 9.4 the CRG, CARB, or Responsible Manager can deviate from the criteria to appropriately manage resources. In some instances GMPO/Director or Site VP concurrence is required. Exceptions taken to the timeliness criteria do not relieve the CA/CR Owner from meeting performance indicator goals.

(d) Corrective Action DDE Approval for all corrective action types should be in accordance with the guidance contained in Attachment 9.4.

(1) The "Assigned To" origination must ensure that, if the individual identified to approve the extension in PCRS is not at the authority level designated in Attachment 9.4 for approval, then additional discussion on how approval was obtained should be recorded in the DDE Request Description by the "Assigned To" organization (group). For example, "approval obtained from Director Eng" or "approval obtained from General Manager," etc.

(e) When approving DDEs, impact to overall corrective action plan should be considered.

5.9 cont

[4] CA Closure (a) Upon completion of an action item, the CA assignee documents the response in PCRS.

CRG approval is required before closing the CR or a CA from the CR to a Work Order.

This requirement is not applicable if the CA was issued to track an Enhancement that was not needed to correct the original condition or was not needed to address an identified cause. The basis for the Enhancement designation should be documented in PCRS.

(b) The only process that a CA or (CR) can be closed to is a Work Order with a Priority of 1, 2, 3 or 8 (with CRG concurrence - reference 5.8[6]). The following additional guidance is provided concerning Training Evaluation Action Requests TEARs)

(1) When training performance or modification to training material is identified as corrective action in a condition report to address a cause or correct the identified condition, then the completion of the training or modification of training material must be documented in the condition report.

(2) When a CR/CA identifies training or training material modification as corrective action and a TEAR is written to accomplish the activity; if the TEAR process determines no training or modification is required, THEN the condition report action plan approval authority (CRG, CARB, or Responsible Manager) must approve the change to intent of the associated action plan. A new corrective action directing an alternate strategy to address the associated cause or correct the identified condition may be required.

(3) Performance of Training or modification to training material properly identified as an Enhancement, as defined in 3.0[22], may be addressed by referencing a TEAR and not followed to completion through the corrective action process. The Enhancement justification and TEAR number should be referenced in the closure to ensure traceability.

(c) When a procedure change is required per a CR's corrective action plan then the change should be tracked to completion in a CA. The procedure change is complete when the procedure is effective in eB RefLib or Merlin as applicable. This should be documented prior to CA/CR closure. With concurrence of the CR's RM a Priority 5 Enhancement CA may be closed referencing the process handling the change outside of CAP.

(d) CA Assigner or CA Assignee, when permitted as described in Step 5.9 [2] (0), reviews each completed action and verifies that the required action is complete and any additional actions are planned. This includes: [ANSI N45.2.12 Section 4.5.2.4], [ANSI N45.2.12, Section 3.3.7], [P7239], [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

Ensuring that the response is adequate, answers all aspects of the assigned action, and the intent of the action is met.

5.9[4] (d) cont

" If a change in intent of a Corrective Action plan is necessary, the change should be coordinated with the Responsible Manager (and CARB / CARB Chairperson, if CARB is applicable) and documented.

" Evaluation of the adequacy of the response to a CA shall be performed by safeguard qualified personnel when additional safeguards information is required to describe information in the CA.

" Ensuring all the requirements of step 5.9[1] (g) are met when additional safeguards information is required to describe information in the CA.

  • Issuing, in PCRS, any follow-up or additional actions that are documented in the response or documenting why the recommendation is not needed.

" Ensuring that CA closure is timely commensurate with safety significance of the identified issue

  • Ensuring that the CA is not closed to a "promise" of future action.
  • Ensuring that the CA is not closed to an unapproved process.

o CRG approval is required before closing a CA to a Work Order (reference 5.8[6]).

o CRG approval is not required ifthe CA was issued to track an Enhancement that was not needed to correct the original adverse condition or was not needed to address an identified cause. The Enhancement designation, with a basis should be documented in PCRS.

o CAPRs, actions to correct Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions, and Category "A" CR actions (except Enhancements), may not be closed to other processes and must remain in the corrective action process until resolved.

" Ensuring any Effectiveness Review Learning Organization documents are initiated when applicable

" Ensuring that electronic copies of any documents needed to understand, clarify, or validate completion of the corrective action responses are attached to the response. (Those attachments must be in either MS Word or PDF format.)

5.9[4] (e) cont (e) If the action taken is adequate, the CA is closed in PCRS.

(1) Ifthe action taken is inadequate the response is revised until considered adequate for approval, or:

a. Process a Due Date Extension to allow sufficient time for resolution of the issues with the response or
b. NOTE in the closure of CA the identified changes to the response and issue a new CA to resolve the issues with the response at the appropriate management level.
c. Changes to actions should have the same level of review as the original actions (e.g., approval by CARB / CARB Chairperson). Once approved at the appropriate level additional actions may be issued, as needed, to complete the changes.

(2) Ifadditional corrective actions are identified in the response, appropriate CAs are generated in PCRS.

(f) Closing an open CA in one CR to another CR should be handled as described in Step 5.10 [1] (h) and 5.10 [1] (i).

[5] CR Interim and Periodic Reviews [SOER 10-2 Rec 1]

(a) Each open CR associated with Safety Related equipment will be reviewed at approximately six months from initial assignment date. This review will be documented in a CA assigned to the CR owner and will include at least the following items:

(1) Verification that the action plan documented in PCRS will correct the condition (2) Document expected CR Closure date based on remaining needed actions, (3) Verification, for equipment related CRs that the documented operability/functionality position remains valid for the current condition of the equipment and is expected to remain valid for the duration of the action plan.

Initiate a new CR if the current operability/functionality position is questionable.

(4) Verification that administrative performance within the corrective action process has been acceptable to date. (Appropriate approval levels and justifications for DDEs are documented; LTCAs are appropriately flagged, etc.)

(5) Verification that the risk of not correcting the condition is acceptable for the duration of the action plan, (6) Approval of these reviews and approval for the CR to remain open beyond six months has been obtained and documented from a director level or above.

5.9[5] (a) cont (7) Attachment 9.8 is provided to facilitate the review and approval process. It can be used if desired. The expectation is to capture the discussion points of that form in a CA, DDE request or initial CA assignment as appropriate. The form itself need not be used, but all points applicable must be addressed and the guidance of 5.9[5] (a) and (b) must be followed as applicable.

(b) At least once per year, following the initial review, each open CR associated with Safety Related equipment will be reviewed. This review will be documented in a corrective action and will include as a minimum the same items as the interim review above, and may be accomplished by a documented verification of the previous review.

5.10 CONDITION REPORT CLOSURE [P15552], [P4669] [CAPR 00734434.01], [CAPR CR-PLP-2009-05938],

[ANSI N45.2.13 9.2 Sla, b, c, d]

[1] Condition Report Closure - Responsible Manager Closure Review [P9849]

(a) When all CR actions are complete the Responsible Manager (RM) shall approve the closure of all Category A and B CRs assigned to their department. While the department manager is ultimately accountable to ensure this closure activity is satisfactorily completed, he/she can delegate necessary tasks, as required, to support this closure to staff within their department.

(b) The RM or designee should perform CR closure review for Category C CRs.

(c) For Safeguards CRs, the Responsible Manager closure review shall be performed by safeguard qualified personnel. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(d) Accountability for a proper and complete CR response and CR closure review remains with the Responsible Manager.

(e) The closure review by the Responsible Manager (or designee for Category C CRs),

may be documented in the last CA closed from a CR. Ifthe closure is not readily apparent and documented, then CA&A may notify the Responsible Manager that a closure review is necessary. This notification may be in the form of a CR Closure Review CA in PCRS. The Responsible Manager, or designee, reviews the CR to make a recommendation for closure using the following criteria as applicable: [P9849]

  • The root cause or apparent cause is valid.

" The specific condition is corrected or resolved.

  • Overall plant safety is not inadvertently degraded.
  • Generic implications of the identified condition are considered, as appropriate, including generic applicability to other departments and Entergy Sites.

" Actions were taken to preclude repetition, as appropriate.

" Any potential operability/functionality or reportability issue(s) identified during the resolution of the condition has been appropriately addressed.

" All corrective action items are completed.

" No safeguards information or proprietary documents are contained in the CR documentation.

  • Effectiveness Review actions have been initiated, when applicable.

5.10 11] cont (f) If the CR is not adequate for closure, the Responsible Manager will issue any additional actions needed to complete the corrective action plan. Minor clarifications and editorial corrections can be documented in the RM closure review response or comments. The issuance of additional actions will take the CR out of the closure process.

(g) If the condition report is adequate for closure the Responsible Manager recommends and documents final closure of the condition report.

(h) When an open CR is closed to another existing CR, the following requirements should be met:

The CR being closed is the same or lower significance Category level than the existing CR. Otherwise CRG concurrence is required.

The owner of the CR to be closed will obtain concurrence from the owner (Responsible Manager) of the CR to remain open that the open CR will be allowed to resolve the condition identified in the CR that will be closed.

The owner of the CR to be closed should ensure a CA is assigned to the owner of the CR remaining open stating that the CR has been closed to the CR remaining open and that the CR being closed must be addressed within the CR remaining open.

(i) Closing an open CA in one CR to another CR should be done as described in 5.10[1]

(h).

(j) An independent closure review is performed for all significant CRs prior to the CA&A closeout review (Quality Check) and CR closure. CA&A normally performs this independent closure review to the same standards/requirements applicable for the RM closure review, but a subject matter expert from a department (or Site) other than the Responsible Manager's may be assigned to complete this review if warranted (k) An independent closure review is not required for non-significant CRs prior to the DPIC I CA&A closeout review (Quality Check) and CR closure. The documented RM closure review is adequate authorization for processing and closure of the CR by DPIC / CA&A as allowed per the requirements of this section

[2] Condition Report Closeout Review (CR Quality Check) and Closure (a) DPICs are allowed to perform the CR closeout review (CR Quality check) and electronically close Non-CARB "B - Lower Tier" and "C" level CRs. Otherwise CA&A performs this function (e.g. "A" and "B-Higher Tier level CRs as well as B-Lower Tier CRs that were approved by CARB). Also, CA&A may perform this function as a backup for DPICs as required. If an RM has completed a DPIC Familiarization guide, then the RM can perform the DPIC function for Non-CARB "B- Lower Tier" and "C" level CRs.

5.10 [2] cont (b) General requirements for CR closeout review and CR closure (1) For Safeguards CRs, closure / closeout reviews shall be performed by safeguard qualified personnel. [CR-HQN-2009-1107, NRC Order EA-09-060]

(2) Upon receipt of response from the Responsible Manager stating that the CR is ready for closure the Manager, CA&A (or Manager CA&A Projects at headquarters) or designee, or DPIC ensures any applicable independent review and closure reviews of the CR are performed as appropriate.

(3) If the CR closeout review determines that the condition report is adequate for closure, then the CR is electronically closed in PCRS.

(4) Ifthe CR closeout review determines that the report is not adequate for closure, then a CA is issued using the "UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A" action type, with specific recommendations or identified discrepancies that need further review

a. Due dates for "UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A" actions are usually _ 30 days from the date of issuance. "UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A" actions do not require the concurrence of the manager being assigned the action
b. "UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A" actions are issued to the Responsible Manager of the CR to evaluate the specific recommendations or identified discrepancies. Based on the evaluation results, additional actions are issued or a documented response is provided as to why no additional actions are necessary.
c. Ifa satisfactory response cannot be obtained for adequate closure of the CR then the issue is resolved at the appropriate level of management (c) During the closeout review process, the results of the root cause or apparent cause evaluation is reviewed and the associated trend codes are adjusted if necessary (d) Ifthe CR was assigned to a Responsible Manager for correction of a condition, CRG approval is required before closing the CR or a CA in the CR to a Work Order (reference 5.8[6]). This requirement is not applicable ifthe CA was issued to track an Enhancement that was not needed to correct the original condition or was not needed to address an identified cause.

(1) CAPRs, actions to correct Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures conditions, and Category "A CR actions (except Enhancements), may not be closed to other processes and must remain in the corrective action process until resolved.

[3] EN-LI-1 02-02, CR Closure Quality, is available as a closure review tool for Responsible Managers, CA&A, and DPICs.

QUALITY RELATED EN-LI-102 REV. 21 MANUAL INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 44 OF 72 Corrective Action Process 5.11 PROGRAM OVERSIGHT [NL-88-062-C02], [NL-97-134-C04], [NL-98-025-C02]

[1] CA&A reports status of the condition reporting process (e.g., the number of open condition reports, open corrective actions, late corrective actions) monthly. [P5085]

[2] A computerized reporting tool is provided with PCRS. This reporting tool provides up to date reports and queries that allow plant personnel to stay abreast of the status of their condition reports and corrective actions.

[3] The corrective action program is periodically evaluated through audit & assessment processes. A focused self-assessment is performed on Corrective Action Process approximately every two years. [P7237]

5.12 Senior Management may request a Fleet Challenge for an ACE or RCE. IF a Fleet Challenge is required, THEN:

[1] The site at which the event occurred may consider the addition of independent (not from the same site as the event) Senior Managers (VP, GMPO or NSA/Engineering Director) to provide independent oversight to the RCE Team.

[2] An independent RCE Evaluator (not from the same site as the event) should also be considered.

[3] The Fleet Challenge should follow the Site CARB review.

[4] The Site CARB Chair should present the RCE to the Fleet Challenge meeting.

5.13 Department Performance Improvement Coordinators(DPICs)

[1] DPICs complete a training Job Familiarization Guide, FFAM-CAA-DPIC, Department Performance Improvement Coordinator (DPIC).

6.0 INTERFACES

[1] NMM EN-DC-153, Preventive Maintenance Component Classification

[2] NMM EN-EC-100, Guidelines for Implementation of the Employee Concerns Program

[3] NMM EN-HU-101, Human Performance Procedure

[4] NMM EN-LI-1i02-02, CR Closure Quality

[5] NMM EN-LI-1I08, Event Notification and Reportability

[6] NMM EN-LI-1I08-01, 10 CFR 21 Evaluations and Reporting

[7] NMM EN-LI-1 18, Root Cause Evaluation Process [SOER 83-07, Recommendation 2],

[SOER 92-01 Recommended CA 4A]

[81 NMM EN-LI-1 19, Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) Process [SOER 83-07, Recommendation 2], [SOER 92-01 Recommended CA 4A]

[9] NMM EN-LI-119-01, Equipment Failure Evaluation 6.0 cont

NUCLEAR QUALITYRELATED EN-LI-102 REV. 21

  • Enterngy MANAGEMENT MANUAL INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 45 OF 72 Corrective Action Process

[10] NMM EN-LI-121, Entergy Trending Process (11] NMM EN-MP-120, Material Receipt

[12] NMM EN-MP-115, Material Issues and Returns

[13] NMM EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process

[14] NMM EN-FAP-OP-009, Tagging Performance Indicator Program

[15] NMM EN-NS-204: Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information

[16] NMM EN-QV-109, Audit Process

[17] NMM EN-QV-1 06, Escalation of Quality Concerns

[18] NMM EN-QV-126, Oversight Follow-Up Procedure

[19] NMM EN-AD-101: Procedure Process

[20] EN-PL-155, Entergy Nuclear Change Management

[21] Significance Determination Process (SDP)

[22] NMM EN-FAP-LI-003, Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Process

[23] NMM EN-FAP-LI-001, Condition Review Group (CRG)

[24] NMM EN-MA-101-02, Control of Material Outside Facility Warehouse

[25] NMM EN-AD-103, Document Control and Records Management Programs 7.0 RECORDS

[1] CA&A transmits closed CRs for retention in accordance with EN-AD-103. After CRs are closed and entered into the permanent document management system, they should not be re-opened. However, a CR may be administratively re-opened in PCRS to add non Quality record related information for ease of future research, in the trend section, reference section, equipment section, CA Priority, CA Type or Administrative section. Only trend coding, reference items, CA Priority, CA Type or equipment identification information can be updated / corrected. Then the CR will be immediately re-closed. Otherwise, if information becomes available that indicates additional work is required for a CR in the permanent document storage system, a new CR should be initiated. [QAPM B.15.a], [10 CFR 73.71 A.5],

[P15297], [P757], [ANSI N45.2.12], [P14653]

8.0 SITE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS Step Site Document Commitment Number or Reference

[1] ANO Commitment P4997

[2] ANO Commitment P7531

[3] ANO Commitment P15552

[4] ANO Commitment P2993

[5] ANO Commitment P5431

[6] ANO Commitment P3098

[7] ANO Commitment P5085

[8] ANO Commitment P9849

[9] ANO Commitment P7239

[10] ANO Commitment P6919

[11] ANO Commitment P7237

[12] ANO Commitment P15414

[13] GGNS UFSAR 13.1.2.2 S3 P22828

[14] GGNS UFSAR 13.1.2.2 S4 P22829

[15] GGNS UFSAR 12.5.3.7 S5 P22638

[16] GGNS UFSAR 12.5.3.7 S6 P22639

[17] GGNS AECM 89/0162 P24458 89-17-02. At I.IV.3

[18] GGNS AECM 90/0004 VII.A.1 P24500

[19] GGNS AECM 84/0062 83-43-03. P23977 Af I.IV. (1)

[20] GGNS AECM 84/0062 83-43-03. P23978 Aft I.IV. (2)

[21] GGNS QDR 46-95 P32520

8.0 cont

[22] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.1 P24842 S1

[23] GGNS ANSI-ANS 13.6/66 4.9.2 P24843 S2

[24] GGNS 10CFR21.21.A.1 P17819

[25] GGNS 10CFR21.21.A.2 P17820

[26] GGNS UFSAR 8.3.1.1.4.1.2.S14, P21886, P21887, P21888

$15, $16

[27] GGNS UFSAR 8.3.1.1.4.2.13.S3, P21895, P21896, P21897 S4

[28] GGNS GIN92/03494 5.6 P33542

[29] GGNS GNRO 96/0056 96-06 P32648

[30] IP2 Commitment NL-81-AOI-C15

[31] IP2 Commitment NL-88-062-C02

[32] IP2 Commitment NL-97-084-C07

[33] IP2 Commitment NL-97-084-C13

[34] IP2 Commitment NL-97-137-C04

[35] IP2 Commitment NL-98-025-C02

[36] IP2 Commitment NL-98-066-C024

[37] IP2 Commitment NL-98-066-C040

[38] IP2 Commitment NL-98-066-C041

[39] IP2 Commitment PD-77-234-C02

[40] IP2 Commitment PD-88-028-C21

[41] IP2 Commitment PD-97-037-C03

[42] IP2 Commitment RA-78-A05-C06

[43] IP3 Commitment COMM-93-04786

8.0 cont.

(44] JAF Commitment JAFP-91-0834

[45] JAF SOER 83-07 Recommendation 2

[46] JAF SOER 92-01 Recommended Corrective Action 4A

[47] PLP Commitment CAPR 00734434.01

[48] PLP Commitment CR-PLP-2007-1243 (49] RBS Commitment P13307

[50] VY Commitment AUDIT RPT 9617-01

[51] VY Commitment ER960078_02

[52] VY Commitment ER960265_02

[53] VY Commitment ER970230

[54] VY Commitment ER20032022_01

[55] VY Commitment ER20031761_02

[56] VY Commitment ER20031910_12

[57] VY Commitment Gentletr9l18R1

[58] VY Commitment INPO93OE21TP3

[59] VY Commitment INS938OTP2

[60] VY Commitment INS9620004

[61] VY Commitment TREND92TP4

[62] VY Commitment ER20031637_01

[63] VY Commitment INF9607_01 (64] WF3 Commitment P5110

[65] WF3 Commitment P15297

[66] WF3 Commitment P16529

8.0 cont.

[67] WF3 ANSI N13.6.1.7 P15005

[68] WF3 Commitment P17707

[69] WF3 Commitment P17726

[70] WF3 Commitment P20277

[711 WF3 Commitment P21439

[72] WF3 Commitment P21440

[73] WF3 10 CFR 21.21 A P21693

[74] WF3 10 CFR 21.21 C P21700

[75] WF3 Commitment P22593

[76] WF3 Commitment P23035

[77] WF3 Commitment P23038

[78] WF3 10 CFR 21.51 A P757

[79] WF3 Commitment P4669

[80] WF3 Commitment P22362 9.0 ATTACHMENTS 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATION/CATEGORY 9.2 EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION 9.4 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES 9.5 ENTERGY FLEET LEARNING REVIEW PROCESS 9.6 GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF CRs ON LOWER LEVEL EQUIPMENT ISSUES 9.7 TYPICAL NONCONFORMANCE TAG 9.8 CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM 9.9 LTCA CLASSIFICATION FORM 9.10 CR ASSIGNMENT AND LIFE CYCLE PROCESS MAP

NUCLEAR QUAUTY RELATED EN-LI-102 REV. 21

- ne MANAGEMENT INOMTNAUS MANUAL INFORMATIONAL USE PAGE 50 OF 72 Corrective Action Process ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS / CATEGORY Sheet I of 6 [P5431], [P6919], [QAPM A.6.e], [ANSI N45.2.13 9.2 Sla, b, c, d]

Assignment of Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Oversight:

The Condition Review Group (CRG) is responsible for determining that a condition report (CR) contains an issue that warrants CARB oversight. The purpose of CARB oversight is to ensure the condition reports are evaluated in-depth and well documented. CARB oversight includes approval of the final cause determination and the corrective action plan. CARB oversight is assigned for all Category A, Significant CRs and may be assigned for Category B, Non-significant CRs. The following guidance is provided to assist CRG in the determination of CARB assignment:

  • Condition reports with cross-disciplinary (across more than one department) aspects to them.
  • Condition reports with cross human performance aspects.
  • Condition reports with cross organizational aspects.
  • Condition reports important to nuclear, public, or personnel safety
  • OSHA Recordable and more severe injuries
  • Condition reports important to generation capability
  • Condition report events with generic implications
  • Condition reports on equipment reliability applicability items impacting:
  • Capability factor

" Forced loss rate

  • Unplanned LCO entry
  • Dose
  • Maintenance rule functional failure

" Chronic system or component failure

  1. CRs on training programs which are determined to meet the criteria for a "Finding" per the Measures for Judgment" contained in the INPO Accreditation Evaluator Reference Manual. Note: A Fleet Training Assessment Challenge Board will be convened at the Training Director's discretion to review ACE or RCE results related to training assessment findings prior to their presentation to CARB.

The following classification guidance is subiect to CRG discretion. The CRG maintains the authority to deviate from this guidance, as warranted, so long as resolutions of Adverse Conditions are documented in the Corrective Action program.

Significant classification is the highest and most important. In most cases, significant events are the result of multiple barrier failures or programmatic breakdowns. There is considerably more investigation into the cause of the identified condition.

  • Category A - An adverse condition classified as significant and requires a Root Cause and actions to preclude repetition.

Condition meets one of the "significant" definitions. Typically, the condition is viewed as applicable to 10CFR50, requiring cause determination, correction of adverse condition and corrective actions to preclude repetition.

Root Cause Evaluations should be completed within 30 days.

-For Human Performance/Process issues:

1. Does the identified problem meet the Human Performance Event Criteria? (see HU-101,Attachment 9.1) If yes then the CRG should consider classifying the CR as Significant.

-For Tagging Issues (Tagging error classification is defined in EN-FAP-OP-009)

1. Level I Tagging issue - Where no barriers were present and event is significant a Cat. "A" CR RCA may be applicable the CRG should consider classifying the CR as Significant.

-For Trainin-g issues:

1. Condition Reports for Training Assessment Standards Performance Deficiency (SPD as defined by EN LI-104) which are determined to meet the criteria for a "Finding" against objective criteria of ACAD 02-001, per the "Measures for Judgment" contained in the INPO Accreditation Evaluator Reference Manual should be evaluated through a root cause process.

ATTACHMEINT9. CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY Sheet 2 of '6

-For Reactivity Management Events

1. Reactivity Management Significant Classification Level 1 Events
2. Reactivity Management Significant Classification Level 2 Events (Specific Conditions may be downgraded to a CR Level 'B' if proper justification is provided).

Non-Significant condition reports document problems for which a repeat occurrence (while always undesirable) can be tolerated.

  • Category B - An adverse condition classified as non-significant and assigned to a Responsible Manager for documentation of apparent cause, corrective actions taken to correct the condition and to address the apparent cause(s). This CR will require an Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) which is performed as either Higher Tier or Lower Tier type as determined by the CRG.

Condition does not meet the "significant" definition. Usually, Category B conditions are "Conditions Adverse to Quality" and 10CFR50 applicable. However, since they are not significant, 10CFR50 only requires prompt identification and correction. Notwithstanding, the CRG views a Category B condition to be more than a "broke-fix" issue. In addition to correcting the identified deficiency, the Category B Condition Report should:

1. Determine and document the apparent cause of deficiency.
2. Determine and document the action plan to eliminate identified causes of the condition thereby reducing likelihood of condition repetition.

Category B designation should be prudently used to ensure a value added resource expenditure. Apparent Cause Evaluations / Equipment Failure Evaluations should be done within 30 days.

The following guidance (for both Equipment Failure Evaluations and Human Performance/Process issues) is provided as a tool to further help differentiate "B" level CRs from "C" level CRs after a determination is made that the condition does not meet the criteria to be designated as a Significant CR ("A"). This information is only a tool and doesn't override authority of the CRG to make a final decision on classification of a CR's category.

- For Taqqing Issues (Tagging error classification is defined in EN-FAP-OP-009)

1. Level I Tagging issue - Where no barriers were present requires a minimum Cat. "B" CR, Higher Tier ACE, based on significance of the event a Cat. "A"CR RCA may be applicable.
2. Level II tagging issue - Where one barrier was present requires a minimum a Cat. "B" CR, Lower Tier ACE based on significance of the event a Higher Tier ACE may be applicable.

-For Equipment Failure Evaluations:

1. For High Critical Component failures (as determined by EN-DC-345) a minimum Category "B" High Tier apparent cause and an EN-LI-1 19-01, Attachment 9.1 Equipment Failure Evaluation is recommended.
2. For Low Critical Component failures (as determined by EN-DC-345) a minimum Category "B" Lower Tier apparent cause and an EN-LI-119-01, Attachment 9.1 Equipment Failure Evaluation is recommended.

-Other Equipment Failures:

1. For an unexpected failure of safety related or important equipment a minimum Category "B" apparent cause is recommended. [ER2003191012]
2. For equipment failures of a repeat nature if the CRG concludes it is prudent to determine why it failed and take action to preclude repetition a minimum Category "B" apparent cause is recommended.

-For INPO Area For Improvements:

1. A justification statement to support classification of a CR intended to address an INPO AFI is required if the CR is not classified Cat. B or higher.

-For Iniury CRs:

1. For Lost Time Accidents, hospitalizations, and severe injuries that are not classified as Category "A", a minimum Category "B"High Tier ACE with CARB review is required.
2. For all other OSHA Recordable injuries a minimum Category "B" Lower Tier ACE with CARB review is required.

-For HQN CRs:

1. Perform a causal analysis for fleet issues if there's an underlying corporate contributor identified in more than one site analysis that hasn't been addressed via the sites' CRs.

ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS / CATEGORY Sheet 3 of 6

-For Human Performance/Process issues:

1. Does the identified problem meet the Human Error threshold? (see HU-1 01, Attachment 9.2)
2. Is the identified problem a repetitive issue that demands a more aggressive approach to eliminate the issue? Is continuing to treat a repetitive problem as a "broke/fix" still prudent?
3. Is it prudent to not only fix the identified problem, but also to determine/document cause(s) of the problem and determine/document an action plan to fix cause(s)?

-For Quality Assurance Issues:

1. B LT classification is the minimum required response to a:
  • Quality Assurance (QA) Findings (OAF) (as defined by EN-QV-109) o IF the QAF has elements of O&P, then a HT ACE is required
2. B HT classification is the minimum required response to a:

" QA Unsat. Follow-up (as defined by EN-QV-126)

-For Reactivity Management Events:

1. Reactivity Management Significant Classification Level 3 Events (Specific Conditions may be downgraded to a CR Level 'C' if proper justification is provided).
  • Category C - An adverse condition classified as non-significant or a non-adverse condition assigned to a Responsible Manager for investigation and correction. A condition that has or would have minimal effect on the safe or reliable operation of the plant or personnel. The safety significance of the occurrence is sufficiently minor that an ACE is not required. Required action need only return the equipment or process to an acceptable status. Conditions in this category are frequently referred to as "broke/fix". See Attachment 9.6.

A Category C condition does not meet definition of significant. However, it may be a "Condition Adverse to Quality" and IOCFR50 applicable (prompt identification and correction). The desired resolution is correction of the identified problem. While determination of cause is often required to fix a problem, no formal documentation of cause is required. Repeat occurrence of the problem is viewed as acceptable.

-For Equipment Failure Evaluations:

For High or Low Critical Component Failures (as determined by EN-DC-345) for which CRG determines NO causal analysis is required, a minimum Category "C"assignment and an EN-LI-119-01, Attachment 9.1 Equipment Failure Evaluation (EFE) is recommended Additional Significance classification guidance is provided in Attachment 9.6 for equipment related CRs that do not screen as Category "A" or "B"level CRs or "C" level CRs that do not require an EFE.

-For Reactivity Manaqement Precursors:

1. Reactivity Management Significant Classification Level 4 Precursors (Specific Conditions may be downgraded to a CR Level 'D' if proper justification is provided).
  • Cate-gory D - No tracking of corrective actions is required and the CR may be closed. For example the condition has been corrected, closed to a Work Order, closed to an existing CR, or is below CR threshold.

Adverse Conditions (and Non-Adverse conditions at the discretion of the CRG) which would not exceed the criteria for a category "C"CR may be closed in one of the three following ways:

Category "D"Close to WMS Category "D"Close to CR Category "D"Condition Corrected (when supporting documentation is provided)

CRs identifying conditions which are below the level of Adverse Conditions as defined in 3.0[2] may be classified as Category "D"and closed in the following ways:

Category "D"- Actions Taken Category "D"- Close Reference Category "D"- Review for Emerging Trend Category "D"- Below Threshold

ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS / CATEGORY Sheet 4 of 6 Note: In order to ensure appropriate oversight and independence, the Quality Assurance (QA) organization has the right to determine ifa QA identified condition is a Condition Adverse to Quality or a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality. Incases where the CRG does not concur that a QA identified condition is a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality, the Director, Oversight has the authority to overrule the CRG.

Standardize Significance Level and Classification Codes for CR Assiqnment Tab S16 tF:N1* CO* *' CLASSiFICATIONDESC A RCA CRG Directs a Root Cause Analysis B HT-ACE CARB CRG Directs CARB Review B HT-ACE CRG Directs a Higher Tier ACE B LT-ACE CARB CRG Directs CARB Review B LT-ACE CRG Directs a Lower Tier ACE C CORRECT/ADDRESS CRG Directs Correct/Address Identified Conditions D CLOSE TO CR CRG Directs CR to Close to Another CR D CLOSE TO WMS RG Directs CR to Close to An Open Work Order D CONDITION CORRECTED RG Directs CR - Condition Corrected I Documented D ACTIONS TAKEN RG Directs CR to Close - Sufficient Actions Taken / Documented D REVIEW EMERG TREND RG Directs CR to Close - Still Reviewed As Part of Trending Process D CLOSE REFERENCE CRG Directs CR to Close - Listing # to Address the Item D BELOW THRESHOLD CRG Directs CR to Close - No Condition IdentifiedlExists or Below Threshold D VOID/DUPLICATE CR CRG Directs CR to Close - Void (Cancel) or Duplicate of Another CR

ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS / CATEGORY Sheet 5 of 6 The following is a "guidance" tool for determining the CR Categorization. It allows for more consistency in Categorization of Condition Reports. To use this tool, first select the closest fit under Severity Levels, then choose the best fit under Frequency Levels. If more than one level fits select the higher level. Finally, use the matrix to find the recommended CR categorization, recognizing that CRG discretion may be needed in final determination.

Severity Levels

1. Severity Level I - Condition that:

" Is classified as a. Significant (Level 1 or 2) Reactivity Management Event,

" Is classified as White, Yellow, or Red through the NRC Significance Determination Process,

  • Results in E-Plan declaration, regulatory intervention or significant public interest,
  • Results in an industrial related fatality, severe injury requiring transportation off site,
  • Results in major system, component, or structure damage or loss,
  • Affects more than one department,
  • Is deemed a near miss to catastrophic consequences,
  • Results in a loss of production (>10%),

" Identifies a problem that meets the Human Performance Event Criteria, excluding injuries classified as events (see EN-HU-101 Attachment 9.1). When a CR identifies a Human Performance Event the CRG should consider classifying the CR as Significant.

2. Severity Level 2 - Condition that does not meet Severity Level 1 criteria, but does:
  • Result in a reportable event pursuant to 10CFR21, 50.72, 50.73, or other NRC reporting criteria

" Identify a Operable-DNC or Operable-Comp Measures condition

" Result in unplanned events or failure impacting the function of a structure, system, or component

  • Identify errors that demonstrate fundamental misunderstandings of, or noncompliance with, procedural or regulatory requirements
  • Result in the loss of a High Risk Maintenance Rule function or in the failure of a High Critical or Low Critical component (as determined by EN-DC-345)

" Result in > 1 day delay of planned LCO,

  • Identify an equipment deficiency that adversely impacts NRC or WANO Performance Indicators

" Result in a Green NCV, Green finding, violation, or traditional enforcement from the NRC

" Result in a reportable event pursuant to NERC Standard EOP-004-1, Attachment 2 Table 1, Item 5

[consequential physical sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism to major electrical systems].

" Result in a reportable event pursuant to NERC Standard EOP-004-1, Attachment 2 Table 1, Item 6

[consequential cyber sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism.].

" Result in an injury that is classified as an OSHA Recordable or lost time accident,

" Result in a Human Performance Clock reset (see EN-HU-101)

  • Result in an Adverse Trend designation by the CRG

" Identify an equipment failure of repetitive nature such that it is prudent to determine why

" Identify an Internal Oversight QA Finding (EN-QV-109, ANSI 18.7, and ANSI N45.2.12)

" Identify a Corporate or External AFI,

" May affect more than one department.

CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS I CATEGORY ATTACHMENT ATTACHMENT 9.1 CONDITION REPORT CLASSIFICATIONS / CATEGORY Sheet 6 of6

3. Severity Level 3 - Condition that does not meet Severity Level 1 or 2 criteria, but does:
  • Result in minor system damage, minor injury, or other event generally confined to one department,

" Identify a Corporate or External Negative Observation, or an Internal Self-Assessment Standards Performance Deficiency (SPD),

" Result in a reportable event pursuant to NERC Standard EOP-004-1, Attachment 2 Table 1, Item 5 [non consequential physical sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism to major electrical systems].

  • Result in a reportable event pursuant to NERC Standard EOP-004-1, Attachment 2 Table 1, Item 5 (non consequential cyber sabotage, terrorism, or vandalism].
  • Identify a problem that meets the Human Error threshold (see EN-HU-1 01 Attachment 9.2).

" Abnormal and/or long term unexplained plant conditions [SOER 2-04 Rec 3]

4. Severity Level 4 - Less than the above.

Frequency Levels Consider fleet implications that could indicate an Extent of Condition or Generic Implication review is needed when selecting the appropriate Frequency Level.

I. Likely to occur often or has occurred often during the life of an individual item, system, process or very often in operation of a large number of similar items.

I1.Likely to occur several times or has occurred several times inthe life of an individual item, system, process, or often in operation of a large number of similar items.

I1l. Likely or possible to occur sometime in the life of an individual item, system, process, or will likely or reasonably be expected to occur in the life of a large number of similar components.

IV. So unlikely to occur in the life of an individual item, system, or process, that it may be assumed not to be experienced, or it may be possible, but unlikely, to occur in the life of a large number of similar components.

CR Category Matrix Guideline CR Grade Freq. I Freq. II Freq. III Freq. IV Severity 1 A A A A Severity 2 A B B C Severity 3 B C* C* C*

Severity 4 C* D D D

  • Category 'D'is chosen if the condition is corrected and documented, and no further analysis or corrective actions are warranted.
  • Category 'D' is chosen for relatively straightforward conditions when it is appropriate to close them to a work order or another open condition report.
  • Attachment 9.6 contains additional guidance on when it is appropriate to close relatively straightforward equipment relate CRs to a work order OR when it is appropriate to just reference the work order.

ATTACHMENT 9.2 EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS Sheet I of 3 [P3098], [ANSI N45.2.11, Section 9.2], [P7531], [P15005], [P21693], [P21700] [P22638] [P22639]

[P24842] [P24843] [P17819] [P17820], [ANSI N45.2.11 9 S1-S4]

Examples of Adverse Conditions Employees are encouraged to report a broad range of problems and potential problems. However, adverse conditions are required to be documented on CRs. The conditions described in this attachment are examples of adverse conditions. This list is not necessarily all-inclusive. Any adverse condition as defined in Section 3.0 should be documented on a Condition Report.

1. QOperational Conditions

" Plant transient (per INPO, WANO guidance documents)

" Unplanned actuation of RPS, ESF, or Emergency Power Systems

" Potentially reportable conditions

" Events or conditions that could negatively impact reliability or availability

" Unplanned conditions or events that affect reactivity

  • Unplanned entry or failure to enter a LCO (includes performance outside acceptance criteria)

" Grid Disturbance including protective relay or equipment failures, or mis-operations

2. Radiological Conditions
  • Any exposures that exceed allowable administrative or regulatory limits.
  • Lost or missing licensed radioactive material

" Unplanned radioactive release

" Violations of procedures or policies or regulations that are intended to satisfy 10CFR19, IOCFR20 or other applicable federal regulations

" Abnormally high radiation or airborne radioactivity levels

3. Security Conditions
  • Potentially Reportable events (one hour report) per 10CFR73.71
  • Programmatic failure(s), recurring events or human errors that require further management attention

" Other security events that could reduce the overall effectiveness of the security program

  • Adverse trends in the number of Security events
  • Potential or confirmed tampering, terrorism, vandalism or sabotage.
4. Industrial Safety Conditions
  • Lost time accident
  • Near miss Incident
  • OSHA Recordable event
  • Recurring minor injuries of similar cause judged to need further evaluation

" Conditions which could create a significant personnel safety hazard

5. Material Conditions (not installed)

" Deficient components issued or ready-for-issue for which elements of the QA program have been applied.

Deficient components are those that have not met design or procurement specifications.

" Deficiency reported by vendor bulletin when confirmed that the product has been issued or is ready for issue at the station.

" Conditional release of materials, parts, or components, for installation and testing, which have not been fully accepted under the Quality Assurance program.

ATTACHMENT 9.2 EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS Sheet 2 of 3

6. Structures, Systems or Components Conditions (Installed) [ER20031637_01], [QDR 200-95/RCDL 95-20, Long Term Action 2.a.1]

Conditions affecting a safety related, quality-related or trip sensitive system caused by a deficiency in characteristic, documentation or procedure that renders the quality of an item unacceptable or indeterminate.

Examples include, but may not be limited to:

" Recurring or generic failure

" Item has a defect as a result of design or manufacturing process that prevents or could have prevented the component from performing its intended function

" Any Degraded or Nonconforming Condition affecting an SSC within scope of the Operability Determination Process per EN-OP-104.

  • Item fails testing performed to prove environmental or seismic design conformance

" Deviation from prescribed processing or inspection

" Documentation not available to confirm required inspections or tests

" Deficiency reported by vendor bulletin

" M&TE: A condition report is required when the non-conforming condition is related to the calibration of M&TE and the following conditions exist:

- The condition cannot be resolved through a record search.

- It cannot be verified that plant hardware or system performance is not affected and no further action is required.

" Oil leaks or spills that could increase the potential for a plant fire or adversely affect equipment operation.

The Fire Prevention Coordinator, Fire Protection Engineer, or System Engineer should be consulted to evaluate the potential impact. This includes events such as, but not limited to: oil wetted/fouled insulation or equipment, and leaks and spills involving liquids such as fuel oil, lube oil, fluid, etc. [P15414]

" Chemical or other leaks that could potentially impact plant operations or the environment.

" Missed or late preventive maintenance task required to satisfy technical specifications, environmental qualification or station commitments.

" Any code repairs on failed components that are performed to repair a component to operable status.

  • Conditions where nuclear fuel defects exist or are suspected.
  • Maintenance Rule"Category Al" items

" Conditions that degrade the ability of a Regulatory required installed fire protection system or component to perform its intended function. This includes degraded fire barriers and their sub components (penetration seals, fire doors and dampers), and fire detection and suppression systems. Additional components include Appendix R fire wrap and emergency lighting, and any Reactor Coolant Pump (PWR) oil collection system.

[P15414]

7. Welding Related Conditions

" Welds not made in accordance with applicable procedures

" Welds made by unqualified welders

" Welds made with improper or undocumented filler material

  • Welds on which specified hold points are bypassed
  • Welds which do not meet applicable code or job specific requirements and on which the final weld inspection and NDE have been completed/accepted

ATTACHMENT 9.2 ATTACHMENT 9.2 EXAMPLES OF ADVERSE CONOmONS m

ExAmPLES OF ADVERSE CONDITIONS Sheet 3 of 3 8, Deviations From Design/Licensing Basis Conditions

  • Functional inaccuracies in safety-related documents (procedures, technical manuals, work plans, drawings, etc.) which could degrade plant safety [P4997], [P22593]

" Failure to comply with design or license basis commitments as described in the SAR, TS, TRM, etc.

  • Inadequate Technical Specifications

" Conditions that may require written or telephone notifications to the NRC, excluding routine reports.

  • SSCs or physical conditions that deviate from Design / License basis assumptions
9. Administrative or Work Practice Conditions

" Performance of activities on the wrong equipment

" Mispositioned equipment

  • Errors or deficiency in the design process, including computer programs.
  • Tagging errors
10. Engineering Related Conditions An error or omission in an engineering product which, if uncorrected could result in any of the following. These criteria apply even if the error was discovered before the product was finalized or issued for use.
  • significantly reduces the margin to safety as defined by Technical Specifications or the FSAR,
  • renders equipment important to safety inoperable or incapable of performing intended safety functions
  • reflects a significant procedural non-compliance or programmatic breakdown.
11. Regulatory Issues
  • potential or actual NRC violations

" potential or actual INPO Areas for Improvement (AFIs)

" potential or actual 10 CFR 21 conditions

12. Training Issues
  • Any condition which adversely impacts training related regulatory compliance.
  • Any condition which has the potential to adversely impact training program accreditation.

" Areas for Improvement, Standards Performance Deficiencies, Findings, or other weaknesses identified in self-assessments, QA audits, NRC inspections, or INPO evaluations.

" Training procedure non-compliance.

" Any adverse trends identified through routine monitoring of training-related data, condition reports, assessment findings, etc.

" Loss of electrical power to the Training Center that impacts training.

" Unplanned fire system actuations that impact training.

  • Simulator downtime results in greater than 15 minutes of lost scheduled training time.
  • Training facilities in disrepair for extended periods.

" A human performance event or error that results in a reset of the Training Department Human Performance Clock, or the reset of another department's clock for training-related events (for example, student absence or tardiness).

" Any condition that requires that commitments be made to an outside organization.

  • Any condition or event which adversely impacts the personnel safety of the training staff or students.

" Work performed by an unqualified worker.

13. Other Issues

" Abnormal plant conditions or indications that cannot be readily explained [SOER 2-04 Rec 3]

" Long-term unexplained plant conditions [SOER 2-04 Rec 3]

ATTACH4MENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION Sheet 1 of 4 NOTE Sample forms used to implement this procedure are included in this attachment. It is not mandatory that the exact forms be used. Equivalent forms may be used, but they must contain the same or additional information. Any deletion of information must be accomplished by procedure revision.

This attachment provides a contingency method for generating, performing operability/functionality and immediate reportability determinations, and tracking Condition Reports when PCRS is not available. The Entergy Help Desk and CA&A staff should be called ifa PCRS outage is experienced.

Manual operation of the Condition Reporting System is limited to the generation of Condition Reports and the documentation of operability/functionality and immediate reportability determinations/evaluations. Issuing and responding to Condition Report Corrective Actions will be postponed until PCRS is available. However, any actions required to place the plant in a safe condition, or any other emergency actions, can proceed.

1.0 Condition Report Generation (Form 1):

1.1 Any individual, who discovers a Condition, when PCRS is not available, should follow the steps of section 5.2 with the exception of writing the Condition report with PCRS.

1.2 The attached form should be used to document a Condition when PCRS is unavailable.

1.3 Take the completed form and any supporting documentation to the Control RoomiWork Control Center, as appropriate. (Not applicable when generating Headquarters CRs. When generating Headquarters CRs manually, contact the Headquarters Corrective Action Coordinator).

2.0 Operability and Immediate Reportability Determinations (Form 3): (This section does not apply when generating CRs for offsite locations such as Headquarters. Results of Impact Applicability Reviews for CRs generated for offsite locations are documented on the Manual CR Continuation Form (Form 2)).

2.1 The Shift Manager/designee ensures that the manual CRs are maintained in the Control Room for periodic retrieval by CA&A and that CA&A is informed when manual CRs are ready for CA&A to pick up.

2.2 The Shift Manager/designee will perform the operability and immediate reportability.

2.3 Following the completion of the operability/functionality and immediate reportability determinations the Shift Manager/designee retains the Condition Report package for CA&A pick up.

3.0 Conversion of manual Condition Reports to PCRS:

3.1 CA&A picks up manual Condition Report packages and presents them to the CRG. CA&A communicates any immediate management actions .to the affected parties.

3.2 When the PCRS becomes available, CA&A informs the Control Room and then CA&A enters the manual Condition Reports into PCRS. PCRS automatically assigns the next sequential CR number to each manual CR. The original forms are then scanned into PCRS.

ATTACHMENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION Sheet 2 of 4 CONDITION REPORT Manual CR NO.

FORM I Maua __ ___

PAGE _

OF CONDITION IDENTIFICATION FORM (PRINT/TYPE, USE BLACK INK ONLY)

IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM For Operations Use Only (Please Print)

Orginator: Ext.: Date Rec'd Organization: Time Rec'd Supervisor:

Date of Discovery: Time of Discovery:

CONDITION DESCRIPTION:

[Include information pertinent to operability/functionality determination.]

Work Document # (i.e., WR/WO, OD, etc.) Other:

IMMEDIATE ACTION DESCRIPTION:

AFFECTED EQUIPMENT/DOCUMENTSlMATERIAL:

Number/Description(s)

SUGGESTED CORRECTIVE ACTION (S):

a OperabilitylFunctionality in question? o Potentially reportable?

ATTACHMENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION Sheet 3 of 4 I CONDITION REPORT FORM 2 ICR NO.

PAGE OF CONDITION REPORT CONTINUATION FORM (PRINT/TYPE, USE BLACK INK ONLY)

CONTINUATION FORM:

ATTACHMENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION ATTACHMENT 9.3 MANUAL CR INITIATION Sheet 4 of 4 Note: This section replaces the "electronic PCRS" operability/functionality section of the CR only. The operability/functionality determination process (EN-OP-104) is expected to be performed & attached to this manual CR form as needed.

OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY REVIEW & IMMEDIATE REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION - FORM 3 I. OPERABILITYIFUNCTIONALITY REVIEW OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONAUTY EVALUATION REQUIRED [I NO El YES IF NO - EXPLAIN WHY:

(IF NO THEN LEAVE OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY EVALUATION SECTION BLANK - COMPLETE REPORTABILITY SECTION AND SIGN AS APPROVER)

I1. OPERABIUTY DETERMINATION OPERABILITY CODE PLANT CONDITION/MODE:

EFFECT OF THIS CONDITION ON EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM/TRAIN OPERABILITY/FUNCTIONALITY:

[3 ADMIN-NA 0 OPERABLE - OP EVAL [I EQUIPMEI IT FUNCTIONAL EO NOT REQUIRED 0 OPERABLE-DNC El EQUIPMEI* IT NON- FUNCTIONAL 0 OPERABLE 0 OPERABLE-COMP MEASURES

[I INOPERABLE El INOPERABLE - OP EVAL Time Entered Operability Desc: enter or attach the required documentation per EN-OP-104 LCO ENTERED El NO E] YES LCO NO. LCO ACTION TIME TECH SPEC/TRM ACTION STATEMENT # DATE ENTERED TIME ENTERED IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TAKEN:

Ill.IMMEDIATE REPORTABIUTY DETERMINATION IS IMMEDIATE NRC NOTIFICATION REQUIRED? [I NO[] YES IF YES (Mark appropriate time requirement and complete this section) 0 1-HR RPTEl 4-HR RPT C] 8-HR RPTO 24-HR RPT DATE: AND TIME: OF REPORT.

NAME OF PERSON REPORT MADE TO:

CFR REQUIREMENT: NAME OF PERSON MAKING REPORT:

NRC EVENT NO.

REACTOR POWER:  % REACTOR PRESSURE: RX / RX COOLANT TEMP

[(BWR ONLY) CORE FLOW X 106 Ibm/HR REACTOR LEVEL in]

III. PERFORMANCE/APPROVAL PERFORMED BY: I DATE/TIME:

OPERATIONS REPRESENTATIVE APPROVAL: DATE/TIME:

ATTACHMENT 9.4 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES ATTAiCHMENT 9.4 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES SHEET I OF 3 [AUDIT RPT 9617-01], [ER960078.02], [ER960265_02], [P16529]

NOTES:

1. These guidelines should be used when setting corrective action due dates and extension requests. The target for completion of all corrective actions and closure of the CR associated with an "A", B" or "C" Condition Report is 6 months (except for those with Long Term CAs). CA timeliness criteria are provided to achieve CR age goals that are monitored via performance indicators. These criteria are considered guidelines and not procedural requirements. The CRG, CARB, or Responsible Manager can deviate from these guidelines to appropriately manage resources, except as noted below. Exceptions taken to the timeliness criteria do not relieve the CA/CR Owner from meeting performance indicator goals.
2. Corrective Action Due Dates should be selected with consideration given toward:
a. The risk to plant imposed as a result of the action not being complete.
b. Due Date(s) should ensure the action is complete prior to the next potential occurrence of the problem, if possible.
3. Document GMPO, Director, Site VP, or CARB Chairperson approval in DDE request when that approval is required per this attachment & that position is not the authority level for approval in PCRS.
4. The "30 day clock" for Root Cause Analysis stops when the final Cat "A" Evaluation has been approved by CARB and the CAs have been issued.
a. When CARB approves with comments, the 30 day clock can stop IF the comments do not require bring back to CARB, CAs from the RCA have been issued AND a CA is initiated, not to exceed 4 working days, to track the comment incorporation and approval by the CARB Chairperson..
b. Extension of the action to incorporate comments and obtain approval by the GARB Chairperson beyond 4 working days requires initiation of a specific Condition Report documenting the lack of timely incorporation of the comments.
5. The 30 day clock for Apparent Cause Evaluations stops when the Responsible Manager approves the report and corrective actions have been entered in PCRS.
a. Apparent Cause Evaluations requiring CARB review are presented within 60 days of the disposition assignment.
b. CARB comments are addressed and report finalized within 7 working days of CARB approval. DDEs requiring time beyond 7 working days will be documented in a CR.
c. Apparent Cause Evaluations that receive an unsatisfactory CARB score will be revised and returned to GARB for re-review on a timeline determined appropriate by CARB.

Timeline will be determined commensurate with the significance of the changes required and the risk of potentially delaying any final required changes to action plan.

Corrective Action Type Corrective Action Due Date Guideline Due Date Extension (DDE) Approval

" For Cat A: < 30 days from CR categorization (including GARB approval of RCE)

" For Cat B: < 30 days from CR categorization The following DDE escalation requirements apply to any action issued in a Disposition (not including CARB approval of ACE) CR (all CA Types). Document appropriate concurrence in the DDE request 1st: Supervisor

" For Cat C: < 30 days from CR categorization 2 nd: Responsible Manager/Superintendent 3T: GMPO/Director 4 th: SVP a For Cat A, B, & C: :: 180 days from CR Note: Site VP approvalis requiredfor extensions that allow disposition of Corrective Action categorization Significant Root Causesincluding CARB approvalto extend beyond 30 days.

-- ------ Note: CARB Chairpersonapprovalrequiredfor ANY CARB approved CAPR Long Term Actions

  • As approved by GMPO/Director/Site VP related extensions Note: LTCA extensions require GMPO/Directoror Site VP approval Human Performance < 7 days (Outage < 3 days) from CRG assignment Error Review (HPER) or from error classification

29.F4 ATAHMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GuIDELINES SHEET 2 OF 3 TABLE: CORRECTIVE ACTION PRIORITY to CA TYPE PRIORITY 1 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 1 Conduct Root Cause Analysis DISP-RCA *CA&A USE ONLY** Initial disposition action for CAT A CRs 1 Corrective Action to Preclude Repetition CAPR "RCA ACTIONS ONLY** Corrective Actions to Preclude Recurrence 1 Correct Condition- Category A CAT A- CORRECT "RCA ACTIONS ONLY" Corrective Actions to address Significant Condition identified in the CAT A CRs 1 Conduct Apparent Cause Analysis DISP-ACE/HT **CA&A USE ONLY** Initial Disposition action for CAT B I _Higher Tier.

1 Conduct Apparent Cause Analysis DISP-ACEILT **CA&A USE ONLY* Initial Disposition action for CAT B I __ Lower Tier.

PRIORITY 2 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 2 Correct Contributing Cause from Category A CR CAT A-CC Corrective Actions to address the contributing causes identified in the RCA 2 :orrect Extent of Condition/Cause Category A CR CAT A-EOC Corrective Actions to address the extent of condition identified in the RCA 2 Correct Apparent Cause Category B CAT B-AC Corrective Actions that address the apparent causes identified in the B Level CR 2 Correct Original Condition Category B CAT B-CORRECT Additional Corrective Actions that address the original condition excluding those that are addressing the apparent causes.

PRIORITY 3 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 3 Correct Contributing Cause Category B CAT B-CC CA to address contributing causes identified in B level CR 3 Correct Extent of Condition Category B CAT B-EOC Corrective Actions to address the extent of condition identified in the B level CR 3 Correct or Address Condition Category C DISP-CA *CA&A USE ONLY* Initial Disposition action for Cat C CRs.

3 Correct Original Condition Category C CAT C-CORRECT Corrective Actions to address Cat C conditions

39OF4 ATAHMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION PROCESSING GUIDELINES SHEET 3 OF 3 PRIORITY 4 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 4 Actions to move issues through PCRS which CARB REVIEW CARB review is required for this CA are not corrective in nature.

4 CR CLOSURE REVIEW Used in requesting a CR closure review 4 CA QUALITY UNSAT Tracks correction of unsatisfactory CA closures..

4 HUMAN PERF Action to perform HP fact finding/HPER.

4 INPO INITIAL OE SUB INPO Initial OE Submittal 4 OCMC Provides oversight of the correction of issues identified as Operable with Compensatory Measures 4 ODMI Action to develop an ODMI Action Plan (EN-OP-111]

4 ODNC Provides oversight of the correction of issues identified as Operable but Degraded or Non-conforming 4 OPERABILITY INPUT **OPS and Licensing Use Only* Provide current or past Operability Input.

4 REGULATORY Provides oversight of issues identified as having regulatory importance.

4 UNSAT RESPONSE CA&A *CA&N/DPIC only': Tracks correction of unsatisfactory CR closures.

4 GENERAL ACTION General Actions.

4 PERIODIC REVIEW Action to complete a interim or periodic review PRIORITY 5 ACTIONS CA Priority Discussion Typical CA Types Description 5 Items meeting the definition of Enhancement ENHANCEMENT Actions that address improvement items or actions that from LI -102 (item could be tracked outside of address conditions, which meet minimum acceptable criteria.

CAP) This action should not be used to correct the originally identified adverse condition or to address an identified cause.

ATTACHMENT 9.5 ENTERGY FLEET LEARNING REVIEW PROCESS Sheet I of 2 Purpose:

The Entergy Fleet Learning process enables the sharing of condition reports (CR) identifying internal significant conditions, events or issues that warrant focused sharing with other Entergy Nuclear Fleet stations using the Internal Fleet Learning Operating Experience (OE) process.

This attachment provides the Condition Review Group (CRG) and Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) the criteria and guidance for the identification of an internal significant condition, event, or issue for processing through the Internal Fleet Learning OE process.

The CRG or CARB may identify the CR for:

a. Immediate Sharing - CRs which need to be shared in a timely manner. There should be sufficient information provided in the CR to allow other sites to understand, and if necessary, act on the condition.
b. Site Sharing - condition for which the causal analysis needs to be shared
c. Fleet Learninq - condition for which the causal analysis is significant enough to assign a Responsible Manager to review and to determine fleet impact.

This may be done by CRG during CR classification/assignment or CARB during approval review of RCAs or ACEs.

2.0 Scope

2.1 The Fleet Learning process should include, as a minimum, the following issues identified at a Entergy Nuclear Station:

  • Each Area for Improvement (AFI) from INPO Evaluations or WANO Peer Reviews.

. Each Unsat SOER / IER from INPO Evaluations or WANO Peer Reviews.

  • All Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Substantive Cross-Cutting Issues.
  • All NRC violations characterized as greater then GREEN.
  • Significant events, typically Category A CRs, as deemed appropriate by CRG or CARB. Not all Category A CRs are expected to be shared using this process, however those with particularly significant consequences should be shared.
  • Other issues identified by CRG or CARB of significance. Each Training program FINDING level issue identified by an INPO Accreditation Team, or by an Entergy Self-Assessment Team.

2.2 The Site Sharing process should include, as a minimum, any of the following issues identified at a Entergy Nuclear Station if they are not designated for Fleet Learning:

0 All green findings, violations, or traditional enforcement from the NRC.

2.3 Entergy's Condition Review Group (CRG) screens and classifies all condition reports and may select condition reports identifying internal significant condition, events or issues for internal fleet learning OE processing as immediate sharing and/or evaluation results sharing.

ATTACHMENT 9.5 ENTERGY FLEET LEARNING REVIEW PROCESS Sheet 2 of 2 2.4 Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) reviews/approvals all Root Cause Reports and selected Apparent Cause Evaluations and may also identify one of these condition reports not previously identified by CRG for internal fleet learning or Site Sharing OE processing as evaluation results sharing.

3.0 Details

3.1 Internal Fleet OE Initiation for Fleet Learning 3.1.1 Once CRG or CARB has determined that a condition report (CR) should be processed through the internal fleet learning OE process, CA&A ensures a corrective action is issued within the identified CR, to the site OE Coordinator(s) as follows:

3.1.1.1 For CRs that require "Immediate Sharing" (at CR initiation) a corrective action is issued to the OE Coordinator with a due date of <14 days, unless otherwise directed by CRG. The OE Coordinator will normally process in accordance with EN OE-100 as Code "B"- "Useful for Site Awareness".

3.1.1.2 For CRs that require "SITE SHARING" a corrective action is issued to the OE Coordinator with a due date of <60 days, unless otherwise directed by CRG or CARB. The OE Coordinator will process in accordance with EN OE-1 00.

3.1.1.3 For CRs that require "FLEET LEARNING" a corrective action is issued to the OE Coordinator with a due date of <60 days, unless otherwise directed by CRG or CARB. The OE Coordinator will process in accordance with EN OE-100 as Code "A"-"Evaluation Required A2". When closed the CA will contain the following information (provided by CRG/CARB):

  • Site subject matter expert.
  • Identity of the Responsible Manager that will support the Internal Fleet OE through issuing review actions, performing closure review and determination of aggregate impact to the fleet..

ATTACHMENT 9.6 GUIDELINES FOR CLASSIFICATION OF CRs ON LOWER LEVEL EQUIPMENT ISSUES SHEET 1 OF I NOTE: This guidance reflects typical classification for equipment conditions that do not screen as category 'A' or 'B' level CRs.

However, it does not override the CRG's authority to apply management discretion when classifying these CRs.

IYesl i Is the equipment issue an Adverse Condition?

I Lio--4 I Is the issue affecting Operability, Functionality, or Full Qualification of Safety/Quality Related Equipment?

N1o

'IF Does the issue constitute a risk to generation or an unplanned LCO?

Isth filrereatd o qupmNto eddfr mrec SIs theorfailure plan related or site security to negatively equipment affectsneededanforNRC emergency PI? -

Yes No Is the failure an operations aggregate issue or corrective maintenance? I IYes L a

I Does the issue constitute a credible Industrial Safety threat?

Yes; The identified problem is an Adverse Condition and should be screened as higher than CAT "C" when other The identified problem is not an Adverse significance guidance in this procedure is applicable.

Condition. The condition report may be Otherwise, it should be screened as Cat "C". However, if screened as CAT "D""Close Reference" the completion of the Work Order (WO) is the only action Work Request number and/or Work Order needed, then the CR may be screened as CAT "D" subject number generated for repair. Additional to the requirements of Section 5.8[6] of this procedure.

tracking per this procedure is not required.

ATTACHMENT 9.7 TYPICAL NONCONFORMANCE TAG Sheet I of 1

[ANSI N18.7 5.2.14] [ANSI N45.2.4 2.6 S1 S2]

Typical Nonconformance Tag CE Namnbw MARIPIIPNJ EquIpmunt Numbo, 10uscdwUang Nonwnnftrrrnwi 0

NONCONFORMANCE TAG 0 NONCONFORMING ITEM MAY NOT BE REMOVED WrlHOUT AUWIORIZATIO N

ATTACHMENT 9.8 CR INTERIM AND PERIODIC REVIEW FORM SHEET I OF I [SOER 10-2 REC 1]

CR Interim and Periodic Review CR Number: Category Level _ A B C CR Owner Group:

CR

Description:

CR Review: (All No responses require explanation be included.)

1. Will the Interim actions taken to date adequately address the issue until all corrective actions are complete? Yes _ No
2. Will the existing corrective actions documented in the condition report, when completed, correct the condition report issue? Yes / No
3. What is the expected CR Closure date based on remaining needed actions? DATE:
4. Determine if a new condition currently exists that potentially requires a re-evaluation of operability/functionality? Yes / No _ /N/A If the answer is Yes, then initiate a new CR to document the concern; CR #
5. Are all LI-1 02 requirements for corrective action administration and control being met, i.e.

justifications for Due Date Extensions valid, Long Term Corrective Actions identified, CARB approved CAPRs identified, and appropriate approvals obtained for all?

Yes / No

6. What activity is "preventing" the condition report from being resolved and closed?
7. What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the action plan?

Review / Approval Required:

Director/GM Title: Date:

(Print name & Position title)

NOTE: The expectation is to capture the discussion points of this form in a CA. The form itself need not be used, but all points applicable must be addressed.

ATTACHMENT 9.9 LTCA CLASSIFICATION FORM SHEET I OF I LTCA Classification Form Long Term CA Classification:

CR Number:

CR Owner Group:

CA Number: LTCA Assigned to Group:

LTCA Classification (check ONLY one):

RFOIFOIPlanned Long Mod/Design Change Req'd System/Component Outage Req'd NRC Resp. Req'd Multi-cycle Training Req'd Provide specific details for LTCA classification selected above.

What risk to plant operation is imposed by the condition identified and how is risk reduced to an acceptable level for the duration of the action plan?

Explain impact to condition report timeliness.

Review / Approval Required:

Director/GM Title: Date:

(Print name & Position title)

NOTE: The expectation is to capture the discussion points of this form in a CA, DDE request or initial CA assignment as appropriate. The form itself need not be used, but all points applicable must be addressed.

ATTACHMENT 9.10 CR ASSIGNMENT AND LIFE CYCLE PROCESS MAP SHEET I OF I 6/24/2010 CR Assignment and Life Cycle & Enfe W Yes

Doc 7.

Miller, Geoffrey From: Schaup, William Sent: Friday, May 24, 2013 8:22 AM To: Miller, Geoffrey

Subject:

FW: Requested Information Geoff I believe this is the rest of the information you requested. Any questions please call.

Enjoy your week end From: McMahan, James entergy.com

Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2013 4:14 PM To: Schaup, William Cc: BAUMAN, DAVID N; Gresh, Evan; Marks Jr, Robert

Subject:

Requested Information William, Below is the requested information. Should you need anything else next week while I am gone please contact Evan Gresh 4386 (concerning information below) or Bob Marks 4408.

1. Bigge Crane assembly start time (based on installation of pedestal column) 2/28/13 1300
2. Finish assembly 3/31/13 0049
3. Start time of lift 3/31/13 0639 James M. McMahan Sr Project Manager Arkansas Nuclear One VILEGED AND CONFIDENT Attorney/Clien -vilege onmmunication Att ey Work Pr t Pre4ared at the Direction of Legal Coun'st-,

1

Doc'9.

Baca, Bernadette From: Allen, Don Sent: Monday, June 17, 2013 10:44 AM To: Bradley, Dan; Melfi, Jim; Tindell, Brian

Subject:

FW: Region IV Drop In Agenda This is the licensee's agenda.

From: PYLE, STEPHENIE L [maifto:SPYLE~enteray.coml Sent: Monday, June 17, 2013 8:57 AM To: Allen, Don

Subject:

Region IV Drop In Agenda Region IV Drop In Visit June 18, 2013

- Introductions

- Unit 1 Status

- Core Reload

- Restoration (Electrical/Structural)

- New Stator Move

- Plant Restart

- Stator Drop RCE

- AIT

- Site Challenges/Major Mods

- Concurrent NFPA 0805 and Fukushima Mods

- Cask Transfer Facility

,8/3

JDoc 11 Melfi, Jim From: Fairbanks, Abin Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2013 9:05 AM To: Allen, Don; Melfi, Jim; Bradley, Dan; Azua, Ray; Kalyanam, Kaly Cc: Tindell, Brian; Schaup, William; Hatfield, Gloria

Subject:

ANO Stator Lift Rig Assembly Attachments: IMG_1023.jpg; IMG_1024.jpg Pictures resent.

From: Fairbanks, Abin Sent: Wednesday, June 26, 2013 8:36 AM To: Allen, Don; Melfi, Jim; Azua, Ray; Bradley, Dan; Kalyanam, Kaly Cc: Schaup, William; Hatfield, Gloria; Tindell, Brian

Subject:

ANO Stator Lift Rig Assembly The attached pictures show the vertical members (Unit 2 side of the train bay) of the Rigging International stator lift rig. Assembly of the lift rig should be complete Saturday; the stator is expected to be lifted into position on Sunday.

I

Melfi, Jim From: Tindell, Brian Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2013 8:21 AM To: Alien, Don Cc: Azua, Ray; Melfi, Jim; Bradley, Dan; Fairbanks, Abin; Willoughby, Leonard

Subject:

ANO Outage Risk Attachments: signed report.PDF Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Completed Categories: Red Category

Don, This is the overall risk assessment for the rest of the outage. It contains some information on the new stator lift.

I still plan on sending you the individual risk assessment for the stator lift when I receive it.

Thanks, Brian From: CLARK, ROBERT W rmailto:RCLARKaentergy.com)

Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2013 8:10 AM To: Tindell, Brian; Fairbanks, Abin Cc: PYLE, STEPHENIE L

Subject:

ORAT Report Good morning gentlemen. My name is Bob Clark and I work in the ANO Licensing Department. Stephenie informed me last week that you wanted to see a copy of the latest Outage Risk Assessment Team (ORAT) report. Attached is Supplement 2. This addresses the outage schedule up to and through the stator lift. This report was reviewed and approved by the OSRC yesterday and I received the approval signatures this morning. Please let me know ifyou have any questions regarding this information.

Bob Clark X4663 1

1R24 OUTAGE RISK ASSESSMENT TEAM REPORT, SUPPLEMENT 2 Approved by: 7/.?1/ 3 ANO-1 Manager, Outage Date Approved by:

ANO Manager, Operations Date

/*~6Z~- Z 257V Approved by:

ANO General Manager, Plant Operations Date OLA-2013-00065, CA 4

-PRWLV DAND CONFIDENTIAL Attorney/Client Prhtile e ;munication A ork Pro red at the Direction of Legal Counse Page 1

1R24 Outage Risk Assessment Team Report, Supplement 2 INTRODUCTION This is Supplement 2 of the ANO- I1 R24 Outage Risk Assessment Team (ORAT) report. The purpose of this revision is to document the review of a portion of the revised schedule that was developed post-stator lift assembly collapse. Supplement 1 addressed the schedule from the beginning of the reload of the core until the fuel transfer canal is scheduled to be drained. This report addresses the schedule from the end of the core reload until the refurbished stator has been lifted Into place.

This report supplements Revision 2 of the 1R24 ORAT report (OLA-2013-00059, CA 2) and Supplement 1 (OLA-2013-00065, CA 1).

Two of the original ORAT members that performed the review of this revised schedule are the same ones (Mark Gohman and Bob Clark) that performed the previous reviews of the outage schedule. The other two members (James Keys and Chip Garbe) were not able to attend this review due to vacation. Their positions were filled by Ernest Christian and Don Phillips. Both of the gentlemen meet the requirements of EN-OU-108 and OP-1015.048 for being members of the ORAT.

BACKGROUND ANO-1 Outage Management provided the schedule to the ORAT to review on June 25, 2013.

The team met June 26, 2013, to perform a review of the schedule that was provided. The calendar time shown on the schedule started at June 17, 2013, 0700 with "INSPECT BREAKERS FROM A-2 SWITCHGEAR" to August 4, 2013 at 0146 when "POWER LEVEL CHECKS" are scheduled to be performed after the unit Is operating at 100% rated thermal power. This schedule was of sufficient detail to show the relationship among the significant work activities and the availability status of safety systems.

The team limited the scope of the schedule from the beginning as noted above until the schedule showed THE REMOVAL OF THE t-Mod for temporary power to breaker A-309 switchgear A3 (July 8, 2013, 1800). This time period addresses the stator lift and the preparations for returning the electrical system back to its normal configuration only (Shutdown Operations Protection Plan (SOPP) Conditions 2, or 3).

The team believes the schedule beyond this time frame is not firm enough to perform an adequate risk assessment at this time. The ORAT recommends that it reviews the remaining schedule through the restart of the unit when the schedule is stable.

The schedule that was reviewed was of those activities that were denoted with a "Y" (activities that effect risk) in the Primavera RISK-ASSESSMENT-PRG code. Another sort of the outage schedule was provided to the ORAT. This sort was of the activities that were denoted with an "N" (activities that do not affect risk) in the RISK-ASSESSSMENT-PRG code. The logic of the schedule was the same as was previously presented in Revisions 1 and 2 of the schedule for the most part. The ORAT did review the schedule sort of activities denoted with an "N".

Page 2

The EOOS model was not required to be revised for this schedule review. The requirements of the SOPP were confirmed to be met during this time frame. This does not mean risk is at its lowest level. The SOPP provides the minimum set of equipment needed for that particular plant condition's safety function.

For the schedule period reviewed, the only period of elevated risk is during the remaining portion of the core reload and the rigging and lifting of the lift rig and stator. During which time ANO-1 will be in Acceptable Risk.

Attachment 9.1 of EN-OU-108 "Shutdown Safety Management Program (SSMP)" provides qualitative risk guidelines. Based on no protected equipment or trains being under or in the vicinity of the load path, no specific risk mitigation actions are required for the Replacement Stator Lift. As a prudency measure, however, several mitigation actions are planned and are discussed further below in this report. The plant is taking specific risk mitigation actions for the Heavy Load Lift per EN-MA-119, and OP-1005.002. Per the Qualitative Risk Evaluation itself, there is no requirement to elevate the designated risk category. All Key Safety Functions are met (Green or Minimal Risk).

Although all Key Safety Functions meet the "N+1 "philosophy during the replacement stator lift, the evolution is considered a High Risk Evolution (HRE), and per EN-OU-108, this requires the Outage Safety Status to be elevated to a non-Green status. Outage Safety Status will be elevated to "Yellow" or "Acceptable" during the replacement Stator rigging and Lift evolutions.

It should be noted that the EOOS model does not account explicitly for weather. Prior to taking any equipment out of service, the weather conditions should be considered. Typically, there are indications as to the weather conditions for the duration of the maintenance period. Ifthe plant condition is vulnerable to external factors that could increase the risk, a qualitative decision should be made to elevate the risk. Ifconditions change unexpectedly, then the plant will address this as an emergent issue (the same as would be done during online maintenance)

(COPD-024).

Procedure OP-1015.048, "Shutdown Operations Protection Plan", Revision 11 was reviewed by the ORAT and no revisions were identified during the review. No revisions to this procedure had been identified during the outage.

The methodology used in performing this review was the same as the one discussed in Revision 1 of the ORAT report. As a result of this review, comments were made by the team.

The comments and their resolutions are provided in Attachment 1.

FUEL MOVEMENT The schedule that was reviewed starts with the finishing of the core reload (SOPP Condition 3, moving into SOPP Condition 2). A review of OP-1 015.048, SOPP Condition 3 for handling of irradiated fuel Indicates that all of the required equipment needed for fuel handling to ensure that the defense In depth criteria for this evolution is met is present.

Page 3

The risk assessment of fuel movement was discussed in Supplement 1 of this report. That assessment has not changed during this time period. This is includes a discussion of the time to boil in the RCS and to reach 200 F in the spent fuel pool.

It should be noted that if the stator lift portion of the schedule is revised to an earlier time and the core reload is still progress, one of the two activities will be paused long enough to complete the other. No fuel movement in either the core or in the spent fuel pool will be allowed while the stator is being lifted and moved into place. This includes any core verification, core alignment checks or potential moves to reconfigure the spent fuel pool into a B.5.b configuration. This requirement is contained In the Operational Impact Statement associated with the stator lift.

The ROS and the fuel transfer canal will remain flooded during this time frame and both Decay Heat Removal Pumps will be in operation. This requirement is contained in the Operational Impact Statement associated with the stator lift.

RCS INVENTORY The Fuel Transfer Canal will remain flooded >390' during the Replacement Stator Rigging and Lift Evolution. This requirement is contained in the Operational Impact Statement associated with the stator lift.

CONTAINMENT CLOSURE The risk assessment of containment closure was discussed in Supplement 1 of this report. That assessment has not changed during this time period.

The fuel transfer tube isolation valve (SF-45) will be closed or the tilt pit gate will be installed prior to the lift. This requirement is contained in the Operational Impact Statement associated with the stator lift.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS The time period in question addresses the stator lift and what is called the preparation phase of the electrical system recovery plan.

During this review, HREs were identified. They were coded into the schedule. During the review, the HREs were identified and then justified. The lift and moving of the stator and moving of the stator lift system are considered to be HREs.

These are Heavy Load Lifts. Table 3 of Attachment 9.1 of EN-OU-108 provides possible risk mitigation actions. Compensatory risk mitigation actions are contained in EN-MA-1 19, Material Handling Program. These lifts will be addressed in IPTE briefs and will contain compensatory measures to limit risk.

Some of the contingencies that Operations Is performing include:

  • Requirement to ensure hydrogen isolated to the train bay at locations far away from the train bay prior to lift. Requirement to isolate firewater to the train bay.

Page 4

" NO personnel in the control room extension during lift (upstairs or downstairs).

" For Unit 2 only, an extra RO and SRO stationed in at least Control Room during lift.

  • Communicators in the control rooms.
  • Alternate shutdown contingencies taken for Unit 2 prior to restricting access to control room via normal path (equipment removed from extension and in possession of watchstanders).

" Only personnel involved with lift on 386 elevation of Unit 2 Turbine Deck with watches /

postings at entrances to turbine deck due to the potential impact to an 1800 rpm turbine (flying debris/shrapnel).

  • Unit 2 crew review SPTA's and LOOP prior to stator lift.

" Uft to not occur during shift change. Specific permission to perform lift obtained from both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Shift Managers immediately prior to lift. If delays are encountered that would stretch lift across turnover time of the Operations crew or rigging crew, the lift will be delayed until adequate time is obtained to perform lift.

OFFSITE POWER SU 1 is currently out of service. The ORAT reviewed the aspect of SU 1 being out of service in detail and concluded there is no additional risk based on SU 1 being out of service. The cabling from SU 2 does not run through or under the travel path of the stator and both diesel generators are available ifneeded.

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING It was identified that during the stator drop event that ANO-1 lost Instrument Air due to damaged air lines. While the lines that were damaged have not been restored yet, a crosstie header between Unit 1 and Unit 2 exists in the northern portion of the Trainbay that was not impacted during the stator drop, but was in close proximity. Loss of Instrument Air on Unit 1 will result 11h in the loss of[jrei] remote indication of Spent Fuel Pool Level in the Control Room, and closure of ICW cross-tie valves that may impact ICW cooling to the Spent Fuel Coolers. To address these potential issues, local monitoring of the SFP level will always be possible, and the Control Room will be briefed on ICW pump manipulations if necessary to ensure adequate ICW flow is provided to the Spent Fuel Coolers.

Loss of Instrument Air on Unit 2 would ultimately result in a Plant Shutdown. Unit 2 has multiple means of isolating Instrument Air from Unit 1 including local and remote isolation capability that are not in proximity of the stator lift area.

The ORAT has reviewed the restraints listed in PCRS. Current there are no restraints associated with the evaluated time period.

The ORAT has reviewed the resolution to the issues identified during this review.

Page 5

The team concludes the schedule that was presented to it has been optimized to reduce risk and provides for a safe outage Page 6

ATTACHMENT I 1R24 ISSUES REQUIRING RESOLUTION (OLA-2013-00065, CA 3)

1. The stator lift as shown in the schedule does not match up with the summary provided by Project Management. The summary discussion has the lift being performed early compared to the schedule.

The schedule has been revised.

2. The sequence of activities associated with the stator lift appeared to be out of order.

The schedule has been revised.

3. Provide a hard tie In the schedule to prevent the preparation phase of the recovery efforts associated with the electrical distribution system from being performed In parallel with the stator lift.

Activity 30768, Set Generator on Foundation, has been tied as a predecessor to activity Al 150, De-energize A-3.

Activities A2190, A2200 and A2210 have been tied as successors to setting the generator stator.

Page 7

M-elf i, Jim From: Tindell, Brian Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2013 10:50 AM To: Allen, Don Cc: Fairbanks, Abin; Azua, Ray; Bradley, Dan; Melfi, Jim; Willoughby, Leonard

Subject:

ANO Stator Risk Assessment Part 2 Attachments: Operational Impact.doc

Don, FYI - this is the other piece of the risk assessment. We are taking a risk assessment baseline inspection sample for this.
Thanks, Brian From: CLARK, ROBERT W [mallto: RCLARKDentergv.com]

Sent: Tuesday, July 02, 2013 10:45 AM To: Tindell, Brian Cc: PYLE, STEPHENIE L

Subject:

Requested Information I believe this is what you requested. I would like to note that it is signed and what you pull up with the Work Order. The Work Order itself is not "ready", so it could change depending on the review of it at the Critical Evolution Meeting today. Operations has told me that ifthey make any changes to the document that they will provide you with a copy of the revised document. Please let me know if this is not what you were looking for and I will continue my search.

Bob Clark X 4663 1

EN-WM-105 Attachment 9.3 OPERATIONAL IMPACT Technical Specifications YES I"] NO Is there a reactivity impact?

YES [-] NO Potential reactivity impact to Unit 2 should the lift system fail; up to and including Rx trip.

Potential SystemlComponent Effects?

YES ] NO I-This impact statement covers the last stage of crane construction ( placing the runway and trolley on the supports ) and the stator lift and placement.

Potential damage to both units non vital switchgear should the lift system fail at any point during construction and lift.

Actual or Potential Contingency Measures Required?

YES [E NO' See risk assessment below.

Is there a potential for a loss of offsite power?:

YES Z NO D Potential damage to both units non vital switchgear should the lift system fail. This could include offsite power sources. Unit 1 is not as vulnerable since power is being supplied by the temporary switchgear in the transformer yard.

Is power reduction required?

YES [:1 NO Z Infrequently Performed Tests or Evolutions? (IPTE) (EN-OP-116)

YES Z NO 7 IPTE briefing will be performed prior to the stator lift. Contact RCC for date and time.

Risk Model Affected? List Components YES Z NO 1D See risk assessment below.

STATOR LIFT RISK ASSESSMENT THIS TASK IS RELATED TO THE USE OF A MOBILE CRANE.

Completed on 11/22/2013 Page 1 of 4

EN-WM-105 Attachment 9.3 COPD-024 Attachment 9 Should be used to determine potential risk for crane activity which could impact Q/F/S equipment/structures.

If a mobile crane is required to assist in staging material then verify risk assessment has been performed.

If an extend a boom lift is required in the Train Bay to assist in staging material then verify risk assessment has been performed.

MOBILE CRANE USED FOR:

Stator lift from the train bay and placement on the Unit 1 turbine deck. This assessment includes setting I removal of the runway and trolley system of the crane on the turbine deck.

Information

  • If crane use will be in the switchyard or transformer yard, refer to additional requirements in 1015.033 (Switchyard Controls) and EN IS 123 (Electrical Safety).
  • If crane use will be under high voltage lines, refer to additional requirements in EN IS 123 (Electrical Safety).
  • Crane risk assessments must be evaluated for crane movement near risk significant components in addition to when the crane is actively involved in lifting loads (this includes setting counter weights, crane load cell testing, etc.).
  • Crane boom radius is the distance the boom is expected to travel during the course of the crane activity. For example, ifthe crane has a boom that can extend to 50 ft, but will only be extended 25 ft for the lift, then the distance assumed in the risk assessment would be 25 ft.
  • Mobile Crane Risk Assessments are applicable in ALL modes.
  • EOOS risk assessments are performed to determine potential risk ifthe crane were to damage plant equipment. This information is used to determine restrictions on crane use. Plant equipment is not made unavailable by crane use unless it is actually damaged.
  • If no Q/F/S equipment/structures could be impacted, then crane use may be authorized and only page 2 performed.
  • Consider the consequences on plant/switchyard equipment when moving heavy equipment not only reaches the intended destination.
  • The use of Genie Manlifts and bucket trucks for personnel access only does not require a mobile crane risk assessment. The use of other types of vehicles will require mobile crane risk assessments until determined otherwise.

Risk Assessment 1.0 Refer to Attachment 2 Table 9 for performing risk assessment for crane use.

2.0 Based on assessment performed, list any limitations on crane use and document these limitations on page 2 of this attachment.

ATTACHMENT 9 Page 2 of 2 MOBILE CRANE RISK ASSESSMENT Instructions (only perform if crane usage allowed)

  • Notify affected unit Shift Manager of proposed crane activity and limitations.
  • If dual unit impact, such as SU#2 or Fire Water for Unit 1 intake structure, ensure both control rooms are notified.

Ensure crane operator has a copy of this page.

Completed on 11/22/2013 Page 2 of 4

EN-WM-105 Attachment 9.3 If crane operation will commence within 24 hours1 days <br />0.143 weeks <br />0.0329 months <br />, then communicate completion of risk assessment to SM.

  • Contact name and contact number of responsible person for crane use:
  • Records retention is not required.

Risk Assessment Performed by: Mike Fields / Steve Wolfe 7-01-13/1200 (Signature) (Date/Time)

Crane Operator Instructions and additional Unit 1 and 2 items; Crane Location: Crane location will be on the turbine deck spanning the train bay.

Unit 1:

0 Crane erection on the turbine deck poses no additional risk to unit one other than potential equipment damage should a heavy component fall.

0 Prior to lifting the stator, all unit 1 emergency diesels must be operable and Startup #2 must be operable.

0 Temporary switch gear supplying A3 and A4 as well as other auxiliaries via Startup #1 or Startup #2 transformers during stator lift.

  • Unit 1Control Room access will be via the north Unit 2 control room door or the South Unit 1 Control Room door depending on danger flagging while the large cross beams are being lifted into place and during stator lift and set. This requirement may be modified with Unit 1 /2 shift manager permission.

9 All unnecessary personnel on elevation 386' and below on the north and south sides of the train bay shall remain clear of the areas during the stator lift and cross beam ( runway ) placement.

  • Outage Risk will be elevated to Yellow or will be as dictated by the ORAT during stator lift.
  • The RCS and the Fuel Transfer Canal will remain flooded >390' during stator lift.
  • Both DH Removal Pumps will remain in Operation during stator lift.
  • Both SFP Cooling Trains will remain in Operation including two ICW pumps in service during stator lift.

The Fuel Transfer Tube Isolation valve (SF-45) will be closed or the tilt pit gate installed prior to the lift.

No Fuel Movement in either the core or in the spent fuel pool while the stator is being lifted and moved into place. This includes any core verification, core alignment checks or potential moves to reconfigure the Spent Fuel Pool into a B.5.b configuration.

Unit 2:

Prior to lifting and setting the long cross beams and during the stator lift, Unit 2 will be in Yellow Acceptable risk PSI 9.3 both the swyd slider bar (Offsite power availability COPD-024 table 5) and Rx trip bar (Heavy load COPD-024 table 9) slider bars slide to high risk No other trip initiator / event mitigator maintenance activities should be performed while the cross beams are set and during stator lift and set.

All unnecessary personnel on elevation 386' and below on the north and south sides of the train bay shall remain clear of the areas during cross beam placement and stator lift.

Completed on 11/22/2013 Page 3 of 4

EN-WM-105 Attachment 9.3 Prior to lifting the stator, all unit 2 emergency diesels must be operable and Startup #2/3 must be operable.

  • The AAC diesel generator must be operable prior to stator lift as well.
  • Unit 2 Control Room access will be via the north Unit 2 control room door while the large cross beams are being lifted into place and during stator lift and set. This requirement may be modified with Unit 1 /2 shift manager permission.
  • Disable turbine high vibration trip prior to setting large cross beams on the turbine deck.
  • Alternate shutdown contingencies taken for Unit 2 prior to restricting access to control room via normal path (equipment removed from extension and in possession of watchstanders).

Both 2P-40NB Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps will be in service. (Time to boil as of 6/28/13 is approximately 24 hours1 days <br />0.143 weeks <br />0.0329 months <br />; Initial SFP temp = 117.5 degrees).

Unit 2 crew review SPTA's and LOOP prior to stator lift.

Common Unit Items:

  • Firewater in the train bay isolated.
  • NO personnel in the control room extension during lift (upstairs or downstairs).
  • Extra RO and SRO stationed in at least U2 Control Room during lift.
  • Communicators in the control rooms during the lift.
  • Only personnel involved with lift on 386 elevation of Unit 2 Turbine Deck with watches I postings at entrances to turbine deck due to the potential impact to an 1800 rpm turbine (flying debris/shrapnel).

Lift to not occur during shift change. Specific permission to perform lift obtained from both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Shift Managers immediately prior to lift. If delays are encountered that would stretch lift across turnover time of the Operations crew or rigging crew, the lift will be delayed until adequate time is obtained to perform lift.

No discretionary Switchyard Maintenance will be allowed.

  • Abide by the risk assessment limitations below (otherwise, N/A):
  • The crane operator will operate the crane in accordance with approved procedures.

When mobile cranes are not in use they should be parked in their designated parking area north of the Central Support Building (CSB).

A spotter with an orange vest should be used when moving mobile cranes inside the Protected Area.

When the crane is not attended, then the crane boom shall be secured in the cradle. Locate the boom and hook to avoid inadvertent contact with other equipment that may drive by the crane.

Mobile Crane keys are issued from the Control Room.

When Mobile Crane scope of work which was authorized by the Shift Manager is complete return the key back to the Control Room.

Additional requirements can be found in EN MA 119, Material Handling Program.

Completed on 11/22/2013 Page 4 of 4

Doc 201 Melfi, Jim From: Tindell, Brian Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 8:10 AM To: Willoughby, Leonard; Melfi, Jim; Bradley, Dan; Azua, Ray; Fairbanks, Abin

Subject:

FW: ANO Stator Lift Attachments: contingencies.docx FYI From: CLARK, ROBERT W [3]

Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 7:54 AM To: Tindell, Brian; Allen, Don Cc: JAMES, DALE E; PYLE, STEPHENIE L

Subject:

ANO Stator Lift Good morning gentlemen.

Attached is a list of the prerequisites, contingencies, and other actions needed to support the stator lift. This consolidated list was developed pulled this from the Outage Risk Assessment Team (ORAT) report, the Engineering Change associated with the stator lift and the Operational Impact Statement. If you have any questions concerning this information, please let me know.

Bob Clark 479 858 4663 I

PREREQUISITES/PRECAUTIONS/CONTINGENCIES:

The following activities have been identified as recommended actions to be completed prior to lifting the stator from the transporter in the Unit 1 Turbine Building train bay. These requirements also apply to activities associated with lifting and placing the runway girder/trolley assembly.

PREREQUISITES/PRECAUTIONS/CONTINGENCIES TRACKING TOOL Verify with Operations that required powers sources are available / operable.

Verify that firewater to the train bay is isolated Verify the hydrogen system is isolated at the hydrogen house as required by Operations Verify that Operations has stationed operators outside the Control Room as needed Conduct IPTE brief in accordance with EN-OP-1 16 prior to any work activities Coordinate with Unit 1 and Unit 2 Operations prior to any lifts to ensure Operations compensatory measures are in place Before the stator is lifted, advise the Unit 2 Control Room to consider disabling the Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation (TSI) to prevent turbine trip in the-unlikely event that the lifting evolution creates vibration Prior to use, verify rigging system equipment meets the requirements EN-MA-11 9-01 Establish personnel access controls in the lift area. As a minimum, the boundaries should be established in the area east of column line 6, north of Unit I Turbine Building column line F, and south of Unit 2 Turbine Building column line B2 for all elevations including the Control Room Extension Facility. Prior to any lifting, all personnel who are not required to support the rigging activities shall be removed from these areas.

Walkways just east of column line 6 may be established for access to CA-i, CA-2, Control Rooms, etc. These requirements also apply while lifting and placing the runway girder/trolley assembly. The "bowling alley" may remain open Ensure Entergy review and approval of Sarens lifting procedures is completed prior to use Notify Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms

Verify that no movement activated fuel is in progress or planned for the duration of the lift Conduct a pre-job brief for all personnel necessary to start work Verify all necessary equipment is properly staged and is ready for use Verify stator is in correct position and orientation in the train bay Verify there are no high wind conditions forecast for the scheduled lifting operation. If sustained winds are forecast to exceed 20 mph, consult project Design Engineering for additional guidance. Conducting lifts with winds in excess of 20 mph in the train bay is expressly prohibited by this EC Verify good housekeeping practices are in place prior to lifting operations Verify Entergy has approved all changes (if any) to equipment and rigging plan Stage/issue fall protection as needed to support lifting operations Verify that all aspects of the lift meet or exceed the applicable requirements provided in EN-MA-1 19 The Fuel Transfer Canal will remain flooded >390' during the Replacement Stator Rigging and Lift Evolution.

The fuel transfer tube isolation valve (SF-45) will be closed or the tilt pit gate will be installed prior to the lift.

Prior to lifting the stator, all unit 1 and unit 2 emergency diesels must be operable and Startup

  1. 2 must be operable Temporary switch gear supplying A3 and A4 as well as other auxiliaries via Startup #1 or Startup #2 transformers during stator lift.

Unit 1 Control Room access will be via the north Unit 2 control room door or the South Unit 1 Control Room door depending on danger flagging while the large cross beams are being lifted into place and during stator lift and set. This requirement may be modified with Unit 1 /2 shift manager permission.

Unit 2 Control Room access will be via the north Unit 2 control room door while the large cross beams are being lifted into place and during stator lift and set. This requirement may be modified with Unit 1 /2 shift manager permission

All unnecessary personnel on elevation 386' and below on the north and south sides of the train bay shall remain clear of the areas during the stator lift and cross beam (

runway) placement Both DH Removal Pumps will remain in Operation during stator lift Both SFP Cooling Trains will remain in Operation including two ICW pumps in service during stator lift.

Unit 2 only - No other trip initiator I event mitigator maintenance activities should be performed while the cross beams are set and during stator lift and set.

The AAC diesel generator must be operable prior to stator lift as well Alternate shutdown contingencies taken for Unit 2 prior to restricting access to control room via normal path (equipment removed from extension and in possession of watchstanders).

Both 2P-40AB Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps will be in service Unit 2 crew review SPTA's and LOOP prior to stator lift NO personnel in the control room extension during lift (upstairs or downstairs).

Extra RO and SRO stationed in at least U2 Control Room during lift Communicators in the control rooms during the lift An Assistant Operations Manager in the Control Room envelope Lift to not occur during shift change. Specific permission to perform lift obtained from both Unit 1 and Unit 2 Shift Managers immediately prior to lift. If delays are encountered that would stretch lift across turnover time of the Operations crew or rigging crew, the lift will be delayed until adequate time is obtained to perform lift.

No discretionary Switchyard Maintenance will be allowed

The following instructions apply during lifting operation of the stator from the transporter in the Unit I Turbine Building train bay.

PREREQUISITES/PRECAUTIONS/CONTINGENCIES DOCUMENTED COMPLETE Movement the stator is only permitted in one direction. I.e., raising/lowering, sliding trolley, side-shifting, and rotating the stator shall not be performed simultaneously.

Only one movement activity may be performed at any given time during lifting operations.

Horseshoe shims shall be installed and removed on the main trolley lifting jacks during raising and lowering operations. The maximum permitted gap between the bottom of the yoke and top of the shims is 2" When the stator is first lifted, conduct a 5 minute hold to verify all rigging is in good order Sufficient spotters shall be positioned to identify any potential impacts with the nearby SSCs Prior to and immediately after lifting of the stator'(during the 5-minute hold period) from the KAMAG SPMT, surveys shall be done to make sure that the displacements at both ends of the top of the long-bent column girders are less than that were measured during the load test. This will verify plumbness and levelness of the long bent columns and girder and that there are no anomalies at the start of the lift The following instructions apply to activities associated with installing and removing the runway girder/trolley assembly.

PREREQUISITES/PRECAUTIONS/CONTINGENCIES DOCUMENTED COMPLETE Movement the runway girder/trolley assembly is only permitted in one direction. L~e.,

raising/lowering or traveling the runway girder/trolley assembly shall not be performed simultaneously. Only one movement activity may be performed at any given time during lifting operations When the runway girder/trolley assembly is first lifted, conduct a 5 minute hold to verify all rigging is in good order

Sufficient spotters shall be positioned to identify any potential impacts with the nearby SSCs I

iDoc 21 Melfi, Jim From: Melfi, Jim Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 8:58 AM To: Azua, Ray; Bradley, Dan; Allen, Don; Tindell, Brian Cc: Melfi, Jim; Fairbanks, Abin; Young, Matt

Subject:

ANO Status 7/3/2013 ANO Unit 1 : Mode: 6/ Risk:

TS Action Statements: N/A Events/conditions of interest SFP Temp 97 F; TT 20OF - 29.1 hours0.0417 days <br />0.00595 weeks <br />0.00137 months <br />; RCS Temp 94F; TTB 19.4 hours0.167 days <br />0.0238 weeks <br />0.00548 months <br /> RCS Level 400 Feet.

Day 101 of the outage. Green Train Protected. Both SFP trains inservice.

A3 is de-energizedfor a cable pull, which means I OHR pump (P34A) out. Switchgear Recovery efforts ongoing. S/U 1 work.

ANO Unit 2 Mode: 1 / 100% Power Risk:

TS Action Statements: No short term LCOs Planned Maintenanceand Surveillances.

Condition(s) of interest:

Stator move date slipped a little. Licensee believes that stator lift will be on Saturday (Maybe).

Because of NRC concerns the alternate shutdown capability, they have a continuous firewatch established in the Control

,* Room until further notice. AA

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 1 of 17 ATTACHMENT 9.6 TEST PROCEDURE COVER SHEET Sheet 1 of I TEST COVER SHEET TEST TYPE: Z ECT Procedure MD ECT WO El STI Procedure Page 1 of 17 TEST #: 44312-01 REV. #: 0 Quality Class: OR ED NOR O

TEST TITLE: A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing. Miscellaneous Controls j'.

REVIEW (PrintlSignlDate) 1-,71211 1 Test Engineer (TE): Susan Mitchell / Vfi/ 1-/ /

Technical Reviewer: Alan Smith CROSS-DISCIPLINE REVIEW O p e ra t io n s De p a rtm e nt: Org a niz ati on M~aint"enancPJ4*f* / Organization  :/

Organization L. Organization Organization Or ion ADDITIONAL STI (ONLY) PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT.& A) 1A ----

EN-LI-100 Review: ached Other 10CFR50.59 Evaluation: -0N uired [0 Attached 0l Other OSRO Approval ~ot Required Mtg No. Date: Chairman:

APPROVAL(Print/Sign/Date)

TE Supervisor: ,,'*"¢. /, f' {.'v'-* * .(*/J:

TEST COMPLETION REVIEW /AC~gfTANCE f Summary of Test Results:

Responsible Engineer (RE)*:

Test Engineer (TE): /

Technical Reviewer /

TE Supervisor: I

  • Ifrequired for confirmation of assumptions made in the development of the EC.

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 2 of 17 Table of Contents 1.0 Obiectives ................................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 References ................................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 Test Equipment ........................................................................................................................... 4 4.0 Precautions and Lim itations ................................................................................................... 4 5.0 Prerequlsltes ............................................................................................................................... 4 6.0 Instrumentation ........................................................................................................................... 5 7.0 Test Instructions ......................................................................................................................... 5 7.1 Cable A104E2 (E-79-2) ................................................................................................ 5 7.2 Cable A105M wires 18 and 20 and cable A105N wires 17 and 20.(E-306-1) ................ 6 7.3 Cable A106M wires 17 and 20 and cable A106N wires 18 and 20 (E-306-3) ................ 7 7.4 Cable A107D wires 29, 31, 2P, and 21 and cable A107K wires 2P and 29 (E-304-1) ........ 8 7.5 Cables 1302K1, wires 9 and 10 (E-386-1) ................................................................... 10 7.6 Cables 1302M1, wires BA1 and 8A2 (E-386-1) ............................................................ 10 8.0 Restoration ................................................................................................................................ 11 9.0 Test Results and Evaluation ................................................................................................ 11 10.0 M&TE Instrumentation ........................................................................................................ 12 11.0 Summ ary Inform ation .......................................................................................................... 13 12.0 Attachments: ............................................................................................................................. 14 12.1 EN-DC-117 Attachment 9.11 - Signature Identification Log ....................................... 14 12.2 EN-DC-117 Attachment 9.9-Test Log ..................................................................... 14 12.3 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.10- Test Deficiency Log .................................................. 14 12.4 Test Change Notices ................................................................................................... 14

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 3 of 17 1.0 Oblectives 1.1 This ECT provides functional testing of Switchgear A-1, miscellaneous controls associated with breakers A-1 02 through A-1 10 and A-1 14 through A-1 16. Testing is being performed as a result of reconstruction due to damage which occurred during the ANO-1 Stator Drop Event.

1.2 Testing performed per this ECT will be done with BUS A-1 AND BUS A-2 DE-ENERGIZED.

1.3 This testing does not include system or performance testing of the loads supplied by A-i.

2.0 References 2.1 EC-44312, A-1 SWITCHGEAR CHILD EC, STATOR RECONSTRUCTION 2.2 EN-DC-117, Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions 2.3 E-4 Sh. 1, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram, 4160 Volt System, Main Supply 2.4 E-76 Sh. 1, Schematic Diagram, Typical Circuit Breaker 6900V & 4160V Switchgear 2.5 E-79 Sh. 2, Schematic Diagram, Typical Internal Wiring Diagram, Load Center Trans. Fdr. Protection 2.6 E-93 Sh. 2, Schematic Diagram, Switchgear Bus Lockout and Undervoltage Relays 2.7 E-104 Sh. 2 Schematic Diagram Load Center Transformer X1 4 Feeder A-1 04 2.8 E-304 Sh. 1, Schematic Diagram, Heater Drain Pumps 2.9 E-306 Sh. 2, Schematic Diagram, Condensate Pump P2B 2.10 E-386 Sh. 1, Schematic Diagram, Sodium Bromide/Sodium Hypochlorite, Control Panel C165 2.11 E-505 Sh. 2, Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (Non-ES), Units A108 through A104 2.12 E-505 Sh. 4, Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (Non-ES), Units A201 through A205 2.13 E-507 Sh. 7, Connection Diagram, Load Center B14, Transformer X14 2.14 *E-531 Sh. 42, Connection Diagram, Terminal Boxes 2.15 E-560 Sh. 1, Connection Diagram, Main Control Panel C20, Plant Protective Relay & Gen Recorder BDS 2.16 E-572 Sh. 5, Connection Diagram, Control Panel C30 2.17 E-582 Sh. 1, Connection Diagram, Control Panel C165 2.18 M-201-110 Wiring Diagram for Balance of Plant Relay Control Panel C30 2.19 VP E-8-AC-83 Sh. 2, Metalclad Switchgear Connection Diagram (Unit A104) 2.20 VP E-8-AC-89, Metalclad Switchgear Connection Diagram (Units A204, A205, A206, A207, A208) 2.21 VP E-8-AC-94, Metalclad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram (Units Al 10, A109, A108 & A107)

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 4 of 17 2.22 VP E-8-AC-95, Metalclad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram (Units A106, A105, A104 & A103) 2.23 VP E-8-AC-98, Metalclad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram (Units A205, A206, A207 & A208) 2.24 VP E-8-AC-161, Metalclad Switchgear Connection Diagram (Units Al 05, Al 06, A107, A108, A114) 2.25 VP 223955 Sh. 1, Dwg. Notes-New Chiller Load Center B14 2.26 VP 223955 Sh. 2, XFMR Dimensions- New Chiller Load Center B14 2.27 VP M-47-68 Sh. 2, Internal Wiring Diagram, Control Panel C1 65 2.28 WO 354186, A-1 Miscellaneous Controls, Dead Bus Functional Testing 3.0 Test EpuiDment 3.1 Multi-meter 3.2 Temporary test jumpers with switch and configured for attachment so that terminals do not need to be disturbed to insert jumper.

3.3 Wrench for manual operation of the STA switch.

4.0 Precautions and Limitations 4.1 Circuit Breakers associated with this testing have high levels of potential energy. Exercise caution when working in the area if equipment is energized.

4.2 All testing shall be done with the A-1 and A-2 buses DE-ENERGIZED.

4.3 Test steps shall be performed in order unless authorized by the Test Engineer and the sequence change documented in the Test Log.

4.4 Any leads lifted or jumpers installed shall be controlled using a Lifted Lead and Jumper Sheet.

4.5 All M&TE equipment used during testing shall be recorded in section 10.0.

4.6 All personnel performing test steps in this ECT shall complete the appropriate sections of the Signature Identification Log in section 12.0.

4.7 The Test Engineer or designee shall maintain the Test Log In Section 12.0 per the requirements of EN-DC-1 17, Section 5.2 111](b).

4.8 All test discrepancies shall be documented in the Test Deficiency Log in Section 12.0, including evaluation and resolution of each discrepancy.

4.9 The Test Engineer shall provide a post-test summary, including evaluation of test results, in Section 11.0.

5.0 Prerequisites 5.1 Verify that affected A-1 connection diagrams have been yellow-lined or as-built as required.

5.2 Verify A-1 switchgear inspection complete satisfactory lAW OP-1416.001 and PMs are current.

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 5 of 17 5.3 Verify that the Implementing Field Supervisor has signed the Return to Service Forms and verified A-1 is ready for testing.

5.4 Verify that the A-1 Testing Work Order Task for this test has been authorized.

5.5 Perform a Pre-test Brief per EN-DC-117, Attachment 9.12, Pre-Test Briefing Guidelines.

5.6 Verify A-1 is available and has control power available.

5.7 Verify A-205 is available for handswitch manipulation.

5.8 Ensure that test personnel are on the appropriate Clearances as required.

6.0 Instrumentation 6.1 No instrumentation is required.

7.0 Test Instructions 7.1 Cable A104E2, Load Center X14 Protection (E-79-2) 7.1.1 Verify 4160 V Fused Disconnect Switch S-14 is tagged OPEN.

7.1.2 Verify B14 supply breaker to B87 Tagged Open.

7.1.3 Cable A104E2, wires 2P and 9.

7.1.3.1 Verify DC control power, 4160 Volt Switchgear Al (D11-03) available.

7.1.3.2 Verify A-104 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located inside A-104 Cabinet CLOSED.

7.1.3.3 Verify fuses UB, UC, UR, UT located inside A-104 Cabinet ON.

7.1.3.4 Verify Breaker A-104 is RACKED UP or in the test position.

7.1.3.5 Close Breaker A-104 using local control switch.

7.1.3.6 Manually actuate the 51 G/B14 (neutral ground) relay located in B14.

Reference VP 223955 sh. 1 & 2.

7.1.3.6.1 Check A-104 breaker trips.

7.1.3.6.2 Check 51G/B14 relay target operates.

7.1.3.7 Reset the relay target indicator.

7.1.4 Cable A104E2, wires 11 and 12 (E-79-2).

7.1.4.1 Verify Breaker A-104 is RACKED DOWN.

7.1.4.2 OPEN A-104 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located inside A-104 Cabinet.

7.1.4.3 In A-104, lift the internal wire landed at TB BB terminal 12, opposite cable A104E2 Green wire. Reference E-8-AC-83 & E-505 sh. 2.

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 6 of 17 7.1.4.3.1 In A-104, verify continuity on the internal side of TB BB through terminals 11 and 12.

7.1.4.4 At B14, Unit A, lift internal wire 12 at TB TC, opposite cable A104E2 Green wire. Reference E-507-7.

7.1.4.4.1 In A-104, verify no continuity on the internal side of TB BB through terminals 11 and 12.

7.1.4.5 At B14, re-term wire 12 at TB TC.

7.1.4.5.1 In A-104, verify continuity on the internal side of TB BB through terminals 11 and 12.

7.1.4.6 At B14, install jumper with momentary test switch from TB TB wire #10 to TB TC wire #11 on terminal 5 opposite cable Al 04E2 Red wire.

Reference E-507 sh. 7.

7.1.4.6.1 CLOSE A-104 DC breaker BA NOTE Do Not hold the test jumper closed longer than 3 seconds to prevent possible damage to the lockout relay coil.

7.1.4.6.2 Momentarily close test jumper switch in B14.

7.1.4.6.2.1 Check lockout relay 86FP on A-104 trips.

7.1.4.6.3 Reset lockout relay 86FP 7.1.4.7 OPEN A-104 DC breaker BA.

7.1.4.8 Remove jumper with momentary test switch from B14.

7.1.4.9 In A-104, re-term wire at TB BB terminal 12.

7.1.4.10 In A-104 CLOSE DC breaker BA unless otherwise directed by UI Operations.

7.2 Cable A105M wires 18 and 20 and cable A105N wires 17 and 20, P2A Auto Start Aux Relays.(E-306-1)

NOTE GE HGAI1 control relay CR-A105 in C30 will require its plastic cover be removed to visually check whether the relay is picked up or not picked up. Reference V/P M-201 -101 and M-201 -110 for location of relay.

7.2.1 If relays CR-A105 or CR-A106 in C30 have plastic covers installed, then remove covers.

7.2.2 Verify A-105 breaker RACKED DOWN.

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 7 of 17 7.2.3 Verify A-105 DC control power breaker BA CLOSED 7.2.4 Verify fuses UB, UC, UR, UT located inside A-105 Cabinet in the ON position.

7.2.5 Verify A-106 breaker RACKED DOWN.

7.2.6 Verify A-106 DC control power Breaker BA OPEN.

7.2.7 Verify A-205 is RACKED DOWN.

7.2.8 Verify A-205 DC control power Breaker BA OPEN.

7.2.9 Verify P-8A Heater Drain Pump (A-107) handswitch HS-2808 on C12 in Normal-After-Stop or Pull-To-Lock position.

7.2.10 Verify P-8B Heater Drain Pump (A-207) handswitch HS-2810 on C12 in Normal-After-Stop or Pull-To-Lock position.

7.2.11 Take P-2A handswitch HS-2886 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.12 Take P-2B handswitch HS-2893 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.13 Take P-2C handswitch HS-2897 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.13.1 Visually check relay CR-A105 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up. Reference M201-110.

7.2.14 Take P-2B handswitch HS-2893 on C02 to START and release.

7.2.14.1 Visually check relay CR-Al05 in C30 Pan 0 picked up.

7.2.15 Take P-2B handswitch HS-2893 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.15.1 Visually check relay CR-A105 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up.

7.2.16 Take P-2C handswitch HS-2897 on C02 to START and release.

7.2.16.1 Visually check relay CR-Al 05 in C30 Pan 0 picked up.

7.2.17 Take P-2C handswitch HS-2897 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.17.1 Visually check relay CR-A105 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up.

7.3 Cable Al06M wires 17 and 20 and cable AlO6N wires 18 and 20, P2C Auto Start Aux Relays. (E-306-3)

NOTE GE HGA1 1 control relay CR-A106 in C30 will require its plastic cover be removed to visually check whether the relay is picked up or not picked up. Reference V/P M-201 -101 and M-201 -110 for location of relay.

7.3.1 Verify A-105 breaker RACKED DOWN.

7.3.2 Verify A-105 DC control power Breaker BA OPEN.

7.3.3 Verify A-1 06 breaker RACKED DOWN.

7.3.4 Verify A-106 DC control power breaker BA CLOSED 7.3.5 Verify fuses UB, UC, UR, UT located inside A-106 Cabinet in the ON position.

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 8 of 17 7.3.6 Verify A-205 breaker RACKED DOWN.

7.3.7 Verify A-205 DC control power Breaker BA OPEN.

7.3.8 Verify P-8A Heater Drain Pump (A-107) handswitch HS-2808 on C12 in Normal.

After-Stop or Pull-To-Lock position.

7.3.9 Verify P-8B Heater Drain Pump (A-207) handswitch HS-2810 on C12 in Normal-After-Stop or Pull-To-Lock position.

7.3.10 Take P-2A handswitch HS-2886 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.3.11 Take P-2B handswitch HS-2893 on C02 to STOP and release, 7.3.12 Take P-2C handswitch HS-2897 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.3.12.1 Visually check relay CR-A106 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up. Reference M201-110.

7.3.13 Take P-2A handswitch HS-2886 on C02 to START and release.

7.3.13.1 Visually check relay CR-A106 in C30 Pan 0 picked up.

7.3.14 Take P-2A handswitch HS-2886 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.3.14.1 Visually check relay CR-A106 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up.

7.3.15 Take P-2B handswitch HS-2893 on C02 to START and release.

7.3.15.1 Visually check relay CR-A106 in C30 Pan 0 picked up.

7.3.16 Take P-2B handswitch HS-2893 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.3.16.1 Visually check relay CR-A106 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up.

7.3.17 If covers for relays CR-A 05 or CR-Al 06 were removed for this test, then reinstall covers.

7.4 Cable Al 07D wires 29, 31, 2P, and 21 and cable Al 07K wires 2P and 29, Heater Drain Pump P8A Start and Stop (E-304-1)

NOTE Test Switch TS-286T-1 is the last two test switches (switches 9 and 10) of TS-1 86-STl -1.

7.4.1 Verify Test Switch TS-186-ST1-1 (TS-286T-1), SW #9 at Control Room panel C20 is in the OPEN position.

7.4.2 Verify Test Switch TSI-111, SW D in A-11 is in the OPEN position. (E-93-2) 7.4.3 Verify A-107 Local/Remote Handswitch in LOCAL.

. 7.4.4 Verify A-1 07 DC control power Breaker (BA) OPEN.

7.4.5 Remove bulb from RED ON indicating light for local control at A-107 cubicle.

7.4.6 In terminal box TBI089 (Reference E-531 sh. 42):

7.4.6.1 Lift the cable A107F 2P RED wire from terminal block scheme A107,

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 9 of 17 7.4.6.2 Without lifting existing leads, install a test switch jumper with switch OPEN across terminal block scheme A107 terminal 29 (cable A107F BLACK wire) and onto RED wire 2P lifted above.

7.4.6.3 Without lifting existing leads, install a test switch jumper with switch OPEN across terminal block scheme A107 terminals 31 and 21 on the terminal board side opposite cable A107F WHITE wire number 2P and GREEN wire number 21.

7.4.7 In C20, without lifting existing leads, install a test switch jumper with switch OPEN across terminal block scheme A107 terminals 2P and 29 on the terminal board side opposite cable Al 07K BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29.

Reference E-560 sh. 1.

7.4.8 At A-1 07, verify no continuity between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A107D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

Reference 505 sh. 2 7.4.9 At TB1089, place the test switch jumper across 2P and 29 in the CLOSED position.

7.4.9.1 At A-107, observe a change to continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A107D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

7.4.10 At TB1 089, place the test switch jumper across terminals 2P and 29 back in the OPEN position.

7.4.10.1 At A-107, observe a change to no continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of terminal board CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A107D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

7.4.11 At C20, place the test switch jumper in the CLOSED position.

7.4.11.1 At A-107, observe a change to continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable Al07K BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29.

7.4.12 At C20, place the test switch jumper back in the OPEN position.

7.4.12.1 At A-107, observe a change to no continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A107K BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29.

7.4.13 At A-107, verify no continuity between the cabinet internal side of TB BB terminals 10 and 11 opposite cable A107D GREEN wire number 21 and WHITE wire number 31.

7.4.14 At TB1 089, place the test switch jumper across terminals 31 and 21 in the CLOSED position.

7.4.14.1 At A-107, observe a change to continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB BB terminals 10 and 11 opposite cable Al 07D GREEN wire number 21 and WHITE wire number 31.

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 10 of 17 7.4.15 At TB1089, place the test switch jumper across terminals 31 and 21 back in the OPEN position.

7.4.15.1 At A-107, observe a change to no continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB BB terminals 10 and 11 opposite cable A107D GREEN wire number 21 and WHITE wire number 31.

7.4.16 Re-term lifted cable A107F 2P RED wire to terminal block scheme A107 in TB1 089 per the Lifted Lead Log.

7.4.16.1 At A-107, observe continuity measured between TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A107D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

7.4.17 Remove both test switch jumpers installed at terminal box TB1 089.

7.4.18 Remove the test switch jumper installed at panel C20.

7.4.19 Restore test switch TS-186-ST1-1 (TS-286T-1), SW #9 to the as-found position or as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

7.4.20 Restore test switch TS1 -111, SW D to the as-found position or as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

7.4.21 Reinstall bVlb into RED ON indicating light for local control at A-1 07 cubicle.

7.4.22 Place A-1 07 Local/Remote Handswitch in REMOTE or as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

7.4.23 CLOSE A-107 DC control power Breaker BA or leave as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

7.5 Cables 1302K1, wires 9 and 10, A-110 input to NaBr/NaOCI (E-386-1) 7.5.1 Verify A-110 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) OPEN.

7.5.2 Verify A-110 RACKED DOWN.

7.5.3 Manual actuate A- 110 STA switch to simulate breaker closed and hold.

7.5.3.1 Verify LED on I/O module address 115 is LIT on UY-8232 in cabinet C165 (Note: The referenced I/O module is the last module on 1st row of the I/O tracks. This is a dual address module for address 115 and 116. The LED for address 115 is on the left side -of the module). .

7.5.4 Release the A-110 STA switch and allow to return to breaker open position.

7.5.4.1 Verify LED on I/O module address 115 is NOT LIT on UY-8232 in cabinet C1 65 (Note: The referenced I/O module is the last module on 1st row of the I/O tracks. This is a dual address module for address 115 and 116.

The LED for address 115 is on the left side of the module).

7.6 Cables 1302M1, wires 8A1 and 8A2, A-109 input to NaBr/NaOCI, (E-386-1) 7.6.1 Verify A-109 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) OPEN.

7.6.2 Verify A-109 RACKED DOWN.

7.6.3 Manual actuate A-1 09 STA switch to simulate breaker closed and hold.

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 11 of 17 7.6.3.1 Verify LED on I/O module address 117 is LIT on UY-8232 in cabinet C165 (Note: The referenced I/O module is the first module on 2nd row of the I/O tracks. This is a dual address module for address 117 and 118. The LED for address 117 is on the left side of the module).

7.6.4 Release the A-109 STA switch and allow to return to breaker open position.

7.6.4.1 Verify LED on I/O module address 117 is NOT LIT on UY-8232 in cabinet C165 (Note: The referenced I/O module is the first module on 2nd row of the I/O tracks. This is a dual address module for address 117 and 118.

The LED for address 117 is on the left side of the module).

8.0 Restoration 8.1 Verify removal of test switches and restoration of lifted leads.

9.0 Test Results and Evaluation 9.1 No test data sheets are required for this test. See section 11.0 for discussion of test results / summary.

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 12 of 17 10.0 M&TE Instrumentation Record the appropriate information for all M&TE equipment used in the following table.

Record the applicable M&TE Record Test Step for Recorded By / Date Information (e.g. instrument #, cal which the M&TE was due date, instrument range, etc.) used I .1

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 13 of 17 11.0 Summary Information 11.1 Test Summary Record any additional pertinent information obtained during testing not recorded in section 7 or the Test Log and provide a post test summary.

Test Step # [ Summary or Additional Information Recorded By / Date 11.2 Test Deficiencies Record any test deficiencies and document the evaluation / resolution of the deficiency in the Test Deficiency Log in section 12.0.

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Page 14 of 17 12.0 Attachments:

12.1 EN-DC- 117 Attachment 9.11 - Signature Identification Log 12.2 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.9- Test Log 12.3 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.10 - Test Deficiency Log 12.4 Test Change Notices

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Attachment 12.1 ATrACHMENT 9.11 SIGNATURE IDENTIFICATION LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: 44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Misc. Page .ol Name Title Signature Initials I I I I I I

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Attachment 12.2

[1] ATTACHMENT 9.9 TEST LOG SHEET 1 OF I Test Number: ECT/STI: 44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Misc Page of Date Entry Initials 4 I 4 -t I 1 4 __________________

4 I 4 4 4 I 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 9 4 4 4- 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 I I 4 4 I I I. 4 I. I I. 4

ECT-44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Miscellaneous Controls Attachment 12.3

[2] ATTACHMENT9.10 TEST DEFICIENCY LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: 44312-01 Rev 000 A-1 Functional Dead-Bus Testing Page of DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION DATE/TIME NUMBER 4 &

4 I t I

____ I I ____

]Doc 213

  • ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 11, ST2 Feeder Page 1 of 20 ATTACHMENT 9.6 TEST PROCEDURE COVER SHEET Sheet 1 of 1 TEST COVER SHEET TEST TYPE: ] ECT Procedure El ECT WO [I STI Procedure Page 1 of 20 TEST #: ECT-44312-05 REV. #: 0 Quality Class: F] OR Z NOR TEST TITLE: Functional Testin-g of Start-up Transformer #2 A-1 Feeder Breaker A-111 REVIEW (Print/Sign/Date)

Test Engineer (TE): Chris Shively / 3 Technical Reviewer: Pat Riedmueller / 7- ?-13 CROSS-DISCIPLINE REVIEW Operations Department: A14 Organization Organization I .. Organization Organization Organization ADDITIONAL STI (ONLY) PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS EN-LI-100 Review: El Attached MIA '-" rOother- See EC44313 10CFR50.59 Evaluation: E] Not Required _ZýAtched 0l Other OSRC Approval El Not Regquiid-d Mtg No. Date: Chairman:

APPROVAL(Print/Sign/Date) 171.1 TE Supervisor: -,0 Alv* *'/ ' ,/ 7/6/,,

TEST COMPLETION REVIEW ! ACCEPTANCE Summary of Test Results:

Responsible Engineer (RE)*: /

Test Engineer (TE): /

Technical Reviewer /

TE Supervisor: /

  • Ifrequired for confirmation of assumptions made in the development of the EC.

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS) 6/21

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 2 of 20 Table of Contents

1. O bjectives .......................................................................................... 3
2. References.............................. ............................................... 3
3. Test Equipment ............................................................. 5
4. Precautions and Limitations ........................................ 6
5. Prerequisites...................................................6
6. Instrumentation .................................................. 7
7. Test Instructions ................................................. 8
8. R esto ra tio n .................................................................................................................... 14
9. Test Results and Evaluation ...................................................................................... 15
10. M&TE Instrum entation .............................................................................................. 15
11. Sum m ary Inform ation .............................................................................................. 16 12 . Attac h m e n ts : ................................................................................................................. 17

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 3 of 20

1. Obeectives 1.1. This ECT provides functional testing of Switchgear Cubicle A-111, 4160 v feed from Startup 2 transformer. Testing is being performed as a result of switchgear reconstruction due to damage which occurred during the ANO-1 Stator Drop Event.

1.2. The A-1 bus testing is limited to functions that are coordinated with external components to address the cables and wires impacted by the damage zone. Breaker interconnecting wiring and internal cubicle wiring is not functionally tested. Therefore, bus undervoltage and synch permits and feeder undervoltage trip within A-1 11 is not tested. A-1 load shed is tested in ECT-44313-03 (A-21 1), AAC diesel trip is tested in ECT-44312-03 (2A-9 to A-1), A-308 EDG trip is tested with EC-43758 removal and Unit Auxiliary Transformer Failure Protection testing is with ECT-44312-07 (A-1 13), A-111 synchronization circuit tested in ECT-44313-03 (A-21 1).

1.3. UAT Differential Current Transformers (8000/5 in A-1 11 bus compartment) - Reference E-34 and E-8-AC-84 device "ZA".

Differential Current Transformer testing will be completed under the currently installed Temporary Modification removal testing per EC 43763 and EC 43758 due to the Unit 1 reconnection and the Unit 2 Startup Transformer 2 coordination scheduling.

1.4. Damaged SIS wiring (reference Electrical Recovery Master List) 1.4.1. Al 11 SIS #1; wire labeled with Al12X running between A-111 and A-1 12 from terminal strip XL in A-111 to terminal strip XL in A-1 12. Per E-8-AC-93, wire is daisy chained to A-1 13 TB XL terminals 1 and 2. Wire function is power to fuse UL (remote control trip and elevator mechanism) and to spring operation. Checked during OP-1416.001 PM and this ECT remote manual operation.

1.4.2. Al 11 SIS #2; wire from device UC, which provides remote close power. Tested during A-1 11 remote operation.

1.5. Testing performed per this ECT will be done with bus A-1 DE-ENERGIZED.

2. References 2.1. EN-DC-1 17 Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions 2.2. EC-44312 Al SWITCHGEAR CHILD EC, STATOR RECONSTRUCTION 2.3. EC 43763 DISCONNECT SU # 2 4.16 KV AND 6.9 KV BUSSES FROM UNIT 1 TO ASSURE RELIABILITY OF THE FEED TO UNIT 2 2.4. EC 43758 PROVIDE TEMPORARY POWER TO FIRE PUMP P-6A, MAIN CHILLER

.- .. VCH-lB, CIRC WATER PUMPS P-3A & P-3D, SWGR A-3 & A-4, AND LOAD CENTERS B1, B2, AND B3 [REV-1 / PHASE-I &2]

2.5. E-4 Sh 1 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram, 4160 Volt System, Main Supply (TMEC 43686, ST1 disconnect; TMEC 43758, Temp power from ST2; TMEC 43763, ST2 disconnected from bus) 2.6. E-17 Sh 1 Red Train Vital AC & 125 VDC Single Line & Distribution 2.7. E-31 Sh 1 System Phasing & Synchronizing Diagram (EC 43758, Temp power from ST2; TMEC 43763, ST2 disconnected from bus) 2.8. E-33 Sh 1 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram, 6900 Volt System (EC 43758, Temp power from ST2; TMEC 43763, ST2 disconnected from bus) 2.9. E-34 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram, 4160V System, Main Supply (EC 43758, Temp power from ST2; TMEC 43763, ST2 disconnected from bus)

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 11, ST2 Feeder Page 4 of 20 2.10. E-38 Sh 2 Logic Diagram, Electrical Systems, 6.9 KV & 4.16 KV Bus Undervoltage Relays 2.11. E-76 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Typical Circuit Breaker 6900V & 4160V Switchgear 2.12. E-87 Schematic Diagram, Unit Auxiliary Trans. 6900V ACB's 2.13. E-90 Schematic Diagram, Unit Auxiliary Trans. 4160V ACB's 2.14. E-91 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Startup Transformer No 1, 4160V Air Circuit Breakers 2.15. E-92 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Startup Trans No 2, 4160v ABC 2.16. E-93 Sh 2 Schematic Diagram, Switchgear Bus Lockout and Undervoltage Relays (EC 43258, no effect) 2.17. E-94 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Startup Transformers No. 1 & No. 2, Lockout Relays 2.18. E-95 Schematic Diagram, Transformer Undervoltage Relays 2.19. E-100 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Diesel Generator DG1 ACB (TMEC 43758, disconnected) 2.20. E-100 Sh 1A Schematic Diagram, Diesel Generator ACB (EC 43758, Temp power from ST2; disabled EDG interconnect) 2.21. E-1 18 Schematic Diagram, Load Shedding on Fast Transfer to Startup Transformer ST2 2.22. E-136 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Generator Protection and Lockout Relays - Generator 2.23. E-138 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Generator Protection and Lockout Relays - Turb. And Reactor 2.24. E-271 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Circulation Water Pumps (EC 22630, no effect; TMEC 43758, P3A/D out of service) 2.25. E-271 Sh 3 Schematic Diagram, Circulation Water Pumps 2.26. E-304 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Heater Drain Pumps 2.27. E-306 Sh 3 Schematic Diagram, Condensate Pump P2C 2.28. E-372 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Main Chiller (EC 43758, Temp power from ST2) 2.29. E-418 Sh 7 Schematic Diagram, 4.16KV Bus Feeder Breaker Trip, Reflash Annunciator 2.30. E-452 Sh 2 Schematic Diagram, Annunciator K02, (On Panel C10) 2.31. E-452 Sh 3 Schematic Diagram, Annunciator K02, (On Panel C10) 2.32. E-452 Sh 4 Schematic Diagram, Annunciator K02, (On Panel C10) (EC 27204 &

27205, no effect) 2.33. E-482 Sh 7 Computer Digital I/O Signals 2.34. E-482 Sh 16 Computer Digital I/O Signals 2.35. E-482 Sh 19 Computer Digital I/O Signals 2.36. E-482 Sh 60 Connection Schedule, Computer Digital Inputs 2.37. E-505 Sh 1 Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (Non-ES), Units Al 13 Through Al 09 (TMEC 43763; ST2 disconnected) 2.38. E-505 Sh 6 Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (Non-ES), Units A211 Through A501 (EC 21171, EC 43979 & EC 5000114654, no effect)

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 5 of 20 2.39. E-506 Sh 9A Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (GE UNIT A309) ACB A309 ESF Bus A3 Feeder (EC 43758, Temp power from ST2; EC 5000116443 &

EC 5000115631, no effect) 2.40. E-506 Sh 9C Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (GE UNIT A309) ACB A309 2.41. E-560 Sh 1, Connection Diagram, Main Control Panel C20, Plant Protective Relay &

Generator Recorder BDS (TMEC 43763, TB850 add) 2.42. E-560 Sh 2, Connection Diagram, Main Control Panel C20, Plant Protective Relay &

Generator Recorder BDS (EC 43758, Temp power from ST2; TMEC 43763, terminal box; EC 11038, EC 12923, EC33142, EC 44585 & EC 5000107429, no effect) 2.43. E-561 Sh 4 Connection Diagram, Main Control Panel C10, Electrical Auxiliary System (EC 5000118050, no effect) 2.44. E-2034 Sh 1 Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram, 4160V System, Main Supply (TMEC 43763, TB850 add) 2.45. E-2042 Sh 2 Logic Diagram, AAC Generator System, 4.16KV Tie Breakers 2.46. E-2116 Sh9 Schematic Diagram, AAC Generator System, 4160V FDR BKR 903 Power

& Control Ckt (EC 5000117962, no effect) 2.47. E-2600 Sh 11 Connection Diagram, AAC Generator System, Control Panel 2C436 (EC 45220, Restoration cable replacement, not issued) 2.48. E-8-AC-2 Metalclad Switchgear 2.49. E-8-AC-14 Section Views (EC 5000117605, no effect) 2.50. E-8-AC-84 Metalclad Switchgear, Connection Diagram (EC 428, EC 5000109807 &

EC 500011896, no effect) 2.51. E-8-AC-90 Metalclad Switchgear, Connection Diagram (Condition Report CR-ANO-C-2013-01496, minor drawing error corrected by EC 43258; EC 5000111897

& EC 5000118335, no effect) 2.52. E-8-AC-91 Metalclad Switchgear, Connection Diagram (EC 21171, EC 5000114687 &

EC 5000117602, no effect) 2.53. E-8-AC-93 Metalclad Switchgear, Interconnection Diagram (EC 428, no effect) 2.54. E-8-AC-94 Metalclad Switchgear, Interconnection Diagram 2.55. E-8-AC-98 Metalclad Switchgear, Interconnection Diagram 2.56. E-8-AC-99 .. Meftlclad SWitthgear, Inte rbonietion Diagram ..

2.57. E-8-AC-100 Metalclad Switchgear, Interconnection Diagram (EC 21171; no effect) 2.58. E-8-AC-161 Metalclad Switchgear, Connection Diagram 2.59. M-201-57 Wiring Diagram for Plant Protective Relays & Generator Recorder Board C20 (EC 19839, EC 41747, EC 5000109569 & EC 5000117330; no effect) 2.60. M-201-59 Wiring Diagram for Plant Protective Relays & Generator Recorder Board C20 (EC 39987, EC 41547, EC 5000108443 & EC 5000109571; no effect) 2.61. M-201-62 Wiring Diagram for Plant Protective Relays & Generator Recorder Board C20 (EC 5000108438 & EC 5000109577; no effect)

3. Test Equipment 3.1. multimeter

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 11, ST2 Feeder Page 6 of 20 3.2. Four (4) temporary test jumpers configured for attachment so that terminals do not need to be disturbed to insert jumper.

4. Precautions and Limitations 4.1. Circuit Breakers associated with this testing have high levels of potential energy. Exercise caution when working in the area ifequipment is energized.

4.2. Testing will be done with the A-1 Bus DE-ENERGIZED and grounded.

4.3. Test steps shall be performed in order unless authorized by the Test Engineer and the sequence change documented in the Test Log.

4.4. Any leads lifted or jumpers installed shall be controlled using a Lifted Lead and Jumper Sheet.

4.5. M&TE equipment used during testing shall be recorded in section 10.0.

4.6. Personnel performing test steps in this ECT shall complete the appropriate sections of the Signature Identification Log in section 12.0.

4.7. The Test Engineer or designee shall maintain the Test Log in Section 12.0 per requirements of EN-DC-117 section 5.2 [11] (b).

4.8. Test discrepancies shall be documented in the Test Deficiency Log in Section 12.0, including evaluation and resolution of each discrepancy.

4.9. The Test Engineer shall provide a post test summary, including evaluation of test results, in Section 11.0.

5. Prerequisites 5.1. Verify that breaker A-111 impacted connection diagrams have been yellow lined or as-built as required.

5.2. Verify A-1 11 relay calibrations are current.

5.3. Verify that 125VDC control Power is available to Al switchgear; breaker D1 1-03 closed (reference E-17 Sh 1).

5.4. Verify Implementing Field Supervisor has signed the Retum to Service form for EC-44312 and EC-44987 to confirm A-1 11 is ready for testing.

5.5. Verify that the A-111 Testing Work Order WO 00354186 task 02 has been authorized (set to working).

5.6. Ensure that test personnel are on the appropriate clearances.---.-------------

5.7. Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing and performing this ECT, the following definitions will be utilized:

CHECK means to verify an expected condition exists without taking any further action to make it so.

VERIFY will mean ifa breaker, switch, etc. is not in the desired position; place it in the desired position.

TRIP and OPEN have the same meaning when verifying or placing a breaker, switch, etc. in a desired position.

When a breaker is placed in the closed or trip position, it is understood that the switch handle will be released unless stated to hold in a position.

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 7 of 20

6. Instrumentation 6.1. No instrumentation is required.

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 11, ST2 Feeder Page 8 of 20

7. Test Instructions 7.1. DC Power Check 7.1.1. Verify DC Control Power breaker (BA) located inside A-111 breaker cubicle is CLOSED (reference E-8-AC-84).

7.1.2. Verify breaker A-1 11 is racked up and open.

7.1.3. Check nominal 125 vDC at load side of fuses "UAA" points 2 (-) and 4 (+) at A-111.

7.1.4. Check nominal 125 vDC at load side of fuses "UA" points 2 (-) and 4 (+) at A-111.

7.1.5. Check nominal 125 vDC at load side of fuses "UT" points 2 (-) and 4 (+) at A-111.

7.1.6. Check nominal 125 vDC at load side of fuses "UC" points 2 (-) and 4 (+) at A-111.

7.1.7. Check nominal 125 vDC at load side of fuses "UB" points 2 (-) and 4 (+) at A-111.

7.1.8. Check nominal 125 vDC at load side of fuses "UR" points 2 (-) and 4 (+) at A-111.

7.1.9. Check nominal 125 vDC at load side of fuses "UL" points 2 (-) and 4 (+) at A-1 11.

7.1.10. Verify that 125 VDC control power is available to A- 112.

7.1.11. Verify that 125 VDC control power is available to A-113.

7.1.12. Verify breaker A-1 12 is racked up and open.

7.1.13. Verify breaker A-1 13 is racked up and open.

7.2. DC OPS CHECK - Remote Manual Operation 7.2.1. Permissives Setup 7.2.1.1. Place A-11l handswitch (152-111/CS) on CIO in PULL TO LOCK.

7.2.1.2. Verify test switch TS1-1 11 switch F open in A-i 111 to disable feeder undervoltage trip.

7.2.1.3. Verify test switch TS1-112 switch G open in A-112 to disable bus lockout trip.

7.2.1.4. Verify test switch TS-1 86-ST2-1 switch #3 open in C20 to disable Startup #2 Feed to A-1 (A-111) lockout trip.

7.2.1.5. Request Relay technician remove glass cover and open the following knife switches for Loss of Field relay (240) in C20 (reference E-136 Sh 1 andOP-1305.029) ..

7.2.1.5.1. Red knife switch open.

7.2.1.5.2. Black knife switches open.

7.2.1.6. At C20, open the following test switches:

7.2.1.6.1. TS-286T switch 6 - Generator Lockout 7.2.1.6.2. TS-286-G1-2 switch 9 - Reactor Trip 7.2.1.6.3. TS-286-G1-3 switch 2 - Generator Lockout 286 Gl-1 and 2 7.2.1.7. Reset Generator Lockout Relay 286-G1 -1 7.2.1.8. Reset Generator Lockout Relay 286-G1-2

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 11, ST2 Feeder Page 9 of 20 7.2.1.9. Install jumper in A-111 at TB B terminal 2 to terminal 4 to simulate no ST2 undervoltage at relay 127-111-1/X contacts 11 to 12 closed, (reference E-95 and E-8-AC-84)].

7.2.1.10. Verify test switch TS-286-G1-2 switch #8 open in C20 to disable Unit Aux Trans Prot to L.O. A-1 (reference E-93).

7.2.1.11. Check ST2 NOT locked out at 186-ST2-2 in C20.

7.2.1.12. IF ST2 locked out at 186-ST2-2, THEN RESET or jumper 186-ST2-2 contacts 10 to 10C in C20 at scheme Al 11 terminal 11 to terminal 21 (references E-92, E-94, M-201-62 & E-560 Sheet 1).

7.2.1.13. Check ST1 NOT locked out at 186-ST1-1 in C20.

IF STI locked out at 186-ST1-1, THEN RESET 186-ST1-1 (references E-92, E-94) 7.2.1.14. Check bus Al NOT locked out at 186-Al in A-112.

IF bus Al locked out at 186-Al, THEN reset 186-Al (references E-92, E-93 sheet 2).

7.2.1.15. Remove connection plug (pie plate) for A-1 bus Undervoltage Load Tripping relay 127-Al-1 in A-1 12, to defeat the undervoltage load trip condition.

7.2.1.16. Verify undervoltage auxiliary relay 127-Al-1/X1 in A-11 de-energized.

7.2.1.17. Install jumper Al bus undervoltage relay 127-Al-1/X1 contacts 11 to 12 in A-111 at TB F terminal 9 to TB B terminal 5 for automatic transfer undervoltage permissive (reference E-93 & E-8-AC-84)].

7.2.2. Place breaker LOCAL/REMOTE handswitch at A-1 11 in LOCAL.

7.2.2.1. Check amber LOCAL indicating light at panel C10 is ON.

7.2.3. Place breaker LOCALREMOTE handswitch at A-1 11 in REMOTE.

7.2.3.1. Check A-111 white CHARGED indicating light at panel C10 is ON.

7.2.3.2. Check A-111 amber LOCAL indicating light at panel C10 is OFF.

7.2.3.3. Check A-1 11 amber LOCAL indicating light at panel A-111 is OFF.

7.2.4. Place Synchronization switch 152-111/SS ON at C10.

7.2.5. Place A-I 11 CONTROL SWITCH (152-111/CS) at C10 in CLOSE.

7.2.5.1. Check red CLOSED light at C10 is ON.

7.2.5.2. Check green TRIPPED light at C10 is OFF.

7.2.5.3. Check breaker A-1 11 CLOSED per local indication.

7.2.6. Place Synchronization switch 152-i1 I/SS OFF at C10.

7.2.7. Trip A-111 using handswitch 152-111/CS on C10 7.2.7.1. Check green TRIPPED light at C10 is ON.

7.2.7.2. Check red CLOSED light at C10 is OFF.

7.2.7.3. Check breaker A-1 11 TRIPPED per local indication.

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 10 of 20 7.3. Relay 152X-1 11 Test (Ref E-92, E-561 Sh 4) 7.3.1. Verify approximately 125 VDC in C10 at TBB1 between terminal Al 11 N3 and terminal 31.

7.3.2. Place A-11I handswitch (152-111/CS) on C10 in PULL TO LOCK.

7.3.3. Verify approximately 0 VDC in C10 at TBB1 between terminal A 111 N3 and terminal 31.

7.4. DC OPS CHECK - Automatic Transfer Unit Auxiliary Transformer Trip A-111 Close NOTE Test conditions required are:

Simulated Generator trip with ST1 not available (A-113 open).

7.4.1. Verify A-111 handswitch (152-111/CS) in PULLTO LOCK on CIO.

7.4.2. Select ST2 as the preferred standby power source at 143-1 on C10 (reference E-87).

7.4.3. Verify Unit Auxiliary Transformer NOT locked out at 286-G1-2 on C20.

7.4.4. Install jumper C20 scheme Al 11 in C20 at terminal 51 to terminal 61 to simulate Generator locked out (generator tripped) at 286-Gl -2 for A-1 11 close permissive (reference E-138, E-560 Sheet 1 & M-201-62).

7.4.5. Verify ESAS bypassed or ESAS Digital Subsystem No. 1 shutdown such that relay ESX-A3 is de-energized. When energized, ESX-A3 relay provides a trip signal to A-112 (reference OP-1105.003, E-102 Sh 1, and E-90 Sh 1).

7.4.6. Place breaker LOCALJREMOTE handswitch at A-112 in LOCAL.

7.4.7. Place local control switch at A-1 12 in CLOSE position (to open 152-112/b contact 7-7T).

7.4.8. Verify A-1 12 Unit Auxiliary Transformer feeder breaker closed.

7.4.9. Verify test switch TSl -111 switch E open in A-1 11 to disable the A-1 13 feeder undervoltage trip.

7.4.10. Verify test switch TSl-112 switch E open in A-1 12 to disable the A-1 13 bus lockout trip.

7.4.11. Verify test switch TS-1 86-ST1 -1 switch #3 open in C20 to disable the A-1 13 Startup #1 Feed to A-1 lockout trip.

7.47..12. Plac~e-breake-r-lOCAL/R-IMOTE han-dwitclh at-*-A *-i-n-,LOCAL ...............

7.4.13. Place local control switch at A-113 in CLOSE position.

7.4.14. Verify A-1 13 Startup Transformer #1 (ST1) feeder breaker closed.

7.4.15. Place A-111 handswitch (152-111/CS) on C10 in CLOSE position.

7.4.16. Verify A-111 feeder breaker remains OPEN.

7.4.17. Verify PDS point ZSlA1 11 "4.16KV ACB ST2/BUS 1A1" TRIP 7.4.18. Trip A-113 using local control switch.

7.4.19. Verify A-111 closes.

7.4.20. Verify PDS point ZS1A111 "4.16KV ACB ST2/BUS 1A1" NORMAL

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 11 of 20 7.4.21. Remove jumper C20 wire scheme Al 11 in C20 at terminal 51 to terminal 61 installed at 286-G1-2 on C20 (reference E-138, E-560 Sh 1 & M-201 -62).

7.5. DC OPS CHECK - Automatic Transfer SUT #1 not Available or Tripped

(+ Annunciator + Computer)

NOTE Test conditions required are:

Simulated STJ disconnect with Auxiliary Transformer not available (A-1 12 open).

7.5.1. Place A-111 handswitch (152-111/CS) on C10 in PULL TO LOCK.

7.5.2. Verify ST2 Selected as the preferred standby power source at 143-1 on C10.

7.5.3. Install jumper C20 scheme Al 11 in C20 at terminal 51 to terminal 52 to simulate ST1 Transformer locked out at 186-ST1 -1 for A-1 11 close permissive (reference E-94, E-560 Sheet 1 & M-201-62).

7.5.4, Place local control switch at A-1 13 in CLOSE position (to open 152-113/b contact 1-1T).

7.5.5. Verify A-i 13 Startup Transformer #1 (ST1) feeder breaker closed.

7.5.6. Verify A-i 12 Unit Auxiliary Transformer feeder breaker closed.

7.5.7. Take A-111 handswitch (152-111/CS) on C10 to TRIP.

7.5.8. Verify A-1 11 feeder breaker remains OPEN.

7.5.9. Verify Annunciator K02/F7 "A1/A2 AUTO TRANSFER" not lit.

7.5.10. Verify PDS point YS1A1 11 "AUTO CLOSE ACB 152-111" NO 7.5.11. Verify SPDS point Z1 Al 11 "4160V SYS ST2 TO Al BKR STAT" TRIPPED 7.5.12. Trip A-1 12 using local control switch.

7.5.13. Verify A-111 closes.

7.5.14. Verify Annunciator K02/F7 "AL/A2 AUTO TRANSFER" lit.

7.5.15. Verify PDS point YSA1l11 "AUTO CLOSE ACB 152-111" YES 7.5.16. Verify SPDS point Z1Al 11 "4160V SYS ST2 TO Al BKR STAT' NORMAL 7.5.17. Trip A-1 13 using local control switch.

7.5.18. Remove jumper C20 scheme Al 11 in C20 at terminal 51 to terminal 52 (reference E-94, E-560 Sh 1 & M-20!-62).

7.6. DC OPS CHECK - Manual Transfer to ST #1 7.6.1. Verify A-111 closed 7.6.2. Take A-111 handswitch (152-111/CS) on C10 to CLOSE (to establish Normal after Close contact).

NOTE K1629 is a reflash unit located Inside panel CIO.

7.6.3. Verify Annunciator K1 629/1 "Al 11 Breaker Trip" not lit.

7.6.4. Verify Annunciator K02/F6 "AI/A2/A3/A4 FEEDER BRKR TRIP" not lit.

7.6.5. Take A-1 13 Local Control Switch to CLOSE and release.

7.6.6. Check breaker A-1 13 Closed.

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 12 of 20 7.6.7. Verify A-113 remote Control Switch on C10 in Normal-After-Close.

7.6.8. Take A-1 13 Sync Switch to ON.

7.6.9. Verify A-1 11 trips.

NOTE K1629 is a reflash unit located inside panel C10.

7.6.10. Verify Annunciator K1629/1 "A 111 Breaker Trip" lit.

7.6.11. Verify Annunciator K02/F6 "Ai/A2/A3/A4 FEEDER BRKR TRIP" lit.

7.6.12. Take A-1 13 Sync Switch to OFF.

7.6.13. Trip A-113 using local control switch.

7.7. DC OPS CHECK - Manual Transfer to Auxiliary Transformer 7.7.1. Place Synchronization Switch 152-111/SS ON at C10.

7.7.2. Close A-111 using handswitch 152-111/CS on C10.

7.7.3. Verify A- 111 closes.

7.7.4. Place Synchronization Switch 152-11 1/SS OFF at C10.

7.7.5. Take A-1 12 Local Control Switch to CLOSE and release.

7.7.6. Check breaker A-1 12 Closed.

7.7.7. Verify A-1 12 remote Control Switch on C10 in Normal-After-Close.

7.7.8. Take A-112 Sync Switch to ON.

7.7.9. Verify A-111 trips.

7.7.10. Take A-1 12 Sync Switch to OFF.

7.7.11. Trip A-112 using local control switch.

7.8. DC OPS CHECK - Trip Transformer Lockout 7.8.1. Place Synchronization switch 152-111/SS ON at C10.

7.8.2. Close A-111 using handswitch 152-111/CS on C10.

7.8.3. Verify A-111 closed.

7.8.4. Place Synchronization Switch 152-111 /SS OFF at C10.

7.8.5. IF 186-ST2-1 is TRIPPED, THEN perform the following:

7.8.5.1. Place test switch TS-186-ST2-1 switch #3 in C20 CLOSE.

7.8.5.2. Verify A-111 trips.

7.8.6. IF 186-ST2-1 is NOT TRIPPED, THEN perform the following:

7.8.6.1. Install jumper C20 scheme A 111 terminal 2P to terminal 29 to simulate ST2 Transformer locked out at 186-ST2-1 on C20.

(reference E-94, E-560 Sh 1 & M-201-62).

7.8.6.2. Verify A- 111 trips.

7.8.6.3. Remove jumper C20 scheme Al 11 terminal 2P to terminal 29.

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 13 of 20 7.9. Damaged SIS wiring (reference Electrical Recovery Master List) 7.9.1. Al 11 SIS #3; wire from A-111 TB F terminal #7 to A-107 TB C terminal #4. Per E-8-AC-93 & E-304, this circuit provides undervoltage trip to the P-BA Heater Drain Pump. Test as follows:

7.9.1.1. Verify undervoltage auxiliary relay 127-A1-1/X1 in A-1Il de-energized.

7.9.1.2. OPEN TS1-111 switch D.

7.9.1.3. Verify open contact by checking continuity in A-107 at TB CC3 to CC12 (reference E-304 sheet 1, E-8-AC-84, E-8-AC-93, E-8-AC-95 and E-8-AC-161).

7.9.1.4. Install connection plug (pie plate) for A-1 bus Undervoltage Load Tripping relay 127-Al-1 in A-1 12, to activate the undervoltage load trip condition.

7.9.1.5. Verify undervoltage auxiliary relay 127-Al-1/X1 in A-111 energized (undervoltage condition).

7.9.1.6. Verify closed contact by checking continuity in A-1 07 at TB CC3 to CC12 (reference E-304 sheet 1, E-8-AC-84 and E-8-AC-93).

7.9.1.7. CLOSE TS1-111 switch D.

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 14 of 20

8. Restoration 8.1. Verify breaker A-111 is tripped and racked down, or as directed by Operations.

8.2. Place test switch TS1-1 11 switch F closed in A-111 or as directed by Operations.

8.3. Verify test switch TS1-1 12 switch G closed in A-1 12 or as directed by Operations.

8.4. Verify test switch TS-186-ST2-1 switch #3 closed in C20 or as directed by Operations.

8.5. Place test switch TS-286-G1 -2 switch #8 closed in C20 or as directed by Operations.

8.6. At C20, verify the following test switches are closed unless otherwise directed by Unit 1 Operations (ref. E-138 sh. 1):

NOTE: Closing the following test switches will likely result in tripping Generator Lockout Relays 286-G1-1 and 286-G1-2.

" TS-286T switch 6 - Turbine Trip Generator Lockout

" TS-286-G1-2 switch 9 - Reactor Trip Generator Lockout

  • TS-286-G1-3 switch 2 - Lockout Trip Generator Lockout 8.7. At C20, verify the following switches in Loss of Field relay 240 are closed and glass cover reinstalled unless otherwise directed by Unit 1 Operations:
  • Red knife switch
  • Black knife switches 8.8. Place test switch TS1 -111 switch E closed in A-111 or as directed by Operations.

8.9. Verify test switch TS1 -112 switch E closed in A-1 12 or as directed by Operations.

8.10. Place test switch TS-186-ST1-1 switch #3 closed in C20 or as directed by Operations.

8.11. Remove jumper in A-111 at TB F terminal 9 to TB B terminal 5 (reference E-93 & E-8-AC-84)].

8.12. Remove jumper in A-111 at TB B terminal 2 to terminal 4 (reference E-95 and E-8-90)].

8.13. IF 186-ST2-2 jumpered, THEN remove 186-ST2-2 jumper from contacts 10 to 1OC in C20 at scheme Al 11 terminal 11 to terminal 21 (references E-92, E-94, M-201-62 & E-560 Sheet 1).

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 15 of 20

9. Test Results and Evaluation 9.1. No test data sheets are required for this test. See section 11.0 for discussion of test results / summary.
10. M&TE Instrumentation Record the appropriate information for all M&TE equipment used in the following table.

Record the applicable M&TE Record Test Step for Recorded By / Date Information (e.g. instrument #, cal which the M&TE was due date, instrument range, etc.) used

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 16 of 20

11. Summary Information Test Summary Record any additional pertinent information obtained during testing not recorded in section 7 or the Test Log and provide a post test summary.

Test Step # Summary or Additional Information Recorded By / Date L _______________________________________

Test Deficiencies Record any test deficiencies and document the evaluation / resolution of the deficiency in the Test Deficiency Log in section 12.0.

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 11, ST2 Feeder Page 17 of 20

12. Attachments:

12.1. EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.11 - Signature Identification Log 12.2. EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.9 - Test Log 12.3. EN-DC-117 Attachment 9.10 - Test Deficiency Log 12.4. Test Change Notices

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 11, ST2 Feeder Page 18 of 20 ATTACHMENT 9.11 SIGNATURE IDENTIFICATION LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: 44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-ill, Startup Transformer 2 Feeder Page of Name Title Signature Initials t I.

I I.

t I I

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 11, ST2 Feeder Page 19 of 20

[1] ATTACHMENT 9.9 TEST LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: 44312-05 REV 000 SWGR A-111, STARTUP TRANSFORMER 2 FEEDER Pageof__

Date Entry Initials

_____ I ______

+ 4

..........

..

ECT-44312-05 Rev 000 SWGR A-111, ST2 Feeder Page 20 of 20

[2] ATTACHMENT 9.10 TEST DEFICIENCY LOG SHEET 1 OFi Test Number: ECT/STI: 44312-05 REv 000 SWGR A-ill1, STARTUP TRANSFORMER 2 FEEDER Page of DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION DATE/TIME NUMBER

__ I I _ _

-t

.1.

IDoc 24I Melfi, Jim From: Tindell, Brian Sent: Friday, July 12, 2013 12:02 PM To: Kennedy, Kriss Cc: Allen, Don; Azua, Ray; Fairbanks, Abin; Bradley, Dan; Hatfield, Gloria; Melfi, Jim; Willoughby, Leonard

Subject:

FW: Stator Incident RCE Kriss, I know you were interested in this. FYI Thanks, Brian From: PYLE, STEPHENIE L [4]

Sent: Friday, July 12, 2013 11:49 AM To: Tindell, Brian; Allen, Don; Willoughby, Leonard

Subject:

Stator Incident RCE Brian, Just letting you know that they have decided to have another CARB to review the changes to the RCE that have been made since the original CARB last week. Dale is in the process of scheduling and I will let you know as soon as it is scheduled.

Stephenie

- IVILEGED AND CONFID Attorney/Chien v Communication 1 ey Wor ut Psepred at the Direction of Legal ttse 1

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 1 of 12 ATTACHMENT 9.6 TEST PROCEDURE COVER SHEET Sheet I of 1 TEST COVER SHEET TEST TYPE: 0 ECT Procedure Li ECT WO 0i STI Procedure Page 1 of 12 TEST #: ECT-44312-03 REV. #: 0 Quality Class: E- OR 0 NOR TEST TITLE: Functional testing for breaker 2A-903 REVIEW (Print/SlgnlDate)

Test Engineer (TE): A. Spencer i,. --- ' / 7//7i Technical Reviewer: P Riedmeuller 74/-13 CROSS-DISCIPLINE REVIEW Operations Department: E. A / 7jjf&

/?\\3t, & -LL jI . P: 7-613 Organization Organization Organization

_ _ :__ / _ :___ _ _ _ _ _

Organization Organization ADDITIONAL STI (ONLY) PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS EN-LI-I00 Review: [I Attached Li Other 10CFR50.59 Evaluation: E] Not Required [] Attached Li Other OSRC Approval El Not Required Mtg No. Date: Chairman:

APPROVAL(PrintlSign/Date)

TE Supervisor 71/1//3 i TEST COMPLETION REVIEW / ACCEPTANCE Summary of Test Results: 5ee A d[Cd1&

Responsible Engineer (RE)*: , A//A I Test Engineer (TE): /I,/iz, 17J/#iZ Technical Reviewer 7 ,ia TE Supervisor: 4I9 ' 7

  • Ifrequired for confirmation of assumptions made in the development of the EC.

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

ATTACHMENT 9.8 TEST CHANGE NoncE Sheet 1 of 1 TEST CHANGE NOTICE TEST TYPE: 9ECT E] ECTWO E0 STI Page I of ..L TEST #: fC T-- 'f-3 12 -03 Change Notice No.: i Quality Class: 0] OR

  • NOR TEST TITLE:

Type of Change: [] Intent XNon Intent DescritoRof Cbange(s):Sp 5 '11q 5, r't* lkO4 tIt+.

M0f I?'t-t I TCN POSTING INSTRUCTION List Page(s) being Replaced (N/A, if not applicable): A.) A List Page(s) being Added (N/A, if not applicable): ___

List Page(s) being Deleted (N/A, if not applicable): _ A/t/

REVIEW (Print/Sign/Date) ,

Test Engineer: -i I i Technical Reviewer: I__K or 0 Non Intent Change (Signature not required for Non-intent Changes, mark N/A and check box)

STI Original EN-LI-100, process Applicability Determination: ot Impacted; [] Impacted and Revised OSRC Approval:[] Not Required Mtg No. Date: Chairman:

Operations Department: ______________ /

... .... Organization Organization Organization

___________________ ________________ /

Organization Organization On Site Risk Assess Went Group:

APPROVAL (Print/Sg/Date)

TE Supervisor _ V t---dv- c Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

EN-DC-117 R5

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 2 of 12 Table of Contents 1.0 Oblectives ........................................................................................................................ 3 2.0 References ....................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 Test EquiDm ent ........................................................................................................ 3 4.0 Precautions and Lim itations ..................................................................................... 3 5.0 Prerequisites .................................................................................................................... 4 6.0 Instrum entation ........................................................................................................ 5 7.0 Test Instructions ...................................................................................................... 5 7.1 A-111 Trip to 2A-903 .............................................................................................. 5 7.2 A-1 12 Trip To 2A-903 ........................................................................................... 5 7.3 A-113 Trip To 2A-903 ............................................................................................ 6 7.4 Al Bus Lockout To 2A-903 .................................................................................. 7 7.5 286-Gl-2 Generator Lockout Trip to 2A-903 ....................................................... 7 7.6 186-ST2-2 Startup Transformer 2 (ST2) Lockout to 2A-903 ............................... 7 7.7 186-ST1-2 Startup Transformer 1 (ST1) Lockout to 2A-903 ............................... 8 8.0 Restoration .... ,................................................................................................................. 8 9.0 Test Results and Evaluation ...................................................................................... 8 10.0 M&TE Instrum entation ................................................................................................ 8 11.0 Sum m ary Inform ation ................................................................................................ 8 12.0 Attachm ents ..................................................................................................................... 8

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 3 of 12 Oblectives This ECT provides functional testing of the control cables for Swltchgear Cubicle 2A-903 that were damaged by the stator drop. 2A-903 ties the Unit 1 Al bus to the 2K9 (AAC) generator. This testing is being performed to ensure proper repair of the damage that occurred due to the ANO-1 Stator Drop Event.

This testing does not include system or performance testing of the load supplied by 2A-903.

This testing does not tie the 2A-903 breaker to a live bus.

(2.q, References 2 EC-44312 Al SWITCHGEAR CHILD EC, STATOR RECONSTRUCTION EN-DC-117 Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions E-4 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 Volt Main Supply E-90 Schematic Diagram Unit Auxiliary Trans. 4160V ACB

--. E-91 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram, Typical Startup Transformer No 1 4160 Air Circuit Breakers E-92 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram Startup No 2 4160 ACB'S E93 Sh 2 Schematic Diagram Switchgear Bus Lockout And Undervoltage Relays 2Z E94 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram Startup Transformers No. 1 & No. 2 Lockout Relays E-1 38 Schematic Diagram Generator Protection And Lockout Relay SE-505 Sh 1 Connection Diagram 4160 Volt Switchgear (non ES Units A 109 through Al 13 E-560 Sh 2 Connection Diagram Main Control Panel C20 Plant Protective Relay &Gen Recorder BDS

  • E-2600 Sh 11 Connection Diagram AAC Generator System Control Panel 2C436
  • E-2042 Sh 2 Logic Diagram AAC Generator System Tie Breakers 09040369-444 Circuit Schematic PLC-C Inputs 09040369-445 Circuit Schematic PLC-C Inputs Test Equipment

. Mufti-meter Test Jumpers Precautions and Limitations rCircuit Breakers associated with this testing have high levels of potential energy. Exercise caution when working in the area ifequipment is energized.

'Testing shall be done with the A-1 and A-2 Bus de-energized.

~Testing shall be done with the breaker 2A-903 racked out.

Test steps shall be performed in order unless authorized by the Test Engineer and the sequence change documented in the Test Log.

nY leads lifted or jumpers installed shall be controlled using a Lifted Lead and Jumper Sheet.

All M&TE equipment used during testing shall be recorded in section 10.0.

tllpersonnel performing test steps in this ECT shall complete the appropriate sections of the Signature Identification Log in section 12.0.

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 4 of 12 6*<The Test Engineer or designee shall maintain the Test Log in Section 12.0 per requirements of EN-DC-1 17 section 5.2 [11] (b).

I/'All test discrepancies shall be documented in the Test Deficiency Log in Section 12.0, including evaluation and resolution of each discrepancy.

The Test Engineer shall provide a post test summary, including evaluation of test results, in Section 11.0.

Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the word Check means to verify an expected condition exists without taking any further action to make it so.

4. Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the word VERIFY will mean if a breaker, switch, etc. is not in the desired position, place it in the desired position.

Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the words trip and open have the same meaning when verifying or placing a breaker, switch, etc. in a desired position.

4 Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, when a breaker is placed in the closed or trip position, it is understood that the switch handle will be released unless stated to hold in a position.

0 When installing jumpers, place tape on the adjacent terminals as a precaution against 4 Whenever possible, jumpers should be installed in a manner so as not to disturb rminations (i.e. gator clips, ez-hooks, etc.)

When racking up breakers, use the following sequence to charge the breaker springs:

.1 erify DC control breaker (BA) in the OPEN position.

F ull the racking handle forward.

& ce DC control breaker (BA) in the CLOSED position.

Release racking handle and check that springs charge.

Prerequisites (5 , Verify that the following connection diagrams have been yellowlined for cables listed:

DRAWING CABLE I

. .E-2600 sh 11 2C436C E-2600 sh 11 2C436B (Note: this cable is being relabeled as 2C436B1 E-505 sh 1 2C436C 51 E-560 sh 2 2C436B

., Vernfy all construction testing has been completed.

(.5 Verify that the Implementing Field Supervisor has signed the Return to Service Form and 2A-903 is ready for testing.

I7 Verify that the 2A-903 testing work order (00354318) has been authorized.

Perform a Pre-test Brief per EN-DC-117, Attachment 9.12, Pre-Test Briefing Guidelines.

Verify that personnel are on the appropriate clearances.

Verify breaker D11-03 is closed (125 VDC control power to Al).

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 5 of 12 Obtain permission from the Unit 1 Shift Manager prior to commencing testing.

~ ani permission from the Unit 2 Shift Manager prior to commencing testing.

Verify A-1 (186-Al) lockout is reset.

Verify 2A-903 is racked out.

Check the following breakers are racked up/open, springs charged with the Breaker BA closed--125 VDC control power):

A-112

.3 A-113 Instru nentation NONE Test InstructIons A-111 Trip To 2A-903 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2)

. At A-111, verify TSI -111 switch F is in the open position.

At A-1i12, verify TSl -112 switch G is in the open position.

,1. At C20, If SU-2 Lockout Relay (186-ST2-1) is tripped, then place TS-1 86-ST2-1, 4 '"-- switch 3 in the open position.

fi At A-11l, place local/remote handswitch (152/SEL) in the local position.

  • At A-i 11, place the local handswitch (152/CS) in the TRIP position.

.**heck breaker A-1 11 is TRIPPED.

At 2C436, check approximately 0 VDC present from terminal 1 to terminal 2, indicating a CLOSED contact.

At A-1 11, place the local handswitch (152/CS) in the close position.

Check breaker A-1 iis CLOSED.

At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 1 to terminal 2

~ýrldicating an OPEN contact.

lAt A-111, place the local handswitch:(152/CS) in the TRIP. position.

7At A-111, restore TSI-111 switch F to it's original position.

7. At A-1 12, restore TSI-112 switch G to it's original position.

!7" ,At C20, ifTS-1 86-ST2-1, switch 3 position was changed by this testing, then ro~restore to it's original position.

7 A-112 Trip To 2A-903 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2)

At A-112, verify TSI-112 switch F is in the open position.

At C20, verify TS-286-G1-2 switch 1 is in the open position.

At C20, verify TS-286-Gl -1 switch 6 is in the open position.

. At A-112, remove the "pie plate" from relay 127-Al-1.

At A-1 12, measure voltage from terminal block DD terminal 3 to terminal 12. 9 XI

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 6 of 12 the voltage is approximately zero (0) VDC, then lift the lead from terminal block DD terminal 3, otherwise N/A this step.

At A-1 12, place local/remote handswitch (152/SEL) in the local position.

At A-112, place the local handswitch (152/CS) in the TRIP position.

  • heck breaker A-1 12 is TRIPPED.

- Aýt 2C436, check approximately 0 VDC present from terminal 3 to terminal 4, indicating a CLOSED contact.

At A-i 12, place the local handswitch (152/CS) in the close position.

Check breaker A-112 is CLOSED.

-4'A t 2C436, check approximately 125 VOC present from terminal 3 to terminal 4 indicating an OPEN contact. I t.,/5UcP 1 At A-1 12, place the local handswitch (152/CS) in the TRIP position.

aýýA A-1 12, restore the "pie plate" in relay 127-Al-1.

A-1 12, restore TS1I-112 switch F to it's original position.

t A-112, if internal lead was lifted from terminal block DD, terminal 3, reterm the

,ýOlead. Otherwise N/A this step.

0 C20, restore TS-286-G1 -2 switch 1 to it's original position.

At C20, restore TS-286-G1-1 switch 6 to it's original position.

1" A-1 13 Trip To 2A-903 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2)

NOTE: This testing is duplicated in ECT 44312-07. If ECT 44312-07 has completed this testing, then this test section can be marked N/A.

At A-111, verify TS1I-1 11 switch E, is in the open position.

. At A-112, verify TSl-112 switch E, is in the open position.

7 t*JAt C20, if SU-1 Lockout Relay (186-ST1-1) is tripped, then verify TS-186-ST1-1 I/switch 3, is in the open position.

7 At A-1 13, place local/remote handswitch (152/SEL) in the local position.

AtA 113, place the local handswitch (152/CS) in the TRIP position.

heck breaker A-113 is TRIPPED.

At 2C436, check approximately 0 VDC present from terminal 5 to terminal 6,6 ,,

indicating a CLOSED contact.

AtA-113, place the local handswitch (152/CS) in the close position.

~Check breaker A-113 is CLOSED.

J A 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 5 to terminal 6 indicating an OPEN contact. V

, At A-1 13, place the local handswitch (152/CS) in the TRIP position.

2At A-111, restore TSI -111 switch E, to its original position.

7e At A-112, restore TS1-112 switch E, to its original position.

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 7 of 12

( At C20, if TS-186-ST1-1, switch 3 position was changed by this testing, then restore to it's onginal position.

Al Bus Lockout trip to 2A-903 (186-AlX) (E-2600 Sh 11, E-505 Sh 1) t A-112, check Bus lockout relay 186-Al is reset.

-At 2C436, check 125 VDC present from terminal 7 to terminal 8, indicating an OPEN contact.

(*At A-112, place a hand held jumper from terminal Block CC terminal 10 to terminal 12.

(* *t 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 7 to terminal 8, indicating a c L-i CLOSED contact.

At A-112, remove the hand held jumper from terminal Block CC terminal 10 to terminal 12.

,*At 20436, check 125 VDC present from terminal 7 to terminal 8, indicating an

)9 1"'OPEN contact. 1 -5 P 07*86-G 1-2 Generator Lockout Trip to 2A-903 (E- 138, E-2042 Sh 2, E-2600 Sh 11, E-560

  • At C20, If generator lockout 286-G1 -2 is reset, then lift the black lead in cable C436B from TB-3, terminal block 2C436, terminal 113.

.2 At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 37 to terminal 38, rindicating an OPEN contact.

J. V

.Iý.,At C20, place a hand held jumper from TB-3 Terminal block 2C436, terminal 484t

.14.  :,%,  ; e c' L1 7.5.4 At 2C436, check approximately 0 VDC present from terminal 37 to terminal 38, 0

'* ndicating a CLOSED contact.

7 .5 t C20, remove the hand held jumper from TB-3 Terminal block 2C436, terminal "Z 113 to 114.

At C20, if the black lead in cable 2C436B was lifted from TB-3, terminal block

<2ý2C436, terminal 113, then reterm the lifted lead. yz.

/'**'* 86-T2-~t~~a",*rm~f'2**L:Lo~*<o*ut*o 2*f903 (E-20?¢42* Sh 2, E-2600 Sh 11,

~E-560 Sh 2)

SAt C20, If ST2 lockout 186-ST2-2 is tripped, then lift the red lead in cable 2C436B from TB-3, terminal block 2C436, terminal 115.

'At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 39 to terminal 40, ,-,*

indicating an OPEN contact.

S7 At 020, place a hand held jumper from TB-3 Terminal block 2C436, terminal 115 to

__At 2C436, check approximately 0 VDC present from terminal 39 to terminal 40, indicating a CLOSED contact.

)~At C20, remove the hand held jumper from TB-3 Terminal block 2C436, terminal

( 115 to 116.

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 7 of 12

( At C20, ifTS-1 86-ST1-1. switch 3 position was changed by this testing, then restore to It's original position.

Al Bus Lockout trip to 2A-903 (186-A1X) (E-2600 Sh 11, E-505 Sh 1)

At A-1 12, check Bus lockout relay 186-Al is reset.

At 20436, check 125 VDC present from terminal 7 to terminal 8, Indicating an 12S Lý)

OPEN contact.

At A-1 12, place a hand held jumper from terminal Block CC terminal 10 to terminal 12.

7xV At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 7 to terminal 8, indicating a )Vb C X5 LOSED contact.

SAt A-1 12, remove the hand held jumper from terminal Block CC terminal 10 to termInal 12.

W7. "At 2C436, check 125 VDC present from terminal 7 to terminal 8, indicating an 5,/

12 S

)*-' OPEN contact.

(K2186-Gl-2 Generator Lockout Trip to 2A-903 (E-138, E-2042 Sh 2, E-2600 Sh 11, E-560

" Sh 2)

~At C20, Ifgenerator lockout 286-G1-2 is reset, then lift the black lead in cable

  • _ C436B from TB-3, terminal block 2C436, terminal 113.

(7.,At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 37 to terminal 38, IZ5 VP*

indicating an OPEN contact.

7.F53 At G20, place a hand hold jumpor firom TB1 3Terminal bloc~k=4C36, torMinal 113 to TCM/-

444.4 7.*.51 OC436. *r@GL e)M- *pru-impmy liat \lr praeant from tarmlnl 37 Wn tarrnigl-IL indicating a CLOSED contact.

7 *5.A A G2 20,et, ... e han;

. .l jumpr from T Trmin,-l Q-F3 bloak 2C436. tarminA2 113 to 114.

7.5.f0 At C20, Ifthe black lead in cable 2C436B was lifted from TB-3, terminal block 2C436, terminal 113, then reterm the lifted lead.

....e

. ......... ......::. ...... . . .. . ..... . .......... .

  • 7// 186-ST2-2 Start up Transformer 2 (ST2) Lockout to 2A-903 (E-2042 Sh 2, E-2600 Sh 11, E-560 Sh 2)

/7- At C20, If ST2 lockout 186-ST2-2 Is tripped, then lift the red lead in cable 2C436B

/ from TB-3, terminal block 2C436, terminal 115.

7 ' At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 39 to terminal 40, 9 indicating an OPEN contact. 13Z V.D-

7. . At C20, place a hand held jumper from TB-3 Terminal block 2C436, terminal 115 to 116.
7. At 2C436, check approximately 0 VDC present from terminal 39 to terminal 40, i/indicating a CLOSED contact.

7.* At C20, remove the hand held jumper from TB-3 Terminal block 2C436, terminal W.115 to 116.

t- --T-

ý-C Cob Sý (/V G-ff 2 /9 - q 0 'ý eo,j P7ýq o-ý- )2-286-G1-2 Generator Lockout Trip to 2A-903 Keep 7.5.1 and 7.5.2 as performed.

Delete 7.5.3 through 7.5.5.

Step 7.5.6 becomes 7.5.3.

f-6I k C20, if black lead in cable 2C436B was lifted from TB-3, terminal block "2C436,terminal 113, then re-term the lifted lead.

0 A 2C436,Check approximately 0 VDC present from terminal 37 to 38, indicatng a CLOSED contact.

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 8 of 12 (dj t)t C20, if the red lead in cable 2C436B was lifted from TB-3, terminal block 2C436,

- terminal 115, then reterm the lifted lead.

' 86-ST1 -2 Start up Transformer 1 (ST1) Lockout to 2A-903 (E-2042 Sh 2, E-2600 Sh 11, E Sh 2)

At C20, If ST1 lockout 186-ST1-2 is tripped, then lift the orange lead in cable 2C436B from TB-3, terminal block 2C436, terminal 117.

t 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 41 to terminal 42, , v

<ýý -krndicating an OPEN contact.

(7. 7 At C20, place a hand held jumper from TB-3 Terminal block 2C436, terminal 117 to

" J--

118.

At 2C436, check approximately 0 VDC present from terminal 41 to terminal 42, 6w

- indicating a CLOSED contact.

  • At 020, remove the hand held jumper from TB-3 Terminal block 20436, terminal 7 to 118.

C20, ifthe ORANGE lead in cable 2C436B was lifted from TB-3, terminal block t2C436, terminal 117, then reterm the lifted lead.

Restoration

.'Veify that all lifted leads have been reterminated.

-~Ve "the following breakers are in the OPEN position.

/A A-111 "84 ,A-112 8L A-113 f Test Results and Evaluation 1 Verify all test steps have been completed satisfactory.

M&TE Instrumentation

.. E O4eDu MA 25'f 5o//// 3 1 Summary Information 11.1 Record any test deficiencies and their resolution in the test deficiency log.

1 Aftachments:

  • EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.8 - Test Change Notice W EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.9 - Test Log WEN-DC-117 Attachment 9.10 - Test Deficiency Log

(*EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.11 -Signature Identification Log

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 10 of 12 ATTACHMENT 9.9 TEST LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: EC.T-4+9 S) z - 0 3 Page . of 2-Date Entry Initials 9/1/3/13203a w4!) F5. A 1:F1414C.t br Is 1

___5_e- 1 p,- -13pjp1-Tjý

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 10 of 12 ATTACHMENT 9.9 TEST Loa SHEET 1 OF 1

__-__ __ _ _ _ _ _ Page-.ýOfI Test Number: ECT/STI:

Date Entry Initials; SLY___ imn-'7. 5,y.7 T2 -A -ZitmIIP Sct ZU6D2) 5,CTof4-ki7 1-5 I t

ATTACHMENT 9.10 TEST DEFICIENCY Loo SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: eC" - *"+ I Z - 3 P U/ C c5 PageJof_._

DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION DATE/TIME NUMBER Srfd VM 6 7.5. - 7//7/3zps pe 1e f d zce ___t___2___C r I 5 fe .reqcl DweO1 = c)'A sAo I 7/9/, MaoI briv/ be,=h n/oreJ L+'U~e~ek7 hIQ,,.L/;)'+pd ____

ike nP,4 rooPd, 4 -fro W T-3,'&pem cqHit +b 2cn

  • +I.!. ;,,ctl 3 .,

+/-Ceyni;nil -T 7=1//-. - ,

m CLs' *72' d .ora4-cct b;

  • 2 *.J,-. Cy-2r, .

rt Qd L <- Dc+o Y-t*+

v~7eo1~~flpL~a §c~+/- -tJ l P7I.-O1c ne Th o- II 5 '; 0 L - ctb l )fý EN-DC-117 R5

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Page 12 of 12 ATTACHMENT 9.11 SIGNATURE IDENTIFICATION LOG SHEET 1 OF I Test Number: ECT/STI: -F CT -44t3 /a2--3 /? 4e. V. 0 0 L) P..._J_.fL Name Title Signature Initials

__ ____Clay ...-..

R s4 ... . /0..

ECT-44312-03 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-903 Sheet 1 of 1 TEST PROCEDURE

SUMMARY

All anticipated test results were obtained except one. A TCN was performed to modify the test, fulfilling the original intent of the uncompleted test step and obtaining the expected result. No other deficiencies were encountered. Breaker A-1 12 had to be racked down to access Terminal Blocks CC and DD, but this had no effect on any steps performed or results obtained from this procedure.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 1 of 23 ATTACHMENT 9.6 TEST PROCEDURE COVER SHEET Sheet 1 of 1 TEST COVER SHEET TEST TYPE: Z ECT Procedure Dl ECT WO Dl STI Procedure Page I of 23 TEST #: 44313-06 REV. #: 0 Quality Class: [] OR 0 NOR TEST TITLE: A-501 Functional Dead-Bus Testing, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Feeder REVIEW (Print/Sign/Date) -

Test Engineer (TE): Susan Mitchell /11 - 7/

Technical Reviewer: k"I ~ 17~fC~

/7/13 CROSS-DISCIPLINE REVIEW Operations Department: /-."IAfJt _ _"_ __._\3 _ _/

Organization Maintenance ".: .- Ognal .

Organization Organization Organization Organization ADDITIONAL STI (ONLY) PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS EN-LI-100 Review: E] AttachedA 14- E--Other 10CFR50.59 Evaluation: El Not Required ed Other OSRC Approval []Not Regl* " ýMtg No. Date: Chair-man:,

TE Supervisor: */

TSCOPEINREVIEW / ACCEPTANC*E Summary of Test Results:

Responsible Engineer (RE)': _

Test Engineer (TE): /

Technical Reviewer I TE Supervisor: /

if required for confirmation of assumptions made inthe development of the EC.

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 2 of 23 Table of Contents 1.0 Objectives .................................................................................................................................... 3 2.0 References .................................................................................................................................. 3 3.0 Test Equipm ent ........................................................................................................................... 4 4.0 Precautions and Lim itations ................................................................................................ 4 5.0 Prerequisites ............................................................................................................................... 5 6.0 Instrum entation ........................................................................................................................... 5 7.0 Test Instructions ......................................................................................................................... 5 7.1 Fuse Checks ..................................................................................................................... 5 7.2 DC Power .......................................................................................................................... 5 7.3 Local Control ............................................................................................................... 6 7.4 Protective Relay Trip Functional Check ........................................................................ 8 7.5 Remote Control ............................................................................................................ 9 7.6 Output Interlocks ........................................................................................................ 11 7.7 M iscellaneous Items ................................................................................................... 11 8.0 Restoration ................................................................................................................................ 17 9.0 Test Results and Evaluation ................................................................................................ 17 10.0 M&TE Instrum entation ........................................................................................................ 18 11.0 Sum m ary Inform ation .......................................................................................................... 19 12.0 Attachm ents: ............................................................................................................................. 20 12.1 EN-DC-117 Attachment 9.11 - Signature Identification Log ....................................... 20 12.2 EN-DC-117 Attachment 9.9 -Test Log ..................................................................... 20 12.3 EN-DC- 117 Attachm ent 9.10- Test Deficiency Log ..................................................... 20 12.4 Test Change Notices ................................................................................................... 20

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 3 of 23 1.0 Objectives 1.1 This ECT provides functional testing of Switchgear Cubicle A-501, which supplies Control Rod Drive System Transformer X8. Testing is being performed as a result of cubicle replacement due to damage which occurred during the ANO-1 Stator Drop Event.

1.2 Testing performed per this ECT will be done with BUSES A-1 and A-2 DE-ENERGIZED.

1.3 This testing does not include system or performance testing of the load supplied by A-501.

2.0 References 2.1 EC-44313, A2 SWITCHGEAR CHILD EC, STATOR RECONSTRUCTION 2.2 EN-DC-117, Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions 2.3 E-4 Sh 1, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram, 4160 Volt System, Main Supply 2.4 E-61 Sh 22 Panel Schedule, 10LA (P30) 2.5 E-76 Sh 1, Schematic Diagram, Typical Circuit Breaker 6900V & 4160V Switchgear 2.6 E-79 Sh 1, Schematic Diagram, Typical internal Wiring Diagram, Load Center Trans FDR Protection 2.7 E-34, Schematic Meter & Relay Diagram, 4160V System, Main Supply 2.8 E-94 Sh 1, Schematic Diagram, Startup Transformers No. 1 & No. 2, Lockout Relays 2.9 E-104 Sh 1G, Schematic Diagram, Load Center Trans Feeder, Main Supply ACB 2.10 E-480 Sh 1, Schematic Diagram, Computer Digital Inputs, Schemes C9814, C9815 & C9828 2.11 E-505 Sh 6, Connection Diagram, 4160V Switchgear (Non-ES) Units A211 through A501 2.12 E-557 Sh 3, Connection Diagram, Control Panel C03 2.13 E-560Sh2, Connection Diagram, Main Control Panel C20, Plant Protective Relay & Gen Recorder BDS 2.14 E-561 Sh 2, Connection Diagram, Main Control Panel C10, Electrical Auxiliary System 2.15 VP E-8-AC-164, Power & Control Circuits, 480 L.C. Trans Feeders - Unit A501 2.16 VP E-8-AC-167, Metal Clad Switchgear Connection Diagram 2.17 VP E-8-AC-100, Metal Clad Switchgear Connection Diagram 2.18 VP E8-AC-14, Section Views 2.19 WO 354198 A-501 Dead Bus Functional Testing

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 4 of 23 3.0 Test Equipment 3.1 Multi-meter 3.2 Lamp connection test setup for CT testing capable of supplying 1 to 2 Amps from a nominal 120 VAC source - suggest a series light bulb for a current limited supply with alligator clips for connecting to the CT circuit.

3.3 Temporary test jumper with momentary switch and alligator clips or mini-grabber ends so that terminals do not need to be disturbed to insert jumper.

3.4 Three (3) GE relay test plugs with three (3) digital ammeters connected from stud 3 to stud 5.

4.0 Precautions and Limitations 4.1 Circuit Breakers associated with this testing have high levels of potential energy. Exercise caution when working in the area ifequipment is energized.

4.2 All testing shall be done with the A-2 Bus DE-ENERGIZED and Differential Current Transformer testing shall also be done with A-1 Bus DE-ENERGIZED.

4.3 Test steps shall be performed in order unless authorized by the Test Engineer and the sequence change documented in the Test Log.

4.4 Any leads lifted or jumpers installed shall be controlled using a Lifted Lead and Jumper Sheet.

4.5 All M&TE equipment used during testing shall be recorded in section 10.0.

4.6 All personnel performing test steps in this ECT shall complete the appropriate sections of the Signature Identification Log in section 12.0.

4.7 The Test Engineer or designee shall maintain the Test Log in Section 12.0 per the requirements of EN-DC-117, Section 5.2 [11](b).

4.8 All test discrepancies shall be documented in the Test Deficiency Log in Section 12.0, including evaluation and resolution of each discrepancy.

4.9 The Test Engineer shall provide a post-test summary, including evaluation of test results, in Section 11.0.

4.10 Due to terminology differences between groups, the word CHECK means to verify an expected condition exists without taking any further action to make it so.

4.11 Due to terminology differences between groups, the word VERIFY means if a breaker, switch, etc. is not in the desired position, place it in the desired position.

4.12 Due to terminology differences between groups, the words TRIP and OPEN have the same meaning when verifying or placing a breaker, switch, etc. in a desired position.

4.13 Due to terminology differences between groups, when a breaker is placed in the closed or trip position, it is understood that the switch handle will be released unless stated to hold in a position.

4.14 When installing jumpers, place tape on the adjacent terminals as a precaution against shorting.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 5 of 23 5.0 Prerequisites 5.1 Verify that affected A-501 connection diagrams have been yellow-lined or as-built as required.

5.2 Verify Cubicle A-501 switchgear inspection complete satisfactory lAW OP-1416.501 and all A-501 relays and meter calibrations are current for the components listed below:

5.2.1 150/151 A 5.2.2 150/151 B 5.2.3 150/151 C 5.2.4 150GS 5.2.5 Local Ammeter 5.3 Verify that the Implementing Field Supervisor has signed the Return to Service Forms and verified A-501 is ready for testing.

5.4 Verify that the A-501 Testing Work Order 354198, Task 01 has been authorized.

5.5 Perform a Pre-test Brief per EN-DC-117, Attachment 9.12, Pre-Test Briefing Guidelines.

5.6 Verify A-501 is available or at least as a minimum has control power available.

5.7 Ensure that DC Control Power available to the A2 switchgear.

5.8 Ensure that test personnel are on the appropriate Clearances as required.

5.9 Verify that the A-501 CT shorting bars/jumpers are removed at Terminal Blocks D, E and F, as required, when field circuits are completed. Reference E-8-AC-167 and E-79 sh. 1.

6.0 Instrumentation 6.1 No instrumentation is required.

7.0 Test Instructions 7.1 Fuse Checks 7.1.1 Verify the following fuses installed in A-501 and are of the proper amperage:

  • UB (15A)

" UC (15A)

  • UR (35A)
  • UT (35A) 7.2 DC Power 7.2.1 Verify Breaker A-501 is racked down.

7.2.2 Verify 4160 Volt Switchgear A2 DC Control Power breaker (D21-03) is open.

7.2.3 Verify A-501 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located inside A-501 Cabinet open.

7.2.3.1 Verify all other DC input Control Power Breakers open in A2 as required.

7.2.3.2 Check nominal 0 VDC at line side of A-501 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located inside A-501.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 6 of 23 7.2.4 Close 4160 Volt Switchgear A2 DC Control Power breaker (D21-03).

7.2.4.1 Check nominal 125 VDC at line side of A-501 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located inside A-501 Cabinet.

7.2.4.2 Check polarity for the 125 VDC is correct at breaker BA line side (terminal 1-, terminal 3 +) (Reference drawing 6600-E-8-167) 7.2.4.3 Check nominal 0 VDC at load side of A-501 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) at A-501.

7.2.4.4 Check nominal 0 VDC at line side of fuses "UB" (pts. 1 and 3) at A-501.

7.2.4.5 Check nominal 0 VDC at line side of fuses "UC" (pts. 1 and 3) at A-501.

7.2.4.6 Check nominal 0 VDC at line side of fuses "UR" (pts. 1 and 3) at A-501.

7.2.4.7 Check nominal 0 VDC at line side of fuses "uT" (pts. 1 and 3) at A-501.

7.2.5 Close A-501 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located inside A-501 Cabinet.

7.2.5.1 Check nominal 125 VDC at load side of A-501 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) at A-501.

7.2.5.2 Check polarity and nominal 125 VDC at load side of fuses "UB" (pts. 2 (-)

and 4 (+)) at A-501.

7.2.5.3 Check polarity and nominal 125 VDC at load side of fuses "UC" (pts. 2 (-)

and 4 (+)) at A-501.

7.2.5.4 Check polarity and nominal 125 VDC at load side of fuses "UR" (pts. 2 (-)

and 4 (+)) at A-501.

7.2.5.5 Check polarity and nominal 125 VDC at load side of fuses "UT" (pts. 2 (-)

and 4 (+)) at A-501.

7.3 Local Control 7.3.1 Verify A-501 breaker installed and fully inserted but not racked up into A-501 cubicle.

7.3.2 Check Breaker A-501 OPEN flag visible on front of breaker.

7.3.3 Check A-501 breaker springs discharged by observing white DISCHARGED flag on front of breaker mechanism.

7.3.4 Open Test Switch TS-186-ST1-1, SW #5 at C20.

7.3.5 Verify A-501 DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located inside A-501 Cabinet CLOSED.

7.3.6 Verify LOCALIREMOTE handswitch at A-501 is in LOCAL.

7.3.7 Rack up Breaker A-501. Refer to OP-1107.001 Exhibit C.

7.3.7.1 Check A-501 spring charging motor operates (audible indication).

7.3.7.2 Check A-501 breaker springs charged by observing yellow CHARGED flag on front of breaker mechanism.

7.3.7.3 Check auxiliary contact disconnect block fully engaged.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 7 of 23 7.3.7.4 Check breaker auxiliary switch plunger gap exists and <1/8".

7.3.7.5 Check red CLOSED indicating light at A-501 is off.

7.3.7.6 Check green TRIPPED indicating light at A-501 is ON.

7.3.7.7 Check white BRKR SPRINGS CHARGED indicating light at A-501 is ON.

7.3.7.8 Check amber BREAKER ON LOCAL indicating light at A-501 is ON.

7.3.8 Monitor the white BRKR SPRINGS CHARGED indicating light at A-501 while performing the following:

7.3.8.1 Place local control switch at A-501 in the CLOSE position.

7.3.8.2 Check Breaker A-501 closes.

7.3.8.3 Check white BRKR SPRINGS CHARGED indicating light momentarily goes OFF.

7.3.8.4 Check red CLOSED indicating light at A-501 is ON.

7.3.8.5 Check green TRIPPED indicating light at A-501 is OFF.

7.3.9 Place local control switch at A-501 in the TRIP position.

7.3.9.1 Check Breaker A-501 trips.

7.3.9.2 Check red CLOSED indicating light at A-501 is OFF.

7.3.9.3 Check green TRIPPED indicating light at A-501 is ON.

7.3.10 Place LOCAL/REMOTE handswitch at A-501 in REMOTE.

7.3.10.1 Check green TRIPPED indicating light at A-501 is ON.

7.3.10.2 Check red CLOSED indicating light at A-501 is OFF.

7.3.11 Place local control switch at A-501 in the CLOSE position.

7.3.11.1 Check Breaker A-501 does not close.

7.3.12 Place LOCAL/REMOTE handswitch at A-501 in LOCAL.

7.3.13 Place local control switch at A-501 in the CLOSE position.

7.3.13.1 Check Breaker A-501 closes.

7.3.14 Place LOCAL/REMOTE handswitch at A-501 in REMOTE.

7.3.14.1 Check red CLOSED indicating light at A-501 is ON.

7.3.14.2 Check green TRIPPED indicating light at A-501 is OFF.

7.3.14.3 Check white BRKR SPRINGS CHARGED indicating light at A-501 is ON.

7.3.14.4 Check amber BREAKER ON LOCAL indicating light at A-501 is OFF.

7.3.15 Place local control switch at A-501 in the TRIP position.

7.3.15.1 Check Breaker A-501 trips.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 8 of 23 7.4 Protective Relay Trip Functional Check 7.4.1 Verify Test Switch TS-186-ST1-1, SW #5 at C20 is open.

7.4.2 Relay A-501 150/151A 7.4.2.1 Verify Breaker A-501 is closed.

7.4.2.2 Manually actuate the IOC (instantaneous) unit and check Breaker A-501 trips and relay target operates.

7.4.2.3 Close Breaker A-501.

7.4.2.4 Reset the relay target indicator.

7.4.2.5 Manually actuate the TOC (overcurrent induction) unit and check Breaker A-501 trips and relay target operates.

7.4,2.6 Close Breaker A-501.

7.4.2.7 Reset the relay target indicator.

7.4.3 Relay A-501 150/151B 7.4.3.1 Verify Breaker A-501 is closed.

7.4.3.2 Manually actuate the IOC (instantaneous) unit and check Breaker A-501 trips and relay target operates.

7.4.3.3 Close Breaker A-501.

7.4.3.4 Reset the relay target indicator.

7.4.3.5 Manually actuate the TOC (overcurrent induction) unit and check Breaker A-501 trips and relay target operates.

7.4.3.6 Close Breaker A-501.

7.4.3.7 Reset the relay target indicator.

7.4.4 Relay A-501 150/151 C 7.4.4.1 Verify Breaker A-501 is closed.

7.4.4.2 Manually actuate the IOC (instantaneous) unit and check Breaker A-501 trips and relay target operates.

7.4.4.3 Close Breaker A-501.

7.4.4.4 Reset the relay target indicator.

7.4.4.5 Manually actuate the TOC (overcurrent induction) unit and check Breaker A-501 trips and relay target operates.

7.4.4.6 Close Breaker A-501.

7.4.4.7 Reset the relay target indicator.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 9 of 23 7.4.5 Relay A-501 150GS 7.4.5.1 Verify Breaker A-501 is closed.

7.4.5.2 Manually actuate the 150GS (instantaneous ground sensor) unit and check Breaker A-501 trips and relay target operates.

7.4.5.3 Close Breaker A-501.

7.4.5.4 Reset the relay target indicator.

7.5 Remote Control 7.5.1 Verify Breaker A-501 is tripped.

7.5.2 If Startup Transformer #1 Lockout is TRIPPED (blue indication light on C20 is OFF), install a jumper across 186-ST1 -2, contacts12-12C in C20, TB 2, scheme A501, terminal points 1P1 and 1 (E-104 Sh. 1G and E-560 Sh. 2).

7.5.3 Verify Test Switch 186-ST1 -1, SW #5 at C20 open.

7.5.4 Verify LOCAL/REMOTE handswitch at A-501 is in REMOTE.

7.5.4.1 Check amber LOCAL indicating light for A-501 at C10 is OFF.

7.5.4.2 Check red CLOSED indicating light for A-501 at C10 is OFF.

7.5.4.3 Check green TRIPPED indicating light for A-501 at C10 is ON.

7.5.4.4 Check white CHARGD indicating light for A-501 at C10 is ON.

7.5.5 Monitor the white CHRGD indicating light for A-501 at C10 while performing the following:

7.5.5.1 Place A-501 CONTROL SWITCH (152-501/CS) at C10 in CLOSE.

7.5.5.2 Check Breaker A-501 closes.

7.5.5.3 Check white CHARGD indicating light momentarily goes OFF.

7.5.5.4 Check red CLOSED indicating light for A-501 at CIO is ON.

7.5.5.5 Check green TRIPPED indicating light for A-501 at C10 is OFF.

7.5.5.6 Check computer point HS1A501, CNT RD DRV TRANS 1X8 HV ACB is NORM.

7.5.6 Place A-501 CONTROL SWITCH (152-501/CS) at C10 in TRIP.

7.5.6.1 Check Breaker A-501 trips.

7.5.6.2 Check red CLOSED indicating light for A-501 at C10 is OFF.

7.5.6.3 Check green TRIPPED indicating light for A-501 at C10 is ON.

7.5.6.4 Check white CHARGD indicating light for A-501 at C1 0 is ON.

7.5.6.5 Check computer point HS1A501, CNT RD DRV TRANS 1X8 HV ACB is NORM.

7.5.7 Place A-501 CONTROL SWITCH (152-501/CS) at CIO in CLOSE.

7.5.7.1 Check Breaker A-501 closes.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 10 of 23 7.5.8 TRIP A-501 using PUSH BUTTON PB-0140 at C03.

7.5.8.1 Check Breaker A-501 trips.

7.5.8.2 Check computer point HS1A501, CNT RD DRV TRANS 1X8 HV ACB is TRIP.

7.5.9 Place A-501 CONTROL SWITCH (152-501/CS) at C10 in CLOSE.

7.5.9.1 Check Breaker A-501 closes.

7.5.10 If the Startup Transformer #1 lockout is not TRIPPED (blue indication light on C20 is ON) , jumper 186-ST1-1, contacts10-10C in C20, TB 2, scheme A501, terminal points 2P and 129 (E-560 Sh. 2);

7.5.10.1 Or if Startup Transformer #1 lockout is TRIPPED, close Test Switch TS-186-ST1-1, SW #5 at C20.

7.5.10.2 Check Breaker A-501 trips.

7.5.11 Verify Test Switch TS-186-ST1-1, SW #5 at C20 Open.

7.5.12 Remove jumper from 186-ST1-1, contacts I0-10C in C20, TB 2, scheme A501, terminal points 2P and 129 (E-560 Sh. 2) if installed.

7.5.13 Remove jumper from across 186-ST1-2, contacts12-12C in C20, TB 2, scheme A501, terminal pointslP1 and 1, if installed. (E-560 Sh. 2).

7.5.14 If the Startup Transformer #1 lockout is not TRIPPED (blue indication light on C20 is ON), lift lead at C20, TB 2, scheme A501, terminal point 1P1, to simulate Startup Transformer 1 lockout.

7.5.15 Place A-501 CONTROL SWITCH (152-501/CS) at C10 in CLOSE.

7.5.15.1 Check Breaker A-501 does not close.

7.5.16 Re-term lifted lead at C20, TB 2, scheme A501, terminal point 1P1, if previously lifted.

7.5.17 If Startup Transformer #1 Lockout is TRIPPED (blue indication light on C20 is OFF), install jumper across 186-ST1-2, contacts12-12C in C20, TB 2, scheme A501, terminal points 1P1 and 1. (E-560 Sh. 2).

7.5.18 Verify LOCAL/REMOTE handswitch at A-501 is in LOCAL.

7.5.18.1 Check amber LOCAL indicating light for A-501 at C10 is ON.

7.5.19 Place A-501 CONTROL SWITCH (152-501/CS) at C10 in CLOSE.

7.5.19.1 Check Breaker A-501 does not close.

7.5.20 Close Breaker A-501 using local control switch at A-501.

7.5.20.1 Check Breaker A-501 closes.

7.5.21 Place A-501 CONTROL SWITCH (152-501/CS) at C10 in TRIP.

7.5.21.1 Check Breaker A-501 does not trip.

7.5.22 Verify LOCAL/REMOTE handswitch at A-501 is in REMOTE.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 11 of 23 7.5.23 Place A-501 CONTROL SWITCH (152-501/CS) at C10 in TRIP.

7.5.23.1 Check Breaker A-501 trips.

7.5.24 Remove jumper across 186-ST1i-2, contacts12-12C in C20, TB 2, scheme A501, terminal points 1P1 and 1, if installed. (E-560 Sh. 2).

7.5.25 Close Test Switch 186-ST1 -1, SW #5 at C20.

7.6 Output Interlocks 7.6.1 None 7.7 Miscellaneous Items 7.7.1 Local Ammeter and Overcurrent Relays CT (75/5) 7.7.1.1 Verify the following relays in A-501 are installed and have their connection plugs installed:

  • 150/151A
  • 150/151B

" 150/151C NOTE CT polarity marks are typically a round dot near one of the two secondary wiring terminals or marks "Hi" for the primary and "Xl" for the secondary terminal.

7.7.2 Rear C Phase CT 7.7.2.1 Check "C" right phase (viewed from rear) CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the breaker primary disconnect.

NOTE Per E-8-AC-167 for CT device "ZA", the "C" phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 1. The opposite secondary wiring terminal is terminal 2.

7.7.2.1.1 Install the lamp test setup for the C Phase CT by connecting the test setup between C phase CT secondary terminal 2 and ground.

7.7.2.1.2 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

7.7.2.1.3 Place the ammeter switch in the "C" position.

7.7.2.1.3.1 Check that the ammeter indicator moves and indicates some level of current.

7.7.2.1.4 Place the ammeter switch in the "A" position.

7.7.2.1.4.1 Check that the ammeter indicates no current.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 12 of 23 7.7.2.1.5 Place the ammeter switch in the "B"position.

7.7.2.1.5.1 Check that the ammeter indicates no current.

7.7.2.1.6 Using a DMM set to measure AC voltage, check AC voltage detected across relay 150/151C terminal 5 to terminal 6 on back of relay case.

7.7.2.1.7 Remove the lamp test setup for the C Phase CT.

7.7.3 Rear A Phase CT 7.7.3.1 Check "A"right phase (viewed from rear) CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the breaker primary disconnect.

NOTE Per E-8-AC-167 for CT device "ZA", the "A"phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 3. The opposite secondary wiring terminal is terminal 4.

7.7.3.1.1 Install the lamp test setup for the A Phase CT by connecting the test setup between A phase CT secondary terminal 4 and ground.

7.7.3.1.2 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

7.7.3.1.3 Place the ammeter switch in the "A"position.

7.7.3.1.3.1 Check that the ammeter indicator moves and indicates some level of current.

7.7.3.1.4 Place the ammeter switch in the "C"position.

7.7.3.1.4.1 Check that the ammeter indicates no current.

7.7.3.1.5 Place the ammeter switch in the "B"position.

7.7.3.1.5.1 Check that the ammeter indicates no current.

7.7.3.1.6 Using a DMM set to measure AC voltage, check AC voltage detected across relay 150/151 A terminal 5 to terminal 6 on back of relay case.

7.7.3.1.7 Remove the lamp test setup for the A Phase CT.

7.7.4 Rear B Phase CT 7.7.4.1 Check "B"right phase (viewed from rear) CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the breaker primary disconnect.

NOTE Per E-8-AC-1 67 for CT device "ZA", the "B"phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 5. The opposite secondary wiring terminal is terminal 6.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 13 of 23 7.7.4.1.1 Install the lamp test setup for the B Phase CT by connecting the test setup between B phase CT secondary terminal 6 and ground.

7.7.4.1.2 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

7.7.4.1.3 Place the ammeter switch in the "B"position.

7.7.4.1.3.1 Check that the ammeter indicator moves and indicates some level of current.

7.7.4.1.4 Place the ammeter switch in the "C" position.

7.7.4.1.4.1 Check that the ammeter indicates no current.

7.7.4.1.5 Place the ammeter switch in the "A"position.

7.7.4.1.5.1 Check that the ammeter indicates no current.

7.7.4.1.6 Using a DMM set to measure AC voltage, check AC voltage detected across relay 150/151B terminal 5 to terminal 6 on back of relay case.

7.7.4.1.7 Remove the lamp test setup for the B Phase CT.

7.7.4.2 IF any protective relay(s) or lockout relay tripped, THEN reset relays and/or target(s).

7.7.5 Ground Sensor Relay CT (50/5) 7.7.5.1 Verify the 150GS relay in A-501 is installed and has its connection plug installed:

NOTE CT polarity marks are typically a round dot near one of the two secondary wiring terminals or marks "HI" for the primary and "Xl" for the secondary terminal.

7.7.5.2 Check "GS (viewed from rear) CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the breaker primary disconnect.

NOTE Per E-8-AC-167 for CT device "ZB", the "GS" CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 1. The opposite secondary wiring terminal is terminal 2.

7.7.5.2.1 Install the lamp test setup for the GS CT by connecting the test setup between GS CT secondary terminal 2 and ground.

7.7.5.2.1.1 Ifterminal 2 is not accessible, connect at TB E, pt 2.

7.7.5.2.2 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

7.7.5.2.3 Using a DMM set to measure AC voltage, check AC voltage detected across relay 150GS terminal 5 to terminal 6 on back of relay case.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 14 of 23 7.7.5.2.4 Remove the lamp test setup for the GS CT.

7.7.6 Startup Transformer #1 Differential Current Transformers (800015 in A-501 bus compartment) - Reference E-34 and E-8-AC-167 device "ZC".

7.7.6.1 Testing of the Differential Relay CTs shall be done with the A-1 and A-2 Buses DE-ENERGIZED.

NOTE Connecting plugs are tagged out for SU-1 TMOD. Test Plugs are not connecting plugs and can be installed in relays that are tagged out.

7.7.6.2 Obtain three (3) GE protective relay test plugs.

7.7.6.3 Verify the three (3) relay test plugs have shorting jumpers installed from stud 4 to stud 5 and from stud 6 to stud 5.

7.7.6.4 Connect three (3) digital ammeters to the three (3) relay test plugs from stud 3 to stud 5.

7.7.6.5 Mark the ammeters with temporary labels "A", "B", & "C" 7.7.6.6 Verify ammeters are connected and set to measure AC current in the 0 to 2 A range or in automatic range mode.

7.7.6.7 Verify the following Startup #1 Transformer (ST1) differential current relays in C20 have their connection plugs removed:

" 187-ST1/A

  • 187-ST1/B

" 187-ST1/C 7.7.6.8 Install the three (3) relay test plugs with three (3) connected and marked ammeters in the corresponding phase differential current relay:

  • 187-ST1/A

" 187-ST1/B

" 187-STI/C 7.7.6.9 Remove A-501 front horizontal bus cover(s) as required to visually inspect and access the window type CTs between the breaker primary disconnects and the A-2 horizontal bus.

NOTE CT polarity marks are typically a round dot near one of the two secondary wiring terminals or marks "Hi" for the primary and "X1" for the secondary terminal.

7.7.6.10 Front C Phase CT 7.7.6.10.1 Check "C" left phase (viewed from front) CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the horizontal bus (top side).

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 15 of 23 NOTE Per E-8-AC-167 for CT device "ZC", the "C" phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 1.

7.7.6.10.2 Install the lamp test setup for the C Phase CT by connecting the test setup between "C" phase CT secondary terminal 1 (near polarity mark) and ground.

7.7.6.10.3 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

NOTE All three test ammeters should indicate some current flow, but current through "A"and "Er phases is expected to be a traction of the current through "C" phase if the CT circuit is connected properly.

7.7.6.10.4 Check that all three ammeters connected to the test plugs in the C20 ST1 differential current relays indicate current flow:

  • 187-ST1/A ammeter "A"

" 187-ST11B ammeter "B"

" 187-ST1/C ammeter "C" 7.7.6.10.5 Check ammeter "C" in relay 187-STl/C indicates more current than ammeter "A"in relay 187-ST1/A and ammeter "B"in relay 187-ST1/B.

7.7.6.10.6 Remove the lamp test setup for the C Phase CT.

7.7.6.11 Front A Phase CT 7.7.6.11.1 Check "A"middle phase CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the horizontal bus (top side).

NOTE Per E-8-AC-167 for CT device "ZC", the "A"phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 3.

7.7.6.11.2 Install the lamp test setup for the A Phase CT by connecting the test setup between "A"phase CT secondary terminal 3 (near polarity mark) and ground.

7.7.6.11.3 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

NOTE All three test ammeters should indicate some current flow, but current through "B"and "C" phases is expected to be a fraction of the current through "A"phase ifthe CT circuit is connected properly.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 16 of 23 7.7.6.11.4 Check that all three ammeters connected to the test plugs in the C20 ST1 differential current relays indicate current flow:

" 187-ST1/A ammeter "A"

" 187-STI/B ammeter "B"

" 187-ST1/C ammeter "C" 7.7.6.11.5 Check ammeter "A"in relay 187-ST1/A indicates more current than ammeter "B"in relay 187-ST1/B and ammeter C" in relay 187-STl/C.

7.7.6.11.6 Remove the lamp test setup for the A Phase CT.

7.7.6.12 Front B Phase CT 7.7.6.12.1 Check "B" right phase (viewed from front) CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the horizontal bus (top side).

NOTE Per E-8-AC-1 67 for CT device "ZW", the "B"phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 5.

7.7.6.12.2 Install the lamp test setup for the B Phase CT by connecting the test setup between "B"phase CT secondary terminal 5 (near polarity mark) and ground.

7.7.6.12.3 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

NOTE All three test ammeters should indicate some current flow, but current through "A"and "C" phases is expected to be a small fraction of the current through "B" phase ifthe CT circuit is connected properly.

7.7.6.12.4 Check that all three ammeters connected to the test plugs in the C20 ST1 differential current relays indicate current flow:

" 187-ST1/A ammeter "A"

" 187-ST1/B ammeter "B"

  • 187-ST1/C ammeter "C" 7.7.6.12.5 Check ammeter "B"in relay 187-ST1/B indicates more current than ammeter "A"in relay 187-ST1/A and ammeter C" in relay 187-ST1/C.

7.7.6.12.6 Remove the lamp test setup for the B Phase CT.

7.7.6.13 Re-install any A-501 front horizontal bus cover(s) that were removed to visually inspect and access the window type CTs between the breaker primary disconnects and the A-2 horizontal bus.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 17 of 23 7.7.6.14 Remove the three (3) relay test plugs with three (3) ammeters in the ST1 differential current relays in C20.

7.7.6.15 Verify the following Startup #1 Transformer (STI) differential current relays in C20 have their connection plugs re-installed or tagged out:

" 187-ST1/A

  • 187-ST1/B

" 187-ST1/C 8.0 Restoration 8.1 Verify Breaker A-501 is tripped or racked out or leave as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

8.2 Verify/Remove jumper across 186-ST1 -2, contacts12-12C in C20, TB 2, A501, 1 P1 and 1 (E-560 Sh. 2).

8.3 Close Test Switch 186-ST1-1, 5 at C20 or leave as directed by Operations.

9.0 Test Results and Evaluation 9.1 No test data sheets are required for this test. See section 11.0 for discussion of test results / summary.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 18 of 23 10.0 M&TE Instrumentation Record the appropriate information for all M&TE equipment used in the following table.

Record the applicable M&TE Record Test Step for Recorded By / Date Information (e.g. instrument #, cal which the M&TE was due date, instrument range, etc.) used

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 19 of 23 11.0 Summary Information 11.1 Test Summary Record any additional pertinent information obtained during testing not recorded in section 7 or the Test Log and provide a post test summary.

Test Step # Summary or Additional Information Recorded By / Date 11.2 Test Deficiencies Record any test deficiencies and document the evaluation / resolution of the deficiency in the Test Deficiency Log in section 12.0.

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page 20 of 23 12.0 Attachments:

12.1 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.11 - Signature Identification Log 12.2 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.9 - Test Log 12.3 EN-DC-117 Attachment 9.10 - Test Deficiency Log 12.4 Test Change Notices

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Attachment 12.1 ATrACHMENT 9.11 SIGNATURE IDENTIFICATION LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STh: 44313-06 Rev OOOSWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Page of Name Title Signature Initials

_______ I______ I ________ I ___

4 4. -+

4 .4. +

4 + +

4 *I. .4.

I 'I-I *I- +

I 4.

4 + 4 4 + 4 I 4-

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Attachment 12.2

[1] ATTACHMENT 9.9 TEST LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: 44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Xfr X8 Page-of Date I Entry Initials 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 I I 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 I I 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 I A 1 A

ECT-44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer X8 Attachment 12.3

[2] ATTACHMENT 9.10 TEST DEFICIENCY LOG SHEET 1 OF I Test Number: ECT/STI: 44313-06 Rev 000 SWGR A-501, Control Rod Drive Transformer XB Pageof...

DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION DATE/TIME NUMBER I I 4.

I I.

¶ .1.

I _ _

  • 4 t 4
  • I b 4

Doc27. :-D ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 1 of 23 ATTACHMENT 9.6 TEST PROCEDURE COVER SHEET Sheet I of 1 TEST COVER SHEET TEST TYPE: 0 ECT Procedure 0l ECT WO El STI Procedure Page 1 of 23 TEST #: ECT-44312-07 REV. #: 0 Ouality Class: El OR 0 NOR TEST TITLE: Functional Testing for A-i Startup 1 Feeder Breaker A-1 13 REVIEW (Print/SIgr/Date)

Test Engineer (TE): A. Spencer ,

Technical Reviewer: C. Shively 0 173&'

CROSS-DISCIPLINE REVIEW Operations Department: K. McNeaill . / ___,\\_

.S q Organization Maint.  :/ -- ____ __,,,

Organization Organization

_ __ _ _ / __ _ __

Organization Organization ADDITIONAL STI (ONLY) PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS EN-LI-100 Review: 0l Attached Other 10CFR50.59 Evaluation: []Not Required [I Attached 0] Other OSRC Approval []Not Required Mtgl No. Date: Chairman:

,APPROVAL(Print/'Sign/Date)

TEST COMPLETION REVIEW / ACCEPTAN*3 Summary of Test Results:

Responsible Engineer (RE)': I Test Engineer (TE): /

Technical Reviewer /

TE Supervisor: /

'If required for confirmation of assumptions made in the development of the EC.

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 2 of 23 Table of Contents 1.0 Oblectives .................................................................................................. ....... 3 2.0 References ....................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 Test Equipm ent .......................................................................................................... 4 4.0 Precautions and Lim itations ............................................................................. 4 5.0 Prerequisites ............................................................................................................. 5 6.0 Instrum entation .......................................................................................................... 6 7.0 Test Instructions ........................................................................................................ 6 7.1 DC Power .................................................................................................................. 6 7.2 Local Control ........................................................................................................ 7 7.3 Rem ote Operation .............................................................................................. 9 7.4 A-113/2A-903 Interface ....................................................................................... 12 7.5 Unit Aux XFM R Protection .............................................................................. 12 7.6 STI Lockout Trip (186-ST1-1) To A113 ............................................................ 13 7.7 STI Current Transform ers ................................................................................ 14 7.8 A-113 Synchronization Circuit ........................................................................ 16 7.9 Cubical Heater ................................................................................................... 16 7.10 Breaker trip Alarm A-308 ........................................................................................... 17 8.0 Restoration .................................................................................................................... 18 9.0 Test Results and Evaluation ......................................................................................... 18 10.0 M&TE Instrum entation ............................................................................................... 199 11.0 Sum m ary Inform ation .............................................................................................. 19 12.0 Attachm ents .............................................................................................................. 19

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 3 of 23 1.0 Objectives 1.1 This ECT provides functional testing of Switchgear Cubicle A-113, which supplies the Al bus.

Testing is being performed as a result of damage which occurred during the ANO-1 Stator Drop Event.

1.2 This testing does not include system or performance testing of the load supplied by A-1 13.

1.3 The A-1 13 trip to A-308 trip will be tested as part of EC-43758 TMOD removal and will not be tested by this ECT.

2.0 References 2.1 EC-44312 Al SWITCHGEAR CHILD EC, STATOR RECONSTRUCTION 2.2 EN-DC-117 Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions 2.3 E-4 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 Volt Main Supply 2.4 E-17 Sh 1 Red Train Vital AC and 125 VDC Single Line and Distribution.

2.5 E-31 Sh 1 System Phasing &Synchronizing Diagram 2.6 E-34 Sh 1 Schematic Meter Diagram And Relay Diagram 2.7 E-61 Sh 22 Panel Schedule No. 10 LA (P30) 2.8 E-76 Sh IA Schematic Diagram Typical Circuit Breaker 6900 V Switchgear 2.9 E-87 Schematic Diagram Unit Auxiliary Trans 6900 V ACB'S 2.10 E-90 Schematic Diagram Unit Auxiliary Trans. 4160V ACB 2.11 E-91 Sh I Schematic Diagram, Typical Startup Transformer No 1 4160 Air Circuit Breakers 2.12 E-92 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram Startup No 2 4160 ACB'S 2.13 E93 Sh 2 Schematic Diagram Switchgear Bus Lockout And Undervoltage Relays 2.14 E94 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram Startup Transformers No. 1 & No. 2 Lockout Relays 2.15 E-100 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator ACB 2.16 E-138 Schematic Diagram Generator Protection And Lockout Relay 2.17 E-104 Sh 1G, Schematic Diagram Load Center Trans Feeder Main Supply ACB 2.18 E-418 Sh 7 Schematic Diagram 4.16 KV Bus Feeder Breaker Trip Reflash Annunciator 2.19 E-452 Sh 2 Schematic Diagram Annunciator K02 (ON Panel CIO) 2.20 E-452 Sh 3 Schematic Diagram Annunciator K02 (ON Panel C1O) 2.21 E-480 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram Computer Digital Inputs 2.22 E-482 Sh 60 Connection Schedule Computer Digital Input 2.23 E-505 Sh 1 Connection Diagram 4160 Volt Switchgear (non ES Units A-109 through A-1 13 2.24 E-505 Sh 6 Connection Diagram 4160 Volt Switchgear (non ES Units A 111 through A501 2.25 E-506 Sh 9C ES Bus A4 Feeder GE Unit No. A409 Comp, A409 Int & Ext Wiring 2.26 E-560 Sh 1 Connection Diagram Main Control Panel C20 Plant Protective Relay &Gen Recorder BDS 2.27 E-560 Sh 2, Connection Diagram Main Control Panel C20 Plant Protective Relay &Gen Recorder BDS 2.28 E-561 Sh 4, Connection Diagram Main Control Panel CIO Electrical Auxiliary System 2.29 E-2116 Sh 11 Schematic Diagram AAC Generator System 4160 V Bus 2A9 Differential Circuit 2.30 E-2600 Sh 11 Connection Diagram AAC Generator System Control Panel 2C436

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 4 of 23 2.31 E-8-AC-85 Metal Clad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram 2.32 E-8-AC-84 Metal Clad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram 2.33 E-8-AC-86 Metal Clad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram 2.34 E-8-AC-100 Metal Clad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram 2.35 M-201-56 Wiring Diagram for Plant Protective Relays & Generator Recorder No. 8 2.36 940369 Sh 444 Circuit Schematic PLC-C Inputs 3.0 Test Equipment 3.1 Multi-meter 3.2 Lamp connection (for CT testing) 3.3 Test Jumpers 3.4 Two 120 VAC power sources 4.0 Precautions and Limitations 4.1 Circuit Breakers associated with this testing have high levels of potential energy. Exercise caution when working in the area if equipment is energized.

4.2 Testing shall be done with the A-1 and A-2 Bus de-energized and A-1 grounded.

4.3 Test steps shall be performed in order unless authorized by the Test Engineer and the sequence change documented in the Test Log.

4.4 Any leads lifted or jumpers installed shall be controlled using a Lifted Lead and Jumper Sheet.

4.5 All M&TE equipment used during testing shall be recorded in section 10.0.

4.6 All personnel performing test steps in this ECT shall complete the appropriate sections of the Signature Identification Log in section 12.0.

4.7 The Test Engineer or designee shall maintain the Test Log in Section 12.0 per requirements of EN-DC-1 17 section 5.2 [11 ] (b).

4.8 All test discrepancies shall be documented in the Test Deficiency Log in Section 12.0, including evaluation and resolution of each discrepancy.

4.9 The Test Engineer shall provide a post test summary, including evaluation of test results, in Section 11.0.

4.10 Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the word Check is means to verify an expected condition exists without taking any further action to make it SO.

4.11 Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the word VERIFY will mean if a breaker, switch, etc. is not in the desired position, place it in the desired position.

4.12 Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the words trip and open have the same meaning when verifying or placing a breaker, switch, etc. in a desired position.

4.13 Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, when a breaker is placed in the closed or trip position, it is understood that the switch handle will be released unless stated to hold in a position.

4.14 When installing jumpers, place tape on the adjacent terminals as a precaution against shorting.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 5 of 23 4.15 Whenever possible, jumpers should be installed in a manner so as not to disturb terminations (i.e. gator clips, ez-hooks, etc.)

5.0 Prerequisites 5.1 Verify external connection diagram E-505 Sh. 1 has been yellow-lined or as-built for connections to A-i 13.

5.2 Verify cubicle A-1 13 Switchgear testing completed satisfactory lAW OP-1416.001.

5.3 Verify that the Implementing Field Supervisor has signed the Return to Service Form and verified A-1 13 is ready for testing.

5.4 Verify that the A-1 13 Testing Work Order 354186 Task 04 has been set to working.

5.5 Perform a Pre-test Brief per EN-DC-1 17, Attachment 9.12, Pre-Test Briefing Guidelines.

5.6 Verify that construction is complete and all Al switchgear cubicles (A-1 02 through A-1 16) are ready for DC power to be energized.

5.7 Verify that 4160 volt switchgear Al control power breaker (D11-03) is closed to Al switchgear. (Ref E-17 sh 1) 5.8 Verify that 120 VAC Al space heater power breaker (1OLA-31) is closed or tagged out.

(Ref E-61 sh 22) 5.9 Verify the following potential transformer fuses on A-1 are withdrawn to prevent any possibility of inadvertent back-feed during secondary circuit energized testing.

5.9.1 A-103 Bus PT Fuses (Reference E-8-AC-82 Device PA) 5.9.2 A-1 13 PT Fuses (Reference E-8-AC-86 Device PA) 5.10 Verify the following conditions for breaker A-1 11:

" Connection diagrams have been yellow-lined or as-built.

" Breaker is available for testing.

  • Breaker is racked up.

" Breaker BA is in the closed position

" A-111 Switchgear testing completed satisfactory lAW OP-1416.001 5.11 Verify the following conditions for breaker A-1 12:

" Connection diagrams have been yellow-lined or as-built.

  • Breaker is available for testing.
  • Breaker is racked up.
  • Breaker BA is in the closed position

" A-1 12 Switchgear testing completed satisfactory lAW OP-1416.001 5.12 Verify that personnel are on the appropriate clearances.

5.13 At C20, remove the glass cover for Loss Of Field Relay (240) then place the following switches in the OPEN position: (This will allow the 286-Gl-1 and 286-Gl-2 generator lockout relays to be reset. Ref Op-1 305.029)

  • Red Knife Switch
  • Black Knife Switches

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 6 of 23 5.14 At A-1 13, verify that the shorting jumpers have been removed from TB-BB terminals 1, 2 and 3. (Ref E-505 Sh 1) 6.0 Instrumentation NONE 7.0 Test Instructions 7.1 DC Power 7.1.1 Verify breaker A-1 13 is racked down and the patch cord is NOT installed.

7.1.2 At A-113, verify A-113 DC control power breaker (BA) is OPEN.

7.1.3 At DC panel D11, verify 4160 volt switchgear Al breaker D11-03 is closed.

7.1.4 At A-1 13, verify Approximately 125 VDC at the line side A-1 13 DC control power breaker (BA).

7.1.5 At A-1 13, verify polarity for the 125 VDC is correct at the line side of breaker BA.

(terminal 1- terminal 3 +) (Reference drawing E-8-AC-86) 7.1.6 At A-1 13, verify load side of DC input breaker BA is 0 VDC. (terminal 2 - terminal 4 7.1.7 At 010, place A-113 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the PULL TO LOCK position.

7.1.8 At C10, lift the black lead in cable Al 12F from TBB2 terminal block 4, terminal 2P.

(REF E-561 SH 4) (ESX-A3) 7.1.9 At A-1 11, place TS1 -111, switch E, in the open position.

7.1.10 At A-111, place TSl-111, switch F, in the open position.

7.1.11 At A-1 12, place TS1 -112, switch E, in the open position.

7.1.12 At A-1 12, place TS1-112, switch F, in the open position.

7.1.13 At A-112, place TS1-112, switch G, in the open position.

7.1.14 At A-112, place TS1-112, switch H, in the open position.

7.1.15 At A-112, remove the "pie plate" from relay 127-Al-1.

7.1.16 At C20, place TS-186-ST1-1 switch 3 (Startup XFMR 1 Lockout Trip A-113), in the open position. (Ref E-91, E-94) 7.1.17 At C20, place TS-186-ST2-1 switch 3 (Startup XFMR 2 Lockout Trip A-1 13), in the open position. (Ref E-91, E-94) 7.1.18 At 020, place TS-286-G1-1 switch 6 (Generator Lockout A-1 12 trip), in the open position. (Ref E-138) 7.1.19 At C20, place TS-286-GI-2 switch 1 (Generator Lockout A-1 12 trip), in the open position. (Ref E-138) 7.1.20 At 020, place TS-286-Gl-2 switch 9 (Generator Lockout Unit Aux Protection), in the open position. (Ref E-138) 7.1.21 At C20, place TS-286-G1-3 switch 2 (Generator Lockout 286 G1 & G2 trip), in the open position. (Ref E-138) 7.1.22 At C20, Place TS-286T switch 6 in the open position.

7.1.23 At C20, place generator lockout Relay 286-G1-1 in the RESET position.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 7 of 23 7.1.24 At C20, place generator lockout Relay 286-G1-2 in the RESET position.

7.1.25 Verify A-1 11 is in the Breaker Racked UP/Open position.

7.1.26 Verify A-1 12 is in the Breaker Racked UP/Open position.

7.1.27 At C10, verify ST1/ST2 selector switch (143-1) in the STi position. (Ref E-87).

7.1.28 At C10, verify A-113 sync switch (152-113-SS) in the OFF position. (Ref E-31 shl) 7.1.29 Install a jumper at C20, from TBAI 13 terminal 11 to C20, TBA1 13 terminal 21. (Ref E-91, E-560 Sh 1, M-201-56) 7.1.30 At A-1 12, verify lockout relay 186-Al (Al bus lockout) is RESET.

7.1.31 At A-1 13, verify the following Fuses are installed:(Reference drawing E-8-AC-86) 7.1.31.1 UA (FU-9) +, 35 amp 7.1.31.2 UA (FU-9) -, 35 amp 7.1.31.3 UB (FU-5) +, 15 amp 7.1.31.4 UB (FU-5) -,15 amp 7.1.31.5 UC (FU-6) +, 15 amp 7.1.31.6 UC (FU-6) -,15 amp 7.1.31.7 UD (FU-20) 10 amp 7.1.31.8 UE (FU-21) 10 amp 7.1.31.9 UF (FU-22) 10amp 7.1.31.1OUR (FU-7) +, 35 amp 7.1.31.11 UR (FU-7) -,35 amp 7.1.31.12 UT (FU-8) +, 35 amp 7.1.31.13 UT (FU-8) -,35 amp 7.1.32 At A-1 13, place A-1 13 DC control breaker (BA) in the CLOSED position.

7.1.33 At A-1 13, verify approximately 125 VDC is present at the following locations:

7.1.33.1 UA (FU-9) terminal 2 - to UB (FU-5) terminal 4+

7.1.33.2 UB (FU-5) terminal 2 - to UB (FU-5) terminal 4+

7.1.33.3 UC (FU-6) terminal 2 - to UC (FU-6) terminal 4+

7.1.33.4 UR (FU-7) terminal 2 - to UR (FU-7) terminal 4+

7.1.33.5 UT (FU-8) terminal 2 - to UT (FU-8) terminal 4+

7.2 Local Control 7.2.1 At A-111, Place A-1 11 DC control power breaker (BA) in the CLOSED position.

7.2.2 At A-1 11, Verify fuse UL (FU1) is installed.

7.2.3 Place breaker A-1 13 in the racked up position.

7.2.4 At A-1 13, place local/remote handswitch (152-SEL/SW) in the LOCAL position.

7.2.5 At C10, place A-i 13 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the PULL TO LOCK position.

7.2.6 At C10, place A-111 handswitch (152-11i/CS) in the PULL TO LOCK position.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 8 of 23 7.2.7 At C10, place A-112 handswitch (152-112/CS) in the PULL TO LOCK position.

7.2.8 At A-1 13, charge the breaker springs as follows:

7.2.8.1 Pull the racking handle forward.

7.2.8.2 Place A-1 13 DC control breaker (BA) in the CLOSED position.

7.2.8.3 Release racking handle and check that springs charge.

7.2.9 At A-113, check WHITE (breaker springs charged) light is ON. (Ref E76 sh 1A) 7.2.10 At A-1 13, check AMBER (breaker on local) light is ON. (Ref E76 sh IA) 7.2.11 At A- 113, check GREEN (breaker tripped) light is ON. (Ref E76 sh 1A) 7.2.12 At A- 113, check RED (breaker closed) light is OFF. (Ref E76 sh 1A)

NOTE C10 RED, WHITE AND GREEN LIGHTS SHOULD ONLY BE ON WHEN THE LOCAL/REMOTE SWITCH IS IN REMOTE.

7.2.13 At C10, check A-113 WHITE (CHRGD) light is OFF. (Ref E-91 sh 1) 7.2.14 At C10, check A- 113 AMBER (LOCAL) light is ON. (Ref E-91 sh 1) 7.2.15 At C10, check A-113 GREEN (breaker tripped) light is OFF. (Ref E-91 sh 1) 7.2.16 At C10, check A-113 RED (breaker closed) light is OFF. (Ref E-91 sh 1) 7.2.17 At C10, verify A-1 13 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the pull to lock position. (Ref E-91) 7.2.18 At C10, check annunciator K02-F7 (ALI/A2 Auto Transfer) is NOT in alarm. (Ref E-91, E-452 sh 3) 7.2.19 Check annunciator K1629-3 (A-1 13 BREAKER TRIP) inside back of C10 is NOT in alarm. (Ref E-91, E-418 sh 7) 7.2.20 Check that Unit 1 PMS display indicates NORM for computer point ZS1A113. (Ref E-480 sh 1) 7.2.21 Check that Unit 1 PMS display indicates NO for computer point YS1A1 13. (Ref E-480 sh 1) 7.2.22 Check the SPDS NESF display indicates GREEN (tripped) for A-1 13. (SPDS point Z1Al13) 7.2.23 At A-1 13, place local handswitch (152/CS) in the CLOSE position.

7.2.24 Check the following:

7.2.24.1 Breaker A-113 is closed.

7.2.24.2 At A-1 13, AMBER (breaker on local) light is ON.

7.2.24.3 At A-1 13, WHITE (breaker springs charged) light is ON.

7.2.24.4 At A-1 13, RED (breaker closed) light is ON.

7.2.24.5 At A-1 13, GREEN (breaker tripped) light is OFF.

7.2.24.6 At C10, A- 113 AMBER (LOCAL) light is ON.

7.2.24.7 At C10, WHITE (CHRGD) light is OFF.

7.2.24.8 At C1O, A-1 13 RED (breaker closed) light is OFF.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 9 of 23 7.2.24.9 At C10, A-113 GREEN (breaker tripped) light is OFF.

7.2.24.10 At 010, annunciator K02-F7 (AL/A2 Auto Transfer) is NOT in alarm. (Ret E-91, E-452 sh 3 )

7.2.24.11 Check annunciator K1629-3 (A-113 BREAKER TRIP) inside back of C10, is NOT in alarm. (Ref E-91, E-418 sh 7) 7.2.24.12 SPDS NESF display indicates RED (closed) for A-1 13. (Ref E-482 sh 60) 7.2.24.13 Unit 1 PMS display indicates NORM for computer point ZS1A1 13. (Ref E-480 sh 1A) 7.2.24.14 Unit 1 PMS display indicates NO for computer point YS1A1 13. (Ref E-480 sh IA) 7.2.25 At A-113, place local handswitch (152/CS) in the TRIP position.

7.2.26 Check breaker A-1 13 is tripped.

7.3 Remote Operation 7.3.1 Indication Lights and Handswitch 7.3.1.1 At A-113, remove fuse UD (FU20).

NOTE: Temporary 120 VAC power sources installed in the following steps shall be from the same source.

7.3.1.2 At A-113, connect a temporary 120 VAC power source to TB A terminal 3 (line) and TB A, terminal 4 (neutral). (Sync Relay) (Ref E-34, E-8-AC-86) 7.3.1.3 Remove both UE (FU-29) fuses from A-112. (Ref E-34, E-8-AC-85) 7.3.1.4 At A-112, connect a temporary 120 VAC power source at TB A terminal 4 (line), and TBA terminal 2 (neutral).

7.3.1.5 At A-113, place A-113 local/remote handswitch in the remote position.

7.3.1.6 At C-10, place A-113 sync switch (152-113/SS) in the ON position.

7.3.1.7 At C10, place A-1 13 hand switch (152-113/CS) in the CLOSE position.

7.3.1.8 Check the following:

7.3.1.8.1 Breaker A-1 13 is CLOSED.

7.3.1.8.2 At A-1 13, AMBER (breaker on local) light is OFF.

7.3.1.8.3 At A-1 13, White (breaker springs charged) light is ON.

7.3.1.8.4 At A-113, RED (breaker closed) light is ON.

7.3.1.8.5 At A-1 13, GREEN (breaker trip) light is OFF.

7.3.1.8.6 At C10, A-1 13 AMBER (LOCAL) light is OFF.

7.3.1.8.7 At C10, A-1 13 White (CHRGD) light is ON.

7.3.1.8.8 At C10, A-113 RED (breaker closed) light is ON.

7.3.1.8.9 At C1O, A-1 13 GREEN (breaker trip) light is OFF.

7.3.1.9 At C-10, place A-113 sync switch (152-113/SS) in the OFF position.

7.3.1.10 At C1O, place A-113 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the TRIP Position.

7.3.1.11 Check the following:

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 10 of 23 7.3.1.11.1 Breaker A-1 13 is tripped.

7.3.1.11.2 At A-113, AMBER (breaker on local) light is OFF.

7.3.1.11.3 At A-1 13, RED (breaker closed) light is OFF.

7.3.1.11.4 At A-113, GREEN (breaker trip) light is ON.

7.3.1.11.5 At A-1 13, White (breaker springs charged) light is ON.

7.3.1.11.6 At C10, A-113 AMBER (LOCAL) light is OFF.

7.3.1.11.7 At CIO, A-1 13 White (CHRGD) light is ON.

7.3.1.11.8 At C10, A-113 RED (breaker closed) light is OFF.

7.3.1.11.9 At ClO, A-113 GREEN (breaker trip) light is ON.

7.3.1.11.10 AT C1 0, annunciator K02-F7 (A1/A2 Auto Transfer) is NOT in alarm. (Ref E-91, E-452 sh 3 )

7.3.1.11.11 At C10, check annunciator K1629-3 (A- 113 BREAKER TRIP) inside back of C10 is NOT in alarm. (Ref E-91, E-418 sh 7) 7.3.1.11.12 SPDS computer NESF display indicates breaker A- 113 green (tripped). (Ref E-482 sh 60) 7.3.1.11.13 Unit 1 PMS display indicates NORM for computer point ZS1A113. (Ref E-480 sh 1A) 7.3.1.11.14 Unit 1 PMS display indicates NO for computer point YS1A1 13. (Ref E-480 sh 1A) 7.3.2 Remote Close/Trip (Ref E-91, E-561 Sh 4) 7.3.2.1 At C10, place A-1 13 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the PULL TO LOCK position.

7.3.2.2 At C10, check the voltage at terminal TBB2 -Al 13, terminals 21 TO 31 is approximately 125 VDC.

7.3.2.3 At C10, check the voltage at terminal TBB2 -Al 13, terminals 31 TO N3 is approximately 0 VDC.

7.3.2.4 At C10, place A-113 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the TRIP position.

7.3.2.5 At C10, check the voltage at terminal TBB2 -Al 13, terminals 21 TO 31 is approximately 0 VDC.

7.3.2.6 At C10, check the voltage at terminal TBB2 -Al 13, terminals 31 TO N3 is approximately 125 VDC.

7.3.2.7 At C10, place A-1 13 sync switch (152-113/SS) in the ON position.

7.3.2.8 Check A-1 13 is tripped.

7.3.2.9 At C10, place A-113 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the CLOSE position.

7.3.2.10 Check A-1 13 is CLOSED.

7.3.2.11 At C10, place A-113 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the TRIP position.

7.3.2.12 Check A-1 13 is tripped.

7.3.2.13 At A-i 13, terminal block B, install a jumper from terminal 3 to terminal 5.

(ref E-91, E-8-AC-86)

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 11 of 23 7.3.2.14 Check A-111 is tripped.

7.3.2.15 At C20, TB-A113 place a hand held jumper from terminal 51 to 61. (Ref E-560 sh 1) 7.3.2.16 Check A-1 13 AUTOMATICALLY CLOSED.

7.3.2.17 At C20, TB-Al 13 remove the hand held jumper from terminal 51 to 61.

(Ref E-560 sh 1) 7.3.2.18 At C10, check annunciator K02-F7 (Al/A2 Auto Transfer) IS in alarm. (ref E-452 sh 3) 7.3.2.19 Check that Unit 1 PMS display indicates YES for computer point YS1Al13, 7.3.2.20 At C10, place A-113 sync switch (152-113/SS) in the OFF position.

7.3.2.21 At A-111, verify the local/remote switch 152/SEL SW) in the LOCAL position.

7.3.2.22 At A-111, place the handswitchl 52/CS in the CLOSE position.

7.3.2.23 Check that A-111 is CLOSED 7.3.2.24 At C10, place A-111 sync switch (152-111/SS) in the ON position.

7.3.2.25 At C10, place A-111 handswitch (152-111/CS) in the CLOSE position.

7.3.2.26 Check that A-113 AUTOMATICALLY TRIPPED.

7.3.2.27 At C10, check that annunciator K02-F7 (Al /A2 Auto Transfer) is NOT in alarm. (ref E-452 sh 3) 7.3.2.28 At C10, place A-111 sync switch (152-111/SS) in the OFF position.

7.3.2.29 At C10, place A-113 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the CLOSE position.

7.3.2.30 Check that A-113 is not closed.

7.3.2.31 Check that plant computer point ZSlAl 13 IS in alarm.

7.3.2.32 At C20, TB-A1 13 place a hand held jumper from terminal 51 to 52. (Ref E-560 sh 1) 7.3.2.33 Check that A-i 13 AUTOMATICALLY CLOSED.

7.3.2.34 Check that plant computer point ZS1A1 13 IS NOT in alarm.

7.3.2.35 At C20, TB-A1 13 remove the hand held jumper from terminal 51 to 52.

(Ref E-560 sh 1) 7.3.2.36 At C10, check that annunciator Ki629-3 (A-113 BREAKER TRIP) inside back of C10 IS NOT in alarm. (ref E-418 sh 7) 7.3.2.37 At C10, place A-113 sync switch (152-113/SS) in the OFF position.

7.3.2.38 At C10, place A-112 sync switch (152-112/SS) in the ON position.

7.3.2.39 At C10, place A-1 12 handswitch (152-112/CS) in the CLOSE position.

7.3.2.40 Check that A-1 12 AUTOMATICALLY CLOSED.

7.3.2.41 At 010, place A-112 sync switch (152-112/SS) in the OFF position.

7.3.2.42 Check that A-1 13 AUTOMATICALLY TRIPPED.

7.3.2.43 At C10, check that annunciator K1629-3 in the back of C10 (A-113 BREAKER TRIP) IS in alarm. (ref E-418 sh 7)

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 12 of 23 7.3.2.44 At A-113, terminal block B, remove the jumper from terminal 3 to terminal

5. (ref E-91, E-8-AC-86) 7.3.2.45 At A-111, verify the following conditions:

7.3.2.45.1 Local /Remote handswitch (152/SEL-SW) in the LOCAL position 7.3.2.45.2 A-111 handswitch (152/CS) in the trip position 7.3.2.45.3 A-111 tripped.

7.3.2.45.4 A-1 11 racked up.

7.3.2.46 At A-1 12, verify the following conditions:

7.3.2.46.1 Local /Remote handswitch (1 52/SEL-SW) in the LOCAL position 7.3.2.46.2 A-1 12 handswitch (152/CS) in the trip position 7.3.2.46.3 A- 112 tripped.

7.3.2.46.4 A-112 racked up.

7.3.2.47 At A-1 13, verify the following conditions:

7.3.2.47.1 Local /Remote handswitch (152/SEL-SW) in the LOCAL position 7.3.2.47.2 A- 113 handswitch (152/CS) in the trip position 7.3.2.47.3 A-1 13 tripped.

7.3.2.47.4 A-1 13 racked up.

7.4 A-1 13/2A-903 Interface (Ref E-2116 sh 11, E-2600 sh 11, E- 506 sh 1, 940369 Sh 444)

Note: This testing is duplicated in ECT 44312-03 and may be marked N/A if this testing has been completed in ECT 44312-03.

7.4.1 Verify breaker A-1 13 is in the Tripped position.

7.4.2 Obtain permission from Unit 2 Operations prior to performing any work in the Unit 2 switchgear area.

7.4.3 At 2C436, check approximately 0 VDC between terminal 5 and terminal 6. (ref E-2600 sh 11) 7.4.4 At A-1 13, place local handswitch (152/CS) the CLOSE position.

7.4.5 Check that A-1 13 is CLOSED.

7.4.6 At 2C436, check that approximately 125 VDC between terminal 5 and terminal 6.

(ref E-2600 sh 11, 940369 sh 444) 7.5 Unit AUX XFMR Protection (186-Al) (4.16KV Al bus lockout) (Ref E-90, E-91, E-92, E-93 sh 2) 7.5.1 At A-1 12, verify 186-Al lockout (4.16KV Al bus lockout) is reset.

7.5.2 At A-1 11, place handswitch 152 SEL in the LOCAL position.

7.5.3 At A-i 11, place handswitch 152/CS in the TRIP position.

7.5.4 At A-1 12, place handswitch 152 SEL in the LOCAL position.

7.5.5 At A-112, place handswitch 152/CS in the TRIP position.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 13 of 23 7.5.6 At A-113, place handswitch 152 SEL in the LOCAL position.

7.5.7 At A-1 13, place handswitch 152/CS in the TRIP position.

7.5.8 At A-1 12, verify switch E on TS1 -112 is in the OPEN position.

7.5.9 At A-1 12, verify switch F on TSl-112 is in the OPEN position.

7.5.10 At A-1 12, verify switch G on TS1 -112 is in the OPEN position.

7.5.11 At A-1 12, verify switch H on TS1 -112 is in the OPEN position.

7.5.12 At C20, place TS-286-G1-2 switch 8 (Generator Lockout Unit Aux Protection), in the CLOSED position. (Ref. E-93 sh 2) 7.5.13 At A-112, place handswitch 152/CS in the CLOSE position and check that breaker A-112 closes.

7.5.14 At A-112, verify 186-Al (4.16KV Al bus lockout) lockout is NOT tripped.

7.5.15 At A-1 13, place handswitch 152/CS in the CLOSE position and verify breaker A-113 closes.

7.5.16 At A-112, verify 186-Al lockout (4.16KV Al bus lockout) is TRIPPED.

7.5.17 At A-113, place handswitch 152/CS in the TRIP position and check that breaker A-113 trips.

7.5.18 At A-1 12, reset 186-Al lockout (4.16KV Al bus lockout).

7.5.19 At A-111, place handswitch 152/CS in the CLOSE position and check that breaker A-111 closes.

7.5.20 At A-112, check that 186-Al lockout (4.16KV Al bus lockout) is tripped.

7.5.21 At A-112, place handswitch 152/CS in the TRIP position and check that breaker A-112 trips.

7.5.22 At A-112, reset 186-Al lockout (4.16KV Al bus lockout).

7.5.23 At A-111, place handswitch (152/CS) in the TRIP position and check that breaker A-111 trips.

7.6 ST1 Lockout Trip (186-ST1-1) to A- 113 (Ref. E-91, E-94, E-560 sh 1) 7.6.1 At A-1 13, Place local/remote handswitch (152/SEL-SW) in the REMOTE position.

7.6.2 At C10, place A-1 13 sync switch (152-113/SS) in the ON position.

7.6.3 At C10, place A-1 13 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the CLOSE position.

7.6.4 Check that A-1 13 closed.

7.6.5 At C10, place A-1 13 sync switch (152-113/SS) in the OFF position.

7.6.6 At C20, place a hand held jumper from terminal blockAl 13, terminal 2P to terminal 29.

7.6.7 Check that A-1 13 is TRIPPED.

7.6.8 At C20, remove the hand held jumper from terminal blockAl 13, terminal 2P to terminal 29.

7.6.9 At C10, place A-1 13 handswitch (152-113/CS) in the TRIP position.

7.6.10 At A-1 13, Place local/remote handswitch (152/SEL-SW) in the LOCAL position.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 14 of 23 7.7 ST1 Differential Current Transformers (8000/5 in A-1 13 bus compartment) - Reference E-34 and E-8-AC-86 device "ZA".

NOTE: Connecting plugs are tagged out for SU-1 TMOD. Test Plugs are not connecting plugs and can be installed in relays that are tagged out.

7.7.1.1 Obtain three (3) GE protective relay test plugs.

7.7.1.2 Verify the three (3) relay test plugs have shorting jumpers installed from stud 4 to stud 5 and from stud 6 to stud 5.

7.7.1.3 Connect three (3) digital ammeters to the three (3) relay test plugs from stud 3 to stud 5.

7.7.1.4 Mark the ammeters with temporary labels "A", "B", & "C" 7.7.1.5 Verify ammeters are connected and set to measure AC current in the 0 to 2 A range or in automatic range mode.

7.7.1.6 Verify the following Startup Transformer No. 1 (ST1) differential current relays in C20 have their connection plugs removed:

  • 187ST/A
  • 187ST/B
  • 187ST/C 7.7.1.7 Install the three (3) relay test plugs with three (3) connected and marked ammeters in the corresponding phase differential current relay:
  • 187ST/A
  • 187ST/B
  • 187ST/C 7.7.1.8 Remove A-1 13 front horizontal bus cover(s) as required to visually inspect and access the window type CTs between the breaker primary disconnects and the A-1 horizontal bus.

NOTE: CT polarity marks are typically a round dot near one of the two secondary wiring terminals or marks "HI" for the primary and "Xl" for the secondary.

7.7.1.9 Front C Phase CT 7.7.1.9.1 Check "C" left phase (viewed from front) CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the horizontal bus (top side).

NOTE: Per E-8-AC-86 for CT device "ZA", the "C" phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 1(BB6).

7.7.1.9.2 Install the lamp test setup for the C Phase CT by connecting the test setup between "C" phase CT secondary terminal 1 (near polarity mark) and ground.

NOTE: When A-1 13 differential relay CTs are energized for testing, the corresponding A-213 differential CTs will also be energized - reference E-34.

7.7.1.9.3 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 15 of 23 NOTE: All three test ammeters should indicate some current flow, but current through "A"and "B"phases is expected to be a fraction of the current through "C" phase if the CT circuit is connected properly.

7.7.1.9.4 Verify that all three ammeters connected to the test plugs in the C20 ST1 differential current relays indicate current flow:

" 187ST/A ammeter "A"

" 187ST/B ammeter "B"

" 187ST/C ammeter "C" 7.7.1.9.5 Check that ammeter "C" in relay 187ST/C indicates more current than ammeter "A"in relay 187ST/A and ammeter "B"in relay 187ST/B.

7.7.1.9.6 Remove the lamp test setup for the C Phase CT.

7.7.1.10 Front A Phase CT 7.7.1.10.1 Check "A"middle phase CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the horizontal bus (top side).

NOTE: Per E-8-AC-86 for CT device "ZA", the "A"phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 3 (wire BB4).

7.7.1.10.2 Install the lamp test setup for the A Phase CT by connecting the test setup between "A"phase CT secondary terminal 3 (near polarity mark) and ground.

7.7.1.10.3 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

NOTE: All three test ammeters should indicate some current flow, but current through "B"and "C" phases is expected to be a fraction of the current through "A"phase if the CT circuit is connected properly.

7.7.1.10.4 Check that all three ammeters connected to the test plugs in the C20 ST1 differential current relays indicate current flow:

e187ST/A ammeter "A"

.187ST/B ammeter "B"

  • 187ST/C ammeter "C" 7.7.1.10.5 Check that ammeter "A"in relay 187ST/A indicates more current than ammeter "EBin relay 187ST/B and ammeter C" in relay 187ST/C.

7.7.1.10.6 Remove the lamp test setup for the A Phase CT.

7.7.1.11 Front B Phase CT 7.7.1.11.1 Check that "B"right phase (viewed from front) CT polarity mark is on the side of the CT closest to the horizontal bus (top side).

NOTE: Per E-8-AC-86 for CT device "ZA", the "B"phase CT secondary terminal that corresponds with the polarity mark is terminal 5 (BB5).

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 16 of 23 7.7.1.11.2 Install the lamp test setup for the B Phase CT by connecting the test setup between "B"phase CT secondary terminal 5 (near polarity mark) and ground.

7.7.1.11.3 Energize the CT lamp test circuit from a 120 VAC supply.

NOTE: All three test ammeters should indicate some current flow, but current through "A"and "C" phases is expected to be a small fraction of the current through "B" phase ifthe CT circuit is connected properly.

7.7.1.11.4 Check that all three ammeters connected to the test plugs in the C20 ST1 differential current relays indicate current flow:

e 187ST/A ammeter "A" S187ST/B ammeter "B" S187ST/C ammeter "C" 7.7.1.11.5 Check ammeter "B" in relay 187ST/B indicates more current than ammeter "A"in relay 187ST/A and ammeter "C" in relay 187ST/C.

7.7.1.11.6 Remove the lamp test setup for the B Phase CT.

7.7.1.12 Re-install any A-1 13 front horizontal bus cover(s) that were removed to visually inspect and access the window type CTs between the breaker primary disconnects and the A-1 horizontal bus.

7.7.1.13 Remove the three (3) relay test plugs with three (3) ammeters in the STI differential current relays in C20.

7.7.1.14 Verify the following Startup Transformer 1 (ST1) differential current relays in C20 have their connection plugs re-installed or tagged out:

  • 187ST/A
  • 187ST/B
  • 187ST/C 7.8 A-113 Synchronizing Circuit (Ref E-31 Sh 1, E-34, E-561 Sh 4) 7.8.1 At C 10, place A-1 13 sync switch (152-113/SS) in the OFF position.

7.8.2 At C10, check that approximately 120 VAC from TBB1 -AO1 terminal 413 to ground.

7.8.3 At C10, check that approximately 120 VAC from TBB1-A01 terminal 413 to terminal 0613.

7.8.4 At A-1 13, remove the temporary 120 VAC power source from TB A terminal 3 (line) and TB A, terminal 4 (neutral). (Ref E-34, E-8-AC-86) 7.8.5 At A-1 13, reinstall fuse UD (FU20).

7.9 Cubicle Heater NOTE: Note breaker 10LA-31 may be tagged out due to a previously damaged cable or this testing may be performed as part of procedure Op-1416.001. If either condition is true, N/A these step and document the reason in the Test Log.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 17 of 23 7.9.1 At panel 10 LA (P30), verify breaker 31 is in the CLOSE position. (Ref E61 sh 22, E-8-AC-85))

7.9.2 At A-1 12, verify breaker BC is in the CLOSE position. (Ref E-8-AC-85) 7.9.3 At A-1 12, adjust Temperature control CA to a setting below ambient temperature or cool until it activates.

7.9.4 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-102.

7.9.5 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-103.

7.9.6 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-104.

7.9.7 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-105.

7.9.8 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-106.

7.9.9 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-107.

7.9.10 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-108.

7.9.11 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-109.

7.9.12 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-110.

7.9.13 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-111.

7.9.14 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-112.

7.9.15 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-113.

7.9.16 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-114.

7.9.17 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-1 15.

7.9.18 Check approximately 120 VAC across terminals 1&2 for heater SE in A-116.

7.9.19 At A-1 12, adjust Temperature control CA to as found condition (should be 950 to 1000 F on decreasing temperature).

7.10 A-308 Breaker trip Alarm (Ref. E-418 Sh, 7, E-100 Sh. 1) 7.10.1 Obtain permission from Unit 1 Operations prior to performing this test section.

7.10.2 At A-308, verify local/remote handswitch (152/SEL-SW) is in the LOCAL position.

7.10.3 At A-308, verify handswitch (152/CS) is in the TRIP position 7.10.4 Verify breaker A-308 is in the OPEN position.

7.10.5 AT C10, verify A-308 handswitch is in the TRIP position.

7.10.6 Verify that annunciator K1629-4 in the back of C10 Is NOT in alarm.

7.10.7 AT C10, place A-308 handswitch in the CLOSE position.

7.10.8 Check that breaker A-308 is in the OPEN position.

7.10.9 Check that annunciator K1629-4 in the back of CIO IS in alarm.

7.10.10 AT C1O, place A-308 handswitch in the TRIP position.

7.10.11 At A-308, place local/remote handswitch (152/SEL-SW) is in the REMOTE position unless otherwise directed by Unit 1 Operations.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 18 of 23 8.0 Restoration 8.1 AUlswitchgear breakers manipulated during this testing should be left in the racked up, tripped position with the DC control power energized unless otherwise directed.

8.2 At C20, remove the jumper from TBA1 13 terminal 11 to terminal 21.

8.3 At C10, reterm the black lead in cable Al12F, lifted from TBB2 terminal block 4, terminal 2P. (REF E-561 SH 4) (ESX-A3) 8.4 Place the following test switches in the closed position unless other wise directed by Unit 1 Operations:

8.4.1 A-111 TS1-111, switch E.

8.4.2 A-1Il TS1-111, switch F 8.4.3 A-112 TS1-112, switch E 8.4.4 A-112 TS1-112, switch F 8.4.5 A-112 TS1-112, switch G 8.4.6 A-1 12 TS1 -112, switch H 8.4.7 At A-112, reinstall the "pie plate" in relay 127-Al-1.

8.4.8 At C20, TS-186-ST1-1 switch 3 (Startup XFMR 1 Lockout Trip A-113). (E-91, E-94) 8.4.9 At C20, TS-186-ST2-1 switch 3 (Startup XFMR 1 Lockout Trip A-408). (E-94, E-l00 sh 1A) 8.4.10 At C20, TS-286-Gi-1 switch 6 (Generator Lockout A-112 Trip) (E-91, E-93 SH 2) 8.4.11 At C20, TS-286-Gl-2 switch 1 (Generator Lockout A-112 Trip) (E-91, E-93) 8.4.12 At C20, TS-286-Gl-2 switch 9 (Generator Lockout Unit Aux Protection) (E-91, E-93) 8.4.13 At C20, TS-286-GI-3 switch 2 (Generator Lockout 286 G1 & G2 Trip) (Ref E-138) 8.4.14 At A-1 12, remove the temporary 120 VAC power source at TB A terminal 4 (line),

and TB A terminal 2 (neutral).

8.4.15 At A-1 12, install both UE (FU-29) fuses.

8.4.16 At A-113, install fuse UD (FU-20).

8.5 IF PT fuses are not on a tagout, then Install the following potential transformer fuses on A-1:

8.5.1 A-103 Bus PT Fuses (Reference E-8-AC-82 Device PA) 8.5.2 A-1 13 PT Fuses (Reference E-8-AC-86 Device PA) 8.6 At C20, remove the glass cover for Loss Of Field Relay (240) then place the following switches in the CLOSE position: (This may cause the 286-G1-1 and 286-GI-2 generator lockout relays to TRIP. Ref Op-1305.029)

  • Red Knife Switch

" Black Knife Switches 9.0 Test Results and Evaluation 9.1 Attach a completed copy of OP-1416.001 used for relay verification.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 19 of 23 10.0 M&TE Instrumentation NONE 11.0 Summary Information 11.1 Test Deficiencies 12.0 Attachments:

12.1 EN-DC-117 Attachment 9.8 - Test Change Notice 12.2 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.9- Test Log 12.3 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.10 - Test Deficiency Log 12.4 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.11 -Signature Identification Log

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 20 of 23 ATTACHMENT 9.8 TEST CHANGE NOTICE SHEET 1 OF I TEST CHANGE NOTICE TEST EJECT 0 ECT WO STI Page I of TYPE:

TEST #: Change Notice No.: - Quality Class: 0 QR C NOR TEST TITLE:

Type of Change: 0 Intent ii Non Intent Description of Change(s):

TCN POSTING INSTRUCTION List Page(s) being Replaced (N/A, If not applicable):

List Page(s) being Added (N/A, ifnot applicable):

List Page(s) being Deleted (N/A, if not applicable):

REVIEW (Print/Sign/Date)

Test Engineer: /

Technical Reviewer: _ _ or 0 Non Intent Change (Signature not required for Non-intent Changes, mark N/A and check box)

STI Original EN-LI-100, process Applicability Determination: 0 Not Impacted: [I Impacted and Revised OSRC Approval:h Not Required Mtg No. Date: Chairman:

Operations Department: / /

Organization Organzatio / Oranzaio Organization Organization

___ _ __ / _ /___

Organization Organization On Site Risk Assessment Group:

APPROVAL (Print/Sign/Date)

TE Supervisor. /.

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes e.o., AS)

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-113 Page 21 of 23 ATTACHMENT 9.9 TEST LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: Page____at Date Entry Initials 4 +

4 1*

4 +

4 .9.

4 __________

[_______________________________________________

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-113 Page 22 of 23 ATTACHMENT 9.10 TEST DEFICIENCY Loo SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: Page-...of DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION DATE/TIME NUMBER 4 +

4 4 4 4 4.

4

.1.

ECT-44312-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-1 13 Page 23 of 23 ATTACHMENT 9.11 Initials SIOxNAIURE IDE~flFcATION LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Signature Test Number: ECT/STI: Page-.of Title Name Name Title Signature Initials

Doc 28 ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 1 of 12 ATTACHMENT 9.6 TEST PROCEDURE COVER SHEET Shoot 1 of 1 TEST COVER SHEET TEST TYPE: [0 ECT Procedure El ECT WO El STI Procedure Page 1 of 12 TEST #: ECT-44312-04 REV. #: QOQuality Class: El QR 0 NOR TEST TITLE: Functional testing for breaker 2A-901 REVIEW (PrintISign/Date) .

Test Engineer (TE): A. Spencer i? ._-.--'/ ,

Technical Reviewer: P. Riedmueller CROSS-DISCIPLINE REVIEW Operations Department: K. McNeaill /

'IV_ _

Ognzto_______ _ ,__ Organization Maint / 7an 1",H .7:

Organization .... Organization

_ _ :__ / _ _ :__

Organization Organization ADDITIONAL STI (ONLY) PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS EN-LI-100 Review: [I Attached El Other 10CFR50.59 Evaluation: El Not Required [E Attached El Other OSRC Approval El Not Required Mt"g No. Date: Chairman:

APPROVAL(Print/Sign/Date)

TE.Supervisor: [..2Ai .li7c&4

..

TEST COMPLETION REVIEW / ACCEPTANCE Summary of Test Results: Al ter.+ s.cio, c-;,fle- .*, ,.,;'to Responsible Engineer (RE)*: O/A/

Test Engineer (TE): Y- RoStAI&P / 7/A/13 Technical Reviewer ,, ,-V/i, /qrr TE Supervisor: &4 /4&A' I

  • Ifrequired for confirmation of assumptions made inthe development of the EC.

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

ATTACHMENT 9.8 TEST CHANGE No'nCE Sheet 1 of 1 TEST CHANGE NOTICE TEST TYPE: KECT E ECT WO El STI Page 1 of _

TEST #: *'L.,312 -014 Change Notice No.: L Quality Class: 0 OR jNQR TEST TITLE: c t A1'*;.t1F^4' 4f,-,r 2A - lv/

Type of Change: [I Intent VjNon Intent Descri ptionof Cha ngeoy): P=.U4& Drtf d AeLtllZ ,q Vf°J cL4 /A- 3,,.A ,-q 4Ar-e TCN POSTING INSTRUCTION . .

List Page(s) being Replaced (N/A, if not applicable): "4 -- O,,q STr1r -. 1 (iu" #1n4/Ou%

List Page(s) being Added (N/A, if not applicable): ,V/A List Page(s) being Deleted (N/A. if not applicable): /V REVIEW (Print/Sign/Date)

Technical Reviewer: II' or &jNon Intent Change (Signature not required for Non-intent Changes, mark N/A and check box)

STI Original EN-LI-100, process Applicability Determination: 0 Not Im ed; [] Impacted and Revised OSRC Approval:[] Not Required Mtg No. Date:_____ irman:--___.....

Operations Department: .___/___ .:_ " /

Organization Organization Organization Organization On Site Risk Assessment Group:

APPROVAL (Print/Sign/Date)

TE Supervisor. ..64" , ,

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic ppo:e~ s'(e.g., AS)

EN-DC-1 17 R5

AT1ACNMENT g.8 TEST CHANGE NOTICE Sheet I of 1 TEST CHANGE NOTICE TEST TYPE: 0 ECT ECT WO 0 STI Page 1 of 1 TEST #: ECT-44312-04 Change Notice No.: 002 Quality Class: []O R 0 NOR TEST TITLE: Functional Testing for 2A-901 Type of Change: 0 Intent LI Non Intent Description of Change(s): This TCN is being initiated to document satisfactory completion and review of sections 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 (A-308, A-309, and A-310 breaker position inputs to 2A-9 PLC 2C436) to allow return to service of A-1 bus including the feed to A-3 bus. The ECT includes both A-3 and A-4 breaker status inputs to 2A-9 PLC. Green train components A-408, A-409, and A-410 were protected train components when this test was initially performed and testing of those components could not be performed at that time. The A-4 breaker inputs to 2A-9 PLC will be completed at a later time when A-4 is no longer protected train. Steps completed up through 7.3.2.4 have been completed satisfactorily with no test deficiencies.

This TCN is marked as an intent change solely for the purpose of getting a technical review.

TCN POSTING INSTRUCTION List Page(s) being Replaced (N/A, ifnot applicable): N/A (Paqe 6 marked-up)

List Page(s) being Added (N/A, if not applicable): N/A List Page(s) being Deleted (N/A, ifnot applicable): N/A REVIEW (Print/Sign/Date) / /'

Test Engineer: Alan Smith ,/"/, ,

Technical Reviewer: L ,-ý 1 /*b*"/ -* 2 or C3 Non Intent Change (Signature not reqLtrec~r"r"Non-ihtent Chainges, mfark NfA and check box)

STI Original E 1-100, process Applicability Determination: E] Not Impacted; El Impacted and Revised OSRC Approval:E- _ ered_Mt~g_No. Date: N/A Chairman: N/A Operations Department: __/_  : /

A "Organization Organization Organization

_ _ _ :__ / ___ _ :_ /

Organization rganization On Site Risk Assessment Group:_

APPROVAL (Print/Sign/Date) /

TE Supervisor: ma / c -7aiia

/p2-s31/,

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

EN-DC-1 17 R5

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 2 of 12 Table of Contents 1.0 Oblectives ........................................................................................................................ 3 2.0 References ....................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 Test Equipm ent ........................................................................................................ 3 4.0 Precautions and Lim itations .................................................................................... 4 5.0 Prerequisites .................................................................................................................... 4 6.0 Instrum entation ........................................................................................................ 4 7.0 Test Instructions ...................................................................................................... 4 7.1 A-308 Close To 2A-901 ........................................................................................... 4 7.2 A-309 Close To 2A-901 ........................................................................................... 5 7.3 A-310 Close To 2A-901 ........................................................................................... 5 7.5 A-408 Close To 2A-901 ........................................................................................... 6 7.6 A-409 Close To 2A-901 ........................................................................................... 6 7.7 A-410 Close To 2A-901 ........................................................................................... 7 8.0 Restoration ...................................................................................................................... 7 9.0 Test Results and Evaluation ........................................................................................ 7 10.0 M&TE Instrum entation ................................................................................................ 8 11.0 Sum mary Inform ation ................................................................................................ 8 12.0 Attachm ents ..................................................................................................................... 8

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 3 of 12 Oblectlves 1.1 This ECT provides functional testing of Switchgear Cubicle 2A-901, which supplies the A3/A4 bus from the AAC generator. Testing is being performed as a result of damage which occurred during the ANO-1 Stator Drop Event.

1.2 This testing does not include system or performance testing of the load supplied by 2A-901.

'i References 2.1 2.2 EC-44312 EN-DC-117 Al SWITCHGEAR CHILD EC, STATOR RECONSTRUCTION Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions 2.3 E-4 Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160 Volt Main Supply 2.4 E97 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram 4160V Engineered Safeguard Bus Feeder ACB.

2.5 E97 Sh 1A Schematic Diagram 4160V Engineered Safeguard Bus Feeder ACB.

2.6 E98 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram 4160 V Engineered Safeguard Bus A3 and A4 Tie.

2.7 E98 Sh 1A Schematic Diagram 4160 Engineered Safeguard Bus Tie Breaker 152-410.

2.8 E-100 Sh 1 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator DGl ACB 2.9 E-100 Sh 1A Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator ACB 2.10 E-506 Sh 9C Connection Diagram 4160 VAC Switchgear (GE Unit A309) ACB A309 4160V ESF Bus A3 Feeder 2.11 E-506 Sh 19C ES Bus A4 Feeder GE Unit No. A409 Comp, A409 Int &Ext Wiring 2.12 E-2600 Sh 11 Connection Diagram AAC Generator System Control Panel 2C436 2.13 E-2042 Sh 2 Logic Diagram AAC Generator System Tie Breakers 2.14 E-2678 Sh 18 Connection Diagram Terminal Boxes 2.15 940369-444 Circuit Schematics Schematic Inputs 2.16 949369-445 Circuit Schematics Schematic Inputs 9 Test Equipment

  • . Multi-meter

.. T.......

eJ....pr.----------- -_- ..J. --

5 Precautions and Limitations R Circuit Breakers associated with this testing have high levels of potential energy. Exercise caution when working in the area if equipment is energized.

,Testing shall be done with breaker 2A-901 racked out.

44X Test steps shall be performed in order unless authorized by the Test Engineer and the sequence change documented in the Test Log.

Any leads lifted or jumpers installed shall be controlled using a Lifted Lead and Jumper Sheet.

.All M&TE equipment used during testing shall be recorded in section 10.0.

4 All personnel performing test steps in this ECT shall complete the appropriate sections of the Signature Identification Log in section 12.0.

The Test Engineer or designee shall maintain the Test Log in Section 12.0 per requirements of EN-DC-1 17 section 5.2 [11] (b).

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 4 of 12 All test discrepancies shall be documented in the Test Deficiency Log in Section 12.0, including evaluation and resolution of each discrepancy.

" The Test Engineer shall provide a post test summary, including evaluation of test results, in Section 11.0.

( For testing purposes in this ECT, a jumper may be defined as a test switch with leads that would allow the installer to connect the leads inside the cubicle, close the cubicle door then close the switch to make the connection.

(Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the word Check is means to verify an expected condition exists without taking any further action to make it SO.

SDue to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the word VERIFY will mean ifa breaker, switch, etc. is not in the desired position, place it in the desired position.

I Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, the words trip and open have the same meaning when verifying or placing a breaker, switch, etc. in a desired position.

1, Due to terminology differences between groups reviewing this ECT, when a breaker is placed in the closed or trip position, it is understood that the switch handle will be released unless stated to hold in a position.

When installing jumpers, place tape on the adjacent terminals as a precaution against

./ shorting.

Whenever possible, jumpers should be installed in a manner so as not to disturb terminations (i.e. gator clips, ez-hooks, etc.)

S Prerequisites SVerify that the following connection diagrams have been yellowlined for cables listed:

DRAWING CABLE j* E-2600 sh 11 2C436E1 .',,,-*(,

5*.t 1**,

E-2678 sh 18 2C436D2 E-506 sh 9C 2C436E

..................

r------*h t G............. ....... ~ -;E

-C---

Verify that the Implementing Field Supervisor has signed the Return to Service Form and verified 2A-901 is ready for testing.

./Verify that the 2A-901 testing work order task (00354320) has been authorized.

Perform a Pre-test Brief per EN-DC-1 17, Attachment 9.12, Pre-Test Briefing Guidelines.

Verify that personnel are on the appropriate clearances.

Obtain permission from Unit 1 Shift manager prior to commencing work.

Obtain permission from Unit 2 Shift manager prior to commencing work.

=J 2.

j)Verify A_901 is racked out. a 716I- 5 tha A- 8 an A 4 are O ben upI sI OVJ,* p led fr -- I VV !/VILli Ee-43MfO-[O. T AoJ-o I CA./ý Instrumentation 6.1 NONE 9AA'.3 V-q 13 S5ec /172 T (Cjý) Test Instructions DMAI- 3ý5 k*. .Lt I $C'. .LI,7dS

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 5 of 12 A-308 Close To 2A-901 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2, E-506 Sh 9C)

.~If A-308 is tripped, then perform the following:

  • , At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 13 to terminal 14, indicating a CLOSED contact. 3., ,c5 Vbr 4 At A-309, lift the black lead in cable Z0436E from TB-BB, terminal 1.

At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 13 to terminal 14, indicating an open contact. ]13;_z VP :c.>

1 At A-309, reconnect the black lead in cable 2C436E lifted from TB-BB terminal 1.

A2 t 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 13 to terminal 14, indicating a CLOSED contact.

7.Ilf A-308 is closed, then perform the following:

7.1.2.1 At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 13 to terminal 14, indicating an open contact.

7.1.2.2 At A-309, install a jumper from TB-BB terminal 1 to terminal 2.

7.1.2.3 At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 13 to terminal 14, indicating a CLOSED contact.

7.1.2.4 At A-309, remove the jumper from TB-BB terminal 1 to terminal 2.

A-30 Close To 2A-901 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2, E-506 Sh 9C)

If A-309 is tripped, then perform the following:

At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 15 to terminal 16, indicaing a CLOSED contact.

7. At A-309, lift the red lead in cable 2C436E from TB-BB, terminal 3.

At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 15 to I 2,51'k terminal 16, indicating an open contact.

1At A-309, reconnect the red lead in cable 2C436E, lifted from TB-BB terminal 3.

...........- .....--*

=At24,*,*hekO-D~prsen-fmmte mir~~t.-totermrniral-It 6indieating .......

a CLOSED contact. L/ Dc NIR/A 7.2.2 IfA-309 is closed, then perform the following:

7.2.2.1 At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 15 to terminal 16, indicating an open contact.

7.2.2.2 At A-309, install a jumper from TB-BB terminal 3 to terminal 4.

7.2.2.3 At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 15 to terminal 16, indicating a CLOSED contact.

7.2.2.4 At A-309, remove the jumper from TB-BB terminal 3 to terminal 4.

" A-31 0 Close To 2A-901 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2, E-506 Sh 90)

If A-310 is tripped, then perform the following:

7.3.1.1 At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 17 to terminal 18, indicating I a CLOSED contact.

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 6 of 12 7.3.1.2 At A-309, lift the orange lead in cable 2C436E from TB-BB, terminal 5.

7.3.1.3 At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 17 to terminal 18, indicating an open contact.

7.3.1.4 At A-309, reconnect the orange lead in cable 2C436E, lifted from TB-BB terminal 5.

7.3.1.5 At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 17 to terminal 18, indicating

- a CLOSED contact.

f A-310 is closed, then perform the following:

  • te2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 17 to S.....terminal 18, V indicating an open contact. 72z Vbc

ýI At A-309, install a jumper from TB-BB terminal 5 to terminal 6.

___At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 17 to terminal 18, indicating a CLOSED contact. f Ltc (f. ""At A-309, remove the jumper from TB-BB terminal 5 to terminal 6.

.TO - N>TI- .S:4 -MN - 00z r A-4 lose To 2A-901 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2, E-506 Sh 19C)

,rlIf A-40 is tripped, then perform the following:

(t 20436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 25 to terminal 26, indicating 5 a CLOSED contact.

    • At A-409, lift the black lead in cable 2C436D from TB-DD, terminal 1.

(*At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 25 to

/ - terminal 26, indicating an open contact. Il3 Sr/jDc-,

, At A-409, reconnect the black lead in cable 2C436D, lifted from TB-DD eminal 1.

At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 25 to terminal 26, indicating a CLOSED contact. f b c-

-408 is closed, then perform the following:

S -* ---. 4-.2.-1---At-2-0436,-ehe-k-aloximately-terminal 26, indicating an open contact.

7.4.2.2 At A-409, install a jumper from TB-DD terminal 1 to terminal 2.

7.4.2.3 At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 25 to terminal 26, indicating a CLOSED contact.

7.4.2.4 At A-409, remove the jumper from TB-DD terminal 1 to terminal 2.

,.1A-40 Close To 2A-901 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2, E-506 Sh 19C)

If A-409 is tripped, then perform the following:

(:* At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 27 to terminal 28, indicating Sa CLOSED contact. P 7 .1.2 At A-409, lift the red lead in cable 20436D from TB-DD, terminal 3.

At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 27 to O-' terminal 28, indicating an open contact. tV DC

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 7 of 12 o5.1 terminal At A-409,3.reconnect the red lead in cable 2C436D, lifted from TB-DD 5 *t 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 27 to terminal 28, indicating a CLOSED contact. I"( c.

7.5.2 If A-409 is closed, then perform the following:

7.5.2.1 At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 27 to terminal 28, indicating an open contact.

7.5.2.2 At A-409, install a jumper from TB-DD terminal 3 to terminal 4.

7.5.2.3 At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 27 to terminal 28, indicating a CLOSED contact.

7.5.2.4 At A-409, remove the jumper from TB-DD terminal 3 to terminal 4.

A-41 0 Close To 2A-901 (Ref. E-2600 Sh 11, E-2042 Sh 2, E-506 Sh 19C) 7.6.1 If A-410 is tripped, then perform the following:

7.6.1.1 At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 29 to terminal 30, indicating a CLOSED contact.

7.6.1.2 At A-409, lift the orange lead in cable 2C436D from TB-DD, terminal 5.

7.6.1.3 At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 29 to terminal 30, indicating an open contact.

7.6.1.4 At A-409, reconnect the orange lead in cable 2C436D, lifted from TB-DD terminal 5.

7.6.1.5 At 2C436, check 0 VDC present from terminal 29 to terminal 30, indicating a CLOSED contact.

.2f A-410 is closed, then perform the following:

  • At 2C436, check approximately 125 VDC present from terminal 29 to

-- terminal 30, indicating an open contact. ,13c5L/$:C 2.2 At A-409, install a jumper from TB-DD terminal 5 to terminal 6.

--.....7-- ...At *-43.&,,-heek-0O-VDG-prese Fndc3t0ng-%

fntrteanni-29te-torm.0, a CLOSED contact. C, SAt A-409, remove the jumper from TB-DD terminal 5 to terminal 6.

Restoration Verify all jumpers have been removed.

Verifyany leads lifted have been restored.

..._.fy (9* Te esults and Evaluation

  • 2 Verify testing has been completed satisfactory.

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 8 of 12 10.0 M&TE Instrumentation 11.0 Summary Information 11.1 Verify any deficiencies have been logged and their resolution(s) documented. s.e, e

12.0 Attachments:

12.1 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.8 - Test Change Notice 12.2 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.9 -Test Log 12.3 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.10- Test Deficiency Log 12.4 EN-DC-i 17 Attachment 9.11 -Signature Identification Log All +,5 5tt+,w, SPrTJ#

Ot'i+54A-4h¶I~ deAicePa ci&' s. 0 7/eLS W1._L 110

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 9 of 12 ATTACHMENT 9.8 TEST CHANGE NOTICE SHEET 1 OF 1 TEST CHANGE NOTICE TEST EJECT [JECT WO OSTI Page I of TYPE:

TEST #: Change Notice No.: - Quality Class: [] R [] NOR TEST TITLE:

Type of Change: [I Intent E0 Non Intent Description of Change(s):

TCN POSTING INSTRUCTION List Page(s) being Replaced (N/A, if not applicable):

List Page(s) being Added (N/A, if not applicable):

List Page(s) being Deleted (N/A, if not applicable):

REVIEW (Print/Sign/Date)

Test Engineer: /

Technical Reviewer. / or LI Non Intent Change (Signature not required for Non-intent Changes, mark N/A and check box)

STI Original EN-LI-100, process Applicability Determination: 0 Not Impacted; 0 Impacted and Revised OSRC Approval:E] Not Required Mtg No. Date: Chairman:

Operations Department: /  : /

Organization Organzatio / Orgnizti /

Organization Organization

_ _ _ :__ / _ :___ /

Organization Organization On Site Risk Assessment Group:

APPROVAL (Print/Sign/Date)

TE Supervisor: /

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-9011 Page 10 of 12 ATTAcHMENT 9.9 TEST LOG SHEET 1 OF I Test Number: ECT/STI: ECT-'IZ-QOf m = i Rflu. 0 m

  • BB Page-.....-Of Date Entry Initials yp n Ie asa t lz ikl- IZZ A) C ____a____3 7

' I2Af13 zttL 4 :t Yd1'f ky.-

_____ I I _____

9 4

.. ...

. .. ..... .. -.... ... . . .... ... . . ..-........-..---

.....-... ............. I-. -

4 4 9 9 I I 4 1 I I I I

-I I

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 11 of 12 ATrACHMENT 9.10 TEST DEFICIENCY Loa DATE/TIME SHEET 1 OF I DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION Test Number: ECT/STI: EcTl-11312 -c9 ' Page /of DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION DATEITIME NUMBER

/% **,*  :,,t.,/lo ,*oa lvo-t,;'-,;,, "/J~_Li z tt 14'

___....... " /~wd

_ . 5 Tc_____'f-o o C.v~*'

od*lS c

ECT-44312-04 Rev 000 SWGR 2A-901 Page 12 of 12 ATTACHMENT 9.11 SIGNATURE IDENTIFICATION LOG SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: ECT- '&.3,2. Page.J..of.l..

Name Title 1 ,, Signature Initials CIAUAR-1) CZ&ok -rfsZPpr-Fmyxy-k- ete477-I..

_ _ _ _ _ I _ _ _ _ I _ _ i I__

& 4. 1

rooc2-9..I ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 1 of 16 ATTACHMENT 9.6 TEST PROceouRe COVER SHEET Sheet 1 of 1 TEST COVER SHEET TEST TYPE: 0 ECT Procedure Fl ECT WO D STI Procedure Page 1 of 16 TEST #:, 44313-07 REV. #: 000 Quality Class: E] OR Z NOR TEST TITLE: A-2 Switchgear Functional Testing, Miscellaneous Controls REVIEW (Print/Sign/Date) h .ll.

  • Test Engineer (TE): Sus n Mitchell /....... t , . .,- .

Technical Reviewer: Ir7/l/i3 Phillip Stadler CROSS-DISCIlPLINE REVIEW MvK5 pefh3i / Maintenance: nl 71 Organization ,1 / I Organization

__ _ ,IV/- Organization

____ I,¢ Organization Organization ADOITIONAL STI (ONLY) PROCEDURE REQUIREMENTS EN-LI-100 Review: aD,,tp , Other 10CFR50.59 Evaluation: [] Not Re Attached 0 Other OSRC Approval C] Norlulred " Mtg No. Date:- Chairman:

APPROVAL(Prlnt/Sign/Date)

TE Supervisor: Al -~VZ 4 4?

TEST COMPLETION REVIEW / ACCEPTANCE Summary of Test Results:

Responsible Engineer (RE)*: /

Test Engineer (TE): /

Technical Reviewer /

TE Supervisor: /

'It required for confirmation of assumptions made in the development of the EC.

Note: Signatures may be obtained via electronic processes (e.g., AS)

B/2(o

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 2 of 16 Table of Contents 1.0 Oblectives ........................................................................................................................ 3 2.0 References ....................................................................................................................... 3 3.0 Test Equipment .......................................................................................................... 4 4.0 Precautions and Lim itations .................................................................................... 4 5.0 Prereauisites ................................................................................... ................... 5 6.0 Instrumentation .......................................................................................................... 5 7.0 Test Instructions ........................................................................................................ 5 7.1 Control Power, Elevator Motor Power.......................................................................................... 5 7.2 A-205 Condensate Pump P2B Breaker ....................................................................................... 6 7.3 A-207 Heater Drain Pump P8B Breaker ............................................................................................. 8 8.0 Restoration .................................................................................................................... 10 9.0 Test Results and Evaluation ..................................................................................... 10 10.0 M&TE Instrumentation .............................................................................................. 11 11.0 Sum mary Inform ation .............................................................................................. 12 12.0 Attachm ents: ............................................................................................................ 13 12.1 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.11 - Signature Identification Log ....................................................... 13 12.2 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.9 - Test Log ...................................................................................... 13 12.3 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.10 - Test Deficiency Log .................................................................. 13 12.4 Test Change Notices ......................................................................................................................... 13

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 3 of 16 1.0 Oblectlves 1.1 This ECT provides DC control power checks for switchgear cubicles A-202 through A-208, elevator motor power for switchgear cubicles A-202 through A-210, and functional testing of switchgear cubicles A-205 and A-207 damaged cables. Testing is being performed as a result of cables impacted by the damage which occurred during the ANO-1 Stator Drop Event or the subsequent temporary modification and repair efforts, 1.2 This testing does not include system or performance testing of the loads supplied by switchgear cubicles A-205 and A-207.

1.3 Testing performed per this ECT will be done with BUS A-1 AND BUS A-2 DE-ENERGIZED.

2.0 References 2.1 EC-44313, A-2 SWITCHGEAR CHILD EC, STATOR RECONSTRUCTION 2.2 EN-DC-117, Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions 2.3 E-4 Sh. 1, Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram, 4160 Volt System, Main Supply 2.4 E-61 Sh. 18 Panel Schedule No. 2LB 2.5 E-76 Sh. 1, Schematic Diagram, Typical Circuit Breaker 6900V & 4160V Switchgear 2.6 E-93 Sh. 2, Schematic Diagram, Switchgear Bus Lockout and Undervoltage Relays 2.7 E-304 Sh. 1, Schematic Diagram, Heater Drain Pumps 2.8 E-306 Sh. 2, Schematic Diagram, Condensate Pump P2B 2.9 E-505 Sh. 2, Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (Non-ES), Units A108 through A104 2.10 E-505 Sh. 3, Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (Non-ES), Units A103 through Al 15 2.11 E-505 Sh. 4, Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (Non-ES), Units A201 through A205 2.12 E-505 Sh. 5, Connection Diagram, 4160 Volt Switchgear (Non-ES), Units A206 through A210 2.13 E-531 Sh. 42, Connection Diagram, Terminal Boxes 2.14 E-551 Sh. 1, Connection Diagram, Main Control Console C02, Feedwater &

Condensate 2.15 E-560 Sh. 1, Connection Diagram, Main Control Panel C20, Plant Protective Relay & Gen Recorder BDS 2.16 E-561 Sh. 2, Connection Diagram, Main Control Panel C10, Electrical Auxiliary System 2.17 E-572 Sh. 5, Connection Diagram, Control Panel C30 2.18 VP E-8-AC-87, Metalclad Switchgear Connection Diagram (Unit A202) 2.19 VP E-8-AC-89, Metalclad Switchgear Connection Diagram (Units A204, A205, A206, A207, A208) 2.20 VP E-8-AC-95, Metalclad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram (Units A106, A105, A104 & A103)

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 4 of 16 2.21 VP E-8-AC-97, Metalclad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram (Units A201, A202, A203 & A204) 2.22 VP E-8-AC-98, Metalclad Switchgear Interconnection Diagram (Units A205, A206, A207 & A208) 2.23 VP E-8-AC-161, Metalclad Switchgear Connection Diagram (Units Al05, A106, A107, A108, A114) 2.24 VP E-8-AC-162, Metalclad Switchgear Connection Diagram (Units A209, A210) 2.25 WO 354185 A-2 Miscellaneous Controls, Dead Bus Functional Testing 3.0 Test Equlpment 3.1 Multi-meter 3.2 Temporary test jumper with switch and configured for attachment so that terminals do not need to be disturbed to insert jumper.

3.3 Clamp-on ammeter 4.0 Precautions and Umitations 4.1 Circuit Breakers associated with this testing have high levels of potential energy. Exercise caution when working in the area ifequipment is energized.

4.2 Testing shall be done with the A-1 and A-2 buses DE-ENERGIZED.

4.3 Test steps shall be performed in order unless authorized by the Test Engineer and the sequence change documented in the Test Log.

4.4 Any leads lifted or jumpers installed shall be controlled using a Lifted Lead and Jumper Sheet.

4.5 All M&TE equipment used during testing shall be recorded in section 10.0.

4.6 All personnel performing test steps in this ECT shall complete the appropriate sections of the Signature Identification Log in section 12.0.

4.7 The Test Engineer or designee shall maintain the Test Log in Section 12.0 per the requirements of EN-DC-1 17, Section 5.2 (11 ](b).

4.8 All test discrepancies shall be documented in the Test Deficiency Log in Section 12.0, including evaluation and resolution of each discrepancy.

4.9 The Test Engineer shall provide a post-test summary, including evaluation of test results, in Section 11.0.

4.10 Due to terminology differences between groups, the word CHECK means to verify an expected condition exists without taking any further action to make it so.

4.11 Due to terminology differences between groups, the word VERIFY means ifa breaker, switch, etc. is not in the desired position, place it in the desired position.

4.12 Due to terminology differences between groups, the words TRIP and OPEN have the same meaning when verifying or placing a breaker, switch, etc. in a desired position.

4.13 Due to terminology differences between groups, when a breaker is placed in the closed or trip position, it is understood that the switch handle will be released unless stated to hold in a position.

4.14 When installing jumpers, place tape on the adjacent terminals as a precaution against shorting.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 5 of 16 5.0 Prerequisites 5.1 Verify that affected connection diagrams and schematic diagrams for each breaker cubicle have been yellow-lined or as-built as required.

5.2 Verify that the Implementing Field Supervisor has signed the Return to Service Form, for EC-44313, and verified cubicles A-202 through A-21 0 are ready for testing.

5.3 Verify that the A-2 Testing Work Order 354185, Task 01 for this test has been authorized.

5.4 Perform a Pre-test Brief per EN-DC-1 17, Attachment 9.12, Pre-Test Briefing Guidelines.

5.5 Verify A-2 is available and has control power available.

5.6 Verify Heater Drain Pump Motor space heater power, 2LB-3, is available.

5.7 Ensure that test personnel are on the appropriate Clearances.

6.0 Instrumentation 6.1 No instrumentation is required.

7.0 Test Instructions 7.1 Control Power, Elevator Motor Power 7.1.1 Verify breakers A-202 through A-210 are RACKED DOWN.

7.1.2 Verify breakers A-105 and A-106 are RACKED DOWN.

7.1.3 Verify 4160 Volt Switchgear A-2 125 VDC Control Power Breaker D21-03 is OPEN.

7.1.4 Verify DC Control Power Breakers (BA) located in all A-2 breaker cubicles are OPEN.

7.1.5 CLOSE 4160 Volt Switchgear A-2 125 VDC Control Power Breaker D21-03.

7.1.6 Verify 125 VDC (nominal) and proper polarity at line side of DC Control Power Breakers (BA) at terminal 3 (+) and terminal 1 (-) for the following breakers:

7.1.6.1 A-202 7.1.6.2 A-203 7.1.6.3 A-204 7.1.6.4 A-205 7.1.6.5 A-206 7.1.6.6 A-207 7.1.6.7 A-208 7.1.7 CLOSE DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located in breaker A-202.

7.1.8 In breaker cubicle A-209, verify 125 VDC (nominal) and proper polarity at terminal board XL points 1 (+) and 2 (-). Reference E-8-AC-162.

7.1.9 In breaker cubicle A-210, verify 125 VDC (nominal) and proper polarity at terminal board XL points 1 (+) and 2 (-). Reference E-8-AC-162.

7.1.10 OPEN DC Control Power Breaker (BA) located in breaker A-202 or position as directed by Unit lOps.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 6 of 16 7.2 A-205 Condensate Pump P2B Breaker 7.2.1 Cable A205M wires 17,18, 20 between A106 and C30 (E-306-2):

Note GE HGA1 1 control relay CR-A205 in C30 will require its plastic cover be removed to visually check whether the relay is picked up or not picked up.

Reference V/P M-201-101 and M-201-110 for location of relay.

7.2.1.1 If relay CR-A205 in C30 has a plastic cover installed, then remove cover.

7.2.1.2 Verify A-205 breaker RACKED DOWN.

7.2.1.3 Verify A-205 DC control power breaker BA CLOSED 7.2.1.4 Verify A-205 Local/Remote Handswitch is in REMOTE.

7.2.1.5 Verify fuses UB, UC, UR, UT located inside A-205 Cabinet in the ON position.

7.2.1.6 Verify A-106 breaker RACKED DOWN.

7.2.1.7 Verify A-106 DC control power Breaker BA OPEN.

7.2.1.8 Verify A-105 is RACKED DOWN.

7.2.1.9 Verify A-105 DC control power Breaker BA OPEN.

7.2.1.10 Verify P-BA Heater Drain Pump (A-107) handswitch HS-2808 on C12 In Normal-After-Stop or Pull-To-Lock position.

7.2.1.11 Verify P-8B Heater Drain Pump (A-207) handswitch HS-2810 on C12 in Normal-After-Stop or Pull-To-Lock position.

7.2.1.12 Take P-2A handswitch HS-2886 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.1.13 Take P-2B handswitch HS-2893 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.1.14 Take P-2C handswitch HS-2897 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.1.14.1 Visually check relay CR-A205 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up.

Reference M201 -110.

7.2.1.15 Take P-2A handswitch HS-2886 on C02 to START and release.

7.2.1.15.1 Visually check relay CR-A205 In C30 Pan 0 picked up.

7.2.1.16 Take P-2A handswitch HS-2886 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.1.16.1 Visually check relay CR-A205 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up.

7.2.1.17 Take P-2C handswitch HS-2897 on C02 to START and release.

7.2.1.17.1 Visually check relay CR-A205 in C30 Pan 0 picked up.

7.2.1.18 Take P-2C handswitch HS-2897 on C02 to STOP and release.

7.2.1.18.1 Visually check relay CR-A205 in C30 Pan 0 not picked up.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 7 of 16 7.2.1.19 If plastic cover for relay CR-A205 was removed for this test, then reinstall.

7.2.2 Cable A205Q wires 2P, 29A between A-205 and A-105 (E-306-2):

7.2.2.1 Verify A-205 Local/Remote handswitch in LOCAL.

7.2.2.2 Verify A-205 DC control power breaker (BA) is OPEN.

7.2.2.3 Remove bulb from RED ON indicating light for local control at A-205 cubicle.

7.2.2.4 In cubicle A-1 05, install a maintain position test switch jumper with the switch OPEN across TB FF terminals 11 and 12 opposite cable A2050 WHITE wire number 29A and BLACK wire number 2P without lifting existing leads. Reference E-8-AC-95.

7.2.2.5 In cubicle A-1 06, install a maintain position test switch jumper with the switch OPEN in cubicle A-106 across TB AA terminal points 3 and 4 without lifting existing leads. Reference E-8-AC-161.

7.2.2.6 In A-205, verify no continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 1 and 3 opposite cable A205Q BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29A. Reference E-8-AC-98 and E-505 sh. 4.

7.2.2.7 In A-105, place the test switch jumper in the CLOSED position.

7.2.2.7.1 In A-205, observe a change to continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 1 and 3 opposite cable A205Q BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29A (E-505-4).

7.2.2.8 In A-105, place the test switch jumper back in the OPEN position.

7.2.2.8.1 In A-205, observe a change to no continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 1 and 3 opposite cable A205Q BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29A.

7.2.2.9 In A-1 06, place the test switch jumper in the CLOSED position.

7.2.2.9.1 In A-205, observe a change to continuity measured between the cabinet internal side TB CC terminals 1 and 3 opposite cable A2050 BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29A.

7.2.2.10 In A-106, place the test switch jumper back in the OPEN position.

7.2.2.10.1 In A-205, observe a change to no continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 1 and 3 opposite cable A2050 BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29A.

7.2.2.11 Remove the test switch jumper installed at cubicle A-105.

7.2.2.12 Remove the test switch jumper installed at cubicle A-106.

7.2.2.13 Reinstall bulb into RED ON indicating light for local control at A-205 cubicle.

7.2.2.14 Place the A-205 Local/Remote handswitch in REMOTE, or as requested by Unit 1 Operations.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 8 of 16 7.3 A-207 Heater Drain Pump P8B Breaker NOTE Test Switch TS-286T-1 is the last two test switches (switches 9 and 10) of TS-186-ST1-1.

7.3.1 Verify Test Switch TS-186-ST1-1 (TS-286T-1), SW #10 at Control Room panel C20 is in the OPEN position. (E-304-1) 7.3.2 Verify Test Switch TS1 -211, SW D in A-21 1 is in the OPEN position. (E-93-2) 7.3.3 Verify A-207 Local/Remote handswitch in LOCAL.

7.3.4 Verify A-207 DC control power breaker (BA) OPEN.

7.3.5 Remove bulb from RED ON indicating light for local control at A-207 cubicle.

7.3.6 Cable A207D wires 21, 29, 31 and 2P between A-207 and TB1 18, and cable A207K wires 2P, 29 between A-207 and C20 (E-304-1) 7.3.6.1 In terminal box TB1089 (Reference E-531 sh. 42):

7.3.6.1.1 Lift the cable A207F 2P RED wire from terminal block scheme A207.

7.3.6.1.2 Without lifting existing leads, install a maintain position test switch jumper with switch OPEN across terminal block scheme A207 terminal 29 (cable A207F BLACK wire) and onto wire 2P lifted above.

7.3.6.1.3 Without lifting leads, install a maintain position test switch jumper with switch OPEN across terminal block scheme A207 terminals 31 and 21 on the terminal board side opposite cable A207F WHITE wire number 2P and GREEN wire number 21.

7.3.6.2 In C20, without lifting existing leads, install a maintain position test switch jumper with switch OPEN across terminal block scheme A207 terminals 2P and 29 on the terminal board side opposite cable A207K BLACK wire number 2P and WHITE wire number 29. Reference E-560 sh. 1.

7.3.6.3 At A-207, verify no continuity between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A207D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29. Reference E-505 sh. 5.

7.3.6.4 At TB1089, place the test switch jumper across 2P and 29 in the CLOSED position.

7.3.6.4.1 At A-207, observe a change to continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A207D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

7.3.6.5 At TB1 089, place the test switch jumper across terminals 2P and 29 back in the OPEN position.

7.3.6,5.1 At A-207, observe a change to no continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A207D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 9 of 16 7.3.6.6 At C20, place the test switch jumper in the CLOSED position.

7.3.6.6.1 At A-207, observe a change to continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A207D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

7.3.6.7 At C20, place the test switch jumper back in the OPEN position.

7.3.6.7.1 At A-207, observe a change to no continuity measured between the cabinet internal side of TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A207D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

7.3.6.8 At A-207, verify no continuity between the cabinet internal side of TB BB terminals 10 and 11 opposite cable A207D GREEN wire number 21 and WHITE wire number 31 (E-505-5, E-8-AC-98).

7.3.6.9 At TB1089, place the test switch jumper across terminals 31 and 21 in the CLOSED position.

7.3.6.9.1 At A-207, observe a change to continuity measured at A-207 between the cabinet internal side of TB BB terminals 10 and 11 opposite cable A207D GREEN wire number 21 and WHITE wire number 31.

7.3.6.10 At TB13089, place the test switch jumper back in the OPEN position.

7.3.6.10.1 Observe a change to no continuity measured at A-207 between the cabinet internal side of TB BB terminals 10 and 11 opposite cable A207D GREEN wire number 21 and WHITE wire number 31.

7.3.6.11 Re-term lifted cable A207F 2P RED wire to terminal block scheme A207 in TB1089 per the Lifted Lead Log.

7.3.6.11.1 At A-207, observe continuity measured between TB CC terminals 3 and 12 opposite cable A207D RED wire number 2P and BLACK wire number 29.

7.3.6.12 Remove both test switch jumpers installed at terminal box TB1 089.

7.3.6.13 Remove the test switch jumper installed at panel C20.

7.3.6.14 Restore test switch TS-186-ST1-1 (TS-286T-1), SW #10 to the as-found position or as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

7.3.6.15 Restore test switch TS1-21 1, SW D to the as-found position or as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

7.3.6.16 Reinstall bulb into RED ON indicating light for local control at A-207 cubicle.

7.3.6.17 Place the A-207 Local/Remote handswitch in REMOTE or leave as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

7.3.6.18 CLOSE A-207 DC control power Breaker BA or leave as directed by Unit 1 Operations.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 10 of 16 7.3.7 Cable A207D wires X1 and X2 between A-207 and TB1 18 and cable Al 07D wire U between A-107 and TB 118. (E-304-1):

7.3.7.1 Verify the heater 120 VAC breaker 2LB-3 is CLOSED.

7.3.7.2 For each heater circuit measure the current to the winding heater using a clamp-on ammeter on one power lead to the winding heater.

7.3.7.2.1 P-8A motor heater current reading: amps 7.3.7.2.2 P-8B motor heater current reading: amps 7.3.7.3 Record the heater calculated wattage (300 watt heaters installed);

7.3.7.3.1 P-8A watts 7.3.7.3.2 P-8B watts 7.3.7.4 Ensure that the measured current is not excessive compared to the recorded wattage.

8.0 Restoration 8.1 Verify removal of test switch and restoration of all lifted leads.

8.2 Verify DC Control Power Breakers (BA) located in the A-2 breakers are OPEN or left as directed by Operations.

8.3 Verify 4160 Volt Switchgear A-2 125 VDC Control Power Breaker D21-03 is OPEN or left as directed by Operations.

9.0 Test Results and Evaluation 9.1 No test data sheets are required for this test. See section 11.0 for discussion of test results / summary.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 11 of 16 10.0 M&TE Instrumentation Record the appropriate Information for all M&TE equipment used in the following table.

Record the applicable M&TE Record Test Step for Recorded By / Date Information (e.g. instrument #, cal which the M&TE was due date, instrument range, etc.) used

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 12 of 16 11.0 Summary Information 11.1 Test Summary Record any additional pertinent information obtained during testing not recorded in section 7 or the Test Log and provide a post test summary.

Test Step # Summary or Additional Information Recorded By / Date 11.2 Test Deficiencies Record any test deficiencies and document the evaluation / resolution of the deficiency in the Test Deficiency Log in section 12.0.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page 13 of 16 12.0 Attachments:

12.1 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.11 - Signature Identification Log 12.2 EN-DC-1 17 Attachment 9.9 -Test Log 12.3 EN-DC- 117 Attachment 9.10 - Test Deficiency Log 12.4 Test Change Notices

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Attachment 12.1 ATrACHMENT 9.11 SIGNATURE IDEif4nFICATION Loa SHEET 1 OF 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: 44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page of_

Name Title Signature Initials

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Attachment 12.2

[1] ATrACHMENT 9.9 TEST Loo SHEer 1 op 1 Test Number: ECT/STI: 44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page-of_

Date I Entry Initials 4 4 I I 1 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 I I 4 4.

a 4.

ECT-44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Attachment 12.3

[2] ATTACHMENT 9.10 TEST DEFICIENCY LOG SHEET 1 OwFI Test Number: ECT/STI: 44313-07 Rev 000 SWGR A-2, Miscellaneous Controls Page of DEFICIENCY DEFICIENCY DESCRIPTION DATEITIME NUMBER

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