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| number = ML17151B022
| number = ML17151B022
| issue date = 05/31/2017
| issue date = 05/31/2017
| title = Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 - NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000341/2017301 (Meb)
| title = NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000341/2017301 (Meb)
| author name = Orlikowski R J
| author name = Orlikowski R
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OB
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OB
| addressee name = Fessler P
| addressee name = Fessler P
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUIT E 210 LISLE, IL 60532
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES May 31, 2017
-4352 May 31, 2017 Mr. Paul Fessler, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer DTE Energy Company Fermi 2 - 210 NOC 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166


SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000341/2017301
==SUBJECT:==
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000341/2017301


==Dear Mr. Fessler:==
==Dear Mr. Fessler:==
On April 7, 2017
On April 7, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the initial operator licensing examination process for license applicants employed at your Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Fermi 2). The enclosed report documents the results of those examinations.
, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the initial operator licensing examination process for license applicants employed at your Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Fermi 2). The enclosed report documents the results of those examination s. Preliminary observations noted during the examination process were discussed on April 5, 2017, with Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of your staff
. An exit meeting was conducted by telephone on April 20, 2017
, between Mr. A. Pullam of your staff and Mr. M. Bielby, Senior Operator Licensing Examiner, to review the proposed final grading of the written examination for the license applicants.


During the telephone conversation, the final modification of answers to two written examination questions, and deletion of a third question were discussed based on review of questions missed by at least half of the applicants.
Preliminary observations noted during the examination process were discussed on April 5, 2017, with Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of your staff. An exit meeting was conducted by telephone on April 20, 2017, between Mr. A. Pullam of your staff and Mr. M. Bielby, Senior Operator Licensing Examiner, to review the proposed final grading of the written examination for the license applicants. During the telephone conversation, the final modification of answers to two written examination questions, and deletion of a third question were discussed based on review of questions missed by at least half of the applicants.


The NRC examiners administered an initial license examination operating test during the week of March 27, 2017. The written examination was administered by Fermi 2 training department personnel on April 3, 2017
The NRC examiners administered an initial license examination operating test during the week of March 27, 2017. The written examination was administered by Fermi 2 training department personnel on April 3, 2017. Three Senior Reactor Operator and five Reactor Operator applicants were administered license examinations. The results of the examinations were finalized on May 2, 2017. Eight applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and three were issued senior operator licenses and five were issued operator licenses.
. Three Senior Reactor Operator and five Reactor Operator applicants were administered license examinations. The results of the examinations were finalized on May 2, 2017
. Eight applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and three were issued senior operator licenses and five were issued operator licenses.


The administered written examination and operating test, as well as documents related to the development and review (outlines, review comments and resolution, etc.) of the examination  
The administered written examination and operating test, as well as documents related to the development and review (outlines, review comments and resolution, etc.) of the examination will be withheld from public disclosure until April 21, 2019. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.


will be withheld from public disclosure until April 21, 2019. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading
Sincerely,
-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
/RA/
Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43


Sincerely,/RA/
===Enclosures:===
Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
1. OL Examination Report 05000341/2017301 2. Post-Examination Comments, Evaluation, and Resolutions 3. Simulation Facility Fidelity Report


Docket No. 5 0-341 License No.
REGION III==
Docket No: 50-341 License No: NPF- 43 Report No: 05000341/2017301 Licensee: DTE Energy Company Facility: Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 Location: Newport, MI Dates: March 27 through April 7, 2017 Inspectors: M. Bielby, Senior Operations Engineer, Chief Examiner R. Baker, Operations Engineer, Examiner D. Reeser, Operations Engineer, Examiner Approved by: R. Orlikowski, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure 1


NPF-43 Enclosure s: 1. OL Examination Report 05000 341/2017301 2. Post-Examination Comments, Evaluation, and Resolutions 3. Simulation Facility Fidelity Report cc: Distribution via LISTSERV A. Pullam, Training Manager, Fermi Power Plant Letter to Paul Fessler from Robert Orlikowski dated May 31, 2017
=SUMMARY=
 
ER 05000341/2017301; 03/27/2017 - 04/07/2017; DTE Energy Company, Fermi Power Plant,
SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2
- NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000341/2017301 DISTRIBUTION
: Jeremy Bowen RidsNrrDorlLpl3 RidsNrrPMFermi2 Resource RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource Cynthia Pederson Darrell Roberts Richard Skokowski Allan Barker Carole Ariano Linda Linn DRPIII DRSIII Nancy Salgado
 
Colleen Schmidt
 
ADAMS Accession Number: ML17151B022 OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII NAME MBielby:jw ROrlikowski DATE 05/31/17 05/31/17 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


Enclosure 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No:
Unit 2; Initial License Examination Report.
50-341 License N o: NPF- 43 Report No:
05000341/2017301 Licensee: DTE Energy Company Facility: Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 Location:
Newport, MI Dates: March 27 through April 7, 2017 Inspectors:
M. Bielby, Senior Operations Engineer, Chief Examiner R. Baker, Operations Engineer, Examiner D. Reeser, Operations Engineer, Examiner Approved by:
R. Orlikowski, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety 2
 
=SUMMARY=
ER 05000341/2017301; 03/27/2017


- 04/07/2017
The announced initial operator licensing examination was conducted by regional U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission examiners in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 10.
; DTE Energy Company, Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2; Initial License Examination Report.


The announced initial operator licensing examination was conducted by regional U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission examiners in accordance with the guidance of NUREG
Examination Summary:
-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors,
Eight of eight applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations. Three applicants were issued senior operator licenses and five applicants were issued operator licenses.
" Revision 10. Examination Summary
: Eight of eight applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations. Three applicants were issued senior operator licenses and five applicants were issued operator licenses.  (Section 4OA5.1).


3
(Section 4OA5.1).


=REPORT DETAILS=
=REPORT DETAILS=
Line 83: Line 62:


====a. Examination Scope====
====a. Examination Scope====
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) examiners and members of the facility licensees staff used the guidance prescribed in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 10, to develop, validate, administer, and grade the written examination and operating test. Members of the facility licensees staff prepared the outlines and developed the written examination and operating test. The NRC examiners validated the proposed examination during the week of February 27, 2017, with the assistance of members of the facility licensees staff. During the on-site validation week, the examiners audited two license applications for accuracy. The NRC examiners, with the assistance of members of the facility licensees staff, administered the operating test, consisting of job performance measures and dynamic simulator scenarios, during the period of March 27 through March 31, 2017. The facility licensee administered the written examination on April 3, 2017.
NRC) examiners and members of the facility licensee's staff used the guidance prescribed in NUREG
-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Revision 10, to develop, validate, administer, and grade the written examination and operating test. Members of the facility licensee's staff prepared the outline s and developed the written examination and operating test. The NRC examiners validated the proposed examination during the week of February 27, 2017, with the assistance of members of the facility licensee's staff. During the on
-site validation week, the examiners audited two license application s for accuracy. The NRC examiners, with the assistance of members of the facility licensee's staff, administered the operating test, consist ing of job performance measures and dynamic simulator scenarios, during the period of March 27 through March 31, 2017. The facility licensee administered the written examination on April 3, 2017.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
(1) Written Examination The NRC examiners determined that the written examination, as proposed by the licensee, was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.
: (1) Written Examination The NRC examiners determined that the written examination, as proposed by the licensee, was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.


Less than 20% of the proposed examination questions were determined to be unsatisfactory and required modification or replacement. All changes made to the proposed written examination, were made in accordance with NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," and documented on Form ES 9, "Written Examination Review Worksheet
Less than 20% of the proposed examination questions were determined to be unsatisfactory and required modification or replacement.
." On April 7, 2017, the licensee submitted documentation noting that there were no post-examination comment s for consideration by the NRC examiners when grading the written examination.


However, the NRC
All changes made to the proposed written examination, were made in accordance with NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and documented on Form ES-401-9, Written Examination Review Worksheet.
's post-examination review of applicant comments and written examination questions missed by half of the applicants identified three written examination questions with flaws. The NRC's post-examination comments and resolution s are included as Enclosure 2 to the report.


The written examination outlines and worksheets, the proposed written examination, as well as the final as
On April 7, 2017, the licensee submitted documentation noting that there were no post-examination comments for consideration by the NRC examiners when grading the written examination. However, the NRCs post-examination review of applicant comments and written examination questions missed by half of the applicants identified three written examination questions with flaws. The NRCs post-examination comments and resolutions are included as Enclosure 2 to the report.
-administered examination and answer key (ADAMS Accession Number ML17150A088
 
), will be available, in 24 months, electronically in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).
The written examination outlines and worksheets, the proposed written examination, as well as the final as-administered examination and answer key (ADAMS Accession Number ML17150A088), will be available, in 24 months, electronically in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).


The NRC examiners graded the written examination on April 28, 2017, and conducted a review of each missed question to determine the accuracy and validity of the examination questions.
The NRC examiners graded the written examination on April 28, 2017, and conducted a review of each missed question to determine the accuracy and validity of the examination questions.
 
: (2) Operating Test The NRC examiners determined that the operating test, as originally proposed by the licensee, was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.
4 (2) Operating Test The NRC examiners determined that the operating test, as originally proposed by the licensee, was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.


During the review and validation of the operating test, minor modifications were made to several Job Performance Measures (JPMs), and some minor modifications were made to the dynamic simulator scenarios.
During the review and validation of the operating test, minor modifications were made to several Job Performance Measures (JPMs), and some minor modifications were made to the dynamic simulator scenarios.


Changes made to the operating test, documented in a document titled, "Operating Test Comments," as well as the final, as
Changes made to the operating test, documented in a document titled, Operating Test Comments, as well as the final, as-administered, dynamic simulator scenarios and JPMs, will be available, in 24 months, electronically in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's ADAMS.
-administered, dynamic simulator scenarios and JPMs, will be available, in 24 months, electronically in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's ADAMS.


The NRC examiners completed operating test grading on May 1, 2017
The NRC examiners completed operating test grading on May 1, 2017.
. (3) Examination Results Three applicants at the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) level and five applicants at the Reactor Operator (RO) level were administered written examinations and operating tests. Eight applicants passed all portions of their examinations and were issued their respective operating licenses on May 2, 2017.
: (3) Examination Results Three applicants at the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) level and five applicants at the Reactor Operator (RO) level were administered written examinations and operating tests. Eight applicants passed all portions of their examinations and were issued their respective operating licenses on May 2, 2017.


===.2 Examination Security===
===.2 Examination Security===


====a. Scope====
====a. Scope====
The NRC examiners reviewed and observed the licensee's implementation of examination security requirements during the examination validation and administration to assure compliance with Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 55.49, "Integrity of Examinations and Tests.
The NRC examiners reviewed and observed the licensee's implementation of examination security requirements during the examination validation and administration to assure compliance with Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests. The examiners used the guidelines provided in NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, to determine acceptability of the licensees examination security activities.
 
"  The examiners used the guidelines provided in NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors
," to determine acceptability of the licensee
's examination security activities.


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
Four of the eight Initial License Operator (ILO) class applicants obtained in-plant checkouts on Task Performance Evaluations that involved interaction with six licensed operators with knowledge of the examination. The six licensed operators had previously signed the licensee's Exam Security agreement that clearly stated they were not to instruct, evaluate or provide performance feedback to those applicants in the ILO class.
Four of the eight Initial License Operator (ILO) class applicants obtained in-plant checkouts on Task Performance Evaluations that involved interaction with six licensed operators with knowledge of the examination. The six licensed operators had previously signed the licensees Exam Security agreement that clearly stated they were not to instruct, evaluate or provide performance feedback to those applicants in the ILO class.


The incidents happened prior to the NRC examination administration, in an evaluation situation, as a result of the applicants and licensed operators failing to verify the exam security limitations placed on each other. The applicants wore green badges to identify they were in the current ILO class; however, the licensed operators with knowledge of the NRC examination, did not wear any type of visual indication.
The incidents happened prior to the NRC examination administration, in an evaluation situation, as a result of the applicants and licensed operators failing to verify the exam security limitations placed on each other. The applicants wore green badges to identify they were in the current ILO class; however, the licensed operators with knowledge of the NRC examination, did not wear any type of visual indication. The interactions primarily involved the licensed operators evaluating system and procedural knowledge of the ILO applicants. A follow-up investigation determined that no exam compromise occurred. This issue, which was of minor significance, was documented in Condition Assessment Resolution Documentation (CARD) 17-21402.


The interactions primarily involved the licensed operators evaluating system and procedural knowledge of the ILO applicants.
Three instances of marked up procedure pages were identified during the NRC administration of operating test scenarios which was not in accordance with the licensees Nuclear Training Work Instructions for Conduct of Simulator Assessments and Evaluations. The initial marked up procedure page was identified after completion of a scenario and the page was replaced with a clean copy. The second instance of a marked up procedure page was identified early during a subsequent scenario administration, and the scenario was halted by the Chief Examiner until all procedures were reviewed. A third marked up procedure page was identified and replaced with a clean copy. A follow-up investigation determined that no exam compromise occurred.


A follow-up investigation determined that no exam compromise occurred. This issue, which was of minor significance, was documented in Condition Assessment Resolution Documentation (CARD) 17
This issue, which was of minor significance, was documented in CARD 17-23151.
-21402.
 
5 Three instances of "marked up" procedure pages were identified during the NRC administration of operating test scenarios which was not in accordance with the licensee's Nuclear Training Work Instructions for Conduct of Simulator Assessments and Evaluations.
 
The initial marked up procedure page was identified after completion of a scenario and the page was replaced with a clean copy. The second instance of a marked up procedure page was identified early during a subsequent scenario administration
, and the scenario was halted by the Chief Examiner until all procedures were reviewed. A third marked up procedure page was identified and replaced with a clean cop y. A follow-up investigation determined that no exam compromise occurred.


This issue, which was of minor significance, was documented in CARD 17-23151.
{{a|4OA6}}
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Management Meetings==
==4OA6 Management Meetings==


===.1 Debrief The chief examiner presented the examination team's preliminary observations and===
===.1 Debrief===


findings on April 5, 2017
The chief examiner presented the examination team's preliminary observations and findings on April 5, 2017, to Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of the Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, staff.
, to Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of the Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, staff.


===.2 Exit Meeting===
===.2 Exit Meeting===


The chief examiner conducted an exit meeting on April 20, 2017, with Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of the Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, staff, by telephone. The NRC
The chief examiner conducted an exit meeting on April 20, 2017, with Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of the Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, staff, by telephone. The NRCs final disposition of the stations post-examination comments were disclosed and discussed with Mr. Pullam during the telephone discussion. The examiners asked the licensee whether any of the material used to develop or administer the examination should be considered proprietary. One proprietary bases document was identified and removed from the NRC examiner files.
's final disposition of the station
 
's post-examination comments were disclosed and discussed with Mr. Pullam during the telephone discussion. The examiners asked the licensee whether any of the material used to develop or administer the examination should be considered proprietary. One proprietary bases document was identified and removed from the NRC examiner files. ATTACHMENT:
ATTACHMENT:  


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=


SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTAC
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
T Licensee  
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
: [[contact::A. Pullam]], Training Manager
: [[contact::A. Pullam]], Training Manager
: [[contact::B. Crone]], General Supervisor
: [[contact::B. Crone]], General Supervisor-Operations Training
-Operations Training
: [[contact::M. Donigian]], Supervisor-Operator Training
: [[contact::M. Donigian]], Supervisor
-Operator Training  
: [[contact::J. Vanbrunt]], Initial License Training Exam Developer
: [[contact::J. Vanbrunt]], Initial License Training Exam Developer
: [[contact::E. Thisius]], Initial License Training Exam Team
: [[contact::E. Thisius]], Initial License Training Exam Team
Line 173: Line 132:
None
None
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
A/C Air Conditioning
A/C   Air Conditioning
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access and Management System
ADAMS Agencywide Document Access and Management System
BOP Balance of Plant
BOP   Balance of Plant
CARD Condition Assessment Resolution Documentation
CARD Condition Assessment Resolution Documentation
DFP Diesel Fire Pump
DFP   Diesel Fire Pump
DW Drywell EFP Electric Fire Pump
DW   Drywell
GSW General Service Water
EFP   Electric Fire Pump
ILO Initial License Operator
GSW   General Service Water
ISO Isolation
ILO   Initial License Operator
JPM Job Performance Measures
ISO   Isolation
LPCI Low Pressure Coolant Injection
JPM   Job Performance Measures
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
LPCI Low Pressure Coolant Injection
OOS Out-of-Service RHR Residual Heat Removal
NRC   U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
RO Reactor Operator
OOS   Out-of-Service
SDC Shutdown Cooling
RHR   Residual Heat Removal
SRO Senior Reactor Operator
RO   Reactor Operator
VLV Valve
SDC   Shutdown Cooling
SRO   Senior Reactor Operator
VLV   Valve
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOULTION
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOULTION
QUESTION No.
QUESTION No. 18
An offsite release is in progress with CCHVAC running in Recirculation mode. If both the North
An offsite release is in progress with CCHVAC running in Recirculation mode. If both the North
and South
and South Emergency Makeup intakes receive a Hi-Hi radiation signal while the intake selector
Emergency Makeup intakes rece
switch is in AUTO, how will Emergency Makeup logic respond?
ive a Hi-Hi radiation signal while the intake selector switch is in
AUTO, how
will Emergency Makeup logic respond?
A. Both inlets will remain open.
A. Both inlets will remain open.
B. Both inlets will close for a
B. Both inlets will close for a five minute sampling period.
five minute sampling period.
C. Both inlets will close and remain closed.
C. Both inlets will close and remain closed.
D. Both inlets will open for a 5 minute sampling period.
D. Both inlets will open for a 5 minute sampling period.
Explanation:
Explanation:
Answer A - If both of the radiation monitors are both above or below the Hi
Answer A - If both of the radiation monitors are both above or below the Hi-Hi setpoint,
-Hi setpoint
the logic will not select either intake and both the intakes will remain open. The operator
, the logic will not select either intake and both the intakes will
must select the Emergency intake to open using radiation level indication in the Relay
remain open.
Room. This will occur With the 3 position switch for Emergency air intake selected to AUTO.
The operator must select the Emergency intake to open using radiation level indication in the Relay Room. This will occur With the 3 position switch for Emergency air intake selected to AUTO.
Distractor Explanation:
Distractor Explanation:
B - Incorrect  
B - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes takes a 5 minute sample,
- Distractor
but both intakes remain open during the sampling.
is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes take
C - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes takes a 5 minute sample,
s a 5 minute sample
but both intakes remain open during the sampling.
, but both intakes remain open during th
D - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes takes a 5 minute sample,
e sampling.
but both intakes remain open during the sampling.
C - Incorrect  
- Distractor is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes takes a 5 minute sample, but both intakes remain open during th
e sampling.
D - Incorrect  
- Distractor is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes takes a 5 minute sample,
but both intakes remain open during th
e sampling.
Technical Reference(s):
Technical Reference(s):
ST-OP-315-0073 - Operations Training, Control Center HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning)
ST-OP-315-0073 - Operations Training, Control Center HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning)
(Pg. 20) I-2611-51 - Schematic Diagram, Reactor Building Main Control Room A/C Isolation Dampers Div 1  
    (Pg. 20)
- (T41M72) relay that forces both (dampers)
I-2611-51 - Schematic Diagram, Reactor Building Main Control Room A/C Isolation Dampers Div 1 -
open APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION
    (T41M72) relay that forces both (dampers) open
There were no comments or contentions by the applicant's; however, at least half of the applicants
APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION
answered the question incorrectly,
There were no comments or contentions by the applicants; however, at least half of the
which prompted a review by the NRC written examination graders. FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION
applicants answered the question incorrectly, which prompted a review by the NRC written
examination graders.
FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION
The station did not submit any post examination comments.
The station did not submit any post examination comments.
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
QUESTION No. 18
QUESTION No. 18 (page 2 of 2)
(page 2 of 2)
NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION
NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION
Given the technical information
Given the technical information initially provided by the Facility, the NRC agrees that answer
initially
choice A is a correct answer; however, based on further review, information and discussions
provided by the Facility, the NRC agrees that answer choice A is a correct answer; however, based on further review
with the licensee, choice D is also a correct answer.
, information
As indicated in the reference information provided, placing the 3 position switch for Emergency
and discussions with the licensee, choice D is also a correct answer.
air intake in AUTO will open both Emergency Air Intake dampers. Subsequently, if the radiation
As indicated in the reference information provided, placing the 3 position switch for Emergency air intake in AUTO will open both Emergency Air Intake dampers.
monitor(s) are above the Hi-Hi setpoint, both intakes will remain open (answer A). However,
Subsequently, if the radiation monitor(s) are above the Hi
additional information identified that with the Emergency air intake switch in AUTO, a Hi-Hi
-Hi setpoint, both intakes will  
radiation signal initiated by either of the normal intake radiation detectors will initially open both
"remain" open (answer A). However,
Emergency air intakes and start a 5 minute sample of both inlets (answer D).
additional information identified that with the Emergency air intake switch in AUTO, a Hi
Normally, the Emergency air intake would not be in the AUTO position, and after the 5 minute
-Hi radiation signal initiated by either of the normal intake radiation detectors will initially open both Emergency air intakes and start a 5
sample, the damper associated with the Hi-Hi radiation detection will close, and the other
minute sample of both inlets
damper will remain open. If both radiation monitors are above the Hi-Hi setpoint, the logic will
(answer D).
not select either intake and both intakes will remain open. The operator must then select the
Normally, the Emergency air intake would not be in the AUTO position, and after the 5 minute sample, the damper associated with the
Emergency intake to remain open based on radiation level indications located in the Relay
Hi-Hi radiation detection will close
Room.
, and the other damper will remain open. If both radiation monitors
The question asks how the Emergency Makeup logic will respond to the indicated status of
are above the Hi
the Emergency air intake switch and a Hi-Hi radiation level. Choice A addresses the final state
-Hi setpoint, the logic will not select either intake and both intakes will remain open. The operator must then select the Emergency intake to
of the logic response; however, choice D correctly addresses an early response of the logic.
remain open based on radiation level indications located
Although at different times in the Emergency Makeup logic response, both choices A and D
in the Relay Room. The question asks how the Emergency Makeup "logic" will respond
address how the logic responds and; therefore, both choices correctly answer the question.
to the indicated status of the Emergency air intake switch and a Hi
-Hi radiation level
. Choice A addresses the final state of the logic response; however, choice D correctly addresses an early response of the logic. Although at different times in the Emergency Makeup logic response, both choices A and D address how the logic responds
and; therefore, both choices correctly answer the question.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes that there are two correct answer
Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes
s to the question
that there are two correct answers to the question.
.
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
QUESTION NO.
QUESTION NO. 29
Residual Heat Removal
Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop B is in Shutdown Cooling, and RPV Water level
(RHR) Loop B is in Shutdown Cooling, and RPV Water level
is 194 inches and lowering. A maintenance mishap has caused a line to be sheared.
is 194 inches and
The line is the reference line for the following instruments:
lowering. A
* B21-N080C DIV 1 REACTOR LEVEL NARROW RANGE TRANSMITTER
maintenance mishap has caused a line to be sheared.
* B21-N080D DIV 1 REACTOR LEVEL NARROW RANGE TRANSMITTER
The line is the reference line for
Shortly after this incident ACTUAL RPV level begins lowering at 2 inches a minute.
the following instruments:
Assuming no operator action what is the position of the following valves 15 minutes after
-N080C DIV 1 REACTOR LEVEL NARROW RANGE TRANSMITTER
ACTUAL RPV level started to lower?
-N080D DIV 1 REACTOR LEVEL NARROW RANGE TRANSMITTER
E1150-F008                         E1150-F009
Shortly after
RHR SDC OTBD                       RHR SDC INBD
this incident ACTUAL RPV level begins lowering at 2 inches a minute.
SUCTION ISO VLV                   SUCTION ISO VLV
Assuming no operator action what is the position of the following valves 15 minutes after ACTUAL RPV level started to lower?
A.           OPEN                               OPEN
E1150-F008 E1150-F009 RHR SDC OTBD RHR SDC INBD
B.           CLOSE                             OPEN
SUCTION ISO VLV SUCTION ISO
C.           OPEN                               CLOSE
VLV A. OPEN   OPEN B. CLOSE   OPEN C. OPEN CLOSE D. CLOSE CLOSE Explanation:
D.           CLOSE                             CLOSE
Answer C  
Explanation:
- Per M-2090 B21-N080C/D are supplied from a single tap.
Answer C - Per M-2090 B21-N080C/D are supplied from a single tap. Failure to the reference
Failure to the reference leg will make a level instrument fail HIGH.
leg will make a level instrument fail HIGH. This means that for NSSSS (C & D) logic will never
This means that for NSSSS (C & D) logic will never be met. 23.601 Trip sheet shows that A&C will be met at below 173.4 inches. 2 inches per min for 15 minutes is 30 inches. 194
be met. 23.601 Trip sheet shows that A&C will be met at below 173.4 inches. 2 inches per min
-30 = 164 with is less than 173.4. A&C NSSSS closes the E1150-F009. A - Incorrect  
for 15 minutes is 30 inches. 194-30 = 164 with is less than 173.4. A&C NSSSS closes the
- Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.
E1150-F009.
B - Incorrect  
A - Incorrect - Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.
- Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.
B - Incorrect - Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.
D - Incorrect  
D - Incorrect - Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.
- Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.
Technical Reference(s):
Technical Reference(s):
M-2090 23.601 (Pg. 11)
M-2090
23.601 (Pg. 11)
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
QUESTION No.
QUESTION No. 29 (page 2 of 2)
(page 2 of 2)
APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION
APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION
There were no comments or contentions by the applicant's; however, at least half of the applicants answered the question incorrectly which prompted a review by the NRC written examination graders. FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION
There were no comments or contentions by the applicants; however, at least half of the
applicants answered the question incorrectly which prompted a review by the NRC written
examination graders.
FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION
The station did not submit any post examination comments.
The station did not submit any post examination comments.
NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION
NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION
A review of the administered written examination question indicated the incorrect Divisional nomenclature had been assigned to the instrument
A review of the administered written examination question indicated the incorrect Divisional
plant identification numbers listed
nomenclature had been assigned to the instrument plant identification numbers listed in the
in the question stem. Division I does not correspond to B21
question stem. Division I does not correspond to B21-N080C and -N080D, and as a result
-N080C and -N080D, and as a result the question does not make sense.
the question does not make sense.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes that there is no correct answer to the question and the question will be deleted from the exam.
Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes
 
that there is no correct answer to the question and the question will be deleted from the exam.
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
QUESTION No.
QUESTION No. 75
Which one of the following identifies the MINIMUM required qualifications for person(s)
Which one of the following identifies the MINIMUM required qualifications for person(s)
responsible for the Command Function in the control room during (1) NORMAL and (2) EMERGENCY conditions?
responsible for the Command Function in the control room during (1) NORMAL and
A. (1) CRS (2) CRS B. (1) CRS (2) SM C. (1) SM (2) CRS D. (1) SM (2) SM Explanation:
(2) EMERGENCY conditions?
Answer B - Per MOP01 There shall be one individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license for Fermi 2 assigned the Command Function for and located in the Control Room at all times when the plant is in Operational Condition 1, 2, or 3.
A.       (1) CRS
During emergency conditions this shall be the S
        (2) CRS
: [[contact::M. During routine operations]],
B.       (1) CRS
it shall be the CRS except for short periods of relief, during which the SM should be in the Control Room, but another individual possessing an active SRO license for Fermi 2 may provide relief.
        (2) SM
A - Incorrect  
C.       (1) SM
- Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.
        (2) CRS
C - Incorrect  
D.       (1) SM
- Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.
        (2) SM
D - Incorrect  
Explanation:
- Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.
Answer B - Per MOP01 There shall be one individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)
license for Fermi 2 assigned the Command Function for and located in the Control Room at all times
when the plant is in Operational Condition 1, 2, or 3. During emergency conditions this shall be the S
: [[contact::M.
During routine operations]], it shall be the CRS except for short periods of relief, during which the SM
should be in the Control Room, but another individual possessing an active SRO license for Fermi 2 may
provide relief.
A - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.
C - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.
D - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.
Technical Reference(s):
Technical Reference(s):
MOP01, Conduct of Operations; Section 3.7.4, Pg
MOP01, Conduct of Operations; Section 3.7.4, Pg. 20
. 20 Task 02SFGA004; Objective 45397
Task 02SFGA004; Objective 45397
Administrative Qualification Card (QP0013)
Administrative Qualification Card (QP0013)
APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION
APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION
There were no comments or contentions by the applicant's; however, at least half of the applicants answered the question incorrectly,
There were no comments or contentions by the applicants; however, at least half of the
which prompted a review by the NRC written examination graders. FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION
applicants answered the question incorrectly, which prompted a review by the NRC written
examination graders.
FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION
The station did not submit any post examination comments.
The station did not submit any post examination comments.
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION
QUESTION No.
QUESTION No. 75 (page 2 of 2)
(page 2 of 2)
NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION
NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION
A review of the administered written examination question and references indicated Choice A, vice B was the correct answer.
A review of the administered written examination question and references indicated Choice A,
vice B was the correct answer.
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes that Choice A vice B is the
Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes
correct answer to the question.
that Choice A vice B is the correct answer to the question.
 
SIMULATION FACILITY FIDELITY REPORT
SIMULATION FACILITY
Facility Licensee:                     Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2
FIDELITY REPORT Facility Licensee:
Facility Docket No:                     50-341
Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 Facility Docket No:
Operating Tests Administered:           March 27 through 31, 2017
50-341 Operating Tests Administered:
The following documents observations made by the NRC examination team during the initial
March 27 through 31, 2017
operator license examination. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings
The following documents observations made by the NRC examination team during the initial operator license examination. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non
and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with Title 10 of
-compliance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
the Code of Federal Regulations 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification
55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information, which may be,
or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information, which may be, used in
used in future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were
During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were
observed:
observed:
ITEM DESCRIPTION
ITEM                                         DESCRIPTION
East and West Battery Rm Remote Trigger Scenario 2, Normal Event 1 (BOP), Shifting Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water pumps: No remote trigger developed to turn off the East and West Battery Room A/C Units, which
East and West           Scenario 2, Normal Event 1 (BOP), Shifting Reactor Building Closed
would make the Emergency Fans start.
Battery Rm Remote      Cooling Water pumps: No remote trigger developed to turn off the
Isolation Valve F510A failed close
Trigger                East and West Battery Room A/C Units, which would make the
Scenario 2, Instrument Failure Event 2 (SRO), Drywall (
Emergency Fans start.
DW) Pressure Xmitter Failure with Individual Rod Scram
Isolation Valve         Scenario 2, Instrument Failure Event 2 (SRO), Drywall (DW) Pressure
: Received DW pressure transmitter failure and half scram. A few minutes later, the B side fuse clip burnt and the associated rod scrammed; however, also received alarms for #1 Circulating Water Pump
F510A failed close      Xmitter Failure with Individual Rod Scram: Received DW pressure
cooling because the motor
transmitter failure and half scram. A few minutes later, the B side fuse
lube oil cooling isolation valve F510A failed close and isolated the motor
clip burnt and the associated rod scrammed; however, also received
cooling. Simulator put in freeze to investigate but cause of the isolation was never identified (ghost occurrence).
alarms for #1 Circulating Water Pump cooling because the motor lube
Diesel Fire Pump (DFP) start
oil cooling isolation valve F510A failed close and isolated the motor
ed Scenario 3 (first run), Normal Event 3 (BOP), trip of General Service Water (GSW) pump and shutdown Electric Fire Pump (EFP)
cooling. Simulator put in freeze to investigate but cause of the
: As part of the crew turnover, the DFP was tagged out
isolation was never identified (ghost occurrence).
-of-service (OOS). During loss of the GSW pump, the EFP started as expected;
Diesel Fire Pump       Scenario 3 (first run), Normal Event 3 (BOP), trip of General Service
however, the DFP also started (unexpected).
(DFP) started          Water (GSW) pump and shutdown Electric Fire Pump (EFP): As part
EFP failed to start
of the crew turnover, the DFP was tagged out-of-service (OOS).
Scenario 3 (second run), Normal Event 3 (BOP), trip of GSW pump and shutdown EFP
During loss of the GSW pump, the EFP started as expected; however,
: As part of the crew turnover, the DFP was tagged OO
the DFP also started (unexpected).
: [[contact::S. During loss of the GSW pump]], the DFP did not start (as expected); however, the EFP also failed to start (unexpected).
EFP failed to start     Scenario 3 (second run), Normal Event 3 (BOP), trip of GSW pump
Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump A tripped Simulator JPM 5e, Shift Division 2 RHR from Torus Spray Mode to Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Mode
and shutdown EFP: As part of the crew turnover, the DFP was tagged
: Division 2 RHR pump A was initially in Torus Spray mode and Division 2 RHR pump B would not start such that the operator was forced to do a valve realignment
OO
to LPCI mode. However, the Division 2 RHR pump A tripped for no reason and forced the operator to restart the tripped pump. Cause
: [[contact::S. During loss of the GSW pump]], the DFP did not start (as
expected); however, the EFP also failed to start (unexpected).
Division 2 Residual     Simulator JPM 5e, Shift Division 2 RHR from Torus Spray Mode to
Heat Removal            Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Mode: Division 2 RHR pump A
(RHR) pump A            was initially in Torus Spray mode and Division 2 RHR pump B would
tripped                not start such that the operator was forced to do a valve realignment
to LPCI mode. However, the Division 2 RHR pump A tripped for no
reason and forced the operator to restart the tripped pump. Cause
of the tripped pump was never identified (ghost).
of the tripped pump was never identified (ghost).
These events were captured in CARDs 17-23824 and 17
These events were captured in CARDs 17-23824 and 17-23174
-23174
3
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 03:39, 30 October 2019

NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000341/2017301 (Meb)
ML17151B022
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/31/2017
From: Robert Orlikowski
Operations Branch III
To: Fessler P
DTE Energy
References
ER 2017301
Download: ML17151B022 (17)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES May 31, 2017

SUBJECT:

FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000341/2017301

Dear Mr. Fessler:

On April 7, 2017, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the initial operator licensing examination process for license applicants employed at your Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Fermi 2). The enclosed report documents the results of those examinations.

Preliminary observations noted during the examination process were discussed on April 5, 2017, with Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of your staff. An exit meeting was conducted by telephone on April 20, 2017, between Mr. A. Pullam of your staff and Mr. M. Bielby, Senior Operator Licensing Examiner, to review the proposed final grading of the written examination for the license applicants. During the telephone conversation, the final modification of answers to two written examination questions, and deletion of a third question were discussed based on review of questions missed by at least half of the applicants.

The NRC examiners administered an initial license examination operating test during the week of March 27, 2017. The written examination was administered by Fermi 2 training department personnel on April 3, 2017. Three Senior Reactor Operator and five Reactor Operator applicants were administered license examinations. The results of the examinations were finalized on May 2, 2017. Eight applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations and three were issued senior operator licenses and five were issued operator licenses.

The administered written examination and operating test, as well as documents related to the development and review (outlines, review comments and resolution, etc.) of the examination will be withheld from public disclosure until April 21, 2019. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43

Enclosures:

1. OL Examination Report 05000341/2017301 2. Post-Examination Comments, Evaluation, and Resolutions 3. Simulation Facility Fidelity Report

REGION III==

Docket No: 50-341 License No: NPF- 43 Report No: 05000341/2017301 Licensee: DTE Energy Company Facility: Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 Location: Newport, MI Dates: March 27 through April 7, 2017 Inspectors: M. Bielby, Senior Operations Engineer, Chief Examiner R. Baker, Operations Engineer, Examiner D. Reeser, Operations Engineer, Examiner Approved by: R. Orlikowski, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure 1

SUMMARY

ER 05000341/2017301; 03/27/2017 - 04/07/2017; DTE Energy Company, Fermi Power Plant,

Unit 2; Initial License Examination Report.

The announced initial operator licensing examination was conducted by regional U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission examiners in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 10.

Examination Summary:

Eight of eight applicants passed all sections of their respective examinations. Three applicants were issued senior operator licenses and five applicants were issued operator licenses.

(Section 4OA5.1).

REPORT DETAILS

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Initial Licensing Examinations

a. Examination Scope

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) examiners and members of the facility licensees staff used the guidance prescribed in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, Revision 10, to develop, validate, administer, and grade the written examination and operating test. Members of the facility licensees staff prepared the outlines and developed the written examination and operating test. The NRC examiners validated the proposed examination during the week of February 27, 2017, with the assistance of members of the facility licensees staff. During the on-site validation week, the examiners audited two license applications for accuracy. The NRC examiners, with the assistance of members of the facility licensees staff, administered the operating test, consisting of job performance measures and dynamic simulator scenarios, during the period of March 27 through March 31, 2017. The facility licensee administered the written examination on April 3, 2017.

b. Findings

(1) Written Examination The NRC examiners determined that the written examination, as proposed by the licensee, was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.

Less than 20% of the proposed examination questions were determined to be unsatisfactory and required modification or replacement.

All changes made to the proposed written examination, were made in accordance with NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and documented on Form ES-401-9, Written Examination Review Worksheet.

On April 7, 2017, the licensee submitted documentation noting that there were no post-examination comments for consideration by the NRC examiners when grading the written examination. However, the NRCs post-examination review of applicant comments and written examination questions missed by half of the applicants identified three written examination questions with flaws. The NRCs post-examination comments and resolutions are included as Enclosure 2 to the report.

The written examination outlines and worksheets, the proposed written examination, as well as the final as-administered examination and answer key (ADAMS Accession Number ML17150A088), will be available, in 24 months, electronically in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).

The NRC examiners graded the written examination on April 28, 2017, and conducted a review of each missed question to determine the accuracy and validity of the examination questions.

(2) Operating Test The NRC examiners determined that the operating test, as originally proposed by the licensee, was within the range of acceptability expected for a proposed examination.

During the review and validation of the operating test, minor modifications were made to several Job Performance Measures (JPMs), and some minor modifications were made to the dynamic simulator scenarios.

Changes made to the operating test, documented in a document titled, Operating Test Comments, as well as the final, as-administered, dynamic simulator scenarios and JPMs, will be available, in 24 months, electronically in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's ADAMS.

The NRC examiners completed operating test grading on May 1, 2017.

(3) Examination Results Three applicants at the Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) level and five applicants at the Reactor Operator (RO) level were administered written examinations and operating tests. Eight applicants passed all portions of their examinations and were issued their respective operating licenses on May 2, 2017.

.2 Examination Security

a. Scope

The NRC examiners reviewed and observed the licensee's implementation of examination security requirements during the examination validation and administration to assure compliance with Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests. The examiners used the guidelines provided in NUREG 1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, to determine acceptability of the licensees examination security activities.

b. Findings

Four of the eight Initial License Operator (ILO) class applicants obtained in-plant checkouts on Task Performance Evaluations that involved interaction with six licensed operators with knowledge of the examination. The six licensed operators had previously signed the licensees Exam Security agreement that clearly stated they were not to instruct, evaluate or provide performance feedback to those applicants in the ILO class.

The incidents happened prior to the NRC examination administration, in an evaluation situation, as a result of the applicants and licensed operators failing to verify the exam security limitations placed on each other. The applicants wore green badges to identify they were in the current ILO class; however, the licensed operators with knowledge of the NRC examination, did not wear any type of visual indication. The interactions primarily involved the licensed operators evaluating system and procedural knowledge of the ILO applicants. A follow-up investigation determined that no exam compromise occurred. This issue, which was of minor significance, was documented in Condition Assessment Resolution Documentation (CARD) 17-21402.

Three instances of marked up procedure pages were identified during the NRC administration of operating test scenarios which was not in accordance with the licensees Nuclear Training Work Instructions for Conduct of Simulator Assessments and Evaluations. The initial marked up procedure page was identified after completion of a scenario and the page was replaced with a clean copy. The second instance of a marked up procedure page was identified early during a subsequent scenario administration, and the scenario was halted by the Chief Examiner until all procedures were reviewed. A third marked up procedure page was identified and replaced with a clean copy. A follow-up investigation determined that no exam compromise occurred.

This issue, which was of minor significance, was documented in CARD 17-23151.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Debrief

The chief examiner presented the examination team's preliminary observations and findings on April 5, 2017, to Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of the Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, staff.

.2 Exit Meeting

The chief examiner conducted an exit meeting on April 20, 2017, with Mr. A. Pullam, Training Manager, and other members of the Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, staff, by telephone. The NRCs final disposition of the stations post-examination comments were disclosed and discussed with Mr. Pullam during the telephone discussion. The examiners asked the licensee whether any of the material used to develop or administer the examination should be considered proprietary. One proprietary bases document was identified and removed from the NRC examiner files.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

A. Pullam, Training Manager
B. Crone, General Supervisor-Operations Training
M. Donigian, Supervisor-Operator Training
J. Vanbrunt, Initial License Training Exam Developer
E. Thisius, Initial License Training Exam Team

U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission

B. Kemker, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Smagacz, Resident Inspector
M. Bielby, Chief Examiner
R. Baker, Examiner
D. Reeser, Examiner

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed, and Discussed

None

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

A/C Air Conditioning

ADAMS Agencywide Document Access and Management System

BOP Balance of Plant

CARD Condition Assessment Resolution Documentation

DFP Diesel Fire Pump

DW Drywell

EFP Electric Fire Pump

GSW General Service Water

ILO Initial License Operator

ISO Isolation

JPM Job Performance Measures

LPCI Low Pressure Coolant Injection

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OOS Out-of-Service

RHR Residual Heat Removal

RO Reactor Operator

SDC Shutdown Cooling

SRO Senior Reactor Operator

VLV Valve

POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOULTION

QUESTION No. 18

An offsite release is in progress with CCHVAC running in Recirculation mode. If both the North

and South Emergency Makeup intakes receive a Hi-Hi radiation signal while the intake selector

switch is in AUTO, how will Emergency Makeup logic respond?

A. Both inlets will remain open.

B. Both inlets will close for a five minute sampling period.

C. Both inlets will close and remain closed.

D. Both inlets will open for a 5 minute sampling period.

Explanation:

Answer A - If both of the radiation monitors are both above or below the Hi-Hi setpoint,

the logic will not select either intake and both the intakes will remain open. The operator

must select the Emergency intake to open using radiation level indication in the Relay

Room. This will occur With the 3 position switch for Emergency air intake selected to AUTO.

Distractor Explanation:

B - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes takes a 5 minute sample,

but both intakes remain open during the sampling.

C - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes takes a 5 minute sample,

but both intakes remain open during the sampling.

D - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect because the Air intakes takes a 5 minute sample,

but both intakes remain open during the sampling.

Technical Reference(s):

ST-OP-315-0073 - Operations Training, Control Center HVAC (Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning)

(Pg. 20)

I-2611-51 - Schematic Diagram, Reactor Building Main Control Room A/C Isolation Dampers Div 1 -

(T41M72) relay that forces both (dampers) open

APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION

There were no comments or contentions by the applicants; however, at least half of the

applicants answered the question incorrectly, which prompted a review by the NRC written

examination graders.

FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION

The station did not submit any post examination comments.

POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION

QUESTION No. 18 (page 2 of 2)

NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION

Given the technical information initially provided by the Facility, the NRC agrees that answer

choice A is a correct answer; however, based on further review, information and discussions

with the licensee, choice D is also a correct answer.

As indicated in the reference information provided, placing the 3 position switch for Emergency

air intake in AUTO will open both Emergency Air Intake dampers. Subsequently, if the radiation

monitor(s) are above the Hi-Hi setpoint, both intakes will remain open (answer A). However,

additional information identified that with the Emergency air intake switch in AUTO, a Hi-Hi

radiation signal initiated by either of the normal intake radiation detectors will initially open both

Emergency air intakes and start a 5 minute sample of both inlets (answer D).

Normally, the Emergency air intake would not be in the AUTO position, and after the 5 minute

sample, the damper associated with the Hi-Hi radiation detection will close, and the other

damper will remain open. If both radiation monitors are above the Hi-Hi setpoint, the logic will

not select either intake and both intakes will remain open. The operator must then select the

Emergency intake to remain open based on radiation level indications located in the Relay

Room.

The question asks how the Emergency Makeup logic will respond to the indicated status of

the Emergency air intake switch and a Hi-Hi radiation level. Choice A addresses the final state

of the logic response; however, choice D correctly addresses an early response of the logic.

Although at different times in the Emergency Makeup logic response, both choices A and D

address how the logic responds and; therefore, both choices correctly answer the question.

CONCLUSION

Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes

that there are two correct answers to the question.

POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION

QUESTION NO. 29

Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Loop B is in Shutdown Cooling, and RPV Water level

is 194 inches and lowering. A maintenance mishap has caused a line to be sheared.

The line is the reference line for the following instruments:

  • B21-N080C DIV 1 REACTOR LEVEL NARROW RANGE TRANSMITTER
  • B21-N080D DIV 1 REACTOR LEVEL NARROW RANGE TRANSMITTER

Shortly after this incident ACTUAL RPV level begins lowering at 2 inches a minute.

Assuming no operator action what is the position of the following valves 15 minutes after

ACTUAL RPV level started to lower?

E1150-F008 E1150-F009

RHR SDC OTBD RHR SDC INBD

SUCTION ISO VLV SUCTION ISO VLV

A. OPEN OPEN

B. CLOSE OPEN

C. OPEN CLOSE

D. CLOSE CLOSE

Explanation:

Answer C - Per M-2090 B21-N080C/D are supplied from a single tap. Failure to the reference

leg will make a level instrument fail HIGH. This means that for NSSSS (C & D) logic will never

be met. 23.601 Trip sheet shows that A&C will be met at below 173.4 inches. 2 inches per min

for 15 minutes is 30 inches. 194-30 = 164 with is less than 173.4. A&C NSSSS closes the

E1150-F009.

A - Incorrect - Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.

B - Incorrect - Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.

D - Incorrect - Distractor is incorrect and plausible based on Answer Explanation.

Technical Reference(s):

M-2090

23.601 (Pg. 11)

POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION

QUESTION No. 29 (page 2 of 2)

APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION

There were no comments or contentions by the applicants; however, at least half of the

applicants answered the question incorrectly which prompted a review by the NRC written

examination graders.

FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION

The station did not submit any post examination comments.

NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION

A review of the administered written examination question indicated the incorrect Divisional

nomenclature had been assigned to the instrument plant identification numbers listed in the

question stem. Division I does not correspond to B21-N080C and -N080D, and as a result

the question does not make sense.

CONCLUSION

Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes

that there is no correct answer to the question and the question will be deleted from the exam.

POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION

QUESTION No. 75

Which one of the following identifies the MINIMUM required qualifications for person(s)

responsible for the Command Function in the control room during (1) NORMAL and

(2) EMERGENCY conditions?

A. (1) CRS

(2) CRS

B. (1) CRS

(2) SM

C. (1) SM

(2) CRS

D. (1) SM

(2) SM

Explanation:

Answer B - Per MOP01 There shall be one individual with an active Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)

license for Fermi 2 assigned the Command Function for and located in the Control Room at all times

when the plant is in Operational Condition 1, 2, or 3. During emergency conditions this shall be the S

M.

During routine operations, it shall be the CRS except for short periods of relief, during which the SM

should be in the Control Room, but another individual possessing an active SRO license for Fermi 2 may

provide relief.

A - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.

C - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.

D - Incorrect - Distractor is plausible and incorrect based on answer.

Technical Reference(s):

MOP01, Conduct of Operations; Section 3.7.4, Pg. 20

Task 02SFGA004; Objective 45397

Administrative Qualification Card (QP0013)

APPLICANT COMMENT/CONTENTION

There were no comments or contentions by the applicants; however, at least half of the

applicants answered the question incorrectly, which prompted a review by the NRC written

examination graders.

FACILITY RESPONSE AND PROPOSED RESOLUTION

The station did not submit any post examination comments.

POST-EXAMINATION COMMENT, EVALUATION, AND RESOLUTION

QUESTION No. 75 (page 2 of 2)

NRC EVALUATION/RESOLUTION

A review of the administered written examination question and references indicated Choice A,

vice B was the correct answer.

CONCLUSION

Based the information provided and a review of the applicable references, the NRC concludes

that Choice A vice B is the correct answer to the question.

SIMULATION FACILITY FIDELITY REPORT

Facility Licensee: Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2

Facility Docket No: 50-341

Operating Tests Administered: March 27 through 31, 2017

The following documents observations made by the NRC examination team during the initial

operator license examination. These observations do not constitute audit or inspection findings

and are not, without further verification and review, indicative of non-compliance with Title 10 of

the Code of Federal Regulations 55.45(b). These observations do not affect NRC certification

or approval of the simulation facility other than to provide information, which may be, used in

future evaluations. No licensee action is required in response to these observations.

During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests, the following items were

observed:

ITEM DESCRIPTION

East and West Scenario 2, Normal Event 1 (BOP), Shifting Reactor Building Closed

Battery Rm Remote Cooling Water pumps: No remote trigger developed to turn off the

Trigger East and West Battery Room A/C Units, which would make the

Emergency Fans start.

Isolation Valve Scenario 2, Instrument Failure Event 2 (SRO), Drywall (DW) Pressure

F510A failed close Xmitter Failure with Individual Rod Scram: Received DW pressure

transmitter failure and half scram. A few minutes later, the B side fuse

clip burnt and the associated rod scrammed; however, also received

alarms for #1 Circulating Water Pump cooling because the motor lube

oil cooling isolation valve F510A failed close and isolated the motor

cooling. Simulator put in freeze to investigate but cause of the

isolation was never identified (ghost occurrence).

Diesel Fire Pump Scenario 3 (first run), Normal Event 3 (BOP), trip of General Service

(DFP) started Water (GSW) pump and shutdown Electric Fire Pump (EFP): As part

of the crew turnover, the DFP was tagged out-of-service (OOS).

During loss of the GSW pump, the EFP started as expected; however,

the DFP also started (unexpected).

EFP failed to start Scenario 3 (second run), Normal Event 3 (BOP), trip of GSW pump

and shutdown EFP: As part of the crew turnover, the DFP was tagged

OO

S. During loss of the GSW pump, the DFP did not start (as

expected); however, the EFP also failed to start (unexpected).

Division 2 Residual Simulator JPM 5e, Shift Division 2 RHR from Torus Spray Mode to

Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Mode: Division 2 RHR pump A

(RHR) pump A was initially in Torus Spray mode and Division 2 RHR pump B would

tripped not start such that the operator was forced to do a valve realignment

to LPCI mode. However, the Division 2 RHR pump A tripped for no

reason and forced the operator to restart the tripped pump. Cause

of the tripped pump was never identified (ghost).

These events were captured in CARDs 17-23824 and 17-23174

3

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