ML17251A343

LER 88-009-00:on 880930,two 6-inch Diameter Pipes Found to Have Degraded Blocks Around Pipe Sleeves & Improper Fire Barrier Fill.Caused by Inadequate Fire Barrier Insp Procedures.Procedure Will Be upgraded.W/881031 Ltr

ML17251A343
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/31/1988
From:	Biedenbach R, Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-009, LER-88-9, NUDOCS 8811090368
Download: ML17251A343 (10)

Text

AC CELERATZD DISIRIBUYION DEMONSTRATION SYSTEM.'REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8811090368 DOC.DATE: 88/10/31 NOTARIZED:

NO FACIL:50-244 Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, Rochester G AUTH.NAME AUTHOR.AFFILIATION BIEDENBACH,R.C.

Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.MECREDY,R.C.

.Rochester Gas&Electric Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET 05000244

SUBJECT:

LER 88-009-00:on 880930,inadequate fire barrier insp procedure identified through breaches.W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR I ENCL 2 SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES:License Exp date in accordance with 10CFR2,2.109(9/19/72).

05000244 8: RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-3 LA STAHLE,C COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME'TTR ENCL PD1-3 PD 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON ACRS WYLIE AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSIR/EIB RGN1 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EG&G WI LLIAMS I S , H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DOA ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/RAB 10~N~~IB 9A RES/DSR/PRAB FORD BLDG HOY, A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I D NVZE IO ALL iIBIDSn RECIPIENTS PIZASE HELP US IO REIXKZ WASTE.'GMI'ACT THE DOCUMENT CXÃIBOL DESK, BOOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)IO EXZtGNA!KE

~NAME PRCH DISTRIKKIGN

~POR DOCUMENI'S YOU DGN~T NEED)A D, S TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 42 ENCL 41

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aa XCal aa>>a)AAA IC)I LICENSEE ENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUAT v I>>vclIAA AIcvIAloalv coee4)io>>Aaa>>O>>lo oei>>o.)110MIOa Ix~illII la)laII I AC ICII v IIAeI III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 0 C x I I>>v aa~I 11 I)I v)AA IIX>>Vaa~IX III IIOVI>>liAV

~\aa A~I v>I>>I>>aAOI III Ilxl III a>>aaa IAaaa aa aaaa>>e4, aaa An<aaat>>ac laiaa JIIaa II ll 0 5 0 0iO 2 4 4 88-009-0 OF A PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 100%steady state full power with no major activities in progress.SCRIP ION OF EVENT A.Dates and approximate times for major occurrences:

September 16, 1988, 13:45 EDST: A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report 88-107: Re: Partial penetrations and open conduit September 16, 1988, 13:45 EDST: Discovery date and time September 16, 1988, 14:00 EDST: M-56.1 initiated to temporarily seal Fire Barrier Penetrations September 16, 1988, 14;30 EDST: M-56.1 completed and barriers in compliance with Technical Specifications September 30, 1988, 08:50 EDST: A-25.1, Ginna Station Event Report 88-100: Re: Fiberglass insulation for fire seal and partial penetrations

~September 30, 1988, 08:50 EDST: Discovery date and time September 30, 1988, 09:00 EDST: M-56.1 initiated to temporarily seal Fire Barrier Penetrations September 30, 1988, 09:00 EDST: Fire watch initiated, M-56.1 completed at 12:00 EDST and all barriers in compliance with Technical Specifications October 20, 1988, 00:00 EDST: A-25,1, Engineering Work Request EWR-3986-Design Analysis: "Effects of Heat Transfer to Fire.Wrapped Conduit Through Conduit Supports During Potential Fires">>AC IONIC)I~A OC>At~)vAA C)I LICENSE PENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUA, N O i ttttCllAA AICovAIOAV COtvlttl)tOtt AttAOVIO OOI ttO)I)OWIOA lAttAII lt)ttll I ACII,II)ttAtAI Ill R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCAII ttvvt~IA I)I ll A ttttvt)l A III\I OVI EIIAV~t A V I V tl VI A~t A~Aol I)I lA)Itt Vtttt Wvt tt tttvwtV vtt ttt t~~AAC ttv)IIO t~It oIO 2I44 88-00 9-00 OF B.EVENT On September 16, 1988 at approximately 13:45 EDST, during a.routine inspection augmented with information on industry events and NRC inspectors identification of certain configurations, it was identified that seven (7)partial penetrations approximately 1" in diameter existed in the Turbine building basement south wall.This Technical Specification wall separates the Turbine building from the Intermediate building.These partial penetrations appeared to have been left by the removal of equipment from the wall.Also identified was one (1)open conduit approximately 1" in diameter in the Turbine building Intermediate level east wall.The open conduit is required to have a smoke seal per Station procedure EE-24.This Appendix R wall separates the Turbine building from the Tem o ar Ceramic Fiber Penet ation F'eals, was initiated within one (1)hour after identification of the deficient fire barriers and was completed at 14:30 EDST.On September 30, 1988 at approximately 08:50 EDST during a routine inspection it was identified that two (2)six (6)inch diameter pipes had degraded block around the pipe sleeves which penetrated the Service building east wall.This Technical Specification wall separates the Service building from the Intermediate building.Upon further investigation, it was determined the two (2)penetrations were packed with fiberglass.

Continuing the inspection, access was gained above the ceiling where nine (9)partial penetrations were identified.

The nine.(9)partial penetrations appear to have been from the original construction of the plant where approximately 50%of the original blocks had been cross sectionalized and installed in such a manner that the inspection would not disclose the partial penetration configuration from the accessible side.On the unexposed side of the wall, in the Service building,~tAC I OAtt 1~IA h<l 1 C I~<<<<)vl*4)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION V l AVCLIAA AlCVVAIOAT COMM<i)<Oh A~AAOvl0 OUl hO.)I)OMIOI f At<1ll l<)l<ll IAC<l<)'hAMl III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCAll AVMllA I)I llA<<VMCIA IlI I I O V I'<I<A 1 U 1<<Iv<I<oh h U 1 110l I)l ll AT II<<<<<<<Mvvv<<<vs<<v<<, vU~<<u UA~~<<>C I v<U)II<<II II o0 244 8-009-0 04<<0 8 the cross sectionalized portion of the block was filled with an approximate 8 inch block.A Fire watch was initiated at 09:00 hours and an M-56.1, Placement of Tem orar Ceramic Fiber Penetration Fire Seals was completed.

On October 20, 1988 a study was completed on the effects of heat transfer to fire wrap conduit through conduit supports during postulated fires.It.was concluded from this study that one redundant circuit could possibly reach or exceed its short circuit temperature by the conduction of heat through conduit supports in a postulated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire as required by Appendix"R".Although the fire wrap is not a Technical Specification requirement, the wrapping of conduit supports was a commitment in our Appendix"R" submittal and is included in this LER for your information.

C.D.INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: Inoperable Fire Barrier Penetration I-199A-9.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None.E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

These events were discovered as a result of routine Fire Barrier Inspections and as a result of asbestos inspection in a service corridor.The fire wrap conduit support event was discovered through an NRC concern which resulted in an Engineering Analysis.F.OPERATOR ACTION: The Control Room Operators were notified by the Fire Protection and Safety Coordinator at.which time they performed the following:

Initiated an A-25.1 Ginna Station Event, Re ort hAC<OAM)I~1 1(Iv<<>~A C)I~~II LICENSEE<ENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINVAT<<Octal*>I a)CIIS<<IO<<'I COVV>il>O<<

• It<<0v)0 Ovl<<0)IIO&IOI I a~><<ll I>)I>ll*CII I)T<<A VI III R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOC<<l I<<>>V~I<<I)>cl<<<<vv~IC III~IOOI<~4 v I 1>y>I<<)<<<<~AOC I)I lCT III>>>V>~I>><<le>>et, eV>W>>~>>~><<lC lt>>>>)II~>II II o s o ohio 244 8-09-0 0 05<<0 8 Notified Plant Superintendent Notified NRC Resident Inspector III USE 0 EVENT A.IMMEDIATE CAUSE: Nine (9)of the partial penetrations were caused as a result of poor original construction practices.

Two (2)of the penetrations were packed with fiberglass insulation as per acceptable procedures at time of installation.

The fiberglass insulation was missed as a part of our upgrade program.Seven (7)of the partial penetrations were caused as a result of equipment being removed from the wall.One (1)of the penetrations was a result of an open conduit failing to be capped or filled with a fire retardant material.B.Where fire wrap encapsulation was not acceptal or adequate, field installation directions and Engineering specifications were not adequate.INTERMEDIATE CAUSE C.None.ROOT CAUSE: The root cause was determined to be an inadequate procedure.

ISI-100 was to provide instructions to visually inspect fire barrier penetration seals and fire retardant coating for cables to insure that they are intact.A Procedure Change Notice has been submitted to provide instructions to visually inspect Fire Barriers, Fire Barriers Penetrations Seals and Fire Retardant Coating for Cables.The root cause for the fire wrap was determined to be inadequate specification after re-analysis of the transmission of heat through support members.

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r~rr1C Svrr)AAA It 4)I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION V l IIVCLtA1 AICVI,AIOAe COMMIttIOA ArrAOvtO OMl AO.)ISOWIOI taerAtt Ir)I/ll ACILlte HAMI lll R.E.Ginna Nuclear PalAcr Plant ltA I llr rrvr Mvrr rr rrevvre.vv revr over rvlc lvrv)IAI II II 0 0C 1 I l rr V M I I rl I)I 0 5 0 0 0 elAA llA IIVMtt 1 ltl~lovlrrrAL rvr 1 0 0 vl vMerr 1 JAOt III OF B.Action taken or planned to prevent recurrence:

As the root cause was determined to be inadequate procedures.

A Procedure Change Notice was written for ISI-100.A Non-Conformance Report (NCR)was written to address penetration problems and corrective actions for permanent repairs.VI DDITION L INFORMATIO A.B.C.Failed Components:

None.Previous LER's on similar'vents:

None.Special Comments: None.IrAC IOAIA NIA

%car Saba't ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION

~89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.14649 0001 October 31, 1988 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

LER 88-009, Inadequate Fire Barrier Inspection Procedure Identified Only Through Breaches Causing Partial Breaches To Go Undetected.

R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power plant Docket No.50-244 In accordance with 10CFR50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requires reporting of,"Any operation or condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications", the attached Licensee Event Report'LER 88-009 is hereby submitted.

In accordance with NUREG 1022 the 16 partial fire barrier penetrations and the design analysis on the effects of heat transfer to fire wrap conduit through conduit supports during a potential fire is voluntarily submitted.

This event has in no way affected the public health and safety.Ver Truly Yours, obert C.M cred General Manager Nuclear Production xc: U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Ginna USNRC Senior Resident Inspector