IR 05000245/2010007

IR 05000245-10-007, Dominion Resources, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Millstone Power Station (Unit 1), Waterford, Connecticut, Inspection Report (Corrected Copy)

ML101370021
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/17/2010
From:	Kauffman L A, Modes K D Decommissioning Branch I
To:	Heacock D Dominion Nuclear Connecticut
References
FOIA/PA-2011-0115 IR-10-007
Download: ML101370021 (13)

Text

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Inspection No. Docket No. License No. Licensee:

Location:

Inspection Dates: Date Follow up Information Received:

Inspectors:

Approved By: INSPECTION REPORT 05000245/2010007 05000245 DPR-21 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. Millstone Power Station, Unit 1 (U1) Rope Ferry Road Waterford, CT 06385 March 15 -16, 2010 (on-site)

April 12, 2010 (telephone)

March 17, 23, and 29, 2010 Kathy Modes Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Laurie A. Kauffman Health Physicist Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety Judith A. Joustra, Chief Decommissioning Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. NRC Inspection

Report No. 05000245/2010007 A routine announced safety inspection was conducted from March 15-16, 2010, at Millstone Power Station Unit 1 (U 1). The inspection reviewed operations, maintenance, and plant support activities associated with U1 while in SAFSTOR status. The inspector also reviewed additional information provided by the licensee dated March 17, 23, and 29, 2010 as part of this inspection.

Within the scope of this inspection, no safety concerns or violations were identified.

There are no ongoing decommissioning activities being conducted at Millstone U1. Facilities Management and Control The only changes expected to the licensee's program are personnel changes due to a reduction in force. Retention of personnel with knowledge of plant functions and operations will meet the staffing requirements required in their Technical SpeCifications Section 6.2.2. The NRC will continue to review the knowledge management transfer during future inspections.

Regarding transfer and sale of non-safety related systems and components, the licensee maintained a comprehensive record of each transfer and sale .. Spent Fuel Pool Safety The licensee adequately maintained safety-related systems and components necessary for the safe operation of the Spent Fuel Pool. Inspections of Final Surveys The licensee's implementation of its radiation survey program was adequate.

The licensee continued to survey the buildings in order to identify areas of contamination and minimize the spread of contamination.

The licensee had no near term plans to decontaminate the buildings and pursue decommissioning at this time. The licensee plans to continue in the SAFSTOR program until 2048. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (lSFSIl Construction and Component Fabrication After a formal assessment of spent fuel storage options in 2007, the licensee concluded that they would keep the Millstone U1 fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool, in a SAFSTOR status, until 2048. Based on the results of this inspection, the licensee maintained the fuel and Spent Fuel Pool, along with the necessary support infrastructure, in an adequate manner and satisfied the requirements of a SAFSTOR site. ii Effluent and Environmental Monitoring and Exposure Reports The licensee's implementation of its radioactive effluent control and site radiological environmental monitoring programs was adequate.

The longstanding water intrusion issue may affect building infrastructure in the future, but at the time of the on-site inspection, the material condition of facilities and equipment was acceptable.

Workers demonstrated effective communications and work practices.

Licensee personnel were effectively using Radiation Work Permits (RWP) to control work activities and maintained doses as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Transportation of Radioactive Materials The licensee's implementation of its radioactive waste management and transportation programs was adequate.

Shipments were delivered by FedEx Custom Critical and deliveries were coordinated with the other licensee.

Radioactive materials were properly processed, packaged, stored, and shipped in accordance with NRC and DOT regulations.

111

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Facility Status at Permanently Shutdown Reactor Millstone U1 was a single*cycle, boiling water reactor with a Mark I containment that was designed, furnished and constructed by General Electric Company. The plant went into commercial operation on December 28, 1970, and the plant permanently ceased operation on July 17, 1998. The fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor vessel and placed in the Spent Fuel Pool. The Spent Fuel Pool inventory includes one damaged fuel assembly, and five containers of Greater Than Class "C" waste. Since July 1998, only those conditions or activities associated with the safe storage of fuel and radiological protection (SAFSTOR status) are applicable to the defueled Millstone U1 plant. Owner responsibility for the Millstone site was transferred from Northeast Utilities to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut on March 31, 2001. The owner's current plan is to leave the plant in SAFSTOR until 2048. Safety related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and SSCs important to safety remaining at Millstone U1 are associated with the Spent Fuel Pool Island where the spent fuel is stored. These systems and components include the Spent Fuel Pool and surrounding Reactor Building Structure, Fuel Pool Cooling System, Spent Fuel Pool Island Makeup Water System, Decay Heat Removal System, Building Ventilation and associated Ventilation Radiation Monitors, and Electrical Distribution.

Millstone U 1 is only one of two SAFSTOR licensees in the country that continue to store the fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool and not in an ISFSI. On March 31, 2001, license activities in the Radwaste Building ceased when U1 transitioned to the "Cold and Dark" status. The "Cold and Dark" status refers to limited lighting because the electric power to the Radwaste Building was secured with the exception of a few 120V receptacles.

All liquid discharges were terminated from Radwaste, and the Waste Water Evaporator was used for processing all water collected in the U1 Reactor Building.

There are cracks in the walls, ceilings, and floors of the Radwaste Building and Turbine Building allowing water to enter and accumulate in these buildings.

The licensee continually assesses this issue and performs analysis of the water for radioactivity.

The Condensate Transfer Pump House protected the pump and other components which were used to transfer water from the condensate storage tank to the feedwater system and is also subject to water intrusion similar to the Reactor and Radwaste Buildings water intrusion issues. In addition to the Reactor Building, Turbine Building, and Radwaste Buildings, the licensee's SAFSTOR encompasses the Xenon/Krypton Building which was used to process off gas before entering the U1 Stack. The Xenon/Krypton Building is located outside of the Protected Area, but is a Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA). All the charcoal and desiccant material had been removed from the processing skids, but residual radioactivity remains in this building.

There were also three abandoned water storage tanks in the RCA Yard that contain trace amounts of radioactivity (Le., tritium (H*3), cobalt*60 (Co*60), and cesium*137 (Cs*137)).

These buildings are surveyed by the licensee on a regular basis to assess the residual radioactivity that remains on the floors, walls, and inside pipes and other pieces of equipment.

SAFSTOR requires decontamination of all areas of residual radioactivity prior to license termination.

1 Inspection Report No. 05000245/2010008 T:\DNMS\WordDocs\Currenl\lnsp Report\RDPR*21 2010007SAFSTOR.final.doc 1.0 Facilities Management and Control 1.1 Safety Reviews. Design Changes.

and Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

(Inspection Procedures 40801) The inspector discussed safety reviews, design changes, and modifications that may affect the safe operation of the Spent Fuel Pool and reviewed the licensee's asset recovery program.

b. Observations and Findings

There were no safety reviews, design changes, or modifications made to any safety system or component related to the Spent Fuel Pool. The licensee had no near term plans to make changes to the Spent Fuel Pool or related safety systems. The licensee was undergoing a reduction in force with voluntary and involuntary separation packages for personnel.

Between March 1, 2010 and June 1, 2010, the U1 Operations staff will be reduced from three to one full time employee.

This reduction in force was discussed with the licensee's management to ensure safe operation of the Spent Fuel Pool and necessary safety equipment.

U1 will be able to obtain assistance from personnel from Units 2 and/or 3 to ensure the safe operation of the Spent Fuel Pool and its related safety systems. Regarding other systems that are no longer necessary, the licensee manages an asset recovery program to remove systems and/or components that are no longer needed for the safe operation of the Spent Fuel Pool. These systems/components were removed and either transferred to Millstone Unit 2 or 3, or sold to a competitor.

The following is a list of the assets recovered and their final disposition:

Date Assets/Disposition March 12, 2009 Two AK-25 480vac breakers for Variable Frequency Drive project use (retained on Millstone site) March 26, 2009 Removed four GE power supplies from control room (sold) May 9, 2009 Removed 12 main generator exciter rectifier heat sinks (sold) June 19, 2009 Removed under voltage relay for Meteorological and Test Equipment lab (retained on Millstone site) July 23, 2009 Removed 480vac bucket M4-6B from "B" screen wash pump. Being used by site Core Elec for fitup of new U2 breaker starter (Millstone Unit 2) July 31, 2009 Removed two 125vdc buckets for Millstone technical training dept. (retained on Millstone site) August 26, 2009 Enclosure 480v disconnect switch assembly (sold) February 24, 201 Removed main bearing booster solenoid 1-DGSA-25 for testing by Site Engineering (retained on Millstone site) February 18, 2010 Removed wiring harness, breaker bucket and door from MCC F6-2D for VR11 project use (retained on Millstone site) February 18, 2010 Removed wiring harness from MCC E6-2B for VR 11 project use (Millstone Unit 2) 2 Inspection Report No. 05000245/2010008 T:IDNMSIWordDocslCurrentllnsp ReportIRDPR-21 2010007SAFSTOR.ftnal.doc The inspector reviewed the work package dated May 9, 2009, for the removal and sale of the U 1 turbine exciter heat sink assemblies.

The package identified these components as abandoned equipment and the work package noted that Operations personnel confirmed that the equipment was abandoned.

The removal was performed by a contracted company who maintains an NRC license authorizing possession, storage, maintenance, repair, and decontamination of contaminated equipment.

The equipment . was removed and packaged for transport.

Related records indicated Millstone Health Physics personnel performed surveys on the package and prepared the necessary shipping paperwork.

The job hazard assessment noted that personnel wore appropriate personal protective equipment.

Additional information regarding the transportation of radioactive material can be found in Section 3.3 below.

c. Conclusions

The only changes expected to the licensee's program are personnel changes due to a reduction in force. Retention of personnel with knowledge of plant functions and operations will meet the staffing requirements required in their Technical Specifications Section 6.2.2. The NRC will continue to review the knowledge management transfer during future inspections.

Regarding transfer and sale of non-safety related systems and components, the licensee maintained a comprehensive record of each transfer and sale. No findings of significance were identified.

1.2 Spent Fuel Pool Safety

a. Inspection Scope

(Inspection Procedures 60801 and 62801) The inspector toured the U1 Reactor Building including the Spent Fuel Pool to ensure that the pool instrumentation, leakage protection, pool chemistry and cleanliness controls, and pool support equipment were operational.

The inspector observed a pre-job briefing for the Spent Fuel Pool fan and belt preventive maintenance.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector observed the material condition of plant areas, equipment and components.

The inspector also observed Spent Fuel Pool water level, and inventory and leakage monitoring equipment.

The inspector interviewed licensee personnel and reviewed licensee procedures and reports related to the monitoring, trending and tracking of Spent Fuel Pool makeup, inventory and leakage. The inspector noted that the Spent Fuel Pool temperature, water level, and the decay heat removal system flow rates were monitored in accordance with established procedures.

The Spent Fuel Pool inventory includes one fuel assembly which was damaged (i.e., bent) when inadvertently dropped from the fuel pool bridge. This damaged fuel assembly is located in the fuel pool, partially within a controlled drive rod cylinder.

it is separated from the other fuel assemblies and the licensee is monitoring it to ensure no leakage of radioactivity.

In addition to the fuel assemblies, the pool also contains portions of control rod blades, portions of the Reactor Upper Grid, and nuclear instrumentation that had been processed and placed in one of the five greater than Class "C" storage containers 3 Inspection Report No. 05000245/2010008 T:IDNMSIWordDocslCurrentllnsp ReportIRDPR-21 2010007SAFSTOR.final.doc located in the northeast corner of the Spent Fuel Pool. The inspector discussed the licensee's actions in the event of loss of power and how to effectively remove heat from the fuel pool. The inspector also noted that the material condition of the plant equipment and building areas was adequate with the exception of the water intrusion issue (described in detail in Section 3.2 below). The Reactor Building crane was not operational at the time of the on-site inspection.

On February 4,2010, Condition Report CR368109 was generated when the licensee identified that the U1 Reactor Building crane hook could not be raised or lowered. The crane would be needed to move spent fuel casks. A Work Order was generated and as of May 5, 2010, the crane was operational.

According to the licensee's Dry Cask Storage Readiness Report dated November 6, 2007, the crane was de-rated to 55 tons as a result of a Main Block issue that was identified by the crane manufacturer.

The licensee was aware that the crane would need to be repaired in the future to return the rating to 110 tons prior to any movement of transfer casks or dry shielded canisters.

The licensee had no immediate plans to implement dry cask storage (see Section 3.1 below for more details).

The inspector attended the pre-job briefing for the Spent Fuel Pool fan and belt preventive maintenance.

The briefing was comprehensive, engaged employees, elicited questions from employees, reviewed the protective clothing and tools needed to perform the job, discussed configuration control, and included a detailed review of the Radiation Work Permit.

c. Conclusions

The licensee adequately maintained safety-related systems and components necessary for the safe operation of the Spent Fuel Pool. No findings of significance were identified.

2.0 Decommissioning of Performance and Status Review 2.1 Inspection of Final Surveys

a. Inspection Scope

(Inspection Procedure 83801) The inspector discussed the licensee's plans for final surveys to determine that the licensee was in compliance with the Decommissioning Plan and License Termination Plan requirements.

b. Observations and Findings

Radiological surveys were conducted by Health Physics personnel throughout the year to update Radiation Work Permits. The inspector reviewed survey records from April 2009 through January 2010. The licensee's Health Physics personnel were proactively surveying the Reactor, Turbine, Radwaste, Hydrogen Recombiner, and Xenon/Krypton Buildings, as well as the Radiologically Controlled Area Yard. The Health Physics personnel annotated the surveys to identify high radiation areas, locked high radiation 4 Inspection Report No. 05000245/2010008 T:IDNMSIWordDocslCurrentllnsp ReportIRDPR-21 2010007SAFSTOR.final.doc areas, contaminated areas, radiation control areas, and Cold and Dark areas. The Cold and Dark areas had limited lighting and a potential for mold due to water intrusion.

The surveys also noted large amounts of water on the floor in certain areas. This water intrusion issue is further explained in Section 3.2 below. Radiological postings were readily visible, well-maintained, and reflected radiological conditions.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's implementation of its radiation survey program was adequate.

The licensee continued to survey the buildings in order to identify areas of contamination and minimize the spread of contamination.

The licensee had no near term plans to decontaminate the buildings and pursue decommissioning at this time. The licensee planned to continue in the SAFSTOR program until 2048. No findings of significance were identified.

3.0 Radioactive Waste Management 3.1 ISFSI Construction and Component Fabrication

a. Inspection Scope

(Inspection Procedure 71801) The inspector observed the licensee's Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The inspector reviewed the U1 Dry Cask Storage Readiness Assessment dated November 6, 2007.

b. Observations and Findings

The licensee had no near term plans to move the spent fuel, including the damaged fuel assembly, to their constructed ISFSI. The U1 Dry Cask Storage Readiness Assessment dated November 6, 2007, documented the dry cask storage process and tasks needed to safely move the fuel to the ISFSI. This assessment noted that the transfer of the damaged fuel assembly would require additional analysis and perhaps a fabrication of a specifically designed dry shield canister basket assembly.

The licensee took into account this information, but had not changed their plans to move the fuel to the ISFSI until 2048. The licensee was aware that in lieu of moving the fuel to the constructed ISFSI, they must maintain the following systems as operational:

(a) fuel pool COOling system,

(b) Spent Fuel Pool Island makeup water,

(c) Decay Heat Removal,

(d) building ventilation,

(e) ventilation radiation monitors, and

(f) electrical distribution for these systems. These systems were operational at the time of the inspection.

In addition, the licensee must also possess calibrated instruments, protective clothing and trained and qualified personnel.

c. Conclusions

After a formal assessment was completed by the licensee of spent fuel storage options in 2007, the licensee concluded that they would keep the Millstone U1 fuel in the Spent Fuel Pool, in a SAFSTOR status, until 2048. Based on the results of this inspection, the licensee maintained the fuel and Spent Fuel Pool, along with the necessary support 5 Inspection Report No. 05000245/2010008 T:\DNMS\WordDocs\Current\lnsp Report\RDPR-21 2010007SAFSTOR.final.doc infrastructure, in an adequate manner and satisfied the requirements of a SAFSTOR site. No findings of significance were identified.

3.2 Effluent and Environmental Monitoring and Exposure Reports

a. Inspection Scope

(Inspection Procedures 83750 and 84750) The inspector reviewed the U1 radioactive effluent control program and the site radiological environmental monitoring program. The evaluation included a review of the annual radioactive effluent release report for 2009, the annual radiological environmental operating report for 2009, and the associated analytical results for each program. The inspector observed the licensee's assessment and follow-up of their water intrusion issue and reviewed associated Condition Reports. The inspector reviewed personnel exposure records for 2008, 2009 and the most recent record for 2010.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector noted that since the spent fuel was not being moved and there was no decommissioning activity underway, the annual effluent and environmental monitoring reports demonstrated that a" calculated doses were we" below regulatory dose criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix I. U 1 Operations personnel spend a majority of their time managing the water intrusion issue. The Radwaste Building and Turbine Building have developed cracks in the walls, ceilings, and floors that allowed water to enter and accumulate in the buildings.

Some of the water remains in puddles on the floor until directed to drains that allowed the water to flow and collect in various sumps. At the time of the on-site inspection, a" sumps were filled to their maximum because a Nor'easter storm moved up the east coast the day before and subjected the area to flood watches and warnings.

The inspector observed U1 Operations personnel pump the water from one of the sumps to a rolling tote (i.e., similar to a movable holding tank). Operations personnel then moved the tote to an evaporator storage tank, where it was re-circulated for five hours and then analyzed for radioactivity prior to evaporation. Radioactivity was detected because the water flowed through existing piping, and these pipes had been used when Mi"stone U1 was operational.

These pipes contain residual radioactivity.

The licensee has detected minimal amounts of tritium (H-3), c,obalt-50 (Co-50), and cesium-137 (Cs-137) in the water but no levels that exceeded their discharge permit. The licensee described their program for tracking and trending data for the water intrusion issue at Mi"stone U 1.' A licensee memorandum dated March 8, 2004, titled "Recommendation for Resolving Water Intrusion Issues for Mi"stone U1" noted that the licensee reviewed 15 Condition Reports regarding water intrusion, leaks, and mold in U1. The memorandum provided the following recommendations:

repower/replace the "D" sump and direct water to the "B" sump, repowerlreplace sumps in lower level radwaste or pump water over to Reactor Building Sump "B" and implement evaporator improvements.

However, the water intrusion issues continued as evidenced by the following four similar Condition Reports: CR07-10287, dated October 10, 2007, identified concrete floors cracks in the U1 Reactor Building.

The details of the report indicated that either a section of the floor was sinking or a section was riSing. The Engineering Department was 5 Inspection Report No. 05000245/2010008 T:IDNMSIWordDocsICurren!llnsp ReportIRDPR-21 2010007SAFSTOR.final.doc tasked with investigating the cause of the cracks. Based on the review, the Condition Report documented the cracks and required no further action at the time. CR339058, dated June 23, 2009, identified a slippery floor in the Switch Gear Room due to leaks in the Turbine Building roof. The report noted that the water was leaking through the Turbine Building roof and running down the wall onto the floor into the Switch Gear Room. A facilities service request was generated.

On December 29, 2009, this Condition Report was closed because the roof leaks were located, patched, and repaired.

CR370086, dated February 25,2010, identified roof leaks in the U1 Switch Gear Room due to water running down the wall and pooling on the floor. The licensee placed "wet floor" signs in the area to address the personnel safety aspect and closed the Condition Report. CR373200, dated March 22, 2010, identified cracks in the liner of the Reactor Building Floor drain sump "0" that may be attributed to the cracks identified in CR07-10287.

The licensee was tracking and trending the conditions, and developing plans to resolve this issue. The licensee's memorandum dated March 8, 2004, also noted that the water intrusion issue is dependent on:

(a) volume of water;

(b) potential to spread contamination;

(c) presence of operational equipment in the area;

(d) need for personnel access to area; and

(e) structural function of the buildings.

U1 Operations personnel calculated the total in-leakage to be approximately 2,855 gallons for the period between July 20, 2009 and March 16,2010. Water intrusion was significant for SAFSTOR facilities due to the need to collect, monitor, analyze, and record data for license termination.

The inspector also conducted plant walkdowns and interviews with personnel.

The inspector noted that the radiologically controlled area was appropriately posted and labeled for radioactive material.

The inspector observed that licensee personnel were wearing appropriate anti-contamination clothing and dosimetry, as specified in the Radiation Work Permits (RWP). Workers followed proper techniques when removing anti-contamination clothing.

The radiological survey maps and related information maintained at the U1 access point were current. High radiation areas and Technical Specification locked high radiation areas were properly posted and locked as required.

The U1 radiation dose total for 2008 was 222 mrem, the dose total for 2009 was 114 mrem, and the total dose year-to-date for 2010 was 41 mrem. Individual radiation worker doses were less than 100 mrem per year. These dose totals were significantly less than the licensee's dose goals. The inspector noted that appropriate exposure controls were established and methods to track and trend dose performance were commensurate with the radiological significance of the tasks.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's implementation of its radioactive effluent control and site radiological environmental monitoring programs was adequate.

The longstanding water intrusion issue may affect building infrastructure in the future, but at the time of the on-site 7 Inspection Report No. 05000245/2010008 T:\DNMS\WordDocs\Currenl\lnsp Report\RDPR-21 2010007SAFSTOR.final.doc inspection, the material condition offacilities and equipment was acceptable.

Workers demonstrated effective communications and work practices.

Licensee personnel were effectively using Radiation Work Permits (RWP) to control work activities and to maintain doses as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). No findings of significance were identified.

3.3 Transportation of Radioactive Materials

a. Inspection Scope

(Inspection Procedure 86750) The inspector evaluated the radioactive waste management and transportation programs to determine whether the licensee properly processed, packaged, stored, and shipped radioactive materials.

b. Observations and Findings

As noted above in Section 1.1, the licensee shipped heat sinks to another licensee in May 2009. The inspector reviewed the associated records for this shipment.

The records indicated that the shipment was classified as radioactive material -limited quantity.

The licensee packaged the equipment and completed the required surveys and inspections.

The inspector reviewed the records containing the survey results. The highest contact dose rate was less than 0.1 mR/hr and non-fixed contamination was less 1 ,000dpm/100cm 2 for beta-gamma and less than 20dpm/100cm 2 for alpha. The records also delineated the verification process to ensure that the shipping and vehicle inspections were completed.

The shipping verification process ensured that the licensee complied with the Department of Transportation (DOT) shipping regulations for radioactive material.

The inspector noted that the Bill of Lading and radioactive material manifest had the required information.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's implementation of its radioactive waste management and transportation programs was adequate.

This shipment was delivered by FedEx Custom Critical and the delivery was coordinated with the other licensee.

Radioactive materials were properly processed, packaged, stored, and shipped in accordance with NRC and DOT regulations.

No findings of significance were identified.

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 12, 2010, the inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom Cleary, licenSing.

Mr. Cleary acknowledged the inspection findings.

In addition the licensee's surveillance of the water intrusion issue was discussed.

The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

=SUPPLEMENTAL

INFORMATION=

Inspection

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SUPPLEMENTAL

INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee Rich McManus, Director -Nuclear Safety & Licensing

Gary Sturgeon, Operations

Rich Kennedy, Operations

Ed Palmeri, U1 Supervisor

-Maintenance

George McGovern, Supervisor

-Maintenance

Bill Bartron, Supervisor

-Licensing

Tom Cleary, Licensing

Brian Bowen, Shift Supervisor

-Health Physics Maria Nappi, Supervisor

-ALARA Kate Gannon, Health Physics Jan Drzewianowski, Health Physics Tech Paul Tulba, RAM Control Supervisor

Winnie Ng, Health Physicist

John Doroski, Engineer 3 Cliff Chapin, Assistant

Operations

Manager Don Delcore, Supervisor

-Health Physics NRC Steve Shaffer, NRC Sr. Resident Inspector

SUPPLEMENTAL

INFORMATION

INSPECTION

PROCEDURES

USED 40801 60801 62801 71801 83750 83801 84750 86750 None. Self Assessment

and Corrective

Action Spent Fuel Pool Safety at Permanently

Shutdown Reactors Maintenance

and Surveillance

at Permanently

Shutdown Reactors Decommissioning

Performance

and Status Reviews at Permanently

Shutdown Reactors Occupational

Radiation

Exposure Inspection

of Remedial and Final Surveys at Permanently

Shutdown Reactors Radioactive

Waste Treatment

and Effluent and Environmental

Monitoring

Solid Radioactive

Waste Management

and Transportation

ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Inspection

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LIST OF DOCUMENTS

REVIEWED Millstone

U1 Radiation

Surveys conducted

between April 2009 and March 2010 Millstone

U1 Gamma Spectrum Analyses from the Evaporator

dated 12/23/2009, 2/8/2010, and 2/17/2010

Millstone

U1 Radiation

Exposure (ALARA) Reports for 2008,2009, and most current for 201 0 Millstone

U1 Surveillance

Form for Operator Logs and Inspections (U1 rounds) Summary of Millstone

U1 Condition

Reports between March 2009 and March 2010 Work Orders 53102265690

and 53102187744

associated

with the quarterly

run and annual inspection

of the diesel generator

Work Order 53102234315

associated

with the inspection

and repair of RM-SFP-01

radiation

monitor Work Order 53102330036

associated

with roof leaks in U1 Switch Gear Room Work Order 53102261879

associated

with slippery floor in Switch Gear Room Dominion Memorandum

dated 03/08/2004

regarding

recommendation

for resolving

water intrusion

issues for Millstone

U1 Millstone

U1 Waste Water Management

Spreadsheet

for 07/20/2009

through 03/15/2010

Asset Recovery Information

conducted

between 03/12/2009

and 02/18/2010

Current Photos of Water Intrusion

and Condition

Report No. CR373200 regarding

water intrusion

Condition

Report No. CR368109 regarding

U1 Reactor Building Crane will not raise or lower Condition

Report CR-07-1 0287 U1 Reactor Building Concrete Floor Cracks and associated

trouble report no. 10M1152746

Millstone

U1 Dry Cask Storage Readiness

Assessment

dated 11/06/2007

Millstone

U1 Spent Fuel Pool Island Floor Plans and System Drawings ADAMS ALARA CFR DOT dpm/100cm'

ISFSI mrem mRlhr NRC RCA RWP SSC U1 LIST OF ACRONYMS USED Agency-Wide

Document Management

System As Low As is Reasonably

Achievable

Code of Federal Regulations

Department

of Transportation

DiSintegrations

per minute per 100 square centimeters

Independent

Spent Fuel Storage Installation

Millirem milliRoentgen

per hour Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Radiologically

Controlled

Area Radiation

Work Permit Structures, Systems, and Components

Millstone

Power Station, Unit 1 Inspection

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