Information Notice 1990-06, Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555January 29, 1990NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-06: POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLINGWHILE AT LOW REACTOR COOLANT LEVELS
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 29, 1990 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE NO. 90-06: POTENTIAL
 
FOR LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING WHILE AT LOW REACTOR COOLANT LEVELS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
:
All holders of operating
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:This information notice is intended to alert addressees to a potential problemaffecting the operability of the residual heat removal (RHR) system duringoperating conditions involving mid-loop operation. It is expected that re--cipients will review the information for applicability to their facilitiesand consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However,suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRCrequirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
: This information
 
notice is intended to alert addressees
 
to a potential
 
problem affecting
 
the operability
 
of the residual heat removal (RHR) system during operating
 
conditions
 
involving
 
mid-loop operation.
 
It is expected that re--cipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
On July 18, 1989, at Comanche Peak Unit 1, train 'Al of the residual heat removal system was in operation
 
prior to initial fuel loading. The air operated RHR heat exchanger
 
flow control valve (FCV) was being used to maintain system flow below 2000 gpm. The reactor vessel water level was being maintained
 
slightly abpve the center line of the hot legs.The inverter supplying
 
power to the controller
 
for the FCV failed. The loss of power to the controller
 
resulted in the FCV failing to its emergency
 
core cooling system (ECCS) position of being fully open. The open valve caused an increase in system flow to 4400 gpm. This sudden, increased
 
flow caused conditions
 
where vortexing
 
was expected at the suction of the RHR pipe con-nection to the RCS.The power supply for the controllers
 
was manually transferred
 
to an alternate source and the FCV was throttled, thus terminating
 
the event.Discussion:
The FCV is manually throttled
 
to maintain a desired rate of flow through the RHR heat exchanger.
 
The heat exchanger
 
flow rate is adjusted to control the temperature
 
of the water being returned to the vessel. Total system flow is regulated
 
by throttling
 
the heat exchanger
 
bypass valve coincident
 
with the adjustment
 
of the FCV.001230175 Z ( (' D*1 IC, eo uachr
 
IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications
 
of pump air ingestion.
 
However, the increased
 
system flow corresponded
 
to the rate at which vortexing
 
had been calculated
 
to occur based on the existing RCS level. The licensee had previously
 
determined
 
maximum permitted
 
flow rates for various reduced levels of the RCS to prevent the possibility
 
of vortexing
 
and air entrainment
 
into the RHR pump.Although RHR pump operation
 
was never actually impaired, the potential
 
existed for air to be introduced
 
to the pump's suction. This concern is exacerbated
 
by* the fact that the heat exchanger
 
FCVs for both trains of RHR are powered from the same inverter.
 
Since the FCVs open fully on a loss of power, both trains of RHR could become inoperable
 
on a loss of power during mid-loop operation.(A loss of instrument
 
air would also cause the FCVs to fail to the full open position and could also result in the loss of both trains of the RHR system).During most modes of operation, having the FCVs go -fully open on loss of power or instrument
 
air is not a safety concern because having the valves fully open does not normally prevent the system from performing
 
its safety function.
 
However, having the valves go fully open while at mid-loop could result in the loss of decay heat removal capability.
 
This loss could persist until electrical
 
power or instrument
 
air is restored and air is vented from the RHR system.The licensee has revised procedures
 
for mid-loop operation
 
to require manually positioning
 
the cold leg injection
 
isolation
 
valves to limit the maximum flow through the system, even with the FCVs fully open. This lineup will be used whenever the unit is at mid-loop and protects against the consequences
 
of failure of either electrical
 
power or instrument
 
air.Several generic communications
 
have been issued informing
 
licensees
 
of the consequences
 
of the loss of residual (decay) heat removal and the operating conditions
 
under which the probability
 
of a loss increases;
i.e., reduced inventory
 
conditions.
 
The most recent publications
 
include Generic Letter (GL) No. 87-12, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal While the Reactor Coolant System is Partially
 
Filled;" GL No. 88-17, *Loss of Decay Heat Removal;" NRC In-formation
 
Notice (IN) 87-23, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor Coolant Level Operation;" IN 88-36, 'Possible
 
Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant Level Operation;" and IN 89-67, "Loss of Residual Heat Removal Caused by Accumulator
 
Nitrogen Injection." The event described above introduces
 
a subtle failure scenario which licensees
 
may not have considered.
 
IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, irector Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts:
Nick Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV (817) 897-1500 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
I IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications
 
of pump air ingestion
 
However the increased
 
system flow enrraenan~nA
 
n~ -~ neto. Hwvr Attachment
 
~q ) sx 90-06 Jasmary 2§ 1990 Page I of I LIST OF RECEITLT ISSUED NIR INFORtAT1011 OTICES JCW --lnfonation
 
Notice No.90-05 90-04 SubJect Inter-System
 
Discharge
 
of Reactor Coelant Issuance 1/26/9O Cracking of the Upper Shall- 1/26/90 to-Transition
 
===Cone Girth Melds Is Steam Generators===
Issued te All holders of ULs or Ch for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs.for Westinghouse.
 
designed and Combustion
 
Engineering-disigned
 
nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for uclewr power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for Slis.All holders of NRC materials
 
licenses.90-03 malfunction
 
of Borg-Varner
 
SBlted Sonnet Check Valves Causd by Failure of the Swing Arm 90-02 Potential
 
Degradation
 
of Secondary
 
Contaient 90-01 lIportace
 
of Proper Response to Self-Identifted
 
Violations
 
by Licensees 89-90 Pressurizer
 
Safety Valv Lift Setpoint Shift 89-8 Event Notificatton
 
Workshents
 
89-88 Recent XRC-Sponsored
 
Testing of motor-Operated
 
Valves 8647 Disablilg
 
of Emergency Diesel Generators
 
by Their Neutral Ground-Fault
 
Protection
 
Circuitry 8945. etalclad.
 
Lou-Voltage
 
Supp. 2 Power Circuit Dreakars Refurbished
 
with Substandard
 
Parts 1/23/90 1/29D 1/12/90 12/28/84 All holder of OMs or Ch for Pilb.12/26/89 All holders of CLs or en for nuclear power reactors.12/26189 All holders of Ots or CPs for nutlear poer reactors.12/19189 All helders of OLs or CVs for nuclear power reactors.12/IS/1 9 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL*OpitunceS
 
-_CV s Construction
 
Permit UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. 8300 IPOSTAGE & FEES PAOID ISNiRC 1 IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts: Nick Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV (817) 897-1500 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
EAB:NRR*NFields:
db 1/12/90 TECH:EDITOR
 
*BCalure 1/13/90 EAB:NRR C:EAB:NRR*DCFischer
 
*CJHaughney
 
1/16/90 1/16/90 C:OGCB:NRR
 
*CHBerlinger
 
1/17/90 NRR:SRXB*RJones 1/23/90 1 /Z3'90
K)j V%2IN 90-January , 1990 No specific action or written response is required by this information
 
If you have any questions
 
about this matter, please contact one of the contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator
 
of the appropriate
 
office.notice.technical regional Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts: Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
EAB:NRR*NFields:db
 
/ /90 D:DOEA:NRR
 
CERossi/ /90 TECH:EDITOR
 
*BCalure/ /90 EAB:NRR*DCFischer
 
/ /90 C:EAB:NRR*CJHaughney*
/ /90 C:OGCB:NRR
 
*CHBerlinger
 
/ /90 N R B RJV es I j:/90
IN 90-January , 1990%...Z'age
 
3 of 3 No specific action or written response is required by this infornation
 
notice. If you have any questions
 
about this matter, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the Regional Administrator
 
of the appropriate
 
regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
Contacts: Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500 List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices Attachment:
AJF EAB:NRR NFields:db
 
Jr //,/90 C0Wvtn Au t VIU46x1 4fhire0rAtU
 
rAI TECH:EDITOR
 
EAB:NRR DCFischer I /11/SQ , /14/90 C:EAB:NRR CJHaughney


==Description of Circumstances==
I /14/90 CV C:OGCB:NRR
:On July 18, 1989, at Comanche Peak Unit 1, train 'Al of the residual heatremoval system was in operation prior to initial fuel loading. The airoperated RHR heat exchanger flow control valve (FCV) was being used tomaintain system flow below 2000 gpm. The reactor vessel water level wasbeing maintained slightly abpve the center line of the hot legs.The inverter supplying power to the controller for the FCV failed. The lossof power to the controller resulted in the FCV failing to its emergency corecooling system (ECCS) position of being fully open. The open valve causedan increase in system flow to 4400 gpm. This sudden, increased flow causedconditions where vortexing was expected at the suction of the RHR pipe con-nection to the RCS.The power supply for the controllers was manually transferred to an alternatesource and the FCV was throttled, thus terminating the event.Discussion:The FCV is manually throttled to maintain a desired rate of flow through theRHR heat exchanger. The heat exchanger flow rate is adjusted to control thetemperature of the water being returned to the vessel. Total system flow isregulated by throttling the heat exchanger bypass valve coincident with theadjustment of the FCV.001230175 Z ( (' D*1 IC,eo uachr


IN 90-06January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications of pump air ingestion. However,the increased system flow corresponded to the rate at which vortexing hadbeen calculated to occur based on the existing RCS level. The licensee hadpreviously determined maximum permitted flow rates for various reduced levelsof the RCS to prevent the possibility of vortexing and air entrainment intothe RHR pump.Although RHR pump operation was never actually impaired, the potential existedfor air to be introduced to the pump's suction. This concern is exacerbated by* the fact that the heat exchanger FCVs for both trains of RHR are powered fromthe same inverter. Since the FCVs open fully on a loss of power, both trainsof RHR could become inoperable on a loss of power during mid-loop operation.(A loss of instrument air would also cause the FCVs to fail to the full openposition and could also result in the loss of both trains of the RHR system).During most modes of operation, having the FCVs go -fully open on loss ofpower or instrument air is not a safety concern because having the valvesfully open does not normally prevent the system from performing its safetyfunction. However, having the valves go fully open while at mid-loop couldresult in the loss of decay heat removal capability. This loss could persistuntil electrical power or instrument air is restored and air is vented fromthe RHR system.The licensee has revised procedures for mid-loop operation to require manuallypositioning the cold leg injection isolation valves to limit the maximum flowthrough the system, even with the FCVs fully open. This lineup will be usedwhenever the unit is at mid-loop and protects against the consequences offailure of either electrical power or instrument air.Several generic communications have been issued informing licensees of theconsequences of the loss of residual (decay) heat removal and the operatingconditions under which the probability of a loss increases; i.e., reducedinventory conditions. The most recent publications include Generic Letter(GL) No. 87-12, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal While the Reactor Coolant Systemis Partially Filled;" GL No. 88-17, *Loss of Decay Heat Removal;" NRC In-formation Notice (IN) 87-23, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low ReactorCoolant Level Operation;" IN 88-36, 'Possible Sudden Loss of RCS InventoryDuring Low Coolant Level Operation;" and IN 89-67, "Loss of Residual HeatRemoval Caused by Accumulator Nitrogen Injection." The event describedabove introduces a subtle failure scenario which licensees may not haveconsidered.
CHBerlinger


IN 90-06January 29, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, irectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts: Nick Fields, NRR(301) 492-1173Steve Bitter, RIV(817) 897-1500Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
/ 117/90 D:DOEA:NRR


IIN 90-06January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications of pump air ingestion Howeverthe increased system flow enrraenan~nA n~ -~ neto. HwvrAttachment ~q ) sx 90-06Jasmary 2§ 1990Page I of ILIST OF RECEITLT ISSUEDNIR INFORtAT1011 OTICESJCW --lnfonationNotice No.90-0590-04SubJectInter-System Discharge ofReactor CoelantIssuance1/26/9OCracking of the Upper Shall- 1/26/90to-Transition Cone GirthMelds Is Steam GeneratorsIssued teAll holders of ULsor Ch for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs.for Westinghouse.designed and CombustionEngineering-disignednuclear power reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for uclewrpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for Slis.All holders of NRCmaterials licenses.90-03 malfunction of Borg-VarnerSBlted Sonnet Check ValvesCausd by Failure of theSwing Arm90-02 Potential Degradation ofSecondary Contaient90-01 lIportace of ProperResponse to Self-IdentiftedViolations by Licensees89-90 Pressurizer Safety ValvLift Setpoint Shift89-8 Event NotificattonWorkshents89-88 Recent XRC-SponsoredTesting of motor-OperatedValves8647 Disablilg of EmergencyDiesel Generators byTheir Neutral Ground-FaultProtection Circuitry8945. etalclad. Lou-VoltageSupp. 2 Power Circuit DreakarsRefurbished withSubstandard Parts1/23/901/29D1/12/9012/28/84 All holder of OMsor Ch for Pilb.12/26/89 All holders of CLsor en for nuclearpower reactors.12/26189 All holders of Otsor CPs for nutlearpoer reactors.12/19189 All helders of OLsor CVs for nuclearpower reactors.12/IS/1 9 All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.OL*OpitunceS -_CV s Construction PermitUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555OFFICIAL BUSINESSPENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. 8300IPOSTAGE & FEES PAOIDISNiRC1 IN 90-06January 29, 1990 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Nick Fields, NRR(301) 492-1173Steve Bitter, RIV(817) 897-1500Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEEAB:NRR*NFields: db1/12/90TECH:EDITOR*BCalure1/13/90EAB:NRR C:EAB:NRR*DCFischer *CJHaughney1/16/90 1/16/90C:OGCB:NRR*CHBerlinger1/17/90NRR:SRXB*RJones1/23/901 /Z3'90
CERossi/ /90}}
K)jV%2IN 90-January , 1990 No specific action or written response is required by this informationIf you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of thecontacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriateoffice.notice.technicalregionalCharles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Nick Fields (301) 492-1173Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEEAB:NRR*NFields:db/ /90D:DOEA:NRRCERossi/ /90TECH:EDITOR*BCalure/ /90EAB:NRR*DCFischer/ /90C:EAB:NRR*CJHaughney*/ /90C:OGCB:NRR*CHBerlinger/ /90N R BRJV esI j:/90
IN 90-January , 1990%...Z'age 3 of 3No specific action or written response is required by thisinfornation notice. If you have any questions about this matter,please contact the technical contact listed below or the RegionalAdministrator of the appropriate regional office.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical Contacts:Nick Fields (301) 492-1173Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesAttachment:AJFEAB:NRRNFields:dbJr //,/90C0Wvtn Au tVIU46x1 4fhire0rAtU rAITECH:EDITOR EAB:NRRDCFischerI /11/SQ , /14/90C:EAB:NRRCJHaughneyI /14/90CVC:OGCB:NRRCHBerlinger/ 117/90D:DOEA:NRRCERossi/ /90  
}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 13:45, 31 August 2018

Potential for Loss of Shutdown Cooling While at Low Reactor Coolant Levels
ML031130325
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date: 01/29/1990
From: Rossi C E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-90-006, NUDOCS 9001230175
Download: ML031130325 (7)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 29, 1990 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 90-06: POTENTIAL

FOR LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING WHILE AT LOW REACTOR COOLANT LEVELS

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

This information

notice is intended to alert addressees

to a potential

problem affecting

the operability

of the residual heat removal (RHR) system during operating

conditions

involving

mid-loop operation.

It is expected that re--cipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances:

On July 18, 1989, at Comanche Peak Unit 1, train 'Al of the residual heat removal system was in operation

prior to initial fuel loading. The air operated RHR heat exchanger

flow control valve (FCV) was being used to maintain system flow below 2000 gpm. The reactor vessel water level was being maintained

slightly abpve the center line of the hot legs.The inverter supplying

power to the controller

for the FCV failed. The loss of power to the controller

resulted in the FCV failing to its emergency

core cooling system (ECCS) position of being fully open. The open valve caused an increase in system flow to 4400 gpm. This sudden, increased

flow caused conditions

where vortexing

was expected at the suction of the RHR pipe con-nection to the RCS.The power supply for the controllers

was manually transferred

to an alternate source and the FCV was throttled, thus terminating

the event.Discussion:

The FCV is manually throttled

to maintain a desired rate of flow through the RHR heat exchanger.

The heat exchanger

flow rate is adjusted to control the temperature

of the water being returned to the vessel. Total system flow is regulated

by throttling

the heat exchanger

bypass valve coincident

with the adjustment

of the FCV.001230175 Z ( (' D*1 IC, eo uachr

IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications

of pump air ingestion.

However, the increased

system flow corresponded

to the rate at which vortexing

had been calculated

to occur based on the existing RCS level. The licensee had previously

determined

maximum permitted

flow rates for various reduced levels of the RCS to prevent the possibility

of vortexing

and air entrainment

into the RHR pump.Although RHR pump operation

was never actually impaired, the potential

existed for air to be introduced

to the pump's suction. This concern is exacerbated

by* the fact that the heat exchanger

FCVs for both trains of RHR are powered from the same inverter.

Since the FCVs open fully on a loss of power, both trains of RHR could become inoperable

on a loss of power during mid-loop operation.(A loss of instrument

air would also cause the FCVs to fail to the full open position and could also result in the loss of both trains of the RHR system).During most modes of operation, having the FCVs go -fully open on loss of power or instrument

air is not a safety concern because having the valves fully open does not normally prevent the system from performing

its safety function.

However, having the valves go fully open while at mid-loop could result in the loss of decay heat removal capability.

This loss could persist until electrical

power or instrument

air is restored and air is vented from the RHR system.The licensee has revised procedures

for mid-loop operation

to require manually positioning

the cold leg injection

isolation

valves to limit the maximum flow through the system, even with the FCVs fully open. This lineup will be used whenever the unit is at mid-loop and protects against the consequences

of failure of either electrical

power or instrument

air.Several generic communications

have been issued informing

licensees

of the consequences

of the loss of residual (decay) heat removal and the operating conditions

under which the probability

of a loss increases;

i.e., reduced inventory

conditions.

The most recent publications

include Generic Letter (GL) No. 87-12, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal While the Reactor Coolant System is Partially

Filled;" GL No. 88-17, *Loss of Decay Heat Removal;" NRC In-formation

Notice (IN) 87-23, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor Coolant Level Operation;" IN 88-36, 'Possible

Sudden Loss of RCS Inventory During Low Coolant Level Operation;" and IN 89-67, "Loss of Residual Heat Removal Caused by Accumulator

Nitrogen Injection." The event described above introduces

a subtle failure scenario which licensees

may not have considered.

IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, irector Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts:

Nick Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV (817) 897-1500 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

I IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 During this event, there were no indications

of pump air ingestion

However the increased

system flow enrraenan~nA

n~ -~ neto. Hwvr Attachment

~q ) sx 90-06 Jasmary 2§ 1990 Page I of I LIST OF RECEITLT ISSUED NIR INFORtAT1011 OTICES JCW --lnfonation

Notice No.90-05 90-04 SubJect Inter-System

Discharge

of Reactor Coelant Issuance 1/26/9O Cracking of the Upper Shall- 1/26/90 to-Transition

Cone Girth Melds Is Steam Generators

Issued te All holders of ULs or Ch for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs.for Westinghouse.

designed and Combustion

Engineering-disigned

nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for uclewr power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for Slis.All holders of NRC materials

licenses.90-03 malfunction

of Borg-Varner

SBlted Sonnet Check Valves Causd by Failure of the Swing Arm 90-02 Potential

Degradation

of Secondary

Contaient 90-01 lIportace

of Proper Response to Self-Identifted

Violations

by Licensees 89-90 Pressurizer

Safety Valv Lift Setpoint Shift 89-8 Event Notificatton

Workshents

89-88 Recent XRC-Sponsored

Testing of motor-Operated

Valves 8647 Disablilg

of Emergency Diesel Generators

by Their Neutral Ground-Fault

Protection

Circuitry 8945. etalclad.

Lou-Voltage

Supp. 2 Power Circuit Dreakars Refurbished

with Substandard

Parts 1/23/90 1/29D 1/12/90 12/28/84 All holder of OMs or Ch for Pilb.12/26/89 All holders of CLs or en for nuclear power reactors.12/26189 All holders of Ots or CPs for nutlear poer reactors.12/19189 All helders of OLs or CVs for nuclear power reactors.12/IS/1 9 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.OL*OpitunceS

-_CV s Construction

Permit UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. 8300 IPOSTAGE & FEES PAOID ISNiRC 1 IN 90-06 January 29, 1990 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: Nick Fields, NRR (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter, RIV (817) 897-1500 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB:NRR*NFields:

db 1/12/90 TECH:EDITOR

  • BCalure 1/13/90 EAB:NRR C:EAB:NRR*DCFischer
  • CJHaughney

1/16/90 1/16/90 C:OGCB:NRR

  • CHBerlinger

1/17/90 NRR:SRXB*RJones 1/23/90 1 /Z3'90

K)j V%2IN 90-January , 1990 No specific action or written response is required by this information

If you have any questions

about this matter, please contact one of the contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

office.notice.technical regional Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

EAB:NRR*NFields:db

/ /90 D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi/ /90 TECH:EDITOR

  • BCalure/ /90 EAB:NRR*DCFischer

/ /90 C:EAB:NRR*CJHaughney*

/ /90 C:OGCB:NRR

  • CHBerlinger

/ /90 N R B RJV es I j:/90

IN 90-January , 1990%...Z'age

3 of 3 No specific action or written response is required by this infornation

notice. If you have any questions

about this matter, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

Contacts: Nick Fields (301) 492-1173 Steve Bitter (817) 897-1500 List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Attachment:

AJF EAB:NRR NFields:db

Jr //,/90 C0Wvtn Au t VIU46x1 4fhire0rAtU

rAI TECH:EDITOR

EAB:NRR DCFischer I /11/SQ , /14/90 C:EAB:NRR CJHaughney

I /14/90 CV C:OGCB:NRR

CHBerlinger

/ 117/90 D:DOEA:NRR

CERossi/ /90


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