SNRC-1276, Forwards Rev 8 to Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan,Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1, in Response to FEMA post-exercise Assessment & to Replace Nassau Coliseum W/Lilco Facilities as Evacuee Reception Ctr

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Forwards Rev 8 to Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan,Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1, in Response to FEMA post-exercise Assessment & to Replace Nassau Coliseum W/Lilco Facilities as Evacuee Reception Ctr
ML20210E278
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 09/22/1986
From: Leonard J
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML18023A063 List:
References
SNRC-1276, NUDOCS 8609220213
Download: ML20210E278 (19)
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Text

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m LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION P.O. BOX 618 NORTH COUNTRY ROAD

  • WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 MHN D. LEONARD,JR.

VICE PRE $1DE NT . NUCLE AR OPE R ATIONS

  1. 9 {' h SNRC-1276 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ,

Submittal of Revision 8: Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Shoreham Nuclear Power' Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322

Dear Mr. Denton:

Revision 8 of the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan is being issued to respond in part to the FEMA Region II Post Exercise Assecsment and to replace the Nassau Coliseum with LILCO facilities as evacuee reception centers. By separate letter dated September 16, 1986 the Commissioners and all parties were notified that WALK has withdrawn from it's agreement to serve as the Shoreham Emergency Broadcast primary station. A future revision to the LERO plan will provide a suitable alternative agreement.

For convenience, Attachment I provides a description of Revision 8 and how the modifications respond to the FEMA Assessment 'Arca(s) Requiring Corrective Action' (ARCA) and a summary of the revised reception center plan.

Attachment II contains instructions for insertion of Rev. 8 into the plan and procedures. Please find attached six sets of the revised pages that make up Revision 8.

We ask that you cause a request to be made to FEMA, pursuant to the NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, for a expedited review of Revision 8. To this end, we are forwarding under separate cover, consistent with past practice and in conformance to_our controlled copy distribution, a total of sixteen (16) controlled copies of Rev. 8 directly to members of the RAC.

ge(a 8609220213 860922 p l PDR ADOCK 05000322 F PDR

SNRC-1276 Page-2

.Should you have any' questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely, k fk f John D. Leona , JY.

Vice President - Nuclear Operations DMC/js Enclosures cc: J. A. Berry R. Lo

n - - .

OPIP 5.4.1 Page 11 of 18

- Attachment 4 Page 1 of 1 REVISION SIGNOFF FORM To: Holder, Manual No. Local Offsite Emergency Plans and Implementation Procedures -

From: Emergency Planning Coordinator

Subject:

REVISION TRANSMITTAL Attached is Revision No. to the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Implementation Procedures for insertion into your Controlled Copy. Two copies of this memorandum have been provided. Once you have complied with the instructions presented below, sign one copy and place it in front of your controlled copy of the Manual. Sign the second copy of the memorandum and return it within seven (7) working days to:

Emergency Preparedness Coordinator LILCO 173 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 The undersigned acknowledges completion of the following actions:

1. The receipt and incorporation of this revision into my copy of the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Implementation Procedures.
2. Destruction of all pages which have been superceded by this revision.

Signature Date Rev. 5

OPIP 5.4.1 Page 11 of 18

- Attachment 4 Page 1 of 1 REVISION SIGNOFF FORM To: Holder, Manual No. Local Offsite Emergency Plans and Implementation Procedures -

From: Emergency Planning Coordinator

Subject:

REVISION TRANSMITTAL Attached is Revision No. to the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Implementation Procedures for insertion into your Controlled Copy. Two copies of this memorandum have been provided. Once you have complied with the instructions presented below, sign one copy and place it in front of your controlled copy of the Manual. Sign the second copy of the memorandum and return it within seven (7) working days to:

Emergency Preparedness Coordinator LILCO 173 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 The undersigned acknowledges completion of the following actions:

1. The receipt and incorporation of this revision into my copy of the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Implementation Procedures.
2. Destruction of all pages which have been superceded by this revision.

I Signature Date Rev. 5 J - _ _ _ _ - _ . __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

I

/gj @ LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD e WADING RIVER, N.Y.11792 JOHN D. LEON ARD JR.

VM:E PRE $iDtNT NUCLE AR OPERATIONS SNRC-1276 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Submittal of Revision 8: Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322

Dear Mr. Denton:

Revision 8 of the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan is being issued to respond in part to the FEMA Region II Post Exercise Assessment and to replace the Nassau Coliseum with LILCO facilities as evacuee reception centers. By separate letter dated September 16, 1986 the Commissioners and all parties were notified that WALK has withdrawn from it's agreement to serve as the Shoreham Emergency Broadcast primary station. A future revision to the LERO plan will provide a suitable alternative agreement.

For convenience, Attachment I provides a description of Revision 8 and how the modifications respond to the FEMA Assessment ' Area (s) Requiring Corrective Action' (ARCA) and a l summary of the revised reception center plan.

Attachment II contains instructions for insertion of Rev. 8 into the plan and procedures. Please find attached six sets of the revised pages that make up Revision 8.

We ask that you cause a request to be made to FEMA, pursuant to l

the NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, for a expedited review of Revision 8. To this end, we are forwarding under separate cover, consistent with past practice and in conformance to our controlled copy distribution, a total of sixteen (16) controlled copies of Rev. 8 directly to members of the RAC.

SNRC-1276 Page 2 Should you have any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

, k fk h e

, John D. Leona ,J .

Vice President - Nuclear Operations DMC/js Enclosures cc: J. A. Berry R. Lo 1

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r-ATTACINENT 1 T0: Recipients of Revision 8 of the Shoreham Offsite Emergency Plan SHOREHM OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLAN:

REVISION 8 This attachment describes the modifications made to the plan and procedures by Revision 8.

PART I - RESPONS,E TO FEMA EXERCISE ASSESSMENT PART II - REVISED RECEPTION CENTER PART III - REVISED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY DATA FORM PART I - LILCO Response to FEMA Assessment of February 13, 1986 Emergency Exercise items defined as Area Requiring Corrective Action.

  • ITD4 # RAC RECCHMENDATION LILCO RESPONSE EOC-2 There was some confusion regarding The FAA will be contacted as the method for notifying the Federal part of FEMA's FRERP Aviation Administration (FAA). response. Plan and procedures revised in Revision 7. Training material has been revised accordingly.

(1) The LERO procedures should be reviewed and revised as necessary Plan: Figure 2.1.2, 2. 2-1, to ensure that a point of contact 2.2-2a, 2.2-4, with the FAA has been designated. Figure 2.2.1, Attachment 2.2.2, (2) The LERO EOC staff should be Figure 3.3.3, trained in the appropriate Figure 3.3.4, procedures so that the FAA can Figure 3.3.5, be notified in a timely manner. Figure 3.4.1 Proc.: OPIP 3.3.2, page 11, 15 OPIP 3.6.3, page 2

  • NOTE: The item numbers used correspond to Tables 3.1 - 3.10 in the FEMA report.

Page 1 of 11

l ITEM # RAC RECOMMENDATION I il CD RF SPnNRF EOC-3 Since there are no procedures for The Long Island Railroad is l notification of the Long Island now called and infonned of 4 Railroad (LIRR) in the Plan, the the emergency. Plan and LIRR was not notified during the procedures revised in exe rcise. Revision 8.

(1) The LERO procedures should Plan: Figure 3.3.4, be revised to establish a point Figu re 3.3.5 of contact and a means for Proc. : OPIP 3.3.2, notifying the LIRR. page 5, 14 (2) The LER0 E0C staff should be Training material has trained in the revised procedures been revised accordingly, so that the LIRR can be notified in a timely manner.

E0C-4 The dose assessment status board in The dose assessment status the accident assessment a rea had to boa rti has been revised accommodate both DOE RAP and LILCO to separate data from the field monitoring data. There were DOE PAP and LILC0 field not enough columns on the boarti to monitoring teams.

keep the two (2) sources of data separa ted. LERO should enlarge the dose assessment status boa rd to accommodate a clear separation between the data reports from the DOE RAP and LILC0 field monitoring teams.

E0C-5 The downwind distance of the sample The field teans will was incorrectly reported to be 7,000 transmit data in miles meters instead of 700 meters for one to minimize corfusinn, of the thyroid doses reported by a A precaution has been DOE-RAP field monito ring team, placed in Revision 8.

This error us caused by a decimal point misplaced during the conversion of the distance units and meant that the initial calculation of thyroid dose based on this measurement was 9,000 mrem /hr. at 4.3 miles downwind instead of 9,000 mrem /hr.

at about 0.5 miles downwind.

About fiw (5) minutes elapsed before this error was found and corrected.

All downwind distance from tie field should be reported consistently in eitter miles or meters.

Page 2 of 11 I

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ITEM # RAC RECOMMENDATION LILCor RESPONSE EOC-6 During the reporting of the initial Dose projections based upon DOE RAP thyroid doses, only one field extrapolated field data will measurement, the 1400 mrem /hr be reported as ' projected' measurement made at about 1204 at and posted in the projected two (2) miles from the plant, was data column. A precaution

available. This value was used at has been placed in 3

the LER0 EOC to extrapolate doses at Revision 8.

other distances. These extrapolated 1 data were reported as actual Proc. : OPIP 3.5.2, page 2.

measurements at other distances rather than as projected data on the dose assessment status board. It took two and one half (2.5) hours to identify and correct this error. LERO reporting 4 procedures should be reviewed to ensure i

proper coordination and proper reporting.

to EOC-7 Although he later quoted the PAG The Health Services

! correctly when asked to do so by a Coordinator has been Federal evaluator, during a briefing provided with review

! held at the LERO EOC at about 1110, material on the use

the Health Services Coordinator and meaning of the misstated the EPA PAG as being EPA PAG's.

nandatory evacuation when the projected thyroid dose was five (5) Rem. The Health Services

Coordinator should review the EPA PAG

! guidance in order to avoid any possible confusion that could result due to misinformation given during briefings.

! EOC-8 Prior to the exercise, LILC0 management The siren' system will made the decision that the siren be activated as part '

i system would not be activated as part of a prompt notification of the February 13, 1986 exercise. test, prior to commercial

' Activation of the siren system should operation.

be actually tested in the future.

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Page 3 of 11 l

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ITEM # RAC REC 0fMENDATION LILCO RESPONSE E0C-9 There was a dely of about forty-five Traffic Control procedure (45) minutes between the LERO E0C's has been revised to direct first attempt to have Route Spotter expedited dispatch of

  1. 1005 verify the fuel truck impediment personnel responding to and the dispatch of that spotter from incidents identified by the Port Jefferson Staging Area. the E0C. Procedures This delved timely verification of revised in Rev. 7 and 8.

the impediment. Personnel need to be trained in the development of Proc . : OPIP 3.6.3, alternative approaches when delays page 2, 3a, 8 are reasonably anticipated in the field verification of impediments to evacuation. Developnent of alternatives should include consultation between, at a minimun, the Evacuation Coordinator and the Evacuation Route Coordinator.

EOC-10 Only the Shoreham-Wading River School Schools will be District participated in the requested to participate February 13, 1986 exercise. Prior to in future exercises, the exercise, LILCO management made the decision that other school districts were not to be included in the exen:ise. In the future all schools must be included in all Federally evaluated exen:ises and drills.

EOC-11 Dosimetry and training have not LILC0 is ready to abide been provided to the Bus Drivers by its commitnent to provide used for school evacuation. training in basic principles of radiation (1) Bus Drivers used for school and dosimetry use and to evacuation should be trained provide personal dosimeters in the use of dosimeters. and XI tablets to all school bus drivers upon (2) Adequate supplies of dosimetry request.

should be provided for Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.

E0C-12 Some of the Ambulette Drivers were not Training of ambulance /

aware of when to take their KI. ambulette drivers is Training on XI procedures should be being scheduled and has given to the Ambulette Drivers, been revised to provide increased emphasis on dosimetry and radiological protective actions for emergency workers.

Page 4 of 11

ITEM # RAC RECOPMENDATION LILCO RESPONSE EOC-13 Bus Drivers used for school evacuation See E0C Item 11.

have not been trained in KI policy and the use of KI. Sufficitat supplies of KI are not available for School Evacuation Bus Drivers.

(1) Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should be trained in KI policy and the use of KI.

(2) Adequate supplies of KI should be provided for Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.

EOC-14 Ambulette Drivers were not all trained See E0C Item 12.

regarding who can authorize doses in excess of and what to do in the event of exposure above the general public PAGs. Ambulette Drivers should be trained on excessive exposure authorization and applicable procedures.

EOC-15 Bus Drivers used for school evacuation See EOC Item 11.

have not been trained regarding who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs. Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should receive training regarding who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs.

ENC-2 Maps and displays in the media briefing The suggested additional room were insuf ficient. The following displays and status displays should be posted in an area boards have been provided easily visible to reporters: to the ENC.

o An EPZ map which tracks protective actions and plume pathway, o A status board which provides ECLs and their times of declaration.

ENC-3 Some hard copies of EBS messages that The emergency press were provided to the press contained releases, which do not extraneous information (clearly contain deleted material, marked for deletion) that should will be posted in the ENC.

have been omitted to avoid possible Procedures revised in confusion. Hard copies of EBS Revision 7.

messages posted in the ENC for use by the press should contain only that Proc. : OPIP 3.8.1, page 3, information which was broadcast 4, 5 to the public.

Page 5 of 11 i

RAC REC (NMENDATION LILCO pESPONSE ITEM #

PORT. One (1) Bus Driver neglected to Training materials have JEFF-1 read his DRD at anytime during the been revised to provide seventy-five (75) minutes he was additional emphasis on working in the EPZ. All Bus Drivers radiation and dosimetry, should be trained to read their DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes as described in LERO Procedures.

PATCH.-2 OPIP 4.7.1 specifies that the only Procedure 4.7.1 has been personnel entrance is to be the Main revised in Revision 8 to Entrance on the Conklin Avenue side of indicate actual flow of the building. The entrance actually personnel, used for this purpose was the one on the north side of the building Proc.: OPIP 4.5.1 (Main Street). Since the system page 7, 8 actually used seems to be superior to the Plan due to reduced congestion, OPIP 4.7.1, OPIP 4.7.1 should be revised to page 28, 38, 39, indicate that personnel are to enter 40, 41 the Patchogue Staging Area through the Main Street entrance to the building.

PATCH.-3 LERO personnel entered the upper Procedure 4.7.1 has been fl.oor repeatedly to use telephones revised in Revision 8 to for emergency notification. indicate access to upstairs This practice is explicitly prohibited areas, by OPIP 4.7.1 (page 38, item #3).

Either OPIP 4.7.1 should be revised Proc.: OPIP 4.7.1, to reflect the actual practice of page 38 using telephones on the second floor of the Patchogue Staging Area building, or more telephones should be provided on the first floor for LERO personnel to perfonn their emergency notifications.

PATCH.-4 The south door was not locked for Procedure 4.7.1 has been security as specified in OPIP 4.7.1. revised in Revision 8 to All doors required to be locked by ensure south door is closed the Plan should be verified as actually and guarded, locked by the Staging /.rea Coordinator or a designee. Proc.: OPIP 4.7.1, page 40 PATCH.-S Unauthorized entrance to the staging Procedure 4.7.1 has been area could be achieved through the revised in Revision 8 to open fire escape on the second floor ensure the entrance on the of the east side of the building. northeast corner of the The fire escape on the second floor second floor is locked.

of the east side of the building should be designated as a guard post in the Plan and individual should be assigned to Staff this guard post.

Page 6 of 11

ITEM # RAC KCOMMENDATION LILCO RESPONSE PATCH-7 Traffic Guides do not have complete The Traffic Guide Procedu re or correct information on the has been modified in Rev. 8 appropriate destination for evacuees. to have evacuees listen to All Traffic Guides should be trained WALK for emergency to advise motorists with questions to i nfo rnetion.

tune to the EBS station (WALK-FM) for the latest information on all matters P roc . : OPIP 3.6.3, related to the emergency, including page 18, the location of the Reception Center.

PATC H-8 Appropriate personnel and equipment After road crews are we re not dispatched to clear the dispatched to their multiple vehicle accident simulated field positions they as an impediment to evacuation, communicate via radio The appropriate personnel at the with tie EOC. The Lead Patchogue Staging Area should be Traffic Guides at the trained to request more information Staging Area do not decide from the LERO EOC when impedimerts which trucks a re to be to evacuation are indicated, dispatched to a particular impediment.

PATCH-9 Instructions for the driver of the The Transfer Point non-institutionalized mobility-impai red Coordinators' training bus to proceed to the Reception Center material has been modified were not properly transmitted to the to ensure the relay of Bus Driver at the Brookhaven National instructions f rom the Laboratory transfe r Point. Transfe r SAC's to the bus dri ve rs.

Point Coordinators should be trained to follow instructions forticoming f rom the staging a rea rega rding directions that are to be given to special population evacuation route Bus '

Driw rs, since they are trained to return to the transfer point for instructions as specified in tie LERO Plan.

PATCH-10 Residences of some non-institution- The maps used to find homes alized mobility-impaired persons in the EPZ are being were difficult to find. D ri vers reviewed for cla rity. Whe re designated to pick up non-institution- applicable, the number of alized mobility-impai red evacuees at the utility pole that their residences should be provided services tie risidence or with more detailed maps and clea rer other landnarks will be desc riptions of pickup points, included.

PATCH-ll It took forty (40) minutes f rom Rev. 8 has been revised to receipt of a LERO request to dispatch indicate an additional LERO a Bus Driver to simulate the evacuation Staff person will assist the of forty (40) se hool children. The Special Populations Bus Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Di spa tcher.

Area should be provided with trained staff support so that Bus Drivers can Proc.: OP!P 3.6.5, be dispatcted in a more timely manner. page 11, 12 Page 7 of 11

1 ITEM # RAC REC 00NENDAT10N LILCO RESPONSE PATCH.-12 The Patchogue Staging Area Bus All personnel going into the Dispatcher made repeated statements field receive a dosimetry with a bullhorn which emphasized only briefing when they are that general population evacuation issued their dosimetry.

Route Bus Drivers were to call in if a reading of 3.5 was reached on The Lead Traffic Guides their DRD; he did not give the units and Bus Dispatchers associated with the 3.5 number nor training has been mention the use of the 0-200 mrem DRD modified to emphasize which is supposed to trigger the the need to be more first call-in at a reading precise with their at or above 200 mrem. The verbal information.

instructions given to the general sopulation evacuation route Bus Drivers

)y the Patchogue Bus dispatcher over the bullhorn should be more precise to emphasize the proper use of both dosimeters and the careful reading of exposure control instructions for emergency workers.

PATCH.-13 One general population evacuation Training naterial will be route Bus Driver read DRDs only modified to emphasize the twice at the instructions of the importance of reading the Transfer Point Coordinator and another DRD and other aspects of K!

read his DRDs only when it was and dosimetry.

convenient. General population evacuation route Bus Drivers should be trained to read their dosimeters approximately every fifteen (15) minutes when they are inside the 10-mile EPZ, stopping the bus to do so if necessary.

PATCH.-14 Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not See Patchogue S. A. Item 13.

know dose authorization limits. Train the Traffic Guides so that they know the dose authorization limits.

PATCH.-15 The Route Alerting Driver observed See Patchogue S. A. Item 13.

believed he would receive KI Route Alert Drivers consume authorization in an EBS message. their KI tablet when they This is inconsistent with OPIP 3.3.4, hear a General Emergency declared on the radio.

Attachment 1 Item #9. Route Alert Drivers should be trained to know that KI authorization is to be issued See OPIP 3.3.4, to them by their supervisor as Attachment 1. Step 9.

specified in the LERO Plan.

been modified accordingly.

Page 8 of 11

ITEM # RAC ECOMMENDATION LILCO E SPONSE PATCH-16 Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did See Patchogue S.A. Item 13.

not fully understand that tie chain of command for excess exposure auttorization giws the Lead Traf fic Guide authority to autho rize excess exposure by radio, and some Traf fic Guides indicated that they might question the auttority of the Lead Traffic Guide to issue the authorization for excess exposure. All Traf fic Guides should be trained to know that the Lead Traf fic Guide can authorize exposure in excess of the general population PAGs by radio.

RIV E R-1 While the status board was updated Training material has been pe riodically, the time us not alays modified to ensu re S. A.

included when new information was personnel record tte tire posted. Personnel should be trained that updated irfo rration to record the time that updated is posted on tre status information is posted on the status boa rd .

boa rd.

RIV E R-3 The access road at tie Brookhaven Brookhaven Substation T.P.

Substation Transfer Point was narrow is LILCO property and is and curving and could be impassable in cleared regularly by LILCO inclement weather. Conside ration plows. This facility, should be giwn to relocating the which is at a central and Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point convenient location, was to a different location, not a problem when used durir9 the drill on 1/30/86 imediately followir.g a snow sto rm.

RIVER-4 One (1) of the drivers for the general Trainirg material has been population evacuation bus routes modified to emphasize tte dispatched from the Riverhead Staging importance of reading the ArTa did not read his DRDs ewry DRD and otler aspects of fifteen (15) minutes as stated in KI and dosimetry.

OPIP 3.9.1. Bus Driw rs for the general population bus routes should be 91wn additional training to road their low and mid-range DRDs ewry fifteen (15) minutes.

RIV E R-5 Two (2) of the eight (8) Trsf fic Guides See Riw rhead S. A. Item 4.

did not fully understand the difference between low and mid-range DRDs. Trsf fic Guides should be given additional training in the use of low and mid-range DRDs.

Page 9 of 11

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ITEM # RAC RECOMENDATION LILCO RESPONSE RIVER-6 One (1) Bus Driver simulated the See Riverhead S.A. Item 4.

ingestion of his KI tablet prematurely, prior to being assigned an evacuation route. Bus Drivers should be given additional training in procedures for ingesting KI.

REC. On several occasions, personnel Training has been modified CTR.-1 radiological monitoring took to emphasize that monitoring approximately four (4) to five (5) must be completed within the minutes per individual, which is time specified in the considerably longer than the ninety procedure.

(90) seconds specified in the LERO Procedures. All monitoring personnel assigned to the Reception Center should be trained to monitor individuals within ninety (90) seconds as prescribed in the LERO Procedures.

CONG. Neither of the two (2) congregate The Red Cross has the CARE-1 care facilities activated for the responsibility for February 13, 1986 exercise are maintaining a list of identified in the latest submission congregate care centers.

of the LERO Plan. The Plan should be Since the list is revised revised to include all facilities periodically (as particular intended for use as shelter facilities centers become unavailable during a radiological emergency at SNPS. or as new ones are added),

These facilities should be included in it is not included in the the Ifst attached to LERO's letter of LERO Plan but rather is agreement with the American Red Cross, maintained at Red Cross Headquarters. A new letter from the Red Cross, dated August 21,1986, has been added to Appendix 8. . This letter states that the earlier letter of July 25, 1984 is a statement of Red Cross policy rather than an

" agreement".

t Page 10 of 11

PART II - Revision to Reception Center Planning Basis The LERO Reception Center, previously located at the Nassau Coliseum, has been revised in Revision 8. LERO will now use three LILCO facilities as reception centers. These facilities are located in Bellmore, Hicksville and Roslyn. In addition to just chanping the location of the facilities, LERO has modified the procedure for monitoring incoming evacuees. Incoming vehicles will be directed to monitoring stations where the vehicle and the vehicle driver will be checked for contamination. If contamination, above acceptable limits, is found the vehicle will be directed to another area for detailed monitoring.

If contamination is below limits, the passengers will also be assumed uncontaminated and a clean tag will be issued.

The revised Plan and Procedures pages are:

Plan: Fig. 2.1.1, 2.2-2, 2.2-2a, Fig. 3.3.3, Fig. 3.3.4, Fig. 3.3.5, Fig.

3.3.6, Fig. 3.4.1, 3.6-7, 3.9-5, Table 3.9.1, 4.2-1, Fig. 4.2.1, 4.7-1, 4.8-1 Fig. 5.1.1, Fig. 5.2.1, B-vi App. A: III-36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, IV-4, 73, 74, 74a , 75, 77, 79, 81, 82a ,

84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 96a,101,103,104,107,108a,109, 111, 113, 116, 118, 121, 123, 123a , 124, 129, 131, 133, 135, 138, 140, 142, 144, 147, 149, 152 , 154, 154a , 156, 158, 160, 162 , 164 ,

165a, 166a.

Proc: OPIP 2.1.1 pgs. 3, 4,16a,17, 30, 60, 61, 76, 77, OPIP 3.1.1 pgs. 22, 32, 35, 53, 56 OPIP 3.3.2 pgs. 2, 3, 4 13 OPIP3.3.3pgs.4,6,1E OPIP 3.3.5 pgs.13, 28, 39, 41 OPIP 3.6.1 pg. 2 OPIP 3.6.4 pg. 2 OPIP 3.9.2 pgs. I through 6, 9 through 17, 23, 24, 27a, 49a OPIP 4.2.2 pg. 2a OPIP 4.2.3 pgs. 1 through 29 OPIP 4.3.1 pgs. 2, 6 OPIP 5.1.1 pgs.17,18,19 Appendix B (Not a controlled document, limited distribution)

- Table of Contents

- Support Organizations (Public)

PART III - Revised Radiological Emergency Data Form New York State has developed and issued a new Radiological Emergency Data Form. In order to ensure consistency with state procedures LILC0 has revised their documents accordingly. The revised procedure pages are:

Plan: Fig. 3.3.1 OPIP 3.1.1, Pages 78, 79, 80 7

OPIP 3.3.1,Page OPIP 3.3.5, Pages 40, 8, 9 OPIP 3.5.2, Pages 113,114,115 Page 11 of 11

ATTACHMEtiT 2 SNPS Local Offsite Radiological ,

Emergency Response Plan Insertion Instructions For Revision 8 Plan

1. Replace List of Effective Pages: viii, ix, x, xi
2. Replace pages: Fig. 2.1.1, pgs. 1, 2; 2.2-2; 2.2-2a; Fig. 2.2.1; Fig. 3.3.1, pgs. 1, 2, 3; Fig. 3.3.3, pgs. 1, 2, 3; Fig. 3.3.4, pgs. 1, 2, 4; Fig. 3.3.5; Fig. 3.3.6, pg. 1; Fig. 3.4.1; 3.6-7; 3.9-5
3. Delete and discard page: 3.9-6
4. Replace pages: Table 3.9.1, 4.2-1 i
5. Delete and discard page: 4.2-2
6. Replace page: Fig. 4.2.1
7. Delete and discard page: Fig. 4.2.2
8. Replace pages: 4.7-1; 4.8-1; Fig. 5.1.1, pgs. 1, 2; Fig. 5.2.1, pg. 1; B-vi Procedures
1. Replace List of Effective Pages: 11, iii, iv, v, vii, viii
2. Replace pages: OPIP 2.1.1, pgs. 3, 4
3. Add new page: OPIP 2.1.1, pg. 16a l
4. Replace pages: OPIP 2.1.1, pgs. 17, 30, 60, 61, 76, 77 OPIP 3.1.1, pgs. 22, 32, 35, 53, 56, 78, 79, 80 l OPIP 3.3.1, pgs 7, 8. 9 l OPIP 3.3.2, pgs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 14 OPIP 3.3.3, pgs. 4, 6, 12
OPIP 3.3.5, pgs. 13, 28, 39, 40, 41 l OPIP 3.5.2, pg. 2 i 5. Add new page
OPIP 3.5.2, pg. 2a l 6. Replace pages: OPIP 3.5.2, pgs, 113, 114, 115 OPIP 3.6.1, pg. 2 OPIP 3.6.3, pgs. 2, 18 l

OPIP 3.6.4, pg. 2 OPIP 3.6.5, pgs. 11, 12 OPIP 3.9.2, pgs. 1-6, 9 l

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7. Add new page: OPIP 3.9.2, pg. 9a
8. Replace pages: OPIP 3.9.2, pgs. 10-17, 23, 24
9. Add new page: OPIP 3.9.2, pg. 27a
10. Replace pages: OPIP 3.9.2, pg. 49a OPIP 4.2.2, pg. 2a OPIP 4.2.3, pgs. 1-29
11. Delete and discard page: OPIP 4.2.3, pg. 30
12. Replact pages: OPIP 4.3.1, pgs. 2, 6, 6a OPIP 4.5.1, pgs. 7, 8 OPIP 4.7.1, pgs. 28, 29, 38, 39, 40, 41 OPIP 5.1.1, pgs. 17, 18, 19 APPENDIX A
1. Replace List of Effective Pages: 1,2,3,4
2. Replace pages: 11, iia, iii, III-36, 111-37, 111-38, Fig. 7.2
3. Add new pages: Fig. 7.3, Fig. 7.4
4. Replace pages: IV-4, IV-73, IV-74, IV-74a, IV-75, Fig. 9, IV-79, Fig. 10, IV-82a, Fig. 11, IV-86, Fig. 12, IV-90, Fig. 13, IV-94, IV-95, IV-96, IV-96a, Fig. 14, IV-103, IV-104, Fig. 15, IV-108a, IV-109, Fig. 16, IV-ll3, Fig. 17, IV-ll8, Fig. 18, IV-123
5. Add new page: IV-123a
6. Replace pages: IV-124, Fig. 19, IV-131, Fig. 20, IV-135, Fig. 21, IV-140, Fig. 22, IV-144, Fig. 23, IV-149, Fig. 24, IV-154, IV-154a, Fig. 25, IV-158, Fig. 26, IV-162, Fig. 27, Fig. 27.2
7. Delete and discard pages: IV-165b, IV-165c, IV-165d

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k 8. Replace page: IV-166a i APPENDIX B (Not a Controlled Document, Limited Distribution)

1. Repince Table of Contents: p f, . 1. B-vi
2. F.cplace pages: B-ll, lla, lib, lle, lid
3. Delete and discard: B-12, 12a, 12b, 24, 24a
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