ML24101A316

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Semiannual Status Report on the Licensing Activities and Regulatory Duties of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enclosure
ML24101A316
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/14/2024
From: Christopher Hanson
NRC/Chairman
To: Carper T, Carter B, Duncan J, Fleischmann C, Markey E, Murray P, Rodgers C
US HR (House of Representatives), US SEN (Senate)
Shared Package
ML24101A283 List:
References
200300066, CORR-24-0038, SRM-OGC981013
Download: ML24101A316 (1)
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Text

Protecting People and the Environment

SEMIANNUAL STATUS REPORT ON THE LICENSING ACTIVITIES AND REGULATORY DUTIES OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

October 2023-March 2024

Note: The period of performance covered by this report includes activities that occurred from the first day of October 2023 to the last day of March 2024. The transmittal letter to Congress accompanying this report provides additional information to keep Congress fully informed of the current licensing and regulatory activities of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Enclosure CONTENTS

I. Reactor Oversight Process............................................................................................ 1 II. Implementing Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulations............................... 2 III. Status of Issues Tracked in the Reactor Generic Issues Program.................................. 4 IV. Licensing Actions and Other Licensing Tasks................................................................ 5 V. Status of License Renewal Activities.............................................................................. 6 VI. Summary of Reactor Enforcement Actions.................................................................... 9 VII. Security and Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response Activities................... 14 VIII. Power Uprates............................................................................................................. 16 IX. New Reactor Licensing................................................................................................ 16 X. Planned Rulemaking Activities.....................................................................................25

i I. Reactor Oversight Process

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to assess the performance of operating power reactor licensees and to determine the most effective use of inspection resources. Using inputs from both agency self-assessments and independent evaluations, the NRC adjusts the ROP on an ongoing basis to enhance its effectiveness and efficiency. The NRC staff meets with interested stakeholders periodically to collect feedback on the effectiveness of the process and considers this feedback when making improvements to the ROP.

The agencys most recent performance assessments indicate that all operating power reactor plants continue to operate safely. The NRC staff conducts assessment reviews, communicates changes in licensee performance quarterly, and issues end-of-cycle assessment letters. The NRC issued annual assessment letters to licensees in March 2024. The NRC w ebsite reflects the latest power reactor plant performance assessments.

The ROP is a risk-informed, performance-based oversight program that contains provisions for continuous self-assessment and improvement. The NRC staff revised IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, dated October 31, 2023 (ML23214A284). The revision incorporated qualitative criteria as guidance for inspectors to utilize when developing an assessment of overall licensee performance. The NRC staff continues its process of revising Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process (ML15128A462), dated September 22, 2015, as directed by the Commission in SRM-SECY 0089, Recommendation for Enhancing the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process for the Reactor Oversight Process, dated February 9, 2023 (ML23040A378). This revision will better risk-inform the significance determination process for inspection findings in the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone.

The NRC staff is also currently evaluating IMC 0609, App E, Part l, Baseline Security Significance Determination Process for Power Reactors, dated November 8, 2022 (ML22178A222), to determine whether it can be improved, or further risk-informed. The NRC formed an internal working group in the beginning of the calendar year (CY) 2024 that will evaluate feedback from both internal and external stakeholders to identify options for potential improvements. Those options are expected to be developed and provided to NRC senior managers in third quarter fiscal year (FY) 2024.

One recommendation from the 2019 ROP enhancement effort remains open, which is the staff recommendation to revise the qualitative descriptions of white and yellow safety significance.

The recommendation was sent to the Commission in SECY 0009, Proposed Revisions to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Enforcement Policy, dated January 25, 2024 (ML22318A121), for its consideration. The staffs proposal is to revise the description of white safety and security findings from low-to-moderate safety significance to low safety significance, and yellow will be revised from substantial safety significance to moderate safety significance.

The staff did not recommend any changes to the descriptions of green or red safety significance.

Over the years, licensees have consolidated resources previously supporting site-specific functions into centralized corporate facilities. Some examples include cybersecurity staff and engineering staff. Licensees and t he industry associations have expressed interest in receiving certain inspections, such as Environmental Qualification and Commercial Grade Dedication, where the centralized functions occur rather than at each licensee site to optimize licensee and

inspection resources. The NRC facilitated a public meeting to allow industry to provide input on corporate inspections ( Summary of December 15, 2023, Public Meeting to Discuss Corporate Level Inspections ( ML24004A161)). NRC staff also independently evaluated the possibility of shifting to corporate level inspections. Discussion with industry continued at the March 26, 2024, ROP Bi-Monthly Public Meeting. The NRC staff expect to have another workshop in the second quarter of CY 2024 to further explore centralized inspections.

In SRM-SECY-23- 0010, Recommendation for Approval to Retire the Reactor Oversight Process Performance Indicator for Licensee Alert and Notification System Availability and to Develop a Performance Indicator for Emergency Response Facility and Equipment Readiness Availability, dated September 1, 2023 ( ML23244A282), the Commission approved the staff recommendation to eliminate the alert and notification system (ANS) performance indicator (PI) and to develop a new PI for emergency response facility and equipment readiness. The staff finalized development of the new PI in March 2024 and will pilot its reporting with the six sites not currently reporting the ANS PI with first quarter CY 2024 data and the subsequent quarter.

Full implementation is planned for the fourth quarter CY 2024 PIs, reported in January 2025.

On July 28, 2022, the NRC identified multiple recommendations for NRC management consideration to enhance the ROP and baseline inspection program (ML22172A159). On July 6, 2023, NRC management issued a memorandum dispositioning those recommendations (ML23086C029) and chartered a working group (ML23086C054) to implement the key recommendations. This implementation working group proposed modifications to the operating reactor inspection program IMCs that will properly leverage the use of information technology to accomplish inspection goals while maintaining effectiveness and improving efficiency.

Modifications to the applicable IMCs are either issued or in the process of being finalized for issuance.

II. Implementing Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Regulations

In 1995, the NRC issued the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Policy Statement in the Federal Register (FR) (60 FR 42622; August 16, 1995), which formalized the Commissions commitment to risk-informed regulation through the expanded use of PRA. The use of PRA in regulatory decision-making and licensing activities for U.S. light-water reactors (LWRs) has increased in recent years, and licensees continue to adopt many risk-informed initiatives. PRAs provide licensees with risk insights that allow increased flexibility in plant operations. They also enable both licensees and the NRC to better identify and focus on more safety-significant issues. The NRC staff continues to work with industry to support risk-informed and performance-based initiatives.

The industry has communicated licensees plans to continue to submit applications for adoption of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.69, Risk -informed categorization and treatment of structures, systems and components for nuclear power reactors. This would allow licensees to establish a more risk-informed program for the treatment of structures, systems, and components. Since completion of a pilot in 2014, the licensees have submitted 63 unit amendment applications to adopt 10 CFR 50.69. The NRC staff has reviewed and approved 51 unit amendment applications and is currently reviewing the remaining 12 unit amendment applications.

The industry also continues to communicate licensees plans to submit applications to adopt the Risk-Informed Technical Specifications (RITS) Initiative 4b. This initiative allows licensees to

temporarily extend certain technical specification completion times up to 30 days, based on plant configuration and a real-time risk calculation. This approach maintains and improves safety through the incorporation of risk assessment and management techniques into a plants technical specifications, while reducing unnecessary regulatory burden. To date, the industry has submitted 63 unit amendment applications to adopt RITS Initiative 4b. The NRC staff has reviewed and approved 55 unit amendment applications and is currently reviewing the remaining 8 applications.

The Very Low Safety Significance Issue Resolution (VLSSIR) process, implemented in January 2020, is a framework to review, assess, and disposition issues of very low safety significance that are not clearly within a plants licensing basis. The process is used regularly and resulted in the closure of six potential issues in CY 2022 and four in CY 2023. In August 2022, the VLSSIR process was expanded ( ML22019A175) to include issues of concern that would not be greater than Severity Level IV if the issue was determined to be a violation subject to traditional enforcement. In March 2023, the process was used to disposition an issue of generic applicability regarding inspection of piping under insulation ( ML23046A398). In July 2023, the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) completed a working group effort to implement the VLSSIR process into the materials inspection program. This effort issued a standard definition for VLSSIR and allowed NMSS to maintain consistency with inspection efforts across the agency and enhance the decision-making tools available to inspectors. Prior to the completion on this working group effort, Region II issued an inspection report in August 2022 successfully dispositioning an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) issue, the first such use of VLSSIR for NMSS (ML22213A070), as prior use had been by NRR and the Regions for reactor-related issues.

As part of the VLSSIR initiative, the NRC also developed the Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations (RIPE) to resolve very low safety-significant issues commensurate with their risk significance using existing regulations under 10 CFR Section 50.12, Specific exemptions, or 10 CFR Section 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, and risk information. RIPE guidance was approved for use on January 7, 2021 (ML21006A324). RIPE was expanded on June 30, 2021, to allow licensees with additional approved risk-informed initiatives to use the process (ML21180A011). RIPE was further expanded on May 10, 2022 (ML22088A140), to allow licensees to use the process for license amendment requests involving changes to the technical specifications.

In April 2023, staff received feedback from industry to make adjustments to RIPE to allow more licensees to be able to leverage the process. Staff is finalizing the revised guidance 1 for a risk-informed process for evaluations to incorporate the comments from industry related to the risk thresholds and evaluation criteria allowing more licensees to focus their resources on issues of greater safety significance. In February and March 2024, Harris Nuclear Plant and Palo Verde Generating Station submitted an exemption and a license amendment, respectively, under RIPE, and are going through the acceptance review.

In October 2023, the NRC staff issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.183 Revision 1, Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors, (ML23082A305). Revision 1 incorporated new technical methods, risk insights, and lessons learned since RG 1.183, Revision 0, was originally published and addressed one of the highest priorities listed in the agencys accident tolerant fuel roadmap.

1 TSG-DORL -2021-01, Revision 4, "Risk -Informed Process for Evaluations" and the Safety Impact Characterization Guidance for Implementing the Risk -Informed Process for Evaluations, Rev 3, ML2118A013.

The NRC staff also took steps to review licensing requests for risk-informing the categorization of certain Class 2 and 3 components. In December 2023, the NRC staff authorized the licensees request to use Code Case N-752, Risk -Informed Categorization and Treatment for Repair/Replacement Activities in Class 2 and 3 SystemsSection XI, Division 1, for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and Keowee Hydro Station, Units 1 and 2, for determining the risk-informed categorization and for implementing alternative treatment for repair/replacement activities on moderate and high energy Class 2 and 3 items, in lieu of certain ASME Code Section XI requirements (ML23262A967).

Regarding the use of risk insights in license renewal, the NRC staff has developed the License Renewal Roadmap, as documented in SECY-24- 0026, Achieving Timely Completion of License Renewal Safety and Environmental Reviews (License Renewal Roadmap)

(ML24059A131). It is the staffs goal to complete the reviews within 18 months starting with applications submitted in FY 2026. For the safety review, the staff will implement a 3-phase approach: (1) Phase 1 is comprised of seven process improvement initiatives that leverage best practices from new and advanced reactor reviews that have contributed to timely and cost-effective safety decisions, (2) Phase 2 tailors the level of staffs technical review by incorporating risk insights and leveraging existing operating programs and previous license renewal reviews (Tiered Approach), and (3) Phase 3 involves additional process improvements to optimize audits, safety evaluations (SE), and leverage information technology to improve efficiency. For the environmental review, the staff will implement process improvements to increase efficiency. This includes streamlining the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) development process with hybrid audits and use of requests for confirmatory information, expanding the use of incorporation by reference to eliminate duplicative information across the EIS chapters, and making improvements to administrative processes for draft EIS reviews and comment processing.

The NRC staff has increased use of risk insights in the review of new and advanced reactor applications. Specifically, in preparation of the submittal of the NuScale Standard Design Approval application (SDAA), the NRC staff collected preliminary risk insights in support of a graded review of the NuScale VOYGR 460 standard design. These risk insights were leveraged by NRC staff in its early review of the SDAA by: (1) identifying focus areas for the review, (2) grading the review scope and schedule, and (3) supporting decision-making during the acceptance review of the SDAA. The staff continues to use risk insights to inform its technical reviews of the SDAA and to resolve technical issues identified during the review. This NRC staff initiative is aligned with the implementation of the lessons learned from the previous NuScale Design Certification Application review (ML22294A144). Another example of leveraging risk insights can be seen in the depth and scope of the NRC staffs review of the Kairos Power Hermes construction permit application that was commensurate with the risk and safety significance of the testing facility. The NRC staff considered the size of Hermes and that the review was for a non-power reactor. The review was tailored to the unique and novel Kairos technology based on tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel and molten salt coolant.

III. Status of Issues Tracked in the Reactor Generic Issues Program

There were no generic issues during this reporting period.

Additional detail of the staffs evaluation may be found on the Generic Issues Dashboard:

https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/gen-issues/dashboard.html#genericIssue/

genericIssueDetails/48

IV. Licensing Actions and Other Licensing Tasks

Licensing actions related to operating power reactors include orders, license amendments, exemptions from regulations, relief from inspection or component testing, topical reports submitted on a plant-specific basis, license transfers, and other actions requiring NRC review and approval before licensees can carry out certain activities. Other licensing tasks for operating power reactors include licensees responses to NRC requests for information through generic letters or bulletins, NRC review of generic topical reports, and other licensee actions or reports that do not require NRC review and approval before licensees can carry them out.

Currently there are three performance indicators for operating power reactor licensing actions.

The first is for timely completion of the final SE by the generic milestone date, introduced in FY 2021. In FY 2022, two performance indicators were added; specifically, the percentage of reviews completed within resource estimates and the average percentage of time allotted used in the established schedule. These three performance indicators are applicable to all requested activities of the Commission that involve a final SE as defined by the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (NEIMA) in the Operating Reactor Business Line. In FY 2022, the indicators related to the age of the inventory of licensing actions and the age of the inventory of other licensing tasks were discontinued.

Table 1 shows the actual FY 2021 through FY 202 4 results and the FY 20 24 goals for the above-mentioned Congressional Budget Justification performance indicators.

The agency continues to communicate with licensees about planned licensing submittals. The NRCs senior management remains fully engaged in monitoring the licensing action workload to maintain both the staffs safety focus and target performance goals.

Table 1 Results and FY 2024 Goals for the NRCs Congressional Budget Justification Performance Indicators

Output Measure FY 2021 FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024 FY 2024 Actual Actual Actual Current Goal Age of Inventory 100%

of Licensing 2 year Discontinued Discontinued Discontinued Discontinued Actions Age of Inventory 97%

of Other 2 year Discontinued Discontinued Discontinued Discontinued Licensing Tasks 100% 99% 99% 99% 100%

Timely Completed Completed Completed Completed Completed Completion of by the by the by the by the by the Final SEs generic generic generic generic generic milestone milestone milestone milestone milestone schedule schedule2 schedule3 schedule4 schedule Average Percentage of Time Allotted Not Used in the Applicable 81.75% 98% 92% 115% or 75%

Established Schedule Percentage of Reviews Not Completed Applicable 97.3% 94% 90% >80%

Within Resource Estimates

V. Status of License Renewal Activities

During this reporting period, the NRC staff completed the acceptance review of one license renewal application (LRA) (Diablo Canyon); two subsequent license renewal applications (SLRA) (Browns Ferry and VC Summer) ; completed the safety review of one LR A (Comanche Peak) and one SLRA (Monticello); issued the Draft EISs for three SLRAs (North Anna, Oconee, and Turkey Point). Two additional applications are currently under review.

Commission Direction Related to Subsequent License Renewal (SLR)

On February 24, 2022, the Commission issued three orders (CLI-22-2, CLI-22-3, and CLI 4) addressing SLR proceedings for five operating nuclear plants, affecting a total of 11 reactor

2 In FY 2022, one final SE was not issued within the NRCs established generic milestone schedule due to a delay in the applicants response to NRCs request for additional information.

3 In FY 2023, two final SEs were not issued within the NRCs established generic milestone schedule. The first required additional time to bring closure to all safety aspects of the review, which included a supplement to the operating license application for a phased approach to startup operations. The second required additional time to address technical issues identified during an operational event at the plant.

4 One review exceeded the generic milestone schedule; the delay was due to the licensees action and beyond the staffs control. All appropriate notifications for the delay (i.e., Commission/Congress) of the safety evaluation were completed on-time.

units. Specifically, the Commission concluded that NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Revision 1 (LR GEIS), which the agency relies on in part to meet its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), did not consider SLR, and the staffs environmental review of five SLR applications were therefore incomplete. The Commission noted that SLR applicants could wait for the agency to finish efforts to update the LR GEIS to address SLR or perform their own site-specific environmental analyses. The impacted applications include those for the following units:

  • Turkey Point Units 3 and 4
  • Oconee Units 1, 2, and 3
  • Point Beach Units 1 and 2
  • North Anna Units 1 and 2
  • Peach Bottom Units 2 and 3

Also on February 24, 2022, the Commission issued a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) for SECY-21- 0066 that directed the NRC staff to develop a rulemaking plan to update the 2013 LR GEIS and Table B-1 in Appendix B to Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51 to fully account for one term of SLR that aligns with the Commission orders regarding the NEPA analysis for SLR applications. Following the approval of the rulemaking plan, the staff submitted the proposed rule package (SECY-22- 0109) to the Commission on December 6, 2022. The Commission approved the publication of the proposed rule (SRM-SECY-22- 0109) on January 23, 2023, directing the staff to modify the proposed rule and the LR GEIS to explicitly state that the scope of the LR GEIS is limited to initial license renewal and one term of SLR.

The proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on March 3, 2023 (88 FR 13329), with a 60- day comment period that ended on May 2, 2023. The draft revised LR GEIS and associated draft guidance was also available for comment in parallel with the proposed rule.

Specifically, the NRC was seeking comment on whether the proposed rule should be expanded beyond two license renewal terms-the initial license renewal and one term of SLR.

The NRC staff held six public meetings to provide an overview of and receive comments on the proposed rule and draft revised LR GEIS. These public meetings were held near NRC Headquarters and near each of the NRCs Regional Offices during the period of March 16 to April 6, 2023. In addition, the NRC staff held an informational meeting with federally recognized Tribes on April 19, 2023, to provide Tribal representatives an opportunity to discuss the rule with the NRC staff and ask questions. Approximately 220 people attended the meetings, either in-person or virtually. During the public comment period, the NRC received a total of 1,889 comment submissions on the proposed rule, draft revised LR GEIS, and/or guidance.

On February 21, 2024, the draft final rule package was submitted to the Commission (SECY-24- 0017) for its consideration. Th is draft final rule evaluates the environmental impacts from initial license renewal and one term of SLR. The Commission is holding an affirmation session on the final rule on May 16, 2024.

Applications with Milestones Completed During this Reporting Period

Browns Ferry (SLR)

On January 19, 2024, Tennessee Valley Authority submitted its SLR application for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3 (ML24019A010). On March 15, 2024, the staff issued the

formal acceptance review letter for the application (ML24068A177). The application is currently under review with an established 21-month review schedule.

Comanche Peak (LR)

On October 3, 2022, Luminant submitted an LR application for Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (ML22276A082). On November 23, 2022, the staff issued the formal acceptance letter for the application (ML22297A007). The staff issued the SE in March 2024 (ML24068A075). The application is currently under review with an established 22-month review schedule.

Diablo Canyon (LR)

On November 7, 2023, Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted its LR application for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 (ML23311A154). On December 19, 2023, the staff issued the formal acceptance letter for the application (ML23341A004). The application is currently under review with an established 20- month review schedule.

Monticello (SLR)

On January 9, 2023, Xcel Energy submitted an SLR application for Monticello, Unit 1 (ML23009A352). On February 23, 2023, the staff issued the formal acceptance letter for the application (ML23047A175). The licensee submitted a site-specific environmental report on January 9, 2023 ( ML23009A352). The application was accepted, and a 22-month review schedule letter issued on February 23, 2023 (ML23047A175). A notice of intent to prepare a draft EIS and to start the scoping period was published on March 10, 2023 (88 FR 15103). The staff issued the SE in March 2024 (ML24077A001) and the d raft EIS in April 2024 (ML24102A276), and the NRC its licensing decision in December 2024.

North Anna (SLR)

On August 24, 2020, Virginia Electric and Power Company submitted an SLR application for North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (ML20246G703). On October 13, 2020, the staff issued the formal acceptance letter for the application (ML20258A284). On January 4, 2022, the final SE report was issued (ML21354A174). A draft supplemental EIS was issued in August 2021 ( ML21228A084).

On September 29, 2022, Dominion submitted a site-specific environmental report. A notice of intent to prepare a draft EIS supplement and start the 30-day limited scoping period was published on November 15, 2022. The limited scoping period was completed on December 15, 2022. The draft EIS was made public on December 20, 2023. The comment period for the draft EIS was conducted from January 5 - February 22, 2024. A hearing request on the draft EIS has been submitted. The Final EIS is expected to be issued in July 2024.

Oconee (SLR)

On June 7, 2021, Duke Energy submitted an SLR application for Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 (ML21158A193). On July 22, 2021, the staff issued the formal acceptance letter for the application (ML21194A231). On December 19, 2022, the final SE report was issued (ML22349A145). Duke Energy submitted a plant-specific environmental report. The draft site-

specific EIS was issued on February 8, 2024 (ML24033A298). The current schedule is to issue the SLR in October 2024.

Turkey Point (Site-specific environmental report for issued SLR license)

Turkey Points subsequent renewed licenses were issued prior to the Commission orders in 2022. One of the orders was specific to Turkey Point (CLI-22-02). Those orders left the subsequent renewed licenses in place but directed staff to: 1) change the expiration dates back to the dates prior to those licenses being issued, i.e., 60-year expiration instead of 80, and 2) complete the environmental review by conducting a new plant-specific EIS or by waiting for the updated GEIS and then subsequently referencing the GEIS. With the subsequent renewed licenses remaining valid, the findings in the staffs SE also remain valid, as well as any safety or environmental improvements that the licensee, Florida Power and Light (FPL), may have put in place to comply with the subsequent renewed licenses. By letter dated June 9, 2022 (ML22160A301), Florida Power & Light Company submitted an Environmental Report, Supplement 2, related to its 2018 application (ML18037A812) for SLR of Renewed Facility Operating Licenses for the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 3 and 4. The staff issued the Final EIS ( ML24087A061) on March 29, 2024. Even though the EIS has been issued, those revised dates will remain in effect until the NRC signs a Record of Decision and subsequently modifies the licenses, which can only occur once the contested hearing process is complete.

VC Summer (SLR)

On August 17, 2023, Dominion Energy South Carolina submitted its SLR application for VC Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (ML23233A175). On October 11, 2023, the staff issued the formal acceptance letter for the application (ML23275A014). The application is currently under review with an established 22-month review schedule.

VI. Summary of Reactor Enforcement Actions

The reactor enforcement statistics in the tables below are arranged by region, half FY, FY, and two previous FYs for comparison purposes. These tables provide the non-escalated and escalated reactor enforcement data including traditional enforcement and the ROP. The severity level assigned to a violation (i.e., traditional enforcement) generally reflects the significance of a violation. However, for most violations at power reactors, the significance is assessed using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) under the ROP, which uses risk insights, as appropriate, to assist the NRC in determining the safety or security significance of inspection findings.

Brief descriptions of the escalated reactor enforcement actions associated with traditional enforcement and the ROP (as well as any other significant actions) taken during the applicable fiscal half year follow the tables.

Table 2 Non-escalated Reactor Enforcement Actions*

NON-ESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL Cited 1st Half FY 24 1 0 0 3 4 Severity Level IV or 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Green FY 24 YTD 1 0 0 3 4 Total FY 23Total 1 4 0 6 11 FY 22 Total 0 8 0 2 10 1st Half FY 24 52 62 53 53 220 Non-cited 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Severity FY 24 Total 52 62 53 53 220 Level IV or Green FY 23 Total 79 115 99 118 411 FY 22 Total 80 81 69 108 338 TOTAL 1st Half FY 24 53 62 53 56 224 Cited and 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Non-cited FY 24 Total 53 62 53 56 224 Severity Level IV or FY 23 Total 80 119 99 124 422 Green FY 22 Total 80 89 69 110 348

  • The non-escalated enforcement data reflect the cited and non-cited violations either categorized at S everity Level IV (the lowest level) or associated with Green findings during the indicated time periods. The numbers of cited violations are based on Enforcement Action Tracking System data that may be subject to minor changes following verification. These data do not include Green findings that do not have associated violations.

Table 3 Escalated Reactor Enforcement Actions Associated with Traditional Enforcement*

ESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH TRADITIONAL ENFORCEMENT Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL 1st Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Severity FY 24 Total 0 0 0 0 0 Level I FY 23Total 0 0 0 0 0 FY 22Total 0 0 0 0 0 1st Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Severity FY 24 Total 0 0 0 0 0 Level II FY 23 Total 0 0 0 0 0 FY 22 Total 0 0 0 0 0 1st Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Severity FY 24 Total 0 0 0 0 0 Level III FY 23 Total 0 2 0 0 2 FY 22 Total 0 1 0 1 2 TOTAL 1st Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Violations 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Cited at FY 24 Total 0 0 0 0 0 Severity Level I, II, FY 23 Total 0 2 0 0 2 or III FY 22 Total 0 1 0 1 2

  • The escalated enforcement data reflect the Severity Level I, II, or III violations or problems cited during the indicated time periods.

Table 4 Escalated Reactor Enforcement Actions Associated with the Reactor Oversight Process*

ESCALATED REACTOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS Region I Region II Region III Region IV TOTAL

1st Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0

Violations 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Related to Red FY 24 Total 0 0 0 0 0 Findings FY 23Total 0 0 0 0 0

FY 22Total 0 0 0 0 0

1st Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0

Violations 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Related to Yellow FY 24 Total 0 0 0 0 0 Findings FY 23 Total 0 0 0 0 0 FY 22 Total 0 0 0 0 0

1st Half FY 24 1 2 0 1 4

Violations 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Related to White FY 24 Total 1 2 0 1 4 Findings FY 23 Total 2 3 1 4 10

FY 22 Total 0 2 1 1 4

1st Half FY 24 1 3 0 1 5 TOTAL*

Related to 2nd Half FY 24 0 0 0 0 0 Red, Yellow, or FY 24 Total 1 3 0 1 5 White FY 23 Total 2 6 1 4 13 Findings FY 22 Total 0 2 1 1 4

  • The escalated enforcement data reflect the violations or problems cited during the indicated time periods that were associated with either R ed, Yellow, or White findings. This data does not include Red, Yellow, or White findings that do not have associated violations. The total will include escalated security violations (i.e., greater-than-Green) but are designated official use only - security related information (OUO-SRI) and not disclosed to the public.

Reactor Escalated Enforcement Actions and Other Significant Actions

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station

On December 21, 2023, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white SDP finding to Dominion Energy at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. The white finding, an issue of low-to-moderate safety significance, involved the licensees failure to identify and correct the failure mechanism resulting in cracked piping/fittings in the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil lines, a condition adverse to quality, and a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective action. This eventually led to the failure of the A EDG fuel oil piping during testing on November 2, 2022.

Columbia Generating Station

On November 1, 2023, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white significance determination process finding to Energy Northwest (licensee) at the Columbia Generating Station. The white finding, an issue of low-to-moderate safety significance, involved the licensees failure to take suitable and timely measurements to adequately assess the internal dose of two pipefitters after a reactor water cleanup contamination event. This failure resulted in a violation of 10 CFR 20.1204 "Determination of internal exposure."

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

On October 26, 2023, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white significance determination process finding to Constellation Energy Generation at Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant. The white finding, an issue of low-to-moderate safety significance, involved the licensees failure to establish and implement appropriate procedures and instructions for performing maintenance on the safety-related 1A EDG as required by the licensee technical specification.

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant

On October 19, 2023, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white significance determination process finding to Southern Nuclear Operating Company (licensee) at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. The white finding, an issue of low-to-moderate safety significance, involved the licensees failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the inadequate installation of a lube oil coupling assembly that resulted in the inoperability of the Unit 1 B train EDG. This failure resulted in a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective action. With the 1B EDG inoperable, the licensee also failed to meet the technical specification.

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

On December 21, 2023, a notice of violation associated with a greater-than-green finding was issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. The details of the finding are Official Use Only - Security-Related Information, and thus not discussed in this report.

VII. Security and Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response Activities

The NRC continues to maintain an appropriate regulatory infrastructure that provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety, promotes the common defense and security while implementing risk-informed strategies and improves the realism of NRC licensing and oversight activities. The NRCs security, emergency preparedness (EP), and incident response programs contribute to these goals.

Physical Security

The current NRC security framework is robust and contains performance-based and prescriptive requirements. In addition, two proposed rules were sent to the Commission - SECY-22- 0072, Proposed rule: Alternative Physical Security Requirements for Advanced Reactors (RIN 3150-AK19) (ML 21334A004) and SECY-23- 0021, Proposed Rule: Risk-Informed, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Framework for Advanced Reactors (RIN 3150-AK31) (ML21162A095) -

on August 2, 2022, and March 1, 2023, respectively. In these proposed rules, both voluntary and graded approaches are included to address a comprehensive range of security areas such as physical and cybersecurity, fitness for duty, and access authorization. Demonstrated through a consequence analysis, the graded approaches may offer applicants increased flexibility in the design of their physical security programs such that they could implement certain security alternatives or would not need to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as commensurate with the risk profiles of the facilities.

The NRC remains focused on the mission of protecting public health and safety and has applied risk insights and the use of technology to perform security oversight activities. During 2023, the staff continued to implement its normal security inspection activities. The NRCs security oversight continued to inspect for any vulnerabilities or deficiencies in site protective strategies and programs and to take prompt action, as necessary. In addition, kinetic assessment methods, such as force-on-force (FOF) inspections, continued to provide performance-based insights regarding licensee readiness to defend their sites.

The NRC continued to conduct FOF inspections at each nuclear power reactor and Category I fuel cycle facility on a regular 3-year cycle. Each FOF inspection includes both tabletop drills and exercises that simulate combat between a mock adversary force and the licensees security force. These inspections assess the ability of power reactor and Category I fuel cycle facility licensees to defend against the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage. For Category I fuel cycle facilities, the NRC uses FOF inspections to evaluate the effectiveness of licensees protective strategies against an additional DBT of theft or diversion of special nuclear material. FOF inspections, along with the other inspections that comprise the NRCs security baseline inspection program, provide valuable insights that enable the NRC to evaluate the effectiveness of licensees security programs.

Cybersecurity

Under 10 CFR 73.54, Protection of digital computer and communication systems and networks, the NRC requires nuclear power plant licensees and new license applicants to provide high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks are adequately protected against cyberattacks. These licensees must implement a cybersecurity program to ensure that safety, security, and EP functions are protected from cyberattacks. In conjunction, the NRC has developed an oversight program for power reactor cybersecurity that

includes an inspection program, inspector training, and a process for evaluating the significance of inspection findings.

In 2021, the agency completed the cybersecurity programs full implementation inspections of all operating nuclear power plant licensees. The inspections verified that the facilities had fully implemented their cybersecurity requirements. In December 2023, the staff completed the first biennial inspection cycle of licensees cybersecurity programs as part of the ROP using IP 71130.10, Cybersecurity ( ML21271A106). The staff completed 55 cybersecurity inspections during the biennial inspection cycle of 2022-2023.

In February 2024, the staff conducted a public meeting to discuss lessons learned and insights gained from the first biennial inspection cycle. Staff intend to apply the lessons learned in future efforts to improve cybersecurity inspection efficiency.

Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response

The final rule, Emergency Preparedness for Small Modular Reactors and O ther New Technologies, (88 FR 80050; Nov. 16, 2023) was effective on December 18, 2023, and the associated guidance, Regulatory Guide 1.242, Performance-based Emergency Preparedness for Small Modular Reactors, Non-light-water Reactors, and Non-power Production or Utilization Facilities, was issued November 2023 ( ML23226A036). The NRC staff is assessing the need to develop additional regulatory guidance for staff to ensure an efficient and effective review of EP applications.

On December 22, 2023, the NRC staff issued exemptions from specific requirements of 10 CFR § 50.47, Emergency plans, and Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities, to 10 CFR Part 50, for the Palisades Nuclear Plant. The NRC staff notified the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in a letter dated January 9, 2024 (ML23139A171), that it was no longer required to monitor, review, or report on off-site radiological EP activities at the Palisades site in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between FEMA and the NRC, dated December 7, 2015 (ML15344A371).

The staff continues to ensure the incident response program and facilities are ready to respond through the conduct of exercises, with NRC licensed facilities and with international partners, enhancements to procedures, and coordination with Federal partners.

VIII. Power Uprates

Since the 1970s, licensees have applied for and implemented power uprates to increase the output of their plants. The NRC staff has reviewed and approved 172 power uprates to date.

Existing plants have gained approximately 24, 089 megawatts thermal or 8,030 megawatts in electric generating capacity (the equivalent of about 8 large nuclear power plant units) through power uprates. At this time, the NRC has no power uprate applications under review. Although there is general interest for future applications, the NRC has not received proposed schedules for submittal.

In this reporting period, the staff released LIC-112, Revision 2, Power Uprate Process (ML19254A627), initially developed in 2019, to the public, consistent with the NRCs Principles of Good Regulation, and for coordination of future reviews. The staff continues to engage with industry to understand specific plans for applications to align resources, while leveraging historical data to drive additional efficiencies in the review process. On March 15, 2024, the staff received a letter from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) (ML24078A221) providing recommendations for regulatory improvements to power uprates licensing activities. The NRC has formed an experienced team to look at the power uprate review process and incorporate efficiencies and any potential risk insights. The staff will consider NEIs recommendations and continue public and industry engagement as part of their review.

IX. New Reactor Licensing

The NRCs new reactor program is: (1) focusing on licensing and construction oversight activities for large LWRs, small modular LWRs, and non-LWRs and (2) continuing to develop the specific regulatory framework and infrastructure for advanced reactors (non-LWRs). In addition, the NRC is actively engaged in several new and existing international cooperative initiatives to improve the international collaboration efforts associated with safety reviews of new reactor designs, and to share construction experience.

Standard Design Approval Reviews

NuScale Power, LLC, Small Modular Reactor Standard Design Approval Application

By letter dated December 31, 2022, NuScale submitted a S DAA for its US460 small modular reactor design under 10 CFR Part 52, Subpart E, Standard Design Approvals (ML22339A066).

The proposed 77 MWe nuclear power module US460 design is capable of producing more power than the certified 50 MWe NuScale design and features additional design changes. On March 17, 2023, NRC staff issued a letter (ML23058A160) to NuScale explaining the results of its acceptance review. In the letter, the staff identified technical sufficiency issues related to the phenomenon of density wave oscillation that required supplemental information. NuScale provided supplemental information to address the technical sufficiency issues by letters dated July 14, 2023 (ML23195A092) and July 17, 2023 ( ML23198A244). By letter dated July 31, 2023 (ML23198A163), the NRC informed NuScale that its SDAA, as supplemented, was acceptable for docketing. In its July 31, 2023, letter, the NRC also provided a four phase, 24-month review schedule and committed to provide resource estimates within 60 days of the issuance of the letter. Accordingly, the staff completed its evaluation of the resource needs and communicated these to NuS cale in a letter dated September 22, 2023 (ML23254A192).

Combined License Application Reviews

Carbon Free Power Project Combined License Application Review

Carbon Free Power Project (CFPP) LLC, a subsidiary of Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS) and responsible for developing the nuclear energy sector of the UAMPS energy production portfolio, had planned to submit a 2-part combined license application (COLA) to the NRC for approval to build and operate a 6-module US460 NuScale small modular reactor plant in Idaho National Laboratory, near Idaho Falls, Idaho. CFPP submitted an application for a limited work authorization (LWA), on July 25, 2023 ( ML23212A008), and had planned to submit the COLA in January 2024. The NRC staff accepted CFPPs LWA application on September 5, 2023, for docketing and a detailed review (ML23236A263).

On November 10, 2023, CFPP and NuScale Power jointly submitted a request to NRC to withdraw the LWA Application, Topical Reports, and Exemption Request associated with the CFPP COLA (ML23317A110), following the November 8, 2023, announcement by UAMPS and NuScale Power on the termination of the CFPP.

Vogtle Units 3 and 4

Construction of Vogtle Units 3 and 4 is complete and all inspection activities for both units are being conducted under the ROP. Vogtle Units 3 and 4 are currently in the Licensee Response Column of the ROP action matrix. As of July 31, 2023, Vogtle Unit 3 has been operating commercially. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) projects Vogtle Unit 4 commercial operations to start during the second quarter of calendar year 2024.

On January 16, 2024, the NRC issued a public summary report on lessons learned from construction under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants ( ML23325A202). The summary report identifies best practices, suggestions, and recommendations that can be applied to construction of new facilities, including advanced reactors. On February 14, 2024, the staff held an information meeting with a question and answer session to present this lessons-learned report to the public.

On December 18, 2023, the NRC staff issued a report summarizing lessons learned from the hearing process associated with closure of the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) in the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 combined licenses (ML23352A124). This report was developed after consideration of public input provided in an October 24, 2023, comment gathering meeting that the staff held to allow external stakeholders to provide their perspectives on lessons learned from the ITAAC hearing process. After considering external views and the NRCs experience, the NRC staff concluded that the NRC executed the Vogtle ITAAC hearing process in accordance with the Commission-established procedures for that process and that the limited ITAAC hearing experience for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 did not warrant a change to these procedures.

By memorandum dated December 22, 2023 (ML23317A204), the Vogtle Project Office (VPO) and the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing (DORL) developed a plan to dissolve VPO and transition project management responsibilities of Vogtle Units 3 and 4 from VPO to DORL Plant Licensing Branch LPL2-1 by December 31, 2023.

During the reporting period, the NRC staff completed the following actions related to licensing activities at Vogtle Units 3 and 4:

  • Granted a license amendment request (LAR) to revise technical specifications (TS) to adopt changes described in the NRC-approved licensing topical report WCAP-17661-P-A, Revision 1, Improved Relaxed Axial Offset Control (RAOC) and Constant Axial Offset Control (CAOC) Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (FQ) Surveillance Technical Specifications ( ML23138A085)
  • Granted a LAR to relocate TS 3.7.9, Spent Fuel Pool Makeup Water Sources, to the Vogtle Technical Requirements Manual as Updated Final Analysis Report Standard Content (ML23268A057)
  • Granted a LAR to impose a more restrictive action for TS 3.1.9, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Demineralized Water Isolation Valves and Makeup Line Isolation Valves. ( ML23289A163)
  • Granted a LAR to extend the completion time of a required action in TS 3.8.3, Inverters

- Operating, from 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to 14 days (ML23243A956)

  • Issued an evaluation of the Final Integrated Plan to address the requirements of Order EA-12- 049 now codified in 10 CFR 50.155, Mitigation of beyond-design-basis events.

(ML23335A137)

  • Granted a LAR that removes Appendix C (ITAAC) from the Vogtle Unit 3 Combined License (ML23279A004).

Vendor Inspections

The NRC staff uses the Vendor Inspection Program to confirm that reactor applicants and licensees are fulfilling their regulatory obligations to oversee the supply chain. The NRC staff conducts inspections to verify the implementation of vendor quality assurance (QA) programs to ensure the quality of materials, equipment, and services supplied to the commercial nuclear industry. These inspections ensure that vendors maintain an effective system for reporting defects under 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of defects and noncompliance; and verify the use of commercial-grade dedication programs for safety-related materials, equipment, and services.

Other activities conducted by t he NRC staff include ensuring that counterfeit items are removed and prevented from use in safety-related applications, participation in international cooperation efforts, and the development of industry consensus standards. Focus areas for operating reactors include replacement components, commercial-grade dedication, safeguards information protection, software QA, digital instrumentation and control systems upgrades, and fuel fabrication. The NRC staff has also included review of existing commercial nuclear suppliers who have been contracted in support of design approvals related to new and advanced reactor designs.

For FY 2023, the NRC completed 22 vendor inspections, exceeding the goal of completing at least 20 inspections. So far, for FY 2024, the NRC staff have completed several of the 20 planned vendor inspections.

Nuclear Procurement Issues Corporation (NUPIC) is a licensee-operated organization that serves as an entity that performs joint utility audits of nuclear facility suppliers. The NRC staff observes NUPIC-led audits up to three times a year to verify the effectiveness of the NUPIC-led audit. The typical NUPIC-led audit scope is to determine the overall acceptability and verify the effective implementation of a vendors QA and 10 CFR Part 21 programs. While observing the NUPIC-led audit, the NRC staff samples and reviews audit checklist evaluation areas, observes NUPICs review of the implementation of the vendors QA program, and evaluates the adequacy of NUPICs process for documenting audit findings in the associated trip report. As necessary, the NRC staff provides feedback to NUPIC on the a udits observed.

On October 19, 2022, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) completed an investigation to determine whether a former Director of Advanced Services and a former non-destructive t esting (NDT) Engineer employed by Mistras Services (Mistras) falsified calibration records for equipment used at nuclear power plants. Mistras engages in direct contracts with NRC licensees to perform testing of heavy lifting equipment at nuclear power plants. The NRC staff worked with the Department of Justice to prosecute and negotiate plea agreements with the former Director of Advanced Services and the former NDT Engineer who received bans from working in the nuclear industry for 5 years and 2 years, respectively. As a result of the fraudulent activities at Mistras, on December 7, 2023, the NRC staff issued an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50.5(a)(2) to Mistras for submitting to NRC licensees fraudulent calibration certificates for acoustics emission test equipment used to perform NDT at numerous NRC licensed nuclear power reactors (ML23340A106). The NRC staff and Mistras entered the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process and successfully reached alignment on an agreement in principle and the required actions that will be memorialized in a confirmatory order to Mistras.

On September 7, 2023, the NRC staff published revision 6 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.28, Quality Assurance Program Criteria (Design and Construction), (ML23177A002). The new revision endorses Part I & II requirements in NQA-1-2017, NQA-1-2019, and NQA-1-2022 with certain clarifications and regulatory positions.

The NRC staff will be host ing its ninth biennial Regulatory Workshop on Oversight on June 12, 2024. The purpose of this meeting is to allow the NRC staff to engage in an open dialogue with external stakeholders to discuss any current issues of importance to the nuclear industry.

Topics covered during the meeting will include: an update and follow-up activities associated with the DecaBDE issue, Part 21 reporting requirements, establishing sample sizes in commercial-grade dedication and other issues identified during NRC inspections. There will also be two dedicated question and answer sessions.

In September 2023, the NRC staff hosted visiting regulators from the Polish National Atomic Energy Agency (PAA) interested in understanding the QA and vendor inspection work performed by the NRC. The NRC staff prepared a series of training sessions focused on areas of regulatory oversight including: 10 CFR Part 21, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, conduct of vendor and QA implementation inspections, commercial-grade dedication, comparison of Appendix B to ISO-9001, Quality Management Systems - Requirements, and training and qualification activities for vendor inspectors and QA staff. The NRC and PAA staff also participated in an inspection at a vendors facility in September 2023.

Operator Licensing

The NRC staff continued to prepare for operator licensing activities involving advanced reactors as part of developing the proposed rule to establish a voluntary risk-informed, performance-based, and technology-inclusive regulatory framework for commercial nuclear plants, known as Part 53 (ML24064A047). The proposed regulations provide an integrated, performance-based, and technology-inclusive regulatory framework that includes the areas of staffing, personnel qualifications, training programs, operator licensing examinations, and human factors. Notably, this framework introduces new flexibilities such as provisions for automatic load following, online refueling, customized licensed operator staffing, a modernization of the traditional Shift Technical Advisor position, allowance for facilities to administer their own operator licensing examinations, and the ability for facilities to develop operator license examinations of appropriate scope and format based on their unique design and operational considerations.

The NRC staff also continued parallel work to make improvements to the operator licensing process at facilities that pursue licensing under 10 CFR Parts 50 and 52. The NRC staff have prepared a lessons-learned rulemaking that would improve the usability of operator licensing requirements in 10 CFR Part 55 for new Part 50 and 52 reactors during construction.

Additionally, the NRC staff incorporated public comments into Advanced Reactor Content of Application Project (ARCAP) guidance on organization and human-system considerations to support the NRC staffs reviews of non-LWR facility applicants under 10 CFR Part 50 and 52.

The NRC staff continue information sharing with stakeholders on a wide range of operator licensing and human factors topics via public meetings, conference presentations, and the recent hosting of a workshop on the subject of the remote operation of nuclear power plants.

Non-Light-Water Reactors

The NRC staff continues to make significant progress execut ing its vision and strategy for advanced reactor readiness and meeting the requirements in Section 103 of NEIMA. Additional information on the status of advanced reactor readiness and activities is available on the NRCs public website at https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/advanced.html.

During the reporting period, the NRC staff continued to hold periodic public meetings on numerous advanced reactor topics and extensive stakeholder engagement on various initiatives related to establishing a technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based regulatory framework, including hosting public meetings on micro-reactor licensing, developing a PRA to support a construction permit application, and issuing draft Technology-Inclusive Content of Application Project and ARCAP guidance documents.

Other recent accomplishments include:

  • The NRC staff submitted SECY 0008, Micro -Reactor Licensing and Deployment Considerations: Fuel Loading and Operational Testing at a Factory, (ML23207A252 ) to the Commission for its consideration on January 24, 2024, that outlined potential approaches for licensing and regulation of fuel loading and operational testing at a factory for factory-fabricated micro-reactors.
  • The NRC staff met with the full Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) committee on draft RG (DG-1404) for potential endorsement of industry led NEI 21-07, Technology Inclusive Guidance for Non-Light-Water Reactors, and nine NRC -led ARCAP interim staff guidance documents.
  • In February 2024, the NRC staff issued interim staff guidance (DANU-ISG-2023-01) on material compatibility for N on-Light Water Reactors (ML23188A178).
  • In February 2024, the NRC staff published RG 4.7, Revision 4, General Site Suitability Criteria for Nuclear Power Stations (89 FR 14743) which included alternative approaches to the population-density criterion and expanded the regulatory guidance for advanced reactors.
  • The NRC staff submitted SECY 0020, Advanced Reactor Program Status, on February 27, 2024, to update the Commission on activities to license and regulate advanced reactor technology (ML23350A002).
  • In March 2024, the Commission approved, in part, the proposed rule amending the regulations to establish a voluntary risk-informed, performance-based, and technology-inclusive regulatory framework for commercial nuclear plants, known as Part 53 (ML24064A047).
  • In March 2024, the NRC staff issued RG 1.253, Guidance for a Technology-Inclusive Content-of-Application Methodology to Inform the Licensing Basis and Content of Applications for Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Non-Light-Water Reactors, (ML23269A222) and the nine ARCAP interim staff guidance documents (ML24073A229).

Regarding non-LWR licensing activities, the NRC staff continues to implement flexible and staged non-LWR regulatory review processes and pre-application engagement. The staff completed its review of the construction permit application submitted in October 2021 for the

Kairos Hermes test reactor in Oak Ridge, TN, which is intended to support the development of its fluoride salt-cooled, high-temperature reactor technology (ML21272A375 and ML21306A131). The staff completed its safety review of the Hermes application and issued its final SE on June 13, 2023 (ML23158A265). The Final EIS for the application was issued on August 17, 2023 (ML23214A269). A mandatory hearing on the application was conducted on October 19, 2023, and the construction permit was issued to Kairos on December 14, 2023 (ML23338A258).

On July 14, 2023, Kairos submitted a second construction permit application for a two-unit test reactor facility (Hermes 2) that would be located on the same site as the proposed Hermes test reactor (Hermes 1) (ML23195A121 ). The Hermes 2 test reactors would use the same fluoride salt-cooled, high-temperature reactor technology as the Hermes 1 reactor but would incorporate some additional features such as intermediate salt loops and a shared turbine generator set.

The NRC staff accepted the Hermes 2 construction permit application for review on September 11, 2023 (ML23233A167). The NRC staff estimates that the safety and environmental reviews of the application will be completed by November 2024 (ML23269A176).

The staff is reviewing a construction permit application from Abilene Christian University (ACU) for a molten salt, non-power research reactor (MSRR) (ML22227A201) that was submitted in August 2022. The NRC staff is currently conducting a detailed technical review of the safety of the MSRR design, which will lead to an SE. The staff issued the environmental assessment (EA) and finding of no significant impact (FONSI) on March 14, 2024 (89 FR 18678). The NRC staff originally committed to issuing the final SE by May 2024 and the EA by April 2024 (ML22341A615). On December 21, 2023, the NRC staff notified ACU that additional information would be needed for the staff to complete its review of the MSRR application ( ML23348A196).

As discussed in the letter, once ACU provides the requested information on the identified topics, the NRC staff will provide an update to the schedule and level of effort communicated in its December 16, 2022, letter.

On March 28, 2024, TerraPower, LLC (TerraPower) submitted a construction permit application for Kemmerer Power Station Unit 1 for construction of a Natrium sodium fast reactor near Kemmerer, Wyoming (ML24088A059). This project is supported by the DOEs Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program. The NRC staffs acceptance review of the application is ongoing.

The NRC staff is reviewing pre -application reports and meeting regularly with vendors on potential future applications, including: X-energy on its pebble-bed, high-temperature gas-cooled reactor; Kairos Power on its TRISO particle fuel, fluoride-cooled high-temperature commercial power reactor; Terrestrial Energy on its molten salt coolant, molten salt fuel reactor; TerraPower on its sodium-cooled fast reactor; Westinghouse Electric Company on its high temperature heat pipe micro-reactor; General Atomics on its high-temperature gas-cooled reactor; the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign on its power-generating TRISO fuel research reactor; and Oklo on its liquid-metal-cooled fast reactor.

With respect to advanced reactor fuel fabrication, in September 2022, the NRC staff received the completed application to construct and operate a TRISO fuel fabrication facility from TRISO X, which is a subsidiary of X-energy, LLC (ML22101A200 and ML22266A269). The application was docketed for formal review on November 4, 2022 (ML22320A110). TRISO-X submitted the Electrical and Instrumentation and Control portion of the application on February 29, 2024 (ML24060A239). TRISO-X also notified the NRC staff of its plans to update the license application with a modified facility design to be submitted in December 2024, as stated in letter

dated January 20, 2024 (ML24020A010). The timing and scope of these supplements may impact the review schedule.

In October 2021, Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas (GNF-A) expressed intent (ML21292A180) to submit a LAR to permit h igh-assay low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication. In March 2023, GNF-A requested and received approval of an exemption (ML23039A151) to submit the license amendment application supporting the development of Natrium fuel in two parts: the supplemental environmental report followed by the safety and safeguards portion. The exemption allowed GNF-A one year from the submittal of the supplemental environmental report to submit the safety and safeguards portion. GNF-A submitted the supplemental environmental report on March 6, 2023 (ML23065A072). On July 11, 2023, GNF-A informed the NRC of concerns with the near-term availability of HALEU and asked for a 24-month delay in the review of the supplemental environmental report (until early 2025). GNF-A also indicated that the safety and safeguards portion would be delayed to the third quarter of 2025. With the exemption set to expire on March 6, 2024, GNF-A verbally informed the NRC of the intent to withdraw the supplemental environmental report on March 6, 2024, and followed-up by letter documenting the withdrawal request on March 8, 2024 (ML24068A130). GNF-A plans to submit a complete application by the end of 2025.

Regulatory Infrastructure

The NRC continues to enhance its regulatory infrastructure to meet its goals of improving the planning, licensing, and oversight of future new reactor applications; making timely and effective policy decisions; and updating regulatory guidance for large LWRs, small modular reactors, and non-LWRs. The NRC also continues to review its internal processes to ensure that the safety and environmental reviews are effective and efficient. As part of the NRCs commitment to openness, the staff continues to provide opportunities for external stakeholder input as part of the agencys processes. The agency also rigorously assesses licensing and oversight performance and uses the results to inform these regulatory infrastructure activities.

The previous section discussed infrastructure activities that are largely for non-LWRs. The sections below describe other infrastructure activities conducted during the reporting period.

Environmental Reviews for Advanced Nuclear Reactors

The NRC staff developed a draft GEIS and proposed rulemaking for the environmental review process for the construction and operation of advanced nuclear reactors as described in SECY-20- 0020, Results of Exploratory Process for Developing a Generic Environmental Impact Statement for the Construction and Operation of Advanced Nuclear Reactors (ML20052D029).

This GEIS would use a technology-neutral regulatory framework and performance-based assumptions to determine generic environmental impacts for new commercial advanced nuclear reactors. On September 21, 2020, in SRM -SECY-20- 0020 (ML20265A112), the Commission directed the staff to initiate rulemaking for the GEIS. The staff provided this draft GEIS and proposed rule to the Commission on November 29, 2021 (ML21222A044), for its consideration 5.

Additional information about this rulemaking is available at: https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/rulemaking-ruleforum/active/ruledetails.html?id=1139.

5 In an April 17, 2024, staff requirements memorandum, the Commission approved a proposed rule for a GEIS applicable to new nuclear reactor applications (ML24108A199). Details will be provided in future reports.

Alignment of Licensing Processes and Lessons Learned from New Reactor Licensing

The NRC staff is working on a rulemaking to address the alignment of licensing requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities, and 10 CFR Part 52.

The Commission directed the staff to pursue rulemaking to incorporate lessons learned from recent new power reactor licensing reviews. This rulemaking would help ensure consistency in new reactor licensing reviews, regardless of whether an applicant chooses to use the Part 50 or Part 52 licensing process.

On June 6, 2022, the NRC staff submitted the draft proposed rule (ML21159A055) to the Commission for its consideration. In the draft FR notice for the proposed rule, the NRC staff responded to the public comment submissions on the regulatory basis, which were considered in the formulation of the draft proposed rule. The staff is awaiting Commission direction to proceed with finalizing the proposed rule.

Standard Review Plan Modernization

The NRC staff continued its effort to modernize NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition.6 The objective of the Standard Review Plan (SRP) modernization effort is to help the staff focus its review on the regulatory requirements and associated acceptance criteria that determine whether there is reasonable assurance of adequate protection. In addition, the updated SRP will leverage the improved use of risk insights to inform the staffs reviews. During this reporting period, the NRC staff focused on developing the framework that provides for risk-informing and modernizing SRP sections through the routine update process.

Environmental Guidance Updates

The NRC staff noticed the issuance of Revision 3 of RG 4.2, Preparation of Environmental Reports for Nuclear Power Stations, in the Federal Register on September 24, 2018 (83 FR 48346, ML18071A400). This was the first update to RG 4.2 since July 1976. The staff is currently updating NUREG -1555, Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power Plants: Environmental Standard Review Plan, last revised in July 2007.7 The update will reflect changes in reactor technology and NRC policy and regulations and will incorporate streamlined processes based on experience gained through completed environmental reviews. The update will also reflect statutory requirements, applicable Executive Orders, judicial developments, and agency administrative decisions and will consider, as appropriate and in coordination with a potential NRC rulemaking, any new environmental regulations issued by the Council on Environmental Quality. Further, as directed by the Commission on April 23, 2021, in SRM-M210218B (ML21113A070), the staff conducted a systematic review of how the agency's programs, policies, and activities address environmental justice. On March 29, 2022, the staff submitted the results (ML22031A063) of its review and recommendations to the Commission for its consideration.

As discussed in Section V, on April 5, 2022, the Commission issued SRM-SECY-22- 0024 (ML22096A035), which directed the staff to complete a rulemaking in 24 months for updating

6 The SRP for safety reviews is available online at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc -

collections/nuregs/staff/sr0800/index.html.

7 The SRP for environmental reviews is available online at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc -

collections/nuregs/staff/sr1555/updates.html.

the generic EIS and implementing regulations on renewing nuclear power plants operating licenses environmental reviews to account for SLR applications. On March 3, 2023, the NRC issued the proposed rule and draft GEIS for license renewal of nuclear power plants for a 60-day public comment period (88 FR 13329) (ML18071A400). On February 21, 2024, the draft final rule package was submitted to the Commission (SECY 0017, Final Rule - Renewing Nuclear Power Plant Operating Licenses - Environmental Review, (ML23202A179)). The Commission is currently reviewing the final rule. In the interim, the Commission recognizes that some SLR applicants may not want to await the completion of the rulemaking effort and would instead prefer to do a completely site-specific environmental review. For those applicants, the NRC continues to conduct environmental reviews in accordance with current NRC regulations, while still considering best practices and lessons learned from past reviews.

X. Planned Rulemaking Activities

The attached report lists the status of NRC rulemaking activities as of March 31, 2024, including their priorities and schedules. Of the 68 rulemaking activities, 64 rulemakings are planned activities. The NRC is also reviewing four petitions for rulemaking. The 64 planned rulemaking activities include 13 proposals in response to industry requests, 15 that could reduce or clarify existing requirements, 10 that are required by statute or are needed to conform NRC regulations to other agency requirements or to international treaties or agreements, and 26 that could establish new requirements. The NRC uses a single tracking and reporting system to provide real-time updates on all NRC rulemaking activities. Members of the public can access the NRCs rulemaking activity information at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/rules-petitions.html.

At the time of publication, each proposed and final rule includes a statement that addresses actions taken to meet applicable backfitting and issue finality requirements, including which, if any, backfitting and issue finality requirements apply and how the NRC staff evaluated the rule with respect to those requirements.

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