IR 05000341/2021001
| ML21124A128 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi |
| Issue date: | 05/04/2021 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
| To: | Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company |
| References | |
| IR 2021001 | |
| Download: ML21124A128 (18) | |
Text
May 4, 2021
SUBJECT:
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2021001
Dear Mr. Dietrich:
On March 31, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Fermi 2. On April 27, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or the significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000341
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2021-001-0035
Licensee:
DTE Electric Company
Facility:
Fermi 2
Location:
Newport, MI
Inspection Dates:
January 01, 2021 to March 31, 2021
Inspectors:
T. Briley, Senior Resident Inspector
T. Taylor, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Improper Storage of Nitrogen Bottles in the Reactor Building Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/2021001-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," for the improper storage of material in the reactor building. Specifically, on multiple occasions the inspectors discovered carts of compressed gas cylinders near safety-related equipment that were not restrained in accordance with plant procedures. Examples included missing chocks, inappropriate standoff distance, storage of equipment not in accordance with existing engineering analyses, and exceeding restraint weight limits.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000341/2020-002-00 LER 2020-002-00 for Fermi 2, Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators During Partial Loss of Offsite Power.
71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On March 5, 2021, the unit was down powered to 62 percent rated thermal power for planned maintenance and control rod pattern adjustment. The unit was returned to rated thermal power the following day. The unit remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week; conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status; observed risk-significant activities; and completed on-site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on-site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) while Division 1 RHR and RHR service water was out of service for maintenance during the week ending January 16, 2021
- (2) Division 1 control complex heating ventilation and air conditioning (CCHVAC) while Division 2 CCHVAC was out of service for maintenance during the week ending January 30, 2021
- (3) Division 1 emergency diesel generators (EDG) 13 and 14 while Division 1 mechanical draft cooling tower was out of service for maintenance during the week ending February 13, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Radwaste building, second floor and mezzanine, balance of plant switchgear room on January 22, 2021
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
(1)
(Partial)
P4400B001A heat exchanger on Division 1 emergency equipment cooling water (EECW)
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during power maneuvers for a planned down power on March 5, 2021
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a licensed operator requalification graded scenario in the control room simulator on March 10, 2021
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
(1)
(Partial)
Spent fuel pool level instrumentation
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Emergent work and preparations for alternate diesel fire pump installation due to diesel fire pump blow-by test failure, fire water suppression system jockey pump pressure regulator repair, and combustion turbine generator (CTG) 11-1 ground indication troubleshooting during the week ending January 30, 2021
- (2) Emergent work on EDG 12 fuel rack abnormal position, visual annunciator system power supply low voltage, and planned high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system maintenance during the week ending February 20, 2021
- (3) Planned maintenance on CTG system (CTGs 11-1, 11-2, 11-3, and 11-4 out of service) and emergent work on west gland seal exhauster following abnormal operation during the week ending March 6, 2021
- (4) Condensate storage tank vortex suppressor installation during the week ending March 27, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Operability and functionality of Division 1 64B and 64C 4160-volt safety bus degraded voltage relays following identification of a design calculation error, as documented in condition assessment resolution document (CARD) 21-20658
- (2) Operability and functionality of the diesel fire pump following failed blow-by test, as documented in CARD 21-20687
- (3) Operability and functionality of hydraulic control units and Division 2 safety-related instrumentation due to improper storage of nitrogen bottle carts, as documented in CARDs 21-21373 and 21-21805
- (4) Operability and functionality of CTG 11-1 following low lubricating oil temperature, as documented in CARD 21-22139
- (5) Operability and functionality of Division 1 EECW due to temperature control valve controller abnormal operation and trip of Division 1 CCHVAC, as documented in CARD 21-21951
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Main steam line 'A' and 'C' low reactor steam dome pressure setpoint change (permanent)
- (2) Installation of alternate diesel fire pump (temporary)
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Division 1 non-interruptible air system testing following air dryer relay replacement during the week ending January 16, 2021
- (2) Agastat time-delay relay calibration prior to replacement in HPCI valve control circuit during the week ending January 9, 2021
- (3) Division 2 CCHVAC testing following system maintenance during the week ending January 30, 2021
- (4) Division 1 EECW make-up water tank outlet isolation motor operated valve testing and diagnostics following preventative maintenance during the week ending March 27, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Division 1 nuclear steam supply shutoff system (NSSSS) reactor low water level 1 and 2 channel functional testing during the week ending January 16, 2021
- (2) Review of change in surveillance frequency for procedure 44.030.254, "ECCS-Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2, and 8), Division 2, Channel D Functional Test" during the week ending March 27, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) Standby liquid control pump and valve testing during the week ending January 16, 2021
- (2) Reactor core isolation cooling system pump and valve testing during the week ending February 6, 2021
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Emergency preparedness tabletop drill on February 4,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.01)===
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2 (January 1, 2020 - December 31, 2020)
===71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 2020-002, "Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators During Partial Loss of Offsite Power" (ADAMS Accession No. ML20244A365). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of NRC requirements.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Improper Storage of Nitrogen Bottles in the Reactor Building Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000341/2021001-01 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) with an associated NCV of TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," for the improper storage of material in the reactor building.
Specifically, on multiple occasions the inspectors discovered carts of compressed gas cylinders near safety-related equipment that were not restrained in accordance with plant procedures. Examples included missing chocks, inappropriate standoff distance, storage of equipment not in accordance with existing engineering analyses, and exceeding restraint weight limits.
Description:
On February 12, 2021, the inspectors identified a cart containing 12 nitrogen gas bottles that was not restrained in accordance with plant procedures to reasonably ensure it would not adversely impact nearby safety-related equipment during a seismic event. During operation, the nitrogen is used to periodically recharge the hydraulic control units (HCUs), which helps position or scram the control rods and contain safety-related components. The cart was stored adjacent to an opening leading down to one of the reactor building corner rooms.
Several safety-related instruments associated with the RHR system and reactor recirculation system were directly below this opening. This cart was at a location that was not one of two engineering-approved locations for the storage of nitrogen carts. In addition, it was not restrained in accordance with procedure MOP23, "Plant Storage," Revision 6. Specifically, the cart did not have a required wheel chock and was tied off to a handrail that the procedure stated was acceptable for up to 400 pounds when the cart weight was 2,600 pounds. The inspectors notified the licensee, who then moved the cart away from the floor opening.
In the following days, the inspectors identified additional nitrogen carts improperly stored adjacent to the HCUs. The carts were missing the required number of chocks and staged too close to the HCUs given their width and height per the requirements contained in MOP23.
One of the extra nitrogen carts was subsequently moved and attached to a concrete wall nearby pending removal from the building. However, a few days later the inspectors identified that the cart was missing one of the required restraints for that temporarily approved storage location. The licensee subsequently discovered that one of the two normal staging locations for the HCUs had been previously moved without engineering approval as required by MOP23.
Corrective Actions: The permanently approved location that had been moved was analyzed by the licensee for the new location and found to be acceptable. All nitrogen carts located outside of the permanently approved locations were removed from the reactor building. The licensee also performed several walkdowns of the reactor building to eliminate any remaining storage concerns with other equipment. Additionally, the licensee initiated a common-cause analysis to further review the issue.
Corrective Action References: CARDs 21-21805, 21-21373, and 21-22200
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to properly restrain nitrogen carts stored in the reactor building was contrary to licensee procedure MOP23, "Plant Storage," Revision 6, and was a performance deficiency. Examples included missing chocks, inappropriate standoff distance, storage of equipment not in accordance with existing engineering analyses, and exceeding restraint weight limits.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to properly restrain nitrogen carts stored in the reactor building led to reasonable doubt regarding the operability of nearby safety-related components.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) based on answering 'no' to all the questions in Section A of Exhibit 2. Specifically, the licensee performed engineering evaluations and reasonably determined the operability/functionality of equipment would be maintained under worst-case seismic conditions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee made assumptions regarding the acceptability of the storage of nitrogen carts in the reactor building. Further, the licensee did not recognize and plan for the possibility of additional storage issues as evidenced by the additional issues identified by the inspectors after their initial notification of the issue to the licensee.
Enforcement:
Violation: TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented. and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.
Contrary to the above, since at least February 12 to February 26, 2021, the licensee failed to implement a procedure recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Specifically, Section 9 of Regulatory Guide 1.33 states, in part, that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. The licensee established procedure MOP23, "Plant Storage," Revision 6, to implement storage and staging requirements of equipment during, in part, maintenance activities that could affect the performance of safety-related equipment. However, the licensee did not implement MOP23 when preplanning and performing maintenance activities involving compressed gas cylinders as evidenced by the following examples:
- The procedure required carts in the reactor building to be chocked and imposed spacing requirements between the carts and safety-related components based on cart dimensions. However, multiple compressed gas cylinder carts in the reactor building were not chocked and staged too close to safety-related components given their dimensions.
- A compressed gas cylinder cart was tied off to a handrail that MOP23 stated was acceptable for up to 400 pounds. However, the cart weight was 2,600 pounds.
- Procedure MOP23 required the storage of compressed gas cylinders in the reactor building to be approved by engineering. However, a compressed gas cylinder cart was stored at a location that had not received prior engineering approval for that purpose.
- Compressed gas cylinders temporarily used in the reactor building were required by MOP23 to be tightly mounted to structures with at least two restraints. However, a temporarily secured compressed gas cylinder cart in the reactor building was mounted to a structure with only one restraint.
The start date of the violation was unknown because information was not available to reasonably determine or estimate when the licensee first stored the compressed gas cylinder carts in the reactor building as described above. The inspectors identified the violation on February 12, 2021, and the licensee restored compliance on February 26, 2021.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 27, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. P. Dietrich, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
Emergency Diesel Generator System Functional Operating
Sketch
BL
M-2847
Control Center Air Conditioning Air Side Reactor Building
Z
M-4325
Water Side and MISC Chiller Inst Control Center A/C
System
AG
Drawings
A-2033
Radwaste Building 2nd Floor Plan El 613'-6" & 2nd Floor
Mezz El 628'6"
Fire Plans
Radwaste Building Zones 22, 23, 24, and 25
Procedures
MOP11
Fire Protection
71111.11Q Miscellaneous
Power Profile
March 5, 2021 Downpower
SS-OP-904-2101
Evaluation Scenario
Procedures
2.000.03
Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%
106
23.107
Reactor Feedwater and Condensate Systems
154
23.108
Extraction Steam and Heater Drains
23.109
Turbine Operating Procedure
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-22263
NRC Identified - Concern with the Ability to Evaluate
Emergency Action Level for Lowering Spent Fuel Pool Level
03/11/2021
Engineering
Changes
EDP 37088
Install Spent Fuel Pool Level Instrumentation to Comply with
NRC Order EA-12-051 Guidance
Corrective Action
Documents
21-20649
Fire Header Pressure Low After Replacing P80-F407 Fire
Header Jockey Pump Discharge Backpressure Regulator
01/22/2021
21-20687
Diesel Fire Pump P8000C001 Failed Blow-By Test
01/25/2021
21-20761
Received Main Control Room Alarm 11D64 CTG 11
Transformer Trouble
01/27/2021
21-21476
Fuel Rack at Max Fuel on EDG 12 with Machine Shutdown
2/16/2021
21-21496
MTG Accidental Energization Relay Tripped
2/16/2021
21-21497
Received 4D65 Generator Protective Relaying Operated
2/16/2021
21-21498
While Performing 4D65 Initiating Device IPCS Point for
Reverse Power is Incorrect
2/16/2021
21-21537
Received 5D28
2/17/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
21-21542
Low Alarm Power Found on VAS Paddleboard 7RD-6
2/17/2021
21-21850
Temporary Loss of Brest Bay Feed to Tag Line
2/28/2021
Drawings
One Line Diagram 13.8KV
BE
Engineering
Changes
80127
ECCS Pump CST Vortex Suppression Device
C
Miscellaneous
210301
T-1 Schedule Evaluation (03/01/2021 03/07/2021)
CTG-11-1
Clearance: R1100-000574
03/01/2021
Transformer - 11
Clearance: R1200-000129
03/01/2021
Troubleshooting
Plan
Referencing CARD 21-21497
2/17/2021
Procedures
11D64
CTG 11 Transformer Trouble
23.106
Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System
118
MWC15
Elevated Risk Management
Work Orders
53877347
DCP-80127 Install a Vortex Suppressor on the CST Core
Spray / SBFW Standpipes P1100
03/23/2021
Calculations
DC-6447
Auxiliary Power System Analysis [PROPRIETARY]
F
Calibration
Records
Division 1 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water
Temperature Control
07/24/2016
Corrective Action
Documents
10-22622
CTG 11-1 Lube Oil Tank Temperature Low Alarm
03/26/2010
19-24615
Diesel Fire Pump Engine SWI [Severe Wear Index] > Action
Level B
06/18/2019
20-21494
High SWI on Diesel Fire Pump Engine
2/11/2020
20-25557
NQA - RF20 - Work Order Review of Blow-By Test and Oil
Change of Diesel Fire Pump
05/05/2020
20-30097
Diesel Fire Pump Engine (Spare) High Blow-By Cause
09/10/2020
20-30292
Lessons Learned from Prompt Investigation into Diesel Fire
Pump Engine High Blow-By
09/16/2020
21-20328
DFP Engine SWI High
01/11/2021
21-20658
Unsupported Conclusions for Degraded Voltage Relay
Performance During LOCA Transient DC-6447
01/22/2021
21-20687
Diesel Fire Pump P8000C001 Failed Blow-By Test
01/25/2021
21-21951
Division 1 CCHVAC Chiller Trip
03/02/2021
21-21952
Valve Inoperable
03/03/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
21-21995
Spare HPCI and RCIC Flow Controllers are Obsolete with
Zero in Inventory
03/04/2021
21-22138
CTG 11-1 Unit Trouble on Low Lube Oil Temperature
03/08/2021
21-22139
CTG 11-1 Unit Trouble on Low Lube Oil Sump Temperature
03/09/2021
21-22169
Toolboxes on RB-3 not Stored Properly
03/09/2021
21-22170
Temporary Power Carts Staged on RB-1 Should be
Removed if not Needed
03/09/2021
21-22200
Potential Trend Identified in Storage of Items in the Plant
That do not Meet Requirements of MOP23
03/10/2021
21-22416
ACMP Recommendations not Fully Followed for DFP SWI
03/17/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-21373
Nitrogen Cart not Stored IAW MOP23 in RB
2/12/2021
21-21805
NRC Concern Nitrogen 12 Pack not Stored IAW MOP23
Requirements
2/25/2021
21-22128
NRC Identified: Various Housekeeping/Plant Storage Issues
Identified on RB-1, RB-B, RBSB SW Areas
03/08/2021
Miscellaneous
ACMP 19-007
Diesel Fire Pump Engine
B
ACMP 21-003
Diesel Fire Pump - Engine
Procedures
23.324.01
Operation of CTG 11-1 From CTG11 Peaker Yard
24.207.08
Division 1 EECW Pump and Valve Operability Test
83A
MMA08
MOP23
Plant Storage
Work Orders
46574671
Calibrate CTG 11-1 Instruments, Pressure and Temperature
Switches
03/07/2019
54305120
Perform Blow-By Test to Determine Engine Health
07/17/2019
60510990
Replace P44K800A
03/18/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
2-24521
05/16/2012
19-26921
Alternate DFP, Failed Loss of Offsite Power Test
03/13/2019
21-21167
Alternate Diesel Fire Pump Flow Concern
2/07/2021
Engineering
Changes
37580
Change to Main Steam Line Isolation Low-Pressure Isolation
Setpoint, Analytical Limit, the Allowable Value, and Nominal
Trip Setpoint Revision in Support of Tech Spec and Safety
Limit Change
DCP IP-ENG-001
Alternate Diesel Fire Pump
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
- 21-0001
Fire Plans
FPEE-21-0002
Evaluation of TM-21-0001 - Temporary Diesel Fire Pump
Procedures
ARP 7D2
Diesel Fire Pump Trouble
Work Orders
59086275
Implement EDP-37580 for B21N676A
2/01/2021
59086430
Implement EDP 37580 for B21N676C
2/01/2021
60088154
Installation WO for TM-21-0001 Alternate Diesel Fire Pump
2/05/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-21949
P4400F602A Stem Nut Lock Nut Found Loose During
Periodic Thrust Test
03/02/2021
Drawings
I-2221-05
HPCI SYS-Pump Discharge Isolation Valves
I-2451-13
NIAS Division 1 Dryer P5002D012 Controls
N
I-2611-34
Main Control Room Multi-Zone Unit Electric Heaters
Division 2
O
Miscellaneous
MCAR G-1
Final Report for Limitorque Motor Operator Valve Stem Lock
Nut Staking Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1
and 2
05/15/1980
Procedures
35.318.007
Time-Delay Relays
Work Orders
53086927
Perform MOV Thrust testing (P4400F602A)
03/01/2021
54714285
Replace Agastat Relay in P50P402A, Division 1 NIAS Dryer
Control Cabinet
01/07/2021
56873119
Replace Agastat Relay R3200S016-057 (PM G240)
01/07/2021
58802759
Replace the M Contactor and CR1 Relay for MCC 72F-5A
Pos 2B-R
01/28/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-20242
LPIV #3 Card A12 and A14 Slot Location Need Modification
for Installation
01/08/2021
21-20546
44.030.254 Approaching Critical Date and not Scheduled
01/20/2021
21-20547
44.030.252 Approaching Critical Date
01/20/2021
Drawings
M-2082
Standby Liquid Control System
Miscellaneous
ODMI 20-007
Spurious NSSSS Channel D Isolation Signal
TE-B21-20-062
Risk Evaluation for Frequency Extension of ATWS-
RPT/ECCS RPV Level and Pressure Surveillances
Vendor Manual
VMR1-50
Analog Trip Unit
C
Procedures
24.206.01
RCIC System Pump and Valve Operability Test
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
44.030.254
ECCS - Reactor Vessel Water Level (Levels 1, 2, and 8),
Division 2, Channel D Functional Test
Work Orders
54698574
Perform 24.139.02 SLC Pump and Check Valve Operability
Test
01/08/2021
54714301
Perform 44.020.003 NS4 Rx Low Water Level 1 & 2
Division 1, Channel Functional Test
01/11/2021
282654
Install Test Jacks and Jumpers to Support NSSSS
Surveillance
01/11/2021
Miscellaneous
ERO Tabletop Session
2/04/2021
Procedures
Classification of Emergencies
43A
71151
Miscellaneous
Licensing Performance Indicator Safety System Functional
Failure (SSFF) IRIS Data Entry, Verification, and Approval
01/08/2021
Industry Reporting Information System Performance
Indicator Summary Report
01/21/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
20-27545
Loss of 345kV Due to Mayfly Infestation
07/02/2020
Procedures
27.322
Mayfly Infestation Preparation Plan
0