Text

Request for NRC Approval to Apply Leak-Before-Break Methodology to Reactor Coolant System Branch Piping
	ML20296A623
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	10/22/2020
From:	Mark D. Sartain; Dominion Energy Virginia, Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML20296A622	List: ML20296A623;
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	20-091
	Download: ML20296A623 (156)
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PROPRIETARY INFORMATION -WITHHOLD UNDER 10 CFR 2.390 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY RICHMOND, VIRGINIA 23261 October 22, 2020 10 CFR 50.90 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 Serial No.:

NRA/GDM:

Docket Nos.:

License Nos.:

REQUEST FOR NRC APPROVAL TO APPLY LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK METHODOLOGY TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BRANCH PIPING 20-091 R1 50-280 50-281 DPR-32 DPR-37 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion Energy Virginia) requests an amendment to the Surry Power Station (Surry) Units 1 and 2 operating licenses. NRG approval is requested to permit the application of the leak-before-break (LBB) methodology to auxiliary piping systems attached to the Reactor Coolant System {RCS) for Surry Units 1 and 2 to eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures.

This license amendment request (LAR) applies LBB methodology to demonstrate the risk of pipe rupture is extremely low for portions of the following auxiliary lines attached to the Reactor Coolant Loops (RCLs ):

Pressurizer Surge Line piping Residual Heat Removal piping Safety Injection Accumulator piping RCS Loop Bypass piping, and Safety Injection piping The LAR is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, "Environmental and dynamic effects design bases," following the guidance of NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Section 3.6.3, "Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures." As noted in GDC 4, dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures in nuclear power units may be excluded from the design basis when analyses reviewed and approved by the Commission demonstrate the probability of fluid system piping rupture is extremely low under conditions consistent with the design basis for the piping. A discussion of the proposed change is provided in Attachment 1. contains information that is being withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390. Upon separation from Attachment 2, this letter is decontrolled.

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 Application of LBB Methodology to RCS Branch Lines Page 2 of 4 The supporting technical basis for applying LBB methodology to the RCS branch piping is contained in WCAP-18491-P/NP, Revision 0, "Technical Justification for Eliminating Auxiliary Piping Rupture as the Structural Design Basis for Surry Units 1 and 2, Using Leak-Before-Break Methodology, December 2019," Attachments 2 (proprietary) and 3 (non-proprietary), respectively.

Dominion Energy Virginia has evaluated the proposed amendment and has determined it does not involve a significant hazards consideration as defined in 10 CFR 50.92. The basis for this determination is included in Attachment 1. We have also determined operation with the proposed change will not result in a significant increase in the amount of effluents that may be released offsite or a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Therefore, the proposed amendment is eligible for categorical exclusion from an environmental assessment as set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment is needed in connection with the approval of the proposed change.

The LAR has been reviewed and approved by the Facility Safety Review Committee. contains information proprietary to Westinghouse Electric Company LLC

("Westinghouse"). The information is supported by Westinghouse document CAW 4984, which includes the Affidavit, Proprietary Information Notice, and Copyright Notice.

The Affidavit is signed by Westinghouse, the owner of the information. The Affidavit sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("Commission") and addresses with specificity the considerations listed in paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations.

Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the information which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR Section 2.390 of the Commission's regulations. Correspondence with respect to the copyright or proprietary aspects of the items listed above or the supporting Westinghouse Affidavit should reference CAW-19-4984 and should be addressed to Camille T. Zozula, Manager, Infrastructure & Facilities Licensing, Westinghouse Electric Company, 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Suite 165, Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066. CAW-19-4984 is provided in Attachment 4.

No changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) are required by this LAR. Following NRG approval, the Surry UFSAR will be revised to reflect the application of LBB methodology to the RCS branch lines listed above.

Dominion Energy Virginia requests approval of the proposed change by October 31, 2021.

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 Application of LBB Methodology to RCS Branch Lines Page 3 of 4 If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Gary D.

Miller at (804) 273-2771.

Re~&,(_

Mark D. Sartain Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Fleet Support Commitment made in this letter:

1. Following NRC approval, the Surry UFSAR will be revised to reflect the application of LBB methodology to the RCS branch lines.

COMMONWEAL TH OF VIRGINIA COUNTY OF HENRICO The foregoing document was acknowledged before me, in and for the County and Commonwealth aforesaid, today by Mr. Mark D. Sartain, who is Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Fleet Support, of Virginia Electric and Power Company. He has affirmed before me that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing document in behalf of that company, and that the statements in the document are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Acknowledged before me this '22/J'f:> day of 0c:ft7/3R..

, 2020.

My Commission Expires: _J:l.~,,_/3_1 1

,_/ z_o ___ _

Attachments:

RAIG D Notary Pub Commonwealth o Reg.# 7518 My Co

1. Discussion of Change

2. WCAP-18491-P, Revision 0, Technical Justification for Eliminating Auxilia'ry Piping Rupture as the Structural Design Basis for Surry Units 1 and 2, Using Leak-Before-Break Methodology, December 2019" [Proprietary]

3. WCAP-18491-NP, Revision 0, "Technical Justification for Eliminating Auxiliary Piping Rupture as the Structural Design Basis for Surry Units 1 and 2, Using Leak-Before-Break Methodology, December 2019" [Non-proprietary]

4. Westinghouse Document CAW-19-4984 including Affidavit, Proprietary Information Notice, and Copyright Notice

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 Application of LBB Methodology to RCS Branch Lines Page 4 of 4 cc:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Surry Power Station Mr. Vaughn Thomas NRC Project Manager-Surry U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 04 F-12 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 Mr. G. Edward Miller NRC Senior Project Manager - North Anna U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mail Stop 09 E-3 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 State Health Commissioner Virginia Department of Health James Madison Building - 7th floor 109 Governor Street Suite 730 Richmond, VA 23219 DISCUSSION OF CHANGE Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion Energy Virginia)

Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281

DISCUSSION OF CHANGE TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION 2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 System Design and Operation Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 2.2 Current Technical Specifications Requirements 2.3 Reason for Proposed Change 2.4 Description of Proposed Change

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 4.2 No Significant Hazards Consideration

4.3 Precedents

4.4 Conclusion

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 CONCLUSION

7.0 REFERENCES

DISCUSSION OF CHANGE 1.0

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion Energy Virginia) requests an amendment to the Surry Power Station (Surry) Units 1 and 2 operating licenses. NRG approval is requested for application of the leak-before-break (LBS) methodology to auxiliary piping systems attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) for Surry Units 1 and 2 to eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures.

This license amendment request (LAR) is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, "Environmental and dynamic effects design bases," following the guidance of NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Section 3.6.3, "Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures." The LAR applies LBS methodology to demonstrate the risk of pipe rupture is extremely low for portions of auxiliary lines attached to the Reactor Coolant Loops (RC Ls).

No changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) are required by this LAR.

2.0 DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1 System Design and Operation Surry Units 1 and 2 are 3-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactors. As described in Surry Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Sections 4.2.4, 15.6.2, 15A.3.3, 15A.6, and 18.3.5.3, LBS analyses have demonstrated the probability of rupture of the primary RCL piping is extremely small, and it is no longer necessary to consider the dynamic effects of such an accident. This LAR requests an expansion of the application of LBS to include specific portions of piping systems attached to the RCS (see Figure 1 ). The auxiliary lines attached to the RCLs included in the scope of this request include:

The pressurizer surge line attached to the hot leg RCL piping, The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) lines attached to the hot leg RCL piping (RHR suction) and to the Accumulator injection line piping (RHR return),

The Safety Injection (SI) accumulator injection lines attached to the cold leg RCL

piping, The RCS loop bypass lines attached to the hot and cold leg RCL piping, and The SI lines attached to the hot and cold leg RCL piping.

Pressurizer Surge Line - Pressurizer pressure is transmitted to the remainder of the RCS via the surge line that connects the bottom of the pressurizer with the RCS piping near Page1of16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 the outlet of the reactor vessel. The pressurizer surge line connects the bottom of the pressurizer to the hot leg of RCL C.

Residual Heat Removal Lines - The RHR system is a low-pressure, low-temperature fluid system that is not used during power operation. The system is designed to operate at pressures less than 450 psig and at temperatures less than 350°F.

The system is operated during plant cooldown after RCS pressure and temperature are within RHR system limitations. The primary purpose of the RHR system is to remove decay heat energy generated in the reactor core during plant cooldown and refueling operations.

During normal operation of the RHR system, the suction flow of the RHR system is from the RCL A hot leg and the discharge flow is to RCLs B and C via the SI accumulator injection lines.

SI Accumulator Injection Lines -An accumulator filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen is connected to each RCS cold leg. When RCS pressure drops below the nitrogen pressure setpoint, the accumulators discharge their borated water into the RCS.

This action provides rapid refilling of the lower core plenum in the event of a large break in the RCS.

RCS Loop Bypass Lines - Each RCL is equipped with a bypass-relief line that connects the loop sides of the loop isolation valves. The line is equipped with an isolation valve that is used to secure flow in the bypass line during normal loop operation. When opened, the bypass line allows operation of an RCP in an isolated loop by routing RCP discharge through the bypass line to the loop side of the RCS hot leg isolation valve.

High Head and Low Head SI Lines - The SI system is designed to provide emergency core cooling following a loss of coolant accident for any break in the RCS piping, up to and including the equivalent of a double-ended break in the largest RCS pipe. The SI system is also designed to provide core cooling following the rupture of a control rod drive mechanism housing causing rod ejection, a Main Steam line break, or a steam generator tube rupture. The SI system has three High Head SI (HHSI) pumps, which serve as charging pumps during normal operation, and two Low Head SI (LHSI) pumps. During the injection mode, the HHSI pumps deliver borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) into the cold legs of the RCS. The HHSI pumps maintain RCS pressure in the event of a small break in the RCS. The LHSI pumps also take suction from the RWST and deliver large quantities of borated water to the cold legs of the RCS when RCS pressure drops below the LHSI pump shutoff head. During recirculation mode, recirculation flow is initially provided to the cold legs of the RCS and is then alternated to provide either hot leg or cold leg recirculation flow.

The SI, SI accumulator, and RHR lines described above include piping segments that are isolated from the RCS during normal operation.

The scope of the LAR for these systems/components is limited to the piping segments from the RCS loop to the first RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV).

Page 2 of 16

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2.2 Current Technical Specifications Requirements Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 The Surry Units 1 and 2 TS associated with this change are TS 3.1.C and 4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

TS 3.1. C addresses the limits and actions required for operational leakage from the RCS.

TS 3.1.C.1 restricts RCS Operational LEAKAGE as follows whenever Tavg (average RCS temperature) exceeds 200°F:

a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE,

b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE,

c. 10 gpm identified LEAKAGE, and

d. 150 gallons per day primary to secondary LEAKAGE through any one steam generator (SG).

TS 3.1.C.4 requires that "Detected or suspected leakage from the RCS shall be investigated and evaluated, and that at least two means shall be available to detect reactor coolant system leakage. One of these means must depend on the detection of radionuclides in the containment." As noted in the TS 3.1.C Basis, "Detection of leaks from the RCS is by one or more of the following:

1. An increased amount of makeup water required to maintain normal level in the pressurizer.

2. A high temperature alarm in the leakoff piping provided to collect reactor head flange leakage.

3. Containment sump water level indication.

4. Containment pressure, temperature, and humidity indication.

If there is significant radioactive contamination of the reactor coolant, the radiation monitoring system provides a sensitive indication of primary system leakage.

Radiation monitors that indicate primary system leakage include the containment gas and particulate monitors, the condenser air ejector monitor, the component cooling water monitor, and the steam generator blowdown monitor."

TS 4.13 requires verification that RCS operational LEAKAGE is within the limits specified in TS 3.1.C by performance of an RCS water inventory balance.

The Surveillance Frequency Control Program currently requires an RCS inventory balance to be performed once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

2.3 Reason for Proposed Change Dominion Energy Virginia is requesting the proposed amendment to apply LBS analyses to the RCS branch piping to facilitate potential future plant changes.

Page 4 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 As stated in NRG NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: LWR Edition," Section 3.6.3, "Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures," NRG staff approval of an LBB analysis permits an operating plant licensee to "remove protective hardware such as pipe whip restraints and jet impingement barriers, redesign pipe connected components, their supports and their internals, and other related changes." Therefore, this LAR is being submitted for prior NRG review and approval to change the Surry Units 1 and 2 licensing and design bases to permit the application of leak-before-break to RCS branch piping.

2.4 Description of Proposed Change The proposed change would revise the Surry Units 1 and 2 design and licensing bases to expand the scope of NRG staff's approval of LBB to auxiliary piping connected to the RCLs. The use of LBB for Surry is currently limited to the large, primary loop RCS piping, as discussed in UFSAR Sections 4.2.4, 15.6.2, 15A.3.3, 15A.6 and 18.3.5.3.

1. Section 4.2.4, "Protection Against Proliferation of Dynamic Effects," describes the design requirement for protection of essential operating and protective systems against the loss of function due to dynamic effects and missiles that might result from a pipe rupture. This section includes a footnote that points to Section 15.6.2.

2. Section 15.6.2, "Reactor Coolant System Supports," discusses the LBB analyses that demonstrate the probability of a rupture of the primary reactor coolant loop piping is extremely low and it is therefore no longer necessary to consider the dynamic effects of such a break.

3. Section 15A.3.3, "Reactor Coolant Loops and Supports," summarizes the LBB analyses that supported the removal of several RCS large bore snubbers.

4. Section 15A.6, "Reactor Coolant Loop (RCL) Piping Reanalysis Subsequent to Leak Before Break and Snubber Elimination," discusses the reanalysis of the RCL piping and supports that was performed subsequent to the implementation of LBB to support implementation of several plant changes and refinement of the analytical modeling.

5. Section 18.3.5.3, "Leak-Before-Break," states that, to maintain Surry's LBB design basis during the license renewal operating period, the thermal aging effect for 60 years was revalidated. The change in the material property was found to be insignificant since the number of design transient cycles will not be exceeded during 60 years of operation. Therefore, the existing LBB analysis is projected to be valid for the period of extended operation.

The expanded LBB scope of this LAR would eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated ruptures of specific portions of auxiliary (branch) piping connected to the RCS loop piping for the SI system, RHR system, SI accumulators, loop bypass lines and the pressurizer Page 5 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 surge lines. The technical basis for the application of LBB to the RCS branch piping is contained in WCAP-18491-P/NP, Revision 0, "Technical Justification for Eliminating Auxiliary Piping Rupture as the Structural Design Basis for Surry Units 1 and 2, Using Leak-Before-Break Methodology," December 2019, which is provided in Attachment 2 (Proprietary) and Attachment 3 (Non-proprietary).

The LBB analysis described in Section 3 below and provided in Attachment 2 relies on Surry's ability to detect unidentified RCS leakage and take the appropriate actions to preclude pipe rupture. Positive indications in the control room of leakage of coolant from the RCS to the containment are provided by equipment that permits continuous monitoring of the containment internal pressure, temperature, and gaseous and particulate activity; of containment sump water level; of makeup water to the primary system; and of the temperature of water leaking from the reactor vessel through its head flange. This equipment provides information that is indicative of a basic level of leakage from primary systems and components. Any increase observed may be indicative of an increase in the leakage rate from the RCS. The equipment provided can monitor such a change. TS limits on RCS leakage are described in Section 2.2 above and include the requirement to perform an RCS water inventory balance once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months as an additional means of identifying RCS leakage.

There are no proposed changes to the Surry TS associated with this change.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

The LBB concept is based on calculations and experimental data demonstrating that certain pipe material has sufficient fracture toughness ( ductility) to prevent a small through-wall flaw from propagating rapidly and uncontrollably to catastrophic pipe rupture and to ensure that the probability of a pipe rupture is extremely low. The small leaking flaw is demonstrated to grow slowly, and the limited leakage would be detected by the RCS leakage detection systems early on such that licensees can shut down the plant to repair the degraded pipe long before the potential catastrophic pipe rupture.

The current structural design basis for Surry Units 1 and 2 requires postulating non-mechanistic circumferential and longitudinal pipe breaks. While the dynamic effects of pipe breaks have been eliminated for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RCL piping (Reference 7.2),

additional breaks remain applicable for the auxiliary piping systems connected to the RCLs. The auxiliary piping systems range in size from 6-inch up to 14-inch nominal pipe size (NPS).

The pipe breaks postulated for auxiliary piping systems include the following:

12-inch pressurizer surge line attached to the hot leg RCL piping, Page 6 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 14-inch RHR lines attached to the hot leg RCL piping (RHR suction) and the 10-inch RHR return line to the SI accumulator line piping, 12-inch SI accumulator injection lines attached to the cold leg RCL piping, 8-inch loop bypass lines attached to the hot and cold leg RCL piping, and 6-inch SI lines attached to the hot and cold leg RCL piping.

Postulated breaks in these lines result in the need for additional plant hardware (e.g., pipe whip restraints and jet shields) to mitigate the dynamic consequences of the pipe breaks.

It is, therefore, highly desirable to be realistic in the postulation of pipe breaks for the auxiliary piping. WCAP-18491-P, December 2019, Revision 0, "Technical Justification for Eliminating Auxiliary Piping Rupture as the Structural Design Basis for Surry Units 1 and 2, Using Leak-Before-Break Methodology," included in Attachment 2, provides the descriptions of a mechanistic pipe break evaluation method and the analytical results that can be used for establishing that a circumferential type of break will not occur within the lines identified above. The evaluations consider that circumferentially oriented flaws bound longitudinal flaw cases. The pressurizer surge line is known to be subjected to thermal stratification and the effects of thermal stratification; therefore, the loads of the stratification evaluation have been used in the LBB evaluation as detailed in WCAP-18491.

As further discussed in WCAP-18491, the elimination of postulated line breaks from the structural design basis for Surry Units 1 and 2 for the pressurizer surge lines, RHR lines, SI accumulator lines, loop bypass lines, and the SI lines is justified as follows:

a. Stress corrosion cracking is precluded by use of fracture resistant materials in the piping system and controls on reactor coolant chemistry, temperature, pressure, and flow during normal operation. (Note: Alloy 82/182 welds do not exist at the Surry Units 1 and 2 pressurizer surge, RHR, SI accumulator, loop bypass and SI lines.)

b. Water hammer should not occur in the pressurizer surge, RHR, SI accumulator, loop bypass and SI piping because of system design, testing, and operational considerations.

c. The effects of low and high cycle fatigue on the integrity of the pressurizer surge, RHR, SI accumulator, loop bypass and SI piping are negligible.

d. Ample margin exists between the leak rate of small stable flaws and the capability of the Surry Units 1 and 2 reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage detection systems.

Page 7 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281

e. Ample margin exists between the small stable flaw sizes of item (d) and larger stable flaws.

f.

Ample margin exists in the material properties used to demonstrate stability of the critical flaws.

For the critical locations, postulated flaws will be stable because of the ample margins described in d, e, and f above.

Based on loading, pipe geometry, welding process, and material properties considerations, enveloping critical (governing) locations were determined at which LBB crack stability evaluations were made. Through-wall flaw sizes were postulated which would cause a leak at a rate of ten (10) times the leakage detection system capability of the plant. Large margins for such flaw sizes were demonstrated against flaw instability.

Finally, fatigue crack growth was assessed and shown not to be an issue for the pressurizer surge, RHR, SI accumulator, loop bypass and SI piping connected to the RCLs. Therefore, the LBB conditions and margins are satisfied for the subject Surry Units 1 and 2 piping, and the dynamic effects of the pipe rupture resulting from postulated breaks in the pressurizer surge, RHR, SI accumulator, loop bypass and SI piping need not be considered in the structural design basis of Surry Units 1 and 2.

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

As noted above, the proposed change would revise the Surry Units 1 and 2 licensing and design bases to expand the LBB scope to eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated ruptures of specific portions of piping for the Safety Injection (SI) system, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, SI accumulators, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop bypass lines and the pressurizer surge line attached to RCS loop piping. The following regulatory requirements have been reviewed and a No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination has been performed as discussed below.

4.1 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria (GOG) - The regulations in Appendix A to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50 establish minimum principal design criteria for water-cooled nuclear power plants, while 10 CFR 50 Appendix 8 and the licensee quality assurance programs establish quality assurance requirements for the design, manufacture, construction, and operation of structures, systems, and components.

During the initial plant licensing of SPS Units 1 and 2, it was demonstrated that the design of the reactor coolant pressure boundary met the regulatory requirements in place at that time. The General Design Criteria (GOG) included in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 did not become effective until May 21, 1971. The Construction Permits for SPS Units 1 Page 8 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 and 2 were issued prior to May 21, 1971; consequently, Surry Units 1 and 2 were not subject to current GDC requirements (SECY-92-223, dated September 18, 1992).

However, the following information demonstrates compliance with GDC 14, 15, 30, 31, and 32 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. Specifically, the GDC state that the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) shall have "an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage

... and gross rupture" (GDC 14 ), "shall be designed with sufficient margin" (GDCs 15 and 31 ), shall be of "the highest quality standards practical" and provide a "means... for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of reactor coolant leakage" (GDC 30), and shall be designed to permit "periodic inspection and testing... to assess... structural and leak tight integrity" (GDC 32). Structural integrity refers to maintaining adequate margins against structural failure. Leakage integrity refers to limiting RCS leakage during all plant conditions to within acceptable limits.

The RCPB is designed, fabricated and constructed to have an exceedingly low probability of gross rupture or significant uncontrolled leakage throughout its design lifetime. RCPB piping and components have provisions for inspection, testing and surveillance of critical areas by appropriate means to assess the structural and leaktight integrity of the boundary components during their service lifetime. The TS RCS leakage limits ensure the RCPB will retain adequate structural and leakage integrity during normal operating, transient, and postulated accident conditions.

In addition, GDC 4 states, in part, that "... Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with... postulated accidents....

However, dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures may be excluded from the design basis when analyses reviewed and approved by the Commission demonstrate that the probability of a fluid system piping rupture is extremely low under conditions consistent with the design basis for the piping."

NUREG-1061, Volume 3, "Report of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Piping Review Committee, Evaluation of Potential for Pipe Breaks," dated November 1984, provides the technical basis for the LBB analyses.

NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 3.6.3, "Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures," Revision 1, provides guidance for review of the LBB application, including guidance for determining an acceptable leakage crack and the RCS leakage detection sensitivity based on the fracture mechanics analysis.

The guidance states that determination of leakage from a crack in a piping system under pressure involves uncertainties and, therefore, margins are needed.

Sources of uncertainties include plugging of the leakage crack with particulate material over time, correlation of leakage rates with crack geometry, correlations of measured parameters (e.g., sump level changes or containment radiation levels) with leakage rate, and frequency and accuracy of leakage instrumentation monitoring. Section 111.4 of SRP 3.6.3 states that the NRC staff evaluates the proposed leakage detection systems to determine whether they are sufficiently reliable, redundant, and sensitive so that a margin on the detection of Page 9 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 unidentified leakage exists for through-wall flaws to support the deterministic fracture mechanics evaluation. The guidance specifies that the predicted leakage rate from the postulated leakage crack should be a factor of 10 times greater than the minimum leakage the detection system is capable of sensing unless the licensee provides justification accounting for the effects of uncertainties in the leakage measurement. The guidance of SRP Section 3.6.3 also states that specifications for plant-specific leakage detection systems inside the containment should be equivalent to those in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems." The Surry Units 1 and 2 RCS pressure boundary leak detection system meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.45 and meets a leak detection capability of 1 gpm.

Licensees are required to submit, for NRC review and approval, a fracture mechanics evaluation of specific piping configurations to meet the requirements of GDC 4.

A candidate pipe should satisfy the screening criteria of SRP, Section 3.6.3, by demonstrating that it experiences no active degradation. The candidate pipe should be demonstrated by the fracture mechanics analysis to satisfy the safety margins in SRP, Section 3.6.3. Finally, the licensee must demonstrate that the RCS leakage detection systems have the capability to detect a certain leak rate, with margins, when compared to the leak rate from the leakage flaw size of the candidate pipe.

Regulatory Issue Summary 2010-07, "Regulatory Requirements for Application of Weld Overlays and Other Mitigation Techniques in Piping Systems Approved for Leak-Before-Break," provides guidance on updating fracture mechanics analyses for LBB piping that have welds fabricated with nickel-based Alloy 82/182 filler material.

However, Alloy 82/182 welds do not exist at the Surry Units 1 and 2 pressurizer surge, RHR, SI accumulator, loop bypass and SI lines.

The implementation of LBB requires a license amendment under 10 CFR 50.90 because one or more of the criteria of 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2) applies to LBB. When the proposed LBB LAR is approved by the NRC, the licensee is required to amend its final safety analysis report to document that the LBB methodology has become a part of the licensing basis for the candidate piping.

The requirements related to the content of the Technical Specifications (TSs) are contained in 10 CFR 50.36, which requires that the TSs include limiting conditions for operation (LCOs). The criteria defined by 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) relevant to determining whether capabilities related to reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) leakage detection should be included in the TS LCOs, are as follows:

a) Criterion 1. Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

b) Criterion 2. A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either Page10of16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

The lowest flow rate calculated for the LBS leakage flaws is 10 gpm as stated in WCAP-18491 (Attachment 2).

The proposed change maintains the minimum required unidentified leakage detection capability of 1 gpm after applying the margin factor of 10, in accordance with SRP 3.6.3 criteria. The 1 gpm limit assures timely identification of RCPB degradation, and the measurement capability is sufficient to ensure RCS leakage can be detected well in advance of a through wall flaw propagating to a pipe rupture. The adequacy of the current TS is supported by the margins used in the LBS evaluations, i.e.,

a margin factor of 1 O between leakage crack flow rate and leakage detection capability, and a factor of two between leakage crack size and critical crack size. These margins offset uncertainties associated with leakage detection and prediction. The 1 gpm limit for unidentified leakage is also shown to be conservative for the LBS evaluations by the fatigue crack growth evaluations in WCAP-18491.

In summary, the LAR is consistent with the GDC 4 provision that dynamic effects associated with postulated pipe ruptures may be removed from the design basis if NRC-approved analyses demonstrate an extremely low probability of pipe rupture occurring under design basis conditions. The proposed change also maintains consistency with GDC 14, 15, 30, 31, and 32 for maintaining the integrity of the RCPB and being able to detect RCS leakage. The existing TS requirements for leakage detection and leakage limits are consistent with 10 CFR 50.36 and do not require revision to support this request.

4.2 No Significant Hazards Consideration Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion Energy Virginia) requests an amendment to the Surry Power Station (Surry) Units 1 and 2 Operating Licenses. The proposed amendment would change the licensing basis as described in the Surry Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures in specific portions of systems attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and dynamic effects design bases." This License Amendment Request (LAR) uses Leak-Before-Break (LBB) methodology to demonstrate the risk of pipe rupture is extremely low for portions of the following systems piping conn.ected to the RCS loop piping:

Safety Injection (SI) piping SI accumulator piping Residual Heat Removal (RHR) piping Pressurizer surge line piping RCS loop bypass piping Dominion Energy Virginia has evaluated the proposed changes using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92, and determined that the proposed changes do not involve a significant Page 11 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 hazards consideration. The following information is provided to support a finding of no significant hazards:

1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change requests plant-specific approval of a previously approved Leak-Before-Break (LBS) evaluation methodology, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4. The LBB evaluation demonstrates the probability of a rupture of the piping in the scope of the request is extremely low under design basis conditions, such that the dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures may be removed from the design basis of Surry Units 1 and 2.

The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors.

Overall protection system performance will remain within the bounds of the previously performed accident analyses. The design of the protection systems will be unaffected.

The Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Emergency Core Cooling System (i.e.,

Safety Injection) will continue to function in a manner consistent with the plant design basis. The design, material, and construction standards that were applicable prior to the request will remain applicable.

There will be no change to normal plant operating parameters or accident mitigation performance. The proposed amendment will not alter any assumptions or change any mitigation actions in the radiological consequence evaluations in the Surry UFSAR.

Therefore, these proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change requests NRC approval of LBS methodology to demonstrate an extremely low probability of pipe rupture in auxiliary piping connected to the RCS loop piping. It does not introduce any new accident scenarios, failure mechanisms, or single failures.

Systems, structures, and components previously required for the mitigation of an event remain capable of fulfilling their intended design function. The proposed change has no adverse effects on any safety related systems or components and does not challenge the performance or integrity of any safety related system. Further, there are no changes in the method by which any safety-related plant system performs its safety function. This amendment will not affect the normal method of power operation or change any operating parameters.

Page 12 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed change does not adversely affect the ability of the fuel cladding, reactor coolant pressure boundary, or containment to perform their design basis functions as fission product barriers. The proposed change uses previously accepted analytical methods to demonstrate the probability of a fluid system rupture is extremely low. It has no effect on how safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined, and it does not adversely affect any plant systems necessary to assure the accomplishment of protection functions.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based upon the above, Dominion Energy Virginia concludes the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

4.3 Precedents

Several other licensees have requested and received approval to use the LBB methodology to eliminate the dynamic effects of pipe rupture for auxiliary piping systems attached to the RCLs including the following:

Letter from US NRC to Entergy, "Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 - Issuance of Amendment Re: Approval of Leak-Before-Break of the Pressurizer Surge Line (TAC NO. ME3420)," dated February 28, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML110410119.

Letter from US NRC to Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 "Issuance of Amendments Re: Request to Exclude the Dynamic Effects Associated with Certain Postulated Pipe Ruptures from the Licensing Basis based upon Application of Leak-Before-Break Methodology (TAC Nos. ME2976 and ME2977),"

dated October 27, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML112200856.

Letter from US NRC to Indiana Michigan Power Company, "Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1 - Issuance of Amendment No. 346 Re: 'Approval of Application of Proprietary Leak-Before-Break Methodology for Reactor Coolant System Small Diameter Piping' (EPID L-2018-LLA-0054 )," dated August 1, 2019, ADAMS Accession No. ML19170A362.

Page 13 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 In addition, a similar LAR was recently submitted for NRG approval as noted below:

Letter from PSE&G LLC to the US NRG, "License Amendment Request to Exclude the Dynamic Effects of Specific Postulated Pipe Ruptures from the Design and Licensing Basis Based on Leak-Before-Break Methodology," dated April 24, 2020, ADAMS Accession No. ML20115E374.

4.4 Conclusion Therefore, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) as follows:

(i)

The proposed change involves no significant hazards consideration.

As described in Section 4.2 above, the proposed change involves no significant hazards consideration.

(ii)

There are no significant changes in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released off-site.

The proposed change would change the licensing basis as described in the Surry Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures in specific portions of systems attached to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 4, "Environmental and dynamic effects design bases." The proposed

, change does not alter the design function or operation of any plant structure, system or component. The RCPB will continue to meet its specific structural and leakage integrity performance criteria. As such, the proposed change does not involve the installation of any new equipment or the modification of any equipment that may affect the types or amounts of effluents that may be released off-site. The proposed change will have no impact on normal plant releases and will not increase the predicted radiological consequences of accidents postulated in the UFSAR.

Therefore, there are no significant changes in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released off-site.

Page 14 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 (iii) There is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The proposed change would change the licensing basis as described in the Surry UFSAR to eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures in specific portions of systems attached to the RCS in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4. The proposed change does not implement plant physical changes or result in plant operation in a configuration outside the plant safety analyses or design basis. Furthermore, RCPB will continue to meet specific structural and leakage integrity performance criteria. Therefore, there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure associated with the proposed change.

Based on the above, Dominion Energy Virginia concludes that, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b ), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The proposed change would change the design and licensing bases as described in the Surry Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to eliminate the dynamic effects of postulated pipe ruptures in specific portions of systems attached to the RCS in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 4. The proposed change will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the current design basis and does not affect the safety analyses. The structural integrity and known degradation mechanisms of the RCPB have been evaluated and it has been determined the structural and leakage integrity performance criteria will continue to be met.

Therefore, Dominion Energy Virginia concludes, based on the considerations discussed herein, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

REFERENCES 7.1 Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2 UFSAR Sections 15.6.2, "Reactor Coolant System Supports," Section 15A.3.3, "Reactor.Coolant Loops and Supports," Section 15A.6, "Reactor Coolant Loop (RCL) Piping Reanalysis Subsequent to Leak Before Break and Snubber Elimination," and Section 18.3.5.3, "Leak-Before-Break."

Page 15 of 16

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 7.2 Letter from the USN RC to Virginia Electric and Power Company dated June, 1986, providing License Amendments 108 for Surry Unit 1 (DPR-32) and 108 for Surry Unit 2 (DPR-37) permitting plant operation with the reactor coolant pump and steam generator supports redesigned in accordance with the recently noticed amendment to General Design Criterion 4 (GDC-4 ), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, (51 FR 12502),

which was effective May 12, 1986.

Page 16 of 16 Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 WCAP-18491-NP, DECEMBER 2019, REVISION O, "TECHNICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ELIMINATING AUXILIARY PIPING RUPTURE AS THE STRUCTURAL DESIGN BASIS FOR SURRY UNITS 1 AND 2, USING LEAK-BEFORE-BREAK METHODOLOGY" [NON-PROPRIETARY]

Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion Energy Virginia)

Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2

WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0 WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 December 2019 Technical Justification for Eliminating Auxiliary Piping Rupture as the Structural Design Basis for Surry Units 1 and 2, Using Leak-Before-Break Methodology

@ Westinghouse

- - ~* * *- ---~ ***-- "--* ---M"~" nn 1')t111?n10 ?*1<;*?7 PM /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0 Technical Justification for Eliminating Auxiliary Piping Rupture as the Structural Design Basis for Surry Units 1 and 2, Using Leak-Before-Break Methodology Author:

December 2019 Eric D. Johnson*

Reactor Vessel and Containment Vessel Design and Analysis Reviewer:

Momo Wiratmo*

Piping Engineering Approved:

Lynn A. Patterson, Manager*

Reactor Vessel and Containment Vessel Design and Analysis

Electronically approved records are authenticated in the electronic document management system.

Westinghouse Electric Company LLC 1000 Westinghouse Drive Cranbeny Township, PA 16066, USA

- - Th; 0 roMrrl """' fin<>l <>nnrnvF>rl on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 1-l 1.1 Purpose................................................................................................................................. 1-l 1.2 Scope and Objectives............................................................................................................ 1-1 1.3 References............................................................................................................................. 1-3 2.0 Operation and Stability of the Reactor Coolant System.................................................................... 2-1 2.1 Stress Co1Tosion Cracking.................................................................................................... 2-1 2.2 Water Hammer...................................................................................................................... 2-2 2.3 Low Cycle and High Cycle Fatigue...................................................................................... 2-2 2.4 Other Possible Degradation During Service of the Auxiliary Piping Systems..................... 2-3 2.5 References............................................................................................................................. 2-4 3.0 Pipe Geometry and Loading.............................................................................................................. 3-l

3. l Calculations of Loads and Stresses....................................................................................... 3-1 3.1.1 Surge Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry...................................................... 3-1 3.1.2 RHR Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry....................................................... 3-2 3.1.3 Accumulator Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry........................................... 3-2 3.1.4 Loop Bypass Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry........................................... 3-2 3.1.5 SI Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry............................................................ 3-2 3.2 Loads for Leak Rate Evaluation........................................................................................... 3-3 3.3 Load Combination for Crack Stability Analyses.................................................................. 3-3 3.4 Surge Line Loading Conditions............................................................................................ 3-4 3.5 References............................................................................................................................. 3-5 4.0 Material Characterization................................................................................................................... 4-l 4.1 Pipe Materials and Weld Process.......................................................................................... 4-l 4.2 Tensile Properties.................................................................................................................. 4-l 4.3 Reference.............................................................................................................................. 4-l 5.0 Critical Locations............................................................................................................................... 5-l 5.1 Critical Locations.................................................................................................................. 5-1 6.0 Leak Rate Predictions........................................................................................................................ 6-1 6.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................... 6-1 6.2 General Considerations......................................................................................................... 6-1 6.3 Calculation Method............................................................................................................... 6-1 6.4 Leak Rate Calculations......................................................................................................... 6-2 6.5 References............................................................................................................................. 6-2 7.0 Fracture Mechanics Evaluation.......................................................................................................... 7-1 7.1 Global Failure Mechanism.................................................................................................... 7-1 7.2 Local Failure Mechanism..................................................................................................... 7-2 7.3 Results of Crack Stability Evaluation................................................................................... 7-2 7.4 References............................................................................................................................. 7-2 8.0 Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth................................................................................................ 8-l 8.1 Suny Plant-Specific Fatigue Crack Grown Assessments..................................................... 8-1 8.1. l Residual Heat Removal Suction Line FCG............................................................. 8-2 WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

... ~--L -- ___ __,... __ "~~' -~~Muorl nn 1 ?/11 /?01 Q ?*1!'i*?7 PM. /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 iv 8.1.2 Accumulator Line FCG........................................................................................... 8-2 8.1.3 Safety Injection Line FCG....................................................................................... 8-2 8.2 Representative Fatigue Crack Grown Assessments.............................................................. 8-3 8.2.l Pressurizer Surge Line FCG.................................................................................... 8-3 8.2.2 Residual Heat Removal Return Line FCG............................................................... 8-4 8.2.3 Loop Bypass Line FCG........................................................................................... 8-5 8.3 References............................................................................................................................. 8-6 9.0 Assessment of Margins...................................................................................................................... 9-1 10.0 Conclusions...................................................................................................................................... 10-l Appendix A: Limit Moment.......................................................................................................................... A-1 WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRJETARY CLASS 3 V

LI.ST OF TABLES Table 3-1 Surry Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Line Piping Geomet1y and Operating Conditions........ 3-6 Table 3-2 Suny Unit 1 RHR Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions........................................ 3-6 Table 3-3 Surry Unit 2 RHR Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions........................................ 3-7 Table 3-4 Surry Unit 1 Accumulator Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions............................ 3-8 Table 3-5 Surry Unit 2 Accumulator Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions............................ 3-9 Table 3-6 Suny Units 1 and 2 Loop Bypass Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions.......,........ 3-9 Table 3-7 Surry Unit 1 Cold Leg SI Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions........................... 3-10 Table 3-8 Surry Unit 2 Cold Leg SI Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions........................... 3-11 Table 3-9 Surry Unit 1 Hot Leg SI Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions............................. 3-12 Table 3-10 Suny Unit 2 Hot Leg SI Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions........................... 3-13 Table 3-11 Pressurizer Surge Line Loading Types.................................................................................... 3-13 Table 3-12 Surge Line Normal and Faulted Loading Cases for LBB Evaluations................................... 3-14 Table 3-13 Load Case Combinations Considered for Surge Line Analyses............................................. 3-14 Table 3-14 Suny Units 1 and 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Surge Lines................. 3-15 Table 3-15 Suny Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the RHR Suction Line.................. 3-16 Table 3-16 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the RHR Suction Line.................. 3-17 Table 3-17 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 RHR Return Line....... 3-18 Table 3-18 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 RHR Return Line....... 3-19 Table 3-19 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 RHR Return Line....... 3-19 Table 3-20 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 RHR Return Line....... 3-20 Table 3-21 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Accumulator Line...... 3-21 Table 3-22 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Accumulator Line...... 3-23 Table 3-23 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Accumulator Line...... 3-25 Table 3-24 Suny Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Accumulator Line...... 3-27 Table 3-25 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Accumulator Line...... 3-29 Table 3-26 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Accumulator Line...... 3-31 Table 3-27 Surry Units 1 and 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop Bypass Lines...... 3-33 Table 3-28 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Cold Leg SI Lines...... 3-34 Table 3-29 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Cold Leg SI Lines...... 3-35 WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - ~L, ______,,.. m~ fiMI ~nnr,worl nn 1 ?/11 /?01 ~ 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 vi Table 3-30 Suny Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Cold Leg SI Lines...... 3-36 Table 3-31 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Cold Leg SI Lines...... 3-37 Table 3-32 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Cold Leg SI Lines...... 3-38 Table 3-33 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Cold Leg SI Lines...... 3-39 Table 3-34 SmTy Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Hot Leg SI Lines........ 3-40 Table 3-35 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Hot Leg SI Lines........ 3-41 Table 3-36 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Hot Leg SI Lines........ 3-42 Table 3-37 Suny Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Hot Leg SI Lines........ 3-43 Table 3-38 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Hot Leg SI Lines........ 3-44 Table 3-39 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Hot Leg SI Lines........ 3-45 Table 4-1 A376 TP316 and A403 WP316 Material Properties for Operating Temperature Conditions on Surry Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Piping Systems.................................................... 4-2 Table 5-1 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Suny Units 1 and 2 RHR Lines............. 5-2 Table 5-2 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Surry Units 1 and 2 Accumulator Lines..................................................................................................................... 5-2 Table 5-3 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Suny Units 1 and 2 Loop Bypass Lines...................................................................................................................... 5-3 Table 5-4 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Surry Units 1 and 2 Cold Leg SI Lines....................................................................................................................... 5-3 Table 5-5 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Surry Units 1 and 2 Hot Leg SI Lines........................................................................................................................ 5-3 Table 6-1 Flaw Sizes Yielding a Leak Rate of 10 gpm for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Lines............................................................................................................... 6-3 Table 6-2 Flaw Sizes Yielding a Leak Rate of 10 gpm for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI Lines................................................................................... 6-4 Table 7-1 Flaw Stability Results for the Suny Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Line Based on Limit Load................................................................................................................................... 7-3 Table 7-2 Flaw Stability Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI Lines Based on Limit Load and EPFM................................................................................... 7-4 Table 8-1 80 Year Design Transients for the Suny Units 1 and 2 RHR Suction Lines............................... 8-7 Table 8-2 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR Suction Lines........................ 8-7 Table 8-3 80 Year Design Transients for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Accumulator Lines............................... 8-8 Table 8-4 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Accumulator Lines......................... 8-9 Table 8-5 80 Year Design Transients for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Cold Leg SI Lines................................ 8-9 WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - -rh:- *~~nr" "'~~ fin<>I "nnrnvearl on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 vii Table 8-6 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Suny Units 1 and 2 SI Lines........................................ 8-10 Table 8-7 Comparison of the Representative Surge Line FCG Transient Set with the 80 Year Design Transients for the Sul'l'y Units 1 and 2 Surge Lines................................................................... 8-10 Table 8-8 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Suny Units I and 2 Surge Lines.................................. 8-11 Table 8-9 Comparison of the Representative Accumulator Line FCG Transient Set with the 80 Year Design Transients for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR Return Lines.............................. 8-11 Table 8-10 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Surry Units I and 2 RHR Return Lines....................... 8-11 Table 9-1 Leakage Flaw Sizes, Critical Flaw Sizes, and Margin for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Line................................................................................................................. 9-2 Table 9-2 Leakage Flaw Sizes, Critical Flaw Sizes, and Margin for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI Lines................................................................................... 9-3 WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - -r.._,_ *--M"..,~~ flMI <>nnrm,,,rl nn 1?/11/?019 2:15:27 PM. /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3-1 Surry Units 1 and 2 Piping Layout for Pressurizer Surge Lines............................................. 3-46 Figure 3-2 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for RHR Suction Line................................................................. 3-47 Figure 3-3 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for RHR Suction Line................................................................. 3-48 Figure 3-4 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for RHR Return Lines................................................................. 3-49 Figure 3-5 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for RHR Return Lines................................................................. 3-50 Figure 3-6 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 1 Accumulator Line..................................................... 3-51 Figure 3-7 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 2 Accumulator Line..................................................... 3-52 Figure 3-8 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 3 Accumulator Line..................................................... 3-53 Figure 3-9 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 1 Accumulator Line..................................................... 3-54 Figure 3-10 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 2 Accumulator Line................................................... 3-55 Figure 3-11 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 3 Accumulator Line................................................... 3-56 Figure 3-12 Surry Units 1 and 2 Piping Layout for Loop Bypass Lines.................................................. 3-57 Figure 3-13 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 1 Cold Leg SI Line.................................................... 3-58 Figure 3-14 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 2 Cold Leg SI Line.................................................... 3-59 Figure 3-15 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 3 Cold Leg SI Line.................................................... 3-60 Figure 3-16 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 1 Cold Leg SI Line.................................................... 3-61 Figure 3-17 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 2 Cold Leg SI Line.................................................... 3-62 Figure 3-18 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 3 Cold Leg SI Line.................................................... 3-63 Figure 3-19 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 1 Hot Leg SI Line...................................................... 3-64 Figure 3-20 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 2 Hot Leg SI Line...................................................... 3-65 Figure 3-21 SmTy Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 3 Hot Leg SI Line...................................................... 3-66 Figure 3-22 SmTy Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 1 Hot Leg SI Line...................................................... 3-67 Figure 3-23 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 2 Hot Leg SI Line...................................................... 3-68 Figure 3-24 Suny Unit 2 Piping Layout for Loop 3 Hot Leg SI Line...................................................... 3-69 Figure 5-1 Critical Locations for RHR Suction Lines - Segments RHRs-I and RHRs-II.......................... 5-4 Figure 5-2 Critical Locations for RHR Return Lines - Segments RHRr2-I and RHRr3-I......................... 5-5 Figure 5-3 Critical Locations for Accumulator Lines - Segment ACC-I................................................... 5-6 Figure 5-4 Critical Locations for Accumulator Lines - Segments ACC-II and ACC-III............................ 5-7 Figure 5-5 Critical Locations for Loop Bypass Lines - Segments BP-I and BP-II.................................... 5-8 WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 ix Figure 5-6 Critical Locations for Cold Leg SI Lines - Segments SI-CL-I................................................. 5-9 Figure 5-7 Critical Locations for Cold Leg SI Lines - Segments SI-CL-II.............................................. 5-10 Figure 5-8 Critical Locations for Hot Leg SI Lines - Segments SI-HL-1................................................. 5-11 Figure 5-9 Critical Locations for Hot Leg SI Lines - Segments SI-HL-11............................................... 5-12 Figure 6-1 Analytical Predictions of Critical Flow Rates of Steam-Water Mixtures.................................. 6-5 Figure 6-2

[

]a.c,e Pressure Ratio as a Function ofL/D.................................................... 6-6 Figure 6-3 Idealized Pressure Drop Profile Through a Postulated Crack................................................... 6-7 Figure 7-1

[

]a,c,e Stress Distribution......................................................................................... 7-5 Figure A-1 Pipe with a Through-Wall Crack in Bending........................................................................... A-2 WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - T'--'- *~nM.-< u,n~ f;MI ~nnrnu,orl nn 1?/11/?019 2:15:27 PM. /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 1-1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE The current structural design basis for the Surry Units 1 and 2 require postulating non-mechanistic circumferential and longitudinal pipe breaks. While pipe breaks have been eliminated for the large bore Reactor Coolant Loop (RCL) piping (Reference 1-1), additional break remain applicable for the auxiliary piping systems. The pipe breaks postulated for auxiliary Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) piping, include; Pressurizer surge lines attached to the hot leg RCL piping, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) lines attached to the hot leg RCL piping (RHR suction) and attached to the Accumulator line piping (RHR return),

Accumulator injection lines attached to the cold leg RCL piping, Loop Bypass lines attached to the hot and cold leg RCL piping, and Safety Injection (SI) lines attached to the hot and cold leg RCL piping The auxiliaty piping systems range in size from 6-inch up to 14-inch nominal pipe size (NPS). Postulated breaks in these lines results in additional plant hardware ( e.g., pipe whip restraints and jet shields) which would mitigate the dynamic consequences of the pipe breaks. It is, therefore, highly desirable to be realistic in the postulation of pipe breaks for the auxiliary piping. Presented in this report are the descriptions of a mechanistic pipe break evaluation method and the analytical results that can be used for establishing that a circumferential type of break will not occur within the lines identified above. The evaluations consider that circumferentially oriented flaws bound longitudinal flaw cases.

The pressurizer surge line is known to be subjected to thermal stratification and the effects of thermal stratification. The loads of the stratification evaluation have been used in the Leak-Before-Break evaluation presented in this report.

1.2 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES The purpose of this investigation is to demonstrate Leak-Before-Break (LBB) for the Surry Units 1 and 2 surge, RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI lines. The specific scope of analysis for each line is further discussed in Section 3.0. Schematic drawings of the piping systems are shown in Figure 3-1 through Figure 3-24. For the purpose of this report, the evaluation of the weld between the auxiliary piping nozzle and the RCL piping is considered to be bounded by the safe-end weld between the nozzle and the auxiliary line piping. Loading conditions between these two locations are very similar based on their close proximity.

The nozzle to aux line piping locations will present a significantly more limiting evaluation due to less favorable piping geometry characteristics which result in limiting critical flaw stresses.

Introduction WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 1-2 The recommendations and criteria proposed in Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.6.3 (References 1-2 and 1-3) are used in this evaluation. The criteria and the resulting steps of the evaluation procedure can be briefly summarized as follows:

1.

Calculate the applied loads based on as-built configuration. Identify the location(s) at which the highest faulted stress occurs.

2.

Identify the materials and the associated material properties.

3.

Postulate a through-wall flaw at the governing location(s). The size of the flaw should be large enough so that the leakage is assured of detection with margin using the installed leak detection equipment when the pipe is subjected to normal operating loads. Demonstrate that there is a margin of 10 between the calculated leak rate and the leak detection capability.

4.

Using maximum faulted loads in the stability analysis, demonstrate that there is a margin of 2 between the leakage size flaw and the critical size flaw.

5.

Review the operating history to ascertain that operating experience has indicated no particular susceptibility to failure from the effects of corrosion, water hammer, or low and high cycle fatigue.

6.

For the material types used in the plant, provide representative material properties.

7.

Demonstrate margin on the calculated applied load value; margin of 1.4 using algebraic summation ofloads or margin of 1.0 using absolute summation of loads.

This rep01t provides a fracture mechanics demonstration of the auxilimy line piping integrity for Su11'y Units 1 and 2 consistent with the NRC's position for exemption from consideration of dynamic effects (Reference 1-4).

It should be noted that the terms "flaw" and "crack" have the same meaning and are used interchangeably.

"Governing location" and "critical location" are also used interchangeably throughout the report.

The computer codes used in this evaluation for leak rate and fracture mechanics calculations have been validated and used for all the LBB applications by Westinghouse.

Introduction WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 1-3

1.3 REFERENCES

1-1 WCAP-15550-P, "Technical Justification for Eliminating Large Primary Loop Pipe Rupture as the Structural Design Basis for Surry Units 1 and 2 Nuclear Power Plants for the Subsequent License Renewal Program (80 Years) Leak-Before-Break Evaluation," Revision 2, March 2019.

1-2 Standard Review Plan:

Public Comments Solicited; 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures; Federal RegisterNol. 52, No. 167/Friday August 28, 1987/Notices, pp. 32626-32633.

1-3 NUREG-0800 Revision 1, March 2007, Standard Review Plan: 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures.

1-4 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR 50, Modification of General Design Criteria 4 Requirements for Protection Against Dynamic Effects of Postulated Pipe Ruptures, Final Rule, Federal RegisterNol.

52, No. 207/Tuesday, October 27, 1987/Rules and Regulations, pp. 41288-41295.

Introduction WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 2-1 2.0 OPERATION AND STABILITY OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 2.1 STRESS CORROSION CRACKING The Westinghouse reactor coolant system (RCS) primary loops and connected Class 1 piping have an operating history that demonstrates the inherent operating stability characteristics of the design. This includes a low susceptibility to cracking failure from the effects of corrosion ( e.g., intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC)). This operating history totals over 1400 reactor-years, including 16 plants each having over 30 years of operation, 10 other plants each with over 25 years of operation, 11 plants each with over 20 years of operation, and 12 plants each with over 15 years of operation.

In 1978, the United States Nuclear Regulato1y Commission (USNRC) formed the second Pipe Crack Study Group. (The first Pipe Crack Study Group (PCSG), established in 1975, addressed cracking in boiling water reactors only.) One of the objectives of the second PCSG was to include a review of the potential for stress corrosion cracking in Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs). The results of the study performed by the PCSG were presented in NUREG-0531 (Reference 2-1) entitled "Investigation and Evaluation of Stress Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Light Water Reactor Plants." In that report the PCSG stated:

"The PCSG has determined that the potential for stress-corrosion cracking in PWR primaty system piping is extremely low because the ingredients that produce IGSCC are not all present. The use of hydrazine additives and a hydrogen overpressure limit the oxygen in the coolant to very low levels. Other impurities that might cause stress-corrosion cracking, such as halides or caustic, are also rigidly controlled. Only for brief periods during reactor shutdown when the coolant is exposed to the air and during the subsequent startup are conditions even marginally capable of producing stress-corrosion cracking in the primary systems of PWRs. Operating experience in PWRs supp01is this determination. To date, no stress corrosion cracking has been reported in the primary piping or safe ends of any PWR."

For stress corrosion cracking (SCC) to occur in piping, the following three conditions must exist simultaneously: high tensile stresses, susceptible material, and a corrosive environment. Since some residual stresses and some degree of material susceptibility exist in any stainless steel piping, the potential for stress corrosion is minimized by properly selecting a material immune to SCC as well as preventing the occurrence of a corrosive environment. The material specifications consider compatibility with the system's operating environment (both internal and external) as well as other material in the system, applicable ASME Code rules, fracture toughness, welding, fabrication, and processing.

The elements of a water environment known to increase the susceptibility of austenitic stainless steel to stress corrosion are: oxygen, fluorides, chlorides, hydroxides, hydrogen peroxide, and reduced forms of sulfur (e.g., sulfides, sulfites, and thionates). Strict pipe cleaning standards prior to operation and careful control of water chemistry during plant operation are used to prevent the occurrence of a corrosive environment. Prior to being put into service, the piping is cleaned internally and externally. During flushes and preoperational testing, water chemistry is controlled in accordance with written specifications.

Requirements on chlorides, fluorides, conductivity, and pH are included in the acceptance criteria for the piping.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 2-2 During plant operation, the reactor coolant water chemistry is monitored and maintained within very specific limits. Contaminant concentrations are kept below the thresholds known to be conducive to stress corrosion cracking with the major water chemistry control standards being included in the plant operating procedures as a condition for plant operation. For example, during normal power operation, oxygen concentration in the RCS is expected to be in the parts per billion (ppb) range by controlling charging flow chemistry and maintaining hydrogen in the reactor coolant at specified concentrations.

Halogen concentrations are also stringently controlled by maintaining concentrations of chlorides and fluorides within the specified limits. Thus, during plant operation, the likelihood of stress corrosion cracking is minimized.

During 1979, several instances of cracking in PWR feed water piping led to the establishment of the third PCSG. The investigations of the PCSG repmied in NUREG-0691 (Reference 2-2) further confirmed that no occurrences of IGSCC have been reported for PWR primary coolant systems.

Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) occurred in the reactor vessel hot leg nozzle, Alloy 82/182 weld at V. C. Summer and North Anna Unit 1. It should be noted that this susceptible material is not found within the Suny Units 1 and 2 auxiliary piping systems considered in this repo1i.

2.2 WATERHAMMER Overall, there is a low potential for water hammer in the RCS and connecting auxiliary piping systems since they are designed and operated to preclude the voiding condition in normally filled lines. Piping and components of the RCS and connecting auxiliary piping systems are designed for normal, upset, emergency, and faulted condition transients. The design requirements are conservative relative to both the number of transients and their severity. Relief valve actuation and the associated hydraulic transients following valve opening are considered in the system design. Other valve and pump actuations are relatively slow transients with no significant effect on the system dynamic loads. To ensure dynamic system stability, reactor coolant parameters are stringently controlled. Temperature during normal operation is maintained within a narrow range by the control rod positions; pressure is also controlled within a narrow range for steady-state conditions by the pressurizer heaters and pressurizer spray. The flow characteristics of the system remain constant during a fuel cycle because the only governing parameters, namely system resistance and the reactor coolant pump characteristics are controlled in the design process. Additionally, Westinghouse has instrumented typical reactor coolant systems to verify the flow and vibration characteristics of the system and the connecting auxiliary lines.

Preoperational testing and operating experience has verified the Westinghouse approflch. The operating transients of the RCS primary piping an~ connected auxiliary piping systems are such that no significant water hammer can occur.

The pressurizer safety and relief piping system, which may cause water hammer, is connected to the top of the pressurizer. However, these loads are effectively mitigated from acting on the surge line piping by the pressurizer and have a negligible effect on the surge line.

2.3 LOW CYCLE AND HIGH CYCLE FATIGUE The 1967 edition of the B3 l. l Code does not contain an explicit piping low cycle fatigue analysis requirement. The B31.1 piping complies with a stress range reduction factor to be applied to the allowable stress as a way to address fatigue from full temperature cycles for thermal expansion stress evaluation. The Operation and Stability of the Reactor Coolant System WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 2-3 stress range reduction factor is 1.0 (i.e., no reduction) for equivalent full temperature cycles less than 7000.

For Surry Units 1 and 2, the equivalent full temperature cycles for the applicable design transients are less than 7000, so no reduction is required. In addition to low cycle fatigue, MRP-146 (Reference 2-7) identifies that piping systems may be susceptible to thermal cycling effects. The potential for thermal cycling effects on the Surry auxiliary piping systems is managed in accordance with ER-SU-AUG-101 (Reference 2-8).

For the pressurizer surge line piping, fatigue considerations due to thermal stratification are accounted for through the fatigue usage factor evaluation for the stratification analyses (Reference 2-3) to show compliance with the rules of Section Ill of the ASME Code.

Pump vibrations during operation would result in high cycle fatigue loads in the piping system. During operation, an alarm signals the exceedance of the RC pump shaft vibration limits.

Field vibration measurements have been made on the reactor coolant loop piping in a number of plants during hot functional testing. Analytical models and field measurements of the cyclic stresses in piping attached to the RC pump have been determined to be very small. When vibrations are translated to the connecting auxiliary piping systems, these stresses would be even lower, well below the fatigue endurance limit for the piping material, and would result in an applied stress intensity factor below the threshold for fatigue crack growth.

2.4 OTHER POSSIBLE DEGRADATION DURING SERVICE OF THE AUXILIARY PIPING SYSTEMS The auxiliary piping lines and the associated fittings for the Surry Nuclear Power Plants are forged product forms, which are not susceptible to toughness degradation due to thermal aging.

The maximum normal operating temperature of the auxiliary piping systems is about 656°F. This is well below the temperature that would cause any creep damage in stainless steel piping. Cleavage type failures are not a concern for the operating temperatures and the material used in the stainless steel piping of the auxiliary piping systems.

Wall thinning by erosion and erosion-c01Tosion effects should not occur in the auxiliary piping systems due to the low velocity (typically less than 1.0 ft/sec) and the stainless steel material, which is highly resistant to these degradation mechanisms. Per NUREG-0691 (Reference 2-2), a study on pipe cracking in PWR piping rep01ied only two incidents of wall thinning in stainless steel pipe and these were not in the auxiliary piping systems,that are addressed in this report. The cause of wall thinning is related to high water velocity and is therefore,clearly not a mechanism that would affect these auxiliary piping systems.

Brittle fracture for stainless steel material occurs when the operating temperature is about -200°F. Each of the auxiliary piping systems addressed in this report have an operating temperature higher than 70°F and therefore, brittle fracture is not a concern for the auxiliary piping systems.

Thermal stratification occurs when conditions permit hot and cold layers of water to exist simultaneously in a horizontal pipe. This can result in significant thermal loadings due to the high fluid temperature differentials. Changes in the stratification state result in thennal cycling, which can cause fatigue damage.

This was an important issue in PWR feedwater line and pressurizer surge line piping, where temperature differentials of 300°F were not uncommon. It is well known that the pressurizer surge line is subjected to Operation and Stability of the Reactor Coolant System WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 2-4 particularly significant thermal stratification during certain modes of heatup and cooldown operation. The effects of stratification have been evaluated for the Surry Units 1 and 2 surge lines and the loads, accounting for the stratification effects, have been derived in Reference 2-4. These loads are used in the surge line Leak-Before-Break evaluation described in this report.

Thermal stratification also has the potential to impact other auxiliary line piping. The issue of RHR valve leakage described in NRC Bulletin 88-08, Supplement 3 (Reference 2-5) identifies a scenario that could lead to stratification conditions which would jeopardize piping integrity. For Surry Units 1 and 2, the 6-inch SI lines have been identified to be susceptible to this type of thermal stratification, but it was confirmed that the RHR lines were not susceptible (Reference 2-6, October 1988). Further examination of welds in the SI lines and temperature monitoring programs have confirmed that no significant stratification or thermal cycling was identified for these lines (Reference 2-6, December 1990).

2.5 REFERENCES

2-1 Investigation and Evaluation of Stress-Corrosion Cracking in Piping of Light Water Reactor Plants, NUREG-0531, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, February 1979.

2-2 Investigation and Evaluation of Cracking Incidents in Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors, NUREG-0691, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 1980.

2-3 Calculation 14937.68-NP(B)-002-XC, "Pipe Stress Analysis - Effects of Thermal Stratification and Thermal Striping on the Pressurizer Surge Line," Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, October 1989 with Addenda 00A, July 2009.

2-4 Calculation 14937.68-NP(B)-001, "Pressurizer Surge Line Displacements and Moments Due to Thermal Stratification," Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation, July 1989.

2-5 NRC Bulletin 88-08, Supplement 3, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Coolant Systems," April 11, 1989.

2-6 Virginia Electric and Power Company, N01ih Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, Confirmatory Response to NRC Bulletin No. 88-08, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Coolant System, October 3, 1988 (NRC ADAMs ML 18 l 53B507) and December 4, 1990 (NRC ADAMs ML18153C463).

2-7 Materials Reliability Program: Management of Thermal Fatigue in Normally Stagnant Non-Isolable Reactor Coolant System Branch Lines, MRP-146 Revision 2, Electric Power Research Institute, September 2016.

2-8 Administrative Procedure ER-SU-AUG-101, Revision 19, "Surry Augmented Inspection Program," Dominion Energy.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-1 3.0 PIPE GEOMETRY AND LOADING 3.1 CALCULATIONS OF LOADS AND STRESSES The stresses due to axial loads and bending moments are calculated by the following equation:

F M

er=-+-

(3-1)

A Z

where, (j

stress, psi F

axial load, lbf M

moment, in-lbf A

=

pipe cross-sectional area, in2 z

=

section modulus, in3 The moments for the desired loading combinations are calculated by the following equation:

M = M 2 + M 2 + M 2 X

y Z

(3-2)

where, X component of moment, Torsion My Y component of bending moment M2 Z component of bending moment The axial load and moments for leak rate predictions and crack stability analyses are computed by the methods to be explained in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.

For each piping system, the evaluation of the weld between the auxiliary line branch nozzle and the RCL piping is considered to be bounded by the weld between the nozzle and the auxiliary line piping. Loading conditions between these two locations are very similar based on their close proximity. The nozzle-to-auxiliary line piping locations (safe-end weld) will present a significantly more limiting evaluation due to less favorable piping geometry characteristics which result in limiting critical flaw stresses.

3.1.1 Surge Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry For the Surge lines, the LBB analysis will consider the entire length of piping from the branch nozzle at the RCL hot leg pipe up to the nozzle at the pressurizer. The Surge line piping is 12-inch Schedule 140 and included a 12 x 14 reducer at the pressurizer nozzle. The 14-inch side of the reducer is also Schedule 140.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-2 The dimensions and normal operating conditions are given in Table 3-1. The piping layout is shown in Figure 3-1.

3.1.2 RHR Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry For the RHR suction lines attached to the Loop 1 hot leg, the LBB analysis will not be performed at the locations beyond the second isolation valve away from the hot leg. Two isolation valves will prevent the propagation of any piping breaks in the subsequent RHR piping from affecting the primary loop piping system. For the RHR return lines attached to the Loop 2 and Loop 3 Accumulator lines, the LBB analysis will not be performed at the locations beyond the first valve ( or anchor) away from the Accumulator lines.

Two valves ( or one valve and one anchor), one on the RHR return line and one on the Accumulator line, will prevent the propagation of any piping breaks in the subsequent RHR return piping from affecting the primary loop piping system.

The RHR suction line piping is 14-inch Schedule 140 and the RHR return line piping is 10-inch Schedule 140. The dimensions and normal operating conditions are given in Table 3-2 and Table 3-3. The piping layout is shown in Figure 3-2 through Figure 3-5.

3.1.3 Accumulator Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry For the Accumulator lines, the LBB analysis will not be performed at the locations beyond the isolation valve near the accumulator tank. The two check valves and one isolation valve in the Accumulator line piping provide protection against break propagation. Any breaks past the isolation valve will not have any effect on the primary loop piping system.

The Accumulator line piping is 12-inch Schedule 140. The dimensions and normal operating conditions are given in Table 3-4 and Table 3-5. The piping layout is shown in Figure 3-6 through Figure 3-11.

3.1.4 Loop Bypass Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry For the Loop Bypass lines, the LBB analysis considered the full scope of the piping system between the hot leg isolation valve and the cold leg isolation valve. The Loop Bypass line piping is 8-inch Schedule 120. The dimensions and normal operating conditions are given in Table 3-6. The piping layout is shown in Figure 3-12.

3.1.5 SI Line Analysis Boundaries and Geometry For the SI lines, the LBB analysis will not be performed at the locations beyond the second check valve.

The two check valves, in series, on each SI line provide protection against break propagation. Any break beyond the second check valve will not have any effect on the primary loop piping system.

The SI line piping is 6-inch Schedule 120. The dimensions and normal operating conditions are given in Table 3-7 and Table 3-8 for the cold leg SI lines, and Table 3-9 and Table 3-10 for the hot leg SI lines. The piping layout is shown in Figure 3-13 through Figure 3-18 for the cold leg SI lines, and Figure 3-19 through Figure 3-24 for the hot leg SI lines.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-3 3.2 LOADS FOR LEAK RATE EVALUATION The normal operating loads for leak rate predictions are calculated by the following equations:

F Fnw+ Frn+ Fp Mx (Mx)nw + (Mx)rn Mz (Mz)nw + (Mz)rn The subscripts of the above equations represent the following loading cases:

DW dead weight TH

=

p

=

normal thermal expansion (or thermal stratification for the surge line) load due to internal pressure (3-3)

(3-4)

(3-5)

(3-6)

This method of combining loads is often refeITed to as the algebraic sum method (References 3-1 and 3-2).

The LBB evaluations do not include moment effects due to pressure loading since the moment loading is significantly dominated by the thermal loads for normal operation and by the seismic loads for faulted events. The loads based on this method of combination, for each weld location, are provided in Table 3-14 for the Surge line, Table 3-15 through Table 3-20 for the RHR lines, Table 3-21 through Table 3-26 for the Accumulator lines, Table 3-27 for the Loop Bypass line, Table 3-28 through Table 3-33 for the cold leg SI lines, and Table 3-34 through Table 3-39 for the hot leg SI lines.

3.3 LOAD COMBINATION FOR CRACK STABILITY ANALYSES In accordance with Standard Review Plan 3.6.3 (References 3-1 and 3-2), the absolute sum of loading components can be applied which results in higher magnitude of combined loads. If crack stability is demonstrated using these loads, the LBB margin on loads can be reduced from 2 to 1.0. The absolute summation ofloads is shown in the following equations:

F = I Fnw I+ I Frn I+ I Fp I+ I FssEINERTIA I+ I FssEAM I Mx = I (Mx)nw I + I (Mx)rn I + I (Mx)ssEINERTIAI + I (Mx)ssEAMI Mz = I (Mz)nw I + I (Mz)rn I + I (Mz)ssEINERTIAI + I (Mz)ssEAMI (3-7)

(3-8)

(3-9)

(3-10) where subscript SSEINERTIA refers to safe shutdown earthquake inertia, SSEAM is safe shutdown earthquake anchor motion. It is noted that the certain Surry piping analyses consider Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) as the seismic criteria, which is equivalent to Safe Shutdown Eaiihquake (SSE).

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-4 The loads so determined are used in the fracture mechanics evaluations (Section 7.0) to demonstrate the LBB margins at the locations established to be the governing locations. The loads based on this method of combination, for each weld location, are provided in Table 3-14 for the Surge line, Table 3-15 through Table 3-20 for the RHR lines, Table 3-21 through Table 3-26 for the Accumulator lines, Table 3-27 for the Loop Bypass line, Table 3-28 through Table 3-33 for the cold leg SI lines, and Table 3-34 through Table 3-39 for the hot leg SI lines.

3.4 SURGE LINE LOADING CONDITIONS Because thermal stratification within the surge line piping can cause large stresses during heatup and cooldown, a review of the stratification stresses was performed to identify the upper bound loadings. The types of loading so identified are given in Table 3-11.

Seven loading cases were identified and are shown in Table 3-12. Cases A, B and C are the normal operating load cases and Cases D, E, F and G are the faulted load cases.

The case combinations postulated for the surge line Leak-Before-Break evaluation are summarized in Table 3-13. The cases of primary interest are the postulation of a detectable leak at normal 100% power [

Case Combination [

The case combination [

The realistic case combinations AID or B/E or [

[

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-5

]a,c,e The logic for this system /1 T of [

]8*

0*e is based on the following:

Actual practice, based on experience from other plants with this type of situation, indicates that the plant operators complete the cool down as quickly as possible once a leak in the primary system is detected.

Technical Specifications may require cold shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months but actual practice is that the plant operators depressurize the system as soon as possible once a primary system leak is detected. Therefore, the hot leg is generally on the warmer side of the limits (~200°F) when the pressurizer bubble is quenched.

Once the bubble is quenched, the pressurizer is cooled down fairly quickly reducing the /lT in the system.

3.5 REFERENCES

3-1 Standard Review Plan:

Public Comments Solicited; 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures; Federal Register/Vol. 52, No. 167/Friday, August 28, 1987/Notices, pp. 32626-32633.

3-2 NUREG-0800 Revision 1, March 2007, Standard Review Plan: 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-6 Table 3-1 Surry Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Line Piping Geometry and Loop 3

Operating Conditions Outer Weld Location Segment Diameter Nodes (in)

PZR-1 409 to 473 12.75 PZR-11 480 14.00 Notes:

Figure 3-1 shows the piping layout.

Material type is A376 TP316.

Minimum Wall Thickness (in) 1.005 1.114 Piping in segment PZR-I is 12-inch Schedule 140.

Piping in segment PZR-11 14-inch Schedule 140.

Normal Operating Temperature Pressure (OF)

(psig)

[

2235

]a,c,e 2235 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

Temperatures along the Surge line can vary from [

]a,c,e during normal operation based on the movement of the stratification boundmy. The most limiting temperature condition is considered for the LBB analysis.

Table 3-2 Surry Unit 1 RHR Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions Loop 1

2 3

Outer Minimum Normal Operating Weld Location Wall Segment Diameter Thickness Nodes (in)

(in)

RHRs-1 5 to 19 14.000 1.114 RHRs-11 22 to 35 14.000 1.114 RHRr2-I 175 to 230 10.750 0.896 RHRr3-I 595 to 555 10.750 0.896 Notes:

Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-4 show the piping layout.

Material type is A376 TP316.

Temperature (OF) 609.1 609.1 350.0 350.0 Piping in segment RHRs-I and RHRs-II is 14-inch Schedule 140.

Piping in segment RHRr2-I and RHRr3-I is 10-inch Schedule 140.

Pressure (psig) 2235 2235 660 660 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-7 Table 3-3 Surry Unit 2 RHR Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions Outer Minimum Normal Operating Weld Location Wall Loop 1

2 3

Segment Diameter Thickness Nodes (in)

(in)

RHRs-1 1870 to 1800 14.000 1.114 RHRs-II 1780 to 1680 14.000 1.114 RHRr2-I 410 to 460 10.750 0.896 RHRr3-I 42 to 49 10.750 0.896 Notes:

Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-5 shows the piping layout.

Material type is A376 TP316.

Temperature (OF) 609.1 609.1 350.0 350.0 Piping in segment RHRs-I and RHRs-II is 14-inch Schedule 140.

Piping in segment RHRr2-I and RHRr3-I is 10-inch Schedule 140.

Pressure (psig) 2235 2235 660 660 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thio

0 ~nrrl "'"'C fin<>I :,nnrm,Prl nn 1:;>/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-8 Table 3-4 Surry Unit 1 Accumulator Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions Loop 1

2 3

Outer Minimum Normal Operating Weld Location Wall Segment Nodes Diameter Thickness Temperature (in)

(in)

(OF)

ACC-1 180 to 145 12.750 1.005 543.0 ACC-II 140 to 35 12.750 1.005 350.0 ACC-III 30 to 25 12.750 1.005 120.0 ACC-1 20 to 45 12.750 1.005 543.0 ACC-11 47 to 140 12.750 1.005 350.0 ACC-III 145 to 147 12.750 1.005 120.0 ACC-1 800 to 775 12.750 1.005 543.0 ACC-11 770 to 660 12.750 1.005 350.0 ACC-III 665 to 680 12.750 1.005 120.0 Notes:

Figure 3-6, Figure 3-7, and Figure 3-8 show the piping layout.

Material type is A376 TP316.

Piping in segment ACC-1, ACC-11, andACC-III is 12-inch Schedule 140.

Pressure (psig) 2235 660 660 2235 660 660 2235 660 660 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th,~ ra,,,...rrl """' fin:,I :,nnrnvP.rl on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-9 Table 3-5 Surry Unit 2 Accumulator Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions Loop 1

2 3

Outer Minimum Normal Operating Weld Location Wall Segment Diameter Thickness Temperature Nodes (in)

(in)

(OF)

ACC-I 10 to 55 12.750 1.005 543.0 ACC-II 60 to 305 12.750 1.005 350.0 ACC-III 310to360 12.750 1.005 120.0 ACC-I 10 to 75 12.750 1.005 543.0 ACC-II 80 to 290 12.750 1.005 350.0 ACC-III 300 to 330 12.750 1.005 120.0 ACC-I 1 to 8 12.750 1.005 543.0 ACC-II 9 to 31 12.750 1.005 350.0 ACC-III 32 to 34 12.750 1.005 120.0 Notes:

Figure 3-9, Figure 3-10, and Figure 3-11 show the piping layout.

Material type is A3 7 6 TP316.

Piping in segmentACC-I,ACC-II, andACC-III is 12-inch Schedule 140.

Pressure (psig) 2235 660 660 2235 660 660 2235 660 660 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

Table 3-6 Surry Units 1 and 2 Loop Bypass Line Piping Geometry and Operating Loop 1,2,3 Conditions Outer Weld Location Segment Diameter Nodes (in)

BP-I 250 to 280 8.625 BP-II 280 to 305 8.625 Notes:

Figure 3-12 shows the piping layout.

Material type is A3 7 6 TP3 16.

Minimum Normal Operating Wall Thickness Temperature Pressure (in)

(OF)

(psig) 0.6496 609.1 2235 0.6496 543.0 2235 Piping in segment BP-I and BP-II is 8-inch Schedule 120.

The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;c '"'"'"rl w:a<> firnil 1moroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-10 Table 3-7 Surry Unit 1 Cold Leg SI Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions Loop 1

2 3

Outer Minimum Normal Operating Weld Location Wall Segment Diameter Thickness Temperature Nodes (in)

(in)

(OF)

SI-CL-I 5 to 60 6.625 0.5123 543.0 SI-CL-II 60 to 85 and 200 6.625 0.5123 40.0 SI-CL-I 5 to 35 and 160 6.625 0.5123 543.0 SI-CL-II 35 to 55 6.625 0.5123 40.0 SI-CL-I 54 to 46 6.625 0.5123 543.0 SI-CL-II 46 to 60 and 45 6.625 0.5123 40.0 Notes:

Figure 3-13, Figure 3-14, and Figure 3-15 show the piping layout.

Material type is A3 7 6 TP3 l 6.

Piping in segment SI-CL-I and SI-CL-II is 6-inch Schedule 120.

Pressure (psig) 2235 2520 2235 2520 2235 2520 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

An additional analysis case was considered with segments SI-CL-II at l 70°F, but the case at 40°F was determined to be more limiting.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;c rArnrrl w,io. fin,ii,innroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-11 Table 3-8 Surry Unit 2 Cold Leg SI Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions Loop 1

2 3

Outer Minimum Normal Operating Weld Location Wall Segment Diameter Thickness Temperature Nodes (in)

(in)

(OF)

SI-CL-I 5 to 50 6.625 0.5123 543.0 SI-CL-II 50 to 75 and 205 6.625 0.5123 40.0 SI-CL-I 205 to 165 6.625 0.5123 543.0 SI-CL-II 165 to 225 and 150 6.625 0.5123 40.0 SI-CL-I 380 to 345 6.625 0.5123 543.0 SI-CL-II 345 and 160 to 135 6.625 0.5123 40.0 Notes:

Figure 3-16, Figure 3-17, and Figure 3-18 show the piping layout.

Material type is A376 TP316.

Piping in segment SI-CL-I and SI-CL-II is 6-inch Schedule 120.

Pressure (psig) 2235 2520 2235 2520 2235 2520 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

An additional analysis case was considered with segments SI-CL-II at 170°F, but the case at 40°F was determined to be more limiting.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th:n *~nn,,< "'~~ fim.l <>nnrm,Prl nn 1 ?/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-12 Table 3-9 Surry Unit 1 Hot Leg SI Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions Loop 1

2 3

Outer Minimum Normal Operating Weld Location Wall Segment Diameter Thickness Temperature Nodes (in)

(in)

(OF)

SI-HL-1 1001 to 1050 6.625 0.5123 609.1 S1-HL-II 1050 to 1060 6.625 0.5123 40.0 SI-HL-I 670 to 630 6.625 0.5123 609.1 SI-HL-II 630 to 620 6.625 0.5123 40.0 SI-HL-1 3 to 35 6.625 0.5123 609.1 S1-HL-II 35 to 60 6.625 0.5123 40.0 Notes:

Figure 3-19, Figure 3-20, and Figure 3-21 show the piping layout.

Material type is A376 TP316.

Piping in segment SI-HL-1 and SI-HL-II is 6-inch Schedule 120.

Pressure (psig) 2235 2520 2235 2520 2235 2520 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

An additional analysis case was considered with segments SI-HL-II at l 70°F, but the case at 40°F was determined to be more limiting.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thio rnMcn We>C fin:cil :cinnmvP.rl on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-13 Table 3-10 Surry Unit 2 Hot Leg SI Line Piping Geometry and Operating Conditions Outer Minimum Normal Operating Weld Location Wall Loop Segment Nodes Diameter Thickness Temperature Pressure 1

2 3

(in)

(OF)

Sl-HL-1 71 to 62 6.625 0.5123 609.1 SI-HL-II (see note) 6.625 0.5123 40.0 SI-HL-1 100 to 155 6.625 0.5123 609.1 SI-HL-II 155 to 170 6.625 0.5123 40.0 Sl-HL-1 1 to 8 6.625 0.5123 609.1 SI-HL-11 8 to 11 6.625 0.5123 40.0 Notes:

Figure 3-22, Figure 3-23, and Figure 3-24 show the piping layout.

Material type is A3 7 6 TP3 16.

Piping in segment SI-HL-1 and SI-HL-II is 6-inch Schedule 120.

(psig) 2235 2520 2235 2520 2235 2520 The minimum wall thickness is conservatively based at the weld counterbore and not per ASME Code requirement.

An additional analysis case was considered with segments SI-HL-II at l 70°F, but the case at 40°F was determined to be more limiting.

All nodes within the Unit 2, Loop 1 hot leg SI line are defined in the piping analysis to experience the operating conditions of SI-HL-1.

Table 3-11 Pressurizer Surge Line Loading Types Pressure (P)

Deadweight (DW)

Normal Operating Thermal Expansion (TH)

Safe Shutdown Earthquake including Seismic Anchor Motion (SSE)

[

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP t,c,e t,c,e t,c,e December 2019 Revision 0

-- ___ J --*-- "~~* ~M*nu~,-1 nn 1?/11/?01Q ?*15:27 PM. /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-14 Table 3-12 Surge Line Normal and Faulted Loading Cases for LBB Evaluations CASEA This is the normal operating case at 609.1 °P consisting of the algebraic sum of the loading components due to P, DW and TH.

CASEB

[

] a,c,e

[

CASEC 1

] a,c,e CASED This is the faulted operating case at 609.1 °P consisting of the absolute sum ( every component load is taken as positive) of P, DW, TH and SSE.

CASEE

[

]a,c,e CASEP This is a forced cooldown case [

t'c,e with stratification r 1

a.,c,e CASEG1

[

]a,c,e Note (1 ): Case C and Case G are shown for information only.

Table 3-13 Load Case Combinations Considered for Surge Line Analyses AID This is the standard Leak-Before-Break evaluation.

This depicts a postulated forced cooldown event resulting from experiencing a detectable A/F leak [

]a,c,e B/E

[

]a_,c,e This depicts a postulated forced cooldown event resulting from experiencing a detectable B/P leak [

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP t'c,e December 2019 Revision 0

... ~L,_ -----..J,,, "--1 ---rnuarl nn 1?/11/?n1Q ?*1<;*?7 PM /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-15 Table 3-14 Surry Units 1 and 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Surge Lines Node Case Axial Force (lbf)

Moment (in-lbf)

A 194962 620270 B

193814 1156469 409 D

216083 1234113 E

217231 1815256 F

37652 2659341 A

194962 620270 B

193904 1117237 410 D

216083 1234113 E

217141 1781117 F

37599 2620566 A

194962 868601 B

193905 1073497 425 D

215950 1425557 E

217008 1694510 F

37598 1357708 A

209400 343667 B

210367 578744 455 D

213352 897361 E

214319 1149936 F

35532 870089 A

204721 1284942 B

205442 1234355 473 D

213477 2714921 E

212756 2534771 F

40638 691393 A

245737 1394773 B

246459 1340919 480 D

254495 2942862 E

253773 2768149 F

47650 707867 Notes: See Figure 3-1 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Normal Loads: Cases A and B. Faulted Loads: Cases D, E, and F.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total stress (psi) 11396 16671 18040 23822 27332 11396 16286 18040 23482 26947 13854 15853 19931 22621 14450 9048 11401 14634 17160 9569 18237 17756 32624 30822 7938 15797 15413 27477 26165 6308 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;c ror-nrn '""'" fin:al :annrow,cl on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-16 Table 3-15 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the RHR Suction Line Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 5 245965 97587 6

240511 97587 7

239421 105625 8

239305 107567 9

238806 98520 10 238130 146262 12 237473 219931 15 241196 257516 18 245720 339016 19 240756 341256 22 240756 331594 23 240756 240193 24 240756 144514 25 240756 179238 26 240755 244885 27 240756 266123 28 237627 330195 29 237196 301369 30 236335 272597 32 243610 296511 33 243056 332867 34 245965 364528 35 240511 363444 Notes: See Figure 3-2 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress (psi) 6177 6056 6092 6104 6025 6365 6897 7258 7964 7870 7798 7120 6410 6668 7155 7312 7719 7495 7263 7601 7859 8158 8029 Faulted Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 250924 571660 250924 571660 252992 420773 252054 358076 252496 265081 253094 404644 253665 657095 254352 788814 252104 918198 252104 913321 247970 794629 247970 550134 247798 396588 247658 440140 247524 499421 247523 492719 251092 534598 251387 465032 252142 391325 249971 429233 249300 459587 247526 419695 247526 416297 Total Stress (psi) 9805 9805 8731 8245 7565 8614 10500 11493 12403 12367 11395 9580 8437 8757 9194 9144 9534 9024 8494 8727 8938 8602 8577 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi~ rnr.nrrl wFJs finFil aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-17 Table 3-16 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the RHR Suction Line Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 1870 240422 62630 1860 240299 63597 1850 240211 63224 1840 246700 74771 1830 247296 134516 1820 238584 206244 1810 245129 231724 1800 245500 312809 1780 240976 305124 1775 245500 137045 1770 245500 291586 1760 248711 352004 1750 249065 321019 1740 245846 270011 1730 241096 252064 1720 241562 247895 1710 244448 258174 1700 242102 261079 1680 240825 289749 Notes: See Figure 3-3 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 5795 247327 5799 247433 5795 247527 6024 247962 6481 248516 6820 249041 7154 250251 7764 246819 7607 246744 6460 246744 7607 246480 8126 250642 7904 250926 7454 251595 7216 251129 7195 250556 7335 250004 7305 249930 7489 246554 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 309827 294361 272526 236706 256323 330316 366104 444748 406735 279472 399291 458106 410675 346902 370603 410187 462176 471796 430410 Total Stress (psi) 7783 7670 7510 7254 7412 7973 8265 8773 8489 7544 8428 8956 8611 8152 8318 8599 8973 9042 8660 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;o rornrrl "'"" fin:,1 :,nnrovP.cl on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-18 Table 3-17 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 RHR Return Line Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 175 41555 131987 180 42162 123375 182 41778 117597 185 41778 94127 190 41777 149910 192 41777 156013 195 44030 186415 196 39182 186865 197 44032 182728 198 44030 176749 199 44026 168682 200 44017 159295 203 43994 148706 207 43966 128818 210 39246 104614 213 43887 81700 217 43836 55407 220 39376 31943 223 43712 45725 227 39511600 82104 230 39570 128252 Notes: See Figure 3-4 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 3590 46570 3475 45965 3370 44068 2998 44068 3882 44062 3978 44064 4541 46549 4373 46549 4483 46478 4388 46533 4260 46601 4111 46622 3942 46704 3626 46780 3073 46780 2877 46747 2459 46713 1926 46713 2301 46503 2725 46503 3459 46387 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 340252 384916 337795 222588 272952 284419 310712 297009 287526 260395 243046 244368 245785 246927 227247 203306 152975 86074 70704 149984 266045 Total Stress (psi) 7070 7755 6940 5116 5913 6095 6601 6384 6231 5803 5531 5553 5578 5599 5287 4907 4108 3048 2797 4053 5888 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;~ ra.--nrri "'"" fin"I,mnroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-19 Table 3-18 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 RHR Return Line Normal Faulted Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment Total Stress Axial Force Moment Total Stress (lbf)

(in-lbi)

(psi)

(lbf)

(in-lbf)

(psi) 595 38601 297762 6109 44947 342430 7046 590 45111 227588 5232 45678 269321 5914 585 45112 203368 4849 45679 303316 6452 580 45112 218315 5085 45810 308113 6533 575 39157 199485 4572 44755 255729 5665 570 39646 110489 3180 44309 144589 3889 565 43077 248286 5487 43752 298694 6310 560 45142 285592 6152 45730 337575 6997 555 45143 275292 5989 45731 323526 6774 Notes: See Figure 3-4 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Table 3-19 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 RHR Return Line Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 410 45398 645167 420 37277 428483 I

430 45911 534069 440 38079 330610 450 45133 173045 455 31952 71591 460 31952 82634 Notes: See Figure 3-5 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 11857 48946 8132 50710 10116 50684 6611 48862 4369 48856 2287 54380 2462 54380 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 875927 599372 705002 496116 371370 246371 244041 Total Stress (psi) 15641 11324 12996 9621 7645 5864 5827 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;~ rornrrl "'"" fin"I "nnroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-20 Table 3-20 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 RHR Return Line Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 42 37528 343376 43 40629 358118 44 45684 402517 45 44975 387959 46 42158 351590 4445 36724 331958 47 45646 220876 48 42860 193872 49 40352 175167 Notes: See Figure 3-5 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 6793 48476 7138 45130 8024 47568 7768 49230 7090 47610 6583 48800 5145 47867 4617 46397 4230 46403 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 517370 561843 562455 517621 468905 431331 412508 417577 377059 Total Stress (psi) 9944 10528 10626 9975 9145 8593 8261 8288 7647 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;c r<>rnrrl w<a<> fin<al,rnnroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-21 Table 3-21 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Accumulator Line Weld Location Node Axial Force (lbf) 180 206128 175 205800 170 203247 167 203246 165 204690 160 204302 155 203913 152 204276 150 204276 145 204276 140 61584 137 61583 135 58722 130 59790 125 56062 120 57032 115 58003 110 59071 107 58500 105 60021 100 60022 95 60021 90 60021 87 60368 85 60298 80 60298 75 60298 Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Normal Moment (in-lbf) 199408 237185 242459 232419 262610 306947 351888 304730 290007 230524 201431 148289 99074 59245 162294 276339 391909 519579 119791 137247 149791 98771 87131 45031 39817 37513 58503 Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 7533 208786 7898 208458 7881 207463 7782 207462 8119 208331 8548 208719 8982 209067 8525 207162 8379 207162 7791 207163 3654 63452 3128 63453 2564 66843 2199 67911 3118 66221 4273 65313 5443 66232 6735 67368 2763 63799 2977 62167 3101 62168 2596 62065 2481 62026 2074 62122 2020 60919 1997 60919 2205 61306 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 687912 634313 524419 497557 438606 451120 550223 602560 595220 568728 522910 445733 381117 262259 289273 432549 647124 912852 529813

467182 365363 299983 296381 280543 257780 261204 306574 Total Stress (psi) 12438 11899 10785 10519 9959 10093 11083 11550 11477 11215 6886 6122 5574 4427 4649 6042 8190 10850 6964 6300 5292 4642 4606 4452 4194 4228 4687 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi-, rnN>rrl wlls final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Table 3-21

( continued)

Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 72 60298 63039 70 61568 80447 65 62125 64296 60 62914 58230 57 63087 57597 55 63461 47559 47 59099 33128 45 59342 34163 42 59948 36364 40 60234 36004 37 60234 34637 35 60234 30418 30 60234 10404 27 59705 42993 25 59885 44924 Notes: See Figure 3-6 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 2250 61402 2457 66197 2312 66754 2273 67406 2271 67833 2182 68207 1922 66443 1939 66160 1977 66737 1981 62077 1967 62077 1926 62078 1727 61940 2036 62691 2060 62691 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 317778 314895 281193 261600 264329 285506 414459 464969 490377 451420 425988 375089 317268 248654 256066 3-22 Total Stress (psi) 4801 4901 4583 4407 4445 4665 5893 6386 6653 6141 5890 5386 4810 4151 4225 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This. rAr.nrrl was final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-23 Table 3-22 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Accumulator Line Weld Location Node Axial Force (lbf) 20 207389 10 207195 15 206964 21 203270 23 203270 25 203270 30 205563 33 205391 37 204927 40 208229 42 204506 45 204506 47 61813 48 61813 50 61813 52 57628 55 57887 60 53989 61 54612

'.62 55583 65 56553 68 57524 70 58037 72 58523 75 59158 77 59158 80 59158 Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Normal Moment (in-lbf) 286191 308268 335259 317167 287073 270821 305718 327300 386169 408303 347346 272400 228323 166638 155725 82274 52381 49620 124889 252518 381675 511202 244085 224518 222854 228585 208156 Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 8425 210595 8639 210400 8899 210169 8621 208621 8323 208596 8162 208596 8569 210000 8778 210114 9348 210537 9656 211263 8953 208610 8211 206939 3927 64245 3316 64107 3208 64107 2368 68219 2080 68503 1947 68761 2709 68174 3998 67242 5302 67285 6610 68306 3981 64305 3800 63819 3801 63303 3858 63183 3655 63122 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 998949 953084 924846 747837 663632 616940 595139 573337 617707 665605 703406 654895 592434 513925 501323 400690 336013 299314 327347 434321 645639 903588 628745 544910 454228 394229 388948 Total Stress (psi) 15565 15106 14820 13027 12193 11731 11553 11340 11791 12285 12587 12062 7595 6815 6690 5805 5173 4816 5078 6112 8204 10784 7956 7114 6202 5605 5551 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;~ ra~nrn "'"" fin:,I :,nnrnw,rl on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Table 3-22

( continued)

Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 82 59158 196707 85 58922 139696 90 61323 313632 97 61324 245980 98 61324 219769 100 61324 219312 102 60199 194947 105 60755 139715 110 61544 77320 115 61824 72921 120 56955 62663 123 57425 65961 125 58008 102640 130 58300 126390 135 61349 172785 138 61349 186011 140 61349 196555 145 61349 177669 146 61283 156740 147 60537 193378

Notes: See Figure 3-7 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 3542 63122 2972 62609 4758 62518 4088 61940 3829 61942 3824 61942 3553 64545 3021 64730 2425 65519 2389 65493 2156 65258 2201 64629 2580 63899 2823 63607 3364 62993 3495 63019 3600 63068 3413 63068 3204 63570 3546 62786 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 409457 359396 511064 363880 409672 402965 390009 302403 191142 193482 177877 207398 320492 366748 439708 419360 400142 312549 350076 352369 3-24 Total Stress (psi) 5754 5245 6744 5271 5725 5658 5600 4738 3659 3681 3520 3795 4895 5345 6050 5850 5661 4794 5179 5180 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thio. rPr.nrrl w~s final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-25 Table 3-23 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Accumulator Line Weld Location Node Axial Force (lbf) 800 212981 795 212006 790 211300 785 203658 780 203658 775 203658 770 60966 765 62038 760 54665 755 55790 750 52512 745 53696 740 54881 735 58085 730 58008 725 58008 720 58008 715 58008 705 58066 600 61534 605 61571 610 61571 615 61545 620 62898 625 58461 630 59273 635 59895 Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Normal Moment (in-lbf) 506279 583387 642515 513529 484901 366922 281794 110286 129304 180432 276175 384352 496911 113057 84404 127797 201813 274013 271996 304977 303191 284005 266201 153189 141543 108575 154604 Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 10754 214695 11491 213720 12057 212921 10574 204893 10291 204839 9124 204839 4433 61693 2765 62765 2754 69564 3290 70735 4149 68738 5252 68862 6398 70185 2685 62154 2400 62807 2829 62807 3562 62640 4276 62512 4258 62069 4678 62073 4661 62293 4471 62475 4294 64313 3212 64999 2977 65390 2673 64608 3145 63986 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 762151 708840 750443 649593 626353 532029 417809 192591 231940 267111 341668 440742 603472 246133 164224 173515 261349 362788 363573 385912 377982 359289 363241 228383 206799 166294 280153 Total Stress (psi) 13332 12779 13169 11954 11723 10789 5798 3599 4171 4551 5235 6219 7865 4112 3319 3411 4276 5276 5272 5493 5421 5240 5329 4013 3810 3388 4498 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This rnr.ord was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Table 3-23 (continued)

Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 645 61194 165739 650 61194 157467 655 61194 142929 660 61194 131889 665 61194 118195 675 59076 151623 680 59075 142218 Notes: See Figure 3-8 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometty and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 3291 62254 3209 62254 3065 62254 2956 62338 2820 62338 3094 61648 3001 62071 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 292830 274888 242719 216414 188697 210310 281479 3-26 Total Stress (psi) 4577 4399 4081 3823 3549 3744 4460 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thiss rAr.orrl was final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-27 Table 3-24 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Accumulator Line Weld Location Node Axial Force (lbf) 10 206069 15 206069 20 205124 30 208425 50 203811 55 203811 60 61119 70 61119 80 57917 90 51543 100 52739 110 53935 115 55131 120 57312 125 57312 130 57829 140 59963 150 59963 160 59979 170 60333 180 59963 190 59963 200 60098 205 60098 210 60098 220 60098 230 60789 Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Normal Moment (in-lbf) 235648 235648 312847 396696 319231 242694 199929 98582 57346 96623 202312 312895 424564 37353 37353 33623 20273 89181 94683 100320 93872 89231 84060 48000 45402 47932 52501 Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(Ibf) 7890 212605 7890 212605 8628 213178 9547 214628 8656 207858 7898 206328 3627 63373 2624 63332 2129 71133 2346 74363 3424 73517 4551 72605 5688 71541 1915 64827 1915 64827 1892 64267 1818 62497 2500 62369 2555 61045 2620 61293 2546 61787 2500 61780 2453 61134 2096 62253 2070 62310 2095 62319 2159 65241 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 1020495 1020495 645473 798346 776413 705035 619116 445244 433178 392684 425150 543292 849659 383975 383975 322908 239699 201445 255828 281049 326768 321923 226178 196789 256261 264899 253325 Total Stress (psi) 15833 15833 12137 13689 13289 12542 7836 6114 6205 5892 6190 7335 10338 5548 5548 4929 4058 3676 4178 4434 4900 4852 3887 3626 4216 4302 4266 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi,s mr.orrl was final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Table 3-24 (continued)

Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 240 56421 49490 250 57781 20736 260 57959 17793 270 58106 15767 280 60098 18599 300 60098 29368 305 60098 44828 310 60098 27972 320 60098 12158 330 60048 8132 340 59898 4095 360 59627 25747 Notes: See Figure 3-9 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 2011 68069 1764 66630 1739 66447 1723 66296 1805 62187 1911 62105 2064 61489 1898 61456 1741 61448 1700 61519 1656 61619 1863 61628 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 230096 301992 343850 350897 299327 270927 227300 163076 127308 123323 112573 130655 3-28 Total Stress (psi) 4113 4785 5195 5260 4639 4356 3908 3271 2917 2880 2776 2955 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-29 Table 3-25 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Accumulator Line Weld Location Node Axial Force (lbf) 10 205565 11 205565 15 205195 20 203420 30 203420 40 204092 50 206910 70 204213 75 204213 80 61521 85 61521 90 59294 100 53041 110 53982 120 54924 130 55865 140 56806 150 56183 151 56183 160 56892 170 53929 180 53929 185 53929 190 55733 195 57387 200 66995 210 66995 Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Normal Moment Total Stress (in-lbf)

(psi) 151438 7043 151438 7043 195428 7468 209695 7561 203827 7503 237050 7850 318070 8728 306628 8542 273528 8214 205353 3691 170468 3346 92592 2515 41343 1840 118467 2628 247599 3932 357932 5049 488418 6365 375536 5232 375536 5232 166236 3179 199440 3428 134874 2789 153963 2978 164189 3128 124576 2781 338641 5158 539332 7144 Faulted Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 210873 924119 210873 924119 210462 815843 210153 673343 210145 635451 210159 531249 211826 673264 208230 751375 206517 724716 63813 630495 63546 579872 68580 493730 71659 375200 70861 387119 70068 509426 69289 645957 68477 923407 65226 740403 65226 740403 64442 346891 69817 522775 69446 403757 69404 384734 67102 388542 63649 359977 71743 844723 71766 1008744 Total Stress (psi) 14832 14832 13750 12331 11956 10925 12376 13051 12741 7960 7452 6736 5646 5742 6931 8261 10985 9086 9086 5171 7056 5868 5679 5655 5279 10294 11918 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi<: rpr,nrrl was final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Table 3-25

( continued)

Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 220 65156 490923 230 60775 431741 235 61232 206533 237 61690 80937 240 63191 270377 250 62222 315794 260 62384 395759 270 63958 426251 275 67278 494874 280 67278 477285 281 67278 357638 290 67278 305893 300 67278 206770 310 64322 180796 311 63324 188083 3020 63324 195144 320 63324 194491 330 63324 198614 Notes: See Figure 3-10 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geomet1y and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 6615 67667 5912 68140 3695 67758 2465 67374 4380 65917 4803 69095 5599 68929 5943 70821 6712 73356 6538 72864 5354 72896 4842 71062 3861 73139 3524 68077 3569 66411 3639 66415 3633 66421 3673 66858 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 854415 748631 341785 192849 575555 654452 796126 852094 920103 874716 586972 474901 363331 420289 421383 433822 410790 381286 3-30 Total Stress (psi) 10280 9246 5210 3725 7473 8340 9737 10342 11084 10621 7775 6616 5568 5995 5961 6084 5857 5576 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Th;c rornrrl w,io. fin,il,innrnved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-31 Table 3-26 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Accumulator Line Weld Location Node Axial Force (lbf) 1 206149 2

205979 3

203130 4

203130 5

204807 6

208277 7

207790 8

204016 9

61324 10 61324 11 58434 12 53468 13 54709 14 55949 331 57190 15 55853 332 55853 16 56562 17 57160 18 57160 19 57160 20 57503 21 58907 210 58907 211 58907 22 59881 23 59881 Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Normal Moment (in-lbf) 231806 252574 253553 233149 269391 299477 346569 284392 182779 119134 68039 60938 196046 334606 473596 142772 143296 46679 78867 97931 157114 151804 160489 201940 261635 302514 258492 Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 7854 210167 8055 209965 7988 209536 7786 209481 8189 209787 8581 211913 9034 211288 8317 206842 3463 63004 2833 62669 2249 68056 2045 69910 3416 68870 4820 67833 6229 67507 2919 65777 2924 65777 1987 64984 2322 67376 2511 67004 3096 66494 3053 66338 3177 63137 3587 63981 4178 63281 4609 62604 4173 62627 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 962723 896916 696548 635284 578280 512147 621757 629770 511738 421070 373848 357775 454184 600039 842029 662610 663225 334520 484356 484603 589421 550210 458828 499533 555555 607150 532318 Total Stress (psi) 15195 14539 12544 11936 11381 10783 11851 11811 6763 5857 5535 5426 6352 7767 10153 8331 8337 5063 6610 6603 7626 7234 6243 6669 7204 7697 6957 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi",.,rnrrl w,a,s fin,al aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Table 3-26

( continued)

Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 24 59881 250113 25 61519 216463 26 57110 200973 27 58455 79536 28 58853 53671 29 59881 40555 30 59880 38975 31 59880 43275 32 59880 51942 320 59528 54494 34 58352 84614 Notes: See Figure 3-11 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 4090 63098 3801 67389 3529 68822 2364 67054 2118 66638 2016 64295 2001 62673 2043 62008 2129 61797 2145 61750 2411 63322 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 519601 495434 445244 412052 521239 495577 453635 403962 394332 411265 381776 3-32 Total Stress (psi) 6844 6720 6262 5886 6955 6638 6179 5670 5569 5735 5486 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This rnr.ord was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-33 Table 3-27 Surry Units 1 and 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop Bypass Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 250 92256 194179 255 92256 172699 260 92366 25860 265 96230 32677 270 92012 82267 275 92012 105561 280 92012 132416 280 97327 132427 290 91081 106073 295 97732 12764 300 95830 36313 305 95836 107859 Notes: See Figure 3-12 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 12096 99128 11385 99128 6531 98035 6994 97847 8376 98909 9148 98909 10037 98908 10363 98672 9107 98672 6427 99220 7090 98125 9459 98136 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 305653 268653 86173 137012 200072 214438 234401 231994 176107 121261 163416 249592 Total Stress (psi) 16209 14984 8876 10547 12700 13176 13836 13742 11892 10110 11438 14292 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi.: nar.nrrl was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-34 Table 3-28 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Cold Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbt) 5 56025 78874 15 56086 52689 30 54030 54928 35 52786 52910 40 57330 50354 45 57330 36642 50 57330 28671 60 57330 26163 60 60960 38801 65 63198 34798 70 62133 20477 75 62196 27362 80 60066 51244 85 64092 53336 200 62170 21759 Notes: See Figure 3-13 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 11342 57346 9474 58126 9425 58125 9154 59486 9433 59486 8451 59485 7881 59413 7701 59413 8975 64835 8916 64835 7782 63195 8282 63132 9775 65977 10334 65976 7878 62656 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 158832 104833 108448 102445 99290 89435 94864 100977 121364 112126 87958 80623 106164 107025 35136 Total Stress (psi) 17201 13414 13673 13381 13156 12450 12831 13269 15280 14618 12721 12190 14307 14369 8885 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This rnr.ord was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-35 Table 3-29 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Cold Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 5 56134 103183 20 56146 87174 25 56146 91791 30 53968 101700 35 56148 107619 35 61277 109146 40 61232 86577 45 62368 78824 50 61973 89306 55 63047 89926 160 55178 2901 Notes: See Figure 3-14 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 13093 56526 11949 58101 12279 58101 12767 58098 13412 58098 14043 63850 12423 63805 11983 62653 12693 62748 12847 64613 5817 55543 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 198210 163774 166912 178798 186930 202786 158129 134520 142848 149346 19722 Total Stress (psi) 19936 17631 17856 18707 19289 21009 17807 16000 16605 17260 7058 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi" rnr.orrl wr1s final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-36 Table 3-30 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Cold Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 54 54672 41472 52 54486 34350 50 54487 39786 48 55630 47474 46 54486 51767 46 61769 55685 45 61946 4468 55 62550 46294 56 62622 57087 60 61571 55524 Notes: See Figure 3-15 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress (psi) 8527 7998 8387 9054 9245 10266 6617 9673 10453 10234 Faulted Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 55949 121920 56857 111428 56856 116484 56848 123453 56848 128562 63010 135369 62447 20172 63171 91933 63094 107989 63572 105320 Total Stress (psi) 14416 13757 14119 14617 14983 16097 7792 13003 14145 14002 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This.,.,,wrl was final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-37 Table 3-31 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Cold Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 1 57148 13771 5

53046 19038 6

57031 21720 10 56997 24020 15 54839 24234 40 54839 24656 45 54839 35906 50 54839 47896 50 62298 47890 60 63103 57782 65 61206 56140 70 62836 56236 75 62247 51731 205 62027 3712 Notes: See Figure 3-16 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 6795 58195 6755 58117 7353 58078 7514 58044 7310 56535 7340 56535 8145 56530 9004 56473 9761 63490 10551 63938 10241 63787 10414 63619 10031 63156 6571 62298 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 199881 170258 155837 146652 125999 125452 121436 125742 125734 143807 104258 116399 108518 10506 Total Stress (psi) 20226 18097 17061 16400 14768 14728 14440 14743 15456 16795 13948 14800 14189 7085 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This, rP.r.ord was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-38 Table 3-32 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Cold Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 205 53402 108197 200 56613 71689 195 53540 61181 190 53840 59337 185 56276 54875 180 56276 60780 170 53840 78240 165 53840 98377 165 63294 98378 160 60864 103959 155 62650 112807 150 62115 3843 210 61565 118038 215 61587 122026 220 61221 114585 225 61221 114585 Notes: See Figure 3-17 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geomet1y and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 13175 57271 10887 57170 9823 57133 9721 57109 9649 57109 10072 57102 11075 57102 12516 57039 13477 64057 13630 64057 14445 63015 6589 62209 14709 62958 14997 62910 14427 167784 14427 167784 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 155542 106934 95110 81476 79403 82294 94393 113964 113970 119982 130880 17293 135320 139301 136543 137551 Total Stress (psi) 16958 13467 12617 11638 11490 11696 12563 13957 14671 15102 15776 7562 16088 16368 26832 26904 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-39 Table 3-33 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Cold Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 380 53872 54720 375 53872 47551 370 53873 41655 365 56209 38242 360 55559 34707 355 54557 34905 350 54557 40855 345 54557 51499 345 62579 51499 160 62097 4152 155 61705 60266 150 62395 64908 145 61784 67600 140 61574 65129 135 62584 65120 Notes: See Figure 3-18 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress (psi) 9394 8881 8459 8452 8133 8045 8471 9233 10048 6610 10587 10990 11120 10922 11024 Faulted Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 57038 108243 57038 92469 57039 77360 57005 67106 56175 56772 56175 56876 56175 60631 56105 74048 63125 74048 62155 12045 63101 84612 63043 89181 63012 92878 63015 86010 63015 85991 Total Stress (psi) 13548 12418 11337 10599 9775 9782 10051 11005 11718 7181 12472 12793 13055 12563 12562 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi~ rP.cord was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was a.dded by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-40 Table 3-34 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Hot Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 1001 55675 40640 1005 54437 40178 1010 54983 37181 1015 56076 34581 1020 56181 32950 1025 53842 31700 1030 54962 30609 1032 54962 31667 1035 55154 31573 1040 55131 31406 1045 54985 30814 1050 54984 25558 1050 62152 25558 1055 62006 9393 1060 62153 29822 Notes: See Figure 3-19 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 8569 56313 8410 56317 8251 55965 8176 56338 8070 56443 7743 56535 7779 55991 7854 55992 7867 55992 7853 56344 7796 56344 7419 56061 8148 63079 6976 63079 8453 62987 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 122481 122840 120840 107694 62637 64558 72547 72091 75082 65526 63387 58234 58171 60079 79022 Total Stress (psi) 14493 14519 14340 13437 10222 10369 10886 10853 11067 10419 10266 9868 10577 10713 12060 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This rnr.ord was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-41 Table 3-35 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Hot Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 670 55352 29089 666 55412 18875 665 54945 15260 660 55754 13434 655 55845 17796 650 55936 22188 648 54974 22552 647 55142 23597 645 55120 23000 642 55243 25857 640 54873 26993 635 55243 29704 630 55243 27496 630 61808 27496 625 62264 17115 620 61894 5861 Notes: See Figure 3-20 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 7709 55850 6984 55910 6678 55867 6629 56042 6951 56129 7275 56216 7203 55738 7295 55738 7250 55716 7467 56628 7511 56600 7742 56600 7584 56331 8252 63352 7555 63352 6711 63259 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 97774 91119 89415 74838 54269 67454 80138 81764 81460 76312 75885 76476 72658 72658 61480 66311 Total Stress (psi) 12677 12207 12081 11055 9591 10544 11403 11520 11496 11220 11186 11229 10928 11642 10842 11178 December 2019 Revision 0

- - Thi" re>r.nrrl w:cis final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-42 Table 3-36 Surry Unit 1 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Hot Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 3 55452 16565 5

55124 13668 10 54369 10072 15 54169 15531 20 55088 19279 25 55027 20486 30 55028 27241 35 54683 21005 35 62453 21005 40 61705 25320 45 62454 24437 50 61704 21330 55 61704 16111 60 61704 9697 Notes: See Figure 3-21 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 6823 56216 6582 56093 6248 56130 6619 56330 6980 55929 7060 55930 7544 55929 7063 56686 7852 63706 8085 63706 8098 63459 7800 63459 7426 63406 6967 63352 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 103140 97448 85051 79509 87539 87766 85504 76950 77496 76042 71226 64046 61353 66877 Total Stress (psi) 13099 12679 11795 11419 11953 11969 11807 11271 12024 11920 11550 11036 10838 11228 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon Its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-43 Table 3-37 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 1 Hot Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 71 55210 54461 600 55210 54464 890 55688 50939 89 54117 32315 88 56153 33079 87 55029 42915 86 53843 28270 66 56718 29341 65 53398 39545 64 56718 33004 63 56718 19815 62 56718 15129 Notes: See Figure 3-22 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 9511 56776 9512 56776 9308 57156 7815 56444 8076 56577 8666 56366 7497 57522 7866 57854 8259 57692 8129 57688 7184 57630 6849 57586 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 181272 181286 173492 142837 154536 145538 162920 147495 118702 106478 77649 79787 Total Stress (psi) 18749 18750 18231 15964 16815 16149 17511 16441 14363 13487 11417 11566 December 2019 Revision 0

- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-44 Table 3-38 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 2 Hot Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 100 55842 22637 105 55256 11549 110 54432 5557 120 55515 29559 130 54952 39017 140 54953 39843 145 55163 40892 150 55966 47044 155 55966 49141 155 61171 49140 160 62987 46435 165 61171 32607 170 62987 15584 Notes: See Figure 3-23 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress (psi) 7297 6444 5931 7760 8379 8439 8535 9057 9207 9736 9727 8553 7519 Faulted Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 56622 122833 57028 102110 56951 86163 56760 100363 55983 111939 55981 111713 55980 111912 57116 113001 57121 106703 63980 106711 63985 98852 63918 75146 63907 72242 Total Stress (psi) 14550 13107 11958 12955 13705 13689 13703 13896 13446 14144 13581 11878 11668 December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-45 Table 3-39 Surry Unit 2 Normal and Faulted Loads and Stresses for the Loop 3 Hot Leg SI Lines Normal Weld Location Node Axial Force Moment (lbf)

(in-lbf) 1 55271 22836 2

55305 17104 3

55706 9701 4

54254 30565 5

55012 36068 6

55104 37083 7

55827 39828 8

54289 41541 8

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61310 38007 10 61310 21157 11 61310 9489 Notes: See Figure 3-24 for piping layout.

Axial force includes pressure.

Pipe Geometry and Loading WCAP-18491-NP Total Stress Axial Force (psi)

(lbf) 7253 56088 6847 56250 6357 56242 7703 56377 8174 55783 8256 55780 8526 57443 8493 57440 9363 64188 8953 64186 7747 64134 6912 64057 Faulted Moment (in-lbf) 109190 98703 78343 83246 91075 93418 89287 87018 87018 80359 60300 60231 Total Stress (psi) 13519 12784 11326 11691 12191 12358 12232 12069 12755 12278 10837 10824 December 2019 Revision 0

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- - Thi.a rnr.orrl was final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Loop 1 Hot Leg 14 "-RH-1-1502 32 33 28 29 30 MOV-1701 39 40 Figure 3-2 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for RHR Suction Line 3-47 Pipe Geomet1y and Loading December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

- - This: rnr.nrrl w;cis final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Loop 1 Hot Leg 1840 1830 1820 1810 1850 14"-RH-101-1502 1795 1760 1800 MOV-2700 1750 1740 1730 1720 1675 1710 1700 Figure 3-3 Surry Unit 2 Piping Layout for RHR Suction Line 3-48 Pipe Geometry and Loading December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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94 203 207 WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 10"*RH*16*1502 210 213 217 223 227 Anchor 575 570 1 0"*RH-17-1502 565 Figure 3-4 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for RHR Return Lines 3-49 590 600 Loop3 12" Accumulator 12"-SI-47-1502 705 Pipe Geometry and Loading December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Loop 2 12" Accumulator 12" -SI-246-1502 210 200 195 410

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-54 Critic.al Lo~ation:

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- - This rP.r.ord was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-57 Figure 3-12 Surry Units 1 and 2 Piping Layout for Loop Bypass Lines Pipe Geometry and Loading December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 3-58 Figure 3-13 Surry Unit 1 Piping Layout for Loop 1 Cold Leg SI Line Pipe Geometry and Loading December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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- - This rP.r.ord was final aooroved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon Its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 4-1 4.0 MATERIAL CHARACTERIZATION 4.1 PIPE MATERIALS AND WELD PROCESS The material type for each of the Surry Units 1 and 2 auxiliary piping systems considered in this report is identified as A376 TP3 l 6, which is a seamless pipe material form. Although not explicitly identified in the piping analyses, it is expected that elbows, tees, reducers, and other wrought pipe fittings actually have a material type of A403 WP316. The physical and tensile properties of A376 TP316 (seamless pipe) and A403 WP316 (wrought fittings) are identical per Section II of the ASME Code (Reference 4-1). These piping materials are consistent with the types used for piping systems across the majority of PWR plants.

The welding processes used are Shielded Metal Arc Weld (SMAW) and Submerged Arc Weld (SAW). For all piping systems except for the Surge line there are not sufficient fabrication records available to suppmi identifying the specific welding process used at each weld location. As a result, the SAW process is assumed for all weld locations on the RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI piping systems. The SAW weld process results in the most conservative Z-factor for the evaluation of the critical flaw size. For the surge line piping, analysis locations 409, 455, and 480 are field welds and can conservatively be assumed to use the SMAW process. Surge line analysis locations 410,425 and 473 are shop welds and the SAW process will be assumed since it more conservative than SMAW.

In the following sections the tensile properties of the materials are presented for use in the Leak-Before-Break analyses.

4.2 TENSILE PROPERTIES Certified Materials Test Reports (CMTRs) with mechanical properties were not readily available for the Surry Units 1 and 2 auxiliary piping systems. Therefore, ASME Code mechanical properties were used to establish the tensile prope1iies for the Leak-Before-Break analyses.

For the A376 TP316 (seamless pipe) and A403 WP316 (wrought fittings) material types, the representative properties at operating temperatures are established from the tensile prope1iies given by Section II of the 2007 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Code tensile properties at temperatures for the operating conditions considered in this LBB analysis were obtained by linear interpolation of tensile properties provided in the Code.

, Material modulus of elasticity was also interpolated from ASME Code values for the operating temperatures

.considered, and Poisson's ratio was taken as 0.3. The yield strengths, ultimate strengths, and elastic moduli

'for the pipe material at applicable operating temperatures are tabulated in Table 4-1.

4.3 REFERENCE 4-1 ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section II, 2007 Edition through 2008 Addenda.

Material Characterization WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 4-2 Table 4-1 A376 TP316 and A403 WP316 Material Properties for Operating Temperature Conditions on Surry Units 1 and 2 Auxiliary Piping Systems Segment PZR-II PZR-I RHRs-I RHRs-II BP-I SI-HL-I ACC-I BP-II SI-CL-I PZR-II RHRr2-I RHRr3-I ACC-II PZR-I ACC-III SI-CL-II SI-HL-II Material Characterization WCAP-18491-NP Operating Yield Ultimate Temperature Strength Strength (OF)

(psi)

[

609.1 18827 71800 543.0 19527 71800

[

350.0 22400 72400

[

120.0 28960 75000 40.0 30000 75000 Elastic Modulus (psi)

]a,c,e 25254500 25642000

]a,c,e 26700000

]a,c,e 27992308 28300000 December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 5-1 5.0 CRITICAL LOCATIONS 5.1 CRITICAL LOCATIONS The Leak-Before-Break (LBB) evaluation margins are to be demonstrated for the critical locations (governing locations). Such locations are established based on the loads (Section 3.3) and the material properties established in Section 4.2. These locations are defined below for the Surry auxiliary piping systems.

Critical Locations for the Surge lines:

The LBB evaluation of the Surge line piping considers a discrete evaluation for each of the weld locations identified in Figure 3-1 and Table 3-14. The pipe material type is A376 TP316 or A403 WP316.

Critical Locations for the RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI lines:

All the welds in the RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI lines are conservatively assumed to be fabricated using the Submerged Arc Weld (SAW) processes. The pipe material type is A376 TP316 or A403 WP316. The governing locations were established on the basis of the pipe geometry, welding process, material type, operating temperature, operating pressure, and the highest faulted stresses at the welds.

Table 5-1 shows the highest faulted stress and the corresponding weld location node for each welding process type in each segment of the RHR lines, enveloping both Surry Units 1 and 2. Definition of the piping segments and the conesponding operating pressure and temperature parameters are from Table 3-2, Table 3-3, and Figure 3-2 through Figure 3-5. Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 show the locations of the critical welds for the RHR lines.

Table 5-2 shows the highest faulted stress and the corresponding weld location node for each welding process type in each segment of the Accumulator lines, enveloping both Surry Units 1 and 2. Definition of the piping segments and the corresponding operating pressure and temperature parameters are from Table 3-4, Table 3-5, and Figure 3-6 through Figure 3-11. Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4 show the locations of the critical welds for the Accumulator lines.

Table 5-3 shows the highest faulted stress and the corresponding weld location node for each welding process type in each segment of the Loop Bypass lines, enveloping both Surry Units 1 and 2. Definition of the piping segments and the corresponding operating pressure and temperature parameters are from Table 3-6 and Figure 3-12. Figure 5-5 shows the locations of the critical welds for the Loop Bypass line.

Table 5-4 shows the highest faulted stress and the corresponding weld location node for each welding process type in each segment of the cold leg SI lines, enveloping both Surry Units 1 and 2. Definition of the piping segments and the corresponding operating pressure and temperature parameters are from Table 3-7, Table 3-8, and Figure 3-13 through Figure 3-18. Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7 show the locations of the critical welds for the cold leg SI lines.

Table 5-5 shows the highest faulted stress and the corresponding weld location node for each welding process type in each segment of the hot leg SI lines, enveloping both Surry Units 1 and 2. Definition of the Critical Locations WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 5-2 piping segments and the corresponding operating pressure and temperature parameters are from Table 3-9, Table 3-10, and Figure 3-19 through Figure 3-24. Figure 5-8 and Figure 5-9 show the locations of the critical welds for the hot leg SI lines.

Table 5-1 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR Lines Welding Operating Operating Maximum Weld Location Segment Pipe Size Pressure Temperature Faulted Stress Process (psig)

(OF)

(psi)

Node RHRs-1 14-inch SAW 2235 609.1 12403 Node 18 RHRs-11 (Unit 1)

RHRr2-I 10-inch SAW 660 350.0 15641 Node 410 RHRr3-I (Unit 2, Loop 2)

Table 5-2 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Surry Units 1 and 2 Accumulator Lines Segment Pipe Size ACC-1 12-inch ACC-11 12-inch ACC-III 12-inch Critical Locations WCAP-18491-NP Welding Operating Process Pressure (psig)

SAW 2235 SAW 660 SAW 660 Operating Maximum Temperature Faulted Stress (OF)

(psi) 543.0 15833 350.0 11918 120.0 6084 Weld Location Node Node 10 (Unit 2, Loop 1)

Node 210 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

Node 3020 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 5-3 Table 5-3 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Surry Units 1 and 2 Loop Bypass Lines Welding Operating Operating Maximum Weld Location Segment Pipe Size Process Pressure Temperature Faulted Stress Node (psig)

(OF)

(psi)

BP-I 8-inch SAW 2235 609.1 16209 250 BP-II 8-inch SAW 2235 543.0 14292 305 Table 5-4 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Surry Units 1 and 2 Cold Leg SI Lines Welding Operating Operating Maximum Weld Location Segment Pipe Size Pressure Temperature Faulted Stress Process (psig)

(OF)

(psi)

Node SI-CL-I 6-inch SAW 2235 543.0 19936 5

(Unit 1, Loop 2)

SI-CL-II 6-inch SAW 2520 40.0 26904 225 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

Table 5-5 Critical Analysis Location for Leak-Before-Break of Surry Units 1 and 2 Hot Leg SI Lines Welding Operating Operating Maximum Weld Location Segment Pipe Size Pi*essure Temperature Faulted Stress Process (psig)

(OF)

(psi)

Node SI-HL-1 6-inch SAW 2235 609.l 18750 600 (Unit 2, Loop 1)

SI-HL-II 6-inch SAW 2520 40.0 14144 155 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

Critical Locations WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Loop 1 Hot Leg Critical location for RHRs-I and RHRs-II 14" -RH-1-1502 32 33 28 29 30 MOV-1701 39 40 Figure 5-1 Critical Locations for RHR Suction Lines - Segments RHRs-1 and RHRs-11 5-4 Critical Locations December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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Loop2 12" Accum 12"-SI-24 10-C48 47o WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Critical location for RHRr2-I and RHRr3-I 42 5-5 Loop 3 12" Accumulator 12"-Sl-247-1502 Figure 5-2 Critical Locations for RHR Return Lines - Segments RHRr2-I and RHRr3-I Critical Locations December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Critical location for ACC-J Figure 5-3 Critical Locations for Accumulator Lines - Segment ACC-1 5-6 Critical Locations December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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WE1Y fHJECTION ACCUMULATOR WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 1?"* RC* 323

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Critical location for BP-I WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 5-8 Critical location for BP-II Figure 5-5 Critical Locations for Loop Bypass Lines - Segments BP-I and BP-II Critical Locations December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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- - This record was final approved on 12/11/2019 2:15:27 PM. (This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 5-12

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 6-1 6.0 LEAK RATE PREDICTIONS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this section is to discuss the method which is used to predict the flow through postulated through-wall cracks and present the leak rate calculation results for through-wall circumferential cracks.

6.2 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS The flow of hot pressurized water through an opening to a lower back pressure causes flashing which can result in choking. For long channels where the ratio of the channel length, L, to hydraulic diameter, DH, (L/DH) is greater than [

6.3 CALCULATION METHOD The basic method used in the leak rate calculations is the method developed by [

For a postulated through wall flaw, with the flaw length defined in the circumferential direction, the flow rate was calculated in the following manner. Figure 6-1 (from Reference 6-2) was used to estimate the critical pressure, Pc, for the piping fluid enthalpy condition and an assumed leakage flow rate through the postulated through wall flaw at each analysis location. Once Pc was found for a given mass flow, the

[

]a,c,e was found from Figure 6-2 (taken from Reference 6-2). For all cases considered, [

]a,c,e therefore, this method will yield the two-phase pressure drop due to momentum effects as illustrated in Figure 6-3, where Po is the operating pressure. Now using the assumed flow rate, G, the frictional pressure drop can be calculated using (6-1) where the friction factor f is determined using the [

]a,c,e The crack relative roughness, E, was obtained from fatigue crack data on stainless steel samples. The relative roughness value used in these calculations was [

]a,c,e The frictional pressure drop using Equation 6-1 is then calculated for the assumed flow rate and added to the [

]a,c,e to obtain the total pressure drop from the primary system to the atmosphere.

That is, for the auxiliary piping systems:

Absolute Pressure - 14.7 = [

Leak Rate Predictions WCAP-18491-NP

]a,c,e (6-2)

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 6-2 for a given assumed flow rate G. If the right-hand side of Equation 6-2 does not agree with the pressure difference between the piping system and the atmosphere, then the procedure is repeated until Equation 6-2 is satisfied to within an acceptable tolerance which in turn leads to a flow rate value for a given crack size.

For the single phase cases with lower temperature, leakage rate is calculated by the following equation (Reference 6-4) with the crack opening area obtained by the method from Reference 6-3.

Q = A (2gf..P/kp)°-5 ft3/sec; (6-3) where, t-.P = pressure difference between stagnation and back pressure (lbf/ft2), g = acceleration of gravity (ft/sec2), p = fluid density at atmospheric pressure (lb/ft3), k = friction loss including passage loss, inlet and outlet of the through-wall crack, A= crack opening area (ft2).

6.4 LEAK RATE CALCULATIONS Leak rate calculations were made as a function of crack length at the governing locations previously identified in Section 5.1. The normal operating loads ofTable 3-14 through Table 3-39 (for Units 1 and 2) were applied in these calculations.

The crack opening areas were estimated using the method of Reference 6-3 and the leak rates were calculated using the formulation described above. The material prope1iies of Section 4.2 (see Table 4-1) were used for these calculations.

The flaw sizes to yield a leak rate of 10 gpm were calculated at the governing locations and are given in Table 6-1 for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Surge lines and in Table 6-2 for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI lines. The flaw sizes, so determined, are called leakage flaw sizes.

The Surry Units 1 and 2 RCS pressure boundary leak detection system meets the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.45 and meets a leak detection capability of 1.0 gpm. Thus, to satisfy the margin of 10 on the leak rate, the flaw sizes (leakage flaw sizes) are dete1mined which yield a leak rate of 10 gpm.

6.5 REFERENCES

6-1

[

]a,c,e 6-2 M. M. El-Wakil, "Nuclear Heat Transport, International Textbook Company," New York, N.Y, 1971.

6-3 Tada, H., "The Effects of Shell Corrections on Stress Intensity Factors and the Crack Opening Area of Circumferential and a Longitudinal Through-Crack in a Pipe," Section II-1, NUREG/CR-3464, September 1983.

6-4 Crane, D. P., "Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance Coefficient," Flow of Fluids through Valves, Fittings, and Pipe by the Engineering Division of Crane, 1981, Technical Paper No. 410.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 6-3 Table 6-1 Flaw Sizes Yielding a Leak Rate of 10 gpm for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Lines Welding Weld Location Load Analysis Leakage Flaw Pipe Size Process Node Case Temperature Size (OF)

(in)

A

[

4.12 12-inch SMAW 409 B

2.80 A

4.12 12-inch SAW 410 2.96 B

A 3.48 12-inch SAW 425 3.05 B

A 4.87 12-inch SMAW 455 4.11 B

A 2.61 12-inch SAW 473 2.69 B

A 3.17 14-inch SMAW 480

]a,c,e 3.25 B

Note:

See Table 3-12 for definition of the normal operation loading cases.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 6-4 Table 6-2 Flaw Sizes Yielding a Leak Rate of 10 gpm for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI Lines Analysis Leakage Flaw Welding Weld Location Segment Pipe Size Process Node Temperature Size RHRs-I RHRs-II RHRr2-I RHRr3-I ACC-1 ACC-II ACC-III BP-I BP-II SI-CL-I SI-CL-II SI-HL-1 SI-HL-II Leak Rate Predictions WCAP-18491-NP 14-inch SAW IO-inch SAW 12-inch SAW 12-inch SAW 12-inch SAW 8-inch SAW 8-inch SAW 6-inch SAW 6-inch SAW 6-inch SAW 6-inch SAW Node 18 (Unit 1)

Node 410 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

Node 10 (Unit 2, Loop 1)

Node 210 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

Node 3020 (Unit 2, Loop 2) 250 305 5

(Unit 1, Loop 2) 225 (Unit 2, Loop 2) 600 (Unit 2, Loop 1) 155 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

(OF) 609.1 350.0 543.0 350.0 120.0 609.1 543.0 543.0 40.0 609.1 40.0 (in) 5.34 4.04 5.09 6.21 9.07 3.17 3.64 2.37 2.70 3.33 3.45 December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 6-5 a,c,e STAGNATION ENTHALPY no2 Btu/lbt Figure 6-1 Analytical Predictions of Critical Flow Rates of Steam-Water Mixtures Leak Rate Predictions December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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Figure 6-2 Leak Rate Predictions WCAP-18491-NP WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 LENGTH/DIAMETER RATIO (L/0) 1*,c,e Pressure Ratio as a Function of LID 6-6 a,c,e December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 6-7 a,c,e

[

Figure 6-3 Idealized Pressure Drop Profile Through a Postulated Crack Leak Rate Predictions December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 7-1 7.0 FRACTURE MECHANICS EVALUATION 7.1 GLOBAL FAILURE MECHANISM Determination of the conditions which lead to failure in stainless steel should be done with plastic fracture methodology because of the large amount of deformation accompanying fracture.

One method for predicting the failure of ductile material is the plastic instability method, based on traditional plastic limit load concepts, but accounting for strain hardening and taking into account the presence of a flaw. The flawed pipe is predicted to fail when the remaining net section reaches a stress level at which a plastic hinge is formed. The stress level at which this occurs is termed as the flow stress. The flow stress is generally taken as the average of the yield and ultimate tensile strength of the material at the temperature of interest.

This methodology has been shown to be applicable to ductile piping through a large number of experiments and will be used here to predict the critical flaw sizes in the auxiliary line piping. The failure criterion has been obtained by requiring equilibrium of the section containing the flaw (Figure 7-1) when loads are applied. The detailed development is provided in Appendix A for a through-wall circumferential flaw in a pipe with internal pressure, axial force, and imposed bending moments. The limit moment for such a pipe is given by:

[

]a,c,e where:

The analytical model described above accurately accounts for the piping internal pressure as well as imposed axial force as they affect the limit moment. Good agreement was found between the analytical predictions and the experimental results (Reference 7-1). For application of the limit load methodology, the material, including consideration of the configuration, must have a sufficient ductility and ductile tearing resistance to sustain the limit load.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 7-2 7.2 LOCAL FAILURE MECHANISM The local mechanism of failure is primarily dominated by the crack tip behavior in terms of crack-tip blunting, initiation, extension and finally cracks instability. The local stability will be assumed if the crack does not initiate at all. It has been accepted that the initiation toughness measured in terms of J1c from a I-integral resistance curve is a material parameter defining the crack initiation. If, for a given load, the calculated I-integral value is shown to be less than the Ire of the material, then the crack will not initiate.

Stability analysis using this approach is performed for at selected locations identified in Table 7-2.

7.3 RESULTS OF CRACK STABILITY EVALUATION A stability analysis based on limit load was performed. Welds for the auxiliary piping systems of Surry Units 1 and 2 utilize the SMAW or SAW weld processes. The "Z" c01Tection factor (References 7-2 and 7-3) are as follows:

Z = 1.15 [1.0 + 0.013 (OD-4)] for SMAW Z = 1.30 [1.0 + 0.010 (OD-4)] for SAW where OD is the outer diameter of the pipe in inches.

The Z-factors for the SMAW and SAW were calculated for the critical locations, using the pipe outer diameter (OD) for each respective weld location. The applied faulted loads of Table 3-14 through Table 3-39 (for Units 1 and 2) were increased by the Z factor and critical flaw size was calculated by flaw stability under the respective loading conditions for each governing location. Table 7-1 summarizes the results of the stability analyses based on limit load for the governing locations on Surry Units 1 and 2 Surge line.

Table 7-2 summarizes the results of the stability analyses based on limit load for the governing locations on Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI lines. For Table 7-2, the associated leakage flaw sizes (from Table 6-2) are also presented in the same table.

Additionally, elastic-plastic fracture mechanics (EPFM) I-integral analysis for through-wall circumferential crack in a cylinder is performed for select locations using the procedure in the EPRI Fracture Mechanics Handbook (Reference 7-4). Table 7-2 shows the results of this analysis.

7.4 REFERENCES

7-1 Kanninen, M. F., et. al., "Mechanical Fracture Predictions for Sensitized Stainless Steel Piping with Circumferential Cracks," EPRI NP-192, September 1976.

7-2 Standard Review Plan; Public Comment Solicited; 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures; Federal RegisterNol. 52, No. 167/Friday, August 28, 1987/Notices, pp. 32626-32633.

7-3 NUREG-0800 Revision 1, March 2007, Standard Review Plan: 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures.

7-4 Kumar, V., German, M.D. and Shih, C. P., "An Engineering Approach for Elastic-Plastic Fracture Analysis," EPRI Rep01i NP-1931, Project 123 7-1, Electric Power Research Institute, July 1981.

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 7-3 Table 7-1 Flaw Stability Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Line Based on Limit Load Welding Pipe Size Process 12-inch SMAW 12-inch SAW 12-inch SAW 12-inch SMAW 12-inch SAW 14-inch SMAW Fracture Mechanics Evaluation WCAP-18491-NP Weld Location Node 409 410 425 455 473 480 Load Analysis Case Temperature (OF)

D

[

E F

D E

F D

E F

D E

F D

E F

D E

F

]a,c,e Critical Flaw Size (in) 12.75 10.51 10.68 11.87 9.60 8.69 11.07 9.95 14.90 14.21 13.13 18.58 6.01 6.71 19.00 9.84 10.39 22.79 December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 7-4 Table 7-2 Flaw Stability Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI Lines Based on Limit Load and EPFM Welding Weld Location Segment Pipe Size Process Node RHRs-1 14-inch SAW Node 18 RHRs-Il (Unit 1)

RHRr2-I 10-inch SAW Node 410 RHRr3-I (Unit 2, Loop 2)

ACC-I 12-inch SAW Node 10 (Unit 2, Loop 1)

ACC-Il 12-inch SAW Node 210 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

ACC-III 12-inch SAW Node 3020 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

BP-I 8-inch SAW 250 BP-II 8-inch SAW 305 SI-CL-I 6-inch SAW 5

(Unit 1, Loop 2)

SI-CL-II 6-inch SAW 225 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

SI-HL-1 6-inch SAW 600 (Unit 2, Loop 1)

SI-HL-II 6-inch SAW 155 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

Note:

(1) Based on the methodology in Section 7.2 Fracture Mechanics Evaluation WCAP-18491-NP Critical Flaw Size (in) 15.85 12.15 12.97 16.28 20.69 8.80 9.43 6.10 5.41(1) 6.66(!)

7.84 Leakage Flaw Size (in) 5.34 4.04 5.09 6.21 9.07 3.17 3.64 2.37 2.70 3.33 3.45 December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 Figure 7-1

[

Fracture Mechanics Evaluation WCAP-18491-NP Neutral Axis

]a,c,c Stress Distribution 7-5 December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-1

8.0 ASSESSMENT

OF FATIGUE CRACK GROWTH The fatigue crack growth (FCG) analysis is not a requirement for the demonstration ofLBB (see References 8-1 and 8-2) since the LBB analysis is based on the postulation of a through-wall flaw, whereas the FCG analysis is performed based on a postulated surface flaw. In addition, Reference 8-3 has indicated that, "the Commission deleted the fatigue crack growth analysis in the proposed rule. This requirement was found to be unnecessary because it was bounded by the crack stability analysis."

While not an explicit requirement, FCG evaluations have historically been included with the documentation for demonstrating LBB for RCL and auxiliary piping systems. These FCG analyses are presented as a defense-in-depth justification in relation to other LBB criteria. Specifically; Degradation related to cyclic fatigue: An FCG evaluation supplements a conventional fatigue evaluation and reinforces that small postulated surface flaws do not become through-wall flaws during the entire operating life of the piping system.

Stability of a through-wall flaw: FCG provides an assurance that a leakage flaw can be identified and addressed prior to growing to a critical flaw size. While FCG is not explicitly performed for a through-wall flaw, conelation can be drawn against the very small growth of a surface flaw over the operating life of the plant. Through this conelation, it can be justified that the growth of a through-wall leakage flaw would generally take several months, years, or even decades of operation before growing to a critical size. This demonstration reinforces that sufficient time is available for the flaw to be identified and for the plant to be shut down without any concern of rupture.

The demonstration of FCG for each of the Surry Units 1 and 2 auxiliary piping systems is established through the development of plant-specific analyses or through the use of representative generic FCG analyses. Fatigue crack growth is the only credible mechanism for crack growth, since both the weld and the base metals of the auxiliary piping systems have very low susceptibility to PWSCC.

Based on past evaluations of piping for other operating plants, the circumferential flaw evaluations bound the axial flaws.

The loading conditions, including internal blow-off pressure axial force and the conservative combination of moment loads prescribed by SRP 3.6.3 (References 8-1 and 8-2) ensure that flaw growth in the circumferential orientation is most limiting. Circumferential growth of a flaw through the weld material represents the more realistic scenario.

Fmthermore, the intention of an LBB evaluation is to justify that the double-ended guillotine type of pipe break is not a credible failure mode for the piping system. The growth of a circumferential flaw orientation is directly representative of a scenario that could result in a double-ended guillotine failure. Therefore, the evaluation of a circumferential flaw is more appropriate and conservative than an axial flaw since an axial flaw will not result in a double-ended guillotine break.

8.1 SURRY PLANT-SPECIFIC FATIGUE CRACK GROWN ASSESSMENTS To determine the sensitivity of the piping to the presence of small, circumferentially oriented, surface cracks subjected to operating transients, an FCG analysis was perfonned to suppmt the Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) program for select auxiliary piping systems at Surry Units 1 and 2; including the 14-inch Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-2 RHR suction lines, the 10-inch Accumulator lines, and the 6-inch SI lines. The crack growth for the plant-specific analyses demonstrates that small surface flaws would not develop to through-wall flaws during the extended plant operating life of 80 years.

8.1.1 Residual Heat Removal Suction Line FCG The FCG evaluation procedure for the RHR suction line uses the Surry pipe geometry (14-inch, Schedule 140) and involves postulating an initial flaw at a limiting weld location. Specifically, the weld at the outlet of the first isolation valve. Growth of the postulated flaw is predicted based on loading from a series of imposed operating transients. The transients considered for the RHR suction line are shown in Table 8-1 along with the number of cycles that each transient is expected to incur over the 80 year design life of the plant. Only one transient for the RHR suction line, RHR Operation, contributes to nearly 100% of the crack growth for the limiting FCG analysis location.

The FCG evaluation results of the 14-inch RHR suction lines are presented in Table 8-2. Beyond showing that small surface flaws would not develop to through-wall flaw, the FCG evaluation also demonstrates that the growth of a flaw will be very slow. These results suppmi the justification that flaw growth would be insignificant in between the time when leakage reaches 10 gpm and the time that the plant would be shutdown. Based on this justification, it is concluded that fatigue crack growth is not a concern for the RHR suction lines.

8.1.2 Accumulator Line FCG The FCG evaluation procedure for the Accumulator lines uses the Surry pipe geometry (12-inch, Schedule 140) and involves postulating an initial flaw at a limiting weld location. Specifically, the weld at the outlet of the nozzle on the cold leg pipe. Growth of the postulated flaw is predicted based on loading from a series of imposed operating transients. The transients considered for the Accumulator line are shown in Table 8-3 along with the number of cycles that each transient is expected to incur over the 80 year design life of the plant.

The FCG evaluation results of the 12-inchAccumulator lines are presented in Table 8-4. Beyond showing that small surface flaws would not develop to through-wall flaw, the FCG evaluation also demonstrates that the growth of a flaw will be very slow. These results support the justification that flaw growth would be insignificant in between the time when leakage reaches 10 gpm and the time that the plant would be shutdown. Based on this justification, it is concluded that fatigue crack growth is not a concern for the Accumulator lines.

8.1.3 Safety Injection Line FCG The FCG evaluation procedure for the SI lines uses the Surry pipe geometry (6-inch, Schedule 120) and involves postulating an initial flaw at a limiting weld location. Specifically, the weld at the outlet of the nozzle on the cold leg pipe. Growth of the postulated flaw is predicted based on loading from a series of imposed operating transients. The transients considered for the cold leg SI line are shown in Table 8-5 along with the number of cycles that each transient is expected to incur over the 80 year design life of the plant. The cold leg SI lines experience more severe thermal transients the than hot leg SI lines, and are more Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-3 limiting for the purpose of an FCG evaluation. As such, the FCG results from the cold leg SI line location is considered to bound the hot leg SI lines.

The FCG evaluation results of the 6-inch SI lines are presented in Table 8-6. Beyond showing that small surface flaws would not develop to through-wall flaw, the FCG evaluation also demonstrates that the growth of a flaw will be very slow. These results support the justification that flaw growth would be insignificant in between the time when leakage reaches 10 gpm and the time that the plant would be shutdown. Based on this justification, it is concluded that fatigue crack growth is not a concern for the SI lines.

8.2 REPRESENTATIVE FATIGUE CRACK GROWN ASSESSMENTS To determine the sensitivity of the remaining piping systems to the presence of small, circumferentially oriented, surface cracks subjected to operating transients, a representative FCG analysis is compared with the operating conditions of those lines at Surry Units 1 and 2; including the 12-inch Surge lines, the IO-inch RHR return lines, and the 8-inch Loop Bypass lines. The crack growth for the generic FCG analyses, as shown to be applicable to the Surry piping systems, demonstrates that small surface flaws would not develop to through-wall flaws during the extended plant operating life of 80 years.

These representative FCG evaluations are based on a generic PWR piping system design or based on the design of an operating plant with comparable design considerations. Since these representative FCG evaluations are not plant-specific to Surry Units 1 and 2, a review of the fundamental FCG evaluation input parameters is performed to identify and assess differences between the representative plant design and Suny. This comparison includes consideration of the piping geometry and material properties, operating temperature and pressure of the piping systems, operating transients for the design life of the plants, and piping loads experienced at the evaluated locations.

For each of these analysis parameters, the representative FCG evaluations are shown to be bounding or equivalent to the Surry piping systems. For instances where an input of the representative FCG evaluation is not bounding or equivalent to Surry, justification will be provided to establish that that the associated impact to the FCG evaluation and conclusions would be negligible.

The representative FCG evaluations are performed following the methodology of Section XI, Appendix A of the ASME Code. The FCG evaluations consider a set of initial flaw sizes which typically range from 10% up to 35% of the approximate pipe wall thickness. These ranges of initial flaw sizes are based on acceptance standards from Section XI of the ASME Code for flaw inspections and detectability. Although flaw detectability is not a specific consideration for the demonstration ofLBB, this same initial flaw basis is considered in this report due to the use of these representative FCG evaluations. Relative to the LBB evaluation, these ranges of initial flaw sizes are appropriate for the purpose of demonstrating that flaw growth is stable, regardless of the initial flaw size.

8.2.1 Pressurizer Surge Line FCG The representative FCG evaluation considers a 14-inch, Schedule 160 piping component, which is larger and thicker than the Surry Surge line, and utilizes a crack growth law for stainless steel material type in a PWR water environment. Using FCG results for a thicker piping geometry will be conservative with respect to Surry since the thermal stresses are higher for a thicker pipe. Thermal stresses driven by stratification dominate FCG for the surge line piping. Due to similarities in the piping geometry and line configuration, Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-4 the Surry Surge line normal operating piping loads ( e.g., deadweight and thermal expansion forces and moments) and the associated stresses are similar to the loads and stresses from typical analyses of PWR Surge line piping systems. Based on this comparison of piping loads and stresses, it is determined that the pipe loadings considered in the representative FCG evaluation are appropriate for the estimation ofFCG in the Surry Surge lines.

The operating conditions for the representative Surge line are evaluated at a temperature of [

]8,c,e and an internal pressure of 2235 psi. The respective operating parameters for the Surry Surge lines are a temperature of [

]a,c,e and an internal pressure of 2235 psi. The operating pressure values are equivalent and the difference in temperature will have an insignificant impact on the FCG results.

The operating transient set and applicable operating cycles considered for the representative Surge line FCG evaluation are shown in Table 8-7. Comparatively, Table 8-7 also shows the set of transients which have been projected for the Surry Surge lines for the 80 year design life of the plant. It is noted that the transients of the representative FCG evaluation may have slightly fewer cycles for the higher /1 T ranges, the total cycles of stratification greatly outweigh the Surry transient set. While Table 8-7 only identifies the stratification /1 T cycles, the generic FCG analysis also includes the full set of standard RCS design transients which are also representative of Surry. Surge line FCG is dominated by the stratification transients. As such, the transients and cycles for the representative FCG evaluation are applicable to the Suny Surge lines for the 80 year design life.

The FCG evaluation results of the representative Surge line are presented in Table 8-8. Beyond showing that small surface flaws would not develop to through-wall flaw, the FCG evaluation also demonstrates that the growth of a flaw will be ve1y slow. These results support the justification that flaw growth would be insignificant in between the time when leakage reaches 10 gpm and the time that the plant would be shutdown. Based on this justification, it is concluded that fatigue crack growth is not a concern for the Suny Surge lines.

8.2.2 Residual Heat Removal Return Line FCG The representative FCG evaluation considers a 10-inch, Schedule 140 ptpmg component, which is consistent with the Surry RHR return line, and utilizes a crack growth law for stainless steel material type in a PWR water environment. The generic analysis actually considered a location on a typical Accumulator piping system, but this is considered to be representative since the Surry RHR return lines are connected to the Accumulator lines and will experience loads and transients which are similar to the Aiccumulator line.

Due to similarities in the, piping geometry and line configuration, the Suny RHR return line normal operating piping loads (e.g., deadweight and thermal expansion forces and moments) and the associated stresses are similar to the loads and stresses from that analysis of the typical Accumulator line. Based on this comparison of piping loads and stresses, it is determined that the pipe loadings considered in the representative FCG evaluation are appropriate for the estimation ofFCG in the Surry RHR return lines.

The operating conditions for the representative Accumulator line FCG analysis are evaluated at a temperature of 558°F and an internal pressure of 2285 psi. The respective operating parameters for the Surry RHR return lines are a temperature of 350°F and an internal pressure of 660 psi. The operating conditions of the representative analysis are significantly bounding and will result in conservative flaw growth estimations.

Assessment ofFatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-5 The operating transient set and applicable operating cycles considered for the representative FCG evaluation are shown in Table 8-9. Comparatively, Table 8-9 also shows the set of transients which have been projected for the Surry RHR return lines for the 80 year design life of the plant. It is noted that crack growth for representative analysis is dominated by the transients which include actuation of the Accumulator, SI, or RHR systems. The Surry SI lines are not attached the to Accumulator or RHR return line piping, and SI actuation transients cannot affect the RHR return line. As such, the Surry transients in Table 8-9 only consider events involving actuation of the Accumulator or RHR systems. The generic FCG analysis also includes the set of standard RCS design transients which are also representative of Surry.

Since FCG is dominated by the transients with actuation of the Accumulator, SI, or RHR system any difference in the remaining RCS transients would have a negligible impact on the resulting crack growth.

As such, the transients and cycles for the representative FCG evaluation are applicable to the Surry RHR return lines for the 80 year design life.

The FCG evaluation results representing the RHR return line are presented in Table 8-10. Beyond showing that small surface flaws would not develop to through-wall flaw, the FCG evaluation also demonstrates that the growth of a flaw will be very slow. These results support the justification that flaw growth would be insignificant in between the time when leakage reaches 10 gpm and the time that the plant would be shutdown. Based on this justification, it is concluded that fatigue crack growth is not a concern for the Suny RHR return lines.

8.2.3 Loop Bypass Line FCG A generic FCG evaluation is not readily available for a typical Loop Bypass line. The concern for crack growth in these 8-inch segments is addressed through comparison to the FCG analysis of SI line piping, presented in Section 8.1.3 of this report. While the Surry Loop Bypass line is 8-inch Schedule 120 piping, the SI line is 6-inch Schedule 120. The smaller and thinner SI line piping is conservatively bounding of the Loop Bypass line with respect to mechanical load stresses.

As discerned from Figure 3-12, the configuration of the Loop Bypass piping precludes significant thermal stresses. With the Loop Bypass line valve closed during normal plant operations, the coolant temperature in the Loop Bypass line can only fluctuate along with the respective temperatures of the hot leg and cold leg piping. The Loop Bypass line segments between the RCL and the Loop Bypass line isolation valve will change very slowly due to nominal turbulent penetration and buoyancy convection as transients occur in the RCL piping. Since these effects are gradual, the associated thermal stresses during RCL transients will be negligible. The Loop Bypass lines may be operated during the shutdown process, but it is not expected that there would be any considerable thermal shock effects due to actuating flow through the Loop Bypass line piping because the Loop Bypass lines would already be at or near the operating conditions of the RCL piping.

By a comparison of the piping loads during normal operation and during a faulted event, it can be seen that the limiting loads and stresses acting on the SI line piping are more severe than the most limiting location on the Loop Bypass line piping. Additionally, the thermal transient stresses considered for the FCG evaluation of the SI lines are significantly more severe than any thermal loading experienced by the Loop Bypass line piping. As such, it is justified that the potential for FCG in the Loop Bypass lines are bounded by the FCG evaluation for the SI lines.

Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth W CAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

- - ~LO ______ _, oo,nn,, __, nnnrnHon nn 1?/11/?()H:J ?*1/i:27 PM. /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-6 As concluded in Section 8.1.3 and Table 8-6, beyond showing that small surface flaws would not develop to through-wall flaw, the FCG evaluation also demonstrates that the growth of a flaw will be very slow.

These results support the justification that flaw growth would be insignificant in between the time when leakage reaches 10 gpm and the time that the plant would be shutdown. Based on this justification, it is concluded that fatigue crack growth is not a concern for the Loop Bypass lines.

8.3 REFERENCES

8-1 Standard Review Plan; Public Comment Solicited; 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures; Federal RegisterNol. 52, No. 167/Friday, August 28, 1987/Notices, pp. 32626-32633.

8-2 NUREG-0800 Revision 1, March 2007, Standard Review Plan: 3.6.3 Leak-Before-Break Evaluation Procedures.

8-3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 10 CFR 50, Modification of General Design Criteria 4 Requirements for Protection Against Dynamic Effects of Postulated Pipe Ruptures, Final Rule, Federal RegisterNol.

52, No. 207/Tuesday, October 27, 1987/Rules and Regulations, pp. 41288-41295.

Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

-.J ***--,, __, ---M.. nrl nn 1')/11 /')n1Q ?*1<;*?7 PM /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-7 Table 8-1 80 Year Design Transients for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR Suction Lines Transient Name Cycles RHR Operation 200 Seismic (Operating Basis Earthquake) 50 Table 8-2 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR Suction Lines Maximum Allowable Initial Flaw Final Flaw Allowable End-of-Operating Period Size (a/t)

Size (a/t)

Evaluation Flaw Size (a/t)

(yrs)

[

]a,c,e Note: alt is the ratio of the flaw depth (a) to the pipe wall thickness (t)

Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0 r - -*

, -~ <0 M * '"'11 a ?*1 t;*?7 PM /This,,st;itement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-8 Table 8-3 80 Year Design Transients for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Accumulator Lines Transient Name Individual Total Cycles Cycles Unit Loading at 5%/min 13200 Unit Unloading at 5%/min 13200 10% Step Load Increase 2000 10% Step Load Decrease 2000 Feedwater Cycling 2000 Loop out of Service - Startup 80 Cold Leg Loop out of Service - Shutdown 70 33210 Group 1 Patiial Loss of Flow 80 Reactor Trip No Cooldown 230 Inadvertent Startup of Inactive Loop 10 Control Rod Drop 80 Inadvertent SI Actuation 60 Large Step Load Decrease with Steam Dump 200 Cold Leg Loss of Load 80 80 Group 2 Heatup / Cooldown 200 Loss of Power 40 Cold Leg Reactor Trip Cooldown No SI 160 410 Group 3 SmallLOCA 5

Complete Loss of Flow 5

Reactor Trip Cooldown with SI 10 Cold Leg Small Steam Break 5

65 Group 4 Excessive Feedwater Flow 30 Inadve1ient RCS Depressurization 20 Cold Leg Turbine Roll Test 21 21 Group 5 SI Accumulator Nozzle Safety Injection 5

5 Depress Inadve1ient RCS Depressurization 20 20 Seismic Operating Basis Eaiihquake 50 50 Zero Zero 200 200 RHR RHRReturn 200 200 Note: The 20 cycles oflnadvertent RCS Depressurization included in Cold Leg Group 4 models the transient effects in the Cold Leg piping. The separate 20 cycles oflnadvertent RCS Depressurization (labeled as Depress) model the Accumulator line actuation during an Inadvertent RCS Depressurization event.

Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-9 Table 8-4 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Accumulator Lines Maximum Allowable Initial Flaw Final Flaw Allowable End-of-Operating Period Size (a/t)

Size (alt)

Evaluation Flaw Size (a/t)

(yrs)

[

]a,c,e Note: alt is the ratio of the flaw depth (a) to the pipe wall thickness (t)

Table 8-5 80 Year Design Transients for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Cold Leg SI Lines Transient Name Individual Total Cycles Cycles Unit Loading at 5%/min 18300 Unit Unloading at 5%/min 18300 Cold Leg 10% Step Load Increase 2000 40880 Group 1 10% Step Load Decrease 2000 Patiial Loss of Flow 80 Step Load Reduction from 100% to 50%

200 Cold Leg Loss of Load 80 80 Group 2 Cold Leg Heatup / Cooldown 200 240 Group 3 Loss of Power 40 Cold Leg Reactor Trip Cooldown with SI 400 400 Group 4 Cold Leg Turbine Roll Test 10 10 Group 5 HHSI High-Head Safety Injection 50 50 Seismic Operating Basis Eatihquake 50 50 Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

,., -~ a 011 * '""1 a 0-1&;*?7 PM /Thi<> <>IFilement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-10 Table 8-6 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 SI Lines Maximum Allowable Initial Flaw Final Flaw Allowable End-of-Size (a/t)

Size (a/t)

Evaluation Flaw Operating Period Size (a/t)

(yrs)

[

]a,c,e Note: alt is the ratio of the flaw depth (a) to the pipe wall thickness (t)

Table 8-7 Comparison of the Representative Surge Line FCG Transient Set with the 80 Year Design Transients for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Surge Lines Stratification Representative FCG Surry Units 1 and 2 AT Range AT Cycles Total AT Cycles (OF)

(OF)

Cycles (OF) 345 2

2:340 343 2

8 340 13 342 4

337 2

2: 330 332 2

6 330 12 331 2

2: 320 329 2

2 320 32 2: 310 n/a 0

0 310 57 2: 300 304 116 116 300 88 2: 280 n/a 0

0 280 71 2: 260 275 495 495 260 67 2: 240 250 2849 2849 240 60

<240 150-200 22633 22633 n/a 0

Assessment ofFatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 8-11 Table 8-8 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Surge Lines Initial Flaw Final Flaw Allowable Depth (in)

Depth (a/t)

Opera ting Period (yrs)

[

]a,c,e Table 8-9 Comparison of the Representative Accumulator Line FCG Transient Set with the 80 Year Design Transients for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR Return Lines Transient Name Cycles Representative FCG Surry Units 1 and 2 High Head Safety Injection 110 n/a Inadve1ient Accumulator Actuation 4

4 Inadve1ient RCS Depressurization 20 20 RHR Operation During Refueling 80 80 RHR Operation During Plant Cooldown 200 200 Accumulator Actuation, Accident Operation 21 n/a Table 8-10 Fatigue Crack Growth Results for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR Return Lines Initial Flaw Final Flaw Allowable Depth (in)

Depth (a/t)

Operating Period (yrs)

[

]a,c,e Assessment of Fatigue Crack Growth WCAP-18491-NP December 20 I 9 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 9-1

9.0 ASSESSMENT

OF MARGINS The results of the leak rates of Section 6.4 and the corresponding stability evaluations of Section 7.3 are used in performing the assessment of margins. Margins for the governing locations are shown in Table 9-1 for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Surge lines and Table 9-2 for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI lines. All the LBB recommended margins are satisfied.

In summary, margins at the critical locations are relative to:

1.

Flaw Size - Using faulted loads obtained by the absolute sum method, a margin of2 or more exists between the critical flaw and the flaw having a leak rate of 10 gpm (the leakage flaw).

2.

Leak Rate - A margin of 10 exists between the calculated leak rate from the leakage flaw and the plant leak detection capability of 1.0 gpm.

3.

Loads - At the critical locations the leakage flaw was shown to be stable using the faulted loads obtained by the absolute sum method (i.e., a flaw twice the leakage flaw size is shown to be stable; hence the leakage flaw size is stable). A margin of 1 on loads using the absolute summation of faulted load combinations is satisfied.

Assessment of Margins WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 9-2 Table 9-1 Leakage Flaw Sizes, Critical Flaw Sizes, and Margin for the Surry Units 1 and 2 Pressurizer Surge Line Welding Pipe Size Process 12-inch SMAW 12-inch SAW 12-inch SAW 12-inch SMAW 12-inch SAW 14-inch SMAW Assessment of Margins WCAP-18491-NP Weld Location Node 409 410 425 455 473 480 Load Case AID AIF BIE BIF AID AIF BIE BIF AID AIF BIE BIF AID AIF BIE BIF AID AIF BIE BIF AID AIF BIE BIF Critical Flaw Size (in) 12.75 10.68 10.51 10.68 11.87 8.69 9.60 8.69 11.07 14.90 9.95 14.90 14.21 18.58 13.13 18.58 6.01 19.00 6.71 19.00 9.84 22.79 10.39 22.79 Leakage Flaw Size (in) 4.12 4.12 2.80 2.80 4.12 4.12 2.96 2.96 3.48 3.48 3.05 3.05 4.87 4.87 4.11 4.11 2.61 2.61 2.69 2.69 3.17 3.17 3.25 3.25 Margin 3.10 2.59 3.75 3.81 2.88 2.11 3.24 2.94 3.18 4.28 3.26 4.88 2.92 3.81 3.19 4.52 2.30 7.28 2.49 7.06 3.11 7.19 3.20 7.01 December 2019 Revision 0

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WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 9-3 Table 9-2 Leakage Flaw Sizes, Critical Flaw Sizes, and Margin for the Surry Units 1 and 2 RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass, and SI Lines Welding Weld Location Critical Flaw Leakage Flaw Segment Pipe Size Process Node Size Size (in)

(in)

RHRs-I 14-inch SAW Node 18 15.85 5.34 RHRs-II (Unit 1)

RHRr2-I 10-inch SAW Node 410 12.15 4.04 RHRr3-I (Unit 2, Loop 2)

ACC-I 12-inch SAW Node 10 12.97 5.09 (Unit 2, Loop 1)

ACC-II 12-inch SAW Node 210 16.28 6.21 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

ACC-III 12-inch SAW Node 3020 20.69 9.07 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

BP-I 8-inch SAW 250 8.80 3.17 BP-II 8-inch SAW 305 9.43 3.64 SI-CL-I 6-inch SAW 5

6.10 2.37 (Unit 1, Loop 2)

SI-CL-II 6-inch SAW 225 5.41 2.70 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

SI-HL-I 6-inch SAW 600 6.66 3.33 (Unit 2, Loop 1)

SI-HL-II 6-inch SAW 155 7.84 3.45 (Unit 2, Loop 2)

Note:

(1) Margin of2.0 is demonstrated based on the methodology in Section 7.2 Assessment of Margins WCAP-18491-NP Margin 2.97 3.01 2.55 2.62 2.28 2.78 2.59 2.57

>2.0<1)

>2.0 (l) 2.27 December 2019 Revision 0

" * -**---*.., -- ""M *,,,n1 ° 'J*1 <;*?7 PM /This statement was added by the PRIME system upon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 10-1

10.0 CONCLUSION

S This repmijustifies the elimination of postulated line breaks from the structural design basis for Surry Units l and 2 for the Pressurizer Surge lines, RHR lines, Accumulator lines, Loop Bypass lines, and Safety Injection lines as follows:

a.

Stress corrosion cracking is precluded by use of fracture resistant materials in the piping system and controls on reactor coolant chemistry, temperature, pressure, and flow during normal operation.

Note: Alloy 82/182 welds do not exist at the Surry Units l and 2 Surge, RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass and SI lines.

b.

Water hammer should not occur in the Surge, RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass and SI line piping because of system design, testing, and operational considerations.

c.

The effects of low and high cycle fatigue on the integrity of the Surge, RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass and SI line piping are negligible.

d.

Ample margin exists between the leak rate of small stable flaws and the capability of the Surry Units l and 2 reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage detection systems.

e.

Ample margin exists between the small stable flaw sizes of item ( d) and larger stable flaws.

f.

Ample margin exists in the material properties used to demonstrate stability of the critical flaws.

For the critical locations, postulated flaws will be stable because of the ample margins described in d, e, and fabove.

Based on loading, pipe geometry, welding process, and material properties considerations, enveloping critical (governing) locations were determined at which Leak-Before-Break crack stability evaluations were made. Through-wall flaw sizes were postulated which would cause a leak at a rate of ten (10) times the leakage detection system capability of the plant. Large margins for such flaw sizes were demonstrated against flaw instability. Finally, fatigue crack growth assessment was shown not to be an issue for the Surge, RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass and SI line piping. Therefore, the Leak-Before-Break conditions and margins are satisfied for Surry Units 1 and 2 Surge, RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass and SI line piping.

It is demonstrated that the dynamic effects of the pipe rupture resulting from postulated breaks in the Surge, RHR, Accumulator, Loop Bypass and SI line piping need not be considered in the structural design basis of Suny Units l and 2.

Conclusions WCAP-18491-NP December 2019 Revision 0

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Appendix A: Limit Moment WCAP-18491-NP WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 APPENDIXA: LIMITMOMENT

] a,c,e A-1 December 2019 Revision 0 n

1 r-r\\"7 nt A

/Thin 1-1-

nnf \\Al" :IC" -:irlrlorl h\\/ thA PRIMF R.V~tP.m uoon its validation)

WESTINGHOUSE NON-PROPRIETARY CLASS 3 A-2 d) r.i.---------------------------.

<1' Figure A-1 Pipe with a Through-Wall Crack in Bending Appendix A: Limit Moment December 2019 WCAP-18491-NP Revision 0 11t- :

1 1

1 r1r1 r1 hu fho DDl"-1H:::: c-\\lc-fom 11nnn it~ \\l:::llirl:::1tinn)

Serial No.20-091 Docket Nos. 50-280/281 WESTINGHOUSE DOCUMENT CAW-19-4984 INCLUDING AFFIDAVIT, PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE, AND COPYRIGHT NOTICE Virginia Electric and Power Company (Dominion Energy Virginia)

Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2

Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 AFFIDAVIT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA:

COUNTY OF BUTLER:

CA W-19-4984 Page 1 of 3 (1)

I, Zachary S. Harper, have been specifically delegated and authorized to apply for withholding and execute this Affidavit on behalf of Westinghouse Electric Company LLC (Westinghouse).

(2)

I am requesting the proprietary portions ofWCAP-18491-P Rev O be withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.390.

(3)

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(4)

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the information sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld.

(i)

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(ii)

Public disclosure of this proprietary information is likely to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of Westinghouse because it would enhance the ability of competitors to provide similar technical evaluation justifications and licensing defense services for commercial power reactors without commensurate expenses.

Also, public disclosure of the information would enable others to use the information to meet NRC requirements for licensing documentation without purchasing the right to use the information.

Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 AFFIDAVIT CA W-19-4984 Page 2 of3 (5)

Westinghouse has policies in place to identify proprietary information. Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several types, the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential competitive advantage, as follows:

( a)

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(b)

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( c)

Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of quality, or licensing a similar product.

( d)

It reveals cost or price information, production capacities, budget levels, or commercial strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers.

( e)

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(f)

It contains patentable ideas, for which patent protection may be desirable.

(6)

The attached documents are bracketed and marked to indicate the bases for withholding. The justification for withholding is indicated in both versions by means of lower case letters ( a) through (f) located as a superscript immediately following the brackets enclosing each item of information being identified as proprietary or in the margin opposite such information. These lower case letters

Westinghouse Non-Proprietary Class 3 AFFIDAVIT CAW-19-4984 Page 3 of 3 refer to the types of information Westinghouse customarily holds in confidence identified in Sections (5)(a) through (f) of this Affidavit.

I declare that the averments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executedon, 12/itfzot?

~

~Harper.Manager Licensing Engineering

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION NOTICE Transmitted herewith are proprietary and non-proprietary versions of a document, furnished to the NRC in connection with requests for generic and/or plant-specific review and approval.

In order to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.390 of the Commission's regulations concerning the protection of proprietary information so submitted to the NRC, the information which is proprieta1y in the proprietary versions is contained within brackets, and where the proprietary information has been deleted in the non-proprietary versions, only the brackets remain (the information that was contained within the brackets in the proprietary versions having been deleted).

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Text

SUMMARY

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.3 Precedents

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 CONCLUSION

SUMMARY

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

4.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

4.3 Precedents

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

6.0 CONCLUSION

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.3 REFERENCES

2.5 REFERENCES

3.5 REFERENCES

6.1 INTRODUCTION

6.5 REFERENCES

7.4 REFERENCES

8.0 ASSESSMENT

8.3 REFERENCES

9.0 ASSESSMENT

10.0 CONCLUSION

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